Tag: California

California To Expand Its Data Breach Notification Rules

Sheppard Mullin Law Firm

California has broadened its data breach notification statutes in response to the increasing number of large data breaches of customer information.  AB 1710, which Governor Jerry Brown signed into law, amends California’s Data Breach Notification Law to (1) ban the sale, advertising for sale or offering for sale of social security numbers, (2) extend the existing data-security law and obligations applicable to entities that own or license customer information to entities that “maintain” the information, and (3) require that if the person or business providing notification of a breach under the statute was the source of the breach then the notice must include an offer to provide appropriate identity theft prevention and mitigation services, if any, at no cost for 12 months along with any information necessary to take advantage of the offer.  The last of these amendments has spurned some debate over whether the statute actually mandates an offer of credit monitoring or other services given its use of the phrase “if any.”  It is also unclear what exactly is intended by or who qualifies as “the source of the breach.”

The use and placement of the phrase “if any” in the statute does create some ambiguity.  The statute, however, speaks in mandatory terms when it states the notification “shall include” an offer of these services.  Its plain language also suggests the phrase “if any” is directed to the question of whether appropriate identity theft or mitigation services exist and are available – not whether or not they must be offered.  A review of the measure’s legislative history confirms this.  The Committee analyses all discuss this element of the statute as “requiring” an offer of services.  Indeed, the legislative analysis immediately following the addition of the phrase “if any” defined the problem under existing law to be that it does not require any prevention or mitigation steps and states that this measure (AB 1710) addresses this issue by requiring an offer of appropriate “identity theft prevention and mitigation services, if any are available,…”  This interpretation is also consistent with the fact that an offer is only required when the breach involves disclosure of highly sensitive information that tends to lead to identity theft or credit card fraud, i.e., the customer’s social security, driver’s license or California identification number.

The standard of whether or not such services would, to some degree, be appropriate will not likely be the primary conversation that this amendment sparks.  The more lively topic will likely be who is the “source of the breach” (and even then the offer is only required when you are both the source of the breach and the party giving notice under the statute) and what standards apply for determining “appropriate” services.  The legislative history is not as equally helpful on these questions.  Thus, until the scope of this new requirement becomes more clear, businesses involved in a breach under the statute need to carefully think through the risks of offering certain services when providing notice.

These new rules take effect on January 1, 2015.  To review the amended statute or its legislative history click here.

ARTICLE BY

Brian R. Blackman
OF
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

California Class Action Suit Alleges LinkedIn Violated Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) By Providing Employers With Reference Reports

Allen Matkins Law Firm

Another interesting case filed in California recently highlights the myriad risks employers face when using social media as part of their hiring process.

A class action lawsuit was filed in the Central District of California against LinkedIn based on allegations that thereference reports LinkedIn generates for premium subscribers, including many employers, violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act(“FCRA”). According to the plaintiffs in Sweet, et. al. v. LinkedIn Corporation, an employer who is a premium subscriber can generate a report containing the names, locations, employment areas, current employers, and current positions of all persons in a user’s network who may have worked with a job applicant and also contact the applicant’s “references.” An employer, according to the allegations, can run such a “reference report” on a job applicant without the applicant receiving any notification whatsoever. Thus, as the complaint alleges, “any potential employer can anonymously dig into the employment history of any LinkedIn member, and make hiring and firing decisions based upon the information they gather, without the knowledge of the member, and without any safeguards in place as to the accuracy of the information that the potential employer has obtained.” The complaint claims this activity potentially violates both the FCRA’s purposes, which include safeguards as to the accuracy, fairness, and privacy of the information that a potential employer obtains, and the FCRA’s customer notification requirements.

This latest lawsuit against LinkedIn serves as another example of the complex legal issues and risks that an employer faces when using social media to make recruiting and hiring decisions.

© 2010-2014 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP
ARTICLE BY

Alexander Nestor
Nisha Verma
OF
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

California Law Protects Unpaid Interns and Volunteers from Harassment and Discrimination

Jackson Lewis Law firm

California has become the third state in the country, after New York and Oregon, to ban sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace directed toward unpaid interns.

The new law (AB 1443) extends workplace harassment and discrimination protections under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) to unpaid interns, volunteers, and individuals in apprenticeship training programs. It will go into effect January 1, 2015.

The new law amends current law (Government Code section 12940(c) and (j)) to make it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against or to harass an unpaid intern or volunteer on the basis of any legally protected classification unless an exception applies, such as a bona fide occupational qualification.

The following classifications are protected in California: race, religious creed, religious observance, color, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, national origin, ancestry, marital status, medical condition as defined by applicable state law, disability, genetic information, military service, military and veteran status, pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions. Employers should consider reviewing their policies for compliance with the recent changes in California law.

ARTICLE BY

Jonathan A. Siegel
OF
Jackson Lewis P.C.

New Ridesharing Legislation in California and Oregon Highlights Insurance Uncertainty in Emerging Industries

Proskauer Law firm

Managing a company’s exposure to new types of risks is often a complicated endeavor.  We’ve previously reported on the uncertainty that can arise when existing coverage models are applied to a new risk—such as losses arising from data breaches and other cyber-attacks.  Applying existing coverage models to emerging industries presents similar challenges.  These challenges were highlighted recently in the years-long dispute over insurance of ridesharing companies, like Lyft and Uber, which recently reached some degree of closure in California with the enactment of new insurance legislation for these companies.

Ridesharing companies have arisen in the past few years as an alternative to traditional forms of transportation, such as taxis.  These companies neither employ the drivers nor own the cars used for transportation; they essentially serve as an online “middleman” connecting passengers with freelance drivers for hire and expressly disavow that they provide any sort of “transportation services.”  This new business model—blurring the lines between traditional services and social media—presented many questions as to liability and, consequently, risk management.  These questions were brought to the fore earlier this year, when the family of a six year old girl killed by a ridesharing driver sued the ridesharing company.  The company disclaimed liability on the basis that it is not responsible for the acts of its drivers, especially when the drivers do not have ridesharing passengers or are not en route to pick up one.

Many ridesharing drivers have relied primarily on their personal automobile policies, eschewing business coverage altogether, reportedlyat the recommendation of the ridesharing companies themselves.  While ridesharing companies have carried excess insurance policies to cover ridesharing accidents, the insurance industry took the position that these policies did not cover such accidents because there was no primary coverage.  In other words, because the only “primary” insurance policies were personal use automobile policies that did not cover commercial livery use, the excess insurance could not be triggered.

On September 17, 2014, California AB-2293 was enacted to address this uncertainty of coverage.  The statute was the result of discussions between legislators, ridesharing companies, insurers, and traditional taxi companies.  It requires ridesharing companies in the state to provide $100,000 in coverage for their drivers that takes effect the moment a driver connects to the ridesharing company’s dispatch software and increases to $1 million once the driver agrees to pick up a passenger.  It also states that a personal automobile insurer does not have the duty to defend or indemnify claims arising out of ridesharing, unless the policy expressly provides such coverage, and it requires ridesharing companies to disclose this fact to their drivers.

Whether other states will follow California’s lead remains to be seen.  Legislation addressing ridesharing has been introduced across the country, and as one Pennsylvania state legislator observed, “By far the biggest issue is insurance.”  In other states, regulators are addressing the possible insurance gap.  Just days after California’s new statute was enacted, Oregon’s State Insurance Division issued a consumer advisory, warning of the potential unavailability of insurance coverage under personal insurance policies for ridesharing and other services provided in the peer-to-peer marketplace.

As Oregon Insurance Commissioner Laura Cali observed in connection with ridesharing, “When a new industry emerges, it often creates unique insurance situations.”  New industries may exist under insurance uncertainty for years or decades before legislation, regulation, or litigation clarifies the issue.  It is therefore critical when expanding into a nascent industry to consider how the risks of that industry may be managed, under either new or existing types of insurance coverage.

ARTICLE BY

Shawn Ledingham
OF
Proskauer Rose LLP

Real Estate “Change in Ownership” Can Trigger Documentary Transfer Tax

Sheppard Mullin Law Firm

926 North Ardmore Avenue, LLC v. County of Los Angeles, (9/22/14, B248536)

The California Court of Appeals has recently held that, as a general rule, the Documentary Transfer Tax (“DTT”) applies whenever there is a “change in ownership” of real property under the California Revenue & Taxation Code. In the case, 926 North Ardmore Avenue, LLC v. County of Los Angeles, the court held that the phrase “realty sold” under the DTT Act includes a “change in ownership” (subject to the limited exceptions expressly included in the DTT Act).  San Francisco and Santa Clara Counties have already enacted amendments to their DTT ordinances to provide for this result, and there are several other counties (most notably Los Angeles and San Diego) that have taken this position without any change to their ordinances.

ARTICLE BY

D. Matthew Richardson
OF
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

California’s New Kill-Switch Law Targets Smartphone Thieves

Morgan Lewis

California legislators recently signed Senate Bill 962 into law, which requires manufacturers to install kill-switches on smartphones sold in California that are made on or after July 1, 2015. A kill-switch allows a smartphone owner to remotely disable the device via a wireless command, which renders the device inoperable to unauthorized users. This new law was passed on August 25 to deter smartphone theft in California.

Although manufacturers must include the kill-switch on smartphones, consumers will have the option to disable it as long as the consumer is informed that the function is designed to protect him or her from unauthorized use of the phone.

ARTICLE BY

Vito Petretti
James R. Sherwood
 
OF 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

In This “Unreliable” Opinion, California Court Requires Privity For Action Against Unlicensed Broker-Dealer

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Since California Corporations Code Section 25501.5 was enacted ten years ago, I’ve been repeatedly asked “What do it mean?“.  The statute provides that a person who purchases a security from, or sells a security to, an unlicensed broker-dealer may bring an action for rescission of the sale or purchase or, if the plaintiff or the defendant no longer owns the security, for damages.  The question has always been whether the statute requires privity of contract.

Now, there is a judicial answer; just not one that can be relied upon (more about that below).  In Alpinieri v. Tgg Mgmt. Co., 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3177 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. May 5, 2014), the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded:

The Legislature’s use of the commonplace phrases “purchases a security from” and “sells a security to” demonstrates it intended a civil action for rescission or damages under section 25501.5 be available only to a person who transacts directly with an unlicensed broker-dealer, that is, who is in privity with that unlicensed broker-dealer.  We see no indication in section 25501.5′s language any intent other than to restrict a claim for rescission or damages against one who is directly responsible for violating the statute by virtue of selling the security.  Because no contrary legislative intent appears in the statute, there is no basis to disregard literal construction.

(citation omitted).  The Court distinguished two other decisions involving the privity requirement under the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, Moss v. Kroner, 197 Cal. App. 4th 860 (2011) and Viterbi v. Wasserman, 191 Cal. App. 4th 927 (2011), on the basis that those cases did not involve Section 25501.5.

Why is this an “unreliable” holding?  The opinion, which was penned by Associate Justice Terry B. O’Rourke, was not certified for publication.  Under Rule 8.115(a) of the California Rules of Court, an unpublished opinion, with certain exceptions ”must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action”.

Article By:

Keith Paul Bishop
Of: 
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

California Proposes Enhanced Prop. 65 Warnings and Possible Online Disclosures – Dietary Supplements and Foods Specially Targeted

GT Law

The California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA)announced on March 7, 2014, that it is considering implementation of the most significant changes to Prop. 65 regulations in more than two decades.  OEHHA has posted the draft regulation and Initial Statement of Reasons on its website.

Passed by voters in 1986, Prop. 65 requires warnings prior to exposures to chemicals listed by OEHHA as “known to the State” to cause cancer or reproductive harm.  The law, which carries the potential penalty of $2,500 for each violation, may be and routinely is enforced by entrepreneurial private plaintiffs who are permitted to bring legal actions against alleged violators with minimal evidence.  OEHHA’s proposed regulations will affect almost every industry subject to Prop. 65 and nearly every aspect of compliance.  In all but a few cases, OEHHA’s changes have the capacity to make compliance with Prop. 65 costlier, riskier, and more disruptive to companies doing business in California.

Four Important Provisions Affecting Food and Dietary Supplements

In its far-reaching proposal, OEHHA aims a number of significant changes directly at food and dietary supplement manufacturers, distributors, and retailers.  Four specific proposals stand out as impactful for the industry:

  1. Chemical Identification: Under OEHHA’s proposal, warning labels would have to specifically identify the chemical in question if it is on a proposed list of 12 “common” substances.  One substance on OEHHA’s list, lead, is sometimes naturally occurring in the ingredients used to produce dietary supplements and has been the source of considerable litigation and expense for the industry.  In OEHHA’s draft regulation, products requiring a warning for lead would have to “conspicuously” state its presence in the product.
  2. Display Requirements: For foods not already subject to a consent judgment, the “safe-harbor” warning language must also be enhanced with specific information about the chemical in question, specific text sizing, and the phrase “Cancer [and/or] Reproductive Hazard.” Even where a food supplier has data showing that the chemical poses no actual health threat, a private plaintiff may still litigate knowing that the costly burden of showing no significant risk is borne by defendants.  Unless modified or declared preempted by federal law, OEHHA’s regulation would virtually ensure that this language will be required for food and supplement packaging in California.
  3. Online Reporting: OEHHA would also mandate reporting of exposure data to the agency for its website if a new Prop. 65 warning does not contain 10 details specified by OEHHA.  The details include, among others, the name of the chemical at issue, anticipated exposure routes, exposure levels, and options for minimizing exposure.  Businesses that fail to provide the required detail, no matter how misleading it might be to the consumer, must disclose the additional information to OEHHA and will likely see such data published online.
  4. More Litigation: Despite statements from the agency to the contrary, OEHHA’s complex rules would encourage even more litigation from an already active community of plaintiffs.  OEHHA’s draft litigation reform, a “cure” or fix-it period for retailers with fewer than 25 employees, would do little to stem the current tide of lawsuits, the vast majority of which are ultimately directed at and defended by suppliers.  Additionally, by replacing the generic safe-harbor warning with specific requirements, a regulatory safe-harbor warning would no longer provide a safe harbor from liability or deter plaintiffs from alleging violations for exposures to unspecified or newly listed chemicals.

What You Can Do

Businesses which stand to be affected by OEHHA’s plans, including those operated out of state, have an opportunity to voice their concerns to the agency.

OEHHA will hold a public workshop on April 14, 2014 to discuss the proposed regulations.  In addition, OEHHA is accepting written comments from the public until May 14, 2014.  Unless OEHHA is convinced to delay or withdraw its plans, formal regulations will likely be proposed in the summer of 2014.

Because OEHHA’s proposals are currently in the preliminary stages, interested parties have a time critical opportunity to engage the agency and encourage it to address specific concerns.  Companies that manufacture distribute, or retail dietary supplements in California should consider retaining experienced counsel to analyze the impact of the proposals on their business and to participate in the public comment period on their behalf.   Given the potentially far-reaching consequences of the proposed changes on the individual companies and the industry at large, interested parties should be diligent in bringing their concerns to OEHHA as early and as persuasively as possible.

Article By:

James Mattesich
Justin J. Prochnow
Anthony J. Cortez
Greg Sperla
Of:
Greenberg Traurig, LLP

California Announces Initial Draft Priority Products Under California Safer Consumer Products Regulations

Beveridge Diamond Logo

On March 13, 2014, the California Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) announced the first set of draft priority products that, if finalized, will be subject to the requirements of the California Safer Consumer Products (“SCP”) Regulations.

Notably, while DTSC had legal authority to identify up to five products, it chose to identify only three draft priority products at this time. The three products are:

  1. Children’s Foam Padded Sleeping Products containing the flame-retardant chemical, Tris (1,3-dichloro-2-propyl phosphate) or (“TDCCP”). Such products include nap mats and cots, travel beds, bassinet foam, portable crib mattresses, play pens, and other children’s sleeping products. In its press release announcing the draft priority products, DTSC asserted that TDCCP is a known carcinogen, is released from products into air and dust where it can be absorbed, inhaled, or transferred from hand to mouth, and has been found in California waters and sediments. DTSC also noted that there is no legal requirement applicable to these products that would require them to be made with flame retardants. For more information on DTSC’s selection of this draft priority product, click here.
  2. Spray Polyurethane Foam (“SPF”) Products containing Unreacted Diisocyanates. SPF products are used for home and building insulation, weatherizing and sealing, and roofing. DTSC asserted in its press release that exposure to wet or “uncured” SPF materials can contribute to occupational asthma and noted that unreacted diisocyanates are a “suspected” carcinogen. DTSC expressed its concern for populations using these products that are not protected by Occupational Safety & Health Administration regulations, such as independent contractors and people performing their own home repairs. In its press release, DTSC noted that currently there are no alternatives to unreacted diisocyanates for spray-foam applications. For additional information from DTSC on this draft priority product, click here.
  3. Paint and Varnish Strippers containing Methylene Chloride. Methylene chloride is a well-known and widely used solvent in paint strippers. According to DTSC, when metabolized, methylene chloride converts to carbon monoxide, which is acutely toxic to the brain and nervous system. DTSC claimed that alternative products without methylene chloride are readily available. For more information on this draft listing, click here.

In announcing the “draft list” of proposed priority products, DTSC emphasized that the naming of these products does not constitute a ban on the products, but rather the initiation of process to examine whether the chemicals of concern used in these products are “necessary” or may be replaced with safer alternatives. To put the draft priority products announcement in context, this announcement begins the second of four steps established by California’s SCP Regulations for identifying, prioritizing, and evaluating the use of chemicals and their alternatives in consumer products. The four steps include:

  1. Identification of Candidate Chemicals. The final SCP Regulations promulgated by DTSC include an initial list of candidate chemicals (~1,200), which DTSC later pared down to an informational “initial” list of fewer than 200 candidate chemicals that exhibit a hazard trait and/or environmental or toxicological endpoint.
  2. Identification of Priority Products. The SCP Regulations require DTSC to evaluate and prioritize product/candidate chemical combinations and to develop a list of priority products for which alternatives analyses must be conducted. Once a candidate chemical is the basis for a priority product listing, it is considered a chemical of concern. March 13’s announcement identifies the first product/candidate chemical combinations that DTSC is proposing to subject to the procedural process outlined in the SCP Regulations.
  3. Alternatives Analysis. Responsible entities of a product listed as a priority product must perform an alternatives analysis to determine how best to limit exposures to, or the level of adverse public health and environmental impacts posed by, the chemicals of concern in the product.
  4. DTSC Regulatory Response. The SCP Regulations provide a range of potential regulatory responses that DTSC may require after review of the alternatives analysis. These include provision of information for consumers (such as safe handling or instructions to limit exposure), restrictions on the use of chemicals of concern in the products, sales prohibition, engineered safety measures, and end-of-life management requirements. DTSC may require regulatory responses for a priority product (if the responsible entity decides to continue producing and distributing the priority product to the California market), or for an alternative product selected to replace the priority product.

Applicability

The SCP regulatory requirements apply to businesses (“responsible entities”) that manufacture, import, distribute, sell or assemble consumer products[1] identified by DTSC as priority products that are placed into the stream of commerce in California. Responsible entities are defined to include manufacturers, importers, retailers and assemblers. The SCP Regulations assign the principal duty to comply with the requirements to manufacturers. If a manufacturer does not comply with its obligations with regard to a priority product, DTSC may notify an importer, retailer or assembler of its duty to meet the requirements with respect to the priority product. Even if not called on to conduct an alternatives analysis, importers, assemblers and/or retailers of priority products may be impacted by regulatory responses selected by DTSC after the manufacturer’s completion of the alternatives analysis (e.g., if DTSC imposes a sales prohibition or requires additional information to be provided to the consumer at the point of sale) .

Requirements for Responsible Entities

Once the draft priority products are formally proposed and finalized through a public rulemaking process (which may take up to one year), responsible entities will be required to:

  • Within 60 days after finalization of the final priority products list, notify DTSC that the responsible entity makes or sells a priority product (DTSC will post information obtained from notifications, including the names of the responsible entities as well as the product names, on its web site);
  • Within 180 days after finalization of the final priority products list, prepare a Preliminary Alternatives Analysis[2] to determine how best to limit exposures to, or the level of adverse public health and environmental impacts posed by, the chemicals of concern in the product; and
  • Within one year after DTSC issues a Notice of Compliance for the Preliminary Alternatives Analysis, prepare a Final Alternatives Analysis.

Next Steps

Those that manufacture, sell, use, or otherwise have an interest in the draft priority products may wish to submit comments to DTSC as part of the priority product listing process. DTSC will follow a formal rulemaking process to finalize the draft priority products, which will take up to a year after the products are formally proposed. DTSC plans to hold several workshops in May and June of 2014 before publishing the notice of proposed rulemaking and opening the public comment period. Stakeholders will then have the opportunity to weigh in on whether, and how, the proposed priority products will be regulated by DTSC.

If your products were not among the three proposed priority products,stay tuned: By October 1, 2014, DTSC is required to issue a Priority Product Work Plan that identifies and describes the product categories that DTSC will evaluate to select priority products for the three years following the issuance of the Work Plan (roughly from 2015 to 2017). DTSC intends the Work Plan to serve as a signal to consumers and the regulated community as to the categories of products it will examine next.

Once DTSC finalizes the initial priority product listings (anticipated late summer or early fall of 2015), responsible entities will be required to meet a series of deadlines for notification and submission of alternatives analysis reports outlined above. Manufacturers of draft priority products should engage their supply chain partners to evaluate options prior to finalization of the priority product listings. Note that manufacturers that choose to reformulate products prior to finalization of the priority product listing will not be subject to the DTSC notification or alternatives analysis requirements.

[1] “Consumer product” is defined for purposes of the California Safer Consumer Products regulations to mean “a product or part of the product that is used, brought, or leased for use by a person for any purposes.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25251(e). Certain limited products, such as dental restorative material or its packaging, prescription drugs or devices and their packaging, medical devices and their packaging, food, and federally registered pesticides, and mercury containing lights are excluded from the definition of consumer product.

[2] DTSC is currently developing an alternatives analysis guidance document to assist responsible entities in carrying out their obligations under the SCP Regulations. As of March 13, 2014, the guidance is still in development. DTSC anticipates that it will be released sometime before the first set of priority products is finalized.

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California District Court Holds that Providing Cellphone Number for an Online Purchase Constitutes “Prior Express Consent” Under TCPA – Telephone Consumer Protection Act

DrinkerBiddle

 

A federal district court in California recently ruled that a consumer who voluntarily provided a cellphone number in order to complete an online purchase gave “prior express consent” to receive a text message from the business’s vendors under the TCPA. See Baird v. Sabre, Inc., No. CV 13-999 SVW, 2014 WL 320205 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014).

In Baird, the plaintiff booked flights through the Hawaiian Airlines website. In order to complete her purchase, the plaintiff provided her cellphone number. Several weeks later she received a text message from the airline’s vendor, Sabre, Inc., inviting the plaintiff to receive flight notification services by replying “yes.” The plaintiff did not respond and no further messages were sent. The plaintiff sued the vendor claiming that it violated the TCPA by sending the single text message.

The central issue in Baird was whether, by providing her cellphone number to the airline, the plaintiff gave “prior express consent” to receive autodialed calls from the vendor under the TCPA. In 1992, the FCC promulgated TCPA implementing rules, including a ruling that “persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.” In re Rules & Reg’s Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8769 ¶ 31 (1992) (“1992 FCC Order”). In support of this ruling, the FCC cited to a House Report stating that when a person provides their phone number to a business, “the called party has in essence requested the contact by providing the caller with their telephone number for use in normal business communications.” Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102–317, at 13 (1991)).

The court found that, while the 1992 FCC Order “is not a model of clarity,” it shows that the “FCC intended to provide a definition of the term ‘prior express consent.’” Id. at *5. Under that definition, the court held that the plaintiff consented to being contacted on her cellphone by an automated dialing machine when she provided the number to Hawaiian Airlines during the online reservation process. Id. at *6. Under the existing TCPA jurisprudence, a text message is a “call.” Id. at *1. Furthermore, although the plaintiff only provided her cellphone number to the airline (and not to Sabre, Inc., the vendor), the court concluded that “[n]o reasonable consumer could believe that consenting to be contacted by an airline company about a scheduled flight requires that all communications be made by direct employees of the airline, but never by any contractors performing services for the airline.” Id. at *6. The Judge was likewise unmoved by the fact that the plaintiff was required to provide a phone number (though not necessarily a cellphone number) to complete the online ticket purchase. Indeed, the court observed that the affirmative act of providing her cellphone number was an inherently “voluntary” act and that, had the plaintiff objected, she could simply have chosen not to fly Hawaiian Airlines. Id.

Baird does not address the October 2013 TCPA regulatory amendments that require “prior express written consent” for certain types of calls made to cellular phones and residential lines (a topic that previously has been covered on this blog). See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(2), (3) (emphasis added). “Prior express written consent” is defined as “an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorized such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.” 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8). Whether the Baird rationale would help in a “prior express written consent” case likely would depend on the underlying facts such as whether the consumer/plaintiff agreed when making a purchase to be contacted by the merchant at the phone number provided, and whether the consumer/plaintiff provided an electronic signature. See 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8)(ii).

Nonetheless, Baird is a significant win for the TCPA defense bar and significantly reduces TCPA risk for the defendants making non-telemarketing calls (or texts) to cellphones using an automated dialer (for which “prior express consent” is the principal affirmative defense). If that cellphone number is given by the consumer voluntarily (and, given the expansive logic of Baird, we wonder when it could be considered “coerced”), the defendant has obtained express consent. Baird leaves open a number of questions worth watching, including how far removed the third-party contractor can be from the company to whom a cellphone number was voluntarily provided. Judge Wilson seemed to think it was obvious to the consumer that a third-party might be utilized by an airline to provide flight status information, but how far does that go? We’ll be watching.

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Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP