Five States Put Abortion Questions on the Ballot; Health Care and Other Employers Should Stay Tuned

In the wake of the landmark decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, we have been closely monitoring legal developments across the country. In addition to well publicized “trigger laws” that were effectuated as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s order, states have taken up a variety of legislative actions in response to the ruling, which placed authority for the regulation of abortion with the states.

On Election Day, five states will have voters consider various proposals in light of Dobbs and its directive that abortion law belongs with the people. Here is a run-down of abortion-related ballot initiatives that will be put to a popular vote on November 8, 2022.

A Constitutional Amendment for California

On the ballot in California is Proposition 1: Constitutional Right to Reproductive Freedom, which would amend the state Constitution at Article I, Section 1.1, to provide that the state cannot “deny or interfere with an individual’s reproductive freedom in their most intimate decisions, which includes their fundamental right to choose to have an abortion and their fundamental right to choose or refuse contraceptives.” Any amendment to the California Constitution requires a simple majority of voters. If the amendment is passed, changes take effect the fifth day after the Secretary of State files the statement of the vote for the election.

Should Proposition 1 pass, it would add express protection for reproductive freedom, including decisions about abortion and contraception, to the state constitution, under its existing guaranteed right to privacy. If the proposition does not pass, it will not affect the status quo of reproductive rights in California: while current protections for abortion and other reproductive medical care would not be constitutionally guaranteed, they would remain in place under state law.

California currently has strong protections for the right to abortion, generally only prohibiting abortion at viability. Since the Dobbs decision earlier this year, California has promoted access to abortion, including launching abortion.ca.gov, a website dedicated towards providing information on reproductive health care services to people both inside and outside of California. Recently, in late September, Governor Gavin Newsom signed a package of 12 bills of abortion protections, aimed towards improving access to abortion and protecting patients and clinicians who undergo or provide them.

With the backdrop of an already-strong California legal reproductive health network, consistent polling indicates the ballot measure is expected to pass by a wide margin. Passage of the proposition will likely signal and establish the state as a refuge for individuals from more restrictive states seeking abortions.

Michigan May Modify its Constitution, Too

Michigan will also turn to its voters to decide whether its state constitution should be amended to include protections for abortion. The Michigan proposal, referred to as “Proposal 3 of 2022 – ‘Reproductive Freedom for All’ Petition,” seeks to protect the right to an abortion with a constitutional amendment that declares a right to reproductive freedom. The petition sets forth proposed language for a new section of the Michigan Constitution, stating, in part, that “[e]very individual has a fundamental right to reproductive freedom, which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to pregnancy, including but not limited to prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, contraception, sterilization, abortion care, miscarriage management, and infertility care.”

Proposal 3 would take effect 45 days following the ballot initiative if approved by the majority of voters. It would (1) establish new individual rights to reproductive freedom, to broadly include the right to make and carry out all decisions relating to pregnancy; (2) permit state regulation of abortion in limited circumstances; (3) forbid discrimination in enforcement of reproductive rights; (4) prohibit adverse action by the state with respect to “potential, perceived, or alleged pregnancy outcomes;” and (5) invalidate state laws that conflict with the Constitution as amended by Proposal 3.

If Proposal 3 is not passed and the state constitution remains as is, the future of the right to an abortion in Michigan will be unclear. Michigan has a pre-Roe ban that, if enforced, would prohibit abortion in nearly all situations and make abortions in non-life saving circumstances potentially prosecuted as manslaughter. However, a Michigan Court of Claims judge granted a permanent injunction in Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s suit to block local prosecutors from enforcing the ban. The ban is subject to an ongoing lawsuit.

Given the uncertainty of the ballot initiative’s outcome, Michigan employers should closely monitor the results of the November 8, 2022 vote.

Vermont’s Vote

In Vermont, abortion remains legal after Dobbs under state law. However, on November 8, 2022, voters will have the opportunity to further protect abortion rights through a ballot initiative. This initiative, referred to as Proposal 5, asks registered Vermont voters whether they are in favor of amending the state’s constitution to add the following language: “That an individual’s right to personal reproductive autonomy is central to the liberty and dignity to determine one’s own life course and shall not be denied or infringed unless justified by a compelling State interest achieved by the least restrictive means.” Passage would guarantee the right to access and obtain an abortion as well as other reproductive care, and prohibit government infringement of reproductive rights absent a compelling state interest, which would need to be achieved through the least restrictive means.

Should Proposal 5 pass, the resulting constitutional amendment is not expected to significantly alter the legal landscape of abortion in Vermont, which currently has strong protection for the right to abortion. If approved, the amendment will become part of Vermont’s constitution on November 22, 2022.

In Contrast, Kentucky Seeks to Constitutionally Exclude Abortion Rights

Kentuckians will cast their votes deciding whether to amend the state’s constitution to explicitly provide that the state constitution offers no protection for a right to abortion. The proposal further clarifies that there is no constitutional right to use public funds for abortion. “Constitutional Amendment 2” poses the following question to voters: “Are you in favor of amending the Constitution of Kentucky by creating a new Section of the Constitution to be numbered Section 26A to state as follows: ‘To protect human life, nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to secure or protect a right to abortion or require the funding of abortion?’”

If the majority of votes are affirmative, a new section will be added to Kentucky’s constitution. This does not constitute an outright abortion ban, but rather prohibits courts from finding an implicit right to an abortion within the state’s constitution. Kentucky laws restricting abortion, including those triggered by Dobbs, are among the most restrictive in the nation. Approval of Constitutional Amendment 2 would not alter these laws or their existing narrow exceptions, which permit the procedure only when necessary to preserve the health or life of the mother.

An advisory from the Kentucky Attorney General provides further color on the ramifications of the amendment, noting that Amendment 2 does not ban abortion, but rather ensures that elected officials of Kentucky’s General Assembly, and not courts, would regulate abortion. The Advisory also explains that implementation of Amendment 2 would not amend other provisions in the state’s constitution.

Montana’s Ballot – NOT a Proposed Constitutional Amendment

Abortion is currently legal in Montana, as a 1999 Supreme Court ruling held that the state constitution protects abortion under its right-of-privacy provision. However, in 2021, a number of restrictive abortion laws were enacted, including a law that prohibits abortions after 20 weeks. These laws are under legal challenge by abortion providers and are temporarily enjoined pending litigation.

Meanwhile, on the ballot for November 8 is a referendum on LR-131, also known as the Born Alive Infant Protection Act. The Act proposes a new statute that would classify any infant born alive as “a legal person” and require the provision of “medically appropriate and reasonable care” to such person. This would include all infants born alive from an induced labor, C-section, or attempted abortion. The Act also includes a provision mandating providers, employees, and volunteers to report a failure to comply to law enforcement, and sets forth criminal penalties. Violation of this law would be a felony with a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison or a fine of up to $50,000. The proposed law is aimed at health care workers, and does not impose liability on parents or other parties.

Health care providers have raised concerns that the broad language of the bill could lead to unintended consequences, particularly for OB/GYN practitioners. Health care providers would be required to take “medically appropriate and reasonable care” to keep any infant alive, but these terms are not defined in the bill. Health care workers that could be held liable include doctors, nurses, and “any individual who may be asked to participate in any way in a health care service of procedure.”

If approved by the Montana electorate, the law would take effect on January 1, 2023. Hospitals and other health care providers would need to reexamine their operating procedures to comply with the bill, should it pass, including compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement.

Keeping Up With The Changes

We continue to track litigation, legislative developments, and the entirety of the post-Dobbs legal landscape as it continues to shift. Our 50-state survey and other resources provide employers, health care providers, life sciences stakeholders, and others impacted by these rapidly changing circumstances with in-depth analysis and monthly updates. Election Day results will be another element of this evolving story.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

California Law Prohibits Cooperation with Out-of-State Entities Regarding Lawful Abortion

In response to Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, California Governor Gavin Newsom recently signed AB 1242 into law, which “prohibits law enforcement and California corporations from cooperating with out-of-state entities regarding a lawful abortion in California.”

In particular, AB 1242 prohibits California companies that provide electronic communication services from complying with out-of-state requests from law enforcement regarding an investigation into, or enforcement of, laws restricting abortion.

Sponsored by California Assembly member Rebecca Bauer-Kahan and California Attorney General Rob Bonta, AB 1242:

takes an innovative legal approach to protect user data. The bill prohibits California law enforcement agencies from assisting or cooperating with the investigation or enforcement of a violation related to abortion that is lawful in California. This law thereby blocks out-of-state law enforcement officers from executing search warrants on California corporations in furtherance of enforcing or investigating an anti-abortion crime. For example, if another state wants to track the movement of a woman traveling to California seeking reproductive health care, the state would be blocked from accessing cell phone site tower location data of the woman by serving a warrant to the tech company in California. In addition, if another state wants Google search history from a particular IP address, it could not serve an out-of-state search warrant at Google headquarters in CA without an attestation that the evidence is not related to investigation into abortion services. Although the first state to enact such a law, as California often is when it comes to privacy rights, we anticipate that other states will follow suit and that these laws will be hotly contested in litigation.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

EMTALA in the Post-Dobbs World

The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) requires hospitals with emergency departments and participating in Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) programs to provide medical screening, treatment and transfer for patients with emergency medical conditions (EMCs) or women in labor.1 EMTALA, which was enacted in 1986 to address concerns about patient dumping, went unnoticed for many years, but has garnered heightened attention as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and more recently, the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (Dobbs).2

EMTALA is a federal law and expressly preempts state laws with which it directly conflicts. After the Dobbs decision was officially published in June, a number of states implemented laws that prohibited or restricted access to reproductive care. Many of these laws include potential civil sanctions and criminal liability for healthcare providers offering or performing these services regardless of the circumstances, including emergency situations. The Biden Administration, in contrast, has taken action to preserve access to reproductive care through a number of executive and federal agency actions. These actions are intended by the federal government to apply in all states, including those states where restrictions have been put in place. Following this activity, litigation between the federal government and several states has ensued to address potential conflicts between federal laws requiring the provision of access and state laws that prohibit or restrict access to reproductive health services. A summary of the current EMTALA landscape is set forth below.

EMTALA Requirements

Under EMTALA, hospitals with emergency departments (EDs) must provide a medical screening examination to any individual who comes to the ED, regardless of insurance status. EMTALA prohibits hospitals with EDs from refusing to examine or treat individuals with an EMC. Upon provision of a medical screening examination, hospitals must provide necessary stabilizing treatment for EMCs and labor within the hospital’s capability. If the hospital is unable to properly treat or stabilize the patient, the hospital must provide an appropriate transfer to another medical facility.

Under EMTALA, an EMC includes “a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in:

(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,

(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or

(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part…”3

Many common pregnancy-related complications, such as preeclampsia or ectopic pregnancies, qualify as EMCs. However, certain state anti-abortion laws prohibit or criminalize abortions regardless of the existence of an EMC under federal law, which creates a potential conflict when an abortion is necessary to stabilize an EMC under EMTALA. As a result of this friction between state and federal law, EMTALA has received renewed attention at a federal and state level in recent months.

Executive Order on Protecting Access to Reproductive Healthcare Services

On July 8, 2022, after the Dobbs decision was officially issued, President Biden issued Executive Order 14076 (Executive Order), which directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to submit a report identifying steps to ensure all patients, including pregnant women and women experiencing pregnancy loss, receive the full protections offered by EMTALA. The Executive Order also directed HHS to consider updates to guidance on obligations under EMTALA.

CMS Memorandum and HHS Letter to Healthcare Providers

On July 11, 2022, in response to the Executive Order, CMS published a memorandum to State Survey Agency Directors to restate existing guidance for hospital staff and physicians in light of new state laws that prohibit or restrict access to abortion (Memorandum). The Memorandum reinforced CMS’ view that:

  • EMTALA mandates that all patients who come to a EDs and request examination or treatment must receive an appropriate medical screening examination, stabilizing treatment, and transfer regardless of any state law restrictions about specific procedures,

  • Only physicians and qualified medical personnel may make the determination of an EMC,

  • Hospitals should ensure that all staff who interact with patients presenting to the ED are aware of the hospital’s obligations under EMTALA,

  • Hospitals may not cite state law or practice as the basis for transfer,

  • Physicians’ professional and legal duties under EMTALA preempt any conflicting state law or mandate,

  • If a physician believes that abortion is the stabilizing treatment necessary to resolve an EMC, the physician must provide that treatment, and

  • State law is preempted by EMTALA when it prohibits abortion and does not include an exception for the life and health of the pregnant person or has a more restrictive definition of EMC.

The Memorandum also clarified that pregnant patients may experience EMCs including, but not limited to, ectopic pregnancy, complications of pregnancy loss, or emergent hypertensive disorders, such as preeclampsia with severe features and that stabilizing treatment encompasses both medical and surgical interventions, such as methrotrexate therapy or dilation and curettage.

The Secretary of HHS also published on July 11, 2022 a letter to healthcare providers reminding them of their obligation to provide stabilizing medical treatment to their pregnant patients in accordance with EMTALA, regardless of the state in which the provider practices (Letter). The Letter also reiterated that:

  • any state laws or mandates which employ a more restrictive definition of EMC are preempted by EMTALA statute, and

  • the course of necessary stabilizing treatment is under the physician’s or other qualified medical personnel’s purview.

The State of Texas Sues the Biden Administration

On July 14, 2022, the Texas Attorney General brought suit against HHS and CMS to challenge the Memorandum and Letter relating to federal law obligations for pregnant patients.4 The complaint alleged that EMTALA does not preempt state law when state law prohibits abortion and does not include an exception for the life of the pregnant person or draws the exception more narrowly than the definition of EMC under EMTALA. Specifically, Texas sought to enforce a state statute, the Human Life Protection Act, which would ban and criminalize abortions unless a woman “has a life-threatening physical condition arising from pregnancy that places her ‘at risk of death or poses a serious risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily function unless the abortion is performed”(emphasis added).5 The complaint also alleged that EMTALA does not require a healthcare provider to perform an abortion if it is the stabilizing treatment necessary to resolve an EMC. On August 23, 2022, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Lubbock Division) blocked enforcement of the Memorandum and Letter in the State of Texas on the basis that federal guidance did not preempt state law, exceeded the authority of EMTALA, and was issued without a proper notice and comment period. The Court found that, because EMTALA is silent regarding abortion and “how stabilizing treatments must be provided when a doctor’s duties to a pregnant woman and her unborn child possibly conflict,” “there is no direct conflict” between federal and Texas law with the end result that “EMTALA leaves it to the states”.6

The Biden Administration Sues the State of Idaho

On August 2, 2022, the Department of Justice (DOJ) sued the State of Idaho, alleging violation of EMTALA. Under Idaho’s proposed abortion law, which was slated to go into effect on August 25th, the performance of all abortions are criminalized regardless of the reason for which they may be performed including to prevent the death of the pregnant woman.7 Instead, the law permits physicians to raise two affirmative defenses to avoid criminal liability:

(i) The physician determined, in h/her good faith medical judgment and based on the facts known to the physician at the time, that the abortion was necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman, and

(ii) Prior to the performance of the abortion, the pregnant woman reported the act of rape or incest to a law enforcement agency and provided a copy of such report to the physician.8

The DOJ’s complaint alleged that  Idaho’s law does not provide a defense when the health of the pregnant patient is at stake, which is considered to fall within the definition of an EMC under EMTALA. In addition, the DOJ asserted that the fear of criminal prosecution may lead providers to avoid performing abortions even when it is a medically necessary treatment to prevent severe risk to the patient’s health. On August 24, 2022, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho found that Idaho’s law conflicted with EMTALA and granted the federal government a preliminary injunction blocking the enforcement of Idaho’s proposed abortion law.9 In contrast to the Northern District of Texas Court’s interpretation of the conflict between state law and EMTALA, the District Court of Idaho noted that found that Idaho’s criminal abortion statute deterred abortions given that it provided for an affirmative defense rather than an exception for the provision of emergency care and, therefore, obstructed EMTALA’s purpose.10

Looking to the Future

While EMTALA has been in place for decades, its applications in the post-Dobbs world continue to evolve and will be at the forefront in states with abortion restrictions, particularly where the scope of federal law obligations to provide stabilizing treatment for conditions that threaten the health of the pregnant patient conflict with state law exceptions or affirmative defenses.

The law, policy and regulatory climate surrounding the Dobbs decision is complex and quickly developing. The information included in this article is current as of writing, but it does not address all potential legal issues or jurisdictional differences, and the information presented may no longer be current. Readers should consult counsel regarding their specific situation.


FOOTNOTES

1 42 U.S.C. §1395dd.

For additional information regarding the Dobbs decision, please refer to the following resources: Supreme Court Decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization Overturns 50 Years of Precedent on Abortion Laws and Rights | Healthcare Law Blog (sheppardhealthlaw.com)WHLC Dobbs Series Part 1 Where are we now?: Sheppard Mullin Webinar.

42 U.S.C. §1395dd(e)(1).

4 State of Tex. v. Becerra, et al., No. 5:22-cv-185 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 14, 2022).

Tex. Health & Safety Code § 170A.

State of Tex. v. Becerra, et al., No. 5:22-cv-185 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 14, 2022), Memorandum Opinion and Order at 49.

7 Idaho Code § 18-622.

8  Idaho Code § 18-622(3).

9 U.S. v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW.

10 U.S. v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW, Memorandum Decision and Order at 26-31.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Biden Administration Seeks to Clarify Patient Privacy Protections Post-Dobbs, Though Questions Remain

On July 8, two weeks following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson that invalidated the constitutional right to abortion, President Biden signed Executive Order 14076 (E.O.). The E.O. directed federal agencies to take various actions to protect access to reproductive health care services,[1] including directing the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to “consider actions” to strengthen the protection of sensitive healthcare information, including data on reproductive healthcare services like abortion, by issuing new guidance under the Health Insurance and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).[2]

The directive bolstered efforts already underway by the Biden Administration. A week before the E.O. was signed, HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra directed the HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to take steps to ensure privacy protections for patients who receive, and providers who furnish, reproductive health care services, including abortions.[3] The following day, OCR issued two guidance documents to carry out this order, which are described below.

Although the guidance issued by OCR clarifies the privacy protections as they exist under current law post-Dobbs, it does not offer patients or providers new or strengthened privacy rights. Indeed, the guidance illustrates the limitations of HIPAA regarding protection of health information of individuals related to abortion services.

A.  HHS Actions to Safeguard PHI Post-Dobbs

Following Secretary Becerra’s press announcement, OCR issued two new guidance documents outlining (1) when the HIPAA Privacy Rule may prevent the unconsented disclosure of reproductive health-related information; and (2) best practices for consumers to protect sensitive health information collected by personal cell phones, tablets, and apps.

(1) HIPAA Privacy Rule and Disclosures of Information Relating to Reproductive Health Care

In the “Guidance to Protect Patient Privacy in Wake of Supreme Court Decision on Roe,”[4] OCR addresses three existing exceptions in the HIPAA Privacy Rule to the disclosure of PHI without an individual’s authorization and provides examples of how those exceptions may be applied post-Dobbs.

The three exceptions discussed in the OCR guidance are the exceptions for disclosures required by law,[5]  for purposes of law enforcement,[6] or to avert a serious threat to health or safety.[7]

While the OCR guidance reiterates that the Privacy Rule permits, “but does not require” disclosure of PHI in each of these exceptions,[8] this offers limited protection that relies on the choice of providers whether to disclose or not disclose the information. Although these exceptions are highlighted as “protections,” they expressly permit the disclosure of protected health information. Further, while true that the HIPAA Privacy Rule itself may not compel disclosure (but merely permits disclosure), the guidance fails to mention that in many situations in which these exceptions apply, the provider will have other legal authority (such as state law) mandating the disclosure and thus, a refusal to disclose the PHI may be unlawful based on a law other than HIPAA.

Two of the exceptions discussed in the guidance – the required by law exception and the law enforcement exception – both only apply in the first place when valid legal authority is requiring disclosure. In these situations, the fact that HIPAA does not compel disclosure is of no relevance. Certainly, when there is not valid legal authority requiring disclosure of PHI, then HIPAA prohibits disclosure, as noted as in the OCR guidance.  However, in states with restrictive abortion laws, the state legal authorities are likely to be designed to require disclosure – which HIPAA does not prevent.

For instance, if a health care provider receives a valid subpoena from a Texas court that is ordering the disclosure of PHI as part of a case against an individual suspected of aiding and abetting an abortion, in violation of Texas’ S.B. 8, then that provider could be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the subpoena, despite the fact that HIPAA does not compel disclosure.[9] For more examples on when a covered entity may be required to disclose PHI, please see EBG’s prior blog: The Pendulum Swings Both Ways: State Responses to Protect Reproductive Health Data, Post-Roe.[10]

Notably, the OCR guidance does provide a new interpretation of the application of the exception for disclosures to avert a serious threat to health or safety. Under this exception, covered entities may disclose PHI, consistent with applicable law and standards of ethical conduct, if the covered entity, in good faith, believes the use or disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public. OCR states that it would be inconsistent with professional standards of ethical conduct to make such a disclosure of PHI to law enforcement or others regarding an individual’s interest, intent, or prior experience with reproductive health care. Thus, in the guidance, OCR takes the position that if a patient in a state where abortion is prohibited informs a health care provider of the patient’s intent to seek an abortion that would be legal in another state, this would not fall into the exception for disclosures to avert a serious threat to health or safety.  Covered entities should be aware of OCR’s position and understand that presumably OCR would view any such disclosure as a HIPAA violation.

(2) Protecting the Privacy and Security of Individuals’ Health Information When Using Personal Cell Phones or Tablets

OCR also issued guidance on how individuals can best protect their PHI on their own personal devices. HIPAA does not generally protect the privacy or security of health information when it is accessed through or stored on personal cell phones or tablets. Rather, HIPAA only applies when PHI is created, received, maintained, or transmitted by covered entities and business associates. As a result, it is not unlawful under HIPAA for information collected by devices or apps – including data pertaining to reproductive healthcare – to be disclosed without consumer’s knowledge.[11]

In an effort to clarify HIPAA’s limitation to protect such information, OCR issued guidance to protect consumer sensitive information stored in personal devices and apps.[12] This includes step-by-step guidance on how to control data collection on their location, and how to securely dispose old devices.[13]

Further, some states have taken steps to fill the legal gaps to varying degrees of success. For example, California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”) extends to “any business that offers software or hardware to consumers, including a mobile application or other related device that is designed to maintain medical information.”[14] As applied, a direct-to-consumer period tracker app provided by a technology company, for example, would fall under the CMIA’s data privacy protections, but not under HIPAA. Regardless, gaps remain as the CMIA does not protect against a Texas prosecutor subpoenaing information from the direct-to-consumer app. Conversely, Connecticut’s new reproductive health privacy law,[15] does prevent a Connecticut covered entity from disclosing reproductive health information based on a subpoena, but Connecticut’s law does not apply to non-covered entities, such as a period tracker app. Therefore, even the U.S.’s most protective state privacy laws do not fill in all of the privacy gaps.

Alongside OCR’s guidance, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published a blog post warning companies with access to confidential consumer information to consider FTC’s enforcement powers under Section 5 of the FTC Act, as well as the Safeguards Rule, the Health Breach Notification Rule, and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule.[16] Consistent with OCR’s guidance, the FTC’s blog post reiterates the Biden Administration’s goal of protecting reproductive health data post-Dobbs, but does not go so far as to create new privacy protections relative to current law.

B.  Despite the Biden Administration’s Guidance, Questions Remain Regarding the Future of Reproductive Health Privacy Protections Post-Dobbs

Through E.O. 14076, Secretary Becerra’s press conference, OCR’s guidance, and the FTC’s blog, the Biden Administration is signaling that it intends to use the full force of its authorities – including those vested by HIPAA – to protect patient privacy in the wake of Roe.

However, it remains unclear how this messaging will translate to affirmative executive actions, and how successful such executive actions would be. How far is the executive branch willing to push reproductive rights? Would more aggressive executive actions be upheld by a Supreme Court that just struck down decades of precedent permitting access to abortion? Will the Biden Administration’s executive actions persist if the administration changes in the next Presidential election?

Attorneys at Epstein Becker & Green are well-positioned to assist covered entities, business associates, and other companies holding sensitive reproductive health data understand how to navigate HIPAA’s exemptions and interactions with emerging guidance, regulations, and statutes at both the state and Federal levels.

Ada Peters, a 2022 Summer Associate (not admitted to the practice of law) in the firm’s Washington, DC office and Jack Ferdman, a 2022 Summer Associate (not admitted to the practice of law) in the firm’s Boston office, contributed to the preparation of this post. 



[1] 87 Fed. Reg. 42053 (Jul. 8, 2022), https://bit.ly/3b4N4rp.

[2] Id.

[3] HHS, Remarks by Secretary Xavier Becerra at the Press Conference in Response to President Biden’s Directive following Overturning of Roe v. Wade (June 28, 2022), https://bit.ly/3zzGYsf.

[4] HHS, Guidance to Protect Patient Privacy in Wake of Supreme Court Decision on Roe (June 29, 2022),  https://bit.ly/3PE2rWK.

[5] 45 CFR 164.512(a)(1)

[6] 45 CFR 164.512(f)(1)

[7] 45 CFR 164.512(j)

[8] Id.

[9] See Texas S.B. 8; e.g., Fed. R. Civ. Pro. R.37 (outlining available sanctions associated with the failure to make disclosures or to cooperate in discovery in Federal courts), https://bit.ly/3BjX4I2.

[10] EBG Health Law Advisor, The Pendulum Swings Both Ways: State Responses to Protect Reproductive Health Data, Post-Roe (June 17, 2022), https://bit.ly/3oPDegl.

[11] A 2019 Kaiser Family Foundation survey concluded that almost one third of female respondents used a smartphone app to monitor their menstrual cycles and other reproductive health data. Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Apps and Information Survey (Sept. 2019), https://bit.ly/3PC9Gyt.

[12] HHS, Protecting the Privacy and Security of Your Health Information When Using Your Personal Cell Phone1 or Tablet (last visited Jul. 26, 2022), https://bit.ly/3S2MNWs.

[13] Id.

[14] Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10, Effective Jan. 1, 2022, https://bit.ly/3J5iDxM.

[15] 2022 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 22-19 § 2 (S.B. 5414), Effective July 1, 2022, https://bit.ly/3zwn95c.

[16] FTC, Location, Health, and Other Sensitive Information: FTC Committed To Fully Enforcing the Law Against Illegal Use and Sharing of Highly Sensitive Data (July 11, 2022), https://bit.ly/3BjrzNV.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Abortion-Related Travel Benefits Post-Dobbs

Immediately following the Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson returning the power to regulate abortion to the states, a number of large employers announced that they would offer out-of-state travel benefits for employees living in states where abortion-related medical care is unavailable. Employers considering offering abortion-related travel benefits have several key considerations to keep in mind. The law currently allows health plans to provide reimbursement for travel primarily for and essential to medical care. Although this area of the law is evolving, employers with self-funded medical plans may amend their existing medical plans to provide abortion-related travel benefits while those with fully insured medical plans may face more obstacles in providing such benefits.

In Dobbs v. Jackson, an abortion clinic challenged a Mississippi law that would ban abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy, with limited exceptions. In establishing the constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court restricted states in their ability to limit or ban abortions before viability of the fetus, or 24 weeks from the time of conception. In upholding the Mississippi law, the Supreme Court overturned Roe and held that the protection or regulation of abortion is a decision for each state.

Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and South Dakota have already banned or made abortion illegal pursuant to trigger laws which went into effect as of the Supreme Court decision on June 24, 2022.  Also, a number of additional states are expected to soon have similar legislation in effect, either by virtue of expected legislative action or trigger laws with slightly delayed effective dates.  In response, a number of employers have announced that they will reimburse all or a portion of abortion-related travel expenses for employees in states where abortions are banned or otherwise not available.

Under Section 213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, the definition of “medical care” includes transportation that is both “primarily for and essential to” the medical care sought by an individual. These types of travel benefits have historically been utilized in connection with certain specialized medical treatments, such as organ transplants.  However, Section 213(d) is not limited to particular types of procedures, and thus forms the framework for providing abortion-related travel benefits through existing medical plans.

Although Code Section 213(d) applies to both self-insured and insured medical plans, the substantive coverage provisions of insured medical plans will generally be governed by the state insurance code of the state in which the insurance policy is issued.  Coverage for abortion services or any related travel benefits may not be permitted under the insurance code of the state in which the policy is issued, or an insurer may not offer a travel benefit for such services even if permitted to do so.  Self-insured plans, by contrast, provide employers more flexibility in plan design, including control, consistent with existing federal requirements, over the types and levels of benefits covered under the plan. As noted above, existing plans may already cover travel-related benefits for certain types of medical procedures.

Employers with high-deductible health plans tied to health savings accounts (HSAs) will need to consider the impact of adding abortion-related travel benefits to such plans.  Travel-related benefits of any type would not appear to be eligible for first dollar coverage, and thus may be of minimal benefit to participants enrolled in high-deductible health plans.

Employers with fully insured medical plans that do not cover abortion-related travel benefits may be able to offer a medical travel reimbursement program through an integrated health reimbursement arrangement (HRA).  An integrated HRA is an employer-funded group health plan from which employees enrolled in the employer’s traditional group medical insurance plan are reimbursed for qualifying expenses not paid by the traditional plan.

Another potential option for employers with fully insured medical plans may be to offer a stipend entirely outside of any established group health plan. Such reimbursement programs may result in taxable compensation for employees who receive such reimbursements. Also, employers would need to be sensitive to privacy and confidentiality considerations of such a policy, which should generally be minimized if offered in accordance with the existing protections of HIPAA through a medical plan and under which claims are processed by an insurer or third-party administrator rather than by the employer itself.

Additionally, some state laws may attempt to criminalize or otherwise sanction so-called aiding and abetting actions related to the procurement of abortion services in another state.  This is an untested area of the law, and it is unclear whether any actions brought under such statutes would be legally viable.  In this regard, Justice Kavanaugh stated as follows in his concurring opinion in Dobbs:  “For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel.” (Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion, page 10.)  This is an area that will require continual monitoring by employers who offer abortion-related travel benefits.

© 2022 Vedder Price

Preparing Corporate Messaging in the Wake of Dobbs

The United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”), in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, has held that there is no constitutional right to abortion, overruling Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood.

Employers, who increasingly are finding themselves on the front lines of many societal issues, will need to decide quickly whether and how they might address the Dobbs decision, as public reaction has been and is likely to remain strong. Board members, employees, and shareholders may advocate for corporations to take a visible stand on the issue of abortion and reproductive rights. And employees may want to speak up themselves (possibly via employer social media accounts).

It is important to remember that company communication decisions and actions regarding the Dobbs ruling, as well as other political and social issues, can have practical and legal implications.

The first question is whether your company will comment on Dobbs. If you decide to comment, there are many factors to consider. Your message is an important starting point. Who is your intended audience? Will your employees consider it an opportunity to join in the conversation? What will you say? Even if your message is internal, keep in mind that it may not stay that way, given the nature of social media. And before you think, “I’ll just stay out of it,” remember that some will view silence or neutrality as a statement in and of itself. If you choose not to speak, are you prepared to deal with any potential reaction from customers, employees, or shareholders?

Internally, employees may have questions about health benefits or other terms and conditions of employment because of Dobbs. It will be important to arm all key stakeholders, including leadership, corporate communications, and human resources, with tools to consistently manage these communications and responses.

Whether it’s internal or external communications, expect feedback! How that feedback is handled is as important as the initial communication (or lack thereof).

Certain industries, like healthcare and insurance, may also feel compelled to make an affirmative statement if the Dobbs decision has a direct impact on services and/or products. In those cases, the need to consider all implications is even more pressing.

In thinking through these decisions, employers should also consider who may need to approve any messaging. The board of directors, senior executives, legal, and marketing and communications teams are among the key stakeholders who may need to be consulted. And don’t forget that your public-facing employees may bear the brunt of your response. Are they prepared?

Employers should also keep in mind various laws that may govern their reaction, including those they might otherwise not consider. For example, the National Labor Relations Act protects employees’ rights to collectively discuss terms and conditions of employment at work and off duty – and that applies to employers with and without a unionized workforce. The current Biden-appointed General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has taken an expanded view of topics that are connected to the workplace. Moreover, some states, including California and New York, have enacted off-duty conduct laws that prohibit employers from disciplining employees for lawful conduct outside of work, which may include political advocacy. There may also be anti-discrimination laws and potential civil and criminal liability associated with your statements, depending on their wording.

Reactions to the Dobbs decision may vary. Some reaction may be comparable to what we’ve seen with respect to other recent political and/or social justice movements, such as Black Lives Matter and #MeToo; others may react differently, or not at all. In these rapidly changing times, companies — particularly publicly traded and consumer-facing ones — need to be make informed decisions. Clear, consistent messaging is key to establishing confident and consistent responses to potential concerns by employees and other stakeholders.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Roe and Casey: What This Decision Means for Employers

As many expected based on the draft opinion that was leaked months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court has held the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to obtain an abortion. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (June 24, 2022).

Dobbs overturns nearly 50 years of precedent from the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood Pennsylvania v. Casey on the issue.

The impact of Dobbs will vary, as states are now at liberty to enforce and create abortion legislation without restrictions arising out of constitutional protections.

What does this mean for employers?

As pressure mounts on this issue, some employers may be considering what, if anything, they can or should do. Many states have enacted legislation that restricts individual abortion rights and potentially third parties who assist individuals who seek abortions. To the extent any state laws were not enforced because of the Court’s holding in Roe or Casey, states can move forward now to implement and enforce those laws.

Laws often referred to as “trigger laws,” those that are in place but unenforceable due to overriding federal restrictions, become enforceable once those federal restrictions are lifted. As a result of Dobbs, abortion-related “trigger laws” previously unenforceable can take effect, creating new standards for individuals and others that will redefine the national abortion law landscape.

Some existing state laws and trigger laws may affect employers and put employers at risk of violating state law if they implement policies to assist employees seeking an abortion or even continue to cover abortions under group health plans. For example, a state law may create liability for anyone who “aids or abets” a person who obtains an abortion. Employers also must be cognizant of how they apply their leave policies, who may seek accommodations based on a sincerely held religious belief, and whether certain provisions of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act apply to women who are seeking or who have had an abortion.

In addition, the Court’s ruling may affect employee benefit plans. Many employers are considering additional benefits for their employees, and their covered dependents, such as travel reimbursement for seeking an abortion outside of the local jurisdiction due to state law restrictions. There are many legal issues to consider in connection with the coverage of abortion-related services under employee benefit plans. (For additional guidance on the issue, see our article, Group Health Plan Considerations in the Face of (Potentially) Changing Abortion Laws.) Depending on how the state laws are enacted, there also may be issues with relying on ERISA preemption provisions to avoid these obligations.

Corporate management and directors should plan for changes and be aware of policies and fiduciary responsibilities. This can include preparing for public and employee reactions (for and against), legislative and law enforcement threats, social media posts, and other employee demonstrations. Pressure from a variety of groups to take a corporate public opinion also may occur.

Whether changes to leave policies, employee benefits, travel reimbursement, or handling accommodation requests, employers considering policies or benefit offerings in response to Dobbs must carefully review and consider federal and state laws, including state abortion-related legislation to evaluate the risk of potential liability.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

Broad Majority Decisions in Terrorist Torture and Abortion Law Cases Resolve Important State Secrets and Intervention Procedural Issues: SCOTUS Today

The Court has decided two important cases today, United States v. Zubaydah, upholding the government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege and rejecting the al Qaeda terrorist leader’s discovery request for information concerning his torture by the CIA, and Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C., allowing the intervention of the Kentucky attorney general to assume the defense of the state’s abortion law after the official who had been defending the law decided not to seek further review. Both cases are, at root, about significant issues of public interest and policy—the torture of terrorists and restrictive abortion policies—but neither opinion resolves any such question. Indeed, the lessons learned from each of these cases are essentially procedural, and though the outcomes are determined by significant margins, the alliances of Justices on the multiple opinions published are also instructive.

Zubaydah has been among the most closely watched cases on the Court’s docket. Full disclosure: I am a board member of the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, which has advocated for the closing of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, where Zubaydah is detained, and for the rejection of privilege claims as to non-classified information concerning torture. Though I am not surprised by the outcome in the case, it is contrary to what many human rights organizations have been advocating. The admixtures of Justices also provide interesting insights as to how they approach matters of privilege and national security.

In what likely will be one of the last majority opinions written by retiring Justice Stephen Breyer, and subject to various concurrences by Justices Thomas, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the government’s assertion of state secrets privilege to deny Zubaydah’s attempt to subpoena two CIA contractors from whom he sought to obtain information for use in litigation in Poland concerning his torture at an alleged “black site” in that country. The state secrets privilege allows the government to bar the disclosure of information that, were it revealed, would harm national security. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6–7 (1953). While the Ninth Circuit had accepted much of the government’s claim, it concluded that the privilege did not cover information about the location of the detention site, which the court believed had already been publicly disclosed. Indeed, it is clear from the record in the case that there has been substantial public discussion of such a detention site in Poland. However, although the government has concluded that the “enhanced interrogation” to which Zubaydah had been subjected constituted torture, the fact of its location in Poland has never been formally confirmed by the United States. The state secrets privilege permits the government to prevent disclosure of information when that disclosure would harm national security interests, such as “the risk of revealing covert operatives, organizational structure and functions, and intelligence-gathering sources, methods, and capabilities.” Here, Justice Breyer, in a textbook case displaying the essential role that he has played on the Court in pragmatically fashioning majorities to form consensus opinions in controversial cases, accepted the view that verifying the existence, or non-existence, of a CIA black site in Poland, falls within the state secrets privilege because confirmation or denial of the site’s existence and location, even if such information has already been made public through unofficial sources, would harm relations among foreign intelligence services vital to U.S. interests. The majority also noted that the locational information is not essential to the case that Zubaydah is attempting to make, but it also rejected the remand to consider issues of Zubaydah’s treatment that Justices Kagan, concurring, and Justice Gorsuch (interestingly, joined by Justice Sotomayor), dissenting, would have allowed. In a case where there is virtually no disagreement among the Justices as to what the law is, the decision comes down to a procedural formulation that Justice Breyer loosely compares to applying exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act. In any event, the majority held that, as an objective matter, the government’s assertions of privilege and national security risk satisfied its burden of responding to the demand for information.

Notwithstanding the great public interest that surrounds the debate and litigation concerning the efforts of various state legislatures to restrict abortion and to obtain the reversal or narrowing of Roe v. Wade, the Court’s 8-1 majority (only Justice Sotomayor dissented) held only that the Court would not adopt an arbitrary claims-processing rule barring a non-party intervener from taking over an appeal, especially under the conditions presented here. Having first concluded that neither a jurisdictional requirement nor a mandatory claims-processing rule barred consideration of the attorney general’s motion, the Court concluded that no statute or rule restricts the jurisdiction of a court of appeals or provides a general standard to apply in deciding whether intervention on appeal should be allowed. The one passing reference to intervention made in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure only concerns the review of agency action. Accordingly, with “respondents cit[ing] no provision that deprives a court of appeals of jurisdiction in the way they suggest, and no such supporting language can be found in 28 U. S. C. §2107, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4, or any other provision of law. . . [the] Court refuses to adopt what would essentially be a categorical claims-processing rule barring consideration of the attorney general’s motion. When a non-party enters into an agreement to be bound by a judgment in accordance with the agreement’s terms, it is hard to see why the non-party should be precluded from seeking intervention on appeal if the agreement preserves that opportunity. Here, the attorney general reserved ‘all rights, claims, and defenses . . . in any appeals arising out of this action.’ That easily covers the right to seek rehearing en banc and the right to file a petition for a writ of certiorari.”

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, like the cheese, stands alone. She argues that every case should have a certain end point, and one should be applied here. One wonders if she would entertain a similar opinion in a case like this but where the plaintiffs are appealing. In any event, all of the other Justices are unified by the absence of any textual limitation on their jurisdiction to entertain a motion to intervene on appeal and the reasonable justification made for it by the state attorney general. Where Justice Alito found a constitutional basis for this conclusion and Justice Kagan would only have relied upon statutory interpretation, the vast majority of the Court agreed on the procedural regime adopted irrespective of the fact that there likely would be considerable disagreement about the constitutionality of the statute at issue in the underlying litigation.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more articles about Supreme Court cases, visit the NLR Litigation section.