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The National Law Forum - Page 708 of 753 - Legal Updates. Legislative Analysis. Litigation News.

The 15th Annual ABA National Institute on the Gaming Law Minefield Feb 24-25 LasVegas

The 2011 Gaming Law Minefield program is specifically designed to provide in-depth coverage and discussion of the cutting-edge legal, regulatory, and ethical issues confronting both commercial and Native American gaming. Attorneys, compliance officers, Native American leaders, regulators, and legislators will all provide invaluable insights into current trends, opportunities and obstacles in the gaming industry. The program’s subject matter includes new gaming technology, increased IRS CTR and SAR compliance audit activity, Internet gaming, Native American gaming, breaking hot topics in the gaming industry, latest developments in dealing with problem gamblers, and a two-hour CLE-certified ethics program.

The Gaming Law Minefield program constitutes one of the most comprehensive, state-of-the-law gaming programs available. Program attendees have consistently rated the program as a valuable educational experience that provides participants with the opportunity to meet and talk with a wide variety of gaming law experts and leading state and Native American regulators.

Early Bird Registration ends January 24th. For More Information:  Click Here:

Four Commonly Asked Questions About Patient Medical Information: VIDEO

Published in the National Law Review recently an article by Kimberly Leonard of the Center for Public Integrity regarding the 4 Most Commonly Asked Questions About Patient Medical Information:

The Center for Public integrity interviewed Harley Geiger, policy counsel for the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT), about why patients should request a copy of their health records from their doctor.

The questions are based off a guide CDT issued on its website. It discusses the rights patients have to their health information and how they can correct errors that might appear in their record. It also details how they can protect their medical information.

Reprinted by Permission © 2012, The Center for Public Integrity®. All Rights Reserved.

8th Annual Asian ITechLaw Conference

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information on the upcoming 8th Annual Asian ITechLaw Conference:

ITech --8th Annual Asian ITechLaw Conference on February 23 and 24, 2012

 

  • 8th Consecutive event of the ITechLaw India series
  • A ringside view of Indian IT, Media and Telecom Law
  • Supported by several of the largest law firms and global associations
  • ITechLaw’s CyberSpaceCamp® to be held on February 22, 2012
  • Contemporary topics addressed by leading experts drawn from some of the best global law firms
  • Engaging debates with panelists from industry, regulatory authorities and in-house legal departments
  • Interactive sessions on issues affecting the largest IT bases in the world
  • Welcome Reception and Art Show, promoting emerging Indian artistes, allowing delegates to network with local corporates and invited guests
  • Gala Dinner and Networking Luncheons – ample networking opportunities to meet fellow professionals
  • I – Win Tea Meeting
  • In – House Counsel Breakfast Meeting
  • Exclusive golf outings on February 22 and 25, 2012
  • Make the trip a memorable experience by taking an excursion to exotic destinations across southern India, such as Mysore, Kerala and Tamil Nadu

Court of Appeal Reminds Litigants That Settling With Named Plaintiff Does Not Necessarily End Putative Class Action

An article recently published in the National Law Review by Neil A.F. Popović and Lai L. Yip of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP  regarding Putative Damages and Class-Action Lawsuits:

 

If a defendant in a putative class action settles with the class representative prior to class certification, does the defendant nonetheless have to respond to pre-settlement discovery requests to identify absent class members? According to the California Court of Appeal in Pirjada v. Superior Court, 2011 WL 6144930, Case No. B234813 (Cal. App. Dec. 12, 2011), the answer is no, although the appellate court left open the possibility that the trial court could require some form of notice to protect the interests of absent class members.

Plaintiff Seeks Discovery Identifying Putative Class Members

Putative class representative Obaidul Pirjada (“Pirjada”) brought a purported class action on behalf of all security guards who had been employed in California by defendant Pacific National Security, Inc. (“Pacific National”) during the preceding four years, alleging violations of the California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions Code. Pirjada propounded discovery requesting, among other things, the names and addresses of all putative class members. Pacific National did not object or respond to the discovery requests.

Plaintiff, Without Counsel Involvement, Settles Directly With Defendant

Without the involvement of his attorneys, Pirjada settled directly with Pacific National after negotiating with its CEO. Then, by letter to his counsel, Pirjada requested that his claims be dismissed with prejudice, and enclosed the settlement agreement along with payment for legal services.

Plaintiff’s Counsel Files Motion for Order Providing Notice to Putative Class Members; Defendant Files Motion to Dismiss

Instead of dismissing the lawsuit, however, Pirjada’s counsel filed a motion seeking to provide notice to absent members of the proposed class that substitution of a suitable class representative was necessary. Pacific National filed a motion to dismiss based on the parties’ settlement, which Pirjada joined.

Superior Court Denies Both Motions

The superior court denied Pacific National’s motion to dismiss, noting that a plaintiff’s individual settlement does not vitiate plaintiff’s or his counsel’s fiduciary obligations to the putative class members. The court granted sixty days leave to amend to add a new plaintiff as class representative. The court denied counsel’s motion for notice, finding it unnecessary because unlike in CashCall, Inc. v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 4th 273 (2008), and Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 4th 772 (2006), members of the putative class of security guards know whether they were injured and thus can determine without notice whether to assert claims against Pacific National. The court specifically noted, however, that regardless of notice, plaintiff’s counsel was authorized to communicate with potential class members.

Plaintiff’s Counsel Moves to Compel Discovery to Identify New Class Representative, Which Superior Court Denies

Plaintiff’s counsel then moved to compel responses to the previously propounded requests for information identifying putative class members, arguing that Pacific National had waived its objections by failing to respond; that Pirjada could not provide contact information for other putative class members because he worked at only one Pacific National location and was the only guard assigned there; and that Pirjada contacted counsel only after his employment at Pacific National had ended. The superior court denied the motion to compel, stating that Pirjada had settled his claims and that his discovery requests were therefore moot. The court reiterated, however, that counsel were free to communicate with class members, even if it they were not entitled to discovery.

Court of Appeal Denies Petition, Deciding Superior Court Did Not Abuse Discretion

Plaintiff’s counsel filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the superior court’s denial of the motion to compel, as well as the denial of the motion to provide notice.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the superior court acted within its broad discretion in denying the motion to compel, and choosing instead to protect absent class members by allowing counsel leave to amend the complaint after using informal means to identify potential replacement class representatives.

With respect to notice, the Court stated:

[P]recertification discovery may be allowed in appropriate circumstances to identify a substitute class representative in place of one who is not able to serve in that capacity, as well as to assist the lead plaintiff in learning the names of other individuals who might assist in prosecuting the action. But the obligation to notify absent class members before dismissing the case rests with the superior court, not the lead plaintiff or class counsel. The nature and extent of that notice must be decided by the court itself.

Pirjada, 2011 WL 6144930. at *14. The Court noted that under California Rule of Court 3.770, no notice to absent class members is required at all “if the court finds that the dismissal will not prejudice them.” Id. Moreover, because the superior court issued an order to show cause regarding dismissal, counsel will have the opportunity at that hearing to demonstrate that some form of notice is required to avoid prejudice to absent class members.

Lessons for Class Action Defendants

The somewhat unique circumstances in Pirjada highlight the importance of making sure to tie up procedural loose ends, such as outstanding discovery, when a defendant settles with the named plaintiff(s) prior to class certification. More broadly, the case serves as a reminder that named plaintiffs and their counsel have an ongoing fiduciary duty to potential class members, and courts must take reasonable steps to protect those interests, including through potential discovery and notice procedures.

Under Parris v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 4th 285 (2003), and its progeny, “‘trial courts must apply a balancing test and weigh the actual or potential abuse of the class action procedure against the potential benefits that might be gained'” by allowing precertification discovery to identify a substitute class representative.Pirjada, 2011 WL 6144930, at *5 (quoting Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 4th 820, 825 (2011)). Addressing that standard remains a key consideration for defendants who seek to avoid ongoing class action litigation when they settle with a named plaintiff.

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Inside Counsel presents the 12th Annual Super Conference in Chicago

National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming 12th Annual Super Conference sponsored by Inside Counsel .

Reasons why you should Attend This Year’s Event:

  1. Meet with Decision Makers: You’ll meet face-to-face with senior-level in-house counsel
  2. Networking Opportunities: SuperConference offers several networking opportunities, including a cocktail reception, refreshment breaks, and a networking lunch.
  3. Gain Industry Knowledge: You will hear the latest issues facing the industry today with your complimentary full-conference passes.

Who Should Attend – General Counsel and Other Senior Legal Executives from Top Companies Attend SuperConference:

  • Chief Legal Officers
  • General Counsel
  • Corporate Counsel
  • Associate General Counsel
  • CEOs
  • Senior Counsel
  • Corporate Compliance Officers

The 12th Annual IC SuperConference will be held at the NEW Radisson Blu Chicago.
Radisson Blu Aqua Hotel

221 N. Columbus Drive

Chicago, IL 60601

Recent NLRB Memo Identifies “Hot Topic” Cases for 2012

Recently an article appeared in the National Law Review by Peter T. Tschanz of Barnes & Thornburg LLP regarding Hot Topic cases:

 

The NLRB recently circulated a memorandum asking all Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge and Residential Officers to begin tracking what the Agency has defined as “Hot Topic” Cases.  The categories include:

– Cessation of Dues Check-Off;

– Information Requests for Financial Records;

– Post Arbitration Deferral;

– Social Media; and

– Use of Employer e-Mail.

The memorandum provides insight into the types of issues likely to grab the NLRB’s attention in 2012.  The memorandum can be accessed here.

New NLRB Rule Speeds Union Elections

An article published recently in the National Law Review by John A. Ferguson Jr.Robert S. NicholsNancy M. O’Connor, and Lon R. Williams Jr. of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP covered the New Union Election Rules by the NLRB:

Time and Procedures for Employers to Respond to Union Election Petitions Are Eliminated or Reduced

Today the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) published in the Federal Register its new Rule that will change procedures for private sector union representation elections. The Rule becomes effective April 30, 2012. The Rule dramatically shortens the period between the filing of an election petition and the election unless the parties stipulate to the election date. The Rule also effectively eliminates pre-election challenges to NLRB rulings on such critical issues as the appropriate bargaining unit and eligible voters.

While the NLRB defends these changes predicting they “will reduce unnecessary litigation in representation cases and thereby enable the Board to better fulfill its duty to expeditiously resolve questions concerning representation,” the sure effect of these changes will be to reduce the time period—and thus the opportunity—for employers to communicate their views on unions with their employees and to respond meaningfully to union campaign efforts before an election is held.

Which Election Procedures Will Be Changed?

The specific amendments to the NLRB’s current rules of procedure include:

  • Authorizing NLRB hearing officers in pre-election hearings to limit evidence on any individual eligibility issue.
  • Expanding these hearing officers’ discretion over post-hearing briefs, including limiting the subjects that can be addressed, the amount of time for filing, and also determining whether a brief can be filed at all.
  • Eliminating the right to request pre-election review of a Regional Director’s rulings, requiring the request for review to be consolidated with any post-election requests for review of the Regional Director’s rulings on challenges and objections.
  • Eliminating the current 25-day waiting period between the Regional Director’s post-hearing Decision and Direction of Election and the election.
  • Limiting special appeals from rulings of the NLRB hearing officer or Regional Director to “extraordinary circumstances where it appears that the issue will otherwise evade review.”
  • Subjecting the current right to appeal a Regional Director’s post-election rulings on potentially outcome-determinative challenges and objections to the NLRB’s discretion.

What Changes That the NLRB Had Initially Proposed Are Not Included in Its New Rule?

The NLRB’s Final Rule implements only some of the more dramatic procedural changes that the NLRB had originally proposed in June 2011. Some of those proposed changes which are not included in the current Rule would have:

  • Required employers to directly provide the union—within two days of the Regional Director’s decision—each eligible employee’s name, telephone number, e-mail address, work location, shift and classification. Currently, only the employee’s name and home address are required to be provided by the employer to the Regional Director within seven days of the decision. The Regional Director then makes that information available to the union.
  • Set the pre-election hearing within seven days of the filing of the election petition and required that the non-petitioning party, such as an employer, submit a written statement of position with all substantive arguments before that hearing or risk waiving those arguments on appeal.

Has the NLRB’s Final Rule Been Challenged?

Yes.

  • On December 1, 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives passed theWorkforce Democracy and Fairness Act, which would allow a union representation election only after 35 days from the filing of the petition and would also require a two-week waiting period before the first hearing could be held on that petition.
  • On December 20, 2011, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Coalition for a Democratic Workplace filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the Rule, claiming that employers will be denied a fair opportunity to explain to employees the consequences of unionizing.

© 2011 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

Status Update: Fired – Social media is a great way to market a company. It is also a great way to get fired from one.

Recently featured in the National Law Review an article by Emily Holbrook of Risk Management Magazine about Social Media:

Time Line: Status Update — Fired Social media is a great way to market a

company. It is also a great way to get fired from one.

Facebook recently reached a milestone: 750 million active users worldwide. With people spending more than 700 billion minutes per month on the social network, it’s no wonder many users get themselves in trouble for what they post. For example, a juror in the UK was dismissed after she disclosed sensitive case information on her Facebook profile, asking her friends to participate in a poll to help her decide “which way to go” with the verdict. But repercussions from other comments on social media sites have been much worse.

Many employees have been terminated over certain comments or pictures, and the National Labor Relations Board says it has been receiving an increased number of social media cases as this new mode of communication continues to grow in popularity and users continue to post with reckless abandon.

June 2008

20-year-old James Brennan was fired from his job at a store in central London after posting a derogatory statement about his employers. He believed his comment was visible only to his friends, but a colleague printed off the remark and showed it to his boss. Brennan claimed that what he wrote was private and done on his own time. Nonetheless, he was fired on the spot.

November 2008

Virgin Atlantic canned 13 flight attendants after they criticized the airline’s flight safety standards and described passengers as “chavs” (a derogatory term used in the UK referring to aggressive, arrogant, lower-class young adults) on Facebook. Management at Virgin Atlantic fired the 13 individuals due to their “totally inappropriate behavior” that “brought the company into disrepute.”

April 2009

An unnamed employee of Nationale Suisse, an international insurance company, lost her job after supervisors realized she was using Facebook after calling in sick because she was suffering from a migraine and needed to lie in a dark, quiet room. The woman claimed she was not using her computer, but instead accessing the site from her iPhone. The company said it lost trust in the employee while the woman accused the company of setting up fictitious “friends” to spy on her account activity.

August 2009

Georgia public school teacher Ashley Payne was given a “resignation or suspension” ultimatum after her supervisors saw that her Facebook profile included a photo of her taken during her European vacation that showed her clutching a glass of wine in each hand. Along with the photo, one of her status updates contained an expletive (though she was merely referring to the official name given a local bingo night). Payne sued the school, making hers one of several lawsuits filed within the past few years involving teachers who feel they were unfairly dismissed because of the contents of their Facebook pages.

April 2010

Tania Dickinson, a ministry employee in Auckland, New Zealand, was fired over a Facebook comment in which she described herself as a “very expensive paperweight” who is “highly competent in the art of time wastage, blame-shifting and stationary [sic] theft.” The Employment Relations Authority refused to uphold a complaint from Dickinson that she was unfairly dismissed.

June 2010

24-year-old Andrew Kurtz worked as a “Pittsburgh Pierogi” mascot for the Pittsburgh Pirates baseball franchise, a job that entailed racing around the field between innings and greeting fans. Kurtz was also a diehard Pirates fan and when he found out team president Frank Coonelly decided to keep general manager Neal Huntington and manager John Russell on for another season, he took to Facebook, stating “Coonelly extended the contracts of Russell and Huntington through the 2011 season. That means a 19-straight losing streak. Way to go Pirates.” He was immediately fired.

February 2011

Dawnmarie Souza, an employee of American Medical Response, a Connecticut ambulance service, took to Facebook to criticize her supervisor and other coworkers. Soon after, she was terminated from her position. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) promptly brought the wrongful termination complaint before an administrative court, arguing that the company’s social media policy was too broad and that Souza’s termination violated the National Labor Relations Act, which keeps employers from penalizing employees for talking about unionization or working conditions. A settlement was reached in which Souza did not return to work but the company changed its social media policy.

September 2011

In October 2010, five employees of the minority advocacy group Hispanics United of Buffalo were fired for complaining about working hours at their nonprofit employer. The five decided to fight back, taking their case to the NLRB. There, administrative law judge Arnold Amchan, in a first-of-its-kind decision, ruled that after-hours Facebook wall complaints about being over-worked constituted legitimate “concerted activity” within the meaning of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. He ordered the organization to reinstate the five employees along with back pay.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor.

Copyright 2011 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

California Appellate Court Issues a Decision That Mutual of Omaha Insurance Agents Qualify as Independent Contractors as a Matter of Law

From a recent posting in the National Law Review an article by attorney Thomas R. Kaufman of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP regarding the way insurance companies treat their independent agents:

December 31, 2011, as a final act for the year, the First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal issued a good appellate decision for employers on the issue of independent contractor status, Arnold v. Mutual of Omaha. The case creates a veritable roadmap for insurance companies on how to treat agents so that they maintain their status as independent contractors rather than employees.

The Key Facts

Ms. Arnold worked as a non-exclusive insurance agent for Mutual of Omaha, which meant she was authorized to sell their products but was free to (and did) sell products of other insurance companies. Nonetheless, she claimed she was actually an employee rather than an independent contractor (IC), and that she therefore was entitled to recover for reimbursement of expenses and waiting time penalties for unpaid final wages on behalf of herself and a purported class of similarly situated agents. The factual record was very strong for the defense as to the limited control Mutual of Omaha exercised over Arnold (and its other agents):

  1. The contract Arnold signed with Mutual of Omaha expressly stated that the parties understood it was an independent contractor agreement.
  2. Her chief duties were to procure and submit insurance applications, collect money, and service clients.
  3. She was compensated entirely on commissions for products sold, with a chargeback if money was uncollected or refunded.
  4. She received no performance evaluations and nobody at Mutual of Omaha monitored or supervised her work schedule.  Plaintiff decided when, where, and to whom she would market insurance.
  5. Although Mutual of Omaha provided some training on its products and sales techniques, it was not mandatory for ICs to take the training.  The only mandatory training was as to compliance with certain state insurance laws and regulations.
  6. Mutual of Omaha provided some office space if agents wanted to use it, but it was optional, and agents had to pay for the “workspace and telephone service.”  Mutual of Omaha also did not pay for business cards or any other business expenses, although it provided certain services for a fee if an IC wanted them.
  7. Under the IC agreement in place, either party could terminate the relationship at any time with or without cause, or if Arnold failed to sell a Mutual of Omaha product for 180 days.

On this record, the trial court granted summary judgment to Mutual of Omaha that Arnold was an independent contractor rather than an employee.  Arnold appealed.

What Makes the Case Noteworthy

The court of appeal affirmed, declaring that it was not even a close case.  As a preliminary matter, the court held the common law test of employee v. IC applies to claims under Labor Code Section 2802.  This is a multi-factor test (roughly 10 factors depending how you count them), codified in a decision called S.G. Borelli & Sons, Inc. v. DIR, 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989).  This holding is not exactly earth-shaking as the plaintiff’s argument of statutory interpretation was not particularly cogent.  It is the summary judgment aspect of the case that makes it notable, because the case sets forth a pretty good roadmap of what an insurance company who wants to have independent contractor agents should follow to preclude a lawsuit that the agents are really employees.  The court pointed to the existence of undisputed facts on several specific issues as justifying summary judgment:

“After a careful review of the opposing evidence, we find nothing that raises a material conflict with the supporting evidence summarized above. The salient evidentiary points established Arnold used her own judgment in determining whom she would solicit for applications for Mutual’s products, the time, place, and manner in which she would solicit, and the amount of time she spent soliciting for Mutual’s products. Her appointment with Mutual was nonexclusive, and she in fact solicited for other insurance companies during her appointment with Mutual. Her assistant general manager at Mutual’s Concord office did not evaluate her performance and did not monitor or supervise her work. Training offered by Mutual was voluntary for agents, except as required for compliance with state law. Agents who chose to use the Concord office were required to pay a fee for their workspace and telephone service. Arnold’s minimal performance requirement to avoid automatic termination of her appointment was to submit one application for Mutual’s products within each 180-day period. Thus, under the principal test for employment under common law principles, Mutual had no significant right to control the manner and means by which Arnold accomplished the results of the services she performed as one of Mutual’s soliciting agents.”

The court mentioned that several other factors further tilted in Mutual of Omaha’s favor, but it appears that establishing undisputed facts on the above items would generally be sufficient to support summary judgment.  Furthermore, the court recognized that a plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment simply by raising a triable issue of fact on one or two minor factors of IC status.  Rather, the court held that if a reasonable factfinder considering all of the evidence together could not conclude that the agent was an employee, the employer is entitled to judgment:

“The existence and degree of each factor of the common law test for employment is a question of fact, while the legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts is a question of law. (Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp. (N.D. Cal. 2009) 656 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1136.) Even if one or two of the individual factors might suggest an employment relationship, summary judgment is nevertheless proper when, as here, all the factors weighed and considered as a whole establish that Arnold was an independent contractor and not an employee for purposes of Labor Code sections 202 and 2802. (SeeVarisco, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106.)”

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

The 16th Annual National Institute on the Gaming Law Minefield

The National Law Review is pleased to inform you of the 16th Annual National Institute on the Gaming Law Minefield:

ABA Gaming Law 2012

Gaming Law Minefield 2012

Event Information

When

February 23 – 24, 2012

Where

  • Green Valley Ranch Resort & Spa
  • 2300 Paseo Verde Pkwy
  • Las Vegas, NV, 89101
  • United States of America

Program Description

The Gaming Law Minefield National Institute is one of the most comprehensive, state-of-the-law gaming programs available. Program attendees have consistently rated the program as a valuable
educational experience that provides participants with the opportunity to meet and talk with a wide variety of gaming law experts and leading state and Native American regulators.

  • The program will discuss revolutionary legal, regulatory, and ethical issues confronting both commercial and Native American gaming.
  • Two hours of ethics credit will be available.
  • Learn about global anti-corruption initiatives, Internet gaming, and the challenges faced
    by commercial and Native American gaming.
  • Gain knowledge on the latest techniques to cope with problem gamblers.

Who should attend:

Attorneys, compliance officers, Native American leaders, regulators, and legislators will gain invaluable insights into current trends, opportunities, and obstacles in the gaming industry.