Navigating the EU AI Act from a US Perspective: A Timeline for Compliance

After extensive negotiations, the European Parliament, Commission, and Council came to a consensus on the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (the “AI Act”) on Dec. 8, 2023. This marks a significant milestone, as the AI Act is expected to be the most far-reaching regulation on AI globally. The AI Act is poised to significantly impact how companies develop, deploy, and manage AI systems. In this post, NM’s AI Task Force breaks down the key compliance timelines to offer a roadmap for U.S. companies navigating the AI Act.

The AI Act will have a staged implementation process. While it will officially enter into force 20 days after publication in the EU’s Official Journal (“Entry into Force”), most provisions won’t be directly applicable for an additional 24 months. This provides a grace period for businesses to adapt their AI systems and practices to comply with the AI Act. To bridge this gap, the European Commission plans to launch an AI Pact. This voluntary initiative allows AI developers to commit to implementing key obligations outlined in the AI Act even before they become legally enforceable.

With the impending enforcement of the AI Act comes the crucial question for U.S. companies that operate in the EU or whose AI systems interact with EU citizens: How can they ensure compliance with the new regulations? To start, U.S. companies should understand the key risk categories established by the AI Act and their associated compliance timelines.

I. Understanding the Risk Categories
The AI Act categorizes AI systems based on their potential risk. The risk level determines the compliance obligations a company must meet.  Here’s a simplified breakdown:

  • Unacceptable Risk: These systems are banned entirely within the EU. This includes applications that threaten people’s safety, livelihood, and fundamental rights. Examples may include social credit scoring, emotion recognition systems at work and in education, and untargeted scraping of facial images for facial recognition.
  • High Risk: These systems pose a significant risk and require strict compliance measures. Examples may include AI used in critical infrastructure (e.g., transport, water, electricity), essential services (e.g., insurance, banking), and areas with high potential for bias (e.g., education, medical devices, vehicles, recruitment).
  • Limited Risk: These systems require some level of transparency to ensure user awareness. Examples include chatbots and AI-powered marketing tools where users should be informed that they’re interacting with a machine.
  • Minimal Risk: These systems pose minimal or no identified risk and face no specific regulations.

II. Key Compliance Timelines (as of March 2024):

Time Frame  Anticipated Milestones
6 months after Entry into Force
  • Prohibitions on Unacceptable Risk Systems will come into effect.
12 months after Entry into Force
  • This marks the start of obligations for companies that provide general-purpose AI models (those designed for widespread use across various applications). These companies will need to comply with specific requirements outlined in the AI Act.
  • Member states will appoint competent authorities responsible for overseeing the implementation of the AI Act within their respective countries.
  • The European Commission will conduct annual reviews of the list of AI systems categorized as “unacceptable risk” and banned under the AI Act.
  • The European Commission will issue guidance on high-risk AI incident reporting.
18 months after Entry into Force
  • The European Commission will issue an implementing act outlining specific requirements for post-market monitoring of high-risk AI systems, including a list of practical examples of high-risk and non-high risk use cases.
24 months after Entry into Force
  • This is a critical milestone for companies developing or using high-risk AI systems listed in Annex III of the AI Act, as compliance obligations will be effective. These systems, which encompass areas like biometrics, law enforcement, and education, will need to comply with the full range of regulations outlined in the AI Act.
  • EU member states will have implemented their own rules on penalties, including administrative fines, for non-compliance with the AI Act.
36 months after Entry into Force
  • The European Commission will issue an implementing act outlining specific requirements for post-market monitoring of high-risk AI systems, including a list of practical examples of high-risk and non-high risk use cases.
By the end of 2030
  • This is a critical milestone for companies developing or using high-risk AI systems listed in Annex III of the AI Act, as compliance obligations will be effective. These systems, which encompass areas like biometrics, law enforcement, and education, will need to comply with the full range of regulations outlined in the AI Act.
  • EU member states will have implemented their own rules on penalties, including administrative fines, for non-compliance with the AI Act.

In addition to the above, we can expect further rulemaking and guidance from the European Commission to come forth regarding aspects of the AI Act such as use cases, requirements, delegated powers, assessments, thresholds, and technical documentation.

Even before the AI Act’s Entry into Force, there are crucial steps U.S. companies operating in the EU can take to ensure a smooth transition. The priority is familiarization. Once the final version of the Act is published, carefully review it to understand the regulations and how they might apply to your AI systems. Next, classify your AI systems according to their risk level (high, medium, minimal, or unacceptable). This will help you determine the specific compliance obligations you’ll need to meet. Finally, conduct a thorough gap analysis. Identify any areas where your current practices for developing, deploying, or managing AI systems might not comply with the Act. By taking these proactive steps before the official enactment, you’ll gain valuable time to address potential issues and ensure your AI systems remain compliant in the EU market.

White House Publishes Revisions to Federal Agency Race and Ethnicity Reporting Categories

On March 28, 2024, the White House unveiled revisions to the federal statistical standards for race and ethnicity data collection for federal agencies, adding a new category and requiring a combined race and ethnicity question that allows respondents to select multiple categories with which they identify.

Quick Hits

  • The White House published an updated SPD 15 with revisions to the race and ethnicity data collection standards for federal agencies.
  • The revisions change the race and ethnicity inquiry by making it one question and encouraging respondents to identify under multiple categories.
  • Federal agencies have eighteen months to submit an agency action plan for compliance and must bring all of their data collections and programs into compliance within five years.
  • The race and ethnicity categories are widely used across federal agencies and serve as a model for employers for their own data collection and required diversity reporting.

The White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published updates to its Statistical Policy Directive No. 15: Standards for Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity (SPD 15) with major revisions, the first since 1997. The revisions took immediate effect and were formally published in the Federal Register on March 29, 2024.

OMB stated that the revisions—which come after a two-year review process that included input from more than 20,000 comments, ninety-four listening sessions, three virtual town halls, and a Tribal consultation—are “intended to result in more accurate and useful race and ethnicity data across the federal government.”

Background

In 2022, OMB convened the Federal Interagency Technical Working Group on Race and Ethnicity Standard (Working Group) to review the race and ethnicity standards in the 1997 SPD 15 with the goal of “improving the quality and usefulness of Federal race and ethnicity data.” The race and ethnicity standards are used by federal contractors and subcontractors for affirmative action programs (AAPs) and by employers for federal EEO-1 reporting and U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) surveys. Many employers further use the race and ethnicity categories for their own recordkeeping purposes, and federal agencies use the categories for various surveys and federal forms.

In January 2023, OMB published the Working Group’s proposals, observing that the 1997 SPD 15 standards might no longer accurately reflect the growing diversity across the United States and evolving understandings of racial and ethnic identities. During the pendency of the review process, several justices of the Supreme Court of the United States criticized the imprecision of the 1997 race and ethnicity categories throughout the Court’s 237-page opinion in the June 2023 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard College (SFFA decision) case, in which the Court struck down certain race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.

Revisions to SPD 15

The updated standards closely follow the Working Group’s final recommendations and revise SPD 15 to require that data collection:

  • combine the race and ethnicity inquiry into one question that allows respondents to select multiple categories with which they identify,
  • add “Middle Eastern or North African” (MENA) as a “minimum reporting category” that is “separate and distinct from the White’ category,” and
  • “require the collection of more detailed data as a default.”

Under the 1997 standards, respondents were required to first select an ethnicity (i.e., “Hispanic or Latino” or “Not Hispanic or Latino”), and second, select a race category (i.e., “American Indian or Alaskan Native,” “Asian,” “Black or African American,” “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander,” or “White”).

The revised race and ethnicity categories for minimum reporting are:

  • “American Indian or Alaska Native”
  • “Asian”
  • “Black or African American”
  • “Hispanic or Latino”
  • “Middle Eastern or North African”
  • “Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander”
  • “White”

The updated SPD 15 further revises some terminology and definitions used and provides agencies with guidance on the collection and presentation of race and ethnicity data pursuant to SPD 15. Additionally, the update instructs federal agencies to begin updating their surveys and forms immediately and to complete and submit an AAP, which will be made publicly available, to comply with the updated SPD 15 within eighteen months. Federal agencies will have five years to bring all data collections and programs into compliance.

OMB noted that “the revised SPD 15 maintains the long-standing position that the race and/or ethnicity categories are not to be used as determinants of eligibility for participation in any Federal program.”

Looking Ahead

The new race and ethnicity categories have implications for employers as they use these categories for federal reporting compliance and their own recordkeeping purposes, including potentially influencing their own diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. Covered federal contractors and subcontractors must also use the categories in meeting their affirmative action obligations.

Still, the updated SPD 15 adds only one new minimum category. OMB recognized the tension with attempting to “facilitate individual identity to the greatest extent possible while still enabling the creation of consistent and comparable data.” One of the issues OMB identified as needing further research is “[h]ow to encourage respondents to select multiple race and/or ethnicity categories when appropriate by enhancing question design and inclusive language.” The agency is also establishing an Interagency Committee on Race and Ethnicity Statistical Standards that will conduct further research and regular reviews of the categories every ten years, though OMB may decide to review SPD 15 again at any time.

Employers may want to take note of the revisions to SPD 15 as these changes will directly impact many employers’ compliance and recordkeeping obligations. They may also want to be on the lookout for additional guidance from federal agencies, such as the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) and the EEOC, on when and how to implement the standards. Relevant agencies will have to take action before employers will be required to implement the new standards. In the meantime, employers may want to consider whether to use the government’s new or existing categories when shaping their DEI initiatives, as racial and ethnic identities and terminology continue to evolve.

Unlocking India’s Space Potential: India Liberalizes Foreign Direct Investment Regime

  1. The foreign investment policy was ambiguous about space activities beyond satellites, leading to different interpretations.
  2. Some companies made investments basis the view that investments in the activities not listed under the FDI policy in this sector could be made up to 100% without prior government approval.
  3. The proposed FDI Space Policy addresses these concerns and allows 100% foreign investments under the automatic and governmental approval route.
  4. Formal notification is awaited which will make this policy effective as law.

Background

India currently is home to more than 200 space start-ups, and the space sector in India has attracted USD 124.7 million investment in the year 2023. The existing foreign investment policy of India (“FDI Policy”) requires foreign investors to obtain prior government approvals for investing in the space sector, particularly for the establishment of satellites.

Considering the growth of this sector, the Indian government has been periodically releasing policies / notifications, establishing organizations, etc. with the intent to allow more private participation in this sector. This has led to the establishment of an organization to promote the sector called the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre in 2020, as well as the introduction of the National Geospatial Policy, 2022 followed by the Indian Space Policy, 2023.

On February 21, 2024, the Union Cabinet approved amendments to the Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) policy and communicated it in a press release (“FDI Space Policy”) which proposes to liberalize investments in the space sector. However, a formal notification from the relevant authorities is still awaited for the amendments to become enforceable as law.

Existing FDI Policy 

Existing foreign investment limits in the space sector are provided under the Schedule I of Foreign Exchange Management Act (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019 (“NDI Rules”). The current norms do not recognize “space” as a sector in itself. Instead, the space related activities are primarily captured under the head – “satellites – establishment and operation”. 100% foreign investment is allowed in this sector but the same is subject to approval from the government along with compliance of sectoral guidelines from Department of Space / Indian Space Research Organisation. In essence, all foreign investments in companies undertaking the activities of satellites-establishment and operations require government approval.

Reforms – New FDI Space Policy 

The proposed FDI Space Policy allows 100% foreign investment in the space sector and has also created sub-categories, entry route and investment thresholds for various space related activities, which are as follows:

S.no. Activity FDI Thresholds
1. Satellites-manufacturing & operation, satellite data products and ground segment & user segment Up to 74% under automatic route

and beyond 74% (up to 100%) under government route

2. Launch vehicles and associated systems or subsystems, creation of spaceports for launching and receiving spacecraft Up to 49% under automatic route and beyond 49% (up to 100%) under government route
3. Manufacturing of components and systems/ sub-systems for satellites, ground segment and user segment Up to 100% under automatic route

Analysis 

(i) Status of existing investments

The existing FDI policy did not include space sector related activities (other than satellites-establishment and operation) such as launch vehicle business, ground segment, user segment, sub-component / sub-systems manufacturing, data products etc.

Various stakeholders argued that since the existing FDI policy did not specify certain activities such as launch vehicles, data sets, manufacturing of space systems / components etc. under the head of “satellites-establishment and operation”, foreign investments in such cases should be permitted up to 100% under the automatic route. This was based on the interpretation under the FDI policy that sectors / activities not specifically listed or prohibited, are permissible for foreign investment up to 100% under the automatic route, subject to sectoral conditionalities. Relying on the same, foreign investors made investments in space start-ups whose activities were not explicitly listed or regulated under the current FDI regime without obtaining government approval.

Some stakeholders interpreted “satellites” very broadly and took a more conservative view that all space related activities required government approval. Similarly, there were overlaps in activities / interpretation of the FDI policy under the sectors of defence, telecom and manufacturing.

The space liberalization norms under the proposed FDI Space Policy may have actually de-liberalized this sector for certain companies who received investments in allied space activities based on the understanding that sectors / activities not specifically listed or prohibited, should be eligible for foreign investments up to 100% under the automatic route. In such cases where the investment thresholds under the proposed FDI Space Policy may be breached, it would be interesting to see the government’s approach including granting approvals on a post-facto basis.

(ii) Sub- categorizations of activities within the Space Sector

While the government has acknowledged the sub-categories of activities within the space sector, it hasn’t clarified its rationale for providing different foreign investment thresholds for such activities. Relaxed thresholds for satellites (i.e., 74% under the automatic route (up to 100% under government route)) and its sub-components (i.e., 100% under the automatic route) encourage foreign participation in commercial aspects of space activities. In contrast, the 49% cap on foreign investments under the automatic route (up to 100% under government route) on launch vehicles acknowledge their dual-use potential for both civilian and defence purposes. This sensitivity, combined with the launching state’s heightened liability under Article II of the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (“Liability Convention”), may be viewed as necessitating greater government oversight.

However, industry players have also criticized the differential treatment provided to launch vehicles vis-a-vis satellites. They believe, in essence, both industries have similar sensitivity issues and hence should be treated at par from a foreign investment perspective. Hence, the difference in foreign investment thresholds require more explanation from the government.

(iii) Satellite Data Products

The term ‘satellite data products’ has not been defined under the proposed FDI Space Policy but investments in such activities would be permitted up to 74% under the automatic route (up to 100% under government route). This may lead to some conflict from a satellite imagery / data perspective read along with the liberalized Geospatial Guidelines, 2021. (“Geospatial Guidelines”).

The Geospatial Guidelines largely permit foreign investments up to 100% under the automatic route with limited foreign investment restrictions especially if the activity is for (i) creation / ownership / storage of geospatial data of a certain accuracy (as defined under the Geospatial Guidelines); (ii) terrestrial mobile survey, street view survey and surveying activities in Indian territorial waters. There seems to be no specific restriction on satellite generated data (other than the above) under the Geospatial Guidelines. Thus, the proposed FDI Space Policy may end up limiting foreign investments for activities relating to Satellite Data Products (which would include geo-spatial data) in which otherwise is viewed to be permissible up to 100% under the automatic route.

The government should also define what constitutes satellite data products and to the extent possible it would be recommended that foreign investment up to 100% should be permitted under the automatic route.

Additionally, the rationale for capping investments for satellite data products under the proposed FDI Space Policy seems unclear as these are data sets which could be regulated under the Geospatial Guidelines and the new Indian privacy law.

(iv) Where are sub-components for launch vehicles covered?

The proposed FDI Space Policy explicitly covers the manufacturing of components and systems / sub-systems for the satellite sector, ground & user segment, and permits 100% FDI under automatic route for the same. With the absence of similar language for components in launch vehicles, it could imply its inclusion under the broader launch vehicle category, hence falling under the 49% automatic route (up to 100% under government route). Alternatively, it could also be argued since it is not expressly specified, the same could be covered under the 100% automatic route category. However, considering the critical role of such components in the sector’s development, clarification from the government would provide much-needed comfort especially if the components are dual use (satellite and launch vehicle usage).

(v) What about ground segment and user segment for launch vehicles?

Following the pattern observed with the satellite and ground segment categories, the absence of specific mention for the “ground segment & user segment” in the launch vehicle section raises further questions. This omission could be an oversight or intentional, but the lack of clarity hinders transparency and predictability for potential investors. Further clarity on the inclusion from an industry perspective in the official amendment notification would ensure a comprehensive and consistent policy framework for the entire launch vehicle sector.

(vi) Were any sub-categories / activities missed?

As space activities may expand to include space mining, exploration, international space station construction, space tourism etc., India needs to proactively address these areas. Especially, if these should be interpreted for foreign investments up to 100% under the automatic route, as this would have a bearing on India’s ability to attract foreign investment while safeguarding national interests, technological competitiveness, and responsible stewardship of India in space.

Conclusion

While the proposed FDI Space Policy provides substantial liberalization, further clarity is awaited based on the formal notification which will make this effective as law. Ideally, the Government should provide definitions / explanations for the proposed categorization and sub-categorizations, and further clarity on the inclusions and omissions of activities which may be related to most space sector functions such as user and ground segments.

While the move towards liberalization significantly reduces government control over the space sector, its inherent interconnectedness with other regulated domains like telecommunications / geospatial cannot be ignored. Despite these challenges, the government’s willingness to open the space sector to foreign investments is a positive step offering greater confidence to foreign investors. Relaxation in the existing norms also signifies a supportive stance towards the industry, encouraging both domestic and international participation. Notably, India successfully attracted substantial foreign investment even during the era of full government control. Therefore, with the current reforms, a significant increase in foreign investments is expected.

Footnotes
[1] Rajya Sabha Questions, Department of Space, available at
https://sansad.in/getFile/annex/262/AU621.pdf?source=pqars
[2] Notification, Department of Space, available at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1988864
[3] Notification, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, available at
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2007876
[4] Article II of the Liability Convention provides that a launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft flight.

Dictionaries and the Law – Hunting, Poaching, and the Right to Food

The Law Court’s recent decision in Parker v. Department of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife is fascinating—it is a rare instance when the Court has been called upon to interpret and apply a new constitutional provision. The Maine Constitution has had relatively few amendments, but in 2021 Maine voters approved a “Right to Food Amendment.” Parker involved a challenge to Maine’s Sunday hunting law prohibition under the new amendment.

As is relevant here, the amendment provides that “[a]ll individuals have a natural, inherent and unalienable right to food, including the right to … grow, raise, harvest, produce and consume the food of their own choosing” for certain purposes, including nourishment. It then enumerates limitations on this right, conditioning the right on the requirement that the individual not commit “trespassing, theft, poaching or other abuses of private property rights, public lands or natural resources.”

The question in the case was whether the Maine law banning hunting on Sundays infringes on this right. In an interesting ruling, the Law Court said it did not. After reaching the straightforward conclusion that the plaintiffs could present a justiciable claim given the State’s denial of their request for a Sunday hunting permit, the Court took up the merits—and in so doing, raised some intriguing questions.

First, the Court accorded the Sunday hunting statute a presumption of constitutionality—even though the statute predated the constitutional amendment. But why? Normally the presumption accords the Legislature credit for seeking to act in accordance with existing constitutional limits. That rationale, the Court acknowledged, did not apply. The Court instead suggested that there are other reasons for according this presumption, but relied on cases stating that facial constitutional challenges are disfavored because they lack robust factual records and pose the risk of overbroad rulings. Those concerns seem to go to the particular vehicle for the challenge, not the presumed validity of the enactment itself. Isn’t the right answer, then, to apply the appropriate standard for facial challenges rather than apply a presumption? That point is at least debatable.

Second, the Court’s analysis of the amendment’s language raises interesting interpretive questions. The Court concluded that the term “harvest” includes hunting. The Court buttressed this conclusion by citing several authorities, including dictionary definitions, its own prior precedent, and statutory definitions. Based on these authorities, the Court reasoned, the amendment does include a right to hunt. The Court then observed that this right is subject to express limitations, including that the right does not include engaging in “poaching.” Citing dictionary definitions only, the Court then reasoned that the term “poaching” includes any illegal hunting. Thus, the Court held that the right to hunt does not include the right to hunt on Sundays, because the Legislature has made hunting on Sundays illegal.

One could imagine a potential criticism—does the reasoning in Parker render the right to hunt under the amendment meaningless? If the amendment is meant to protect the right to hunt, but does not circumscribe any law that renders hunting illegal, does the amendment protect hunting at all?

There are arguable critiques of the Court’s reliance on dictionary definitions. Two definitions cited, from Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary and Webster’s II New College Dictionary, suggest a broad definition of the term that includes any illegal taking of game. But query whether that is the ordinary understanding of the term. Various dictionaries, including Merriam Webster and Cambridge, suggest a primary meaning of “poaching” that relates to illegality in the manner in which the game is taken—i.e., taking game while encroaching on the land of another. Indeed, the Court’s citation to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines poaching as the illegal taking of game “on another’s land,” supports this ordinary reading. At the very least, the availability of a narrower common meaning suggests the need for careful reliance on dictionaries, including analysis of primary definitions and the word’s context.

As Justice Scalia and Brian Garner note in Reading Law, the availability of multiple meanings for common words places great importance on evaluating not just to dictionary definitions but also the word’s context to determine its most likely meaning. Here, there are multiple hints at the word’s meaning to be found in the amendment’s context. The amendment itself references poaching and “other abuses of private property rights, public lands or natural resources.” The reference to “other abuses of private property” renders a definition of “poaching” that requires some sort of trespass more likely. And broader context might suggest the same; as mentioned above, a reading of “poaching” that includes any law rendering hunting illegal seems (at first blush) to render the amendment circular, and thus meaningless at least in part—a result that is generally discouraged. Of course, there may be rejoinders, but Parker does not provide them.

As Parker illustrates, constitutional and statutory interpretation requires careful, contextual analysis, and it is incumbent on attorneys to equip the Court with thorough arguments. That’s what a good appellate brief—whether by a party or by an interested party filing an amicus—is for. But for now, Parker answers a narrow question under the Right to Food amendment, while leaving many other questions about its scope and application open.

For more news on State Constitution Interpretation, visit the NLR Constitutional Law section.

Best Practices for Associate Compensation

Welcome back to our in-depth exploration of compensation within law firmsIn our previous post , we emphasized the significance of establishing a robust compensation system to attract and retain top talent and keep them motivated. In this post, we’ll discuss the crucial components needed to make an effective compensation plan for associates within the firm.

Compensating associates is a multifaceted task that law firms tackle annually to attract and maintain a talented workforce. Unfortunately, numerous small to mid-sized firms lack a robust structure that anticipates market trends and internal changes, and they also often need a simplified process for determining raises and bonuses.

Key Considerations for Developing Compensation Plans for Associates:

Associate compensation programs should incorporate the following elements:

  • Market Competitiveness: How does the firm’s associate compensation compare with market standards and rival firms?
  • Progression: Does the firm have a consistent and progressive structure for raises and bonuses that aligns with its associates’ experience and performance progress?
  • Incentive Alignment: Does the firm incentivize behaviors aligned with its vision and priorities?
  • Transparency: Does the firm clearly communicate with associates about their earning potential over time and at specific experience and performance levels?
  • Feedback: Are associates given enough performance feedback to understand the relationship between their salaries, raises, bonuses, and performance?

Capacity and Performance Expectations

Establishing a compensation structure begins with assessing attorneys’ current and future economic and qualitative potential. Firms should project the expected performance and contributions over the first eight to ten years of an attorney’s career in the firm.

  • Production Capacity – How much work will the attorney handle, and what is the value of that work? Production metrics may include billable hours or caseload, expected billings and collections, and, by extension, rates and realization.
  • Qualitative Performance – Which skills does the attorney need to succeed in the position/ to create value? Consider legal skills, case management, business development contributions, compliance/ interpersonal skills, recruiting support, etc.
  • Profitability – How much economic value should the attorney create beyond their cost? (Expected profit or profit margin)

The qualitative increases in value and objective contributions to revenue and profit indicated in the table below provide an example of the most common factors. Contributions should be considered in the context of increasing long-term value and offering short-term profits.

 

INCREASES IN VALUEInvestment_Icon

Profitability_icon-1CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROFIT

  Quality of professional work Personal Productivity
   Work ethic

(consistency of quality and quantity)

Profitability of others

(supervision and training)

  Client relations and service Originations
  Personal development and accountability Recruiting profitable lawyers
   Business development contributions

(networking, publishing, speaking, etc.)

Business hygiene

(timekeeping, billing, collections)

  Cultural support
  Firm building

(recruiting, training, process development, etc.)

  Adding to the reputation of the firm

The table below indicates an example of expectations by experience level.

PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS

KEY

  Consistent 

  Approaching consistent 

  Optional

 Not expected at the experience level 

 

ECONOMIC FACTORS

EXPERIENCE (YR)

Productivity

Realization

Training Supervision

Profit Threshold

Billing Management

Origination

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

 

A firm may combine all economic scores and consider the aggregate result as a qualitative factor. As long as the selected system is consistently applied, room exists for customization.

 

QUALITATIVE FACTORS – WEALTH CREATION

EXPERIENCE (YR)

Work Ethic

Work Quality

Bar, Professional Civic

Content Publishing Speaking 

Business Development Competence

Recruiting Contributions

Client Relations and Service

Pro Bono

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

 

Designing a rewarding compensation strategy is essential for maximizing the value from your law firm’s legal team. This involves careful deliberation over economic and qualitative criteria. Balancing these factors and customizing your approach enables your firm to attract and retain top lawyers while nurturing a consistent organizational culture.

  1. Start by clearly defining the skill set that brings long-term value to your firm and reward attorneys accordingly to ensure retention of the most compatible talent.
  2. Employ strategies to recognize and financially reward lawyers who consistently excel in high-value areas such as work ethic, quality, and client service, thus motivating them to sustain their high performance.
  3. For firms with top lawyers nearing retirement, devise a compensation plan that encourages emerging talents to take on leadership roles, guaranteeing a smooth transition and enduring success.
  4. Recognize and remunerate specialized expertise appropriately, for instance, by providing incentives to skilled litigators in a trial-focused litigation firm.
  5. Acknowledge and reward qualitative achievements, like the publication of influential content, encouraging lawyers to align with the firm’s broader objectives.

It is also necessary to acknowledge the value of specialized expertise and reward it accordingly. For example, if trial experience is highly valued in your litigation firm, compensating successful litigators who excel in this area is an excellent strategy. Finally, recognizing qualitative accomplishments, such as publishing high-quality content, can motivate your lawyers to contribute to the firm’s mission.

A compensation strategy that considers both qualitative and economic performance is vital for motivating and retaining the best-fit individuals for your law firm. By extending recognition beyond mere base salary increments to contributions that exceed expectations, you uphold the fairness and prosperity of your organization.

Join us as we continue to explore compensation best practices for law firms. Stay tuned for upcoming articles that will provide in-depth insights and actionable guidance on creating compensation systems that not only draw in and retain top legal talent but also bolster the firm’s long-lasting prosperity and cultural ethos.

Governor Signs Bill to Exempt Certain Businesses from Fast Food Minimum Wage

On March 26, 2024, Governor Newsom signed Assembly Bill (AB) 610, which amends the definition of “fast food restaurant” to exempt restaurants in airports, hotels, event centers, theme parks, museums, and certain other locations from the requirements set forth under the Fast Food Council requirements.

Last year, Newsom signed AB 1228, which repeals the FAST Recovery Act but establishes a modified version of the Fast Food Council (Council) until January 1, 2029. The bill also sets forth the minimum wage increases for fast food workers, with an increase to $20.00 effective April 1, 2024.

The bill includes an urgency clause which means it takes effect immediately. As such the exempted businesses will not need to comply with the minimum wage requirements past in 2023.

Weather & Climate Risk Management Part IV: Taxation of Weather Risk Management Products

Are there differences in the way in which weather derivatives and weather insurance are taxed?

Yes. Weather insurance products, including parametric insurance, are taxed as insurance; and derivatives are taxed in accordance with the tax rules applicable to the particular type of derivative product held by the taxpayer. A business needs to carefully consider these tax differences to determine the best product or products to meet its weather risk management needs.

How is insurance taxed to a policyholder?

When a business buys weather insurance, it pays a premium to the insurance company so that the company assumes the business risks set out in the policy. Assuring the policy is purchased to manage a business’s legitimate weather-related risk, the premium is deductible under Internal Revenue Code (Code) § 162 as an ordinary and necessary business expense.

If insurance coverage is triggered and a policyholder receives a payout under the policy, the payout is not taxable up to the policyholder’s tax basis if the payment reimburses the policyholder for property damage or loss. In other words, payments under insurance policies are not taxable up to the policyholder’s tax basis because the payments simply restore (in whole or in part) the policyholder to the financial position it was in before it incurred the loss. If the reimbursement amount under the policy exceeds the policyholder’s tax basis, the amount it receives over its tax basis is treated as taxable income.[1]

Business interruption insurance covers losses (such as lost profits and ongoing expenses) from events that close or disrupt the normal functioning of the policyholder’s business. The payout amount is often based on past business results. Business interruption insurance proceeds are likely to be taxable to the policyholder because they compensate the policyholder for lost revenue.

To ensure that a policyholder receives the most favorable tax treatment, it must carefully document its business purpose for entering into the insurance, the amount of its tax basis, and receipt of the insurance proceeds.

How are derivatives taxed?

It depends on whether the taxpayer has entered into a futures contract, forward contract, option, swap, cap, or floor. The taxpayer must then consider its status in entering into each derivative: is it acting as a hedger, dealer, trader, or investor? The taxpayer must also determine whether it has made all the required tax identifications and elections. In dealing with derivatives, the taxpayer must go through this three-step process for each product it is considering. Hedgers and dealers receive ordinary income and loss on their derivative transactions, while traders and investors receive capital gain and loss.

Why might a taxpayer want to be treated as a hedger with respect to its weather derivatives?

A taxpayer seeking to use weather derivatives to manage its weather-related business risks typically wants to be treated as a tax hedger so that the gain or loss on its derivative transactions qualify as tax hedges. This would allow the taxpayer to match its derivative gains or losses with its weather-related income or losses. Because ordinary property generates ordinary income or loss, a business hedger typically wants to receive ordinary income or loss on its weather derivatives. In other words, a hedger wants to match the tax treatment it receives on its hedges with that of the items it is hedging. Many risk management transactions with respect to weather-related risks do not meet the hedge definition (see the discussed below). For a detailed discussion of the tax hedging rules, see the forthcoming Q&A with Andie, “Business Taxation of Hedging Transactions.”

What is required for a weather derivative to be treated as a tax hedge?

To qualify as a tax hedge, the transaction must manage interest rate fluctuations, currency fluctuations, or price risk with respect to ordinary property, borrowings, or ordinary obligations.[2] In addition to meeting the definition of a tax hedge, the taxpayer must comply with the identification requirements set out at Code §§ 1221(a)(7) and 1221(b)(2) and the tax accounting requirements set out at Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4.[3]

What is the tax analysis that a taxpayer should conduct to determine if its weather derivatives qualify as tax hedges?

When entering into a weather derivative, a taxpayer should conduct the following tax analysis: (1) is the transaction entered into in the ordinary course of its trade or business (2) primarily (3) to manage price risk (4) on ordinary property or obligations (5) held or to be held by the taxpayer. If the answer to all of these questions is “yes,” then the taxpayer has a qualified tax hedge if—but only if—it complies with all of the required identification rules set out in Code §§ 1221(a)(7) and 1221(b)(2) and as explained in Treasury Regulation § 1.1221-2. If the taxpayer cannot answer all of these questions with a “yes,” then the weather derivative transaction is not a tax hedge, and it is subject to the tax rules that apply to capital assets.[4] The requirement that a taxpayer must be hedging ordinary property, borrowings, or obligations means that favorable tax hedging treatment is not available for many legitimate weather risk management activities.

What types of assets, obligations, and borrowings qualify as ordinary property and ordinary obligations for purposes of the tax hedging rules?

Weather derivatives qualify as tax hedges if they can be tied to price risk with respect to ordinary assets or ordinary obligations. In many situations, however, weather derivatives are entered into to manage a taxpayer’s anticipated profitability, sales volume, plant capacity, or similar issues. These risks are not the transactions that receive tax hedge treatment.

Ordinary property includes property that if sold or exchanged by the taxpayer would not produce capital gain or loss without regard to the taxpayer’s holding period. Items included in a taxpayer’s inventory—such as natural gas or heating oil held by a dealer in those products—are treated as ordinary property that can be hedged. Qualifying hedges can also include hedges of purchases and sales of commodities for which the taxpayer is a dealer, such as electricity, natural gas, or heating oil. If a utility agrees to purchase electricity at a fixed price in the future, for example, the utility is exposed to price risk if it cannot resell the fixed-price electricity for at least the amount it paid to purchase that electricity. Accordingly, the utility could agree to sell electricity under a futures contract (short position) that would qualify as a tax hedge.

On the liability side of a business, the hedge could relate to a taxpayer’s price risk with respect to an ordinary obligation. An ordinary obligation is an obligation the performance of which (or its termination) would not produce a capital gain or loss. For example, a forward contract to sell electricity or natural gas at a fixed price entered into by a dealer is treated as an ordinary obligation. In addition, a utility that enters into a fixed price forward sales contract agreeing to sell electricity at a fixed price has an ordinary obligation to deliver electricity at that fixed price.

What sorts of weather derivative transactions are not tax hedges?

Many legitimate risk management activities do not qualify as tax hedges. Weather derivative transactions that protect overall business profitability (such as volume or revenue risk) are not directly related to ordinary property or ordinary obligations. As a result, weather derivatives entered into to protect a business’s revenue stream or its net income against volume or revenue risk are not tax hedges.

Many taxpayers in the normal course of their businesses enter into weather derivatives to manage volume or revenue risks of reduced demand for their products or services. These transactions are not tax hedges. The taxpayer is not managing a price risk (either current or anticipated) attributable to ordinary assets, borrowings, or ordinary obligations.

Take, for example, a ski resort or amusement park operator that enters into a weather derivative to protect itself against adverse weather conditions that are likely to result in a reduction in the number of skiers or amusement park visitors. The taxpayer’s risk management efforts in these cases either relate to its investment in its facility (which for the most part consists of real estate and business assets that are not taxed as ordinary assets) or to its expected revenue. Similarly, a power generator that hedges its plant capacity or its revenue stream with a weather derivative tied to the number of Cooling Degree Days would not meet the definition of a tax hedge.

Why don’t more weather derivatives qualify as tax hedges?

As part of Congress’ efforts to modernize the tax rules with respect to hedging, it specifically authorized the Treasury to issue regulations to extend the hedging definition to include other risks that the Treasury sets out in regulations.[5] The Treasury, unfortunately, has not proposed or issued any regulations extending the benefits of tax hedging. This means that weather derivative transactions entered into to manage weather-related volume or revenue risks do not qualify as tax hedges. In this situation, the taxpayer receives capital gain or loss on the derivative product.

What are some examples of weather derivatives that can qualify as tax hedges?

A weather derivative qualifies as a tax hedge if it manages the taxpayer’s price risks with respect to ordinary assets or obligations. Thus, a taxpayer entering into weather derivatives primarily to manage its price risk with respect to increased supply costs will meet the definition of a hedging transaction. Such a transaction manages the taxpayer’s price risks with respect to ordinary property.

If, for example, a commodity dealer buys a put option (or sells a call option) on a designated weather event to protect it against price risks with respect to its existing inventories or future fixed-price commitments, the dealer has entered into a qualified tax hedge, provided it meets the identification requirements.

A heating oil distributor with heating oil inventory (or forward contracts to purchase heating oil at a fixed price) might enter into a weather swap to protect itself from the risk of an unseasonably warm heating season. This swap should qualify as a tax hedge because the swap manages the distributor’s risk of a decline in the market price for its heating oil inventories (or a decline in its fixed-price forward contract purchase commitments) due to unseasonably warm weather.

If an electric utility enters into forward commitments to sell electricity at fixed prices for delivery in the summer cooling months, it may buy a call option on a designated weather event that would qualify as a tax hedge to the extent the option protects the utility against the risk of being unable to acquire or generate the electricity at a low enough price if the demand for electricity in the cooling season is higher than expected because of unseasonably warm weather resulting in higher electricity prices.

Conclusion

All organizations face weather and climate risks. As part of their enterprise-wide risk management, they have available to them a number of weather risk transfer tools. This series on weather and climate risk provides a detailed review of weather risk management. Organizations can look to standardized futures and option contracts traded on regulated commodity exchanges; they can enter into customized OTC weather derivatives designed with their specific weather risks in mind; they can put in place indemnity insurance; they can purchase parametric insurance; or they can mix and match multiple derivative products and insurance coverages to meet their specific organization’s needs. In Part I of this Q&A series on Weather & Climate Risk Management, we considered the landscape and context within which weather and climate decision making takes place, along with the overarching risk management approaches and principles that apply. In Part II, we looked at the details on the various weather risk management products. In Part III, we addressed the regulation of these products; and in Part IV, we reviewed the taxation of these various classes of products.


[1] Taxability is subject to a nonrecognition provision at Code § 1033(a) if the taxpayer complies with the requirements to purchase “qualified replacement property.” https://irc.bloombergtax.com/public/uscode/doc/irc/section_1033

[2] Treas. Reg. § 1221-2 and Code §§ 1221(a)(7) and 1221(b)(2).

[3] For a detailed discussion of the tax hedging rules see my forthcoming Q&A with Andie, “Business Taxation of Hedging Transactions” due out in Spring 2024.

[4] If the taxpayer is a dealer or a commodity derivatives dealer, the weather derivative would be an ordinary asset in the taxpayer’s hands.

[5] Code § 1221(b)(2)(A)(iii).

UNDER SURVEILLANCE: Police Commander and City of Pittsburgh Face Wiretap Lawsuit

Hi CIPAWorld! The Baroness here and I have an interesting filing that just came in the other day.

This one involves alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703, et seq., and the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, et seq.

Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703, et seq., a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he:

(1) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic or oral communication;

(2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication; or

(3) intentionally uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication.

Seven police officers employed by the City of Pittsburg Bureau of Police team up to sue Matthew Lackner (Commander) and the City of Pittsburgh.

Plaintiffs, Colleen Jumba Baker, Brittany Mercer, Matthew O’Brien, Jonathan Sharp, Matthew Zuccher, Christopher Sedlak and Devlyn Valencic Keller allege that beginning on September 27, 2003 through October 4, 2003, Matthew Lacker utilized body worn cameras to video and audio records Plaintiffs along with utilizing the GPS component of the body worn camera to track them.

Yes. To track them.

Plaintiffs allege they were unaware that Lacker was utilizing a body worn camera to video and auto them and utilizing the GPS function of the body worn camera. Nor did they consent to have their conversations audio recorded by Lacker and/or the City of Pittsburgh.

Interestingly, Lackner was already charged with four (4) counts of Illegal Use of Wire or Oral Communication pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703(1) in a criminal suit.

So now Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, including actual damages or statutory damages, punitive damages, and reasonably attorneys’ fees.

This case was just filed so it will be interesting to see how this case progresses. But this case is an important reminder that many states have their own privacy laws and to take these laws seriously to avoid lawsuits like this one.

Case No.: Case 2:24-cv-00461

PTO to Patent Examiners: Make Interpretation of Means-Plus-Function Claims Clear in the Record

On March 18, 2024, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a memorandum to patent examiners addressing means-plus-function and step-plus-function claim limitations and how to clearly articulate, in the prosecution record, the PTO’s interpretation of such claim limitations. The goal of the memorandum is to ensure consistency in connection with the examination of such limitations, provide both the applicant and the public with notice regarding the claim interpretation used by the patent examiner, and provide the applicant an opportunity to advance a different claim interpretation early in the prosecution.

As stated in 35 U.S.C. §112(f), “[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” The memorandum does not suggest any changes in interpretation of the statute.

One aspect of the memorandum is to remind examiners of the resources and guidance available when examining means-plus-function and step-plus-function claim limitations, specifically MPEP §§ 2181-2187 and refresh training. In accordance with the guidance, the primary steps when examining such claim elements include:

  • Determining whether a claim limitation invokes § 112(f)
  • Ensuring the record is clear with respect to invoking § 112(f)
  • Evaluating the description necessary to support a § 112(f) claim limitation under §§ 112(a) and (b).

To determine whether a claim limitation invokes §112(f), the guidance instructs examiners to employ the three-prong analysis set forth in MPEP § 2181, subsection I. Using this analysis, recitation of the terms “means” or “step” in association with functional language, rather than structure, material or acts for performing that function, should be interpreted as claim limitations invoking § 112(f). However, where these terms are accompanied by structure, materials or acts for performing the function, § 112(f) is not invoked. On the other hand, a limitation reciting functional language along with a generic placeholder term instead of “means,” which fails to recite sufficiently definite structure for performing the function, would nonetheless invoke § 112(f), according to a proper analysis. Examples of such generic placeholders include “mechanism for,” “module for,” “device for,” “unit for,” “component for,” “element for,” “member for,” “apparatus for,” “machine for” and “system for.”

An important caveat in the memorandum states that “[e]stablishing the interpretation of § 112(f) limitations in writing during prosecution is critical in supporting the agency goal of establishing a clear prosecution record.” The guidance advises examiners that form paragraphs are available in support of meeting this objective, which serve to inform “the applicant, the public, and the courts . . . as to the claim construction the examiner used during prosecution. This further informs the applicant, the public, and the courts (and the PTO for any post-grant review procedures) as to how the examiner searched and applied prior art based on the examiner’s interpretation of the claim.”

The memorandum further emphasizes the need to evaluate whether claims under §112(f) meet the written description and enablement requirements of § 112(a) and the definiteness requirement of § 112(b). Regarding the latter, the specification must clearly disclose a structure that is clearly linked to or associated with the function, which would be understood by one skilled in the art to perform the entire recited function. Further, “[f]or computer-implemented § 112(f) claim limitations, the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed specific computer function . . . [and] sufficiency of the disclosure of the algorithm must be determined in light of the level of ordinary skill in the art.”

The memorandum further states that an indefinite § 112(f) claim limitation “based on failure of the specification to disclose corresponding structure that performs the entire claimed function will also lack adequate written description and may not be sufficiently enabled to support the full scope of the claim under § 112(a).” Thus, in any § 112(f) analysis, an examiner must determine whether the specification establishes possession of the claimed invention and whether sufficient information is provided to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention.

For further details, see the memorandum here and the Federal Register notice here.

DOJ Plan to Offer Whistleblower Awards “A Good First Step”

The Department of Justice (DOJ) will launch a whistleblower rewards program later this year, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, announced today. Monaco stated that other U.S. whistleblower award programs, such as the SEC, CFTC, IRS and AML programs, “have proven indispensable” and that the DOJ plans to offer awards for tips not covered under these programs.

“This is a good first step, but the Justice Department has miles to go in creating a whistleblower program competitive with the programs managed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),” said Stephen M. Kohn.

“We hope that the DOJ will follow the lead of the SEC and CFTC and establish a central Whistleblower Office that can accept anonymous and confidential complaints. Such a program has been required under the anti-money laundering whistleblower law for over three years, but Justice has simply failed to follow the law,” added Kohn, who also serves as Chairman of the Board of the National Whistleblower Center.

According to Monaco, “under current law, the Attorney General is authorized to pay awards for information or assistance leading to civil or criminal forfeitures” but this authority has never been used “as part of a targeted program.” The DOJ is “launching a 90-day sprint to develop and implement a pilot program, with a formal start date later this year,” she stated.

While the specifics of the program have yet to be announced, Monaco did state that the DOJ will only offer awards to individuals who were not involved in the criminal activity itself.

“The Justice Department’s decision to exclude persons who may have had some involvement in the criminal activity is a step backwards and demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding as to why the Dodd-Frank and False Claims Acts work so well,” continued Kohn. “When the False Claims Act was signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863 it was widely understood that the award laws worked best when they induced persons who were part of the conspiracy to turn in their former associates in crime. Justice needs to understand that by failing to follow the basic tenants of the most successful whistleblower laws ever enacted, their program is starting off on the wrong foot.”

Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.