Consumer Financial Services Basics 2013 – September 30 – October 01, 2013

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming  Consumer Financial Services Basics 2013.

CFSB Sept 30 2013

When

September 30 – October 01, 2013

Where

  • University of Maryland
  • Francis King Carey School of Law
  • 500 W Baltimore St
  • Baltimore, MD 21201-1701
  • United States of America

Facing the most comprehensive revision of federal consumer financial services (CFS) law in 75 years, even experienced consumer finance lawyers might feel it is time to get back in the classroom. This live meeting is designed to expose practitioners to key areas of consumer financial services law, whether you need a primer or a refresher.

It is time to take a step back and think through some of these complex issues with a faculty that combines decades of practical experience with law school analysis. The classroom approach is used to review the background, assess the current policy factors, step into the shoes of regulators, and develop an approach that can be used to interpret and evaluate the scores of laws and regulations that affect your clients.

Is Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Through the Clean Air Act Becoming “Too Big to Fail”?

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In a much-publicized decision in 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) is authorized to regulate greenhouse gases (GHGs) through the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). A slew of recent cases have rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to assert common law claims for damages based on the consequences of past emissions of GHGs. The courts generally have found that USEPA has occupied the role of regulating GHGs, and challenges to the agency’s actions must be brought through the appropriate administrative channels. As the Supreme Court weighs whether to grant certiorari in the Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012), the case that addresses four USEPA GHG rules, the Supreme Court may have difficulty in changing course from the idea that GHGs should be regulated pursuant to the Clean Air Act.

Comer v. Murphy Oil et al., No. 12-60291 (5th Cir. May 14, 2013).

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Gulf residents sued numerous energy companies, alleging that the defendants’ emissions of GHGs exacerbated the severity of and damage caused by the Class 5 hurricane (hereinafter Comer I). The claims ranged from public and private nuisance, trespass and negligence, to fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy. The district court dismissed Comer I with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring these claims and the claims were non-justiciable because they involved a political question.

Comer I became mired in technical details and procedures, and ultimately the plaintiffs tried to refile the case to bring an entirely new lawsuit, Comer II. The Fifth Circuit dismissedComer II because the plaintiffs brought the same claims they alleged in Comer I, and the district court had already dismissed those claims on the merits. The court applied the doctrine of res judicata, which bars parties from litigating the same claim a second time, and, consequently, Comer II was barred by the district court’s original dismissal in Comer I. Because Comer I held that plaintiffs have no standing to challenge GHG emissions through common law claims, it supports the idea that GHGs should be regulated through the Clean Air Act, rather than addressed through litigation.

Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. et al., No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2012).

Kivalina is a village located on the far northwest shore of Alaska. The village had long been protected by the winter ice that persisted and protected the land mass itself. Due to melting icebergs and rising sea levels, the village land mass is eroding, and remains unprotected by the ice wall for much of the year. The village almost certainly will be either eroded into nothingness or inundated by the Arctic Ocean in the next twenty years. Kivalina sued a large group of energy companies, alleging that the GHGs emitted by them resulted in global warming and their village’s imminent destruction. Under a theory of common law public nuisance, the village sought damages to allow the relocation of the community.

The District Court held that political questions such as those raised by the allegations were not justiciable. Further, the court held the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they could not show that the named defendants likely caused the injuries, nor could the injuries be traced to an act of any of the defendants.

The Ninth Circuit agreed but expounded on the role of federal common law in pollution cases. The Court noted that federal common law has developed to fill gaps arising in cases of transboundary pollution and that those cases generally arise as nuisance claims. Despite its acknowledgement that nuisance claims can be used to regulate pollution, the Ninth Circuit explained that where a statute directly addresses the underlying issue, developing a federal common law was not necessary to address the issue. Accordingly, because the Supreme Court found that Congress acted through the Clean Air Act to address GHG pollution inMassachusetts v. EPA, filling the gap with federal common law (or public nuisance claims) was not necessary. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found that federal common law does not fill a gap solely based on the type of relief requested. In other words, the plaintiffs inKivalina sought damages rather than emission reduction, the latter being the type of relief afforded by the Clean Air Act. Although the plaintiffs’ requested relief was not available under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Air Act still displaced federal common law and prevented plaintiffs from seeking damages through a common law claim (such as public nuisance).

Consequently, Kivalina, like Comer, supports the idea that USEPA is charged with regulation of GHGs through the Clean Air Act.

Public Trust Doctrine Cases

Along a similar avenue, a number of public trust doctrine cases have been filed on behalf of children since 2011. In these cases, the plaintiffs allege that children’s futures are being affected by the lack of action to regulate GHGs, and they request that the various agencies cited in the lawsuits — primarily USEPA and Department of the Interior — take immediate action to reduce GHGs. These cases use the public trust doctrine as the basis of the complaint by alleging that the atmosphere is a common resource that must be managed for the public good and the agencies have failed to properly manage that resource. These cases have generally been dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.See Alec L. v. Perciasepe, No. 11-cv-2235 (D.D.C. May 22, 2013); Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, No. D-101-cv-2011-01514 (D.N.M. July 14, 2012); Alec L. v. Jackson, No. 1:11-cv-02235 (D.D.C. May 31, 2012); Loorz v. Jackson (D.D.C. April 2, 2012); Filippone v. Iowa Dep’t of Natural Resources, No. 2-1005, 12-04444 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013); Aronow v. State, No. A12-0585 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012).

In general, cases arising under the public trust doctrine face two challenges. First, the Supreme Court held in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, No. 10-218 (2012), that the public trust doctrine is a matter of state, not federal, common law and so a federal claim is not justiciable in federal court. Second, in AEP v. Connecticut, No. 10-174 (2011), the Supreme Court held that the role of regulating GHGs, and any consequence(s) of GHGs, has been occupied by the Clean Air Act and therefore challenges to the regulation of GHGs should be brought through the Clean Air Act rather than through a common law claim. Again, these cases are important for the future of GHG regulation because they affirm the agency’s role as the regulator of GHGs through the Clean Air Act.

Montana Envt’l Info. Center v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. cv-11-15-GF-SEH (D. Mont. June 14, 2013).

In another case affirming the role of the Clean Air Act in regulating GHGs, environmental groups claimed that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) failed to adequately consider climate change, global warming, and the emission of GHGs in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) before approving oil and gas leases on federal land in Montana in 2008 and 2010. The environmental groups argued that BLM’s failure to follow NEPA procedures would result in emissions of methane gas from the oil and gas leases at issue. The release of methane gas would cause global warming and climate change, which would present a threat of harm to their aesthetic and recreational interests in lands near the lease sites by melting glaciers, warming streams, and promoting the destruction of forests through the proliferation of plagues of beetles.

The district court dismissed the lawsuit because the environmental groups lacked standing to bring the claim. The court found that the environmental groups failed to demonstrate that BLM’s alleged failure to follow proper procedure created an increased risk of actual, threatened, or imminent harm to their recreational and aesthetic interests in lands near the lease sites. Although the environmental groups had local recreational and aesthetic interests at heart, the court found that the effects of GHG emissions are diffuse and unpredictable, and the groups presented no scientific evidence or recorded scientific observations to support their assertions that BLM’s leasing decisions would present a threat of climate change impacts on lands near the lease sites. Furthermore, the environmental groups did not show that methane emissions from the lease sites would make a meaningful contribution to global GHG emissions or global warming. The court therefore found that the environmental groups failed to establish injury-in-fact and causation. As a result, the court foreclosed another potential avenue for litigating claims surrounding GHG emissions, and potential plaintiffs now seem to be left only with direct challenges to USEPA’s regulations (or lack thereof).

Conclusion

The Court would mark a dramatic shift if it moved away from these cases. By the time the Supreme Court has the opportunity to review climate change regulation again, the Obama administration may have set a “too big to fail” bar with its climate policies. Regardless of what happens in the future, however, as of today, the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA appears to have had a pronounced impact, acceding to USEPA the authority to regulate GHGs through the Clean Air Act, and denying common law remedies for impacts tied to climate change.

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Motions To Adjourn – Do They End Or Continue A Meeting?

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I’ve previously remarked on the different usages attached to the word “adjourn”.  Often a meeting will end with a motion to adjourn.  Sometimes, a meeting will be prorogued – that is, continued to another date.  ”Adjourn” is derived from the Latin words “ad” and “diurnus”, meaning “to” and “daily” (a diurnal flower opens only during the day).  The word came into the English language through Old French “ajorner” (“soup du jour” is the soup of the day).  Based on etymology, an adjournment is a moving a meeting to another day.  This is the meaning given by William Shakespeare to Cardinal Campeius (Lorenzo Campeggio) when in Act II, Scene 4 of Henry VII Katherine of Aragon leaves her divorce proceedings:

So please your highness,
The queen being absent, ’tis a needful fitness
That we adjourn this court till further day:

Strangely, many meetings end with a motion to adjourn.  Those inclined to greater precision might move to adjourn the meeting sine die (i.e, without a day – ”diurnus” is an adjective derived from the Latin word for day, “dies”).  Thus, when a motion to adjourn sine die is reduced to its original meaning, it becomes a motion to move to a day without a day!

Corporations Code Section 602(b) allows for either meaning.  It provides:

The shareholders present at a duly called or held meeting at which a quorum is present may continue to transact business until adjournment notwithstanding the withdrawal of enough shareholders to leave less than a quorum, if any action taken (other than adjournment) is approved by at least a majority of the shares required to constitute a quorum or, if required by this division or the articles, the vote of a greater number or voting by classes.

If “adjournment” means the end of the meeting, the statute simply allows shareholders to continue to transact business even though some shareholders have left a quorum has been lost.  In this case, the “until adjournment” is stating the obvious – no shareholder action can be taken after the meeting has ended.  If “adjournment” means until such time as the meeting is continued, then the statute’s special dispensation for quorumless action ends when the meeting is continued.

In a future post, I’ll discuss the question of who has the power to decide to adjourn a meeting.

Details of Health Insurance Exchanges: Health and Human Services (HHS) Releases Proposed Rule

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On Wednesday, June 19, 2013, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a proposed rule that sets forth several new polices related to implementation of the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) health insurance exchanges (Exchanges) (also known as Health Insurance Marketplaces).

The proposed rule focuses in large part on program integrity with respect to qualified health plans (QHPs) offered through state-run Exchanges and federally-facilitated Exchanges (FFE). The proposed rule also addresses the resolution of certain QHP-related grievances and correction of improperly allocated premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions, provides states with new flexibility to operate only a Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP) Exchange, and makes certain notable technical corrections. Significant changes proposed by the rule are:

Program Integrity

  • State Exchanges: The proposed rule establishes oversight and financial integrity standards for state exchanges, including reporting and auditing requirements aimed at ensuring that consumers are properly given their choices of available coverage, qualified consumers correctly receive advance payments of the premium tax credit or cost-sharing reductions, and Exchanges otherwise meet the standards of the ACA.
  • FFE: The proposed rule provides details regarding oversight functions of the FFE, including records retention requirements and compliance reviews to be conducted by HHS and proposes the bases and processes for imposing civil monetary penalties in the FFE, as well as for decertifying plans from participation.

Resolution of Grievances

The proposed rule establishes a process for resolving “cases” received by a QHP issuer operating in an FFE (i.e., grievances regarding the operation of the plan, other than advance benefit determinations). While such cases generally must be resolved within 15 days, “cases involving the need for urgent medical care” must be resolved no more than 72 hours after they are received by the QHP, unless a stricter state standard applies. A determination regarding benefit tiers or plan design may fall within HHS’ proposed definition of a “case” for these purposes, so long as it is not a claim denial, which is subject to a different process.

Correcting Improper Allocation of Premium Tax Credits and Cost-Sharing Reductions

The proposed rule specifies the actions a QHP must take if it does not provide the appropriate premium tax credit payments or cost-sharing reductions. The proposed rule prohibits QHPs from recouping excess funds paid on behalf of a consumer or to a provider and requires QHPs to refund any excess payments made by enrollees within certain, specified timeframes.

State Flexibility to Operate Only a SHOP Exchange

The proposed rule allows states to operate only a SHOP exchange, leaving the operation of the Exchange serving the individual and small group markets to the federal government. To implement this change, HHS proposes to allow states that have received conditional approval to operate a state-based Exchange to modify their proposal to offer solely the SHOP Exchange.

States that have not received conditional approval do not have the option of operating only a SHOP in the 2014 plan year. However, for plan years 2015 and beyond, HHS will consider new proposals from states wanting to operate only the SHOP.

Technical Change

  • The proposed rule also amends the applicable definitions of “small employer” and “large employer” for purposes of the Exchanges to those that with an average of at least one, but not more than 100 employees and those with an average of at least 101 employees, respectively.

China to Strictly Regulate Secondment/Staffing Business Model

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Amendments to the PRC Labor Contract Law take effect on July 1, adding limitations on employment structures.

On July 1, 2013, amendments to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Labor Contract Law will take effect. The amendments increase the regulation of staffing and labor service businesses and discourage the use of secondment arrangements to avoid employer-related liabilities. The new law was published on December 28, 2012 and is an important development in China’s business community.

In recent years, increasing numbers of labor-intensive businesses, including state-owned banks and large multinationals, have used secondment services provided by staffing firms due to the difficulties involved in terminating employees and increased compliance costs in China. The secondment arrangements became attractive options among employers because the termination of such an arrangement was not subject to the numerous restrictions set forth in the labor law and regulations and avoided triggering severance obligations.

In light of the Chinese government’s amendments to the PRC Labor Contract Law, companies with operations in China should keep in the mind the below major requirements when formulating or executing compliance plans.

Qualification of Staffing Firms

To engage in a staffing business for the provision of secondment services, a company must meet the new law’s requirements, which include a minimum registered capital of at least RMB$2 million. In addition, a company must apply for a special permit before conducting any staffing business. As the law is silent on the qualifications of an applicant to obtain such a permit, the approval authorities have broad discretion. It is possible the Chinese government will control the number of service providers in a particular geographic area by limiting the number of permits issued. In practice, firms without permits may structure their business models as outsourcing businesses by arguing that they are not providing staffing services. However, because the distinction between “secondment” and “outsourcing” is not defined in any law or regulation, the regulatory authorities may treat the outsourcing model as secondment in substance and thus require a permit.

Equal Work, Equal Pay

The new law requires that the recipients of secondment services compensate the secondee for his or her services on the principle of “equal work, equal pay.” Although this concept has been in existence since the promulgation of the PRC Labor Law in 1994, it is not a defined term in any labor regulation, including the new law. Traditionally, benefits and other nonsalary items, such as equity incentive awards, have not been considered when applying the principle of equal work, equal pay. It remains to be seen how the courts and labor arbitration organizations will interpret the principle in the context of the new law.

Limitation on the Role of Secondees

The new law expressly states that, as a general principle, employers should hire employees through signed labor contracts and that secondment can be used only if the position is of a temporary, auxiliary, or replaceable nature. A position will be treated as temporary if it lasts no more than six months, but it is not clear whether the secondment term can be renewed upon expiration. “Auxiliary positions” are defined as noncore business positions without further explanation. In practice, it may often be very difficult to distinguish between core and noncore positions. For instance, while it can be argued that only bankers are core to the banking business, it can also be asserted that in-house lawyers should be core personnel as well because of their role in controlling and managing risks, which is critical to banks. The new law defines “replaceable positions” as those left vacant because the formal employees are on leave for personal or business reason, but it is not clear if replacement positions can be renewed.

Percentage Limitation on the Number of Secondees

The new law requires employers to strictly limit the number of secondees to a certain percentage of the total number of personnel (including secondees). Specific percentages will be announced by the State Council. It is generally understood that the percentage should be within a 10% to 30% range. A literal reading of the language of the new law suggests that any percentage limitation should be in addition to the requirement that the positions for secondees should be of a temporary, auxiliary, or replaceable nature. Thus, an employer may not argue that it complies with the law by limiting the number of secondees below the maximum percentage, regardless of the nature of a secondee’s position. In practice, however, employers or regulatory authorities may take the percentage cap as a safe harbor due to the difficulties of defining the nature of a secondee’s position.

Consequences of Breach

For staffing firms without a permit, the Chinese government may take away all illegal revenue and impose monetary penalties of up to five times the amount of the revenue. If a staffing firm or employer fails to comply with the law, the labor regulatory authority will order it to take corrective measures. A per person penalty ranging from RMB$5,000 to RMB$10,000 will be imposed if no remedial measures are adopted by the employer or staffing service provider. The new law is silent on whether a secondee may request that the employer convert him or her into a formal employee if the employer is found to be noncompliant. If the answer is no, what will happen to the existing secondment? Should the parties terminate the secondment and should the actual user of the employee’s service formally employ someone for the same position? May the secondee have a right of first refusal if the actual user is required to do so? These and other similar questions remain to be answered by further implementing rules from the State Council or judicial interpretation from the Supreme People’s Court.

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The Value of Having an In-House E-Discovery Process

Marcus Evans

Having an end-to-end process in place for electronic discovery (e-discovery) and litigation management is critical, says Raquel Tamez, Principal/Deputy General Counsel, Litigation, Computer Sciences Corporation and speaker at the marcus evans Chief Litigation Officer Summit Fall 2013. Even if outside counsel and multiple service providers are involved, Chief Litigation Officers (CLOs) need to have a process, identify the various stakeholders, and determine and define their respective responsibilities. According to Tamez, that is the best approach to take.

How should CLOs approach e-discovery?

It is different for each company. There are opportunities for cost savings if companies can bring some of the data collection and processing in-house, but not every company has that capability or the appropriate litigation profile to justify the time and expense of doing so.

Nevertheless, CLOs should have a “process” in place whether entirely outsourced or entirely in-house or a hybrid. Having an end-to-end process for e-discovery is critical. CLOs may be inclined to simply hand-off the e-discovery function to its outside counsel who, in turn, utilize various service providers with different data processing capabilities and various document review platforms. There is a lack of efficiency and cost effectiveness with this hand-off approach. The better approach is for the CLO to have a robust, documented, end-to-end e-discovery process and “playbook” that outside counsel is required to follow. The process, ideally, should identify the CLO’s exclusive, full-service e-discovery service provider or at a minimum a list of service providers that have been vetted by the CLO’s legal staff and the company’s IT personnel. CLOs will, necessarily, have to invest time and some money to create and build out the process. These front-end costs will result in significant cost-savings in the long-run.

What is the next step? How does this lead to cost savings?

The key to cost-savings here is to have a repeatable process and not an ad hoc approach where the wheel must be reinvented every time a piece of litigation or an investigation is initiated. If the e-discovery process is well-executed, all relevant stakeholders, will know what to do, when do it, how to do it, and who to go to if any doubt. The transparency in the process leads to defensibility and ultimately, savings in both time and monies.

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Chief Litigation Officer Summit – September 8-10 2013

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming Chief Litigation Officer Summit.

 

Chief Lit Officer Sept 2013

 

When: 8-10 September 2013
Where: The Ritz-Carlton, Amelia Island, FL, USA

The primary objective of the Chief Litigation Officer Summit is to explore the key aspects and issues related to litigation best practices and the protection and defense of corporations. The Summit’s program topics have been pinpointed and validated by leading litigation counsel as the top critical issues they face.

 

Third-Party Litigation Funding Comes of Age

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Law firm Chief Marketing Officers (CMOs) are on the front line of client development, and thus have an unobstructed view of how the legal market for complex litigation is developing. As budget pressures continue to weigh on corporate general counsel, the need for law firms to adjust their pricing to secure new clients is clearly being felt – some firms are now hiring specialty personnel to focus solely on the question of proper pricing. CMOs are thus actively speaking the lingua franca of today’s latest fee structures – from RFPs to AFAs and discounted fees.

Given this, it is surprising to discover that many otherwise business savvy CMOs know little about the emergence of commercial litigation finance. While some are keenly aware of the new industry’s progress – and eager to share their involvement in the funding of multiple cases – others are seemingly unfamiliar with the advent of specialist funding companies and the business development opportunities that they could present for them.

In fairness, due to the often confidential nature of commercial litigation finance, the commercial litigation finance industry has been somewhat constrained in publicizing itself. One example of this is at a recent conference I sat next to the sharp CMO of a top firm who asked me what litigation finance did and what company I worked for. I explained to him that we financed legal fees in multi-million dollar cases, and that we had recently funded a case involving his own firm!

At its most basic level, litigation finance is very straightforward. A third-party funds legal fees and expenses associated with a litigation or arbitration, in return for a portion of the ultimate proceeds (settlement or judgment), if any. Importantly, the funding is typically “non-recourse”, meaning that if there is no recovery for the plaintiff, the litigation financier receives no fee.

Claimants have historically found ways to fund their cases – with available capital, through a bank loan, or by agreeing to a contingency fee with their attorney. What has changed recently is the emergence of specialty finance companies that limit their work to the financing of litigation. These firms – which first appeared in Australia a decade ago, and are now active in the United Kingdom and the United States.  They typically invest in large-scale and complex commercial litigation, with investments (and thus legal fees) on the order of several million dollars.

Not all cases are appropriate for litigation financing, and certain criteria must be met as part of a careful due diligence process. Four considerations include:

  1. the merits of the claim – the case must stand a very strong chance of success on the law and facts;
  2. the ratio of costs/proceeds – the ratio of legal fees (and other costs) must be in proper proportion to the expected proceeds (to allow for reasonable costs associated with financing – typically a ratio of at least 1:4 is required);
  3. the duration of the proceedings – as the cost of financing will usually be related to the time the case takes to resolve (given the time value of money), notice must be paid to the expected length of the case; and
  4. the enforceability of judgment – it must be clear at the outset that, if the claim is successful, the plaintiff will be able to collect its judgment from the defendant.

Once an investment is made, litigation financiers are careful as to their involvement in a given case. Important rules of legal ethics are respected so that the funder does not interfere with case strategy, settlement decisions, or the attorney-client relationship. And, as mentioned above, the financing is typically kept confidential between the parties.

Given the challenge of drawing in new clients, law firm CMOs must leverage every available advantage. In several business development scenarios, the prospect of litigation finance can help:

  • Fee negotiations – in situations where a client would prefer to work with a given firm – but the client will not (or cannot) pay the firm’s standard hourly fees – financing can be used to pay such fees and allow the case to proceed;
  • Alternative to contingency fee – in situations where a firm is asked to act on a contingency fee basis, a litigation financier can step in to provide a similar result: the firm receives its standard hourly fees, paid for by the funder, which in turn only receives compensation in the event of a “win” (sometimes referred to as a “synthetic contingency”);
  • RFP (request for proposal) – in situations where an RFP has been issued by a potential client, a firm’s response may be better received if it makes proper mention of litigation finance as an innovative variation to AFA (alternative fee arrangements); and
  • Fee “fatigue” – in situations where an existing client involved in extended litigation has begun to express concern regarding mounting fees (perhaps on the eve of trial), litigation finance can offer immediate cash-flow relief and allow the firm to receive its full fees.

In short, litigation finance can offer law firm CMOs (and anyone involved in legal business development) a new tool with which to hammer out difficult pricing issues and fee structures for big-ticket litigation.

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Week in Review: June 10 – June 14, 2013

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CFPB Launches Regulatory Implementation Page

In an effort to streamline resources and better assist financial institutions implementing the many new rules and policies promulgated by the CFPB, the CFPB announced the launch of its “Regulatory Implementation” webpage, available here. The page is a one-stop shop for financial institutions looking for assistance in understanding some of the more salient differences and requirements of the rules. In addition to a number of quick-reference guides, the page also contains compliance guides for the following rules: (i) Ability to Repay/Qualified Mortgage; (ii) 2013 HOEPA Rule; (iii) Loan Originator Compensation; (iv) ECOA Valuations; (v) TILA HPML Appraisals; (vi) Escrows; and (vii) TILA and RESPA Servicing.

CFPB Examines Impact of Overdraft Practices on Consumers

On June 11, 2013, the CFPB released its “CFPB Study of Overdraft Programs” (the Report), which is available here. The Report was based upon (i) responses the CFPB received to a request for information published in the Federal Register in February 2012, and (ii) aggregate, institution-level information data and random samples of consumer checking accounts. Through the inquiry, the CFPB determined that overdraft programs are costly to consumers, provide substantial sources of checking account revenue for financial institutions, and vary widely across financial institutions.

The Report noted that overdraft practices employed by financial institutions are frequently very complex. Not only do the fees charged for overdraft protection vary, but many other differences exist throughout the industry, including: the number of times a consumer can be charged; whether there are caps on such charges; the amount of such caps; the scope of overdraft protection; and even the order in which transactions are posted. Each of these factors can play a significant role in determining the fees consumers will face. Accordingly, the CFPB’s report raises concerns about consumers’ ability to understand, navigate and anticipate fees.

In light of the Report’s findings, the CFPB has announced its intention to engage in further review of account-level data to better understand how differences in practices affect consumers.

CFPB Proposes New Redress System for Victims of Unlawful Activities

Under Section 1055(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the CFPB may obtain various types of monetary relief, such as restitution, refunds and damages, in both judicial and administrative proceedings. The CFPB collectively refers to such relief as “redress”, and can be required to receive such redress from a defendant and then distribute it to victims of unlawful activities. In order to better assist this process, which is known as “Bureau-Administered Redress,” the CFPB is proposing a new system of records that will enable the CFPB to manage distributions to consumers.

Specifically, the new system will enable the CFPB to: (i) track the collection, allocation and distribution of funds in the Civil Penalty Fund and redress monies; (ii) identify and locate victims who may receive such payments; (iii) determine the amounts that the CFPB will distribute to such victims; (iv) maintain associated account and financial information; and (v) develop reports to applicable tax officials regarding such payments.

The proposal, which is available here, states that any comments on the proposed system must be received no later than July 11, 2013. The new system will become effective on July 22, 2013, unless comments are received that result in a contrary determination.

CFPB Releases New Training Module to Combat Financial Exploitation of Older Americans

On June 12, 2013, the CFPB along with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), released a tool called “Money Smart for Older Adults.” The purpose of the module is to assist older adults (age 62 and older), as well as their caregivers, in avoiding and preventing financial exploitation. In addition, it provides information to educate consumers about planning for a secure financial future and making informed financial decisions.

The module, which consists of a scripted instructor guide, a participant/resource guide and Power Point slides, has been designed to be presented and administered by financial institution representatives, adult protective services agencies, senior advocacy organizations, law enforcement, and similar organizations and agencies.  The module is available, free of charge, on the FDIC website. Click here to view.

CFPB Assistant Director Tells Nonbanks to Quickly Implement Compliance Management Systems

During the American Bankers Association’s Regulatory Compliance Conference on June 12, 2013, Peggy Twohig, the CFPB’s Assistant Director for Supervision Policy, urged nonbank entities to implement compliance management systems without delay. She specifically pointed to many payday lenders, consumer reporting agencies, mortgage lenders and servicers, student lenders and debt collectors that have yet to implement these compliance management systems.

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Supreme Court Holds That Reverse Payment Patent Settlements Are Subject to Antitrust Scrutiny

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For over a decade, the antitrust enforcers at the Federal Trade Commission have challenged the type of patent settlement where a brand-name drug manufacturer pays a prospective generic manufacturer to settle patent challenges, and the generic manufacturer agrees not to bring its generic to market for a specified number of years. The lower federal courts have over the years rejected the challenges. However, on June 17, 2013, the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, and in a 5-3 decision held that such settlements are subject to rule of reason antitrust scrutiny. However, beyond that conclusion, the Court left the questions of how to structure and resolve the rule of reason issue to the lower courts and future cases.

As Justice Breyer’s majority opinion summarized the issue and its holding:

Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called a ‘reverse payment’ settlement agreement. And the basic question here is whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish competition in violation of the antitrust laws.

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) complaint claiming that a particular reverse payment settlement agreement violated the antitrust laws. In doing so, the Circuit stated that a reverse payment settlement agreement generally is ‘immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.’ And since the alleged infringer’s promise not to enter the patentee’s market expired before the patent’s term ended, the Circuit found the agreement legal and dismissed the FTC complaint. In our view, however, reverse payment settlement such as the agreement alleged in the complaint before us can sometimes violate the antitrust laws. We consequently hold that the Eleventh Circuit should have allowed the FTC’s lawsuit to proceed. (Citations omitted.)

The Court reasoned that even if the settlement agreement’s anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, that fact or characterization cannot immunize the agreement from antitrust attack. Justice Breyer found that “it would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well” and that “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’ — and consequently antitrust law immunity — that is conferred by a patent.”

Justice Breyer acknowledged that a conclusion of antitrust immunity would find some degree of support in a general legal policy favoring the settlement of dispute. However, he concludes that this factor should not “determine the result here” but is offset by five sets of considerations:

First, the specific restraint at issue has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition. To the Court, even though the settlement permitted the challenger to enter the market before the patent expired, the settlement also entrenched the patent holder for the period the challenger agrees to stay out of the market in exchange for a payment, delaying the potential for lower prices. As the Court put it, “The patentee and the challenger gain; the consumer loses.”

Second, these anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes prove unjustified. To be sure, in some circumstances, the reverse payment may amount to no more than a rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through the settlement, or compensation for other services the generic has promised to perform. In such circumstances, a patentee is not using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of no infringement. In the antitrust proceeding, the Court concludes, the patentee should have to show that such legitimate justifications are present.

Third, where a reverse payment threatens to inflict unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that harm about.

Fourth, the majority believes that an antitrust action would be administratively feasible. The majority did not believe that it would be necessary to litigate patent validity to normally answer the antitrust question — an unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s survival. “In a word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”

Fifth, the fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling in some other way, without the potential to maintain and share patent-generated monopoly profits.

The FTC advocated that the Court adopt a rule that reverse payments are “presumptively unlawful” and that they be analyzed under a “quick look” approach, requiring the patentee to show empirical evidence of procompetitive effects. The Court rejected this position, instead instructing the issue undergo a full rule of reason analysis. In doing so, it left to the lower court the structuring of this and other rule of reason antitrust litigation on the issue.

In practical terms, the decision leaves many difficult issues to be grappled with, and the majority’s apparent confidence that the antitrust question is answerable without getting into the patent issues themselves may prove more aspirational than practical. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent exposes one flaw:

The majority seems to think that even if the patent is valid, a patent holder violates the antitrust laws merely because the settlement took away some chance that his patent would be declared invalid by a court. …This is flawed for several reasons.

First, a patent is either valid or invalid. The parties of course don’t know the answer with certainty at the outset of litigation; hence the litigation. But the same is true of any hard legal question that is yet to be adjudicated. Just because people don’t know the answer doesn’t mean that there is no answer until a court declares one. Yet the majority would impose antitrust liability based on the parties’ subjective uncertainty about that legal conclusion.

The Court does so on the assumption that offering a ‘large’ sum is reliable evidence that the patent holder has serious doubts about the patent. Not true. A patent holder may be 95% sure about the validity of its patent, but particularly risk averse or litigation averse, and willing to pay a good deal of money to rid itself of the 5% chance of a finding of invalidity. What is actually motivating a patent holder is apparently a question district courts will have to resolve on a case-by-case basis. The task of trying to discern whether a patent holder is motivated by uncertainty about its patent, or other legitimate factors like risk aversion, will be made all the more difficult by the fact that much of the evidence about the party’s motivation may be embedded in legal advice from its attorney, which would presumably be shielded from discovery.

The FTC has hailed the decision:

The Supreme Court’s decision is a significant victory for American consumers, American taxpayers, and free markets. The Court has made it clear that [reverse payment] agreements between brand and generic drug companies are subject to antitrust scrutiny, and it has rejected the attempt by branded and generic companies to effectively immunize these agreements from the antitrust laws. With this finding, the Court has taken a big step toward addressing a problem that has cost Americans $3.5 billion a year in higher drug prices.

The FTC’s “victory lap” is probably premature. To be sure, we now know that blanket antitrust immunity for reverse payment settlements does not exist. However, everything else remains up for grabs. Until there are additional decisions grappling with the actual issue of liability issued, and reviewed, the extent and circumstances of antitrust liability is unclear. The risk-averse patent holder to whom Justice Roberts alluded might well be motivated to avoid utilizing reverse payments in structuring settlements in the future. In addition, the Competition Office of the European Union actively continues to examine reverse payments settlements, and there have been renewed calls for federal legislation banning such settlements.

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