Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Releases Exam Procedure Updates For Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)

Sheppard Mullin 2012

On August 15 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released updates to its examination procedures in connection with the new mortgage regulations that were issued in January. These updates offer valuable guidance on how the CFPB will conduct examinations for compliance with the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.

The updates incorporate the first set of interim TILA exam procedures from June. The CFPB Examination manual now contains updated interim exam procedures for RESPA, covering final rules issued by the CFPB through July 10, procedures for TILA, covering final rules issued by the CFPB through May 29, and the previously released interim exam procedures for the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, covering final rules issued by the CFPB through January 18.

A copy of the RESPA exam procedures released on August 15 can be found at:http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201308_cfpb_respa_narrative-exam-procedures.pdf

A copy of the TILA exam procedures released on August 15 can be found at: http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201308_cfpb_tila-narrative-exam-procedures.pdf

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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Initial Decision Lowers Return on Equity (ROEs) for New England Transmission Owners

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On August 6, 2013, FERC Administrative Law Judge Michael J. Cianci issued an initial decision on the complaint filed against the New England Transmission Owners (NETOs) seeking to reduce their currently effective 11.14% base return on equity (ROE) (FERC Docket Nos. EL11-66-000, et al.). Applying FERC’s traditional discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis to financial data largely for the period May 2012 – October 2012, Judge Cianci would require the NETOs to use a 10.6% base ROE to make refunds for transmission service provided between October 1, 2011 and December 31, 2012. Applying the same DCF analysis to financial data largely for the period October 2012 – March 2013, Judge Cianci would allow the NETOs a 9.7% ROE that would apply prospectively once FERC ultimately issues its order in the case (assuming FERC sustains Judge Cianci’s rulings; see PP* 544, 559-560). These rulings undoubtedly are disappointing both to the NETOs, who opposed any reduction in the 11.14% base ROE, and the complainants, who advocated substantially lower ROEs (8.3% to 8.9%) than Judge Cianci would allow.

On the positive side for the NETOs, Judge Cianci found that reducing utility ROEs below 10% for a prolonged period could be harmful to the industry (P 576). He also resolved virtually all conventional DCF methodological issues in the NETOs’ favor and his 10.6% and 9.7% ROEs were the ROEs developed in the NETOs’ conventional DCF analysis (PP 551, 552, 557). This would suggest that the 10.6% and 9.7% ROEs represent the maximum possible ROEs given the financial market data and the constraints of FERC precedent.

Judge Cianci expressly declined to rule on an issue that was hotly contested by both the NETOs and the complainants. The issue is whether post-2007 financial market conditions cause the DCF method to understate ROE costs and require modification of FERC’s conventional DCF analysis by use of alternative ROE methodologies (e.g., CAPM) to determine the NETOs’ actual common equity costs. A related issue, also hotly disputed by the parties, is whether the billions of dollars of required new transmission investment should also impact the ROE calculus.

The NETOs and the complainants are free to dispute all aspects of Judge Cianci’s decision through the FERC appeal process. The initial appellate briefs (known as briefs on exceptions) are due September 20, 2013, and briefs opposing exceptions are due October 24, 2013. The ultimate FERC ruling in this case will clarify and/or modify FERC’s ROE policy and is likely to be of extreme importance not only to the NETOs and their customers but to all utilities who charge or pay FERC jurisdictional transmission rates.

Two elements of Judge Cianci’s decision merit additional comment.

First, his decision concerned the NETOs collectively with the result that the ROE benchmark was the so-called “mid-point” of the zone of reasonableness (the mid-point is the average of the highest and lowest returns within the zone). The benchmark for an individual utility would be the “median” (the median is the point within the zone of reasonableness where half the returns are higher and half the returns are lower). Under current conditions, the median would be somewhat lower than the midpoint. Thus, other things being equal (they never are), a hypothetical Judge Cianci decision in an individual utility rate case would result in somewhat lower ROEs.

Second, due to the statutory fifteen-month limitation on retroactive refunds, the NETOs will not be required to make Docket No. EL11-66-000 refunds for the period between January 1, 2013 and the issuance date of the final FERC order. However, FERC has not yet acted on a second ROE complaint currently pending against the NETOs (Docket No. EL13-33-000). Although FERC would need to make new ROE findings in the new docket, this second complaint could close the Docket No. EL11-66-000 gap, and expose the NETOs to “back-to-back” ROE refunds for a 15-month period beginning January 1, 2013.

The initial decision is available here.

* “P” refers to the relevant numbered paragraph in the initial decision.

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A Review of Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) Approach to $125 Million Recoupment of Payments to Providers for Services to Incarcerated / Unlawfully Present Beneficiaries

Sheppard Mullin 2012

CMS seeks to recover from providers $125 million in alleged overpayments for services to beneficiaries who are belatedly identified as ineligible (incarcerated/unlawfully present). This post examines the recovery process CMS has put in place, noting CMS procedural shortcomings and reviewing some substantive defenses available to providers facing such demands.

In January 2013, CMS’ Office of Investigator General released two parallel reports, criticizing CMS for making improper payments to providers for services rendered to beneficiaries who, according to updated Social Security Administration records, were either incarcerated or unlawfully present in the United States at the time of such service.[1]

OIG concluded that between 2010-2012, CMS made more than $125 million in improper payments to providers (including hospitals, outpatient facilities, physicians, skilled nurses, DME suppliers, home health, and hospice). OIG recommended that CMS take steps to recover such funds and avoid such payments in future.

In response, CMS noted that it already had in place a system that checks, at the time a claim is submitted, the eligibility status of each beneficiary. If data indicates that a patient is not eligible, the claim is rejected. As a result, all overpayments identified by OIG resulted from changes to SSA data after claims were processed.

Apparently anticipating these OIG reports, in November 2012, CMS published two change requests[2] to implement an Informational Unsolicited Response Process (IUR). Through an IUR, the Common Working File system would automatically flag and report to the MACs any previously paid claims where subsequent data updates indicated that the beneficiary was not eligible at time of service due to incarceration or unlawfully present status. In Spring 2013, CMS began implementing the incarcerated patient IUR.

Although CMS has Regional Audit Contractors (RACs) in place to perform post payment technical bill review, CMS has bypassed the RAC process; instead, using the IUR, CMS has instructed the MACs to “initiate recoupment procedures” upon receipt of an IUR to recover these funds. MACs, acting upon this instruction, immediately initiated recoupment through remittance advice[3] based simply upon the subsequent SSA data change. By acting in this way, CMS:

Failed to provide any explanation of the reason for the overpayment redetermination;
Failed to provide the required 15 day opportunity for rebuttal;
Failed to defer recoupment pending the 15 day rebuttal period and through reconsideration;
Failed to address whether provider liability should be waived under section 1870 of the Social Security Act (no fault waiver); and
Failed to advise providers of their appeal rights.[4]

Providers reacted with surprise, placing many calls to the MACs and SSA (to address mistakes in data). In many cases, SSA data indicating incarceration of a patient was simply erroneous; even if valid, it appears that, like CMS, provider were generally unaware of ineligibility at the time of service.

CMS initially took the position that notice letters were not required and there would be no appeal rights; CMS at first indicated that any erroneous findings would be addressed by “data revisions” (presumably through a discretionary reopening by the MAC).

CMS has modified some of its positions based upon provider objection.

In recent FAQs,[5] CMS now concedes that providers do have appeal rights.

But CMS says most errors won’t be fixed until October 2013.

Critically, CMS has not yet addressed its failure to give providers proper notice, explanation of findings, rebuttal rights, its failure to consider no fault waiver. CMS also has so far failed to honor the post payment restrictions on recoupment pending rebuttal and appeal.

The SSA database is not perfect. In one case, a hospice was put on recoupment for months of service to a female beneficiary in 2010-2011 who was mistakenly identified in the SSA database with an unrelated incarcerated male patient. Notice and thoughtful consideration of rebuttal evidence would have prevented this error.

Perhaps more importantly for the general provider community, at the time each provider filed claims for services previously rendered, SSA data showed that the patient was eligible (or the claim would not have been paid). This fact presents a strong case for waiver of provider overpayment liability under the no fault provisions of section 1870 of the Social Security Act.

[1]http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region7/70203008.htm and https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region7/71201116.asp

[2] CR 8007 and CR 8009; eg: http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Transmittals/Downloads/R1134OTN.pdf

[3] Incarcerated Patient shows ANSI Code 81G.

[4] Key Authorities Include: 42 USC §§ 1395ff, 1395gg, 1395ddd(f); 42 CFR §§ 405.373, 405.379, 405.982; and the Medicare Financial Management Manual, Ch. 34, § 90.

[5] http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Contracting/FFSProvCustSvcGen/Downloads/Incarcerated-Beneficiary-FAQs-8-1-13.pdf

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Google, Yahoo, and Ad Networks Agrees to Set of Best Practices to Combat Online Piracy

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The United States Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator Victoria Espinel recently blogged about a new effort to combat online piracy of intellectual property.  The broad-based effort attempts to leverage the participation of several large internet/publishing companies (Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, AOL and Condé Nast), advertising networks (24/7 Media, Adtegrity) and the Interactive Advertising Bureau.  The parties have agreed to voluntarily adopt a set of best practices to remove advertising from websites that are primarily engaged in copyright piracy (movies, video games, music, books, etc.) or selling counterfeit goods.

In addition to efforts by companies to combat a similar problem using the Copyright Alert System, which we have previously covered, the current agreement takes aim at shutting down the profitability (and it is hoped, the major incentive) of these piracy websites to attenuate their proliferation.

The parties have agreed to implement these procedures and establish a system whereby a rights holder will send an initial informal complaint to one of the participating ad networks alleging that the website at issue is “principally dedicated to” engaging in copyright piracy and/or counterfeiting goods.  Further, the website must have no “substantially non-infringing uses.”  Upon receipt of a complaint, the ad networks will investigate and determine whether to take action, which can range from requesting the website cease from engaging in the alleged activity, to an embargo on advertisements placed by that ad network on the website until such time as the alleged violations are removed, or ultimately, removing the website from the ad network altogether.  While not required to, the ad network may also consider any evidence provided by the website owner that it is either not principally dedicated to counterfeiting or copyright piracy, or has substantial non-infringing uses.  Any such “counter notice” should include the content prescribed in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §512(g)(3)).  In addition, the participating ad networks will be certified by the Interactive Advertising Bureau’s Networks and Exchanges Quality Assurance Guidelines.

It is important to note that the burden to initiate the process is squarely on the rights holder, the guidelines explicitly noting that (i) there is no burden on the ad networks to police or actively monitor the websites on which their ads are placed; and (ii) by participating in this program, the ad networks do not prejudice their ability to maintain any “safe harbor” status they may otherwise be entitled to.

These best practices certainly have the critical mass to succeed.  The critical question, however, will be the quality of the analysis by the ad networks in response to allegations of piracy or counterfeiting, and the efficacy of this avenue of redress as perceived by the rights holders.  Regardless, this agreement, which may be refined going forward, is another step towards alleviating some of the pressure search engines have been under recently to take more proactive steps toward protecting intellectual property.

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First Post-Supreme Court Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Case Rules in Favor of Same-Sex Spouse

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In one of the first post-Supreme Court DOMA cases, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, applying Illinois state law, held that the surviving same-sex spouse of a deceased participant in an employer sponsored pension plan was entitled to the spousal death benefit offered under the plan. See Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, Civil Action No. 11-0045; 2013 WL 3878688 (E.D. Pa., July 29, 2013).

This case is significant because it is the first case after the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) to grapple with choice of law in determining whether a marriage is valid for purposes of obtaining spousal benefits under an ERISA-covered plan. While Windsor ruled that Section 3 of DOMA defining marriage only as between persons of the opposite sex unconstitutional for purposes of applying federal law, it did not address or invalidate Section 2, which permits states to decline to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.

Case Background

In 2006, Sarah Farley and Jean Tobits were married in Canada. Shortly after they were married, Ms. Farley was diagnosed with cancer, and she died in 2010. At the time of her death, Ms. Farley was employed by the law firm of Cozen O’Connor and a participant in the firm’s profit sharing plan (the Plan). The Plan provided that a participant’s surviving spouse would receive a death benefit if the participant died before the participant’s retirement date. If the participant was not married or the participant’s spouse waived his or her right to the death benefit, the participant’s designated beneficiary would be entitled to the death benefits. The Plan defined “Spouse” as “the person to whom the Participant has been married throughout the one-year period ending on the earlier of (1) the Participant’s annuity starting date or (2) the date of the Participant’s death.”

Ms. Farley’s parents and Ms. Tobits both claimed a right to the Plan’s death benefits. Ms. Farley’s parents claimed that they had been designated as the beneficiaries, but it was undisputed that Ms. Tobits had not waived her rights to the death benefits. Cozen O’Connor filed an interpleader action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asking the court to determine who was entitled to the benefits. Therefore, the case focused on whether Ms. Tobits qualified as a “Spouse” under the Plan and thus was entitled to the death benefits.

The Court’s Ruling

The court noted that Windsor “makes clear that where a state has recognized a marriage as valid, the United States Constitution requires that the federal laws and regulations of this country acknowledge that marriage” irrespective of whether the marriage is between a same-sex couple or a heterosexual couple. With Windsor’s emphasis on states’ rights to define marriage, lower courts are left with the complicated task of deciding which state law applies when determining whether a same-sex spouse is entitled to benefits under federal law in those instances, as in Cozen, where multiple jurisdictions with different laws on same-sex marriage are implicated.

Apparently, because Cozen O’Connor is headquartered in Pennsylvania, the Plan is administered there, and the Plan’s choice of law provision references Pennsylvania law, the Farleys asked the court to apply Pennsylvania state law to determine the validity of the marriage. Pennsylvania’s mini-DOMA statute expressly defines marriage as between a man and a woman. The court concluded that ERISA preempted Pennsylvania law. It reasoned that if courts were required to look at the state in which the plans were drafted, plan administrators might be encouraged to forum shop for states with mini-DOMA laws to avoid paying benefits to same-sex couples. The court thought this kind of forum shopping would upset ERISA’s principle of maintaining national uniformity among benefit plans. Without further analysis, the court concluded Pennsylvania state law was not an option for determining Ms. Tobits’ status as a spouse within the meaning of the Plan.

Instead, the court applied Illinois law, the state where Ms. Farley and Ms. Tobits had jointly resided until Ms. Farley’s death. It was undisputed that Ms. Farley and Ms. Tobits had a valid Canadian marriage certificate. The court concluded that the marriage was valid in Illinois and that Ms. Tobits was Ms. Farley’s spouse within the Plan’s definition. Accordingly, the court held that Ms. Tobits was entitled to the Plan’s death benefit. Although not entirely clear, the court presumably came to this conclusion based on Illinois’ civil union statute (even though it was enacted after Ms. Farley’s death). The statute provides that (i) same-sex marriages and civil unions legally entered into in other jurisdictions will be recognized in Illinois as civil unions and (ii) persons entering into civil unions will be afforded the benefits recognized by Illinois law to spouses. See 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. An. 75/5 and 75/60 (West 2011).

Impact of Cozen on ERISA Benefit Plans

Cozen is the first ruling in the wake of Windsor to address which state law might apply when there are conflicting state laws as to whether a valid marriage is recognized for the purpose of being a “spouse,” and therefore whether the spouse is entitled to benefits under an ERISA-covered plan. In Cozen, Ms. Farley and Ms. Tobits were lawfully married in Canada, and the court ruled that Illinois’s civil union law recognizes lawful marriages performed in other jurisdictions. The court applied the law of the domicile state to support its holding that Ms. Tobits was a surviving spouse entitled to the Plan’s death benefit.

The Cozen decision may have little value outside of cases where a valid same-sex marriage is performed in one state (the “state of celebration”) and the state where the couple is domiciled recognizes same-sex marriages. In other situations, faced with a choice of law where the law of the state of domicile conflicts with the law of the state of celebration, the outcome could be different, because Section 2 of DOMA survives after the Windsor decision. Unless the federal government creates a uniform method of determining the choice of law question, ERISA cases raising benefit entitlement questions in the context of same-sex marriages are likely to continue to complicate plan administration, and ERISA’s goal of maintaining national uniformity in the administration of benefits will remain elusive.

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How to Be Found by Prospects That Are Looking for a Lawyer

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Most people take a four-step approach when choosing an attorney, and this has been validated by recent research.

Savvy attorneys know they need to be accessible at each step in the decision process; here’s how:

Step 1: Information Gathering. Most people turn to the Internet to gather information and you need to be there to answer their questions via a blog or your website. You should have content that specifically addresses the type of situation that would lead someone to hire you and/or why they need legal counsel for their particular problem.

Step 2: Search. An active presence on social networking sites as well as your blog and website can help lead prospects to your door. Many may ask their Facebook friends for recommendations or turn to other social media sites for information about specific firms, so you need to be there.

Step 3: Validation. Having good reviews and posting testimonials (if your state bar allows it) on your website and blog will help put you front and center during the validation process. Don’t forget to beef up your profiles on Avvo, Lawyers.com and other directories as well as LinkedIn.

Step 4: Selection. Offer free consultations at every opportunity and when someone calls your office, return the call immediately. One attorney asked if two days was too long to return a call from a prospect – the answer is, definitely! Research shows that a hot lead can turn cold in as little as five minutes, so if you can’t get to them quickly, make sure someone else in your office can or that you have an automated system to follow up immediately.

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US Government Accountability Office (GAO) Advocates for Increased Attention on Adapting to the Effects of Climate Change

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The US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the federal government’s non-partisan internal auditor, has jumped into the climate change fray, arguing that the federal government must improve how it is addressing the effects of climate change, in addition to and irrespective of any actions taken to prevent or reverse it. In two reports issued earlier this year, the GAO describes shortcomings in federal efforts to address the “significant financial risks” from climate change and recommends both macro and micro level changes to address these risks.

The first of the two reports is the biennial update to GAO’s list of federal programs and operations at “high risk” for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or needing broad-based transformation (High Risk List).[1] The High Risk List was originally compiled in 1990 and is released at the start of each new Congress to help in setting oversight agendas. An issue is added to the High Risk List if it meets the following four criteria:

  • the issue is of national significance;
  • it is key to government performance and accountability;
  • the associated risk involves public health or safety, service delivery, national security, national defense, economic growth, or privacy or citizens’ rights; and
  • the issue could result in significant impaired service, program failure, injury or loss of life, or significantly reduced economy, efficiency, or effectiveness.

The 2013 High Risk List adds climate change to the list of now 30 issues that meet these “high risk” criteria.[2] According to the GAO, the federal government allocates greater sums of money each year to climate change adaptation activities, but it is “not well organized to address the fiscal exposure presented by climate change, partly because of the inherently complicated, crosscutting nature of the issue.” In particular, the GAO is concerned that the federal government is exposed to “significant financial risks” from climate change: (1) as a property owner of extensive infrastructure; (2) as an insurer through the National Flood Insurance Program; (3) as an investor in infrastructure projects that state and local governments prioritize and supervise; and (4) as a provider of emergency aid in response to natural disasters.

In determining the scope of its policy recommendations, the GAO considered whether to focus on responses to prevent or reverse climate change or responses to adapt to the effects of climate change. In choosing to focus on adaptation strategies, GAO cites research from the National Research Council (NRC) and the United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) concluding that greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere will irrevocably alter the climate system for many decades.[3] The resulting policy recommendations advocate for key entities within the Executive Office of the President, including the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with federal, state, and local stakeholders, to develop “a government-wide strategic approach with strong leadership and the authority to manage climate change risks that encompasses the entire range of related federal activities and addresses all key elements of strategic planning.” The GAO anticipates that this centralized approach will increase efficiencies in these efforts and take advantage of economies of scale. Private entities that operate in the infrastructure sector, and in related industries, should monitor the executive and legislative responses to these broad-based recommendations.

The second report centers on one of the areas of concern from the climate change addition to the High Risk List — the federal government’s role in supporting state and local governments in their efforts to strengthen infrastructure vulnerable to the effects of climate change.[4] In it, the GAO examines (1) the impacts of climate change on infrastructure; (2) the extent to which climate change is incorporated into infrastructure planning; (3) factors that enabled some decision makers to implement adaptive measures; and (4) federal efforts to address local adaptation needs, as well as potential opportunities for improvement. Similar to the recommendations made in the climate change portion of the High Risk List, GAO advocates for a centralized system of information and data, as well as streamlined access to that data for local infrastructure decision makers, as one of the primary means to increasing and improving climate-related adaptions in infrastructure planning. Of the specific projects that GAO studied in order to prepare the report, those that had easy access to climate data and expertise to help interpret that data were more likely to incorporate adaptions to address the effects of climate change into their plans.

Furthermore, the GAO specifically recommends that CEQ finalize its 2010 guidance on how federal agencies should consider the effects of climate change in their evaluations of proposed federal actions under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Until the guidance is final, it is “unclear how, if at all, agencies are to consistently consider climate change in the NEPA process, creating the potential for inconsistent consideration of the effects of climate change in the NEPA process across the federal government.”[5] Therefore, entities involved in projects that fall under NEPA’s purview should monitor CEQ’s activities on this issue and consider submitting comments on any resulting guidance or regulation.

[1] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, Report No. GAO-13-283 (Feb. 2013)

[2] Id. at 61-76 (“Limiting the Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks”).

[3] Id. at 63 (“[L]imiting the federal government’s fiscal exposure to climate change risks will present a challenge no matter the outcome of domestic and international efforts to reduce emissions”).

[4] GAO, Climate Change: Future Federal Adaptation Efforts Could Better Support Local Infrastructure Decision Makers, Report No. GAO-13-242 (Apr. 2013).

[5] Id. at 87. 

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U.S. Medical Oncology Practice Sentenced for Use and Medicare Billing of Cancer Drugs Intended for Foreign Markets

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In a June 28, 2013 news release by the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California, in San Diego, it was reported that a La Jolla, California medical oncology practice pleaded guilty and was sentenced to pay a $500,000 fine, forfeit $1.2 million in gross proceeds received from the Medicare program, and make restitution to Medicare in the amount of $1.7 million for purchasing unapproved foreign cancer drugs and billing the Medicare program as if the drugs were legitimate. Although the drugs contained the same active ingredients as drugs sold in the U.S. under the brand names Abraxane®, Alimta®, Aloxi®, Boniva®, Eloxatin®, Gemzar®, Neulasta®, Rituxan®, Taxotere®, Venofer® and Zometa®), the drugs purchased by the corporation were meant for markets outside the United States, and were not drugs approved by the FDA for use in the United States. Medicare provides reimbursement only for drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use in the United States. To conceal the scheme, the oncology practice fraudulently used and billed the Medicare program using reimbursement codes for FDA approved cancer drugs.

In pleading guilty, the practice admitted that from 2007 to 2011 it had purchased $3.4 million of foreign cancer drugs, knowing they had not been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for use in the United States. The practice admitted that it was aware that the drugs were intended for markets other than the United States and were not the drugs approved by the FDA for use in the United States because: (a) the packaging and shipping documents indicated that drugs were shipped to the office from outside the United States; (b) many of the invoices identified the origin of the drugs and intended markets for the drugs as countries other than the United States; (c) the labels did not bear the “Rx Only” language required by the FDA; (d) the labels did not bear the National Drug Code (NDC) numbers found on the versions of the drugs intended for the U.S. market; (e) many of the labels had information in foreign languages; (f) the drugs were purchased at a substantial discount; (g) the packing slips indicated that the drugs came from the United Kingdom; and (h) in October, 2008 the practice had received a notice from the FDA that a shipment of drugs had been detained because the drugs were unapproved.

In a related False Claims Act lawsuit filed by the United States, the physician and his medical practice corporation paid in excess of $2.2 million to settle allegations that they submitted false claims to the Medicare program. The corporation was allowed to apply that sum toward the amount owed in the criminal restitution to Medicare. The physician pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of introducing unapproved drugs into interstate commerce, admitting that on July 8, 2010, he purchased the prescription drug MabThera (intended for market in Turkey and shipped from a source in Canada) and administered it to patients. Rituxan®, a product with the same active ingredient, is approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use in the United States.

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For Small Business Owners, Suing in Small Claims Court Can Become a Big Headache

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I recognize that when a business owner believes a monetary debt of $5,000 or less is owed to the business, there may be a temptation to control litigation costs by filing a lawsuit in the Small Claims Division of a Virginia General District Court.  Admittedly, there are some benefits, including:

  • Expeditious justice between the litigants, so the cases are not protracted
  • Formal rules of evidence do not apply, and neither side can be represented by an attorney
  • A corporation or partnership has discretion to send the owner, general partner, officer or employee to handle the case
  • Limited discovery afforded to either side, and judges tend to allow all relevant evidence to be considered with a goal towards determining the merits of the dispute

What’s the downside?  I will name a few:

  • You are not guaranteed to stay in Small Claims Court even if you start off there. If the other side hires counsel, the case can no longer be adjudicated in the Small Claims Court and it will be removed to General District Court where there is greater formality and the rules of evidence apply.  Even if the other side does not hire counsel, a defendant still has the right to remove a case to General District Court prior to the court rendering a decision.
  • You could be countersued. There are often two sides to every story.  Be aware that if the defendant files a counterclaim against the business, you as the plaintiff no longer have the ability to unilaterally discontinue the litigation.
  • You could potentially enter a protracted and expensive appeal process. Even if you are awarded a judgment, the defendant has an automatic right to appeal the case to Circuit Court when the judgment exceeds $50.  If this happens, the litigation can go on for a year in a more formal forum with considerably broader discovery allowed.

Suing in Small Claims Court may be a valid choice in some cases. However, it is always wise that a business owner consult a litigation attorney before deciding to file a lawsuit in Small Claims Court.

Consumer Financial Services Basics 2013 – September 30 – October 01, 2013

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming  Consumer Financial Services Basics 2013.

CFSB Sept 30 2013

When

September 30 – October 01, 2013

Where

  • University of Maryland
  • Francis King Carey School of Law
  • 500 W Baltimore St
  • Baltimore, MD 21201-1701
  • United States of America

Facing the most comprehensive revision of federal consumer financial services (CFS) law in 75 years, even experienced consumer finance lawyers might feel it is time to get back in the classroom. This live meeting is designed to expose practitioners to key areas of consumer financial services law, whether you need a primer or a refresher.

It is time to take a step back and think through some of these complex issues with a faculty that combines decades of practical experience with law school analysis. The classroom approach is used to review the background, assess the current policy factors, step into the shoes of regulators, and develop an approach that can be used to interpret and evaluate the scores of laws and regulations that affect your clients.

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