The National Law Forum

The Supreme Court Decides Bay Mills Case, Leaves Tribal Sovereign Immunity Intact

In its long-awaited decision in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, the U.S. Supreme Court today re-affirmed its 1998 holding in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. 523 U.S. 751 (1998) that tribal sovereign immunity extends to tribes’ governmental and commercial activities, both on reservation and off. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act waiver of tribal sovereign immunity for suits to enjoin gaming on Indian lands in violation of a tribe’s gaming compact with a state did not apply to tribal gaming on non-Indian lands and that the State was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suing the Tribe directly for damages.

The Court rejected Michigan’s arguments that Kiowa was wrongly decided and that tribes should enjoy no immunity with respect to their commercial, off-reservation activities. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer and Sotomayor, emphasized the doctrine that the court should not overrule its previous decisions without special justification (stare decisis), pointing out that (1) the Court had explicitly invited Congress to consider limitations on tribal sovereign immunity its Kiowa decision, (2) Congress had, in fact, considered several bills that would have imposed broad limits but had not enacted any of them (“Having held in Kiowa that this issue is up to Congress, we cannot reverse ourselves because some may think its conclusion wrong” Slip. Op. 20), and (3) Michigan had other means of enforcing state law against Bay Mills, including denial of required licenses, suits against employees and officials of the tribe to enjoin violations of state law and criminal prosecution of tribal officials and employees and for violations of state criminal laws.

The Court concluded:

As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian tribes exercise sovereignty subject to the will of the Federal Government. …Sovereignty implies immunity from lawsuits. Subjection means (among much else) that Congress can abrogate that immunity as and to the extent it wishes. If Congress had authorized this suit, Bay Mills would have no valid grounds to object. But Congress has not done so: The abrogation of immunity in IGRA applies to gaming on, but not off, Indian lands. We will not rewrite Congress’s handiwork. Nor will we create a freestanding exception to tribal immunity for all off reservation commercial conduct. This Court has declined that course once before. To choose it now would entail both overthrowing our precedent and usurping Congress’s current policy judgment.

In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor asserted that the historical basis for tribal sovereign immunity is stronger than the dissent recognized and that the result reached by the majority is consistent with comity in view of the fact that State sovereign immunity prevents states from being sued by tribes. Justice Sotomayor also pointed out the special challenges that tribes face with respect to raising revenue and the role that their commercial enterprises play in funding government.

The unmistakable premise of the dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Alito, is that sovereign immunity as currently exercised by tribes under the rule of Kiowa has led to widespread, grave and intolerable injustices. These injustices, according to the dissenters, warrant departing from the rule of stare decisis to correct the Court’s “mistake” in the Kiowa decision:

In Kiowa, this Court adopted a rule without a reason: a sweeping immunity from suit untethered from commercial realities and the usual justifications for immunity, premised on the misguided notion that only Congress can place sensible limits on a doctrine we created. The decision was mistaken then, and the Court’s decision to reaffirm it in the face of the unfairness and conflict it has engendered is doubly so.

Dissent, slip Op. 18.

Justice Thomas’ opinion highlights areas, including taxation, tobacco commerce, payday lending and campaign finance, in which tribes have “exploited” immunity to avoid state regulation. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg expressed her view that the Court had gone too far not only in expanding the scope of tribal sovereign immunity in Kiowabut also in expanding state sovereign immunity from suits by tribes to enforce federal laws in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Justice Ginsburg would impose greater limits on the immunity of both sovereigns.

The Court’s decision leaves unclear two areas of tribal sovereign immunity jurisprudence. First, the Court expressly acknowledged that it has never “specifically addressed” whether immunity “should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim, or other plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe, has no alternative way to obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct. The argument that such cases would present a ‘special justification’ for abandoning precedent is not before us” Slip. Op. 16, n.8. The Court’s comment will be viewed as an invitation for a plaintiff to make the argument that this situation does indeed present a “special justification” for an exception to immunity.

The Court’s opinion also leaves unaddressed the extent to which tribal sovereign immunity applies to subsidiary entities. In a footnote, the dissent observed, without comment, that “[l]ower courts have held that tribal immunity shields not only Indian tribes themselves, but also entities deemed ‘arms of the tribe.’ … In addition, tribal immunity has been interpreted to cover tribal employees and officials acting within the scope of their employment.”

The consequences of the Court’s decision are likely to be (1) arguments by state lobbyists that Congress should take action to limit tribal immunity for the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion and (2) suits based on the assertion that there should be an exception to tribal sovereign immunity for a “tort victim or other plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe” who has “no alternative way to obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct.”

Article By:

Brian L. Pierson

Of:

Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

Michigan Commission of Agriculture Approves Revised Generally Accepted Agricultural and Management Practices' (GAAMP) Limiting Scope of Right to Farm Act

For over a year, the Michigan Ag Commission has considered expanding the scope of the “site selection” GAAMPs in order to bring even small livestock facilities within its scope. The site selection GAAMPs have traditionally applied to very large livestock production facilities, such as those that have at least 5,000 laying hens, 35 mature dairy cattle or 50 feeder cattle, and required those farms to be sited in agricultural areas. Consequently, because there were no siting requirements for small farms, these farms could be in urban areas – often contrary to zoning, which resulted in some conflict.

The Michigan Ag Commission recently voted to revise the site selection GAAMPs to eliminate the minimum animal threshold. Thus, the site selection GAAMPs now apply to all farms, and to comply with those GAAMPs, farms must be located in areas where local zoning allows for agricultural uses. Thus, the GAAMPs and local zoning are now in harmony rather than conflict.

According to Trevor Meachum, Vice-Chair of the Michigan Commission of Agriculture and Rural Development, “Local control is about being a good neighbor, and these GAAMPs – if farmers follow them – help people remain good neighbors. Different communities have different ideas about what they want, and this accommodates those communities.” The changes to the GAAMPs were also endorsed by Michigan Farm Bureau. According to Matt Kapp, Government Relation Specialist with Michigan Farm Bureau, the new GAAMPs do not forbid livestock; they just allow for local decision-making. “While we think that will remove some conflicts, and if this new GAAMP does that, then it creates good neighbors. That’s what right-to-farm is all about, and that’s good public policy.”

Article By:

Aaron M. Phelps

Of:

Varnum LLP

Working Through Lunch: An Update on the Legal Risks

Regular readers of this blog know that we’ve previously alerted you to the risks of using timekeeping software that automatically deducts the lunch hour from employees’ paychecks. As we’ve explained before, such software can expose employers to liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act because, for one reason or another, employees sometimes work through lunch. And, even if an employer has a system in place for employees to request pay for lunchtime work, that is no “get out of jail free card,” because employees who bring FLSA lawsuits commonly argue that they did not use – or were discouraged from using – the system.

A lawsuit that was filed earlier this month in Texas federal court gives us another reason to sound the alert. In Corcione v. Houston Methodist, the plaintiff alleges that she – and a class of some 5,000 nurses, nurses assistants, patient care assistants and other employees at seven different medical facilities – were required to keep their cellphones on hand during their meal breaks in case they were needed to respond to emergencies. And, even though the employers had systems in place for requesting pay for lunchtime work, the plaintiff claims that managers discouraged employees from making such requests. The plaintiff seeks to recover the unpaid wages (for the time claimed to have been worked, including overtime pay), liquidated damages, and legal fees. In other words, the plaintiff wants tens of millions of dollars.

A policy requiring nurses (and similar employees) to be available so that they can respond to emergencies probably seems reasonable to you, and we feel the same way. Work “emergencies” aren’t limited to the medical field, of course, and many other types of employers have similar policies – written or unwritten. If you’re one of them, just remember that the ramifications of such policies can land you on the wrong side of the FLSA if you’re not careful. We’ve said it before, and we’ll say it again: Work time must be compensated. Even if that “work time” comes during what – on a normal day – would have been “lunch time.”

Article By:

James F. Ehrenberg

Of:

Barnes & Thornburg LLP

2nd Conflict Minerals Reporting and Supply Chain Transparency Conference- June 23-25, Chicago, IL

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the 2nd Conflict Minerals Reporting and Supply Chain Transparency Conference, June 24-25, 2014, presented by Marcus Evans.

Click here to register.

Where

Chicago, IL

When

June 24-25, 2014

What

The 2nd Sustaining Conflict Minerals Compliance Conference will break down each SEC filing requirement as well as examine direct filing examples from specific companies. Discussions will tackle key issues including refining conflict minerals teams to create a more successful conflict minerals management program, managing and developing consistent communication within the supply chain, and building an IT program that will continue to secure data from the various levels of the supply chain.

This conference will allow organizations to benchmark their conflict minerals management program against their peers to more efficiently meet SEC expectations and amend their program for future filings. Seating is limited to maintain and intimate educational environment that will cultivate the knowledge and experience of all participants.

Key Topics

Scrutinize the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements and evaluate external resources for a more efficient conflict minerals rule with Newport News Shipbuilding, Huntington Ingalls Industries
Engineer a sustainable conflict minerals program for future filings with Alcatel-Lucent
Integrate filings and best practices from the first year of reporting with BlackBerry
Maintain a strong rapport with all tiers of your supply chain to increase transparency with KEMET
Obtain complete responses moving throughout the supply chain with Global Advanced Metals

New York Federal Court Rejects Preemption and Primary Jurisdiction Arguments in “All Natural” Case

In our February 12, 2014 post, entitled “Consumer Class Actions Trending From Attacking ‘All Natural’ to ‘Raw,’” we addressed whether claims challenging consumer product advertising as “all natural” were preempted in the absence of specific guidance from the FDA and the mixed results the argument has produced. In Ault v. J.M. Smucker Co. et al., 2014 WL 1998235 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2014), the Court denied a motion to dismiss based on preemption and primary jurisdiction where the plaintiff alleged that it was deceived into purchasing Smucker’s Crisco oil by “all natural” advertising where the product contained genetically modified organisms, or GMOs, because the FDA has not addressed the use of the term “all natural” in this context.

All Natural

Smuckers argued that FDA policies regarding the use of the term “natural” preempt state law false advertising claims based on this language, even if those policies are informal. However, the Court found, “no federal specifications exist here.” Id. at *3. And “[e]ven if an informal FDA definition does exist, the term ‘natural’ ‘may be used in numerous contexts and may convey different meanings depending on that context[]” [citation,] [and] “that is one of the reasons the FDA has never adopted a formal definition.” Id. (citing Pelayo v. Nestle USA, Inc.,<“> No. CV 13–5213, 2013 WL 5764644, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 25, 2013)). In addition, “the FDA has declined to consider the specific issue here: whether and under what circumstances food products containing ingredients produced using genetically engineered ingredients may or may not be labeled ‘natural.’” Id. (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted). “As a result,” the Court found, “any general, informal FDA guidance is not controlling.” Id. (citing In re Frito–Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litig., No. 12–md–2413,2013 WL 4647512, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013)).

The Court also rejected Smucker’s argument that the FDA’s decision not to impose a labeling requirement for foods with GMOs supports preemption, stating, “[i]n effect, Defendant interprets the FDA’s lack of action as approval for Defendant’s use of the phrase ‘All Natural’ to describe foods containing GMO [but] [i]n reality, the FDA has stayed silent because it ‘operates in a world of limited resources’ where it ‘must prioritize which issues to address.’” Id. (citation omitted.)

In addition, the Court found Smucker’s primary jurisdiction argument unavailing: “three federal district judges previously referred the question of whether foods containing GMOs may be labeled ‘natural’ to the FDA under the primary jurisdiction doctrine [and on] January 6, 2014, the FDA responded and explicitly declined to make such a determination.” Id. at *4 (citing January 6, 2014 FDA Letter). “The FDA’s refusal to consider the question demonstrates that ‘resort to the agency at this time would be unavailing,’ [citation] and therefore weighs against applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine.” Id.

This case signals that, until the FDA acts, preemption and primary jurisdiction arguments against “all natural” advertising of products with GMOs may be more and more challenging.

Article By:

Jordan D. Grotzinger

Of:

Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Happy Memorial Day!

From your friends at
The National Law Review

EPA’s Power-Plant Cooling Water Rule Takes a Surprise Endangered Species Turn

A surprise awaits those who reach page 334 of the 559-page preamble to EPA’s final cooling-water-intake rule – a potentially significant expansion of the Endangered Species Act.

The rule, which EPA has not yet officially published, is intended to protect aquatic species affected by cooling water intake at power plants and other large facilities. It is the result of a lawsuit by environmental groups, settled by EPA, and delayed on several occasions. Most recently, the rule was hung up as a result of concerns voiced by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service (the Services) about whether the final rule would do enough to protect threatened and endangered species. EPA thought it would; the Services disagreed. The Services’ concerns eventually caused EPA to miss a court-ordered deadline to publish the final rule.

Now that the rule is out, it appears that, in order to finally get the Service’s approval, EPA included in the final rule a first-of-its kind process that expands the Endangered Species Act to entities that previously didn’t have to comply with it. Understanding why requires a paragraph of background:

The ESA applies to (1) anyone who might harm or harass a listed species and (2) federal government actions in general. Federal government compliance typically involves a process under Section 7 of the Act called “consultation,” which essentially involves the agency working with the Services to determine if the action will harm species or their habitat. Many federal environmental responsibilities are carried out at the state level, including issuing clean water act permits like the ones involved in the 316(b) rule. But states don’t have to engage in consultation when they undertake these federal responsibilities. Until now.

EPA’s 316(b) rule doesn’t call the new process consultation, but it looks a lot like it. Consultation involves the federal action agency, in concert with the Services, determining whether the action will jeopardize the recovery of protected species or adversely modify their habitat. Often, if the Services conclude that there might be an ESA issue, they recommend project changes to eliminate the possibility. Since projects can’t go forward if the Services believe species or their habitat will be adversely affected, these recommended changes are usually adopted by the action agency.

The new 316(b) process looks very similar: The state drafts a 316(b) permit for a facility’s cooling-water intake structure. But rather than finalize it and send it to the facility, which they do for every other clean water act permit, the state will send a copy of the draft 316(b) permit to the Services. The Services may then provide “recommendations” on the permit. If they do, the state must include those recommendations in the permit and the facility receiving the permit must implement them. If not, the facility is in violation of 316(b).

In other words, just as in consultation, the Services are consulted about impacts to species and their habitat. If the Services have concerns, they will provide recommended changes to the State permit writer. The State has to adopt those changes and the facility has to implement them or else the project can’t go forward. Thus, for the first time, states issuing federal permits will have to function like a federal agency for Section 7 purposes. We’ve attached a copy of the Services’ flowchart of the process below (in the flowchart, the state is referred to as the “Director.”).

We’ll be following this process closely, both to see if it is challenged and to see if it spreads to other federal clean water or clean air act permitting carried out at the state level.

EPA

Article By:

Lowell M. Rothschild

Of:

Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

School is Almost Out and Summer Interns are (Still) In

With the Memorial Day weekend approaching, many people are looking forward to hitting the beach, firing up the grill and polishing off their golf clubs, which are, for many Northeasterners, covered in cobwebs after this long winter. For employers, summer often means the arrival of (potentially unpaid) interns.

We have written before about the recent wave of high-profile wage and hour class actions lawsuits from interns. Last week, just in time for the arrival of the newest batch of summer interns, a New York federal judge conditionally certified an FLSA class of approximately 3,000 interns of Warner Music Group who were allegedly misclassified as exempt from minimum wage and overtime requirements. The recent litigation has also prompted new legislation to protect interns, including a New York City law aimed at ensuring that unpaid interns will have the right to sue if they are harassed or discriminated against by an employer.

Still, many companies cannot resist the temptation of free or relatively cheap temporary labor, and, in a still-rebounding economy, job-seekers continue to look to internships to build their resumes and gain experience. So, what can a company do in order to ensure a smooth, issue-free summer with its interns?

The first and most obvious answer is to treat interns as temporary employees. Have interns track time like any other non-exempt employees. Pay them at least minimum wage for all hours worked and overtime for any hours worked over 40 per week (assuming they do not meet some exemption from the minimum wage and overtime laws). Comply with all state laws regarding working and meal breaks. This approach will alleviate the vast majority of legal issues with respect to employing summer interns.
Require interns to attend the same non-discrimination, non-harassment trainings as other employees. Draft job descriptions for interns and set appropriate expectations for the program. Have clear policies, including a policy regarding expected conduct at work-related social events, which interns are required to review and acknowledge in writing.
If you decide against paying interns, you should carefully review intern program to ensure that it is legally compliant with appropriate wage and hour laws. In order for an intern to be legally unpaid under federal law:

The intern experience must be similar to training given in an educational environment;
The internship must be for the benefit of the intern (meaning they gain tangible training, experience, etc.);
Interns may not displace or supplant regular employees, or perform duties traditionally rendered by regular employees;
The company must not get any immediate advantage from the intern’s activities;
The intern must not be entitled to a job at the end of the internship; and
The company and the intern should have a written agreement (or an understanding at the absolute minimum) that the intern is not entitled to receive remuneration for his/her work.

According to the Department of Labor, if any one of these criteria is not met the company must pay the intern for all time worked. Some states have their own laws regarding interns, so make sure you are in compliance with those laws as well.

If your summer intern program begins soon after Memorial Day, now is the time to review you policies. A little bit of preparation can ensure a sunny summer for all.

Article By:

Jillian M. Collins

Of:

Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

Getting Lawyers Up to Speed: The Basics for Understanding ITIL®

As more clients use ITIL^®—a standard for best practices in providing IT services—IT lawyers who are unfamiliar with the standard should familiarize themselves with its basic principles. This is particularly important as clients are integrating ITIL terminology and best practices (or modified versions thereof) into their service delivery and support best practices as well as the structure and substantive provisions of their IT outsourcing and services contracts.

Most IT professionals are well versed in ITIL and its framework. They will introduce the concepts into statements of work and related documents with the expectation that their lawyers and sourcing professionals understand the basics well enough to identify issues and requirements and negotiate in a meaningful way.

With this in mind, it is time for IT lawyers and sourcing professionals to get up to speed. Below are some of the basics to get started:

ITIL—which stands for the “Information Technology Infrastructure Library”—is a set of best practice publications for IT service management that are designed to provide guidance on the provision of quality IT services and the processes and functions used to support them.
ITIL was created by the UK government almost 20 years ago and is being adopted widely as the standard for best practice in the provision of IT services. The current version of ITIL is known as the ITIL 2011 edition.
The ITIL framework is designed to cover the full lifecycle of IT and is organized around five lifecycle stages:
1. Service strategy
2. Service design
3. Service transition
4. Service operation
5. Continual service improvement
Each lifecycle stage, in turn, has associated common processes. For example, processes under the “service design” stage include:
1. Design coordination
2. Service catalogue management
3. Service level management
4. Availability management
5. Capacity management
6. IT service continuity management
7. Information security management systems
8. Supplier management
The ITIL glossary defines each of the lifecycle stages and each of the covered processes.

ITIL^® is a registered trademark of AXELOS Limited.

Article By:

Barbara Murphy Melby

Of:

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

Phosphorus in Wisconsin: The Clean Waters, Healthy Economy Act

On April 23, 2014, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker signed the Clean Waters, Healthy Economy Act (Act) into law. This legislation establishes the basis for creating a multi-discharger variance for point sources struggling to meet Wisconsin’s stringent numeric phosphorus water quality criteria. Although several conditions must be met before it is available to permit holders, this legislation could have significant impacts on Wisconsin agribusinesses that hold Wisconsin Pollution Discharge Elimination System (WPDES) permits, as well as agricultural produces that may be targeted for non-point source reductions of phosphorus. In addition, since the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has noted that it generally favors these multi-discharger permit approaches, Wisconsin’s approach may be replicated in other areas of the country that are considering stricter water quality standards for nutrients like phosphorus and nitrogen.

What does the Act do?

Very simply, the Act sets in motion the collection of economic information to justify a multi-discharger variance based on a finding of adverse widespread social and economic impact. The Act requires the Department of Administration (DOA) to look at costs of compliance for categories of point source dischargers statewide. If the DOA finds that the “cost of compliance with water quality based effluent limitations for phosphorus by point sources that cannot achieve compliance without major facility upgrades” would cause substantial adverse social and economic impacts on a statewide basis, then the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) will seek approval from the EPA for a variance under 40 CFR Part 131. The Act also defines the criteria for qualifying for the variance and what a point source must do if it opts into the variance.

How would this multi-discharger variance work for permit holders?

Agribusinesses that hold WPDES permits may be eligible for the variance. To qualify, permit holders will need to:

1) Demonstrate the economic determination made by the DOA applies to the source;

2) Certify the permittee cannot achieve compliance without a major facility upgrade (defined to mean the addition of both new treatment equipment and a new treatment process); and

3) Agree to comply with the requirements of the variance.

Once DNR has confirmed these requirements have been met, the permittee may participate in the variance for up to four permit cycles as long as it meets the discharge limits established by the multi-permit variance and takes steps to reduce phosphorus contributions from other sources.

First, the permit must comply with decreasing phosphorus discharges. These concentrations begin at 0.8 mg/L in the first permit term and then drop to 0.6 mg/L and 0.5 mg/L in the third and fourth permit term, respectively. In the fourth permit for which the variance is available, the DNR will require the permittee to achieve – by the end of the term of that permit – the water quality based effluent limit for phosphorus that would apply without the variance.

Second, while complying with these reduced discharge limits, the permittee must also undertake some activity to reduce phosphorus contributions from other sources in its watershed. This concept borrows from Wisconsin’s EPA-approved adaptive management program, and requires the permittee to:

1) Enter into a binding, written agreement with the DNR under which it implements a project or plan designed to reduce phosphorus contributions from other sources; or

2) Enter into a binding, written agreement that is approved by DNR with another person under which the other person implements a project or plan designed to phosphorus contributions from other sources; or

3) Make a payment to the counties of the watershed in which the permittee is located. These payments are calculated by multiplying $50/lb times the difference between what the permittee is currently discharging, and what the permittee would discharge if its effluent met a target limit. The target limit is either the limit set by a TMDL (total maximum daily load), if applicable, or 0.2mg/L if no TMDL is approved.

How might the Act affect producers as nonpoint sources?

Counties that receive money through this program must use at least 65% of the amounts received to fund cost-sharing for projects governed by 281.16(3)(e) or (4) (the state’s nonpoint source program). These must be applied to projects that have been prioritized by their potential to “reduce the amount of phosphorus per acre entering the waters of the state, based on an assessment of land and land use practices in the county.” Up to 35% can be used for staffing, or toward modeling or monitoring to evaluate the amount of phosphorus in waters for planning purposes. In Wisconsin, producers that are not currently meeting state performance standards may be asked to install certain practices when cost share dollars are available. The Act has the potential to increase the amount of cost share dollars available to county work in this area.

What’s Next for the Act?

Before this program is available to permittees, a number of things must happen. First, the DOA must complete an economic study that demonstrates compliance with the phosphorus standard will have adverse and widespread social and economic impact. This study must also identify the categories of dischargers that will be eligible for the multi-discharger variance. Second, EPA must approve the variance before it may be implemented in Wisconsin. Finally, permittees would need to apply for the variance to alter any existing permit conditions that have been imposed to implement the phosphorus standard. Look for further updates in 2015!

Article By:

Angela A. James

Of:

Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

The National Law Forum

The Supreme Court Decides Bay Mills Case, Leaves Tribal Sovereign Immunity Intact

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Michigan Commission of Agriculture Approves Revised Generally Accepted Agricultural and Management Practices' (GAAMP) Limiting Scope of Right to Farm Act

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Working Through Lunch: An Update on the Legal Risks

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2nd Conflict Minerals Reporting and Supply Chain Transparency Conference- June 23-25, Chicago, IL

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New York Federal Court Rejects Preemption and Primary Jurisdiction Arguments in “All Natural” Case

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Happy Memorial Day!

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EPA’s Power-Plant Cooling Water Rule Takes a Surprise Endangered Species Turn

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School is Almost Out and Summer Interns are (Still) In

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Getting Lawyers Up to Speed: The Basics for Understanding ITIL®

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Phosphorus in Wisconsin: The Clean Waters, Healthy Economy Act

What does the Act do?

How would this multi-discharger variance work for permit holders?

How might the Act affect producers as nonpoint sources?

What’s Next for the Act?

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What does the Act do?

How would this multi-discharger variance work for permit holders?

How might the Act affect producers as nonpoint sources?

What’s Next for the Act?

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