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The National Law Forum - Page 532 of 753 - Legal Updates. Legislative Analysis. Litigation News.

What Does Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions as Described by EPA in the “Tailoring Rule” have to do with the Clean Air Act?

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UARG v. EPA: Tailoring Rule Litigation

On June 23, 2014 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether EPA motor vehicle greenhouse gas regulations necessarily automatically triggers permitting requirements under the CAA for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases. The statements in the opinion concerning EPA’s assertions of power are quite provoking. If read carefully, this opinion launches a warning to EPA about its future regulatory actions relative to greenhouse gases. The text of the opinion can be found here. The following quotes are offered as examples of that warning.

“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate “a significant portion of the American economy,” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159, we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast “economic and political significance.” Id., at 160; See Also MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994); Industrial Union Dept., APL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 645-646 (1980) (plurality opinion). Slip op at 19.

“. . . in EPA’s assertion of that authority, we confront a singular situation: an agency laying claim to extravagant statutory power over the national economy while at the same time strenuously asserting that the authority claimed would render the statute “unrecognizable to the Congress that designed” it. “ Slip op at 20.

“We are not willing to stand on the dock and wave goodbye as EPA embarks on this multiyear voyage of discovery. We reaffirm the core administrative-law principle that an agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.” Slip op at 23.

In a step wise fashion the opinion presents and answers the following:

1.  The question before the Court was “. . .whether it was permissible for EPA to determine that it motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas regulations automatically triggered permitting requirements under the Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.” Slip op at 2.

First we decide whether EPA permissibly interpreted the statute to provide that a source may be required to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse-gas emissions. Slip op at 10.

“It is plain as day that the Act does not envision an elaborate, burdensome permitting process for major emitters of steam, oxygen, or other harmless airborne substances. It takes some cheek for EPA to insist that it cannot possibly give “air pollutant” a reasonable, context-appropriate meaning in the PSD and Title V context when it has been doing precisely that for decades.” Slip op at 12.

“Massachusetts does not strip EPA of authority to exclude greenhouse gases from the class of regulable air pollutants under other parts of the Act where their inclusion would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.” Slip op at 14.

“In sum, there is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting “any air pollutant” in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them unworkable as written.” Slip op at 16.

2.  . . . we next consider the Agency’s alternative position that its interpretation was justified as an exercise of its “discretion” to adopt “a reasonable construction of the statute.” Tailoring Rule 31517. We conclude that EPA’s interpretation is not permissible.” Slip op at 16.

“EPA itself has repeatedly acknowledged that applying the PSD and Title V permitting requirements to greenhouse gases would be inconsistent with – in fact, would overthrow – the Act’s structure and design.” Slip op at 17.

“A brief review of the relevant statutory provisions leaves no doubt that the PSD program and Title V are designed to apply to, and cannot rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.” Slip op at 18.

3.  “We now consider whether EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require those sources to comply with “best available control technology” emission standards for greenhouse gases.” Slip op at 25.

“EPA argues that carbon capture is reasonably comparable to more traditional, end-of-stack BACT technologies, . . . and petitioners do not dispute that.” Slip op at 26. “. . . it has long been held that BACT cannot be used to order a fundamental redesign of the facility.” “. . . EPA has long interpreted BACT as required only for pollutants that the source itself emits; accordingly, EPA acknowledges that BACT may not be used to require “reductions in a facility’s demand for energy from the electric grid.” Slip op at 27.

“The question before us is whether EPA’s decision to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by sources otherwise subject to PSD review is, as a general matter, a permissible interpretation of the statute under Chevron. We conclude that it is.” Slip op at 27.

“We acknowledge the potential for greenhouse-gas BACT to lead to an unreasonable and unanticipated degree of regulation, and our decision should not be taken as an endorsement of all aspects of EPA’s current approach, nor as free rein for any future regulatory application of BACT in this distinct context. Our narrow holding is that nothing in the statute categorically prohibits EPA from interpreting the BACT provision to apply to greenhouse gases emitted by “anyway” sources.” Slip op at 28.

Opinion of Breyer, with whom Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Rather than exempting certain air pollutants like greenhouse gas emissions from the statute, it makes more sense to read into the statute an exemption for certain sources that were never intended to be subject to PSD.

Opinion of Alito, with whom Thomas joins, comments that Massachusetts v. EPA was wrongly decided at the time, and these cases further expose the flaw with that decision.

 

Laches, Statutes of Limitations and Raging Bull: The Supreme Court Re-Emphasizes The Pitfalls of Delay In Copyright Cases

Sheppard Mullin 2012

In Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. __ (2014), the United States Supreme Court addressed the role that the equitable defense of laches – i.e., a plaintiff’s unreasonable and prejudicial delay in commencing suit – plays in relation to a claim of copyright infringement filed within the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations period.  There is no doubt that Petrella puts to rest a split amongst the Circuits by clarifying that laches cannot bar a claim for legal relief for infringement occurring within the three-year statutory window.  Yet, Petrella should not be seen as a knock-out punch to the use of laches in copyright actions.  To the contrary, Petrella re-emphasizes the important role that laches plays in connection with the equitable remedies available under the Copyright Act, and provides copyright defendants – and plaintiffs – with guidance as to whether, and to what extent, a plaintiff’s delay in filing suit may limit the availability of those equitable remedies.  Additionally, Petrella’sdiscussion of a copyright plaintiff’s evidentiary burden and comments about the Copyright Act’s registration requirements raise interesting questions about the impact that a delay in filing suit may have on a plaintiff’s ability to prove infringement.  Laches, it seems, “don’t go down for nobody.”[1]

Petrella involved a claim of copyright infringement brought against Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. and certain related entities (collectively, “MGM”) by the daughter of Frank Petrella, who authored two screenplays (a “1963 Screenplay” and “1973 Screenplay,” respectively) and a book based on the life of boxing champion Jake LaMotta.  Id. at 7-8.  In 1976, Frank Petrella and Lamotta assigned their rights in the three works, including the renewal rights, to Chartoff-Winkler Productions, Inc.  Id. at 7.  The motion picture rights to the three copyrighted works were subsequently acquired by United Artists Corporation, a subsidiary of MGM.  Id.  In 1980, MGM released, and registered a copyright in, the motion picture Raging Bull, directed by Martin Scorcese and starring Robert DeNiro.  Id.  Frank Petrella died in 1981 – during the initial terms of the three copyrighted works.  Id.

In 1990, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).  In Stewart, the Supreme Court confirmed that the assignment of renewal rights by an author before the time for renewal arrives cannot defeat the right of the author’s statutory successors to the renewal rights if the author dies before the right to renewal accrues.  Id. at 219-20.  In other words, if the author dies before the right to renewal accrues, then the author’s statutory successor is entitled to renew the copyright free and clear from any assignment previously made by the author.  Id.  In such a case, the owner of a derivative work does not retain the right to exploit that work when the death of the author causes the renewal rights in the preexisting work to revert to the statutory successors.  Id. at 220-21.

In 1991, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Stewart, Frank Petrella’s daughter and statutory successor renewed the copyright in the 1963 Screenplay, thereby recapturing the copyright for the renewal term unburdened by her father’s previous assignment.  Id. at 8.  Petrella, however, took no immediate action against MGM to enforce her copyright in the 1963 Screenplay.  In 1998, seven years after Petrella reacquired the copyright in the 1963 Screenplay, her attorney notified MGM that Petrella had obtained the copyright and that MGM’s continued exploitation of any derivative work – including the motion picture Raging Bull – allegedly infringed on Petrella’s copyright.  Id.  However, once again, Petrella chose to not take any immediate action against MGM because, as she put it, “the film was deeply in debt and in the red and would probably never recoup.”  Id. at 16.

Thereafter, in 2009 – eighteen years after Petrella recaptured the copyright in the 1963 Screenplay – Petrella filed a copyright infringement action against MGM, alleging that MGM infringed her copyright in the 1963 Screenplay by using, producing and distributing the motion picture Raging Bull, which Petrella alleged to be a derivative of the 1963 Screenplay.  Id. at 8. Petrella sought monetary damages and injunctive relief for MGM’s acts of alleged infringement occurring within the three-year statute of limitations period prior to the filing of her lawsuit.  Id. at 8-9.

MGM moved for summary judgment on various grounds, including the equitable doctrine of laches.  As to its laches-based defense, MGM argued that Petrella’s eighteen-year delay in filing suit after she reacquired the copyright in the 1963 Screenplay was unreasonable and prejudicial to MGM.  The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment on MGM’s laches defense, concluding that the doctrine of laches barred Petrella’s complaint, in its entirety.  Id. at 9.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s laches-based dismissal, agreeing with the District Court that MGM had established expectations-based prejudice, in that it made a large investment in marketing, advertising, distributing and otherwise promoting the film, including a 25th Anniversary Edition of Raging Bull that was released in 2005, believing that it had complete ownership and control of the film.  Id.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on the applicability of the laches defense to claims of copyright infringement brought within the three-year statute of limitations set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 507(b).  Id. at 10.  Examining the Copyright Act, the Court found that the three year statute of limitations applicable to copyright claims “itself takes account of delay” because, under § 507(b) and the Copyright Act’s separate-accrual rule, a “successful plaintiff can gain retrospective relief only three years back from the time of suit.”  Id. at 11.  The Supreme Court concluded that courts are not at liberty to “jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit” and, therefore, laches “cannot be invoked to preclude adjudication of a claim for damages brought within the three-year window.”  Id. at 1.

Although Petrella clearly establishes that laches cannot be invoked to knock-out a claim for legal relief for infringement that occurs within the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations period, it does not stop there.  Rather, the Supreme Court goes on to re-emphasize that a plaintiff’s unreasonable and prejudicial delay in commencing suit – the cornerstone of a laches-based defense – still packs a considerable punch in determining the types, and contours, of equitable relief appropriately awardable under the Copyright Act.  Of course, the availability of equitable relief is of particular significance to the parties in an infringement action, as two of the Copyright Act’s more potent remedies – injunctive relief and an accounting of the defendant’s profits – are inherently equitable remedies.

Petrella acknowledges the importance of laches in evaluating claims for equitable relief at both: (1) the outset of the litigation; and (2) the remedial stage when determining the proper relief and assessing an award of profits.  The Supreme Court confirmed that, in “extraordinary circumstances,” the consequences of the plaintiff’s delay in commencing suit may – as a threshold matter – limit the particular type of relief equitably awardable by the Court.  Id. at 20.  The Court cited Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., 474 F. 3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007), as an example of a case where such “extraordinary circumstances” were found to be present.  In Chirco, the plaintiff-copyright owner knew that the defendants’ housing development infringed its copyrighted architectural designs prior to the defendant starting construction on the development, but took no steps to halt the development for two-and-one-half years, during which more than 168 of the units were built, 140 units sold, and 109 occupied by residents.  Id. at 234-36.  Although the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s entire lawsuit based on laches, it affirmed the District Court’s judgment to the extent that it barred the plaintiff from obtaining an injunction mandating the destruction of the housing project.  Id. at 236.  The Sixth Circuit found that such relief would be inequitable given that: (1) the defendants knew about the development plans before construction began; and (2) the requested relief would work an unjust hardship on the defendants and innocent parties.  Id.  Thus, the plaintiff’s unreasonable and prejudicial delay deprived the plaintiff of an equitable remedy otherwise available under the Copyright Act.

Similarly, in New Era Publications International v. Henry Hold & Co., 873 F. 2d 576, 577 (2nd Cir. 1989), the licensee of the copyrights to certain works by Church of Scientology founder, L. Ron Hubbard, brought an infringement action against the publisher of a Hubbard biography, alleging that the biography contained extensive reproductions of Hubbard’s published and unpublished writings.  On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s refusal to permanently enjoin publication of the biography based on the doctrine of laches.  Id. at 584.  The Second Circuit noted that the defendant had been aware that the biography would be published in the United States since 1986, but, despite filing lawsuits in 1987 to enjoin publication of the biography abroad, failed to compare the defendant’s biography with the books published abroad, failed to inquire of the defendant as to the planned date of publication in the United States, and failed to take any steps to enjoin publication of the book until it sought a restraining order in 1988.  Id.  Moreover, by the time that the plaintiff took action in 1988, twelve-thousand copies of the book had already been printed, packed and shipped, review copies had been sent out, and a second printing had already been scheduled.  Id.  The Second Circuit found that, had the plaintiff promptly sought an adjudication of its rights, the book might have been changed at minimal cost while there was still an opportunity to do so, but that a “permanent injunction would result in the total destruction of the work since it is not economically feasible to reprint the book after deletion of the infringing material.”  Id.  The court concluded that “[s]uch severe prejudice, coupled with the unconscionable delay already described, mandates denial of an injunction for laches and relegation of [the plaintiff] to its damages remedy.”  Id. at 585.

In addition to limiting at the outset the type of equitable relief available to a plaintiff,  Petrella acknowledged that “a plaintiff’s delay can always be brought to bear at the remedial stage, in determining appropriate injunctive relief, and in assessing the ‘profits of the infringer…attributable to the infringement.’”  Id. at 21.  The Petrella Court instructed that, “[s]hould Petrella ultimately prevail on the merits, the District Court, in determining appropriate injunctive relief and assessing profits, may take account of her delay in commencing suit”  Id.  In considering Petrella’s delay, the Court directed the District Court to “closely examine MGM’s reliance on Petrella’s delay” and consider factors such as: (1) the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s claims; (2) the protection that the defendant may have achieved through pursuit of a declaratory judgment action; (3) the extent to which the defendant’s investment was protected by the separate-accrual rule; (4) the court’s authority to order injunctive relief “on such terms as it may deem reasonable” under Section 502(a); and (5) any other considerations that would justify adjusting injunctive relief or profits.  Id. at 21-22.

Apart from confirming the significant role that laches plays in determining the equitable relief available to a plaintiff in a copyright action, Petrella hints at potential evidentiary roadblocks that a copyright plaintiff may encounter as a result of the delay associated with a laches-based defense.  Noting that a copyright plaintiff bears the burden of proof, the Petrella Court concluded that any loss of evidence that may result from a plaintiff’s delay in filing suit would likely impact the plaintiff’s ability to establish infringement.  Id. at 18.  The Court further opined that the Copyright Act’s “registration mechanism” reduces the need for extrinsic evidence because, in order for a plaintiff to be able to sue for infringement, both the registration certificate and deposit copy of the original work must be “on file” with the Copyright Office.  Id.  Thus, Petrella seems to implicitly endorse the view that a registration certificate – and not merely a pending application – is required to maintain a copyright action, an issue that is currently the subject of a split amongst the Circuits.  Additionally, the importance that Petrella places on a plaintiff’s deposit of a copy of the original work raises an interesting question; namely, what happens when the plaintiff’s delay in filing suit is such that the Copyright Office no longer has a copy of the original work in its archives?[2] In such a case, the best evidence rule may very well preclude a plaintiff from prevailing on a copyright claim if the plaintiff cannot supply a copy of the original work.  See, e.g., Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 808 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1987).  This could present an insurmountable hurdle in suits brought by statutory heirs alleging the infringement of unpublished works.

In short, while Petrella clearly limits the role that the equitable defense of laches has vis-à-vis claims for legal relief for copyright infringement occurring within the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations period, it by no means absolves a plaintiff from the consequences of unreasonable delay.  To the contrary, an unreasonable and prejudicial delay in commencing suit can hit a plaintiff where it matters most – the ability to enjoin infringing conduct, deprive a defendant of profits attributable to its alleged infringement and, indeed, meet its burden of proving infringement.  Thus, laches is still a contender that should be considered when evaluating a claim of copyright infringement.

Article By:

Edwin Komen
Dylan J. Price
Of:
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

[1] Quote attributed to Jake LaMotta character portrayed by Robert DeNiro in “Raging Bull”.

[2] Under the Copyright Office’s retention policies, deposits may be transferred to the Library of Congress, given away to other institutions or discarded, the latter generally after five years.  See, Notice of Policy Decision – Policy Statement on Deposit Retention Schedule, 48 Fed. Reg. 12862, March 28, 1983.  Full term retention requires a government filing fee of $540 in addition to the normal copyright application fee.  See, current fee schedule at www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html.

The Meridian Sunrise Village Opinion Redux Re: Bankruptcy and Distressed Debt Investors

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In my last post I discussed the Meridian Sunrise Village v. NB Distressed Debt Investment Fund Ltd. opinion handed down by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington in March of this year.  The prior blog post focused on the Court’s holding that distressed loan investors are not “financial institutions” and therefore, cannot exercise rights and remedies under a loan agreement as permitted assignees. The Court didn’t stop there, however.  Within the opinion, the Court also signed off on the debtor’s gerrymandering of votes in respect of its plan of reorganization.  Today’s blog post discusses this second significant ruling.

Magnifying Glass on Money

As previously reported,Meridian Sunrise Village (“Meridian“) borrowed approximately $75 million from U.S. Bank for the construction of a shopping center.  Shortly after closing, U.S. Bank sold off pieces of the loan to other institutional lenders, including Bank of America.

Following a series of defaults under the loan agreement, Meridian filed for chapter 11 in early 2013.  During the course of the bankruptcy case, Bank of America sold its piece of the loan (“Ratable Loan“) to NB Distressed Debt Fund Limited (“NB“), which subsequently assigned one half of its interest to two other distressed debt investors (together with NB, the “Funds“).

Meridian, in an attempt to undermine the Funds’ position in its bankruptcy case, sought an injunction from the bankruptcy court limiting the Funds’ voting rights in respect of Meridian’s plan of reorganization.  Meridian’s argument focused on the fact that, immediately prior to the bankruptcy petition date, Bank of America was the sole owner of the Ratable Loan.  Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that each of the three Funds held a piece of the Ratable Loan at the date on which voting was to occur, Meridian asserted that the Funds should only have one vote (and not the normal three votes). Unfortunately for the Funds, the bankruptcy court concurred with Meridian and granted the injunction.

Notwithstanding the Funds’ attempt at an interlocutory appeal, voting on Meridian’s plan commenced to the exclusion of NB and its assignees.  The plan, which was supported by Meridian’s other lenders, was confirmed by the bankruptcy court in September 2013.  The Funds then appealed both the confirmation order and the bankruptcy court’s preliminary injunction to the District Court.

The Implications of the Court’s Ruling

After tackling the meaning of the phrase “financial institution,” the District Court considered the issue of allocation and counting of votes in favor of a plan of reorganization.  Under the Bankruptcy Code, a class of creditors is only deemed to accept a plan if more than 50% of the class members and 2/3 of the claimed dollar amount of the class vote in favor of the plan.

As discussed above, Meridian had allocated one vote to Bank of America as the prepetition holder of the Ratable Loan.  Notwithstanding Bank of America’s sale of the loan to NB and NB’s subsequent assignment to the Funds, the District Court held that that the Funds were only entitled to one vote (assuming they were entitled to vote at all), as per Meridian’s classification.  In relevant part, the District Court stated:

“A creditor does not have the right to split up a claim in such a way that artificially creates voting rights that the original assignor never had . . . . If the Funds received the number of votes it [sic] desired by simple assignment, any creditor could assign its interest to multiple parties to increase its voting power. [Another creditor] is correct that ‘the numerosity requirement cannot be so easily manipulated.’”

This is another controversial ruling with perhaps even more far ranging impact than the financial institution ruling discussed in my last post.  The district court effectively gave the debtor the ability to gerrymander voting on a plan of reorganization, at least in terms of satisfying the numerosity requirement.

While it remains to be seen whether this holding will be widely adopted and how it will affect plan classification and voting, we can concede that the district court added a new tool to a debtor’s arsenal vis-à-vis its lenders, particularly lenders who acquire loans post-petition.  In light of the Meridianopinion, lenders should take care when drafting loan agreements to include language addressing a lender’s ability to assign its loan and related rights (including the right to vote on a plan of reorganization) to multiple parties following a borrower’s bankruptcy filing.

The case is Meridian Sunrise Village, LLC v. NB Distressed Debt Investment Fund Ltd., 2014 WL 909219 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 2014).  The Funds have appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Article By:

Stacia Wells
Of:
Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

July 4th Puts the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Drone Policy to the Test

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Dramatic videos posted over the holiday weekend show fireworks displays that were filmed from drones.  The videos are remarkable, with the drones often flying within the sweep of the exploding shells.  Burning fireworks frequently zoom past the cameras.  We found drone fireworks videos from Decatur, Ga., Lake Martin, Ala., Oak Mountain State Park, Ala., and Nashville, Tenn.  The drone operators may have been inspired by a popular YouTube video of fireworks over West Palm Beach that attracted more than 6 million views and considerable press coverage.

We expect that the videos are also causing post-holiday headaches at the FAA.  The FAA’s reaction to these videos may prove to be an early test of its recent regulatory notice interpreting its longstanding rules on model aircraft.

As we previously reported, the FAA is playing catch up on its drone rules.  For years, the agency’s regulation of drones was limited to an advisory circular from 1981 and a policy statement from 2007, neither of which provided a comprehensive set of rules.  In March, the agency lost an enforcement action against a drone operator largely because it had never adopted specific regulations for drones.

On June 23, the FAA took a substantial step forward by issuing a notice of the agency’s interpretation of its authority to regulate drones.  The notice interprets Congress’s 2012 FAA legislation, including a provision that prohibits FAA regulation of model aircraft that are flown for “hobby or recreational” purposes and that meet certain other criteria.

In a key provision of the interpretation, the FAA stated that Congress’s prohibition on regulating model aircraft does not prohibit the agency from enforcing – against drone operators – the “general rules . . . that apply to all aircraft.”  This interpretation would permit the agency, for example, to allege that the fireworks drone operators violated regulations that prohibit careless and reckless operations that endanger life or property.

Finally, for those following the FAA’s position on commercial operation of drones, the fireworks videos may present a novel issue related to compensation.  In the June 23 interpretation, the FAA reiterated its longstanding position that commercial drone operations are generally prohibited, and the agency cited the example of “photographing [an] event and selling the photos to someone else.”

Some of the fireworks videos we reviewed were preceded by advertisements, which would appear to indicate that they are part of the YouTube Partner Program, where a portion of the advertising revenue is paid to the video creator.  The FAA has traditionally adopted a very broad view of commercial operations, and it will be interesting to see whether it considers “monetized” videos to cross the line.

We expect the FAA may have something to say about these fireworks videos.

Article By:

Brian D Smith
Of:
Covington & Burling LLP

 

The Supreme Court of the United States Holds that ESOP Fiduciaries are not Entitled to a Presumption of Prudence, Clarifies Standards for Stock Drop Claims

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On June 25, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that there is no special presumption of prudence for fiduciaries of employee stock ownership plans (“ESOPs”). Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12-751, 573 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2014) (slip op.).

Background

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”) imposes legal duties on fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, including ESOPs.[1] Specifically, ERISA requires the fiduciary of an employee benefit plan to act prudently in managing the plan’s assets.[2] In addition, ERISA requires the fiduciary to diversify plan assets.[3]

ESOPs are designed to be invested primarily in employer securities.[4] ERISA exempts ESOP fiduciaries from the duty of diversify plan assets and from the duty to prudently manage plan assets, but only to the extent that prudence requires diversification of plan assets.[5]

The recent financial crisis generated a wave of ERISA “stock drop” cases, which were filed after a precipitous drop in the value of employer securities held in an ESOP. Generally, the plaintiff alleged that the ESOP fiduciary breached its duty of prudence by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative. Defendant fiduciaries defended on the ground that the plaintiff failed to rebut the legal presumption that the fiduciary acted prudently by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.

The Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals that had considered the issue adopted the rebuttable presumption of prudence but split on the issues of (1) whether the legal presumption applied at the pleadings stage of litigation or whether the legal presumption was evidentiary in nature and did not apply at the pleadings stage of litigation and (2) the rebuttal standard that the plaintiff of a stock drop action must satisfy.[6]

Dudenhoeffer held that ESOP fiduciaries are not entitled to a legal presumption that they acted prudently by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.[7]

The Dudenhoeffer Case

Fifth Third Bancorp maintained a defined contribution plan, which offered participants a number of investment alternatives, including the company’s ESOP. The terms of the ESOP required that its assets be “invested primarily in shares of common stock of Fifth Third [Bancorp].”[8] The company offered a matching contribution that was initially invested in the ESOP. In addition, participants could make elective deferrals to the ESOP.

ESOP participants alleged that the ESOP fiduciaries knew or should have known on the basis of public information that the employer securities were overvalued and an excessively risky investment. In addition, the ESOP fiduciaries knew or should have known on the basis of non-public information that the employer securities were overvalued. Plaintiffs contended that a prudent ESOP fiduciary would have responded to this public and non-public information by (1) divesting the ESOP of employer securities, (2) refraining from investing in employer securities, (3) cancelling the ESOP investment alternative, and (4) disclosing non-public information to adjust the market price of the employer securities.

Procedural Posture

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that ESOP fiduciaries were entitled to a presumption of prudence with respect to their collective decisions to invest in employer securities and continue to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.[9] The District Court concluded that presumption of prudence applied at the pleadings stage of litigation and that the plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption.[10]

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court judgment, holding that the presumption of prudence is evidentiary in nature and does not apply at the pleadings stage of litigation.[11] The Sixth Circuit concluded that the complaint stated a claim for a breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence.[12]

ESOP Fiduciaries Not Entitled to Presumption of Prudence

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that ESOP fiduciaries are not entitled to a presumption of prudence with regard to their decisions to invest in employer securities and continue to offer employer securities as an investment alternative; rather, ESOP fiduciaries are subject to the same duty of prudence that applies to other ERISA fiduciaries, except that ESOP fiduciaries need not diversify plan assets.[13]

The Court began its analysis b
y acknowledging a tension within the statutory framework of ERISA. On the one hand, ERISA imposes a duty on all fiduciaries to discharge their duties prudently, which includes an obligation to diversify plan assets. On the other hand, ERISA recognizes that ESOPs are designed to invest primarily in employer securities and are not intended to hold diversified assets. The Court concluded that an ESOP fiduciary is not subject to the duty of prudence to the extent that the legal obligation requires the ESOP fiduciary to diversify plan assets. The Court found no special legal presumption favoring ESOP fiduciaries.

New Standards for Stock Drop Claims

Although the Court rejected the presumption of prudence, it vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (which held that the complaint properly stated a claim) and announced new standards for lower courts to observe in evaluating whether a complaint properly pleads a claim that an ESOP fiduciary breached its fiduciary duty of prudence by investing in employer securities or continuing to offer employer securities as an investment alternative.

Public Information

First, the Court concluded that “where a stock is publicly traded, allegations that a fiduciary should have recognized from publicly available information alone that the market was over- or undervaluing the stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence of special circumstances.”[14] In other words, a plaintiff generally cannot state a plausible claim of imprudence based solely on publicly available information. An ESOP fiduciary does not necessarily act imprudently by observing the efficient market theory, which holds that a major stock market provides the best estimate of the value of employer securities. To be clear, the Court did not rule out the possibility that a plaintiff could properly plead imprudence based on publicly available information indicating special circumstances affecting the reliability of the market price.

Non-Public Information

Second, the Court concluded that “[t]o state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence on the basis of inside information, a plaintiff must plausibly allege an alternative action that the [fiduciary] could have taken that would have been consistent with [applicable Federal and state securities laws] and that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed as more likely to harm the [ESOP] than to help it.”[15]

The Court reasoned that where a complaint alleges imprudence based on an ESOP fiduciary’s failure to act on non-public information, a lower court’s analysis should be guided by three considerations. First, ERISA does not require a fiduciary to violate applicable Federal and state securities laws. In other words, an ESOP fiduciary does not act imprudently by declining to divest the ESOP of employer securities or by prohibiting investments in employer securities on the basis of non-public information. Second, where a complaint faults fiduciaries for failing to decide, on the basis of non-public information, to refrain from making additional investments in employer securities or for failing to disclose non-public information to correct the valuation of the employer securities, lower courts should consider the extent to which the duty of prudence conflicts with complex insider trading and corporate disclosure requirements imposed by Federal securities laws or the objectives of such laws. Third, lower courts should consider whether the complaint has plausibly alleged that a prudent fiduciary could not have concluded that discontinuing investments in employer securities or disclosing adverse, non-public information to the public, or taking any other action suggested by the plaintiff would result in more harm than good to the ESOP by causing a drop in the value of the employer securities.

Quantifying the Unknowns

Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer will undoubtedly reshape the landscape of ERISA litigation and, specifically, stock drop litigation. To fully understand the decision’s impact, a number of questions must still be answered, including the correct application of the standards espoused by the Court. In addition, Dudenhoeffer involved a publicly-traded company; it is unclear what application, if any, the decision will have in the context of employer securities of a privately held company.

Article By:

Christopher T. Horner
Eric W. Gregory
 
Of: 
Dickinson Wright PLLC

 

[1] See generally, ERISA § 404(a).

[2] ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B).

[3] ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C).

[4] Code § 4975(e)(7)(A).

[5] ERISA § 404(a)(2).

[6] See e.g. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2011); Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 254 (5th Cir. 2008); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995); White v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., Case No. 11-2660, 2013 WL 1688918 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 2013); Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 881 (9th Cir. 2010);Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2012).

[7] No. 12-751, 573 U.S. ____ at 1-2.

[8] Id.

[9] Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (S.D. Ohio 2010).

[10] Id. At 762.

[11] Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F. 3d 410, 418-19 (2012).

[12] Id. At 423.

[13] Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12-751, 573 U.S. ___ at 1-2.

[14] Id. At 16.

[15] Id. At 18.

ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund: How Broad Was That Bylaw?

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On our July 1st posting, I noted a recent Form 8-K filing that discloses the adoption of a fee-shifting bylaw.  In  ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 2014 Del. LEXIS 209 (Del. May 8, 2014), the Delaware Supreme Court held that a fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s bylaws can be valid and enforceable under Delaware law.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court said:  ”A bylaw that allocates risk among parties in intra-corporate litigation would also appear to satisfy the DGCL’s requirement that bylaws must ‘relat[e] to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.’”  Note that the Court held that a fee-shifting bylaw “can be valid and enforceable”.  Thus, the Court only addressed the question of facial validity – it expressly disclaimed any conclusions on either the adoption or use of the bylaw in question.

In my review of the bylaw at issue in the case, it seems to me that it is so broadly worded that it arguably covers situations unrelated to the business of the corporation et cetera.  Here is the bylaw as quoted in the Court’s opinion:

In the event that (i) any [current or prior member or Owner or anyone on their behalf (“Claiming Party”)] initiates or asserts any [claim or counterclaim (“Claim”)] or joins, offers substantial assistance to or has a direct financial interest in any Claim against the League or any member or Owner (including any Claim purportedly filed on behalf of the League or any member), and (ii) the Claiming Party (or the third party that received substantial assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the Claiming Party had a direct financial interest) does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought, then each Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and severally to reimburse the League and any such member or Owners for all fees, costs and expenses of every kind and description (including, but not limited to, all reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively, “Litigation Costs”) that the parties may incur in connection with such Claim.

Now, let’s suppose that one member of the corporation is driving to pick up her child at school and collides with an automobile driven by another member who is on her way to a social occasion.  If the first member sues the second member and fails to obtain a judgment on the merits, will that member be liable under the bylaw for attorneys’ fees and other costs?  The bylaw seems to require only that a member assert a claim against another member and fail to obtain a judgment.  The bylaw does not on its face require that the claim be brought by or against a member qua member.

Article By:

Keith Paul Bishop
Of:
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

10 Insights You Want to Gain from Your Social Media Monitoring

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If you are participating in social media for your law firm, you should also be monitoring whether or not your time investment is paying dividends.

Social Media Insight

You should be creating Google Alerts or searching on Social Mention for the name of your law firm and the names of your attorneys at least once a month.  Create alerts for the areas of law you practice as well.  The social media blog site Buffer recommends you keep these 10 insights in mind when reviewing your results:

Sentiment — Are mentions generally position, neutral or negative?

Questions — Look for questions people may have that you can provide the answers to in your social media posts or blogs.

Feedback — If you see feedback on Avvo or Yelp or some other site that directly affects your firm, you need to listen and respond appropriately.

Links — keep track of who is retweeting or reposting your content and keep track of who is linking back to you.

Pain points — absorb what people are talking about online that is of concern to them and use that information to inform your future posts.

Content — this is where your alerts for your practice area come in handy.  Use these to mine for topics of interest to your target market.

Trends — recent court decisions or trending news in your practice area should be included in your posts so it is clear you are on top of all the trends.

Media — journalists spend a lot of time online so pay attention to the areas they are covering that might provide you with an opportunity to reach out as a spokesperson on those subjects.

Influencers — are there certain individuals who keep popping up in your feeds?  They may be someone it would be advantageous for you to know as an industry influencer.

Advocates — monitoring is a great way to find and recognize those people who are talking positively about you online.

Article By:

Stephen Fairley
Of:
The Rainmaker Institute

Making These 3 Errors in WordPress Makes Your Law Firm’s Blog Less Effective

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Here are three common WordPress mistakes that will make your legal website less effective than it should be:

  1. Posting content that is not unique, engaging or well designed. Unstructured information, filler materials and overly general articles do not motivate a user to interact with the site. Your goal should be to create content that users want to share or bookmark or research further by following your in-text links.
  2. Getting caught up in finding the perfect WP template and design. Many inexperienced website authors expend all their energy before even considering content development. A lot of sites use generic content that reads like it was added as an afterthought. It is hard to schedule time to generate good content but when most people say, “Oh, I’ll come back to improve that later,” they never do.
  3. Failing to design each page for its intended purpose. Out-of-the-box WordPress themes use similar forms and sidebars on every page. It is important for the design (as well as the content) to serve the page’s purpose.
Article By:

Tanner Jones
Of:
Consultwebs.com, Inc.

Supreme Court: Checking in on Bank Fraud

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In Loughrin v. United States, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 13-316, the Supremes approved the application of the federal bank fraud statute to a relatively unsophisticated check cashing scheme, leading to the collective hand-wringing by a host of internet commentators who decried the federalization of state crimes and runaway prices at Whole Foods. The defendant in the underlying case was a pillar of the community named Kevin Loughrin, who stole and altered checks so that he could buy merchandise at his local Target stores, leading to six federal bank fraud charges. According the case record, Loughrin intended to buy merchandise with the checks and return them for cash refunds. Let’s face it, this was not the world’s most enterprising criminal.

What was enterprising, however, was Loughrin’s argument that he intended to target Target and not a federally-insured financial institution. According to Loughrin, a conviction for bank fraud required that prosecutors prove intent to defraud the banks on which the checks were drawn. Otherwise, suggested Loughrin, the federal bank fraud statute would extend to ordinary, unsophisticated frauds that simply involve payment by check – an area that was typically left to prosecution by the states.

Setting aside the debate between the breadth and scope of federal criminal laws (sorry, breathless internet commentators!), I’d instead like to talk about how bank fraud may not be bank fraud even though it’s bank fraud. Make sense? No? Hmm. Let me try again.

The Supremes cleared up that bank fraud applies to things like Loughren’s moronic basic check cashing scheme because of the use of checks, right? And this helps with the definition of what bank fraud actually is and what conduct bank fraud actually covers. But while the crime of bank fraud has become a little more clear, there is still absolutely no straightforward way of figuring out whether your local U.S. Attorney’s Office will actually prosecute the case or not.

“What?” you say indignantly. “But crime has been committed! Criminals must be punished! Heads must roll!” Oh, I agree. And you would be hard pressed to find people who do not agree (criminals have terrible lobbyists). But charging decisions are left entirely to the discretion of local U.S. Attorney’s offices, which must balance Department of Justice priorities with local priorities, office staff, and agency resources. So while a bank fraud of $30,000 in Billings, Montana may capture federal attention, the same fraud in Los Angeles, California, is likely going to be declined by federal prosecutors. The problem becomes more acute when the arbitrary lines bisect the same bustling metropolis, like what happens between the Northern and Eastern District of Texas or between the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. It is entirely possible, for example, that federal prosecution in the Dallas area depends on where a criminal decides to exit Highway 75.

Does that sound arbitrary? If so, it’s because it is. But it’s the system that we have. And because of that system, bank fraud may not be bank fraud . . . even though it’s bank fraud.

Article By:

Shamoil T. Shipchandler
Of:
Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

FDA Issues Guidance for Safety of Nanomaterials in Cosmetic Products (as well as in Food)

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For the last seven or so years, the U.S. federal government and some state governments have been collecting cradle-to-grave information regarding nanomaterials. The data collection call-ins were intended to create a collaborative, scientific dialogue with the goal of examining relevant information, and identifying information gaps and ways to address those gaps.

Last week, the FDA issued guidance documents for both cosmetic and food manufacturers. The guides are one more step intended to assist industry and other stakeholders in identifying the potential safety issues of nanomaterials in consumer products and in developing a framework for evaluating them. It also provides contact information for those who wish to discuss safety considerations regarding the use of specific nanomaterials in cosmetic products with the FDA.

If your company is considering the use of nanomaterials in its products, it is important to recognize that although nanotech cosmetics are still subject to the same legal requirements as other cosmetics, in that they do not require premarket approval, the products must be safe under customary usage conditions and properly labeled. Additionally, although the FDA has explained that the current safety framework used for conventional cosmetics is still appropriate for cosmetics using nanotech, companies should keep in mind the unique properties of nanomaterials when testing safety. Ultimately, as this guidance reminds, companies are legally liable for ensuring the safety of their products. As to food products, the FDA encourages manufacturers to contact the agency early in the development process to assist in assessing the safety and potential issues with using nanotechnology.

Read the complete press announcement from the FDA here.

Article By:

Angela Diesch
Of:
Greenberg Traurig, LLP