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The National Law Forum - Page 520 of 753 - Legal Updates. Legislative Analysis. Litigation News.

President Obama’s Response to the Ebola Crisis

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, December 30, 2013 was epidemiological week 1 for the current Ebola crisis in West Africa.  Since that date, more than 4,985 cases — 2,461 of which have resulted in death — have been confirmed or suspected.

Today, nine months after the epidemic’s outbreak, President Obama has made an overdue announcement that the U.S. will deploy an estimated 3,000 troops in an effort to stem the crisis.  The response is certainly welcome but it remains far from certain that an intervention by the U.S. military will be sufficient to defeat this deadly epidemic.

President Obama is right to characterize the Ebola outbreak as a top national security priority for the U.S., and the past is instructive for what we might be dealing with in this situation.

The last time that the U.S. declared a health emergency to be a threat to U.S. national security was in 2000, when the Clinton administration designated HIV/AIDS as a threat that could undermine governments, lead to conflict and weaken progress on democracy and economic growth.  At that time, the Clinton Administration doubled its budget request to combat HIV/AIDS internationally to $254 million.  However, it was not until 2003 when President George W. Bush requested from Congress $15 billion over five years that the U.S. began to turn the tide of that deadly pandemic.  It was still another two years before medicines became widely available to those infected with HIV and, in 2008, PEPFAR was reauthorized for $48 billion for another five years.

To date, the Obama administration has spent $175 million to address the rapidly spreading Ebola crisis in West Africa.  This is likely to be a fraction of the ultimate cost required to defeat this disease.  Recent estimates from the United Nations place the costs around $1 billion.

In addition to involving the U.S. military, President Obama has committed the U.S. to the construction of 17 treatment centers (each of which will have 100  beds) in Liberia and the establishment of a site to train up to 500 local health care providers per week.  In terms of containing this deadly disease, this “whole of government” response from the Obama Administration is a good, if belated, start.  However, key questions remain.

It is not clear how long the strategy will take to implement and, according to international health officials who spoke with The New York Times, 1,000 beds are needed in the next week alone to contain the spread of the disease.  It also is not clear how the U.S. will work with the governments of Sierra Leone and Guinea, as nearly half the cases reported come from those two countries, nor Nigeria and Senegal who also have reported cases.

Over the weekend, chief executives from 11 companies operating in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea made an urgent appeal to the international community to pool its resources to fight Ebola.  It is an important development that the U.S. is moving forward with a more aggressive response to this plea.  Yet victory will likely require a “whole of community” response from all stakeholders, including governments, businesses, NGOs and others, who want to see the governments of West Africa defeat this deadly scourge.

ARTICLE BY

Witney Schneidman
OF
Covington & Burling LLP

October 23-25 San Antonio: American Bar Association's 9th Annual GPSolo National Solo and Small Firm Conference

The National Law Review is pleased to present you with information about the American Bar Association’s 9th Annual GPSolo National Solo and Small Firm Conference.

 

ABA 9th GPsolo Oct2014

Book your travel now for the 2014 GPSolo 9th Annual National Solo & Small Firm Conference (NSSFC). This year’s theme is “Building a Texas-Sized Practice on a Lone Star Budget.” Traditionally, the NSSFC attracts more than 200 solos and small firm practitioners from across the country and abroad. However, this year’s meeting in Texas is going supersize as we expect to draw record numbers. Come join the excitement and learn to build or expand your practice without spending a fortune.

Some exciting highlights of the meeting include:

–        Off-the-charts networking opportunities such as meet-and-greets with legal service plan providers and potential new business referrals

–        Rainmaking Forum; U.S. Supreme Court Swearing-In Ceremony (register now to take part); Naturalization Ceremony for new U.S. citizens; and an accreditation course for practice before the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (which, like Social Security representation, can result in a fee award). All these programs are new this year.

–        Opportunity to choose up to ten hours of CLE from more than 25 hours of offerings. This is not your everyday CLE. We will have several GPSolo book authors presenting on chapters from their recent publications, including the outstanding Run Your Firm Like a Business by Frank T. Lockwood, the timely Lawyer’s Guide to Financial Planning by Cynthia Sharp, and the ever-important Debt Collector’s Handbook by David J. Cook.

–        Sessions presented by the ABA Commission on Immigration for both immigration and non-immigration practitioners, including a mock trial demonstration with an immigration judge showing you the ins and outs of practicing before the immigration courts.

–        Difference Makers Awards Luncheon, where we celebrate the accomplishments of our honorees.

–        Training for pro bono representation with Kids in Need of Defense (KIND) to assist unaccompanied children who currently represent themselves in immigration court proceedings.

–        The opportunity to help educate high school students about being aware of debt through our Financial Literacy Outreach public service program.

 

GPSolo members will receive all of this and more for the not-so-Texas-sized price of $145—less than the cost of food and beverages alone. Why? We want to thank you in person for being a GPSolo member. So come on down and join the fun! Don’t mess with Texas, and don’t miss out on GPSolo’s signature event! For the best savings, register before September 22 and pay only $145 (GPSolo rate).

 

Not By "Any Manner" Of Means: Securing Cyber-Crime Coverage After Zurich v. Sony

Gilbert LLP Law Firm

Much has been written about the New York Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Sony Corp., Index. No. 651982/2011 (N.Y. Supr. Ct. Feb. 21, 2014), in which a New York trial court denied coverage to Sony Corporation for liabilities stemming from a 2011 cyber-attack on its PlayStation Network. The court held that while a wide-scale data breach represents a “publication” of private information, the PlayStation Network breach did not fall within the ambit of Sony’s commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy because the policy covered only publications by the insured itself—not by third-party hackers. The court rejected Sony’s argument that the phrase “in any manner,” which qualified the word “publication” in Sony’s policy, sufficed to broaden coverage to encompass third-party acts. Instead, the court determined that the “in any manner” language referred merely to the medium by which information was published (e.g., print, internet, etc.), not the party that did the publishing.

Most of the commentary surrounding Sony has focused on the court’s interpretation of the phrase “in any manner.” But that aspect of the court’s ruling was relatively unremarkable: other courts have similarly limited the phrase, most notably the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals inCreative Hospitality Ventures, Inc. v. United States Liability Insurance Co., 444 Fed. App’x 370 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the issuance of a receipt to a customer containing more than the last five digits of the customer’s credit card number does not represent a publication). Lost in theSony debate is the fact that Sony may be able to prevail on appeal even if the appellate court refuses to adopt a broad reading of the “in any manner” language. Indeed, Sony can make a compelling case that the term “publication,” when read in context with the policy as a whole, is intended to encompass both first-party and third-party acts.

In focusing narrowly on the language of the advertising injury coverage grant, the Sony court overlooked a “cardinal principal” of insurance law: namely, that an insurance policy “should be read to give effect to all its provisions and to render them consistent with each other.”Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995). Had the court taken a more holistic approach, it might have noticed that language in other parts of the policy evidenced the insurers’ intent to cover third-party publications. If Sony’s policy resembled the standard Insurance Services Office, Inc. (“ISO”) CGL policy, its exclusions section was surely riddled with clauses restricting coverage for certain types of injury “caused by or at the direction of the insured.” Only six of the exclusions in the ISO policy are not so qualified, including the absolute pollution exclusion and the exclusion for publications that occur prior to the policy period. It makes sense that insurers would wish to broadly exclude such categories of injury, just as it makes sense that exclusions for intentionally injurious acts would be written narrowly to apply only to the insured’s own actions. These carefully worded exclusions—when read together and in context with the policy as a whole—evidence a conscious decision by Sony’s insurers to exclude some injuries only if caused by the insured, while excluding other types of injury regardless of who, if anyone, is at fault. This, in turn, suggests that the insurers contemplated coverage for third-party acts unless such acts are expressly excluded.

Nowhere is this better illustrated that in the ISO policy’s exclusion for intellectual property infringement. This exclusion purports to broadly bar coverage for injury “arising out of the infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other intellectual property rights.” However, this broad exclusion is qualified by the caveat that it “does not apply to infringement,in your ‘advertisement’, [sic] of copyright, trade dress or slogan.” Thus, the exclusion bars coverage in the first instance for all intellectual property infringements irrespective of the identity of the perpetrator, then adds back coverage for certain acts of the insured. This evidences the insurer’s understanding that unless otherwise excluded, the policy affords coverage for advertising injury regardless of who caused it.

At minimum, the fact that the ISO policy exclusions vary with respect to whether they exclude all acts or only first-party acts should be sufficient to raise an ambiguity, thus triggering “the common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous language against the interest of the party that drafted it.” Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62. Even if the policy does not unambiguously afford coverage for third-party publications, it is at the very least “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Discovision Assocs. v. Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd., 71 A.D.3d 448, 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Pointing to ambiguity in the policy as a whole would provide policyholders such as Sony with a more plausible and straightforward avenue to securing coverage for third-party publications than does narrowly parsing the phrase “in any manner.”

The question of whether third-party publications are covered under the typical CGL policy is of crucial importance to policyholders seeking insurance recovery for cyber-crime injuries. Importantly, victory on this point by Sony or another hacking victim would transform Sony into a policyholder-friendly decision, because the Sony court answered the other difficult question presented in the case—whether a data breach represents a “publication”—in favor of coverage. If the appellate court is willing to look past the narrow language of the advertising injury coverage grant and focus on Sony’s policy as a whole, Sony will have a good chance of prevailing on appeal and, in doing so, will set a strong precedent in favor of cyber-crime coverage for hacking victims.

ARTICLE BY

Kami E. Quinn
Miriam Smolen
James Liddell
OF
Gilbert LLP

U.S. And EU Significantly Expand Sanctions and Export Control Restrictions Targeting Russia

In response to Russia’s continuing actions to destabilize Ukraine, the United States and EU took coordinated and significant steps on September 12, 2014, to expand and intensify sanctions targeting the Russian energy, defense, and financial services sectors. In tandem, the United States and EU also imposed additional restrictions on energy-related exports to certain entities in Russia, and the EU introduced new trade controls relating to certain dual-use exports.

In the United States, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) took three steps that target the Russian energy sector:

  • First, OFAC imposed a prohibition on the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: the provision, export, or reexport of goods, services (other than financial services), or technology in support of deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale exploration or production projects that: (1) have the potential to produce oil in or offshore of Russia; and (2) involve any of five major Russian energy companies: Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, or Surgutneftegas. U.S. parties impacted by these new sanctions have two weeks to wind down their activities with these Russian firms, under the terms of a new general license.

  • Second, BIS imposed a license requirement for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer to these same five Russian companies of any item subject to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) if the exporter, reexporter, or transferor knows that the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia. This action – achieved by naming these companies to the BIS Entity List – represents an expansion of the previous BIS restrictions relating to Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, and shale oil and gas projects, which we reviewed in our e-alert of July 30, 2014.

  • Third, OFAC added two Russian energy companies–Gazprom Neft and Transneft–tothegroup of companies whose ability to issue new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days is restricted. Those restrictions on new debt, which apply to U.S. persons and persons in the United States who transact in, provide financing for, or otherwise deal in such debt, were detailed in our e-alert of July 17, 2014.

    U.S. actions targeting the Russian defense and financial services sectors include new or expanded “sectoral sanctions” and the designation of Russian defense companies to BIS’s Entity List and OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. BIS also noted that it will “require licenses for an additional group of items destined to military end-uses or end-users in Russia,” but did not provide further elaborate on what this may entail.

    The new EU sanctions are set forth in two measures. First, Council Regulation No. 960/2014, which amends Council Regulation No. 833/2014 (described in our e-alert of August 4, 2014), introduces new restrictions on the access of certain Russian companies, including major Russian energy companies such as Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, to EU financing and financial markets. It also introduces new trade controls relating to certain dual-use and energy-related exports. Separately, Council Regulation No. 961/2014 designates 24 additional individuals for EU asset-freezing measures.

Collectively, the new U.S. and EU sanctions introduce a significant new range of trade controls, which will be of particular importance to companies in the energy, financial services, and defense sectors. The principal elements of the new sanctions are described below.

NEW U.S. SANCTIONS

A. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Energy Sector

Perhaps the most significant of the new U.S. sanctions are those targeting the Russian energy sector. The new U.S. measures have implications for both U.S. and non-U.S. companies that do business with the Russian energy industry, though they will impact U.S. and non-U.S. companies in different ways. As noted above, OFAC and BIS have taken three new steps to target the Russian energy sector.

OFAC Directive 4 and General License No. 2

The first key action targeting the Russian energy sector is OFAC’s issuance of a new directive – Directive 4 – pursuant to Executive Order 13662. Directive 4 prohibits the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: providing, exporting, or reexporting, directly or indirectly, goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production from deepwater (i.e., more than 500 feet), Arctic offshore, or shale projects that: (1) have the potential to produce oil in Russia or in maritime area claimed by Russia and extending from its territory; and (2) involve parties subject to Directive 4, their property, or their interests in property. These restrictions also extend to entities owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties. Currently, five Russian energy companies are identified on the U.S. Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (“SSI List”) as being subject to Directive 4 – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Surgutneftegas. Directive 4 also makes clear that any conspiracy to violate any of its prohibitions is prohibited, and that any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of Directive 4’s prohibitions is also prohibited.

At the same time that it issued Directive 4, OFAC expanded the guidance it offers on the sectoral sanctions through its Frequently Asked Questions. One of these “FAQs” (#412) explains that the prohibition on the exportation of services includes, but may not be limited to, drilling services, geophysical services, geological services, logistical services, management services, modeling capabilities, and mapping technologies. In contrast, Directive 4 does not prohibit the exportation or provision of financial services, such as clearing transactions or providing insurance related to the targeted activities. However, companies providing such financial services should ensure that those services do not constitute a prohibited dealing in new debt or new equity under Directives 1 or 2, which are addressed further below and apply independently of Directive 4.

Simultaneously, OFAC also issued General License No. 2 to authorize, for a limited time, certain wind down activities involving the Russian energy companies subject to Directive 4. Specifically, activities otherwise prohibited by Directive 4 are authorized until September 26, 2014, if they are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of operations, contracts, or other agreements involving persons determined to be subject to Directive 4 . . . that were in effect prior to September 12, 2014.” OFAC has made clear that General License No. 2 does not authorize the provision, export, or reexport of goods, services (other than financial services), or technology except as needed to cease operations involving the projects covered by Directive 4.

Any U.S. persons participating in transactions authorized by General License No. 2 are required, within 10 business days after the wind down activities conclude, to file a detailed report with OFAC covering the parties involved in the wind down activities and the date, type, and scope of such activities.

Finally, even if General License No. 2 appears to allow an export or reexport of goods, services, or technology related to wind down activities, companies should also confirm that there are no BIS restrictions applicable to the export or reexport before proceeding.

Expansion of BIS License Requirements for Certain Russian Deepwater, Arctic Offshore, and Shale Projects

The second key action targeting the Russian energy sector is BIS’s addition to its Entity List of the same five Russian energy companies currently subject to OFAC’s Directive 4 – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Surgutneftegas. As a result of this action, BIS now requires all U.S. and non-U.S. persons to obtain a BIS license for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer to these five Russian companies of any item subject to the EAR if the exporter, reexporter, or transferor knows that the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia. Moreover, applications for such licenses will be subject to a presumption of denial if the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, a deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale project in Russia that has the potential to produce oil. BIS previously issued guidance addressing the scope of the Entity List, including circumstances where an entity is owned or controlled by an entity on the Entity List. That guidance is available here.

This BIS action – which targets the export, reexport, or transfer of any item subject to the EAR – represents a significant expansion of the BIS export restrictions that were announced in early August, which targeted only certain enumerated items, not any item, subject to the EAR.

Addition of Two Russian Energy Companies to the SSI List as Subject to OFAC Directive 2

The third key action targeting the Russian energy sector is OFAC’s addition of two Russian energy companies – Gazprom Neft and Transneft – to the SSI List as subject to OFAC’s Directive 2. Directive 2 was originally issued on July 16, 2014, pursuant to Executive Order 13662, and prohibited the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of entities identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 2, their property, or interests in property.

Because Gazprom Neft and Transneft are now subject to Directive 2, transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of Gazprom Neft and Transneft, Rosneft and OAO Novatek (which were added to the SSI List as subject to Directive 2 in July), and any entities owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties is prohibited as to U.S. persons and within the United States.

Notably, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, which supersedes General License No. 1 of July 16, 2014, and which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days issued by a person subject to Directive 2.

It is important to highlight that Rosneft and Gazprom Neft are subject to both Directive 2 and Directive 4 (described above). OFAC has made clear that persons dealing with either Rosneft or Gazprom Neft must ensure that such dealings comply with Directive 2 and Directive 4 independently. For example, even if the provision of services to Rosneft is permissible under Directive 4 because the services qualify as “financial services,” the entity providing those services must separately ensure that the services do not run afoul of the prohibitions of Directive 2.

B. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Defense Sector

OFAC Directive 3

OFAC expanded the sectoral sanctions targeting Russia to also cover the defense and related materiel sector. U.S. sectoral sanctions targeting Russia had previously focused only on the Russian financial services and energy sectors.

In particular, OFAC issued a new directive – Directive 3 – prohibiting the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of entities added to the SSI List as subject to Directive 3, or their property or interests in property. Simultaneously, OFAC added Rostec, a Russia-based state- owned holding company for the Russian defense industry, to the SSI List as subject to Directive 3.

Like Directive 4, Directive 3 prohibits any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate Directive 3’s prohibitions. Likewise, Directive 3 prohibits any conspiracy to violate any of its prohibitions.

Notably, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, as discussed above, which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days issued by a person subject to Directive 3.

Addition of Five Russian Defense Companies to the SDN List and Entity List

Separately, OFAC added the following five entities that operate in the Russian defense sector to its SDN List pursuant to Executive Order 13661:

  • Almaz-Antey GSKB (aka Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern Main System Design Bureau, JSC): a subsidiary of the Almaz-Antey Concern (which was itself added to the SDN List pursuant to Executive Order 13661 on July 16, 2014) that designs and manufactures air defense systems for the Russian Ministry of Defense.

  • Dolgoprudny Research Production Enterprise: primarily engaged in the production of weapons and ammunition, including the Buk (SA-11 or SA-17) missile system.

  • JSC NIIP (aka Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design): a subsidiary of the Almaz-Antey Concern that develops anti-aircraft defense systems, including on-board radar systems for MiG and Sukhoi fighters, and anti-aircraft missile systems for land forces, including the Kub and Buk systems.

  • Kalinin Machine Plant JSC: a state-run company involved in the production of special purpose products, including launchers, anti-air missiles, and artillery guns for infantry and anti-air defense.

  • Mytishchinski Mashinostroitelny Zavod OAO: has produced weaponry and equipment, primarily anti-aircraft missile systems and chassis for tracked military vehicles.

U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any dealings with these designated entities or any entities that are owned 50% or more by one or more of the designated entities. Additionally, any property or interests in property of these designated entities that comes within the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person must be blocked.

Simultaneous with the OFAC designations, BIS added these same five entities to its Entity List, which means that any person – including non-U.S. persons – must obtain a BIS license for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer of any item subject to the EAR to the five designated entities. Applications for such licenses will be subject to a presumption of denial.

BIS noted in making these designations that it “will also require licenses for an additional group of items destined to military end-uses or end-users in Russia.” BIS did not further elaborate on what this may entail. We note – as explained in our e-alert of August 4, 2014 – that the EU previously imposed a prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use goods and technology to Russia if those items may be intended for “military use” or a “military end-user.”

C. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Financial Services Sector

OFAC also has taken two key steps to expand and intensify the restrictions under Directive 1, which was originally issued on July 16, 2014, pursuant to Executive Order 13662 and which targets the access of certain entities in Russia’s financial services sector to U.S. capital markets.

First, OFAC amended Directive 1 to decrease the length of maturity of prohibited new debt from 90 days to 30 days. In its original form, Directive 1 prohibited the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity or new equity for persons identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 1 (i.e., certain Russian banks), their property, or their interests in property. In its new, amended form, Directive 1 prohibits the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity or new equity of persons identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 1, their property, or their interests in property.

Second, OFAC added Sberbank to the list of Russian banks subject to Directive 1. Thus, the prohibitions under Directive 1 are now applicable to new debt of longer than 30 days maturity and new equity of the Bank of Moscow, Gazprombank, the Russian Agricultural Bank, Sberbank, VEB, and VTB.

As noted above, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days or new equity issued by a person subject to Directive 1.

NEW EU SANCTIONS

The EU Council first agreed to the core framework of the sanctions on September 8, 2014. However, the cease-fire between the Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian armed militia — signed on September 5, 2014 — caused the EU Council to delay the entry into force of the new sanctions as the Council evaluated the cease-fire and the implementation of broader peace initiatives proposed earlier this month by the President of Ukraine.

The EU Council has signaled that it is prepared to take swift action to remove or reduce the new sanctions if the Russian Government demonstrates cooperation in resolving the conflict in Ukraine − or to further enhance the sanctions regime if Russia continues to contribute to the conflict.

The restrictions implemented on September 12, 2014 introduce a number of new measures, including features that do not have precedent in prior EU sanctions regulations. As in the case of the original version of Regulation 833/2014, the new provisions include a number of ambiguities that have already generated important questions from potentially affected companies, and the EU Member States will likely be called upon in the coming weeks to issue interpretive guidance relating to the new sanctions measures.

A. Additional Restrictions on Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

Regulation 960/2014 imposes a new prohibition − codified in Article 2a of the Amended Regulation 833/2014 − on the sale, supply, transfer, or export, directly or indirectly, of dual-use goods and technologies to any natural or legal person, entity, or body in Russia that is listed in Annex IV to the Regulation. Annex IV currently includes JSC Sirius, OJSC Stankoinstrument, OAO JSC Chemcomposite, JSC Kalashnikov, JSC Tula Arms Plant, NPK Technologii Maschinostrojenija, OAO Wysokototschnye Kompleksi, OAO Almaz Antey, and OAO NPO Bazalt. This new restriction on dual- use items supplements the existing prohibition, reflected in the original Regulation 833/2014, against the export of dual-use items to military end-users or for any military end-use in Russia.

Regulation 960/2014 also prohibits the provision to Annex IV parties of technical assistance, brokering services, or any “other services” related to dual-use items and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance, and use of those items. The provision to the Annex IV parties of financing or financial assistance for the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services, or other services is also prohibited.

The foregoing restrictions are expressed in the Regulation as prohibitions, rather than licensing requirements, thus implying that licenses will not be available to authorize transactions covered under the new restrictions. The new prohibitions are, however, subject to a number of important exemptions. Firstly, they do not apply to (i) the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items intended for the aeronautics and space industry, or the related provision of technical or financial assistance for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, or to (ii) the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items for maintenance and safety of existing civil nuclear capabilities within the EU, for non-military use, and for non-military end-users.

The foregoing provisions are also without prejudice to the execution of contracts or agreements concluded before September 12, 2014, and to the provision of assistance necessary to the maintenance and safety of “existing capabilities within the EU.” Regulation 960/2014 does not define the term “existing capabilities.”

B. New Oil and Gas “Services” Controls

Regulation 960/2014 also introduces a new Article 3a to Regulation 833/2014, prohibiting the direct or indirect provision of certain “services necessary for deepwater oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia,” including (i) “drilling,” (ii) “well testing,” (iii) “logging and completion services,” and (iv) “supply of specialised floating vessels[.]” The new measures supplement existing restrictions, set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation 833/2014, concerning transactions associated with oil and gas equipment listed in Annex II to Regulation 833/2014. The new Article 3a restrictions are not, however, limited to Annex II items or to any other defined products, and the Regulation provides no definition or guidance concerning the scope of the restricted “services.” Moreover, in contrast to Regulation 833/2014 and to trade controls restrictions in other EU sanctions regulations, which distinguish restrictions on exports of goods and technology from restrictions on the provision of related support (e.g., technical assistance, brokering, financing, or financial assistance), the general reference to “services” in Article 3a has invited questions − which are not easily resolved from the text of the Regulation − concerning whether the new measures are intended to capture the supply of goods, the mere provision of technical or other support, or both.

The Article 3a prohibitions are without prejudice to the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or a “framework agreement” concluded before September 12, 2014, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. The term “framework agreement” is not defined in Regulation 960/2014. However, it presumably carries a broader scope than the term “agreement” used in similar grandparenting provisions in Regulation 833/2014.

Finally, Article 3a exempts services that are necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment.

On a separate but related note, a recently published corrigendum to Regulation 833/2014 has clarified the scope of the restrictions on the provision of technical assistance, brokering services, financing, or financial assistance relating to the items listed on Annex II to that regulation. The corrigendum amends Article 4(4), correcting an error to the version of Regulation 833/2014 published on August 1, 2014, to make clear that competent Member State authorities may not authorize such assistance if the Annex II items are for Arctic or deepwater oil exploration or production or for a shale oil project unless the assistance concerns the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before August 1, 2014.

C. Additional Controls on Military Items

Regulation 960/2014 also amends Article 4 of Regulation 833/2014 to prohibit the provision of insurance and reinsurance relating to military items to Russian parties or for use in Russia; this prohibition applies in addition to the pre-existing prohibition against the provision of financing and financial assistance relating to military items.

D. Additional Financial Sector Restrictions

Regulation 960/2014 also amends Article 5 to Regulation 833/2014 to introduce a number of important new financial restrictions against designated Russian parties. The key amendments to Article 5 are as follows:

  • Regulation 960/2014 extends existing restrictions targeting “transferablesecurities” and “money market instruments” issued by Russian financial institutions listed on Annex III to Regulation 833/2014. Specifically, the new provisions introduce a restriction on the provision of “investment services” relating to those instruments, and lower the maturity period for covered instruments from 90 to 30 days (for instruments issued after September 12, 2014). Thus, Article 5 now renders it prohibited to “directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide investment services for or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise deal with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued after 1 August 2014 to 12 September 2014, or with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after 12 September 2014[.]”

  • The newly-introduced term “investmentservices” is defined as“ (i) reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments, (ii) execution of orders on behalf of clients, (iii) dealing on own account, (iv) portfolio management, (v) investment advice, (vi) underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis, (vii) placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis, and (viii) any service in relation to the admission to trading on a regulated market or trading on a multilateral trading facility.”

  • The definition of “transferablesecurities” has been amended to exclude negotiable securities giving rise to a cash settlement.

  • The amended Article 5 also introduces similar prohibitions on dealings in “transferable securities” and “money-market instruments” with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after September 12, 2014, by (1) certain designated Russian military entities, as listed in the new Annex V to Regulation 833/2014, and (2) certain Russian entities active in the oil industry, as listed in the new Annex VI to Regulation 833/2014. Notably, the latter list includes major Russian oil and gas enterprises Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft (the oil branch of Gazprom). Those new restrictions also extend to any entity established outside of the EU that is majority-owned by any entity designated in Annex V or Annex VI.

  • Similar to the restrictions imposed by Regulation 833/2014 against AnnexIIIbanks,the foregoing measures contain an important carve-out, as they do not apply to affiliates of the listed entities that are established within the EU. However, as with the Annex III bank restrictions, they extend to any entity “acting on behalf or at the direction of” the Annex V or Annex VI designated parties or their non-EU subsidiaries.

  • Finally, Regulation 960/2014 prohibits making or being part of any arrangement to make new loans or credit with a maturity exceeding 30 days available to any party listed on Annexes III, V, or VI after September 12, 2014. The Regulation exempts from that prohibition (i) loans or credit that have a specific and documented objective to provide financing for non-prohibited imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the EU and Russia, and (ii) loans that have a specific and documented objective to provide emergency funding to meet solvency and liquidity criteria for legal persons established in the EU that are majority owned by Annex III banks.

    As with the original Article 5, the foregoing restrictions are not asset-blocking measures — EU parties are not generally prohibited from conducting business with the Annex III, V, and VI parties if their activities do not trigger the specific restrictions outlined above.

    E. Additional Parties Subject to the Asset-Freezing Restrictions

    Regulation 961/2014 imposes travel bans and asset freezes on a further 24 individuals, including pro-Russian rebels, Russian lawmakers and state officials, and the chairman of the Russian Rostec conglomerate, Sergey Viktorovich Chemzov. This brings the total number of individuals subject to sanctions under this specific regime to 119, whilst the number of designated entities remains 23.

    In the same manner as prior EU sanctions measures, all funds and “economic resources” belonging to, owned, held, or controlled by the newly designated parties must be frozen. “Economic resources” include “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but which may be used to obtain funds, goods or services.” In addition, Regulation 961 prohibits making available funds or “economic resources,” directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the designated parties.

    F. Jurisdictional Reach of the New Sanctions

    Consistent with the pre-existing sanctions measures, the jurisdictional scope of the new sanctions extends (1) to conduct by EU-incorporated entities and EU nationals anywhere in the world; (2) to conduct by any party, irrespective of nationality, in connection with activities occurring in the territory of the EU or (with regard to legal persons) in respect of business “done in whole or in part within the Union”; or (3) conduct on board any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State.

***

The new sanctions represent the latest, although perhaps not the last, restrictions relating to the crisis in Ukraine. The EU has signaled that it will closely monitor the implementation of the new restrictions and their impact, and it will consider supplemental measures if circumstances in Eastern Ukraine warrant and consensus among the 28 Member States can be reached. Likewise, the U.S. government has stated that additional sanctions targeting Russia could be forthcoming if Russia does not work toward a diplomatic resolution to the crisis in Ukraine.

We are following the above-mentioned sanctions and export control developments closely and will provide further updates as they evolve. We are particularly well-positioned to advise companies and individuals on compliance with the U.S. and EU sanctions related to the Ukraine crisis, as well as on the broader impact of the crisis on foreign investment in both Ukraine and Russia and other legal and commercial interests in the region.

ARTICLE BY

Peter Flanagan
Corrine Goldstein
Peter Lichtenbaum
Kimberly Strosnider
David Addis
David Lorello
OF
Covington & Burling LLP

Walking the Line: Tort Immunity and Pedestrians Outside the Crosswalk in the City of Chicago

Heyl Royster Law firm

Recently, the First District Appellate Court determined that a pedestrian who “walked the line” and was injured while partially inside and partially outside of a crosswalk was barred from recovering for those injuries from the City of Chicago. In Swain v. City of Chicago, the plaintiff was walking through an intersection and broke his foot while stepping in a pothole just a few inches outside of the marked crosswalk. Swain v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 122769 at ¶ 3.

The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized the well settled rule regarding the duty of a municipality to maintain its street in a reasonably safe condition “is that, since pedestrians are not intended users of streets, a municipality does not owe a duty of reasonable care to pedestrians who attempt to cross a street outside the crosswalks.” Vaughn v. City of West Frankfort, 166 Ill. 2d 155, 158 (1995). The court explained:

“[T]he question of whether a municipality owes a duty does not depend on whether the plaintiff-pedestrian was struck by a moving vehicle or tripped over a pothole, but rather depends on whether the municipality intended that the plaintiff-pedestrian walk in that part of the street where the injury occurred and permitted the plaintiff-pedestrian to do so. We note that, except for those cases in which street defects were in the area immediately around a parked vehicle, Illinois courts have refused to impose a duty on municipalities for injuries to pedestrians which were caused by those defects.” Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d at 163. [emphasis added]

Vaughn further held that “local municipalities owe no duty to maintain streets and roadways in a reasonably safe condition for pedestrians who choose to cross the street outside the protection of the crosswalks.” Id. at 164.

This case serves as a reminder that public bodies benefit by having well maintained intersections and crosswalks that are clearly marked. When injuries allegedly occur within those intersections or crosswalks, the public body should take immediate action to (1) obtain an exact description of where the “injury” occurred and (2) examine and document the intersection and area immediately surrounding.

ARTICLE BY

Chrissie Peterson
OF
Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C.

Forever 21 Faces Point-of-Sale Data Collection Class Action Lawsuit

Covington BUrling Law Firm

Fast fashion retailer Forever 21 Retail Inc. faces a putative class action lawsuit alleging that the retailer violated California law by requesting and recording shoppers’ credit card numbers and personal identification information at the point-of-sale.

Forever 21 shopper Tamar Estanboulian filed the lawsuit on September 7 in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.  Estanboulian alleges that Forever 21 has a policy requiring its cashiers to request and record credit card numbers and personal identification information from customers using credit cards at the point-of-sale in Forever 21’s retail stores in violation of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, California Civil Code § 1747.08.  The complaint further alleges that the retailer pairs the obtained personal identification information with the shopper’s name obtained from the credit card used to make the purchase to get additional personal information.

According to the complaint, Estanboulian purchased merchandise with a credit card at a Forever 21 store in Los Angeles, CA this summer.  The cashier asked Estanboulian for her email address without informing her of the consequences of not providing the information.  Estanboulian alleges that she provided her email address because she believed that it was required to complete the transaction and receive a receipt.  She also claims that she witnessed cashiers asking other shoppers for their email addresses.  Shortly after completing her purchase and leaving the store, Estanboulian received a promotional email from Forever 21.

The proposed Class would include:  “all persons in California from whom [Forever 21] requested and recorded personal identification information in conjunction with a credit card transaction within one (1) year of the filing of this case.”

Forever 21 is not the only retailer that has been hit with a class action lawsuit for its data collection practices at the point-of-sale.  In June 2013, a putative class action was filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against J.Crew Group Inc. alleging that it collected zip codes from customers when they made purchases with credit cards at its Massachusetts stores.  The lawsuit also alleged that J.Crew then used that information to send unsolicited marketing and promotional materials.  The court approved a preliminary settlement in June pursuant to which J.Crew will provide $20 vouchers to eligible class members, up to $135,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs, and up to $3,000 to each of the class representatives.

ARTICLE BY

Morgan Kennedy
OF
Covington & Burling LLP

How to Build Trust Online by Being Human

The Rainmaker Institute

All you have to do is troll your own Facebook or LinkedIn account to know that there is LOTS of content online.

In fact, a recent post at Buffer.com noted that more content is published every day on Facebook than is found in every book published in human history!

Building Blocks with Trust

So how do you stand out from that enormous crowd and earn the trust you need to succeed with your social media marketing program?  Buffer provides these tips:

Use personal pronouns.  Using personal pronouns in your posts — I, we, you, me, etc. — and being more conversational elicits empathy from an audience, getting  you a better response.

Use simple words.  By using simple words, you can convey your idea in a way that people don’t have to think about before understanding it.  Big words and legalese will tend to alienate people, not draw them in.

Use stories.  Since the beginning of time, humans have communicated by telling stories and the propensity to listen to a story is ingrained in our DNA.  A Buffer study showed that adding a story to your blog post can increase readership by 300%.

Use contemporary culture references.  Weaving a pop culture reference or two into your post, especially if you’re able to add a celebrity name or two like Beyoncéor George Clooney (see how I did that?), helps boost readership and interest.

Use the Shaq Rule.  Shaquille O’Neal is a social media powerhouse, with a Twitter following of 8.5 million and 4.7 million Facebook fans.  His rule for posting is that 80% of his posts must be entertaining, 15% must be informative and only 5% should sell something.  People can sniff out a sales pitch online immediately, and just as quickly they are on to the next thing.

ARTICLE BY

Morgan Kennedy
OF
Covington & Burling LLP

Department of State Releases October 2014 Visa Bulletin

The bulletin shows slight forward movement in all employment-based preference categories, with the exception of the EB-2 India category, which will remain unchanged.

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) has released its October 2014 Visa Bulletin. The Visa Bulletin sets out per-country priority date cutoffs that regulate the flow of adjustment of status (AOS) and consular immigrant visa applications. Foreign nationals may file applications to adjust their statuses to that of permanent residents or to obtain approval of immigrant visas at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad, provided that their priority dates are prior to the respective cutoff dates specified by the DOS.

What Does the October 2014 Visa Bulletin Say?

The October Visa Bulletin shows moderate advancement of the cutoff dates in all of the employment-based categories other than EB-2 India, which will remain unchanged from September because of significant demand in this category.

The cutoff date for F2A applicants from all countries will advance slightly in October.

EB-1: All EB-1 categories will remain current.

EB-2: The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to India will remain unchanged at May 1, 2009. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to China will advance by 38 days to November 15, 2009. The EB-2 category for all other countries will remain current.

EB-3: The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to India will advance by seven days to November 15, 2003. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to China will advance by 151 days to April 1, 2009. The cutoff date for applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to the Philippines, Mexico, and the worldwide category will advance by six months to October 1, 2011.

The relevant priority date cutoffs for foreign nationals in the EB-3 category are as follows:

China: April 1, 2009 (forward movement of 151 days)
India: November 15, 2003 (forward movement of seven days)
Mexico: October 1, 2011 (forward movement of 183 days)
Philippines: October 1, 2011 (forward movement of 183 days)
Rest of the World: October 1, 2011 (forward movement of 183 days)

Developments Affecting the EB-2 Employment-Based Category

Mexico, the Philippines, and the Rest of the World

The EB-2 category for applicants chargeable to all countries other than China and India has been current since November 2012. The October Visa Bulletin indicates no change to this trend. This means that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to all countries other than China and India may continue to file AOS applications or have applications approved through October 2014.

China

The September Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of October 8, 2009 for EB-2 applicants chargeable to China. The October Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of November 15, 2009, reflecting forward movement of 38 days. This means that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to China with a priority date prior to November 15, 2009 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in October 2014.

India

The September Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of May 1, 2009 for EB-2 applicants chargeable to India. The October Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of May 1, 2009, reflecting no movement. This means that applicants in the EB-2 category chargeable to India with a priority date prior to May 1, 2009 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in October 2014.

The September Visa Bulletin indicated that the use of potentially “otherwise unused” employment-based visa numbers prescribed by section 202(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act had allowed the cutoff date in the EB-2 India category to advance rapidly in recent months. The September Bulletin warned that continued forward movement of this cutoff date could not be guaranteed. The October Visa Bulletin indicates no movement of the cutoff date in the EB-2 India category in October in order to regulate demand. It further notes that increased demand will require the retrogression of the cutoff date, possibly in November, to hold number use within the fiscal year 2015 annual limit.

Developments Affecting the EB-3 Employment-Based Category

China

The September Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of November 1, 2008 for EB-3 applicants chargeable to China. The October Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of April 1, 2009 reflecting forward movement of 151 days. This means that applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to China with a priority date prior to April 1, 2009 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in October 2014.

India

The September Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of November 8, 2003 for EB-2 applicants chargeable to India. The October Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of November 15, 2003, reflecting forward movement of seven days. This means that EB-3 applicants chargeable to India with a priority date prior to November 15, 2003 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in October 2014.

Rest of the World

The September Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of April 1, 2011 for EB-3 applicants chargeable to the worldwide category. The October Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of October 1, 2011, reflecting forward movement of 183 days. This means that applicants in the EB-3 category chargeable to the worldwide category with a priority date prior to October 1, 2011 may file AOS applications or have applications approved in October 2014.

Developments Affecting the F2A Family-Sponsored Category

The September Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of April 22, 2012 for F2A applicants from Mexico. The October Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of July 22, 2012, reflecting forward movement of 91 days. This means that applicants from Mexico with a priority date prior to July 22, 2012 will be able to file AOS applications or have applications approved in October 2014.

The September Visa Bulletin indicated a cutoff date of January 1, 2013 for F2A applicants from all other countries. The October Visa Bulletin indicates a cutoff date of February 1, 2013, reflecting forward movement of 31 days. This means that F2A applicants from all other countries with a priority date prior to February 1, 2013 will be able to file AOS applications or have applications approved in October 2014.

How This Affects You

Priority date cutoffs are assessed on a monthly basis by the DOS, based on anticipated demand. Cutoff dates can move forward or backward or remain static. Employers and employees should take the immigrant visa backlogs into account in their long-term planning and take measures to mitigate their effects. See the October 2014 Visa Bulletin in its entirety at the DOS website.

ARTICLE BY

Eric S. Bord
Lisa Stephanian Burton
Tracy Evlogidis
Malcolm K. Goeschl
Eleanor Pelta
A. James Vázquez-Azpiri
OF
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

Can You Prove the Mail Was Delivered? If You Are Sending An FMLA Notice, the Answer Must Be Yes

Poyner Spruill Law firm

A recent case emphasizes the importance of implementing procedures that establish strict compliance with the employer notice obligations under the FMLA. In Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., the Third Circuit held that Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (the College) could not avoid a jury trial because it did not send the mandatory individual FMLA notice to the plaintiff via a mailing that produced proof of receipt. Ms. Lupyan applied for leave due to depression in December 2007. Her physician completed a  Certification of Health Care Provider form, stating that she needed leave through April 1, 2008. The College verbally advised Lupyan that her leave was being designated as Family Medical Leave and allegedly mailed her a letter explaining her rights and responsibilities under the FMLA, including the fact that her FMLA leave ran out at the end of March. Lupyan did not return to work by the end of March, and the College terminated her employment. She sued, claiming that she never received the letter, and that if she had known that her leave was limited to 12 weeks, she would have returned to work and avoided termination. The lower court granted summary judgment to the College based on its affidavits stating that a letter satisfying the notice requirements of 29 CFR § 825.208 was mailed through regular snail mail to Lupyan. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the presumption of receipt usually given to the U.S Postal Service mail was insufficient in light of Lupyan’s denial that she ever got the letter. Because the FMLA regulations are silent on the type of mail required for delivery of mandatory FMLA notice, many employers may use regular mail. Best practice in light of the Lupyan decision is to use certified or overnight mail so that proof of delivery exists when sending the Notice of Rights and Responsibilities and the Notice of Eligibility required under the FMLA and to obtain a personal email address from employees as part of the leave application and approval process. An email, with a receipt that shows it was opened, would also likely suffice for proof of delivery.

ARTICLE BY

Susanna Knutson Gibbons
OF
Poyner Spruill LLP

Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Litigation Heating Up

Barnes Thornburg

The past few months have been busy for courts and the SEC dealing with securities whistleblowers. The Supreme Court’s potentially landmark decision in Lawson v. FMR LLC back in March already seems like almost ancient history.  In that decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection provision (18 U.S.C. §1514A) protected not simply employees of public companies but also employees of private contractors and subcontractors, like law firms, accounting firms, and the like, who worked for public companies. (And according to Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, it might even extend to housekeepers and gardeners of employees of public companies).

Since then, a lot has happened in the world of whistleblowers. Much of the activity has focused on Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions, rather than Sarbanes-Oxley. This may be because Dodd-Frank has greater financial incentives for plaintiffs, or because some courts have concluded that it does not require an employee to report first to an enforcement agency. The following are some interesting developments:

What is a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank?

This seemingly straightforward question has generated a number of opinions from courts and the SEC. The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower-protection provision, enacted in 2010, focuses on a potentially different “whistleblower” population than Sarbanes-Oxley does. Sarbanes-Oxley’s provision focuses particularly on whistleblower disclosures regarding certain enumerated activities (securities fraud, bank fraud, mail or wire fraud, or any violation of an SEC rule or regulation), and it protects those who disclose to a person with supervisory authority over the employee, or to the SEC, or to Congress.

On the other hand, Dodd-Frank’s provision (15 U.S.C. §78u-6 or Section 21F) defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(a)(6).  It then prohibits, and provides a private cause of action for, adverse employment actions against a whistleblower for acts done by him or her in “provid[ing] information to the Commission,” “initiat[ing], testif[ing] in, or assist[ing] in” any investigation or action of the Commission, or in making disclosures required or protected under Sarbanes-Oxley, the Exchange Act or the Commission’s rules.  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(h)(1). A textual reading of these provisions suggests that a “whistleblower” has to provide information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC.  If the whistleblower does so, an employer cannot discriminate against the whistleblower for engaging in those protected actions.

However, after the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC promulgated rules explicating its interpretation of Section 21F. Some of these rules might require providing information to the SEC, but others could be construed more broadly to encompass those who simply report internally or report to some other entity.  Compare Rule 21F-2(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(3), 17 C.F.R. §240.21F-2(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(3). The SEC’s comments to these rules also said that they apply to “individuals who report to persons or governmental authorities other than the Commission.”

Therefore, one issue beginning to percolate up to the appellate courts is whether Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions consider someone who reports alleged misconduct to their employers or other entities, but not the SEC, to be a “whistleblower.” The only circuit court to have squarely addressed the issue (the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC) concluded that Dodd-Frank’s provision only applies to those who actually provide information to the SEC.

In doing so, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the “plain language and structure” of the statutory text, concluding that it unambiguously required the employee to provide information to the SEC.  Several district courts, including in Colorado, Florida and the Northern District of California, have concurred with this analysis.

More, however, have concluded that Dodd-Frank is ambiguous on this point and therefore have given Chevrondeference to the SEC’s interpretation as set forth in its own regulations. District courts, including in the Southern District of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Tennessee and Connecticut, have adopted this view. The SEC has also weighed in, arguing (in an amicus brief to the Second Circuit) that whistleblowers should be entitled to protection regardless of whether they disclose to their employers or the SEC.  The agency said that Asadi was wrongly decided and, under its view, employees that report internally should get the same protections that those who report to the SEC receive. The Second Circuit’s decision in that case (Liu v. Siemens AG) did not address this issue at all.

Finally, last week, the Eighth Circuit also decided not to take on this question. It opted not to hear an interlocutory appeal, in Bussing v. COR Securities Holdings Inc., in which an employee at a securities clearing firm provided information about possible FINRA violations to her employer and to FINRA, rather than the SEC, and was allegedly fired for it. The district court concluded that the fact that she failed to report to the SEC did not exclude her from the whistleblower protections under Dodd-Frank. It reasoned that Congress did not intend, in enacting Dodd-Frank, to encourage employees to circumvent internal reporting channels in order to obtain the protections of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection.  In doing so, however, the district court did not conclude that the statute was ambiguous and rely on the SEC’s interpretation.

A related question is what must an employee report to be a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank. Thus far, if a whistleblower reports something other than a violation of the securities laws, that is not protected. So, for example, an alleged TILA violation or an alleged violation of certain banking laws have been found to be not protected.

These issues will take time to shake out. While more courts thus far have adopted, or ruled consistently with, the SEC’s interpretation, as the Florida district court stated, “[t]he fact that numerous courts have interpreted the same statutory language differently does not render the statute ambiguous.”

Does Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection apply extraterritorially?

In August, the Second Circuit decided Liu. Rather than focus on who can be a whistleblower, the Court concluded that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions do not apply to conduct occurring exclusively extraterritorially. In Liu, a former Siemens employee alleged that he was terminated for reporting alleged violations of the FCPA at a Siemens subsidiary in China.  The Second Circuit relied extensively on the Supreme Court’s Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank case in reaching its decision. In Morrison, the Court reaffirmed the presumption that federal statutes do not apply extraterritorially absent clear direction from Congress.

The Second Circuit in Liu, despite Liu’s argument that other Dodd-Frank provisions applied extraterritorially and SEC regulations interpreting the whistleblower provisions at least suggested that the bounty provisions applied extraterritorially, disag
reed. The court concluded that it need not defer to the SEC’s interpretation of who can be a whistleblower because it believed that Section 21F was not ambiguous.  It also concluded that the anti-retaliation provisions would be more burdensome if applied outside the country than the bounty provisions, so it did not feel the need to construe the two different aspects of the whistleblower provisions identically.  And finally, the SEC , in its amicus brief, did not address either the extraterritorial reach of the provisions or Morrison, so the Second Circuit apparently felt no need to defer to the agency’s view on extraterritoriality.

Liu involved facts that occurred entirely extraterritorially. He was a foreign worker employed abroad by a foreign corporation, where the alleged wrongdoing, the alleged disclosures, and the alleged discrimination all occurred abroad. Whether adding some domestic connection changes this result remains for future courts to consider.

The SEC’s Use Of The Anti-Retaliation Provision In An Enforcement Action

In June, the SEC filed, and settled, its first Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation enforcement action. The Commission filed an action against Paradigm Capital Management, Inc., and its principal Candace Weir, asserting that they retaliated against a Paradigm employee who reported certain principal transactions, prohibited under the Investment Advisers Act, to the SEC. Notably, that alleged retaliation did not include terminating the whistleblower’s employment or diminishing his compensation; it did, however, include removing him as the firm’s head trader, reconfiguring his job responsibilities and stripping him of supervisory responsibility. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, both respondents agreed to cease and desist from committing any future Exchange Act violations, retain an independent compliance consultant, and pay $2.2 million in fines and penalties.  This matter marks the first time the Commission has asserted Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions in an enforcement action, rather than a private party doing so in civil litigation.

The SEC Announces Several Interesting Dodd-Frank Bounties

Under Dodd-Frank, whistleblowers who provide the SEC with “high-quality,” “original” information that leads to an enforcement action netting over $1 million in sanctions can receive an award of 10-30 percent of the amount collected. The SEC recently awarded bounties to whistleblowers in circumstances suggesting the agency wants to encourage a broad range of whistleblowers with credible, inside information.

In July, the agency awarded more than $400,000 to a whistleblower who appears not to have provided his information to the SEC voluntarily.  Instead, the whistleblower had attempted to encourage his employer to correct various compliance issues internally. Those efforts apparently resulted in a third-party apprising an SRO of the employer’s issues and the whistleblower’s efforts to correct them. The SEC’s subsequent follow-up on the SRO’s inquiry resulted in the enforcement action. Even though the “whistleblower” did not initiate communication with the SEC about these compliance issues, for his efforts, the agency nonetheless awarded him a bounty.

Then, just recently, the SEC announced its first whistleblower award to a company employee who performed audit and compliance functions. The agency awarded the compliance staffer more than $300,000 after the employee first reported wrongdoing internally, and then, when the company failed to take remedial action after 120 days, reported the activity to the SEC. Compliance personnel, unlike most employees, generally have a waiting period before they can report out, unless they have a reasonable basis to believe investors or the company have a substantial risk of harm.

With a statute as sprawling as Dodd-Frank, and potentially significant bounty awards at stake, opinions interpreting Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions are bound to proliferate. Check back soon for further developments.

 
ARTICLE BY

Brian E. Casey
 
OF 
Barnes & Thornburg LLP