New DOL Salary Threshold for Most White-Collar Exemptions Is Now in Effect

Update July 1, 2024: The U.S. Department of Labor’s new rule on the required salary threshold for employees to qualify as exempt from overtime is now in effect as of July 1, 2024. Although the federal district court for the Eastern District of Texas issued an injunction blocking enforcement of the new rule against the State of Texas as an employer on Friday, June 28, 2024, that injunction does not apply to other employers, including private businesses. Thus, the new salary thresholds for exempt status, as detailed below, are in effect nationwide. Other lawsuits challenging the regulation remain ongoing, and should continue to be monitored for any further developments.

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has issued a final rule that significantly raises the required salary threshold for many salaried exempt employees starting July 1, 2024. Under this final rule, issued on April 23, 2024, the guaranteed salary that most employees must receive to qualify as exempt from the overtime rules will increase dramatically over the next nine months. Effective July 1, it will jump from $35,568 per year to $43,888 per year; and then just six short months later, on January 1, 2025, it will jump to $58,656 per year.

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, employees who work in executive, administrative, professional, and certain computer positions must generally meet both the salary basis test and the job duty requirements to be classified as exempt from the overtime rules. In addition to being paid on a salary basis (which means there can be no deductions from salary, subject to certain limited exceptions), the threshold salary is currently $684 a week, amounting to $35,568 annually. The final rule raises the threshold for salaried employees significantly, according to the following schedule:

  • Effective July 1, 2024: $844 per week (equivalent to $43,888 per year)
  • Effective January 1, 2025: $1,128 per week (equivalent to $58,656 per year)
  • Effective July 1, 2027, and every three years thereafter: To be determined based on available earnings data

In addition, the new rule increases the total annual compensation threshold for highly compensated employees from $107,432 per year to $132,964 per year effective July 1, followed by yet another increase to $151,164 per year effective January 1, 2025. This will result in an increase of nearly $44,000 per year to the salary threshold necessary to qualify for the highly compensated employee exemption.

It is widely expected that various business and industry groups may file suit to attempt to block these changes from taking effect. Many employers may remember that a similar scenario occurred in 2016, when the DOL under the Obama Administration proposed a large increase in the salary threshold for these white collar exemptions, before that increase was blocked by court action. If the final rule issued by the DOL is not blocked through court action, it will mean significant changes for employers in compensation structure, as more employees nationwide will qualify for overtime pay unless their salaries are increased over the new threshold.

Employers should immediately review their workforces to determine what changes, if any, may be necessary if the final rule takes effect. Possible considerations include:

  • Raising the annual salary of employees who meet the duties test to at least $43,888 as of July 1, and $58,656 as of January 1, 2025, to retain their exempt status;
  • Converting employees to non-exempt status and paying the overtime premium of one-and-one half times the employees’ regular rate of pay for all overtime hours worked; or
  • Converting employees to non-exempt status and eliminating or reducing the amount of overtime hours worked by such employees.

Similar considerations should be undertaken with highly compensated employees. While it is wise to review pay practices proactively and identify potential changes that may become necessary, employers may wish to continue to monitor legal developments prior to actually implementing such changes. As employers will recall from 2016, significant changes can occur between the announcement of a final rule and the date on which it is scheduled to become effective.

Employers are encouraged to consult with legal counsel to discuss their options and strategies for implementing these changes, if necessary.

© 2024 Varnum LLP

House Committee Postpones Markup Amid New Privacy Bill Updates

On June 27, 2024, the U.S. House of Representatives cancelled the House Energy and Commerce Committee markup of the American Privacy Rights Act (“APRA” or “Bill”) scheduled for that day, reportedly with little notice. There has been no indication of when the markup will be rescheduled; however, House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairwoman Cathy McMorris Rodgers issued a statement reiterating her support for the legislation.

On June 20, 2024, the House posted a third version of the discussion draft of the APRA. On June 25, 2024, two days before the scheduled markup session, Committee members introduced the APRA as a bill, H.R. 8818. Each version featured several key changes from earlier drafts, which are outlined collectively, below.

Notable changes in H.R. 8818 include the removal of two key sections:

  • “Civil Rights and Algorithms,” which required entities to conduct covered algorithm impact assessments when algorithms posed a consequential risk of harm to individuals or groups; and
  • “Consequential Decision Opt-Out,” which allowed individuals to opt out of being subjected to covered algorithms.

Additional changes include the following:

  • The Bill introduces new definitions, such as “coarse geolocation information” and “online activity profile,” the latter of which refines a category of sensitive data. “Neural data” and “information that reveals the status of an individual as a member of the Armed Forces” are added as new categories of sensitive data. The Bill also modifies the definitions of “contextual advertising” and “first-party advertising.”
  • The data minimization section includes a number of changes, such as the addition of “conduct[ing] medical research” in compliance with applicable federal law as a new permitted purpose. The Bill also limits the ability to rely on permitted purposes in processing sensitive covered data, biometric and genetic information.
  • The Bill now allows not only covered entities (excluding data brokers or large data holders), but also service providers (that are not large data holders) to apply for the Federal Trade Commission-approved compliance guideline mechanism.
  • Protections for covered minors now include a prohibition on first-party advertising (in addition to targeted advertising) if the covered entity knows the individual is a minor, with limited exceptions acknowledged by the Bill. It also restricts the transfer of a minor’s covered data to third parties.
  • The Bill adds another preemption clause, clarifying that APRA would preempt any state law providing protections for children or teens to the extent such laws conflict with the Bill, but does not prohibit states from enacting laws, rules or regulations that offer greater protection to children or teens than the APRA.

For additional information about the changes, please refer to the unofficial redline comparison of all APRA versions published by the IAPP.

Copyright © 2024, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on the status of the American Privacy Rights Act, please visit the NLR Communications Media Internet section.

Firework Safety Tips: Enjoying Independence Day Without the Risks

Independence Day celebrations are not complete without some fireworks displays. The only problem is that some of the people participating in creating the displays fail to exercise due diligence, increasing the risk of personal injury to themselves and other parties.

There is a history of explosives used for fun, resulting in untold losses and, in some cases, death. A good example is the 2017 case in Oregon, where a fire was started by a firecracker flung by a 15-year-old. What followed was a fire that burned for three months straight, charring 50,000 acres, and reports of pockets of fire nine months later.

Economic losses aside, there have been quite a number of deaths reported as a result of fun-related explosives and thousands of personal injuries suffered every year, with children and young adults being most at risk. There is no problem with enjoying some fireworks as a part of the Independence Day celebration. However, you will want to exercise extra caution to reduce the risks; below are some tips you may want to borrow.

Leave It to Professionals

The beautiful fireworks display you see during Independence Day celebrations are the work of professionals who have received specialized training on safety. But still, there has been an occasion where the displays have gone wrong, resulting in revelers suffering personal injuries.

These incidents are quite rare compared to the many times individuals have suffered injuries in fireworks displays handled by untrained individuals. If you must enjoy a fireworks display and are not sure of your ability to handle explosives safely, it is best to attend a public display.

Handle With Care

Some people will not be content with a public fireworks display, and there is the thrill that comes with setting off your own fireworks. If this feels like you, and not setting off fireworks is out of the question, you must tread carefully. Most fireworks come with a how-to-use guide, and it’s best to follow manufacturer guidelines for safety.

Basic preventive measures like maintaining a safe distance between you and the fireworks after lighting, not pointing it at someone else, and using it in an open area can help avoid accidents. You may want to have water or a fire extinguisher on standby in case of an accidental fire. Lighting multiple fireworks at a time greatly increases the risks of an accident, so you may want to ensure that you light one at a time in your group.

Have the Right Person Handle It

The risk posed by fireworks is too great to entrust the responsibility of lighting to anyone, especially not children. If they must ignite fireworks, ensure there is an adult to supervise and guide them.

Alcohol, a big part of Independence Day celebrations, does not go well with tasks that require caution and sobriety, like igniting and supervising fireworks displays. If you must drink, wait until after the display to drink to avoid the chance of alcohol getting into your decision-making and, ultimately, accidents.

Clean Up

After a display, there will always be pieces of fireworks that fail to go off or burn up completely. If reignited, these pieces still pose a significant risk, and children may be tempted to reignite them out of curiosity.

So, ensure you clean up all the pieces after the display by soaking them in water before disposing of them. Remember, mistakes that result in an accident can lead to you facing legal consequences in the event they cause personal injuries or property damage to other parties.

Buckfire & Buckfire, P.C. 2024

by: Lawrence J. Buckfire of Buckfire Law

For more on Firework Safety, visit the NLR Personal Injury section.

Nine Questions, Nine Answers: The Supreme Court’s Decision Overruling ‘Chevron Deference’

On the second-to-last day of its term, the US Supreme Court issued its decisions in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Dep’t of Commerce. These decisions overruled Chevron USA. v. National Resource Defense Council, the 40-year-old precedent that established the “Chevron” doctrine, which gave federal agencies a certain amount of deference to interpret statutes they administer.

The Chevron doctrine provides that when a statute is ambiguous — that is, when it is unclear whether US Congress has spoken directly to the precise issue at hand — courts must defer to the interpretation of the relevant agency as long as the agency interpretation of the statute is reasonable.

Since 1984, the Chevron doctrine has played a foundational role in administrative law and placed federal agencies as the primary interpreters of the statutes they administered. In recent years, many scholars and policy advocates have questioned whether the Supreme Court should, or would, overrule Chevron and reassert the judiciary’s primary role in interpreting statutes.

The Loper Bright decision is available here. Understanding that for many, this decision has resulted in a deep dive into arcane issues of constitutional law and regulatory policy, below we ask and answer nine questions about the decision, its background, context, and likely impact.

What happened?

CASE BACKGROUND

Both Loper Bright and Relentless involve the Magnuson-Stevens Act, a law that empowers the US Secretary of Commerce and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to require certain fishing vessel operators to provide space onboard their vessels for federal observers tasked with ensuring compliance with various federal regulations.

To implement the Magnuson-Stevens Act, NMFS issued a rule requiring the fishing companies, rather than the government, to pay the costs and salary of the observers (roughly $710 per day). The petitioners in Loper Bright, four family-operated herring fishing companies, argued that the Act did not authorize the agency to impose these fees and challenged the rule before the US District Court for the District of Columbia. Relentless involved a challenge to the same regulations by two New England fishing vessels brought in Rhode Island federal court.

The appellate courts reviewing Loper Bright and Relentless, the US Courts of Appeals for the DC Circuit and the First Circuit, respectively, both applied the “Chevron doctrine” and ultimately upheld the NMFS regulation.

The DC Circuit found ambiguity in the statute that justified deferring to the agency’s reasonable interpretation. The First Circuit, in turn, cited back to the DC Circuit’s opinion in Loper Bright and similarly found the NMFS regulation did not exceed “the bounds of the permissible.” The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and, considering them together, addressed whether it should uphold, limit, or overturn Chevron.

THE LOPER BRIGHT DECISION

In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron and held that courts must “exercise their independent judgment” when interpreting federal statutes and may not defer to agency interpretations simply because they determine that a statute is ambiguous.

Tracing the history of “deference” from the Federalist Papers through the New Deal, the Court explained that the judicial branch has always had the exclusive responsibility for interpreting the law. While courts should and did give “respect” to executive branch interpretations, the final decision has historically been for the courts alone.

The judicial branch’s role, explained the Court, was solidified in 1946 with the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which provides that the courts will decide “all relevant questions of law” arising during a review of agency actions. The courts may “seek aid” from the agency interpretations, but courts still must “independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of congress.”

The Court concluded that Chevron deference is inconsistent with this history and the text of the APA, and further noted that federal agencies (as opposed to federal judges) have no special expertise when it comes to interpreting statutes.

Why now? 

Chevron has been in the Court’s crosshairs for the better part of a decade. Justice Neil Gorsuch pointed out in a lengthy concurrence in Loper Bright that the Supreme Court has not applied the Chevron doctrine since 2016. In a separate dissenting opinion last year — discussed here — Justice Gorsuch outlined how the Chevron doctrine has been subjected to so many competing interpretations and carve-outs that it has been rendered practically unworkable and incoherent.

Further, as the majority recognized, if courts defer to agencies under Chevron, that approach is inconsistent with other interpretive doctrines, most notably the “major questions doctrine,” which the Court used to strike down the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) regulation of greenhouse gases in West Virginia v. EPAin 2022 because the Clean Air Act had not “expressly” granted EPA authority to require decarbonization of the US energy sector. (For more on this case, see here.)

Why is everyone talking about “Chevron deference”? 

Loper Bright, when read in conjunction with other decisions like West Virginia v. EPA from two terms ago or SEC v. Jarkesy, decided this term and discussed here, has been interpreted by some as the culmination of a long-term trend in which justices appointed by Republican presidents are reconfiguring US administrative law. Some view Chevron deference as a crucial safeguard to protect administrative agencies and permit them to regulate in highly technical areas based upon sometimes broad mandates from Congress without fear that a judge lacking technical knowledge or expertise would overstep. For those individuals, the end of Chevron deference represents a threat to the administrative state as we know it and raises fear that judges rather than agencies will decide the propriety of complex technical issues.

For others, Chevron deference represents a usurpation of the judiciary’s role in interpreting the law and leads to administrative agencies over-regulating and over-stepping the authority vested in them by Congress. Some groups may view Chevron deference as part and parcel of some unaccountable deep state. For these individuals, the end of Chevron deference represents a long-awaited victory against overactive agencies exerting authority beyond that granted by Congress.

For many, Chevron deference is simply an interpretive mandate that attempted to balance the judiciary’s role in statutory interpretation with some level of deference to the agency’s particular knowledge and expertise.

Any tendency to catastrophize may be exacerbated by this being a presidential election year. While the Loper Bright decision is important, the practical impact of it is debatable and not yet clear. While it is possible that Loper Bright will announce a sea change in administrative practice, it is also possible that Loper Bright’s calls for “administrative respect” but not “deference” will be modest in the near term. Further, the Court went out of its way to note that prior cases that applied Chevron to uphold an agency’s actions were still good law based on the doctrine of stare decisis and that “mere reliance on Chevron cannot constitute” a reason for “overruling such a holding[.]”

What does the decision mean for agency interpretations of their own regulations? 

It does not affect them. Kisor v. Wilkie, a 2019 Supreme Court decision, remains the key precedent governing judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. Significantly, Loper Bright cites Kisor favorably. Under Kisor,agency regulatory interpretations are entitled to deference if they are reasonable when viewed with traditional tools of statutory construction and courts should defer to agency interpretations that:

  • Are official positions of the agency made in some formal context.
  • Are consistent with prior formal interpretations of the agency.
  • Rest on actual agency expertise and not a litigation position.
  • Were issued with fair notice to regulated entities.

Citing the APA, the Court in Kisor stated that where a rule is ambiguous, “when a court defers to a regulatory reading, it acts consistently with [APA] Section 706.” For more on Kisor, see here.

Does the decision bar courts from considering an agency’s expert input?

It does not. The majority notes that

[d]elegating ultimate interpretive authority to agencies is simply not necessary to ensure that the resolution of statutory ambiguities is well informed by subject matter expertise. The better presumption is … that Congress expects courts to do their ordinary job of interpreting statutes, with due respect for the views of the Executive Branch. And to the extent that Congress and the Executive Branch may disagree with how the courts have performed that job in a particular case, they are of course always free to act by revising the statute.

Loper Bright acknowledges that Congress can delegate policymaking authorities and that reviewing courts should consider any such delegation in reviewing related challenges.

It also notes that “Congress expects courts to handle technical statutory questions. Many statutory cases call upon courts to interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law and courts did so without issue in agency cases before Chevron.” (Internal citation omitted.) The majority suggests that courts “do not decide such questions blindly” and that “parties” — including agencies — “and amici in such cases are steeped in the subject matter, and reviewing courts have the benefit of their perspective.”

In such circumstances, while “an agency’s interpretation of a statute ‘cannot bind a court,’ it may be especially informative ‘to the extent it rests on factual premises within’ [the agency’s] expertise.’” Accordingly, citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., Executive Branch interpretations may still have particular “power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”

Will the decision allow regulatory challenges to be decided more quickly by courts?

Probably not. As we discussed above, nothing in Loper Bright portends that agencies now lack the ability to use technical input to justify how they have interpreted statutes they are tasked with executing. Further, the Loper Bright formulation of “respect” to agencies — with courts being empowered to make ultimate decisions about statutory interpretation — may procedurally look very much like pre-Loper Bright “deference” in terms of what sorts of briefs are filed, how technical evidence is submitted, or how courts process challenges.

Many disputes will also involve an additional layer of briefing related to the impact of the decision itself as challenges proceed through courts, particularly when there are questions about whether Congress delegated specific questions to agencies.

Will this decision result in more litigation? 

Yes. Post-Loper Bright, we can expect increase in challenges to regulations across the government, with parties evaluating what pre-Loper Bright regulations they can encourage the Court to revisit, especially in light of the Court’s decision in Corner Post v. Board of Governors, which effectively relaxes APA-related statutes of limitations in some cases. This litigation will occur even though the Loper Bright majority attempted to stem the tide by stating that agency rules which were enforceable before the decision remain good law for now. As we have discussed before, many regulatory challenges are filed in forums perceived to be hostile to regulation. Those cases will then percolate through appellate courts to flesh out what administrative litigation looks like after this decision, particularly on the issue of how courts can appropriately parse out statutory interpretation, which is in the province of the courts from decisions delegated by Congress to agencies.

The regulated community should use the Loper Bright decision as an opportunity to review key regulations that govern their operations and assess whether regulations are newly vulnerable. Our teams are ready to provide assistance in conducting this review.

Does the decision affect state law?

The Loper Bright decision binds only federal courts.

Traditionally, state courts have not uniformly adopted Chevron. Around half the states, including Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, allow for Chevron-style deference to state agencies. Others, including California and Virginia, allow some degree of deference depending on the particulars of agency decisions.

Given that Chevron deference has been controversial for some time, state legislatures in Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Nebraska, Ohio, and Tennessee have in recent years passed laws closely cabining deference afforded to state agencies. Florida voters amended the state constitution in 2018 to prohibit courts from deferring to state agencies. States including Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Michigan, Mississippi, and Utah have court decisions to the same effect. (See here for a more detailed discussion.)

What should we watch for next? 

In the coming days, many ArentFox Schiff teams will analyze how the Loper Bright decision will affect specific practice areas. Additionally, watch for our end-of-term wrap-up on administrative and environmental law.

© 2024 ArentFox Schiff LLP
For more news on Supreme Court Decision Overturning Chevron, visit the NLR Constitutional Law section.

It Ain’t Over ‘til It’s Over: IRS Reminds Taxpayers That Section 280E Applies to Marijuana Companies Until Rescheduling Becomes Law

This is a tax blog. Stay with me – it’s short.

While marijuana advocates celebrate the potential rescheduling of marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III, the taxman has made clear that marijuana remains a Schedule I substance subject to Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code. For those who aren’t cannabis tax specialists, 280E provides that:

No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business (or the activities which comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substances Act) which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which such trade or business is conducted.

Marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance and is subject to the limitations of the Internal Revenue Code. As we previously reported, the Justice Department recently published a notice of proposed rulemaking with the Federal Register to initiate a formal rulemaking process to consider rescheduling marijuana to Schedule III under the Controlled Substances Act. That change would remove marijuana from the purview of 280E.

Predictably, a number of cannabis operators couldn’t help themselves and began filing amended returns seeking to avail themselves of what they apparently felt was a change in the law. The response from the IRS is clear:

Taxpayers seeking a refund of taxes paid related to Internal Revenue Code Section 280E by filing amended returns are not entitled to a refund or payment. Until a final rule is published, marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance and is subject to the limitations of Internal Revenue Code Section 280E.

The reasoning is simple – marijuana is a Schedule I substance until it is not. While there is currently in place a process that could lead to the rescheduling of marijuana, it has not actually been rescheduled.

Cannabis operators can dream of a time when they will not be subject to the ravages of 280E, but for now that remains just out of grasp, albeit tantalizingly close.

As usual, stay tuned to Budding Trends. We’ll be monitoring all the impacts of rescheduling, including tax implications like this one.

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© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on Cannabis, visit the NLR Biotech Food Drug section.

Investing in SAFE and Convertible Note Rounds ꟷKnow Your Bedmates!

Early-stage companies often rely on Simple Agreements for Future Equity (SAFEs) and convertible promissory notes to raise capital either prior to a company’s first priced preferred equity round, or to raise bridge capital between priced equity raises. In addition to the economic terms, investors considering participation in these financings should seek visibility as to the other investors in the round, and the potential misalignment of incentives among those investors.

Raising funds via SAFEs and convertible notes has a number of advantages for the issuer, not least of which is the speed with which such financings can be achieved. SAFE and convertible note financings involve significantly less documentation, legal lift, and expense than a standard preferred stock financing. Further, depending on how a SAFE or convertible note is structured, it can allow an early-stage company experiencing rapid growth (and, accordingly, valuation) to raise capital without selling equity at a valuation materially lower than the valuation it can justify in the next 12-24 months.

Similarly, SAFEs and convertible note rounds can appeal to early-stage investors. Again, the documentation is relatively straightforward and, to a large extent, consistent from transaction to transaction. Further, more recent iterations of Y-Combinator’s form SAFE include investor-favorite provisions that protect investors from dilution associated with the issuance of other convertible instruments.

That said, most SAFEs and convertible promissory notes include amendment provisions providing that their terms can be amended or waived with the approval of holders representing a majority of the total invested amount. Such amendments can fundamentally change the terms on which investors originally based their decision to participate in the SAFE or note round. For example, common amendments include reductions in the conversion discount, valuation cap, and/or required equity financing threshold at which the SAFE or note is required to convert. Perhaps more drastic, we increasingly see companies raising significant funds in multiple SAFE or note rounds without ever needing to do an equity financing prior to a liquidity event. In those instances, it is not uncommon for the company to get a majority-in-interest of the SAFE or noteholders to convert into equity on terms that bear little or no relation to what was contemplated in the original investment instrument.

Of course, you may ask, why would a majority-in-interest of the SAFE or noteholders agree to an amendment or adjustment that is not in their best interests? The answer is that savvy founders will often ensure that a majority-in-interest of the investors are “company-friendly,” with incentives that may be very different than those of a passive investor. For example, founders and their friends and family may control a majority of the round. Similarly, SAFE and noteholders may already have equity interests in the company, such that they see a net benefit to agreeing to changes in their note or SAFE terms that, viewed in isolation, are subpar.

Accordingly, before making a material investment in a SAFE or convertible note financing, investors should have a clear understanding of the maximum amount that can be raised, and the likelihood that a significant number of those investors may sign off on amendments that undermine the original deal terms.

© 2024 Winstead PC.

Two Blockbuster U.S. Supreme Court Decisions May Spell End of NLRB’s Expansion of Reach of NLRA as Well as How Agency Prosecutes Cases

The U.S. Supreme Court issued two blockbuster decisions this week, both of which likely will curtail the ability of federal agencies, including the NLRB, to prosecute cases and expand the law.

In a 6-3 decision announced Thursday in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy et al., U.S., No. 22-859 (Jun. 27, 2024), the Supreme Court ruled that when the SEC seeks civil penalties against a defendant, the defendant is entitled to a trial by jury. As reported here, this decision could affect a future ruling in Space Exploration Technologies Corp., v. NLRB, No. 24-40315 (5th Cir. 2024), a case challenging the authority of National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) on the same grounds.

Perhaps more significant, a 6-2 decision announced Friday in Loper Bright Enterprises et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al., No. 22-451 (Jun. 28, 2024), eliminates the deference given to federal agencies to interpret laws by reversing the Chevron decision.

Jarkesy: Viability of Agency Administrative Law Judges Put Into Question

Jarkesy Background
In 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) initiated an enforcement action and sought civil penalties for alleged fraud against Defendants. Relying on relatively new authority conferred by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC opted to adjudicate the matter itself before an agency ALJ. In 2014, the SEC ALJ issued a decision levying civil penalties as well as other relief against the Defendants.

Defendants petitioned for judicial review at the Fifth Circuit, which held in 2022 that the agency’s decision to have an ALJ adjudicate the case violated the Defendants’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Fifth Circuit also identified two further constitutional problems: (1) Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the SEC to choose whether to litigate this action in court or adjudicate the matter itself; and (2) the insulation of SEC ALJs from executive supervision, with two layers of for-cause removal protections, violated the separation of powers doctrine.

On March 8, 2023, the SEC appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court. Oral argument was heard on November 29, 2023.

Jarkesy Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution entitled Defendants to a jury trial where the SEC sought civil penalties for securities fraud. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts reasoned that the SEC’s antifraud provisions “replicate common law fraud” claims, which must be heard by a jury. As a result, where a claim brought by an agency (1) resembles common law causes of action; and (2) seeks a remedy traditionally obtained in a court of law, a Seventh Amendment jury right attaches to the claim.

The Court recognized an exception to this general rule under a “public rights” doctrine, which permits non-Article III courts to adjudicate matters that “historically could have been determined exclusively by [the executive and legislative] branches.” However, causes of action that are “quintessentially suits at common law” and not “closely intertwined” with a public right—like the anti-fraud provisions at issue here—are unable to utilize this exception and must be heard in Article III courts.

Because the jury trial issue resolved the case, the Court declined to reach the nondelegation or removal issues. As a result, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Jarkesy on these issues remains good law.

Sotomayor Dissent in Jarkesy
In dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that Congress has latitude—via the Constitution as well as prior Supreme Court decisions—to assign the enforcement of civil penalties “outside the regular courts of law.” This would be the case “even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a federal court of law instead of an administrative agency.”

Justice Sotomayor also raised issue with the majority’s interpretation of a public rights doctrine. Notably, the dissent challenges the majority’s claim that most causes of actions that should be protected under the doctrine involve areas of the law where political branches “traditionally held exclusive power…and had exercised it.” To this end, Justice Sotomayor argues that the majority cannot distinguish between Congress’ enacting of statutes such as the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and its enacting of the Dodd-Frank Act. The dissent implies that neither labor relations nor securities were traditionally governed by political branches, thus (purportedly) refuting the majority’s reliance upon this principle.

NLRB Implications
Similar to the SEC, the NLRB utilizes ALJs to adjudicate violations of the NLRA. Contrary to the SEC, however, the NLRB ALJ scheme has been in place for decades. These judges hear and decide unfair labor practice cases in quasi-judicial hearings that affect the rights of parties to the cases. Moreover, unlike potential violations of the NLRA, the SEC is not always the exclusive forum for vindication of securities issues. The Department of Justice often prosecutes securities laws issues and private plaintiffs can bring lawsuits to vindicate civil claims. Contrast this with the NLRB, which is the exclusive forum for the vast majority of issues arising under the NLRA.

In the wake of the Fifth Circuit’s 2022 decision in Jarkesy, on January 4, 2024, Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (“SpaceX”) filed a complaint in the Southern District of Texas challenging the constitutionality of NLRB ALJs. SpaceX specifically argued that: (1) the NLRB’s structure is unconstitutional in that it limits the removal of NLRB ALJs and Board Members and permits Board Members to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial power in the same administrative proceeding; and (2) the Board’s expanded remedies constitute consequential damages, and therefore violate employers’ Seventh Amendment right to a trial-by-jury.

Because the Supreme Court in Jarkesy declined to reach the nondelegation or removal issues, the Fifth Circuit’s decision on these issues remains good law. This makes the current forum battle even more significant, as the Jarkesy Fifth Circuit opinion could provide dispositive precedent for SpaceX’s removal and nondelegation arguments. In addition, the Supreme Court’s ruling on the Seventh Amendment issue might support SpaceX’s argument that the Board’s expanded consequential damages remedies should be adjudicated in a trial by jury, depending on how the court interprets the current state of NLRB remedies.

As reported here, in Thryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22 (2022), the NLRB expanded remedies under the NLRA to include “all direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms suffered as a result of the respondent’s unfair labor practice.” The Board has been committed to expanding remedies since 2021, when General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo issued a memorandum on this subject. NLRB Regional Offices have also been aggressive in seeking these expanded remedies, which arguably are punitive rather than remedial in nature. In its Complaint, SpaceX used the Board’s position on remedies, coupled with the Jarkesy Fifth Circuit ruling, to argue that the Board has sanctioned compensatory relief that can only be issued through a trial by jury.

However, this position could be impacted by the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Thryv, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 23-60132 (5th Cir. May 24, 2024). In this decision, the Court vacated the Board’s ruling in Thryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22 (2022) on the merits, and thus did not reach the consequential damages issue. The Court did however label this remedy as “draconian” and “a novel, consequential-damages-like labor law remedy.” The Board therefore will require a new case to codify the issuing of consequential damages. It remains to be seen how this ruling would impact SpaceX’s Seventh Amendment argument concerning consequential damages, which could be a key element of its potential reliance on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jarkesy.

Court Deference to Agency Positions Dead: Chevron Reversal
In a massive blow to agency power, the U.S. Supreme Court on Friday reversed Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in a case involving a fishing industry rule. Under Chevron, on review of agency action, where the relevant statute was silent or ambiguous regarding a specific issue, courts were directed to defer to agencies and were not to “impose [their] own construction on the statute.” Thus, where an agency offered “a permissible construction of the statute,” courts were to defer to the agency even if the court would have reached a different conclusion. In the years since Chevron was issued, reviewing courts often remarked that they were bound to uphold an agency determination even if they disagreed with the interpretation. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, held that Chevron could not be reconciled with the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), which commands “the reviewing court” to decide “all relevant questions of law” arising on review of agency action, which of course includes interpretation of the federal statute at issue. As a result, the majority determined that there should be no deference to agencies in answering legal questions, although deference is mandated for judicial review of agency policy-making and fact-finding. The majority concluded that, in deciding Chevron, the Supreme Court had required judges to “disregard their statutory duties,” which required this Court to “leave Chevron behind.”

Takeaways
These two Supreme Court decisions could substantially curtail the NLRB’s ability to bring and prosecute actions against parties (not just employers, but unions as well). While the Jarkesy Supreme Court decision is narrow, it could end the ability of the NLRB to bring certain claims in front of agency ALJs (all of whom are employed directly at the Board and who are not subject to removal). The pending SpaceX decision likely will further the development of the law, as it is a direct challenge to the NLRB adjudicatory scheme, and will also give a Circuit Court—and eventually maybe the Supreme Court—a chance to rule on additional constitutional challenges to federal agencies.

In addition, the reversal of Chevron likely will have a substantial effect on the review of NLRB cases. At time of unprecedented expansion of the reach of the NLRA—including finding non-compete agreements and confidentiality clauses unlawful—the end of Chevron deference allows a reviewing court the ability to disregard NLRB actions as not rooted in the NLRA or beyond the scope of the agency’s mandate. There is no doubt many challenges of NLRB actions will be brought as the probability of prevailing in a reviewing court has increased substantially with the end of deference.

As always, we will monitor decisions and agency actions to see how these important developments play out.

© 2024 Proskauer Rose LLP.

What Does the End of Chevron Deference Mean for Federal Health Care Programs?

On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of Chevron deference in the closely watched case of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.[1] In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that Chevron’s rule that courts must defer to federal agencies’ interpretation of ambiguous statutes gave the executive branch interpretive authority that properly belonged with the courts. Moreover, the Court concluded that Chevron deference was inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), holding that the APA requires courts to exercise independent judgment when deciding legal issues in the review of agency action.

Loper will have significant and immediate implications for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the federal agency charged with the administration of the federal health care programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. As detailed below, the Court’s decision sets a more exacting standard for courts to apply when reviewing HHS’s regulations and legal positions.

What Was Chevron Deference?

The doctrine of Chevron deference was established in 1984 by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.[2] In that case, the Court held when a “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” raised regarding a statute that the agency administers, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”[3]

Although scholars have debated Chevron’s rationale at length, it generally was read to require deference based upon agencies’ presumed subject matter expertise and an assumption that Congress delegated authority to agencies—rather than courts—to fill in gaps in statutory schemes. Notably, the Supreme Court had not itself invoked Chevron deference since 2016, although lower courts have continued to rely on it regularly.[4]

What Did Loper Decide?

Loper involved two New England fishing companies appealing the D.C. Circuit’s ruling that applied Chevron deference to uphold the National Marine Fisheries Service’s interpretation of the Federal Magnuson-Stevens Act (the “Act”) as requiring fishermen to pay for the use of compliance monitors on certain fishing boats, even though the federal law is silent on who must pay. Petitioners used the case as a vehicle to present a broader challenge to Chevron,arguing that the doctrine has led to excessive deference to federal agencies, resulting in overregulation, the abdication of judicial responsibility to interpret statutes, and the unwarranted imposition of regulatory enforcement costs.

The Loper majority firmly rejected Chevron and held that the APA requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding legal questions that arise in reviewing agency action. As the majority held, “courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”[5]

Importantly, however, Loper noted that deference may still be afforded agencies in certain instances. First, the Court observed that the APA expressly mandates a deferential standard of review for agency policy-making and fact-finding.[6] Second, Loper explained that some statutes are best read to “delegate[] discretionary authority to an agency,” in which case a court’s role is to merely ensure the agency “engaged in ‘reasoned decisionmaking’” within that authority.[7] Lastly, Loper reaffirmed that an agency’s “expertise” remains “one of the factors” that may make an agency’s interpretation persuasive.[8]

How Will Loper Impact Federal Health Care Programs?

Loper’s directive that courts should construe statutes independently and not defer to agencies’ positions has enormous implications for providers and suppliers that participate in federal health care programs. Much of today’s health care landscape is governed by HHS’ regulations, impacting many Americans and much of the federal budget. For example, Medicare currently covers more than 67 million beneficiaries, and Medicare spending comprised 12% of the federal budget in 2022 and 21% of national health care spending in 2021.[9]

Federal health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid are established by statutes that set forth myriad requirements regarding the coverage of items and services, and how, when, and by whom those items and services may be furnished.[10] HHS’s various components—most notably the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—have issued numerous, detailed regulations to implement these statutes. HHS’s components also include FDA, CDC, HRSA, AHRQ, OCR, NIH, and many others that intersect with health care providers and suppliers regularly.

Going forward under Loper, future challenges to agency regulations will take place upon a much different playing field. This has several important implications:

  • More Legal Challenges: We expect to see more legal challenges brought against HHS’s regulations as they are issued. Loper expressly stated that it “does not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework,” so prior decisions affirming regulations should be stable.[11] But going forward, Loper means that courts have no “thumb on the scale” in favor of HHS’s legal positions, and so litigants may view Loper as increasing their odds of success. At the same time, this may create more uncertainty for providers and suppliers who must determine how to comply with new regulations under challenge.
  • Less Ability for HHS to Create New Programs or Impose New Requirements: Especially where HHS imposes new substantive requirements that are not clearly authorized by statute, HHS’s regulations may be vulnerable. For example, the challengers to CMS’s minimum-staffing requirements for nursing homes are sure to cite Loper.[12] Likewise, when HHS creates new programs or initiatives by regulation based on broad statutory language (e.g., HHS’s recent creation of rural emergency hospital regulations[13]), the regulations may be more vulnerable to challenges. As another example, legal challenges to FDA’s new rule on Laboratory Developed Tests are pending and will likely invoke Loper.[14]
  • More Incentive to Challenge Reimbursement Rules: Legal challenges are frequently brought to CMS’s rules governing reimbursement, which often have complicated statutory formulas subject to differing interpretations. Whereas in the past, courts often deferred to CMS’s interpretations,[15] Loper now creates more potential for providers and suppliers to seek more favorable legal interpretations to enhance reimbursement.
  • Slower and More Cautious Rulemaking: As HHS promulgates new regulations, it will now have to consider the enhanced litigation risk that Loper creates. This may lead to agencies slowing and proceeding more cautiously in rulemaking as agencies seek to craft defensible regulations.
  • Inconsistent Decisions by Courts: Because Loper directs courts to exercise independent judgment rather than defer to HHS’s interpretations, we expect that courts in different areas of the country may reach differing conclusions regarding HHS regulations. This may make certain geographic locations more advantageous for provider and supplier operations or expansions.

Conclusion

Going forward, courts will be more amenable than ever to siding with challenges to HHS regulations. This creates both challenges and opportunities for providers and suppliers who should carefully assess the legal basis for all new regulations.

The authors acknowledge the contributions of Callie Ericksen, a student at the University of California Davis Law School and 2024 summer associate at Foley & Lardner LLP.

[1] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (June 28, 2024), together with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, No. 22-1219, available here.

[2] 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

[3] Id. at 843 (emphasis added).

[4] See Am. Hosp. Ass’n (“AHA”) v. Becerra, 142 S. Ct. 1896, 1904 (2022) (determining that HHS’s preclusion of judicial review “lacks any textual basis,” remaining silent with respect to Chevron); Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 142 S. Ct. 2354, 2362 (2022) (illustrating that HHS’s reading aligns with the statute’s “text, context, and structure” in calculating the Medicare fraction for purposes of Medicare Part A benefits, without any mention of Chevron); Vanda Pharms., Inc. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,98 F.4th 483 (2024) (holding that CMS’s definitions of “line-extension” and “new formulation” did not conflict with the Medicaid statute).

[5] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, slip op. 35 (June 28, 2024).

[6] Id. at slip. op. 14 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (E)).

[7] Id. at slip op. 18.

[8] Id. at slip op. 25 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

[9] See KFF, Medicare 101 (published May 28, 2024), available here.

[10] See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395lll.

[11] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, slip op. 34 (June 28, 2024).

[12] See Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 24-cv-114 (N.D. Tex) (challenging the rule issued at 89 Fed. Reg. 40876 (May 10, 2024).

[13] Conditions of Participation, 42 C.F.R. §§ 485.500-485.546 (Subpart E), and Payments, §§ 419.90-419.95 (Subpart J), 87 Fed. Reg. 71748, 72292-93 (Nov. 23, 2022),

[14] 21 C.F.R. § 809, 89 Fed. Reg. 37286 (May 6, 2024).

[15] See, e.g., Baptist Mem’l Hosp. – Golden Triangle, Inc. v. Azar, 956 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2020) (deferring to CMS’s rule addressing “costs incurred” for calculating Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital payments).

© 2024 Foley & Lardner LLP
For more news on Supreme Court Health Care Decisions, visit the NLR Health Law & Managed Care section.

June 2024 Legal Industry News Updates: Law Firm Hiring and Expansion, Industry Awards and Recognition

Welcome back to another edition of our legal industry news roundup, and happy summer from the whole team at the National Law Review! Please read below for the latest in law firm hiring and expansion news and key industry awards and recognition.

Law Firm Hiring and Expansion

Bradley Arant Boult Cummings’ Atlanta office continues to grow with the addition of partners Jeff S. Luechtefeld, John Nail and Sean R. Gannon, senior attorney Gabriella Cole and associate Jessica R. Stephan as members of the firm’s Tax Practice Group. The firm’s Atlanta office has more than doubled in size since it was established in May 2023.

Mr. Luechtefeld earned his LL.M. in Taxation from the University of Florida Levin College of Law, his J.D. from the University of Missouri Columbia School of Law and his B.S. in Finance from Missouri State University. Mr. Nail earned his J.D. (cum laude) at Wake Forest University School of Law and his B.S. from the College of Charleston. Mr. Gannon earned his LL.M. in Taxation at the University of Florida Levin College of Law, his J.D. from Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School and his B.A. from Michigan State University. The new partners represent Fortune 500 companies, closely held businesses and high-net-worth individuals in IRS examinations, appeals and litigation, as well as other tax issues.

Ms. Cole received her J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center, her M.B.A. from the University of Houston C.T. Bauer College of Business and her B.S. (magna cum laude) from Kennesaw State University. Her practice focuses on tax controversy law and representing corporations and individuals against the IRS and state departments throughout the audit, administrative appeals and litigation processes.

Ms. Stephan received her J.D. from the University of Southern California Gould School of Law, an LL.M. in Taxation from the University of Florida Levin College of Law and a B.B.A. (summa cum laude) in Finance from Mississippi State University. She advises partnerships, corporations and individuals in federal and state tax disputes.

Bradley Atlanta office managing partner Sidney S. Welch welcomed the new members of the Tax Practice Group: “We are delighted that this group of highly accomplished tax controversy attorneys is joining the firm. Their significant litigation experience and deep understanding of the IRS allows them to offer strategic solutions for our clients. The addition of these attorneys also strengthens and enhances Bradley’s federal tax controversy capabilities, as well as being synergistic with the firm’s government enforcement and investigations work. The Atlanta office is continuing our growth strategy with tremendous legal talent, and we look forward to their collaboration.”

ArentFox Schiff announced the addition of 17 members to the firm’s Technology, Life Sciences, Intellectual Property and Complex Litigation services in the Boston office. With these new additions, the firm’s Boston office has grown by more than 40% in 2024.

New additions to the IP team include partners Joseph M. Maraia, Dr. Daniel W. Clarke, Christopher Carroll, Laura L. Carroll, Brooke A. Penrose, Paul A. Pysher and Howard J. Susser; counsel Shawn P. Foley, Bruce D. Jobse and Joseph P. Quinn; and six associates and patent agents. Litigation partner Shepard Davidson has also joined ArentFox Schiff and will continue to focus his practice on complex business torts and contract claims. Among these new firm members are a former patent examiner, a master electrician and a molecular microbiology Ph.D., all of whom offer unique insights to clients in specialized and technical industries.

“ArentFox Schiff has long had a preeminent IP practice, and one of our strategic goals was to further expand this in Boston with a focus on life sciences, patent, litigation, trademark, and general IP services,” said chairman Anthony V. Lupo. “Adding this talented team helps us accomplish that goal. This group’s clients also fit strategically into our industry approach to the business of law, and based on our prior success with laterals and groups, we anticipate a number of opportunities to significantly grow revenue.”

“Thanks to its many leading universities, research institutions, and cutting-edge companies, the Boston area continues to be a hub for innovation that demands top-tier IP services,” added Boston managing partner David M. Barbash. “Adding this highly respected group of attorneys will offer immense benefits to our clients in New England and across the country as they grow their businesses.”

Varnum formed a Health Care Artificial Intelligence (AI) Task Force focused on the use of AI technologies and machine learning in the health care industry. The Health Care AI Task Force consists of attorneys with particular expertise in health care law, data privacy and AI technologies, and is led by four partners who regularly advise health care clients on regulatory compliance and counsel large corporations on innovative technologies and privacy regulations.

The goal of the task force is to help health care organizations protect sensitive patient data and maintain high clinical standards through advising on AI integration, promoting privacy and data security, assisting in policy development and fostering risk management.

Sarah Wixson, who co-chairs Varnum’s Health Care Practice Team, noted the increasing importance of AI for health practitioners.

“As AI continues to evolve, it is crucial for health care providers to stay ahead of the curve by understanding and adhering to the legal frameworks that govern these technologies,” Ms. Wixson said. “Our task force is committed to helping our clients navigate this complex landscape.”

“Our goal is to provide our clients with the guidance they need to adopt AI technologies,” said data privacy attorney Jeff Stefan. “We are helping clients leverage the power of these revolutionary advancements and avoid their equally significant risks.

Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP expanded their New York office with the addition of financial services partner Mike Katz. With significant experience in crypto, payments, emerging company and venture capital, Mr. Katz will expand Manatt’s blockchain capabilities.

Mr. Katz is a strategic adviser to emerging growth companies and investors and a counsel to tech companies and venture funds. He provides advice to startups and venture capital funds to navigate overlapping corporate and regulatory issues. He earned his J.D. from Columbia Law School and his B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania.

“As I have seen firsthand, Manatt’s interdisciplinary and entrepreneurial approach to client service is extremely effective, and I am excited to join this team to help with leading the expansion of the Firm’s blockchain capabilities and support our clients across all aspects of financial services and venture capital,” said Mr. Katz. “Innovation-focused companies and investors are at the forefront of my practice every day, and Manatt is the perfect platform for me to bring experience to bear for clients across the Firm. I look forward to leveraging my varied in-house, corporate and regulatory skills to further enhance the Firm’s reputation as the go-to adviser for companies at the frontlines of innovation.”

Legal Industry Awards and Recognition

The 2024 Chambers USA Guide recognized Greenberg Traurig’s Data Privacy & Cybersecurity Practice in Band 1 for Nationwide Privacy & Data Security: Highly Regarded for the fourth year in a row. The guide’s “Privacy & Data Security: Privacy” category also recognized shareholders Liz Harding and David A. Zetoony, co-chair of the U.S. Data Privacy & Cybersecurity Practice.

Chambers and Partners selects attorneys and practices for the guide based on thousands of interviews with practicing lawyers and clients on a global scale. Chambers USA provides legal data and analytics to inform buyers of legal services of the top lawyers and law firms in the United States. Overall, the 2024 Chambers USA Guide recognized 273 Greenberg Traurig attorneys.

Claire Weglarz, partner at Womble Bond Dickinson, was elected to the Board of Directors of Trial Attorneys of America, a group of private practice attorneys and corporate counsel focused on the defense of products liability litigation. Membership in Trial Attorneys of America is by invitation only and is based on the recommendation of a member.

Ms. Weglarz is a member of Womble Bond Dickinson’s Product Liability Litigation team in the firm’s Los Angeles office. She represents energy, chemicals, manufacturing, automotive and consumer goods industry clients, and is involved in high-risk litigation on cases involving product liability, premises liability, environmental claims and toxic exposures to chemicals.

Chambers USA and The Legal 500 US recognized Andrea (Andie) S. Kramer in their 2024 nationwide rankings of leading tax lawyers. Specifically, Chambers USA included Ms. Kramer as a top tax and derivatives lawyer, and she was one of only four lawyers named to The Legal 500 Hall of Fame for Tax, Financial Products in the United States for 2024.

Ms. Kramer is a solo practitioner providing integrated legal counsel on regulatory, governance, commercial and tax matters to her clients.

“Each year, Chambers and Partners and The Legal 500 conduct unbiased research on lawyers around the world—and their independence encourages us all to be better,” said Ms. Kramer. “It has been a strong, productive, and interesting 18 months for ASKramer Law—and our clients and colleagues have gone the extra mile with these ranking agencies to underscore our commitment to legal excellence and great service.”

BTI Consulting Group’s 2024 report recognized Jackson Lewis P.C. attorneys Stephanie Adler-Paindiris, Ross M. Gardner and Alessandro “Alex” G. Villanella as Client Service All-Stars. Attorneys are named as Client Service All-Stars for their client service excellence and commitment to fulfilling their clients’ needs. The BTI Client Service All-Stars list is based on feedback gathered from over 350 in-depth, confidential and unsolicited interviews.

Ms. Adler-Paindiris is a principal in the firm’s Orlando office, a member of the firm’s Board of Directors and co-leader of the firm’s Litigation group. She defends class and collective actions on behalf of employers and counsels clients on workplace challenges. Mr. Gardner is a principal in the firm’s Omaha office who represents management throughout traditional labor law and related litigation. Mr. Villanella is a principal in the firm’s Long Island office, whose practice focuses on collective bargaining, labor arbitration, contract administration and representation and unfair labor practice proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board.

“Stephanie, Ross and Alex are true champions of problem-solving for our clients,” said firm chair Kevin Lauri. “They understand exactly what clients need and effortlessly craft solutions that tackle immediate issues and safeguard against future challenges. They uphold the firm’s client service standards to the highest degree, and the entire firm congratulates them on this accomplishment.”

Chaikin, Sherman, Cammarata & Siegel, P.C. partner Allan M. Siegel was awarded the 2024 Trial Lawyer of the Year Award by the Trial Lawyers Association of Metropolitan Washington, D.C. He received this honor at the association’s Annual Awards Dinner at Nationals Park in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Siegel graduated magna cum laude in from The George Washington University and earned his J.D. from The George Washington University’s National Law Center. His practice is centered on personal injury cases related to automobile and commercial vehicle negligence, premises liability and medical malpractice. He is board-certified in civil trial law by the National Board of Trial Advocacy, an honor held by only 3% of attorneys in the United States.

Copyright ©2024 National Law Forum, LLC
For more news on Law Firm Expansions and Legal Awards, visit the NLR Law Office Management section.

Supreme Court Issues Landmark Decision Upending Deference to Federal Agencies

On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States upended the 40-year-old doctrine whereby federal courts gave deference to administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretations of federal statutes. The ruling stands to have significant implications for federal agencies’ rulemaking and enforcement of federal labor and employment laws.

Quick Hits

  • The Supreme Court held that courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency acted within its statutory authority and may not defer to an agency’s interpretation when a law is ambiguous.
  • The decision overruled the four-decades-old doctrine known as Chevron deference, in which courts had deferred to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
  • The ruling will have a major impact on federal agencies’ rulemaking authority.

The Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo held that courts must exercise independent judgment in deciding whether an agency acted within its statutory authority and may not simply defer to the agency’s interpretation of ambiguities in the law.

The decision overrules the longstanding doctrine known as Chevron deference, under which courts would defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous law that the agency administers. The deference had provided the rules of such administrative agencies with the force of law, but that authority will, at a minimum, be weakened, along with the corresponding power of the agencies.

In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that Chevron deference “defies the command of the” Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that courts “not the agency whose action it reviews … ‘decide all relevant questions of law’ and interpret … statutory provisions.” Chevron deference “requires a court to ignore, not follow, ‘the reading the court would have reached’ had it exercised its independent judgment as required by the APA,” (Emphasis in original).

The Court, in its majority, rejected the presumption that ambiguities in federal statutes are implicit delegations of authority to agencies, stating the “presumption is misguided because agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities.”

The ruling will have significant implications for the multiple federal agencies that regulate employers, including the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Community Commission (EEOC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), among others.

Chevron Deference

Under the two-step Chevron deference framework, the court would first determine whether a statute in question was clear and unambiguous regarding an issue. If the statute was clear, then the court would give effect to it. If, however, the court found the statute was ambiguous or silent on the issue, then the court would proceed to step two. At that step, the court would determine whether the agency’s interpretation was a permissible or reasonable construction of the statute. If so, the court would uphold the agency’s interpretation.

The deference had allowed federal agencies leeway to act, allowing them interpret ambiguities and fill gaps in the laws they enforce. However, the doctrine has been criticized in recent years as unconstitutionally allowing the Executive Branch’s policy positions to be advanced by federal agencies outside the democratic process and for taking power away from federal courts to interpret laws.

Background

The issue over Chevron deference came before the Supreme Court in two cases challenging a National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) rule that required fishing vessels to pay the salaries of federal observers that vessels are required to “carry” under the Magnus-Stevenson Act (MSA). The MSA is silent as to whether the fishing industry is responsible for paying the costs for the observers. Given concerns about funding, the NMFS rule required the vessels carrying the observers to pay the costs despite objections from the fishing industry over its negative economic impact on the livelihoods of commercial fishermen.

In Loper Bright Enterprises, four family-owned and –operated fishing companies, argued that the NMFS cannot force vessels to pay for the observers because the MSA did not clearly give the agency power to do so. However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the agency, finding that the law’s silence on the issue created an ambiguity that required deference to the agency.

Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson recused herself from the Loper Bright case as she had sat on the D.C. Circuit panel that had ruled in the case. The Court then added Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, in which the owner of fishing vessels raised a similar challenge to the NMFS rule. The challengers argued that since the MSA provides for observers to be paid in at least three other contexts, the NMFS did not have the authority to require fishing vessels to pay for them. But the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court finding that “the rule is a permissible exercise of the agency’s authority and is otherwise lawful.”

At the Supreme Court, the challengers in Loper Bright Enterprises argued that the Court should “either abandon Chevron for good or at least substantially cabin its scope” because it has “proved unworkable” and has “seriously distorted how the political branches operate.” They argued that stare decisis does not bar the court from abandoning the framework since the Court would not have to change the outcome of the case in which the deference was established but merely alter the interpretative methodologies used. Similarly, the challengers in Relentless argued that the deference is unconstitutional because it “compromise[es] judges’ independence when interpreting the law,” which is a power vested in the federal courts under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

Decision

In deciding Loper Bright, the Supreme Court stated that courts simply “do not throw up their hands because ‘Congress’s instructions have’ supposedly ‘run out.’” “Courts instead understand that such statutes, no matter how impenetrable, do—in fact, must—have a single, best meaning. … So instead of declaring a particular party’s reading ‘permissible’ in such a case, courts use every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute and resolve the ambiguity,” the Court stated.

The Supreme Court further stated that agencies do not have any special ability to interpret ambiguities, “even when an ambiguity happens to implicate a technical matter” as “Congress expects courts to handle technical statutory questions.” However, the Court stated that courts do not decide cases “blindly” and instead, rely on arguments from the parties and amici, noting that an agency’s interpretation “may be especially informative.”

“The better presumption is therefore that Congress expects courts to do their ordinary job of interpreting statutes, with due respect for the views of the Executive Branch,” the court stated. “And to the extent that Congress and the Executive Branch may disagree with how the courts have performed that job in a particular case, they are of course always free to act by revising the statute.”

However, the Court noted that the decision does “not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework,” as cases upholding specific agency actions “are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretative methodologies.

Justice Elena Kagan and Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented and were joined by Justice Jackson to the extent it applied to the Relentless case. In the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the justices argued that Chevron deference “has formed the backdrop against which Congress, courts, and agencies—as well as regulated parties and the public—all have operated for decades” and “has been applied in thousands of judicial decisions.”

They argued that Chevron deference is “right” and the “obvious choice” to resolve ambiguities because “[a]gencies have expertise” that “courts do not.” Further, agencies report to the president, “who in turn answers to the public for his policy calls; courts have no such accountability and no proper basis for making policy.” Moreover, “Congress has conferred on that expert, experienced, and politically accountable agency the authority to administer—to make rules about and otherwise implement—the statute giving rise to the ambiguity or gap,” Justice Kagan wrote.

Next Steps

The Supreme Court’s latest decision is likely to shift power dynamics by weakening agency authority to interpret ambiguous statutes and increasing judicial scrutiny. At a minimum, agencies may need to provide stronger justifications on the merits for their interpretations, and overall, they may be less likely to issue rulemaking in areas where statutory authority is not clear.

The decision is also likely to increase litigation and legal uncertainty, as it potentially opens the floodgates to a wave of legal challenges to overturn all sorts of existing agency rules that have been upheld citing Chevron deference and legal challenges to new agency rules moving forward. For example, this decision likely will have significant impact on the litigation challenging the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) rule purporting to ban noncompetes nationally.

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For more on Chevron, visit the NLR Litigation Trial Practice section.