Two Class Actions Alleging Starbucks Violated FCRA’s Background Report Disclosure Requirements Are Grinding Toward Settlement

Two pending class action lawsuits alleging coffee giant Starbucks violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) by relying on flawed background reports to decline employment to over 8,000 job applicants will likely settle in the coming months.  The two suits are being consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for the purpose of a directing notice to a single nationwide class.

Before taking adverse action against an applicant based on a background report, 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3) requires the employer to provide the applicant with a copy of the report and a written summary of the applicant’s rights under 15 U.S.C. §1681g(c)(1).  The purpose of this requirement is to allow the applicant an opportunity to correct any errors on the report before the adverse action is taken.

In the first suit, pending in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, the lead plaintiff, Jonathan Santiago Rosario (“Rosario”), alleges that he was denied employment as a Starbucks barista based on an inaccurate background report Starbucks obtained from Accurate Background, Inc. (“Accurate Background”).  Rosario claims he was taken out of consideration for the position based on several criminal charges and convictions that appeared on his report.  Rosario maintains that the report was inaccurate and that Starbucks took the adverse action weeks before he was provided with the report and the written summary of rights.  Rosario argues that he never had a meaningful opportunity to dispute the report and that Starbucks never reconsidered him for the position.

Similarly, the lead plaintiff in the second suit, Kevin Wills (“Wills”) of Georgia, alleges that Starbucks took adverse employment action against him without providing proper notice and a written summary of rights under FCRA.  Starbucks allegedly hired Wills pending the results of his criminal background check.  Starbucks allegedly received a report from Accurate Background stating that “Kevin Willis” of Minnesota had two prior convictions for domestic violence.  As a result of the report, Starbucks informed Wills over the telephone that he could not work for Starbucks.  Days later, Wills received a letter enclosing the background report.

According to an April 17, 2019 order issued by Judge Richard Jones, who presides over the Rosario action, the parties from both cases jointly participated in several sessions with a private mediator and have reached an agreement in principle to settle both cases on a class basis.

On April 24, 2019, Magistrate Judge Catherine M. Salinas issued a report and recommendation in the Wills case recommending that the Clerk in the Northern District of Georgia consolidate the Rosario case into the Wills case.  After fourteen days, if no party objects, the cases will likely be consolidated.

To date, no details about the terms of the settlement have been released.

 

Copyright © 2019 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by Nadia Adams of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP.
Read more on FCRA Litigation on the National Law Review’s Litigation Type of Law page.

Arkansas and Kentucky Halt Medicaid Work Requirements

On April 10, 2019, the Department of Justice filed notices[1] appealing two District Court rulings that struck down Medicaid work requirements in both Kentucky[2] and Arkansas[3] to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The rulings, issued on March 27, 2019, by Judge James E. Boasberg of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, held that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) when it approved the Arkansas Works Amendments and Kentucky HEALTH programs. Arkansas and Kentucky halted the programs, pending resolution of the appeals.

Background

Arkansas Works Amendments

In 2017, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson proposed substantial amendments to the Arkansas Medicaid program (known as Arkansas Works since 2017) (the “Arkansas Works Amendments”). While States generally must meet specific federal requirements when implementing their Medicaid programs, Federal law allows the Secretary of HHS (the “Secretary”) to waive federal requirements for “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project[s]” proposed by States.[4]   Specifically, if, in the Secretary’s judgment, the proposals would be “likely to assist in promoting [Medicaid’s] objectives,”[5] then the Secretary may waive compliance with certain Federal Medicaid requirements to the extent necessary to enable the State to carry out its proposed project (a “Section 1115 Waiver”).[6]

The Arkansas Works Amendments included a new requirement that adults ages 19 to 49 complete 80 hours of employment, or earn income equivalent to 80 hours of employment, each month as a condition of continued Medicaid coverage.[7] On March 5, 2018, the Secretary approved the work requirements and issued a Section 1115 Waiver allowing Arkansas to implement the new requirements. After the work requirements were implemented, more than 16,900 individuals lost Medicaid coverage for at least some period of time due to not reporting their compliance.[8]

Arkansas Medicaid recipients filed suit against the Secretary in August 2018. They asserted that the Secretary’s approval of the Arkansas Works Amendments was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the Secretary’s statutory authority, and violated the “Take Care Clause” at Article 2, Section 3 of the Constitution – such clause requiring that the President, “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”[9]

Kentucky HEALTH

In 2018, Kentucky submitted its own Medicaid proposal – the Kentucky HEALTH program – which CMS approved.[10] Like the Arkansas Works Amendments, Kentucky HEALTH made significant changes to Kentucky Medicaid, including, among other things, the implementation of work requirements. Kentucky HEALTH would require Medicaid beneficiaries to spend at least 80 hours per month on certain qualified activities, including: (i) employment; (ii) job skills training; (iii) education; (iv) community service; and (v) participation in Substance Use Disorder treatment. Failure to meet the 80 hour threshold, or failure to report compliance, would result in loss of Medicaid coverage.[11]

Two weeks after the Kentucky HEALTH program was approved, Kentucky Medicaid recipients sued the Secretary. The plaintiffs argued that the Secretary failed to consider Medicaid’s objectives and exceeded his statutory authority when he approved Kentucky HEALTH. The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with the plaintiffs, and vacated the Secretary’s approval on June 29, 2018, and remanded to HHS for reconsideration.[12]

Following remand, HHS re-opened public comments for Kentucky HEALTH, and approved a slightly modified proposal on November 20, 2018. Again, Kentucky Medicaid recipients sued the Secretary, arguing that the Secretary still had not considered Medicaid’s core objectives in violation of the APA.[13]

The Administrative Procedure Act

The APA establishes two important frameworks: (1) procedures which executive agencies must follow when developing, reviewing, and promulgating rules and regulations; and (ii) a judicial framework for courts to review executive agency actions.[14] Under the APA, courts must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”[15] An agency must “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,” or the agency’s action may be stuck down by the courts.[16]

The District Court Held That HHS Failed to Consider Medicaid’s Core Objective

Using the APA framework, the court analyzed whether HHS identified the objectives of Medicaid and explained why the Arkansas Works Amendments and Kentucky HEALTH programs would promote such objectives.[17] The court found that, while HHS had considered several Medicaid objectives, HHS failed to consider one critically important objective – providing medical assistance to needy populations.[18]

While HHS itself admitted that providing health coverage to vulnerable populations is “Medicaid’s core objective,”[19] the court found that HHS failed to consider the impact that the Kentucky and Arkansas projects would have on current and future Medicaid coverage.[20] The court determined this failure alone made the Secretary’s approval of the states’ work requirements arbitrary and capricious.[21] The court vacated HHS’s approval of both the Kentucky and Arkansas programs, and remanded both programs to HHS for reconsideration.[22]

Arkansas and Kentucky Halt Implementation of Work Requirements Pending Appeal

Following the District Court decision, Arkansas suspended the changes made by the Arkansas Works Amendments, which have been in effect since June 2018, and Kentucky halted implementation of its Kentucky HEALTH program, which was scheduled to take effect on April 1, 2019. Governor Hutchinson praised the Justice Department’s decision to appeal the cases, and indicated that the Government will likely seek an expedited appeal.

[1] Notice of Appeal, Stewart v. Azar, Case No. 1:18-cv-152-JEB (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2019); Notice of Appeal, Gresham v. Azar, Case No. 1:18-cv-1900-JEB (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2019)

[2] Memorandum Opinion, Stewart v. Azar, Case No. 18-152-JEB (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2019)

[3] Memorandum Opinion, Gresham v. Azar, Case No. 18-1900-JEB (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2019)

[4] 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)

[5] Id.

[6] 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(i).

[7] Gresham at 7-9.

[8] Id. at 8-9.

[9] Gresham at 10.

[10] Stewart at 4.

[11] Stewart at 5.

[12] Stewart at 6-7.

[13] Stewart at 5-8.

[14] See generally 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.

[15] 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

[16] Stewart at 10 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983))

[17] Gresham at 16; Stewart at 14-15.

[18] Gresham at 17-18; Stewart at 14.

[19] Gresham at 17.

[20] Stewart at 16-17

[21] Stewart at 15

[22] Gresham at 33; Stewart at 48.

Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Employee Wins Federal Appeal Involving Commonly-used Defenses in Employment Discrimination Cases

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision (Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc.) this week that reversed in the employee’s favor.  The opinion tackles many commonly-used defenses by employers in employment discrimination and retaliation cases.  In particular, the Fourth Circuit analyzed whether:

  • the employee had identified a valid comparator (aka a similarly situated employee);
  • established that he was performing his job satisfactorily when the employer fired him; and
  • produced any evidence of pretext, which looks to whether the employee can show that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse employment action (termination, demotion, etc.) was meant to disguise a discriminatory intent.

Ultimately, the court found in favor of the employee and sent the case back down to the trial court.

Background

Jimmy Haynes, who is African-American, claimed that his former employer, Waste Connections, Inc. (WCI), discriminated and retaliated against him when it fired him.  Haynes alleged that WCI violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. §1981 (Section 1981) as a result.  Notably, while Title VII and Section 1981 have many similarities in terms of prohibiting race discrimination in employment, a number of significant differences exist that can impact how a court reviews these claims, as discussed here.

The key facts had to do with Haynes reporting to work one evening and then leaving the job site.  According to Haynes, he left work due to a stomach virus and told his supervisor about this.  WCI, on the other hand, claimed that Haynes walked off the job because he was frustrated that his normal truck was not ready.  Two days later, WCI fired Haynes for job abandonment.  WCI did not mention any other reason for terminating Haynes’ employment at the time.  During the course of his lawsuit though, WCI claimed that Haynes had also committed other violations during June and August 2015.

After Haynes filed his lawsuit in court and the parties exchanged information during the discovery process, WCI filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that no disputed material facts existed and thus a jury trial was unnecessary.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the WCI and dismissed Haynes’ lawsuit.  Haynes then appealed this decision and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision.

The Fourth Circuit’s findings

Valid comparator/similarly situated employee

The Fourth Circuit first analyzed whether Haynes had established a proper comparator who was not African-American and was treated better than him.  Noting that comparing similar employees will never involve exactly the same offenses occurring over the same time period with the same set of facts, the court explained that showing someone is a valid comparator involves:

  • evidence that the employee and the comparator dealt with the same supervisor;
  • were subject to the same standards; and
  • engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them

Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., Case No. 17-2431 at p. 8, (4th Cir. April 23, 2019).  The appellate court found that a white employee, who had the same supervisor as Haynes, had several workplace violations.  These violations included twice using a cellphone while driving, driving while distracted, and responding to a traffic situation late.  Id.  It also appeared that this white employee had yelled at the supervisor before quitting his job.  Yet the white employee was allowed to return to work and Haynes, who had not yelled at his supervisor and had fewer infractions, was fired.

Because both employees had the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and engaged in similar conduct, the court found the white employee to be a valid comparator.  In making this decision, the appellate court rejected WCI’s argument that the white employee’s infractions did not cause any damages whereas Haynes’ violations did.  It also turned away WCI’s claim that the white employee had notified the employer that he was resigning while Haynes simply walked off the job.

Was Haynes performing his job satisfactorily

WCI also argued that Haynes had not demonstrated that he was performing his job satisfactorily at the time WCI fired him.  The Fourth Circuit pointed out that Haynes was not required “to show that he was a perfect or model employee;” rather, he need only show that he was qualified for the position and meeting WCI’s legitimate expectations.  To support his contention that he was satisfactorily performing his job, Haynes produced evidence that:

  • his supervisor told him the month before Haynes was terminated that “everything looks good” and “nothing to worry about” in terms of his upcoming job performance evaluation; and
  • Haynes received bonuses during the relevant time period

The court thus ruled that Haynes had presented enough evidence to demonstrate satisfactory job performance.

Evidence of pretext

To show pretext, “a plaintiff may show that an employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for the termination are inconsistent over time, false, or based on mistakes of fact.”  Haynes, Case No. 17-2431 at 12.  If the employee does so, then summary judgment should be denied and the case should proceed to trial.

The most important factor to the Fourth Circuit was that WCI came up with a new reason why it claims it terminated Haynes’ employment:  his poor attitude.  The only reason given at the time of Haynes’ termination, however, was job abandonment.  Further, the company policy on job abandonment defines it as three days with no call or no show, yet Haynes had called and texted within one day.  Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit found too many inconsistencies with WCI’s purported reasons for firing Haynes and thus ordered that a jury should decide whose version is correct.

Key takeaways

Some important factors can be gleaned from the Fourth Circuit’s decision here:

  • For the comparator/similarly situated analysis, you’re more likely to meet this test if you and the other employee(s) you’re comparing yourself to:
    • share the same supervisor;
    • perform very similar job tasks and responsibilities (both the number and weight) as the other person;
    • if the case involves discipline, then the number and severity of the infractions should be relatively similar;
    • have similar job performance evaluations and disciplinary history; and
    • your experience level (including supervisory experience) the same as the other person
  • To demonstrate that you were performing your job satisfactorily, evidence that you received bonuses, awards, and/or average (or higher) job performance ratings will be important;
  • Regarding pretext, the more inconsistencies you can show the employer’s reasons for firing you, the better off you will be.

© 2019 Zuckerman Law
This post was written by Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.

Executive Orders Aim to Streamline Energy Infrastructure Projects

On April 10, 2019, President Trump signed two executive orders intended to address a range of legal and procedural hurdles commonly facing infrastructure projects, particularly in the energy sector. Most notably, the executive orders require the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review and revise Section 401 water quality certification procedures and increase the president’s direct role in permitting cross-border projects.

In recent years, states and tribes have increasingly utilized Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341, to delay, condition, or deny permits and licenses for projects within their borders that may violate established water quality standards. Executive Order 13868 directs EPA to review these water quality certification procedures in consultation with states, tribes, and other federal agencies, with a focus on:

    • Promoting federal-state cooperation.
    • Clarifying the appropriate scope of water quality reviews.
    • Identifying appropriate conditions for certifications.
    • Establishing reasonable review times for certifications.
    • Delineating the nature and scope of information that states and tribes may need in acting promptly on a certification request.

The executive order contemplates several forthcoming EPA actions with aggressive deadlines. Within 60 days, EPA must issue new water quality certification guidance to states, tribes, and federal agencies. Within 120 days, EPA must publish a proposed rule revising the existing regulations that implement Section 401. Other federal agencies that issue permits or licenses subject to Section 401 certification requirements must then revise their regulations and guidance to conform to EPA’s actions. These actions will afford numerous commenting opportunities and, given the executive order’s focus on “Promoting Energy Infrastructure,” the agencies likely will be interested in specific ideas, experiences, and feedback of project proponents.

Executive Order 13868 is not limited to Section 401. It further directs the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to propose a rule newly allowing transport of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in rail tank cars. DOT must also revise its safety regulations for LNG facilities to reflect modern industry practices. Additionally, the executive order calls for scrutiny of retirement funds’ divestments from the energy sector. It also aims to facilitate renewals and reauthorizations of energy rights-of-way and similar authorizations. Lastly, it seeks information from agencies on barriers to a national energy market, intergovernmental assistance, and opportunities for economic growth in the Appalachian region.

Executive Order 13867 aims to end the multi-year reviews of cross-border infrastructure, such as pipelines and bridges, principally administered by the State Department. These projects have attracted national attention and controversy, as well as litigation. The Secretary of State will continue to receive all applications for such cross-border projects but will face a highly aggressive 60-day deadline to complete its review and provide recommendations to the president for a final permitting decision. The executive order stipulates that the State Department must revise its regulations to reflect these requirements by May 29, 2020. Because presidential actions are not subject to National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review, and to meet the tight deadline, such projects might undergo less review than they do today, which in turn may foster more litigation.

Overall, these executive orders afford opportunities to reduce barriers to energy infrastructure projects and improve the efficiency of the permitting process. Whether they yield tangible results remains to be seen. The substantive details and any legal challenges will emerge through the various agency actions implementing these executive orders, which the regulated community should follow and closely participate in.

 

© 2019 Beveridge & Diamond PC.

Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Cases Determining Extent of Title VII Protection for LGBT Workers

The Supreme Court of the United States announced three cases will be argued next term that could determine whether Title VII protects LGBT employees from workplace discrimination.

Title VII prohibits discrimination because of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” but it does not explicitly mention sexual orientation or gender identity.  Federal courts have disagreed on whether discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex-based discrimination.  Differing opinions on this topic exist within the federal government as well:  the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has taken the position that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, while the Department of Justice has argued it does not.  The Supreme Court’s decisions may ultimately decide these conflicts.

Two cases represent a split in federal appellate courts regarding the extent, if any, to which Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination as a subset of sex discrimination.  In Altitude Express v. Zarda, a skydiving company fired Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor, after Zarda informed a female client he was gay to assuage her concern about close physical contact during skydives.  The trial court dismissed Zarda’s sexual orientation discrimination claim.  In an opinion written by Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann on behalf of a full panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and held that sexual orientation discrimination is properly understood as a subset of discrimination on the basis of sex.  In other words, in the Second Circuit, sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited under Title VII.  The Second Circuit aligned its thinking with the Seventh Circuit’s April 2017 opinion in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, which held that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Gerald Bostock v. Clayton County Georgia.  Gerald Bostock alleged he was terminated from his county job after the county learned of his involvement in a gay recreational softball league and his promotion of involvement in the league to co-workers.  The trial court dismissed and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on its own precedent that broadly held that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.  In other words, in the Eleventh Circuit, Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.

The Supreme Court consolidated the cases into a single case to determine whether the prohibition in Title VII against employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompasses discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation.

The third case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, focuses on whether Title VII applies to transgender employees.  In 2007, a funeral home hired Aimee Stephens, whose employment records identified her as a man.  Later, Stephens told the funeral home’s owner she identified as a woman and wanted to wear women’s clothing to work.  The owner fired Stephens, believing allowing Stephens to wear women’s clothing violated the funeral home’s dress code and “God’s commands.”  The EEOC filed suit on Stephens’ behalf.  The trial court dismissed a portion of the lawsuit because “transgender . . . status is not currently a protected class under Title VII,” but permitted other portions to proceed based on the claim Stephens was discriminated against because the funeral home objected to her appearance and behavior as departing from sex stereotypes.  The Sixth Circuit agreed that Stephens had viable claims.  The Supreme Court will review “[w]hether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender people based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping” under prior Supreme Court precedent.

All three cases will affect the employment rights of LGBT workers.  Dinsmore & Shohl lawyers will closely monitor the Court’s analysis of these cases.  Dinsmore’s Labor and Employment Practice Group stands ready to assist employers in navigating this developing area of law.  Dinsmore’s experience in this arena includes accomplished labor and employment lawyers, former law clerks to federal judges who have drafted orders on these very issues, former federal government attorneys, litigators and published scholars.

 

© 2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.
This post was written by Jan E. Hensel and Justin M. Burns of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
Read more on the US Supreme Court  decision on the National Law Review’s Labor and Employment page.

Chicago and Cook County Amusement Tax

In previous posts, we have explored several local Illinois taxes, including the Chicago Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax and Cook County Parking Lot Tax. Also notable is the Chicago and Cook County Amusement Tax, which can apply more broadly than taxpayers often anticipate. Specifically the scope of the amusement tax has been expanded over the last few years to non-traditional amusements, including electronically transferred television shows, movies, videos, music, and games.

Imposition of The Amusement Tax

Although the Chicago and Cook County amusement tax are imposed similarly on taxpayers, they are independently administered taxes that feature key differences. Both the Chicago Amusement Tax Ordinance (“Chicago Ordinance”) and Cook County Amusement Tax Ordinance (“Cook County Ordinance”) impose the tax “upon the patrons of every amusement” within the city or county, but require the owner, manager, or operator of the amusement to collect the tax from each patron and remit the tax to the Chicago Department of Finance (“Chicago Department”) or the Cook County Department of Revenue (“Cook County Department”).[1] Further, both Ordinances define “amusement” as “any exhibition, performance, presentation or show for entertainment purposes”.[2]

Where the Chicago and Cook County Ordinances deviate, however, are the examples used to define “amusement”, the rates of tax, and applicable exemptions. For example, although the Ordinances provide similar examples of qualifying amusements, including a motion picture show, athletic contest, or any theatrical, musical or spectacular performance, the Chicago Ordinance also includes “paid television programming” viewed within or outside the home.[3] In contrast, the County Ordinance does not include such language. Additionally, whereas the Chicago Ordinance imposes the amusement tax at a rate of 9 percent of the admission fees or other charges paid for the privilege to enter, witness, view or participate in the amusement, the County Ordinance imposes the tax at a rate of 3 percent (unless a lower rate applies, as addressed below).[4]

Further, the Chicago and Cook County Ordinances often exempt different activities. For example, although both Ordinances exempt admission fees to witness in person “live theatrical, live musical or other live cultural performances that take place in any auditorium, theater or other space”[5] with a certain limited capacity (“Small Venue Exemption”), the Ordinances include a different capacity limitation. Under the Chicago Ordinance, the Small Venue Exemption renders the amusement tax inapplicable where the maximum capacity of the venue, including all balconies and all sections, is not more than 1,500 persons.[6] In contrast, under the Cook County Ordinance, the Small Venue Exemption only applies where the venue has a capacity of not more than 750 persons.[7] Further, if the venue has a capacity of more than 750 persons, but fewer than 5,000 persons, the Cook County amusement tax applies at a rate of 1 percent rather than the general rate of 3 percent.[8] This serves as a notable example of where the Ordinances may appear to be substantially similar but in fact feature key differences. Additionally, whereas the City clarified in a 2004 Amusement Tax Ruling that “primarily educational” activities are not taxable amusements, Cook County has not released similar guidance.[9] The result is that depending on the nature of the activity, amusement tax may apply in one but not both jurisdictions.

Identifying Taxable “Admission Fees”

A contested issue in applying the amusement tax in both Chicago and Cook County is the amount that compromises the taxable “admission fees or other charges paid for the privilege to enter, witness, view” such amusement.[10] For example, in 2014, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that under the Cook County Ordinance, for club seats and luxury suites to Chicago Bears home football games, “admission fees or other charges” include the amenities available to holders of club seat tickets and tangible personal property included in the luxury suite admission price, not just the value of the home seat games.[11] The Court determined that because a fan cannot witness a game from a club seat without paying the club privilege fee and annual licensing fee, it is not possible to separate the “other charges” from the fee paid to enter the stadium.[12] As a result, the Illinois Appellate Court determined the full price paid by club seat holders and luxury suite licensees is subject to the County’s amusement tax. This decision may lead to efforts by the Chicago Department and Cook County Department to expand a taxpayer’s taxable base beyond the mere value of a “seat”. For example, both the County and the City have been aggressive in their application of the amusement tax to service fees despite clear language in the Ordinances that exempts separately stated optional charges.[13]

Expanding the Scope to Electronically Transferred Amusements

The Chicago Department has recently become aggressive in its expansion of the scope of the Chicago Ordinance. In a 2015 Amusement Tax Ruling, the Chicago Department asserted that the amusement tax is imposed “not only [on] charges paid for the privilege to witness, view or participate in amusements in person but also charges paid for the privilege to witness, view or participate in amusements that are delivered electronically.”[14] As a result, the Chicago Department intended to clarify that the Chicago amusement tax applies to fees or charges for the following if delivered in the City: (1) watching electronically delivered television shows, movies or videos; (2) listening to electronically delivered music; and (3) participating in games, on-line or otherwise.[15] Although treated with resistance by taxpayers[16], the implication is that the City Department has the authority to impose the amusement tax on users of streaming services such as Netflix and Spotify, and online gaming, such as PlayStation. Following the Mobile Telecommunication’s Sourcing Conformity Act[17], the amusement tax applies to customers whose residential street address or primary business address is in Chicago, as reflected by their credit card billing address, zip code or other reliable information.[18]

Further, as explored briefly above, the Chicago Ordinance treats “paid television programming” as a taxable amusement.[19] “Paid television” means programming that can be viewed on a television or other screen, and is transmitted by cable, fiber optics, laser, microwave, radio, satellite or similar means to members of the public for consideration.[20] Additionally, an “owner” includes “any person operating a community antenna television system or wireless cable television system, or any other person receiving consideration from the patron for furnishing, transmitting, or otherwise providing access to paid television programming.”[21]

In 2014, the Chicago Department began auditing and assessing amusement tax on a number of restaurants and bars located through the City who subscribed to paid satellite television programming and who did not collect the amusement tax[22]. In a move to clarify the application of the tax, in November 2016, the Chicago Department released an Informational Bulletin that provided additional information to business subscribers of satellite television regarding their obligation to collect and remit the Chicago amusement tax. As a result, bars, restaurants and any other businesses that subscribe to satellite television are required to remit the Chicago amusement tax on charges paid for satellite television services used in Chicago.

Applicability to Ticket Resellers and Agents

An area of uncertainty within both the Chicago and Cook County amusement tax is the potential applicability to ticket resellers and agents. The issue dates back to 2006 when the Chicago Department amended the Chicago Ordinance to require not only a “reseller” but also a “reseller’s agent” to collect and remit amusement tax.[23]This amendment set the stage for the Chicago Department to attempt to collect the tax from StubHub as a reseller’s agent. StubHub is an internet auction listing service that operates a “platform” where it charges buyers and sellers a fee to buy and sell ticket to various events.

On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the Court entered a significant decision for online auctioneers, holding that municipalities may not require electronic intermediaries to collect and remit amusement taxes on resold tickets.[24] The basis of the Court’s ruling is that although the Illinois Ticket Sale and Resale Act (the “Act”) [25]gives municipalities the authority to require sellers and resellers of tickets to collect the amusement tax, municipalities do not have the authority to require internet auction listing services, such as StubHub, to collect the tax.[26] Although both the Chicago and Cook County Ordinance still define an “operator” as a person who “sells or resells a ticket”, the Stubhub decision resulted in the removal of the term “reseller’s agent” and “auctioneer” from the Chicago Ordinance.[27]

Conclusion

Although the Chicago and Cook County amusement tax are similarly imposed, there are notable differences between the applicability of the Chicago and Cook County Ordinances. These differences are particularly noteworthy with respect to potential exemptions and electronically transferred amusements. Accordingly, taxpayers should not assume that because the amusement tax applies in one locality, it applies in both Chicago and Cook County.

[1] Municipal Code of Chicago (“M.C.C.”) § 4-156-020(A), 4-146-030(A); Cook County Ordinance (“C.C.O.”) § 74-392(a), 74-395(a).

[2] M.C.C. § 4-156-010; C.C.O. § 74-391.

[3] M.C.C. § 4-156-010.

[4] M.C.C. § 4-156-020; C.C.O. § 74-392.

[5] The Chicago and Cook County Ordinance define “live theatrical, live musical or other live cultural performance” identically as a “live performance in any of the disciplines which are commonly regarded as part of the fine arts, such as live theater, music, opera, drama, comedy, ballet, modern or traditional dance, and book or poetry readings. The term does not include such amusements as athletic events, races, or performances conducted as adult entertainment cabarets.” M.C.C. § 4-156-010; C.C.O. § 74-391. In this regard, the Chicago Department and Cook County Department appear to play the role of an art critic, defining which activities qualify as “fine arts”. See a prior post exploring the issue in the context of disc jockeys.

[6] M.C.C. § 4-156-020(D).

[7] C.C.O. § 74-392(d).

[8] C.C.O. § 74-392(f)(1).

[9] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #1, ¶ 2.

[10] M.C.C. § 4-156-020; C.C.O. § 74-392.

[11] Chi. Bears Football Club v. Cook County Dep’t of Revenue, 16 N.E.3d 827, 835 (2014).

[12] Id. at 834. In determining the full price paid by club seat ticket holders and luxury suite licensees is subject to the amusement tax, the Court affirmed the reasoning of the court in Stasko v. City of Chicago, 997 N.E.2d 975, 993 (2013)(holding that the Chicago Ordinance applied because purchasing the permanent seat license was a prerequisite to viewing the game).

[13] M.C.C. § 4-156-020(H); C.C.O. § 74-392(e)(3).

[14] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #5.

[15] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #5, ¶ 8.

[16] The Chicago amusement tax, as it applies to certain electronically delivered amusements, such as paid television, was challenged but held by the Cook County Circuit Court to be constitutional in Labell v. City of Chicago, Case No. 15 CH 13399 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. May 24, 2018). In this application, the amusement tax is often derisively referred to as the “ Cloud Tax” or the “Netflix Tax“.

[17] 35 ILCS 638.

[18] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #5, ¶ 13.

[19] M.C.C. § 4-156-010.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] For additional background regarding the Department’s efforts to collect the Chicago amusement tax from satellite providers, see a prior post.

[23] Under the Chicago Ordinance, a reseller’s agent is a “person who, for consideration, resells a ticket on behalf of the ticket’s owner or assists the owner in reselling the ticket. The term includes but is not limited to an auctioneer, a broker or a seller of tickets for amusements, as those terms are used in 65 ILCS 5/11-42-1, and applies whether the ticket is resold by bidding, consignment or otherwise, and whether the ticket is resold in person, at a site on the Internet or otherwise.” M.C.C. § 4-156-010 (amended May 24, 2006).

[24] City of Chicago v. Stubhub, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 844, 845 (2011).

[25] 720 ILCS 375/0.01 et seq. (2010).

[26] Stubhub, Inc., 979 N.E.2d at 857.

[27] M.C.C. § 4-156-010; C.C.O. § 74-391.

 

© Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered 2019. All Rights Reserved.

Sixth Circuit Erases Chalking of Parked Cars

It’s not often that a dispute over parking tickets ends up in federal court. But that’s exactly what happened this week in Taylor v. City of Saginaw – a case that has already drawn the attention of the national media.

Taylor involved a challenge to “a common parking enforcement practice known as ‘chalking,’ whereby City parking enforcement officers use chalk to mark the tires of parked vehicles to track how long they have been parked.” This practice can be surprisingly effective (as certain blog authors unfortunately can attest). But it is apparently very effective in Saginaw – according to Judge Donald’s decision, one particular parking enforcement officer managed to chalk (and then ticket) Ms. Taylor fifteen separate times between 2014 and 2017.

Armed with a slew of parking tickets, Ms. Taylor filed suit in federal court, alleging that the City violated the Fourth Amendment by chalking her tires without her consent or a valid warrant. The Sixth Circuit agreed, relying upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), to hold that chalking constitutes an unreasonable trespass upon a constitutionally-protected area (your car).

At first blush, chalking a car’s tires may not seem like the type of “search” typically raising Fourth Amendment concerns. But as Judge Donald explained, Jones signaled a rebirth of “the seldom used ‘property-based’ approach to the Fourth Amendment search inquiry,” which focuses on physical intrusion to one’s property:

Under Jones, when governmental intrusions are accompanied by physical intrusions, a search occurs when the government: (1) trespasses upon a constitutionally protected area, (2) to obtain information.

In the Court’s view, chalking satisfied both of these requirements: the officer came into contact with Ms. Taylor’s car, in an attempt to obtain information about her (whether she remained in her parking spot too long).

The Court proceeded to hold that the search was unreasonable because the car was parked legally when chalked, and the officer lacked any reasonable suspicion (let alone probable cause) that a crime had been committed. The Court also specifically rejected the City’s assertion of the “community caretaker” exception, explaining that “the purpose of chalking is to raise revenue, and not to mitigate [a] public hazard.”

Taylor is the latest in a series of interesting Fourth Amendment cases playing out on our public roadways. The Sixth Circuit’s decision relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, which addressed the constitutionality of electronically monitoring an individual’s location by affixing a GPS device to his car.

And the Supreme Court heard argument yesterday in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, which asks whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist suspected of driving under the influence provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

 

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
Read more news from the Sixth Circuit from the National Law Review on our Litigation Page.

US Supreme Court Agrees to Decide Whether Title VII Prohibits LGBT Discrimination

After considering the petitions at eleven separate private conferences, on April 22, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in three cases involving the extent of protection provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 – if any – against employment-based discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  As we previously reported here, this issue has been watched closely by the nation, with multiple federal courts, government agencies, and employers reaching differing conclusions.  The Court consolidated the two sexual orientation cases, Altitude Express v. Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, and allocated a total of one hour for oral argument for both cases.  In the gender identity case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al., the Court limited its consideration to only the question of whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender people based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989).

The Court will hear argument in these cases next term, which means that it’s possible that a decision may not issue until as late as June 2020.  We will continue to update you with ongoing developments in these cases.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

This post was written by Melissa Legault of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.

Read more on the US Supreme Court on the National Law Review’s Litigation Type of law Page.

Implementation of “Buy American” for Infrastructure Projects Begins May 1st

In 2017, President Trump issued an executive order entitled “Buy American and Hire American” which stated a commitment to do just that. Earlier this year, expanding on this policy, President Trump issued an executive order entitled “Strengthening Buy-American Preferences for Infrastructure Projects.” This order requires federal agencies to encourage contractors working on infrastructure projects that receive federal grants or loans to purchase domestically produced materials. Pursuant to the order, agencies are required to begin encouraging use of domestic products by May 1st, and requires submission of an implementation plan by May 31st.

The new executive order seeks to fill somewhat of a gap in current federal legislation that will no doubt have an effect on an investor’s analysis of a public-private partnership delivery model. The federal Buy American Act applies domestic preference to manufactured materials that are used in the construction of federal projects. Then, there are a set of federal laws that have domestic preference provisions for specific materials in specific construction projects that receive federal funding. The new executive order applies to “covered programs,” which basically includes infrastructure projects that received financial assistance from a federal program, but do not currently include domestic preference requirements. In other words, the policy now potentially applies to any project that receives federal funds, even if it is not solicited by the federal government.

The term “infrastructure projects” is broadly defined, and will apply to local projects that receive federal assistance like aviation, surface transportation, ports, water resources, and energy production projects. The new executive order expands both the types of materials and types of projects for which the Buy American policy is applicable. The interplay with rules for local preference enforced by local governments is unclear, although existing federal regulations typically prohibit the use of local preference for federally funded projects. Also unclear is whether there is or will be an actual enforcement mechanism. The significance and magnitude of this latest push for stronger domestic preference will be revealed in the coming weeks as federal agencies begin to encourage the policy and submit plans for implementation.

© 2019 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP. All Rights Reserved.

This post was written by Elise Holtzman and Albert E. Dotson, Jr.

Read more about US policy updates on the National Law Review’s administrative & regulatory page.

Movements and the Leadership Thread: Facebook Groups Leader Jennifer Dulski on What Makes a Movement

“Movements begin with one person, taking one step,” was perhaps the most inspiring line of Jennifer Dulski’s keynote speech of the LMA Annual  2019 Conference.  Dulksi, best-selling author of Purposeful: Are You a Manager or a Movement Starter?; rooted her talk in her experience as leader of Facebook Groups; the incubator for many social movements from parenting to disaster response.  Before working at Facebook, she was the COO of Change.org, an early Yahoo! Employee and the CEO of Dealmap, an app Google eventually bought making Dulski the first female entrepreneur to sell a company to Google.  Dulski’s presentation dissected the elements and leadership needed to create movements, putting those ideas into context with powerful examples that are instantly recognizable.  Dulski’s self-deprecating, approachable and inspiring presentation reminded us that we can all start a movement.

The Leadership Thread and Starting Movements

Dulski points out that “All movements start with small actions made by individual people.”  When put that way, it all seems very possible, that these grandiose changes that impact our world all begin fundamentally, with one person taking one small action.  Dulski’s keynote continued in that vein, as she broke down the components of successful movements into what she called The Leadership Thread, suffusing her points with optimism and anecdotes of real-world examples, showing how this framework fits with some recent grassroots movements.

Courage to Get Started

The Leadership thread begins with garnering the courageto get started.  While it’s one thing to point out movements begin with a single step, it would be a disservice to ignore how difficult it can be to take that first step.  That’s where leaders begin—with finding the courage to start. And Dulski Shared her personal acronym for when she is scared—the idea that gives her the courage to ride her bike through Delhi or take on any of the many challenges that come her way.  She says IICDICDA; or: If I Can Do This I Can do Anything.  This is the kind of thinking that got her through a team building bike ride in Old Delhi with only one cow-related injury—and importantly, acknowledging that fear is normal and inevitable, and being brave isn’t about not feeling fear—it’s about overcoming that fear, and doing things you might not do otherwise.

Clear and Compelling Vision

After finding the courage to start, movement starters create a clear and compelling vision—with an articulated desired future, a clear purpose, and a compelling story.  Humans need inspiration, and so often, that inspiration comes in the form of a story. By distilling your vision into a clear story you can reach others, and giving them a story gives them something to understand.  A story illustrates your vision and makes it something to pick up and carry—allowing others to join in on the load.

Mobilize Others and Encourage Early Adopters

The next step is mobilizing others around that vision.  If others are moved by your story and can see the vision you see, make sure they have the tools and understanding to work beside you.  This means embracing the early adopters.  Empower those who embrace your vision by giving them jobs, responsibilities, and encouragement.  Make them the moderators of a facebook group, and let them share the load.  Giving people meaningful responsibilities in the movement inspires ownership, and the more invested people feel the more they will give.

Persuade Decision Makers

However, some people’s opinion can be the knife’s edge between success and failure—so finding ways to persuade decision-makers can be crucial for realizing success.  This can be as simple as making it easy for the decision maker to say yes—finding what will persuade that individual and putting what they need—hard data, a story, in front of him or her.  In many instances this can involve a variety of tools, so creating a toolkit of available options is an important starting point.  Build a coalition of the willing with a variety of talent at their disposal, and use each tool where appropriate.  One tool Dulski discussed is power mapping or influence mapping—basically, figuring out who influences the people you need to influence, and then influencing them.

Navigate Criticism

Reminding the audience of a Jeff Bezos quote: “If you absolutely can’t tolerate critics, don’t do anything new or interesting.” Dulski points out that any movement needs to learn to navigate criticism.  One map to that is to understand criticism as helpful information—and figure out what just needs to be managed. Dulski outlined additional strategies for handling criticism, including the bear hug, and leveraging the naysayers.

One strategy for pernicious critics is to wrap them in a bear hug—engage the critic to ask why they feel so strongly, and what can you do about it?  Offering to address their concerns in an honest and meaningful way shows a willingness to listen can be disarming. Many critics, when given the opportunity to air their grievances and most importantly, feel heard, will stop the sort of toxic criticism that can be so harmful to movements.

Another way to empower your critics and help accomplish your goals is to leverage the naysayers; this involves embracing the criticism and asking the critic to use his or her expertise to help improve the process. Again, allowing the critic to be heard, and asking for his or her contributions can neutralize the more negative aspect, bringing them to your side as you work together to make improvements.

Overcome Obstacles

Finally, any movement will hit obstacles along the way.  Finding a way to clear the obstacles is important for any movement, and problems—even crisis, is to be expected. Dulski discussed the four kinds of crisis responders, and how a mix of these personality types in response to a crisis is important to weather the storm. The big takeaway, though-is that obstacles are inevitable, and moving forward with your goals is the most important part.  The good news is that if you keep moving up over and under, whatever it takes, you will get through the tough times.

In understanding how people respond to crisis, Dulski offered a helpful categorization tool and discussed the four types of crisis responders.  The first are firefighters—who want to run into the thick of the problem and solve it; addressing any and all issues right away.  Another response are the Fire Inspectors, who want to understand why the problem happened and make sure it never ever happens again.  Both approaches are helpful, and a mix of both on your team is ideal.  Along the same vein, there are the EMTs, who look to the people affected by the crisis and come in, armed with food and concern, ready to focus on the individuals affected and taking care of them.  And finally, there are the Doomsayers, who see crisis as a sign of doom, and are always seeing a new crisis on the horizon.  There are elements of this kind of crisis response in all of us, and making sure the response balances these elements keeps movements on track.

Taking the First Step

Movements are a lot of work–and sometimes you might question whether or not that work is worth it.  Dulski points out that your work will matter, maybe in ways you don’t expect, but it will still matter to someone down the line.  Dulski left the audience with a sense that our actions are not only powerful but can have an impact beyond our wildest expectations.

© 2019 National Law Forum, LLC

This post was written by Eilene Spear of the National Law Review

Read more on Law Office Management on the National Law Review’s Business of Law page.

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