ITC to Investigate Supply Chain Challenges of COVID-19 Products

On August 21, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) stated that it will conduct an investigation and prepare a report containing more detailed information on supply chain challenges and constraints for COVID-19-related products, including medical devices, personal protective equipment, and pharmaceuticals. Specifically, ITC’s investigation and report will provide information on:

  • Key U.S. industry sectors producing COVID-19-related goods, including information on U.S. production, employment and trade.
  • Detailed case studies on key products (e.g., N95 respirators, ventilators, vaccines and COVID-19 test kits), particularly products with reported shortages in the first half of 2020 due to supply chain fragility, blockages or barriers.

The case studies will draw upon all available information, including information on key products, the U.S. market and manufacturing industry, and U.S. imports of finished goods and inputs. The case studies will also examine supply chain challenges and constraints, including factors (such as regulatory requirements) that may have inhibited domestic production and foreign trade barriers and restrictions affecting U.S. imports of finished goods or inputs needed for domestic production.

Companies importing COVID-19 products that are currently subject to duties — either based on their tariff classification or pursuant to the Section 301 retaliatory duties against Chinese origin goods — may want to take this opportunity to reiterate the impact those duties have on the U.S. health care industry, production of domestic products, and U.S. consumers. These companies may also want to draw attention to any shortages or inability to procure certain raw materials or finished products domestically. The ITC’s request for comments also presents a renewed opportunity to advocate on the breadth of COVID-19 products that may be outside of the ITC’s initial review. Also, for those companies that submitted Section 301 COVID-19 exclusion requests for products imported from China, this may be another opportunity to advocate that the administration exclude your product from Section 301 duties.

The investigation and report are intended to build on a first investigation by ITC that identified and examined tariffs on products needed to combat COVID-19. The purpose of the first investigation was to assist the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Ways and Means and U.S. Senate Committee on Finance in addressing shortages in the domestic supply chain. The first report was released by the ITC on May 4, 2020.

The final report for the current investigation is scheduled to be completed by December 15, 2020 and will be made available to the public. There will also be a virtual public hearing in connection with the investigation on September 23, 2020. Requests to appear at the public hearing should be filed with the ITC Secretary by September 11, 2020.

© 2020 Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved.
For more articles on trade, visit the National Law Review Antitrust, Mergers, FTC & Unfair Competition News section.

SEC Adopts Expansion of “Accredited Investor” Definition

On August 26, 2020, the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted amendments to Rule 501, Rule 144A and other related rules (the Amendments) to expand the definition of “accredited investor” under the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act). The amendments were adopted largely as proposed and broaden the scope of natural persons and entities that may qualify to participate in private offerings of securities that are exempt from registration under the Securities Act.

In particular, the “accredited investor” designation will now include the following:

  • Natural persons holding certain professional certification and designations. The SEC will periodically issue orders designating those professional certificates, designations or credentials that, when held by a natural person, would qualify such person as an accredited investor. Contemporaneously with the Amendments, the SEC designated holders in good standing of the Series 7, Series 65 and Series 82 licenses as qualifying for accredited investor status. In evaluating additional professional designations for qualifying status, the SEC will consider a non-exhaustive list of attributes established by the Amendments.
  • “Knowledgeable Employees” of private funds as defined under the Investment Company Act, but only with respect to investment in such private fund. A Knowledgeable Employee’s spouse will also be considered an accredited investor with respect to joint investments in the private fund.
  • Certain enumerated entities, including:
    • federal- or state-registered investment advisers and exempt reporting advisers, regardless of the level of assets under management;
    • rural business investment companies (RBICs), as defined in Section 384A of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act;
    • limited liability companies that have total assets in excess of $5 million and were not formed for the purpose of acquiring the securities offered1 ; and
    • any entity with at least $5 million in investments (as defined under the Investment Company Act of 1940) that has not been formed for the purpose of investing in the securities offered, in order to encompass entities such as Indian tribes, foreign entities and local government bodies that were not previously covered by Rule 501.
  • “Family offices” and their “family clients,” each as defined under the Advisers Act, provided the family office has at least $5 million in assets under management, was not formed for the purpose of acquiring the securities offered and was directed to make the investment by a person who has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters such that the family office is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the investments.

The Amendments would also clarify that spousal equivalents can pool finances when determining qualification as an accredited investor and update the definition of “qualified institutional buyer” under the Securities Act to conform with the new accredited investor definition.

The expansion of the accredited investor definition has many implications for asset managers, including updates to offering and subscription documents and questionnaires, consideration of expanded options for funding GP commitments via the expanded pool of knowledgeable employees and affiliated professionals and evaluation of fund-raising opportunities. Commissioners adopted the amendments on a 3-2 vote, with commenters disagreeing with the SEC’s decision not to index the wealth thresholds, which were initially adopted in 1982, for inflation.

The Amendments will go effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

_________________________________________________

1 While Rule 501 did not explicitly include LLCs meeting these requirements prior to the Amendments, the SEC historically has taken the position that such LLCs qualify as accredited investors.

© 2020 Vedder Price
ARTICLE BY Robert M. Crea, Joseph M. Mannon, and Adam S. Goldman of Vedder Price.
For more SEC news, visit the National Law Review Securities, SEC, & Financial Institution Law News section.

DOL Issues Additional FFCRA Guidance as Schools Reopen

On Aug. 27, 2020, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) issued three new Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) related to the reopening of schools in various formats and employee paid leave eligibility under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA).

The FFCRA requires employers with fewer than 500 employees to provide up to 80 hours of paid leave to employees for certain reasons related to the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic under the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (PSLA) and expands the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to provide employees up to 12 weeks of emergency job-protected leave to care for a child as a result of school or child care closings due to a public health emergency. The recent FAQ address caregiver leave associated with the closure of schools, which, if eligible, entitles employees to two-thirds’ pay up to $200 per day ($10,000 in aggregate).

NEW FAQ ADDRESSING SCHOOL CLOSURES

The following is an overview of DOL’s three newly issued FAQ regarding school closures:

A child attends a school operating on an alternate day basis

The DOL confirmed in FAQ #98 that an employee will be eligible for paid leave on an intermittent basis to accommodate a hybrid school schedule whereby children attend school both in-person and remotely. For purposes of the FFCRA and its implementing regulations, the school is effectively closed on days that a child cannot attend in person and leave is available on remote-learning days. The DOL cautions in its guidance that even under these circumstances, leave is only available if no other suitable person is available to care for the child.

A parent chooses remote learning when in-person instruction is available

FAQ #99 makes clear that FFCRA leave is not available to take care of a child whose school is otherwise open for in-person attendance. As a result, if a child needs care because the employee chose a virtual or remote school option, the employee is ineligible for leave. The DOL notes, however, that if the child is home due to a quarantine order or has been advised by a health care provider to self-isolate or self-quarantine, an employee may be eligible to take paid leave to care for the child.

School begins with remote learning, but shifts to in-person instruction if conditions change

FAQ #100 clarifies that leave eligibility will change as schools adopt different teaching models. Using the example of a school that starts virtually with the hope of returning to in-person teaching in the future, the DOL explains that an employee will be eligible for leave during the remote learning period for so long as the school remains closed, but eligibility will end when the school converts to in-person instruction.

ADDITIONAL FFCRA RESOURCES

Consider reviewing the following resources to learn more about the FFCRA:

Copyright © 2020 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

ARTICLE BY Margaret R. Kurlinski and Christine McLaughlin of Godfrey & Kahn S.C. 

For more on DOL guidance, see the National Law Review Labor and Employment Legal and Regulatory Law News section.

Courageous Spanish Whistleblower Roberto Macías Becomes the First to Test the EU’s Pledge to Protect Whistleblowers

This year, the European Union passed a Whistleblower Directive specifically designed to protect citizens who report fraud and other legal violations. Yet as twenty-six countries begin the process of transposing this directive, a Spanish whistleblower is fighting for his freedom.

As reported by the New York Times earlier this week, Roberto Macías, the whistleblower responsible for a leak that led to one of the largest anti-corruption prosecutions Spain has seen, is now desperately filing an appeal with the European Union. In this appeal he claims that the new directive protects him from the two-year prison sentence handed down by the court for disseminating allegedly confidential documents. It is clear to observers, including some Spanish lawmakers, that Mr. Macías’ sentence is, in fact, retaliation for exposing fraud. The exact conduct the directive was created to protect.

Although whistleblowers like Mr. Macías can already appeal to the EU to protect such rights, his case shows just how important it will be for nations such as Spain, which have little to no protection for whistleblowers, to step up and created comprehensive programs to protect those who risk everything to expose wrongdoing. We can only hope that the law and policymakers currently making statements in support of Mr. Macías make good come time for Spain to implement the directive.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2020. All Rights Reserved.

A Lawyer, C.I.A. Analyst and a Crisis Management Specialist Walk Into a Bar…

Before James Comey headed up the F.B.I., he served as general counsel of Lockheed Martin Corporation. While at Lockheed, he spoke at the National Security Agency about how studying law is similar to the education intelligence analysts receive. “You read a case and decipher…relevant facts, the [outcome] of the case…you are drilled on your reasoning, challenged by other interpretations…clear writing matters…facts matter.”  He went on to praise legal training “because it is an extraordinarily valuable tool in the world of intelligence.”

He elaborated on what he called a “uniquely lawyerly ability…to transport ourselves to another time and place. The ability to present facts to an imaginary future fact-finder, in an environment very different from the one in which we face current crisis and decision…we know that our actions, and those of the agencies we support, will be held up in a quiet, dignified, well-lit room, where they can be viewed with the perfect, and brutally unfair, vision of hindsight.”

Comey talked about how lawyers “must know how to say both ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ even when ‘no’ must be spoken into a storm of crisis, with loud voices all around, with lives hanging in the balance…and often, ‘no’ must be spoken in competition with the voices of other lawyers who do not have the courage to echo it.”

While I find Mr. Comey’s short remarks to be thoughtful and on target, I do take exception to his assertion that presenting facts to an imaginary future fact-finder is “uniquely lawyerly.”  I would argue that same skill set is present in the men and women who practice the specialized art and craft of crisis management and crisis communications.  They, too, must be able to quickly perform a situation analysis (often within the fog of information overload), look for connections and quickly play out a variety of scenarios, also knowing they will be second-guessed if things go awry.  And just as important as lawyers giving red light-green light counsel, so must crisis management counsel be able to take a stand – and speak truth to power.

Bad things do happen to good people, to good companies, agencies, nonprofits, schools and hospitals.  But as Greek philosopher Epictetus said, “It’s not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters.”  And when those things do happen, it’s important to have both lawyers and seasoned crisis managers in the room, each with the ability to say “yes” or “no” with conviction, backed up with the kind of experience that can’t be found in a book.

In that talk at the National Security Agency, Comey said, “It takes far more than a sharp legal mind to say ’no’ when it matters most.  It takes moral character.  It takes an ability to see the future.  It takes an appreciation of the damage that will flow from an unjustified ‘yes’ (and) when it can be, to ‘no’ when it must be.”

I couldn’t agree more.

© 2020 Hennes Communications. All rights reserved.

See the National Law Review Law Office Management section for similar topics.

Subpoena Motion Practice in Multidistrict Litigation: The Conflict on Authority Over Subpoena-Related Disputes

A key purpose of multidistrict litigation (MDL) is centralized management of pretrial proceedings to avoid duplicative discovery and resolve common issues in an efficient manner.  An MDL court becomes sufficiently familiar with the facts, scientific issues, and procedural history of the litigation to often allow a just and efficient resolution of complex discovery disputes.

One type of dispute common in MDL proceedings concerns third-party discovery.  Often, third parties are essential sources of critical information about a claim—such as physicians who treated a plaintiff in product liability litigation.  Just as frequently, these third parties are located outside the district of the MDL judge, forcing parties to serve extra-district subpoenas to obtain such discovery.

When disagreements arise over the scope or content of a subpoena, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires such disputes to be brought in the “district court where compliance is required,” which is rarely the MDL court.  Those situations raise the question whether the MDL court can exercise jurisdiction over subpoena-related disputes despite the mandate of Rule 45.  This article analyzes the apparent conflict between Section 1407’s authorization of MDL courts to resolve pretrial disputes and Rule 45’s subpoena requirements, and how courts have resolved this conflict for MDL litigants.

  1. The Conflict Between the MDL Court’s Authority to Manage Pretrial Proceedings and Rule 45’s “Where Compliance Is Required” Requirement.

At the heart of the dispute over where parties should bring subpoena-related motions in MDL proceedings is the conflict between Rule 45 and Section 1407.  In ordinary cases, Rule 45(d) provides that a party must move to enforce or quash a subpoena in “the district where compliance is required”—typically, the district where the individual or entity resides.  But in enacting Section 1407, Congress centralized management of pretrial proceedings in a single federal court to ensure the “just and efficient” conduct of the litigation.[1]  Indeed, a key role of multidistrict consolidation is to “avoid duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings and conserve judicial resources.”[2]

To further these goals, Section 1407 also provides MDL courts with the authority to “exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions.”[3]  Thus, whether this statutory language authorizes MDL courts to manage subpoena disputes involving extra-district nonparties requires courts to confront the “apparent conflict” between Rule 45 and Section 1407.[4]

  1. Who Has Jurisdiction Over Extra-District Nonparty Subpoenas?

  1. Leading Decisions Hold that MDL Courts Have Broad Authority to Enforce Extra-District Subpoenas Under Section 1407

The two leading decisions analyzing the conflict between Section 1407 and Rule 45 arose out of a multidistrict qui tam action consolidated in the District Court for the District of Columbia in U.S. ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of America, Inc.  In Pogue, the relator served subpoenas duces tecum on nonparty businesses headquartered in Tennessee.[5]  After the parties failed to resolve disagreements over the scope of the subpoenas, the relator sought to enforce them in the MDL district court.  The nonparties opposed enforcement there, contending that under Rule 45, the subpoenas could only be enforced “where compliance is required”—in that case, the Middle District of Tennessee.[6]

The MDL court noted that “[w]ere this an ordinary case, [the nonparties] would be correct and this case would be easily disposed of” given Rule 45.[7]  But it observed that this was “not an ordinary case” because the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation had “transferred to this Court related qui tam actions pending across the country under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1407.”[8]  The court explained that the purpose of MDL actions is to ensure the “just and efficient” conduct of pretrial proceedings involving common issues and “to eliminate duplicative discovery, pretrial rulings, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.”[9]  It then held that “to that end, § 1407 bestows upon the transferee court the power to exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in MDL cases.”[10]

Although the MDL court found that while it was not “a settled question” whether it had jurisdiction over extra-district subpoenas, “the weight of authority and effectuation of the purposes of multidistrict litigation support a finding of jurisdiction,” and that “§ 1407 confers on MDL judges the power to supervise depositions taking place in other jurisdictions.”[11]  The court also found that the use of the term “shall” in Section 1407(b) “mandates that such motions be heard by the MDL court.”[12]  Thus, the court determined that it had jurisdiction over the relators’ motions to compel the extra-district nonparties to comply with the subpoenas.[13]

In a later appeal, the Sixth Circuit[14] agreed with the MDL court, observing that “the Federal Rules are designed to ensure that district courts remain firmly in control of those depositions and document productions involving nonparties located in their districts.”[15]  Because the Federal Rules “could hamstring an MDL court’s ability to conduct coordinated pretrial proceedings over cases that have been consolidated from far-flung foreign districts, the MDL statute empowers an MDL judge to act as a judge of the deposition or discovery district.”[16]  The court, therefore, held that “[a] judge presiding over an MDL case” could rule on subpoena-related motions “notwithstanding the nonparty’s physical situs in a foreign district where discovery is being conducted.”[17]

  1. Courts Have Expressed Conflicting Views on Whether an MDL Court Can Enforce an Extra-District Subpoena Duces Tecum

As one court has observed, “[t]he overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the issue of whether Section 1407(b) authorizes a transferee judge the power to act as any judge of any district for pretrial depositions as well as subpoenas duces tecum, have found that it does.”[18]  For example, the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico in In re San Juan Plaza Hotel Fire Litig. found that to effectuate the purpose of multidistrict litigation, it is “necessary to append to the transferee judge enforcement powers in relation to subpoenas issued in the deposition district, including depositions and subpoenas addressed to nonparties.”[19]  Likewise, the District Court for the District of Kansas in In re EpiPen Mktg., Sales Practices and Antitrust Litig. observed that the “statute’s remedial purpose of eliminating the potential for conflicting contemporaneous pretrial rulings would be frustrated if the MDL court could not entertain motions to compel [compliance with subpoenas in other districts].”[20]  Other courts have reached similar conclusions when presented with the conflict between Rule 45 extra-district subpoenas and Section 1407.[21]

A small minority of courts, however, has narrowly construed Section 1407(b) as authorizing an MDL court to enforce deposition subpoenas—but not document subpoenas.  For example, in In re Packaged Seafood Prod. Antitrust Litig., the MDL court declined to exercise jurisdiction over enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum.  The court acknowledged that Section 1407(b) authorized it to exercise the powers of a district judge in any district “for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions,” and that “may necessarily include the power to enforce deposition subpoenas.”[22]  But it drew a distinction between a deposition subpoena and a subpoena duces tecum—a distinction which it found “makes a difference.”[23]  In refusing to enforce the subpoena duces tecum, the court reasoned that “[t]he extension of jurisdiction in MDL cases to the conduct of pretrial depositions” is not “tantamount to extending jurisdiction to enforce document subpoenas on third parties.”[24]

Other courts have also interpreted Section 1407 narrowly.  In VISX, Inc. v. Nidek Co., et al., the District Court for the Northern District of California found that “§ 1407(b) expands a transferee court’s discovery powers only to pretrial depositions,” and that “[h]ad Congress wanted to expand these powers to document subpoenas, it would have said so.”[25]  In In re Monat Hair Care Prod. Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., the District Court for the Southern District of Florida found “the reasoning of In re Packaged Seafood and VISX persuasive” that “Section 1407(b) does not expressly exempt MDL courts from Rule 45’s dictates; rather, it expressly gives MDL courts the discretion to exercise the powers of a district judge in any district only for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions.”[26]  Thus, given that “Section 1407(b) makes no reference to subpoenas for the production of documents,” the court held that Rule 45 mandated that only the Middle District of Florida had jurisdiction to enforce the nonparty, nonresident subpoena.[27]

That said, courts holding that MDL courts lack jurisdiction over extra-district document subpoenas are in the minority.  Indeed, the 6th Circuit in Pogue noted that while “[a]n argument can be made that the Section 1407(b)’s grant of authority to the MDL judge to oversee nonparty discovery occurring outside of the MDL district does not extend to enforcement of documents-only subpoenas,” the “rationale underlying the MDL statute of ‘just and efficient’ resolution of pretrial proceedings requires the conclusion that Section 1407(b)’s grant of authority applies to both deposition and document-only subpoenas.”[28]  Most other courts that have considered the issue have similarly agreed that “[i]n keeping with the efficiency goals of the MDL statute,” an MDL court’s authority “extends to overseeing subpoenas for documents.”[29]

  1. A Motion to Transfer to the MDL Is a Viable Alternative

If an opposing party has already moved under Rule 45(d) to quash or modify a subpoena in the “district where compliance is required,” or an MDL court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the initial subpoena-related motion, a Rule 45(f) transfer for “exceptional circumstances” to the MDL court can be appropriate.  Although the term “exceptional circumstances” is not defined in Rule 45, the Advisory Committee Notes provide that while the “prime concern” when considering transfer “should be avoiding burdens on local nonparties subject to subpoenas,” in “some circumstances . . . transfer may be warranted in order to avoid disrupting the issuing court’s management of the underlying litigation[.]”[30]  And courts have found “exceptional circumstances warranting transferring subpoena-related motions . . . when transferring the matter is in the interests of judicial economy and avoiding inconsistent results.”[31]

In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig. provides an especially applicable analysis of Rule 45(f) and MDL subpoenas.  Here, plaintiffs issued a subpoena duces tecum to a nonresident third party, which ultimately refused to comply with the subpoena.[32]  Plaintiffs moved to enforce the subpoena in the MDL court, which found that it lacked authority to rule on the motion because, under Rule 45, “a party seeking to compel compliance with a subpoena must file its motion in ‘the district where compliance is required.’”[33]  Following the MDL court’s ruling, plaintiffs filed an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia—where compliance was sought—to transfer the subpoena-enforcement motion to the MDL court under Rule 45(f) or, in the alternative, enforce the subpoena.[34]  After engaging in an exacting analysis, the district court found that transfer of the motion to enforce the subpoena to the MDL proceeding was appropriate.

First, the court observed that the “MDL status of the underlying litigation is surely an ‘exceptional circumstance’ that weighs strongly in favor of transfer to the Issuing Court under Rule 45(f), because the same concerns about orderliness and disruption that led to the consolidation of actions as an MDL in the first place arise with respect to pretrial disputes regarding subpoenas issued in the context of that complex litigation.”[35]  Second, the court noted that it was “highly unlikely” that the respondent would need to travel to the MDL court in Florida, as a telephonic hearing on the motion was likely, and thus there was no undue burden to the nonresident respondent.[36]  And lastly, given the that the MDL was a “rather a highly complex case and potentially a class action asserting nationwide antitrust claims against five large corporate defendants,” the district court found that the MDL court was best situated to decide whether the subpoena should be enforced.[37]  Thus, given that the “factors that weigh in favor of transferring this subpoena dispute” were abundant, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion and transferred the motion to the MDL court.[38]

  1. Conclusion

While the language of Rule 45 suggests that subpoena-related disputes can only be resolved in the “district where compliance is required,” MDL litigants should be aware of the authority granted to MDL courts under Section 1407.  The MDL court is often better suited to resolve such disputes given its extensive knowledge of the facts and science surrounding the litigation and the history of the litigation.  In the event that an MDL court declines to exercise direct jurisdiction over a dispute concerning a subpoena duces tecum, a Rule 45(f) transfer of a motion from the local district to the MDL court is a feasible alternative.  With either approach, MDL litigants can better ensure that complex subpoena-related disputes are resolved by the MDL court in an efficient manner that reduces the potential for inconsistent rulings or duplicative discovery.

[1] In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 572 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.).

[2] In re Air Disaster, 486 F. Supp. 241, 243 (J.P.M.L. 1980).

[3] 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b).

[4] E.g., In re Mentor Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Prod. Liab. Litig., No. CIV.A. 09-3073JAP, 2009 WL 3681986, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2009); In re Subpoenas Served on Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering & Goodwin Proctor LLP, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2003).

[5] 238 F. Supp. 2d. 270, 273 (D.D.C. 2002).

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b); Man. for Complex Litig. (Third) § 21.424 (2002)) (internal quotations omitted).

[11] Id. at 273-74 (citing In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 662 F.2d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

[12] Id. at 275.

[13] Id. at 279.

[14] As noted in the 6th Circuit’s opinion, appeal from exercise of an MDL judge’s authority to act as a judge of the deposition or discovery district “lies in the circuit court embracing that deposition or discovery district.”

[15] U.S. ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 444 F.3d 462, 468 (6th Cir. 2006).

[16] Id. at 468.

[17] Id. at 468-69.

[18] In re: Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., No. 05-1717-JJF, 2007 WL 9612142, at *3 (D. Del. May 18, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, No. 05-1717-JJF, 2007 WL 9612141 (D. Del. June 14, 2007); see also In re Mentor Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Prod. Liab. Litig., No. CIV.A. 09-3073JAP, 2009 WL 3681986, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2009) (finding that “most courts which have addressed this issue have concluded that section 1407(b) empowers an MDL transferee court to exercise the powers of any other district court, including the enforcement of subpoenas.”).

[19] 117 F.R.D. 30, 32 (D.P.R. 1987).

[20] 2018 WL 2926581, *3 (D. Kan. June 11, 2018).

[21] See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2325, 2017 WL 1090029 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 21, 2017); In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 55 (D. Mass. 2007); In re Accutane Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 804MD2523T30TBM, 2006 WL 1000311 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2006).

[22] No. 15-MD-2670-JLS-MDD, 2018 WL 454440, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b)).

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] 208 F.R.D. 615, 616 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

[26] No. 18-MD-02841, 2020 WL 1950463, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2020).

[27] Id.

[28] U.S. ex rel. Pogue, 444 F.3d. at 468 n.2.

[29] In re Photochromic Lens Antitrust Litig., No. 8:10–md–2173–T–27, 2012 WL 12904391, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2012) (collecting cases); see also In re Bank of New York Mellon Corp. Forex Transactions Litig., No. 11 CIV. 9175 LAK JLC, 2014 WL 2884726, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2014) (“Despite [Section 1407(b)’s] limiting language as to depositions, however, it is widely accepted that this authority extends to all pretrial proceedings, including governance of non-party, extra-district subpoenas.”).

[30] Rule 45(f), 2013 Advisory Committee Note.

[31] Wultz v. Bank of China, Ltd., 304 F.R.D. 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2014); see also In re Braden, 344 F. Supp. 3d 83, 91 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that transfer of subpoena-related motion to Southern District of Ohio “is appropriate to avoid disrupting the underlying litigation.”).

[32] 306 F. Supp. 3d 372, 374 (D.D.C. 2017).

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at 378.

[36] Id. at 379-81.

[37] Id. at 381 (internal quotations omitted).

[38] Id. at 383.

© 2020 Winston & Strawn LLP

For more on subpoenas, see the National Law Review Civil Procedure Law section.

Register for the 51st Annual PLI Estate Planning Institute

Live Webcast: Sept 14 – 15, 2020, 9 a.m. EDT

Click here to register.

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (the “2017 Act”), which was enacted on December 22, 2017, included significant changes to the federal transfer tax regime and related income tax provisions.  More recently, the financial and societal impact of the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 continues to reverberate and create uncertainty in the future.

This program will review the transfer tax and related income tax developments with the 2017 Act as a starting point, and will discuss how such developments impact estate, trust and income tax planning, and the administration of decedents’ estates.  Moreover, the program will review other recent developments regarding estate, trust and transfer tax and income tax planning.  Further, the COVID-19 crisis and the related estate, trust and income tax legislation and rulings promulgated in response to such crisis will be discussed.

What You Will Learn

  • Advising clients in a time of unprecedented uncertainty
  • An update on recent developments in all areas of estate, trust and transfer tax planning including legislation and rulings issued as a result of the COVID-19 crisis
  • A review of the interaction between the federal transfer tax regime and state transfer tax regimes
  • A review of the transfer tax and related income tax provisions of the 2017 Act
  • Income tax planning for estates and trusts
  • Administering estates and trusts during and after the COVID-19 pandemic
  • A review of the SECURE Act of 2019
  • A review of international estate planning and tax changes
  • FATCA and its progeny
  • A discussion of trust planning and divorce
  • Ethical considerations for attorneys
  • Elder law and special needs planning considerations
  • A review of tax issues for art collectors
  • An update on charitable donation planning
  • A review of electronic Wills and modern-day estate planning
  • Asset protection planning in a pandemic world

…and much more!

Special Features

  • Full hour of ethics credit

Who Should Attend

Attorneys and other professionals advising on estate planning and/or transfer tax planning, including accountants, financial planners and anyone else whose practice requires a solid understanding of estate planning.

Program Level: Overview

Prerequisites: Attendees should have a basic understanding of trusts and estates terminology and a foundational background in tax

Intended Audience: Attorneys, accountants, financial planners, and other professionals who specialize in estate planning, life insurance products and/or transfer tax planning

Advanced Preparation: None

See other upcoming events from PLI here.

Feuding Business Partners in Private Companies: Considering Arbitration to Resolve Partnership Disputes

It is common for private company co-owners to have disagreements while they operate their business, but they typically work through these disputes themselves.  In those rare instances where conflicts escalate and legal action is required, business partners have two options—filing a lawsuit or participating in an arbitration proceeding.  Arbitration is available, however, only if the parties agreed in advance to arbitrate their disputes.  Therefore, before business partners enter into a buy-sell contact or join other agreements with their co-owners, they will want to consider both the pros and the cons of arbitration.  This post offers input for private company owners and investors to help them decide whether litigation or arbitration provides them with the best forum in which to resolve future disputes with their business partners.

Arbitration is often touted as a faster and less expensive alternative to litigation with the additional benefit of resulting in a final award that is not subject to appeal.  These attributes may not be realized in arbitration, however, and there are other important factors involved, which also merit consideration.  At the outset, it is important to emphasize that arbitrations are created by contract, and parties can therefore custom design the arbitration to be conducted in a manner that meets their specific needs.  The critical factors to be considered are: (i) speed—how important is a quick resolution to the dispute, (ii) confidentiality—how desirable is privacy in resolving the claims, (iii) scope—how broad are the claims to be resolved, (iv) expense—how important is it to limit costs, and (v) finality—is securing a final result more desirable than preserving the right to appeal an adverse decision.

Speed—Prompt Resolution of Dispute

Arbitrations generally resolve claims more promptly than litigation, but that is not always the case as arbitration proceedings can drag on if the arbitration is not subject to any restriction on when the final hearing must take place.  One way to ensure that an arbitration will promptly resolve the dispute, however, is to require an end date in the arbitration agreement.  Specifically, the parties can state in their arbitration provision that the final arbitration hearing must take place within a set period of time, perhaps 60 or 90 days of the date the arbitration panel holds its first scheduling conference.  The arbitrators will then set a date for the final hearing that meets this contractual requirement.  Similarly, in the arbitration provision, the parties can also specify the length for the hearing (no more than 2-3 days), and they can also impose limits on the extent of discovery, including by restricting the number of depositions than can be taken.

If securing a prompt resolution of a dispute with a business partner is important, this result can be assured by requiring that all claims are arbitrated, particularly if the parties specify in the arbitration provision that the final hearing must take place on a fast track basis.

Confidentiality—Arbitration Conducted Privately

Litigation takes place in a public forum and, as a result, all pleadings the parties file, and with only rare exceptions, all testimony and other evidence presented at any hearings and at trial will be available to the public.  Therefore if a business partner wants to avoid having future partnership disputes subject to public scrutiny, arbitration provides this protection. But looking at this from another perspective, a minority investor may want to decline to arbitrate future claims against the majority owner if the owner is sensitive to adverse publicity.  The threat of claims being litigated in a public lawsuit may provide the investor with leverage in the negotiation and settlement of any future claims the investor has against the majority owner.

Scope of Dispute—How Much Discovery Required

Determining the scope of a future dispute with a business partner is difficult to do at the time that business partners enter into their contract when any future claims are unknown.  The downside arises in the arbitration context, because one of the parties may desire broad discovery of the type that is permitted in litigation, which may be necessary to defend against certain types of contentions, such as claims for fraud, personal injury and other types of business torts.  In an arbitration proceeding, discovery is typically more restricted, and it may further be limited by the arbitration provision, which caps the number of depositions and narrows the scope of document discovery.  Under these circumstances, the defending party (the respondent) may be hamstrung by these discovery limitations in defending against the claimant’s allegations in arbitration.

To avoid prejudice to the respondent from restrictions on discovery in arbitration, the parties may decide to agree that not all claims between them would be subject to arbitration.  For example, the parties could agree that all claims related in any way to the value and purchase of a departing partner’s interest in the business would be subject to arbitration, but that other claims of a personal nature (e.g., claims for discrimination, wrongful termination) would be litigated in court rather than arbitrated.  This splitting of claims in this manner may not be practical, but is something to be discussed by the parties when they enter into their agreement at the outset.

Expense of Dispute Resolution

As discussed above, business partners can limit the expense of resolving future claims between them by requiring a fast track arbitration hearing and also by limiting the scope and the extent of allowed discovery.  For example, if the parties require a final arbitration hearing to take place in 90 days after the initial scheduling conference, limit the hearing to two days and permit no more than three fact witness depositions per side.  They will have likely achieved a significant reduction of the cost of resolving their dispute.

The issue of cost requires additional analysis, however, because if the parties are not of equal bargaining power, the partner with more capital may not agree that arbitration is the best forum to resolve disputes with a less solvent partner.  The wealthier partner may believe that he or she would prevail over the less well-capitalized partner in a “war of attrition.” This factor may be so significant that it causes the wealthier partner to reject the arbitration of future disputes in favor of resolving of all future claims by or against the other partner through litigation.

Finality of Arbitration Awards

There is no right of an appeal in arbitration and the grounds for attacking an arbitration award in a court proceeding after the arbitration concludes are narrow and rarely successful.  This finality element may thus be an important factor in selecting arbitration as the forum for resolving partnership disputes with the goal of ending the dispute without having it linger on.

There is another concern here, however, that also bears considering.   The conventional wisdom among trial lawyers is that arbitrators are prone to “split the baby” by not providing a strict construction of the written contract or the controlling statute at issue.  Instead, the belief is that arbitrators are inclined to include something for both sides in the final award in an attempt to be as fair as possible, which results in mixed bag outcome.   That has not been my personal experience, but it is true that if the arbitration award is not fully consistent with the contract or a governing statute, there is no right to appeal the decision.  The bottom line is that, at the end of the arbitration, the parties will have to live with the result, and there is no available path to challenge an unfavorable/undesired outcome.

Conclusion

The takeaway is that arbitration is not a panacea.  It can be structured to take place faster and more cost-effectively than a lawsuit, and it will also be held in private and not be subject to public scrutiny.  But, business partners also need to consider other factors in arbitration, such as specific limits on discovery that may be problematic and the finality of the arbitrators’ decision, which may not be viewed as fully consistent with the partners’ contract or in strict accordance with the applicable law.   To the extent that business partners do opt for arbitration, they should craft the arbitration provision to make sure its terms closely align with their business goals.

© 2020 Winstead PC.

ARTICLE BY Ladd Hirsch at Winstead.
For more on business conflict resolution, see the National Law Review Corporate & Business Organizations law section.

The Intersection of Libel Law and Politics

Libel Commentary

Since its beginning, the American Republic has debated sedition, free speech, and protection of reputation. After we cut our British roots we ensured our right to criticize our leaders, the politicians who control our government. The British crown demanded loyalty of its printers, but American courts would not tolerate such prosecutions as the notion of a truly free press emerged.

Today, we are witnessing an intense intersection of politics and libel law unlike anything we’ve seen since the 1960s. Politicians are suing for libel damages and being sued. The current overlap of politics and libel includes a push by the president of the United States to change libel law. Those who seek change, including President Trump, say they want to make it easier for plaintiffs to prevail and collect damages. Careful what you wish for, though, because such change would ease the path for plaintiffs seeking to collect damages from public officials such as Donald Trump.

Heading into the 2020 election, the Trump campaign filed three lawsuits in a 10-day period against mainstream media.

Legal scholars and pundits have opined that Trump’s pending libel complaints against The New York Times, The Washington Post, and CNN are weak or even dead on arrival. These analysts point out that Trump’s campaign is seeking damages due to political opinions, which are protected speech under the First Amendment.

As a life-long public figure and now public official, Trump (his re-election campaign is the plaintiff) must prove that the media defendants acted with actual malice, that is, reckless disregard for the truth or that they published information knowing it was false. The actual malice standard is well established through the First Amendment by a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964.

Win or lose in court, the president’s libel lawsuits also are political messaging, dramatic actions that complement his anti-press rhetoric. The stories about the libel suits are arguably more effective than the libel suits themselves in the president’s battles to discredit the mainstream press. In addition to political messaging, libel claims – even when they fail in court — can be a form of punishment.

Historical Context

Presidential involvement in libel litigation is rare, but not unprecedented. President Theodore Roosevelt was irritated by published allegations of corruption in the sale of the Panama Canal. He pushed the Justice Department to prosecute publisher Joseph Pulitzer and other newspapermen for criminal libel. Courts later quashed indictments.

After his presidency, Roosevelt was sued for libel by a New York political figure (William Barnes) who objected to being called corrupt by Roosevelt. The jury trial, in Syracuse in 1915, was grist for Dan Abrams’ book “Theodore Roosevelt for the Defense.” The jury ruled in Roosevelt’s favor; he seemed to thrive in legal combat, the book says.

Fifteen years ago, there was speculation about the prospect of President George W. Bush suing the National Enquirer. The Enquirer published a report based on unnamed sources who claimed that pressures of the job led Bush to drink, even though he said he gave up alcohol on his 40th birthday.

“The president would be exceptionally ill-advised to file suit over this story, even if he knows . . . it’s false,” wrote First Amendment lawyer Julie Hilden in 2005.

She suggested such a suit would likely fail because its “actual malice” claim appeared to be weak. Plus, she warned, the suit would expose the president to civil discovery. Bush did not sue.

After the 1964 election, Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater successfully sued Fact Magazine and its publisher for an article questioning Goldwater’s mental fitness to hold office (Goldwater v. Ginzburg). Federal courts found that Goldwater’s complaint met the actual malice standard, awarding $75,000. The U.S. Supreme Court, in 1970, declined to hear the case.

Trump’s Track Record

In seven earlier speech-related cases filed by Donald Trump or his companies before he became president, four were dismissed on the merits, two were voluntarily withdrawn, and one was an arbitration won by Trump by default. These findings were compiled by Susan E. Seager, a First Amendment attorney who teaches media law at University of Southern California. Indeed, this appears to be a way of life for the highly litigious Trump, who has been involved in approximately 4,000 legal battles over the past 30 years, both as a plaintiff and defendant. An exhaustive analysis by USA Today detailed those seven libel cases where he initiated the lawsuits and seven more where he was named defendant. These don’t even include the threats of suits, the so-called “I’ll sue you” effect that can too often chill speech.

A common thread of these cases is the pursuit of jumbo damages. Trump alleged $5 billion in damages (in New Jersey state court) because author Timothy O’Brien and his book publishers cast doubt on the size of the real estate mogul’s wealth. Trump lost after five years of litigation but assessed the outcome this way to The Washington Post: “I spent a couple of bucks on legal fees but they spent a whole lot more. I did it to make [O’Brien’s] life miserable, which I’m happy about.”

Judicial Nominations

Judicial appointments are a priority for the Trump Administration. Interestingly, a judge nominated by the president in 2018 dismissed (with prejudice) a case filed by a Republican congressman.

On August 5, 2020, U.S. District Court Judge C.J. Williams of the Northern District of Iowa dismissed Congressman Devin Nunes’ defamation complaint against Esquire writer Ryan Lizza and its publisher. The judge said published criticism of Nunes (R-CA) was not actionable (Devin G. Nunes v. Ryan Lizza and Hearst Magazine Media, Inc).

Interestingly, part of this recent case deals directly with President Trump and his tweets. I’ll quote Judge Willliams’ opinion regarding Trump’s tweet that “Obama had my ‘wires tapped’ in Trump Tower:”

First, to the extent defendants assert President Trump “made up” the tweet,

the statement is not of an concerning plaintiff (Nunes). Second, plaintiff has

not alleged that the statement is false. Third, even if the statement is factually inaccurate, the statement that plaintiff’s theory about surveillance of the Trump campaign “began” with President Trump’s tweet is not defamatory.

Other Political Cases

Sarah Palin, John McCain’s vice-presidential running mate in 2008, sued The New York Times for defamation, claiming that a 2017 editorial maliciously associated her with a mass shooting that injured Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords (D-AZ). A federal judge dismissed her case, but a 3-0 panel of the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, thus reviving the case (Sarah Palin v. The New York Times).

Besides the characters involved – and the reversal in federal court – this case is interesting because The New York Times published a correction: “An earlier version of this editorial incorrectly stated that a link existed between political incitement and the 2011 shooting of Representative Gabby Giffords. In fact, no such link was established.”

To prevail, Palin – a public figure — must show that the newspaper acted with actual malice.

Meanwhile, a former contestant on “The Apprentice,” Summer Zervos sued President Trump in 2017 claiming she was defamed because candidate Trump said her allegations of his sexual misconduct in 2007 were lies. In 2019, a 3-2 majority of a New York State appeals court rejected the argument from Trump’s counsel that a sitting president cannot be sued in state court (Zervos v. Trump).

In addition to its spotlight on the Supremacy Clause, the Zervos lawsuit also examines the boundaries of opinion-as-defense in defamation disputes. Trump’s lawyers argue that his campaign rhetoric and opinions are protected by the First Amendment.

Nicholas Sandmann, a student at Covington Catholic High School in northern Kentucky, alleged that he was defamed by news coverage and social media sharing of accounts of his encounter near the Lincoln Memorial with a Native American activist in early 2019. Sandmann sued The Washington Post for $250 million; NBC and CNN for $275 million each.  CNN and The Washington Post settled for undisclosed terms.

Are media rattled by all this litigation? Yes, I think that’s pretty apparent. How could they not be in this anti-press environment? Libel claims are part of a general, overarching criticism of press, reporting the news, and media prerogatives.

From a bottom-line standpoint, media must pay for legal defense. Newspaper publisher McClatchy — a defendant in one of Congressman Devin Nunes’ myriad libel suits — filed for bankruptcy in February. The Poynter Institute for journalism published commentary in 2019 that McClatchy could hire 10 reporters for the money it would spend on the Nunes lawsuit.

A small newspaper in Iowa (Carroll Times Herald) won a libel case but created a GoFundMe appeal in 2019 because the legal defense drained its resources. Response to the solicitation — mainly small donations, from across the country — was impressive.

Most certainly the Sandmann cases have drained considerable resources from some of the most noted media companies in the country as those out-of-court settlements show.

Non-political Cases

We also see a flurry of high-dollar claims not directly related to political speech.

On August 14, the unanimous North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a jury’s libel decision against the Raleigh newspaper (Beth Desmond v. The News & Observer Publishing Company). The Ohio private liberal arts Oberlin College is appealing the whopping $44 million in damages awarded to a local bakery stemming from an alleged shoplifting attempt by three African American students (Gibson’s Bakery v. Oberlin College). Rolling Stone paid dearly for its flawed article about a campus rape at the University of Virginia.

Is libel law likely to change?

Fundamental change is not likely in the near future. Justice Clarence Thomas suggested it’s time for the Supreme Court to examine/roll back the New York Times v. Sullivan standard created in 1964. The premise is that current strict standards intended to protect free speech and free press make it nearly impossible for public figures and public officials to prevail in libel cases.

Justice Thomas’ colleagues on the Court have not publicly joined him in urging review of Sullivan.

Libel cases are percolating in federal and state courts that eventually could ripen for Supreme Court review. The Roberts Court has been protective of speech, including commercial and political speech, such as:

  • Citizens United v. FEC, 2010 (political contributions)
  • Snyder v. Phelps, 2010 (picketing at funerals)
  • Sorrell v. IMS Health, 2011 (data mining, drug marketing)
  • Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 2015 (sign regulations cannot be based on content)
  • Matal v. Tam, 2017 (trademarks)​

We all can be grateful that American libel law does not mirror British libel law, where the burden of proof is on the defendant rather than the plaintiff. Surely by now we have all seen the clickbait coverage of actor Johnny Depp’s libel case against The Sun (Johnny Depp v. News Group Newspapers) for its 2018 reportage of his contentious divorce, which included a headline calling him a “wife beater.”

American libel law is not British libel law. And we need to keep it that way.

© Aimee Edmondson, PhD

Article by Aimee Edmondson, PhD E.W. Scripps School of Journalism at Ohio University and National Law Review Guest Contributor.
For more on free speech, see the National Law Review Constitutional Law section.

U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Investigations Recommends Regulation of the Art Market & Other Headlines

U.S. Senate Subcommittee’s Report Recommends Art Market Regulations

As part of its investigation into the effectiveness of sanctions against foreign persons and entities, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the United States Senate issued a report focused on lack of regulation and pervasive secrecy in the art market. Specifically, the report notes that the art industry is considered the largest legal industry in the United States that is not subject to the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, which mandates detailed procedures aimed at preventing money laundering and requires businesses to know their customers’ identity. The report further observes that under the unwritten rules of the art market, a large number of art sales happen through intermediaries, with purchasers and sellers frequently not inquiring into each other’s identities and sellers not asking about the origin of the purchase money. Art advisers are frequently reluctant to reveal the identity of their clients for fear of losing the business.

The 147-page report sets forth a case study of how the art market was used to evade sanctions imposed on Russia. Brothers Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, billionaire business tycoons and long-time friends of Vladimir Putin, were among a number of Russians placed under U.S. sanctions in 2014 as part of an effort to punish Putin and his associates for the annexation of Crimea. It is illegal for U.S. companies to do business with sanctioned persons, but there are no specific laws in place obliging a buyer or seller in a transaction for the sale of art to identify themselves. The Subcommittee’s report concludes that the Rotenbergs took advantage of the lack of transparency required in art transactions, successfully evading the sanctions imposed on them. It is alleged that through the use of shell companies and a Moscow-based art adviser and dealer, they hid their identities and purchased more than $18 million in art from U.S. dealers and auction houses while under sanction.

Of significance to all art market participants, the Senate Subcommittee’s report recommends, among other things, that Congress should amend the Bank Secrecy Act to add businesses handling transactions involving high-value art. While the term “high-value” is not defined, the report cites the recent European Anti–Money Laundering (AML) legislation, which requires businesses handling art transactions valued at €10,000 to comply with AML laws, including the Know Your Customer rule. The report further recommends that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury issue a comprehensive guide on the steps auction houses and art dealers should take to ensure that they are not doing business with sanctioned individuals or entities.

Legislation will be necessary to amend the Bank Secrecy Act to apply to the art market. In fact, a bill proposing to do exactly that was previously introduced and is presently pending, proposing to regulate antiques dealers only in connection with transactions over $10,000.

White Supremacist Scientist’s Skull Collection to Be Reexamined by University

Last year, a group of students at the University of Pennsylvania presented findings that a collection of skulls kept by the university include crania from at least 55 enslaved individuals. The collection was the work of Samuel George Morton, a now-discredited physician, who used the skulls to come up with pseudoscientific justifications for slavery. Discovery Magazine has touted him as the “founding father of scientific racism.” After facing calls for the skulls to be repatriated or buried, the university moved the collection to storage. Repatriation may be difficult since little is known about the skulls’ origin other than that Morton obtained them from Cuba.

Outdoor Art Serves the Public until New York’s Museums Reopen

New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced that New York City’s museums can reopen beginning August 24. In the meanwhile, New York City’s tourism and marketing division has put together a list of outdoor and open-air art available for viewing by the public throughout all five boroughs.

Two Museums Fear Their Gauguins May Be Fakes

Fabrice Fourmanoir, a Gauguin enthusiast, investigator and collector who exposed the J. Paul Getty Museum’s Gauguin sculpture as a fake has now set his astute gaze on paintings at the National Gallery of Art in Washington D.C. and the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston. Fourmanoir has alleged that both paintings are not Gauguins and were instead commissioned and sold by a Parisian art dealer. The museums are considering a scientific examination of the paintings to confirm their origin and authenticity.

EUROPE

Raphael’s True Cause of Death Revealed

Scientists have dispelled the myth that Renaissance painter Raphael, noted by historians as having had many trysts, died of the sexually transmitted disease syphilis. A new study conducted at the University of Milan Bicocca has concluded that the artist likely died instead from a pulmonary disease similar to pneumonia. Raphael’s physicians subjected him to bloodletting, a process wherein blood is drawn from a patient to rid the body of disease. As physicians of that period did not typically practice bloodletting for lung ailments, it is suspected that Raphael’s doctors failed to properly diagnose his symptoms. Moreover, it has been determined that rather than aiding in his recovery, the bloodletting likely contributed to and quickened his death. Raphael died in 1520 in Rome at the age of 37.

Selfie Menace Continues

Security camera footage has confirmed that an Austrian tourist broke two toes off of a sculpture by famed neoclassical sculptor Antonio Canova. The damage occurred at the Gipsoteca Museum in Possagno, when the tourist sat on a sculpture of Paolina (Pauline) Bonaparte, Napoleon’s sister, to take a selfie. The perpetrator surrendered to authorities. The work damaged was an original plaster cast model dating back to 1804, the marble version of which is kept at the Galleria Borghese in Rome. Artnet previously assembled a round-up of tragic cases of art being damaged by tourists angling for better selfies.

Building Decorated by Picasso Demolished, Triggering Protests

Despite ongoing protests, the Norwegian government has begun tearing down the Y-block office building in Oslo, part of its governmental headquarters in the city damaged in the 2011 terrorist attack by Anders Breivik, who detonated a car bomb. Prior to any demolition of the Y-block building, Picasso’s The Fishermen, a sand-blasted 250-ton section of the building’s facade, and The Seagull, a 60-ton floor-to-ceiling drawing in the building’s lobby, were removed and relocated. Opponents of the demolition argue that the Y-block building’s brutalist architecture should be preserved, and that Picasso’s works and the building “belong together.” They also argue that the demolition is, in essence, a symbolic completion of what Breivik wanted, to erase the symbols of democracy. Construction of the new governmental headquarters is expected to be completed in 2025.

Ancient Greek Architecture Likely Catered to the Handicapped

New research conducted at California State University suggests that the stone ramps featured on many ancient Greek temples were primarily built to accommodate the disabled and mobility impaired. While these ramps may have served other purposes, such as enabling transportation of materials, they were featured most prominently in quantity and size at temples dedicated to Asclepius, the Greek god of healing. As these sites drew in many visitors with disabilities, illnesses and ailments, who would have had difficulty navigating stairs, it is now thought that the ramps were specifically crafted to assist these guests.

Croatian Museums and Historic Sites Can’t Catch a Break

After the coronavirus forced churches, galleries and museums throughout Croatia to close, in March 2020, a 5.3 magnitude earthquake rocked the country, damaging its largest Gothic-style cathedral and many other landmarks, including the Archaeological Museum in Zagreb. The strongest earthquake recorded in the country in almost 150 years made many buildings structurally unsound, and museum owners began storing works in their facility basements. On July 24, 2020, that was no longer an option when a severe storm hit Zagreb, leading to massive flooding. As water surged into their basements, The Archaeological Museum and Museum of Decorative Arts, among others, struggled to protect their collections. The full extent of the damage from the storm is not yet known, but expected to be significant.

Restoration Plans for Notre Dame by Traditional Methods Finalized

After discussing the issue for more than a year, the decision was made to reconstruct the roof and spires of the renowned Notre-Dame de Paris cathedral to resemble their appearance prior to the April 2019 fire. Despite calls from French President Emmanuel Macron to rebuild these features in a contemporary style, they will be constructed using the original material and traditional methods to the extent possible. In addition to the roof and spires, the vault will need to be repaired and three of the cathedral’s gables will have to be dismantled and rebuilt. After this work is completed, the building’s statues, which fortunately were removed just days prior to the fire, will be returned. The reconstruction of Notre Dame is scheduled to be completed in 2024.

© 2020 Wilson Elser

For more art world news, see the National Law Review Entertainment, Art & Sports law section.

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