Fourth Circuit Holds Firm Against Expansion of Religion-Based Defenses to Discrimination (US)

What happened in the interim that ended this beloved educator’s decorated teaching career? In 2014, shortly after North Carolina recognized same-sex marriage, Mr. Billard posted on his personal Facebook page that he and his partner of fourteen years were engaged to be married.

Lonnie Billard was a well-loved and decorated drama and English teacher at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS) in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. He was named Teacher of the Year in 2012 after serving the Catholic high school’s students for eleven years.

Two years later, CCHS told Mr. Billard he was not welcome back as a teacher.

CCHS has never denied why it fired Mr. Billard: his plans to marry violated the Mecklenburg Diocese’s policy against teachers engaging in conduct contrary to the moral teachings of the Catholic faith. Mr. Billard filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging sex discrimination in employment. The EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. Mr. Billard sued in federal court. He won and was awarded stipulated damages.

If that were the end of the story, although a frustrating one for Mr. Billard and his husband, the case would hardly be newsworthy. Why the case warrants attention is the defense that CCHS did not assert, and why.

The ‘Ministerial Exception’

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a judicially crafted concept known as the “ministerial exception” emerged among federal appellate courts: Religious institutions may discriminate in their treatment of certain employees, notwithstanding Title VII, provided that the employee plays a vital ministerial employment role or is involved in ecclesiastical matters. Indeed, ministerial exception is a misnomer because the exception is not limited to those employees holding titles of independent religious significance (e.g., priest, pastor, rabbi, imam), but also applies to employees holding important positions within churches and other religious institutions. The Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). Although the Court refused to answer directly the question of who is and is not a minister, it found on the facts of the case before it that a “called teacher” with the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned” fit the bill.

Hosanna-Tabor was binding law when Mr. Billard filed suit in 2017. CCHS’s obvious defense to Mr. Billard’s allegations of sex discrimination was that he, as a Catholic school teacher engaged to teach his students in accordance with diocesan mission, fell within the ministerial exception, but in an unusual turn of events, CCHS waived this argument. In fact, CCHS stipulated with Mr. Billard that it would not argue that his job duties qualified him for the ministerial exception. Why? CCHS claims that it waived the ministerial exception defense because it wanted to avoid the burden of discovery around the issue of whether Mr. Billard’s role was sufficiently ministerial. (More on that below.) Since CCHS waived the best defense available to it and unequivocally admitted why it fired Mr. Billard, it’s no wonder he prevailed.

The Appeal

On appeal, CCHS propounded four affirmative defenses it had advanced without success at the trial court level – none of which included the ministerial exception. First, CCHS asserted two First Amendment-based defenses: the “church autonomy” doctrine and freedom of association. The trial and appellate courts quickly disposed of both theories, concluding that CCHS’s “church autonomy” argument was another way of trying to dress up the ministerial exception and, as to freedom of association, the courts found “no precedent for privileging a right of expressive association over anti-discrimination laws.” CCHS also asserted a statutory defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), but the courts made quick work of this too, finding that the RFRA does not apply to suits between private parties.

But CCHS’s fourth and final argument, and by far its most controversial, was that the trial court should have exonerated it under Title VII’s religious exemption. This notion, which is different than the First Amendment-inspired ministerial exception and derives from the plain text of Title VII, exempts certain religious organizations from Title VII’s non-discrimination strictures “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). For instance, a Baptist church may favor hiring a Baptist minister or liturgical worship leader over a Methodist or Lutheran candidate, regardless of their respective qualifications. But the religious exemption has only ever been applied as a defense to claims of religious discrimination. Seeking to overturn decades of precedent, CCHS argued in Billard for an unprecedented expansion of the exemption, one that would permit religious organizations to discriminate even on the basis of sex, race or national origin as long as religious belief motivated the employment decision. At oral argument before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, CCHS conceded that its proffered interpretation of the religious exemption would permit discrimination against not only the relatively small number of employees of religious institutions with a claim to ministerial status, but also the hundreds of thousands of groundskeepers, custodians, bus drivers, musicians and administrative personnel that work for such institutions but whose duties are non-ecclesiastical.

An interpretation like that for which CCHS called would seriously erode protections against discrimination. For instance, under CCHS’s interpretation of the religious exemption, if a religious employer asserted as a principle of its faith that women should not work outside the home, it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sex. Likewise, under CCHS’s reading of the exemption, a religious employer asserting a faith-based reason for preferring one race over another would be exempt from Title VII consequences. And, to close the loop, if a religious employer held as a religious tenet that being gay or marrying one’s gay partner was a moral lapse, then it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Fourth Circuit balked at CCHS’s statutorily ungrounded argument for an expansion of the religious employer exemption. The text of Title VII is ambiguous and exempts religious organizations “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion”; it does not protect discrimination against individuals because of religion. The appellate court was also unimpressed by CCHS’s attempt to force a determination on these grounds by earlier waiving the ministerial exception. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit set aside the parties’ waiver and found sua sponte (meaning on the Court’s own initiative), that CCHS was not liable for discrimination for terminating Mr. Billard because he was, notwithstanding his secular teaching subjects, “a messenger of CCHS’s faith.”

The Fourth Circuit explained that it was constrained to reach this outcome based on developing jurisprudence interpreting the ministerial exception. In the years since Mr. Billard filed suit, the Supreme Court expanded on Hosanna Tabor in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, finding in 2020 that two secular subject teachers at religious schools were nonetheless ministers within the ministerial exception as they were entrusted with educating and forming students in the school’s faith. (Notably, CCHS was represented by The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The Becket Fund was also lead counsel in Our Lady of Guadalupe, a fact which raises a few questions about the plausibility of CCHS’s explanation for waiving the ministerial exception. The Becket Fund claims to be a “leader[ ] in the fight for religious liberty … at home and abroad,” and has fought against COVID-19 mandates, contraception care and LGBT and unmarried parent foster and adoption rights.)

The appellate court’s decision undoubtedly provides little comfort to Mr. Billard, who is now spending his retirement with his husband whom he married in May 2015. But even though the Fourth Circuit reversed judgment in his favor and instructed the trial court to enter judgment in CCHS’s favor on the grounds that the ministerial exception protected the school, it at least rejected CCHS’s request for unfettered license to discriminate on any basis so long as it articulated a faith-based motive for doing so. As CCHS proved victorious and therefore lacks grounds to appeal to the Supreme Court, for now, religious employers remain insulated from civil interference with decisions about the appointment and removal of persons in positions of theological significance—even high school drama teachers—but may not use purported religious beliefs to justify discrimination on other grounds.

© Copyright 2024 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more news on Religious-based Discrimination Defenses, visit the NLR Civil Rights section.

Death, Taxes, and Crypto Reporting – The Three Things You Cannot Escape

The IRS released a draft of Form 1099-DA “Digital Asset Proceeds from Broker Transactions” in April which will require anyone defined as a “broker” to report certain information related to the sale of digital assets. The new reporting requirements will be effective for transactions occurring in 2025 and beyond. The release of Form 1099-DA follows a change in the tax law.

In 2021, Congress amended code section 6045 to define “broker” to include any “person who (for consideration) is responsible for regularly providing any service effectuating transfers of digital assets on behalf of another person.” This is an expansion of the definition of a “broker.” The language ‘any service effectuating transfers of digital assets’ is oftentimes construed by many in the tax practitioner community as a catch-all term, in which the government could use to determine many people involved in digital asset platforms aa “brokers.”

The IRS proposed new regulations in August 2023 to further define and clarify the new reporting requirements. Under the proposed regulations, Form 1099-DA reporting would be required even for noncustodial transactions including facilitative services if the provider is in a “position to know” the identity of the seller and the nature of the transaction giving rise to gross proceeds. With apparently no discernible limits, facilitative services include “services that directly or indirectly effectuate a sale of digital assets.” Position to know means “the ability” to “request” a user’s identifying information and to determine whether a transaction gives rise to gross proceeds. Under these proposed regulations and the expanded definition of “broker,” a significant number of transactions that previously did not require 1099 reporting will now require reporting. There has been pushback against these proposed regulations, but the IRS appears determined to move forward with these additional reporting requirements.

Copyright ©2024 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
For more news on Taxes and Crypto Reporting, visit the NLR Tax section.

The Psychology Behind Distracted Driving: Understanding the Urge to Multitask

There was a time when modern devices like smartphones, GPS devices, and infotainment systems in cars didn’t exist, but drivers still had to contend with other distractions. These included children in the back seat, beautiful scenery, and daydreaming, which are also leading causes of car accidents.

All forms of distractions are dangerous to some extent. But there may be nothing you can do to help in some cases, for example, getting lost in thought while at the wheel.

Activities like talking on the phone, texting, messing with the infotainment system, watching a video clip, etc., call for multitasking and are 100 percent avoidable, especially considering the dangers they pose. But it may not be as easy as it sounds, as it is part of human nature to want to multitask.

What Is Multitasking?

Psychology describes multitasking as the act of handling more than one task at a time. The complexity of multitasking and its effect on the brain depends on the types of activities a person is engaging in at once.

For example, it doesn’t take a lot in terms of brain faculties to listen to music while driving, so such a thing isn’t much of a big deal. However, being in a conference meeting while driving is difficult, as both activities require much more attention, making the chances of getting into a car accident much higher.

How Does Multitasking Affect the Brain?

People handle multitasking differently, but it doesn’t make it safe for anyone while at the wheel. The science behind how the brain functions shows that the human brain can handle one task at a time, so it’s right to say there is nothing like multitasking as far as the brain goes.

What looks like multitasking is actually the brain switching between different tasks at a relatively high speed, but it can only focus on one task at any given millisecond. Eventually, the switching back and forth affects focus, accuracy, and a person’s effectiveness.

The Psychology of Distracted Driving

Distracted driving at face value is a choice. However, if you dig deeper, you will realize it takes much more than making a choice to keep off because it also has something to do with most drivers’ psychology. Technology, especially communication technologies like social media, are built to be attention-grabbing, and the more time you stay on there, the more perceived satisfaction you get.

There is always the allure of knowing what has happened in the past few minutes, how your post is doing, who’s liking it, and stuff like that. This allure and the dopamine hits individuals get from the likes and comments make staying away a battle against the mind.

There is also social pressure, and this is especially true for younger drivers. Since everyone talks of doing it, or how good they are at it, the habit seems less and less risky.

Drives can be boring and too monotonous. For people who love mind-stimulating activities, their minds always crave something exciting that only a device can offer.

You Can Avoid Driving Distracted

It won’t be easy to break a bad habit. But understanding that multitasking is a myth and that it’s only a matter of time till you make a terrible mistake should make you want to think twice about it.

It is a matter of life and death, so the question is not if you like keeping off your devices but if you want to save lives. Be intentional, even when it means putting distractions out of reach until you reach your destination.

Buckfire & Buckfire, P.C. 2024
For more news on Avoiding Distracted Driving, visit the NLR Utilities & Transport section.

How to Recover Attorneys’ Fees in a Schedule A Trademark Case in the Northern District of Illinois

In recent years, a substantial number of “Schedule A” trademark infringement cases have been filed in the Northern District of Illinois. In such a case, the trademark owner may file a trademark infringement complaint against a number of defendants, with the complaint identifying the defendants as “The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A hereto.” [See, e.g., Opulent Complaint]

The trademark owner may file Schedule A separately from the complaint with a request to the Court that the schedule be placed under seal. Sometimes, trademark owners file the entire complaint under seal. After filing sealed pleadings that shield the defendants’ identities, the trademark owner may then file ex parte motions for temporary restraining orders (“TROs”) against the secretly-named defendants. Because the proceedings are ex parte, the alleged infringer is not given notice of the proceedings or an opportunity to appear. If the Court grants the TRO, the trademark owner may then present the TRO to online marketplaces with a demand that the marketplaces immediately stop selling the allegedly infringing goods. The result may be that an alleged infringer may find all of its activity frozen by the online marketplace, including a freeze on the alleged infringer’s cash held with the online marketplace. This may create cashflow problems for the alleged infringer and prevent the alleged infringer from making future sales. Because its identity is sealed by the court, an alleged infringer may first learn of the TRO after its accounts are frozen.

Schedule A cases appear to be concentrated in the Northern District of Illinois because judges in that district have been receptive to granting ex parte relief. See, A. Anteau, “The Northern District of Illinois v. the Internet: How Chicago Became the Center of Schedule A Trademark Infringement Litigation”; Law.Com, December 19, 2023. At least two judges in that district even provide templates for TROs, preliminary injunctions and default judgments in Schedule A cases. See Northern District of Illinois (uscourts.gov); Northern District of Illinois (uscourts.gov). The justification for the ex parte nature of these proceedings is that it, if notice was required, online counterfeiters (frequently from China) could hide their assets or move their counterfeit products to new sites as soon as an infringement case was filed.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, remedies and relief do exist if an entity is the subject of a wrongfully obtained ex parte TRO. Recently, Ya Ya Creations, a defendant in a Schedule A trademark case, obtained an attorneys’ fees award against a plaintiff that failed to conduct a proper investigation before naming two Ya Ya-affiliated entities as alleged infringers in a case filed in the Northern District of Illinois. [Award of Fees] The dispute began in August 2021, when the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Ya Ya for trademark infringement and a variety of other causes of action in the Eastern District of Texas. The Texas court transferred the case to the Central District of California in April of 2022. Four months after the transfer, the plaintiff filed a very similar lawsuit against Ya Ya in the Middle District of Florida. On May 26, 2023, the Florida court transferred the case to the Central District of California, and then the CD California consolidated the cases due to the similarity of the facts and claims. On September 26, 2023, the plaintiff filed yet another lawsuit. This time, the plaintiff filed a Schedule A trademark infringement case against a number of defendants in the Northern District of Illinois. In the Schedule A case, the plaintiff named two entities affiliated with Ya Ya as alleged infringers.

Notwithstanding the litigation history between the parties, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte TRO against Ya Ya in the Northern District of Illinois. Ya Ya first learned about the TRO after the court issued it and after an online marketplace froze Ya Ya’s accounts.

Ya Ya’s first step in seeking redress was to file an emergency motion asking the court to dissolve the ex parte TRO. [Ya Ya Motion to Dissolve TRO] Ya Ya argued that, because the parties were actively litigating against each other in California, the plaintiff had no basis to seek ex parte relief against Ya Ya or its affiliated entities without notifying Ya Ya of the proceedings. Ya Ya also argued that the plaintiff’s ex parte TRO was a transparent attempt to gain a litigation advantage in the California cases to either leverage a settlement, force Ya Ya into a position where it could not even pay its lawyers to mount a defense, or force Ya Ya to file for bankruptcy. In response to Ya Ya’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss all of its claims against the Ya Ya-affiliated entities.

Ya Ya’s next step was to file a motion for recovery of the attorneys’ fees it expended in the Northern District of Illinois proceedings. [Ya Ya Request for Reimbursement of Attorneys’ Fees]. In response, the plaintiff argued that it was not obligated to pay Ya Ya’s attorneys’ fees, because it did not know the entities it named in the Northern District of Illinois lawsuit were affiliated with Ya Ya. But the court rejected that argument. The court concluded that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, a court may award attorneys’ fees incurred while defending an ex parte TRO when (1) the TRO caused “needless delay” and unnecessarily “increased the cost of litigation,” or (2) the TRO was obtained by pleadings that were not “well grounded in fact” or made after “reasonable inquiry.” The Court determined that plaintiff could have avoided increasing the costs of litigation if it had conducted a reasonable inquiry to determine if the two entities were affiliated with Ya Ya, but it failed to do so. As a result, the Court awarded Plaintiff to pay Ya-Ya almost $100,000 in attorneys’ fees.

Trademark litigators should be aware that judges in the Northern District of Illinois have been receptive to granting ex parte TROs in trademark cases. If you represent a client that is the subject of an improperly granted ex parte TRO, be prepared to move quickly to dissolve the TRO and consider whether you have a basis to move for an award of attorneys’ fees.

Copyright © 2024, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.
For more news on Recovering Trademark Infringement Attorney’s Fees, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Whistleblower Reward Program is a Force-Multiplier to Detect and Combat Terrorist Financing

Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Whistleblower Program

In a May 6, 2024 speech at the SIFMA AML Conference, the Director of the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Andrea Gacki discussed the success of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) in generating disclosures about money laundering and sanctions evasion:

[The whistleblower] program holds tremendous potential as an enforcement force-multiplier. Whistleblowers have submitted information relating to some of the most pressing policy objectives of the United States, from Iran- and Russia-related sanctions evasion to drug-trafficking to cyber-crimes and corruption. While efforts are underway to develop an online tip intake portal and other aspects of this important program, I want to note that even while these efforts are underway, the program is actively receiving, reviewing, and sharing tips with our enforcement partners.

We have received over 270 unique tips since the program’s inception, and many of the tips received have been highly relevant to many of Treasury’s top priorities.

The AMLA incentivizes whistleblowers to report money laundering and sanctions evasion by requiring the Department of the Treasury to pay an award where a whistleblower’s voluntary disclosure of original information leads to a successful enforcement action imposing monetary sanctions above $1,000,000. The minimum whistleblower award is ten percent of collected monetary sanctions and the maximum award is thirty percent. Awards are paid from penalties collected in successful enforcement actions stemming from whistleblower disclosures.

To determine the amount of an AMLA whistleblower award, Treasury will consider:

  • the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success of the covered money laundering judicial or administrative action;
  • the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower and any legal representative;
  • the programmatic interest of Treasury in deterring the particular violations that the whistleblower disclosed; and
  • additional relevant factors that Treasury will promulgate, which will likely echo the factors that the SEC employs to determine the amount of an SEC whistleblower award.

FinCEN Issues Advisory About Terrorist Financing

Among the violations that whistleblowers can help the government detect and combat are sanctions evasion and money laundering related to Islamic Republic of Iran-backed terrorist organizations. On May 8, 2024, FinCEN issued an Advisory to assist financial institutions in detecting potentially illicit transactions related to Islamic Republic of Iran-backed terrorist organizations. FinCEN Advisory to Financial Institutions to Counter the Financing of Iran-Backed Terrorist Organizations, FIN-2024-A001 (May 8, 2024).

The Advisory identifies the means by which certain terrorist organizations receive support from Iran and the techniques they use to illicitly access or circumvent the international financial system to raise, move, and spend funds. According to the Advisory, the sale of commodities, particularly oil, is the primary source of revenue for Iran to fund its terrorist proxies. Iran has “established large-scale global oil smuggling and money laundering networks to enable access to foreign currency and the international financial system through the illicit sale of crude oil and petroleum products in global markets.” FIN-2024-A001, at 3. In 2021, the National Iranian Oil Company sold approximately $40 billion worth of petroleum products and in 2023, Iran’s exports to the People’s Republic of China reached approximately 1.3 million barrels per day. Some of the proceeds of the sale of Iranian oil finances the activities of the IRGC-Qods Force and other terrorist groups.

Financial Institutions Can Serve as Intermediates for Terrorist Financing Transactions

Financial institutions located outside Iran become intermediaries for the IRGC-QF’s terrorist financing transactions. In particular, “third-country front companies—often incorporated as ‘trading companies’ or ‘general trading companies’—and exchange houses act as a global ‘shadow banking’ network that processes illicit commercial transactions and channels money to terrorist organizations on Iran’s behalf.” Those exchange houses and front companies rely on banks with correspondent accounts with U.S. financial institutions, especially to process dollar-denominated transactions. FIN-2024-A001, at 5.

The Advisory lists red flags of illicit or suspicious activity that financial institutions should consider in determining if a behavior or transaction is indicative of terrorist finance or is otherwise suspicious and therefore may warrant the filing of a Suspicious Activity Report:

  • A customer or a customer’s counterparty conducts transactions with Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)-designated entities and individuals, or transactions that contain a nexus to identifiers listed for OFAC-designated entities and individuals, to include email addresses, physical addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, or CVC addresses.
  • Information included in a transaction between customers or in a note accompanying a peer-to-peer transfer include key terms known to be associated with terrorism or terrorist organizations.
  • A customer conducts transactions with a money services business (MSB) or other financial institution, including a VASP, that operates in jurisdictions known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity and is reasonably believed to have lax customer identification and verification processes, opaque ownership, or otherwise fails to comply with AML/CFT best practices.
  • A customer conducts transactions that originate with, are directed to, or otherwise involve entities that are front companies, general “trading companies” with unclear business purposes, or other companies whose beneficial ownership information indicates that they may have a nexus with Iran or other Iran-supported terrorist groups. Indicators of possible front companies include opaque ownership structures, individuals and/or entities with obscure names that direct the company, or business addresses that are residential or co-located with other companies.
  • A customer that is or purports to be a charitable organization or NPO84 solicits donations but does not appear to provide any charitable services or openly supports terrorist activity or operations. In some cases, these organizations may post on social media platforms or encrypted messaging apps to solicit donations, including in CVC.
  • A customer receives numerous small CVC payments from many wallets, then transfers the funds to another wallet, particularly if the customer logs in using an Internet Protocol (IP) based in a jurisdiction known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity. In such cases, financial institutions may also be able to provide associated technical details such as IP addresses with time stamps and device identifiers that can provide helpful information to authorities.
  • A customer makes money transfers to a jurisdiction known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity that are inconsistent with their stated occupation or business purpose with vague stated purposes such as “travel expenses,” “charity,” “aid,” or “gifts.
  • A customer account receives large payouts from social media fundraisers or crowdfunding platforms and is then accessed from an IP address in a jurisdiction known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity, particularly if the social media accounts that contribute to the fundraisers contain content supportive of terrorist campaigns.
  • A customer company is incorporated in the United States or a third-country jurisdiction, but its activities occur solely in jurisdictions known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity and show no relationship to the company’s stated business purpose.

FIN-2024-A001, at 12-13.

© 2024 Zuckerman Law
For more news on the Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Whistleblower Reward Program, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

The FTC Has Banned Non-Competes: What Do Employers in the Energy Space Do Now?

When is the FTC’s rule effective?

The FTC’s non-compete ban is not in effect yet. It does not become effective until 120 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register of the final rule. The Federal Register is expected to publish the final rule next week, likely making the effective date around the beginning of September 2024.

Has litigation already been filed to challenge the non-compete ban?

The FTC’s non-compete ban is subject to at least two existing legal challenges seeking to have it invalidated. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division (Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 6:24-cv-00148 (E.D. Tex. filed April 24, 2024); see also Ryan, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 3:24-cv-986 (N.D. Tex. filed April 23, 2024)). We don’t know whether these legal challenges will be successful, but we will provide updates when we know more.

What if the legal challenges are unsuccessful?

If the legal challenges are not successful and the rule goes into effect 120 days from next week (again, approximately early September 2024), here are steps that employers can take to get ready for the effective date:

  • Review existing agreements to determine if they are now “unfair methods of competition”:
    • One issue to analyze is whether an individual with a non-compete is a “worker” or a “senior executive.”
      • If a “senior executive,” then a non-compete in place that pre-exists that effective date can still be enforced.
      • If not a “senior executive,” then any non-compete clause that pre-dates the effective date for a worker is banned by the rule.
      • If an independent contractor (or another non-employee worker), any non-compete clause is banned.
    • Another issue to consider is whether non-solicitation, non-disclosure, or reimbursement provisions could be subject to the FTC ban. A provision that prevents a worker from seeking or accepting work in the U.S. with a different person or from operating a business in the U.S., then it is a “non-compete clause” that is subject to the rule. Depending on the wording and the factual circumstances, an obligation not to solicit customers could be considered a prohibited non-compete. For example, if an obligation not to solicit certain clients keeps a worker from accepting any job in the Permian Basin, it is arguable that the provision operates as a non-compete and violates the rule.
  • Determine whether notice is required: After reviewing which non-compete clauses are not in compliance with the FTC rule, prepare a notice for workers who are currently subject to a non-compete clause banned by the rule. The FTC put out model language on the notification, which informs the worker that the non-compete clause is no longer valid as of the effective date.
  • Update any form agreements: As part of the review of existing non-compete agreements, take the opportunity to update form agreements to remove now unenforceable non-compete (and possibly non-solicit) provisions. It is always a good idea to review and update the agreement generally to make sure that it reflects your current business and definition of confidential information.
  • Enter into non-compete agreements with “senior executives”:
    • The FTC ban permits non-compete agreements with “senior executives” that pre-exist the effective date to continue after the effective date. After the effective date, an employer may not require a senior executive to sign a new non-compete.
    • The term “senior executive” refers to officers earning more than $151,164 with “policy-making authority.” As so defined, the FTC estimates that senior executives represent less than 0.75% of all workers.
    • “Policy-making authority” means “final authority to make policy decisions that control significant aspects of a business entity or common enterprise and does not include authority limited to advising or exerting influence over such policy decisions or having final authority to make policy decisions for only a subsidiary of or affiliate of a common enterprise.”
    • Energy company officers of companies that are part of a common enterprise or joint venture will want to analyze whether senior executives have final authority that qualifies for a non-compete under the rule.
    • As always, any employer should make sure that a non-compete complies with existing state laws to assist in any enforcement efforts.
  • Take note of violations before the effective date: The FTC’s noncompete ban does not apply where a cause of action related to a noncompete clause accrued before the effective date. So, if a worker is violating a noncompete that would otherwise be banned under the FTC rule, an employer may want to consider whether to initiate legal action against that worker before the effective date to fall under this exception.
© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on the FTC Noncompete Ban, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

FTC: Three Enforcement Actions and a Ruling

In today’s digital landscape, the exchange of personal information has become ubiquitous, often without consumers fully comprehending the extent of its implications.

The recent actions undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) shine a light on the intricate web of data extraction and mishandling that pervades our online interactions. From the seemingly innocuous permission requests of game apps to the purported protection promises of security software, consumers find themselves at the mercy of data practices that blur the lines between consent and exploitation.

The FTC’s proposed settlements with companies like X-Mode Social (“X Mode”) and InMarket, two data aggregators, and Avast, a security software company, underscores the need for businesses to appropriately secure and limit the use of consumer data, including previously considered innocuous information such as browsing and location data. In a world where personal information serves as currency, ensuring consumer privacy compliance has never been more critical – or posed such a commercial risk for failing to get it right.

X-Mode and InMarket Settlements: The proposed settlements with X-Mode and InMarket concern numerous allegations based on the mishandling of consumers’ location data. Both companies supposedly collected precise location data through their own mobile apps and those of third parties (through software development kits).  X-Mode is alleged to have sold precise location data (advertised as being 70% accurate within 20 meters or less) linked to timestamps and unique persistent identifiers (i.e., names, email addresses, etc.) of its consumers to private government contractors without obtaining proper consent. Plotting this data on a map makes it easy to reveal each person’s movements over time.

InMarket purportedly utilized location data to cross-reference such data with points of interest to sort consumers into particularized audience segments for targeted advertising purposes without adequately informing consumers – examples of audience segments include parents of preschoolers, Christian church attendees, and “wealthy and not healthy,” among other groupings.

Avast Settlement: Avast, a security software company, allegedly sold granular and re-identifiable browsing information of its consumers despite assuring consumers it would protect their privacy. Avast allegedly collected extensive browsing data of its consumers through its antivirus software and browser extensions while ensuring its consumers that their browsing data would only be used in aggregated and anonymous form. The data collected by Avast revealed visits to various websites that could be attributed to particular people and allowed for inferences to be drawn about such individuals – examples include academic papers on symptoms of breast cancer, education courses on tax exemptions, government jobs in Fort Meade, Maryland with a salary over $100,000, links to FAFSA applications and directions from one location to another, among others.

Sensitivity of Browsing and Location Data

It is important to note that none of the underlying datasets in question contained traditional types of personally identifiable information (e.g., name, identification numbers, physical descriptions, etc.) (“PII”). Even still, the three proposed settlements by the FTC underscore the sensitive nature of browsing and location data due to the insights such data reveals, such as religious beliefs, health conditions, and financial status, and the ease with which the insights can be linked to certain individuals.

In the digital age, the amount of data available about individuals online and collected by various companies makes the re-identification of individuals easier every day. Even when traditional PII is not included in a data set, by linking sufficient data points, a profile or understanding of an individual can be created. When such profile is then linked to an identifier (such as username, phone number, or email address provided when downloading an app or setting up an account on an app) and cross-referenced with various publicly available data, such as name, email, phone number or content on social media sites, it can allow for deep insights into an individual. Despite the absence of traditional types of PII, such data poses significant privacy risks due to the potential for re-identification and the intimate details about individuals’ lives that it can divulge.

The FTC emphasizes the imperative for companies to recognize and treat browsing and location data as sensitive information and implement appropriate robust safeguards to protect consumer privacy. This is especially true when the data set includes information with the precision of those cited by the FTC in its proposed settlements.

Accountability and Consent

With browsing and location data, there is also a concern that the consumer may not be fully aware of how their data is used. For instance, Avast claimed to protect consumers’ browsing data and then sold that very same browsing information, often without notice to consumers. When Avast did inform customers of their practices, the FTC claims it deceptively stated any sharing would be “anonymous and aggregated.” Similarly, X-Mode claimed it would use location data for ad-personalization and location-based analytics. Consumers were unaware such location data was also sold to government contractors.

The FTC has recognized that a company may need to process an individual’s information to provide them with services or products requested by the individual. The FTC also holds that such processing does not mean the company is then free to collect, access, use, or transfer that information for other purposes (e.g., marketing, profiling, background screening, etc.). Essentially, purpose matters. As the FTC explains, a flashlight app provider cannot collect, use, store, or share a user’s precise geolocation data, or a tax preparation service cannot use a customer’s information to market other products or services.

If companies want to use consumer personal information for purposes other than providing the requested product or services, the FTC states that companies should inform consumers of such uses and obtain consent to do so.

The FTC aims to hold companies accountable for their data-handling practices and ensure that consumers are provided with meaningful consent mechanisms. Companies should handle consumer data only for the purposes for which data was collected and honor their privacy promises to consumers. The proposed settlements emphasize the importance of transparency, accountability, meaningful consent, and the prioritization of consumer privacy in companies’ data handling practices.

Implementing and Maintaining Safeguards

Data, especially specific data that provide insights and inferences about individuals, is extremely valuable to companies, but it is that same data that exposes such individuals’ privacy. Companies that sell or share information sometimes include limitations for the use of the data, but not all contracts have such restrictions or sufficient restrictions to safeguard individuals’ privacy.

For instance, the FTC alleges that some of Avast’s underlying contracts did not prohibit the re-identification of Avast’s users. Where Avast’s underlying contracts prohibited re-identification, the FTC alleges that purchasers of the data were still able to match Avast users’ browsing data with information from other sources if the information was not “personally identifiable.” Avast also failed to audit or confirm that purchasers of data complied with its prohibitions.

The proposed complaint against X-Mode recognized that at least twice, X-Mode sold location data to purchasers who violated restrictions in X-Mode’s contracts by reselling the data they bought from X-Mode to companies further downstream. The X-Mode example shows that even when restrictions are included in contracts, they may not prevent misuse by subsequent downstream parties.

Ongoing Commitment to Privacy Protection:

The FTC stresses the importance of obtaining informed consent before collecting or disclosing consumers’ sensitive data, as such data can violate consumer privacy and expose them to various harms, including stigma and discrimination. While privacy notices, consent, and contractual restrictions are important, the FTC emphasizes they need to be backed up by action. Accordingly, the FTC’s proposed orders require companies to design, implement, maintain, and document safeguards to protect the personal information they handle, especially when it is sensitive in nature.

What Does a Company Need To Do?

Given the recent enforcement actions by the FTC, companies should:

  1. Consider the data it collects and whether such data is needed to provide the services and products requested by the consumer and/or a legitimate business need in support of providing such services and products (e.g., billing, ongoing technical support, shipping);
  2. Consider browsing and location data as sensitive personal information;
  3. Accurately inform consumers of the types of personal information collected by the company, its uses, and parties to whom it discloses the personal information;
  4. Collect, store, use, or share consumers’ sensitive personal information (including browser and location data) only with such consumers’ informed consent;
  5. Limit the use of consumers’ personal information solely to the purposes for which it was collected and not market, sell, or monetize consumers’ personal information beyond such purpose;
  6. Design, Implement, maintain, document, and adhere to safeguards that actually maintain consumers’ privacy; and
  7. Audit and inspect service providers and third-party companies downstream with whom consumers’ data is shared to confirm they are (a) adhering to and complying with contractual restrictions and (b) implementing appropriate safeguards to protect such consumer data.
© 2024 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.
For more on the FTC, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

CFTC Releases Artificial Intelligence Report

On 2 May 2024, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) Technology Advisory Committee (Committee) released a report entitled Responsible AI in Financial Markets: Opportunities, Risks & Recommendations. The report discusses the impact and future implications of artificial intelligence (AI) on financial markets and further illustrates the CFTC’s desire to oversee the AI space.

In the accompanying press release, Commissioner Goldsmith Romero highlighted the significance of the Committee’s recommendations, acknowledging decades of AI use in financial markets and proposing that new challenges will arise with the development of generative AI. Importantly, the report proposes that the CFTC develop a sector-specific AI Risk Management Framework addressing AI-associated risks.

The Committee opined that, without proper industry engagement and regulatory guardrails, the use of AI could “erode public trust in financial markets.” The report outlines potential risks associated with AI in financial markets such as the lack of transparency in AI decision processes, data handling errors, and the potential reinforcement of existing biases.

The report recommends that the CFTC host public roundtable discussions to foster a deeper understanding of AI’s role in financial markets and develop an AI Risk Management Framework for CTFC-registered entities aligned with the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s AI Risk Management Framework. This approach aims to enhance the transparency and reliability of AI systems in financial settings.

The report also calls for continued collaboration across federal agencies and stresses the importance of developing internal AI expertise within the CFTC. It advocates for responsible and transparent AI usage that adheres to ethical standards to ensure the stability and integrity of financial markets.

Copyright 2024 K & L Gates
For more news on AI in Financial Markets, visit the NLR Financial Institutions & Banking section.

Buy American and Buy European

The Buy American Act was originally passed by Congress in 1933 and has undergone numerous changes across several presidential administrations. While the core of the Act has essentially remained the same, requiring the U.S. government to purchase goods produced in the U.S. in certain circumstances, the domestic preference requirements have changed over the years. While the Buy American Act applies to direct government purchases, the separate (but similarly named) Buy America Act passed in 1982 imposes similar U.S. content requirements for certain federally funded infrastructure projects. Generally, the Buy American Act’s “produced in the U.S.” requirement ensures that federal government purchases of goods valued at more than $10,000 are 100% manufactured in the U.S. with a set percentage of the cost of components coming from the U.S. As of 2024, that set percentage has been increased to 65%. Therefore, the cost of domestic components must be at least 65% of the total cost of components to comply with the rule. Under the existing rules, the threshold will increase to 75% in 2029. These planned changes are consistent with the trend of increasing preferences for domestic goods over time (a trend that has continued across administrations from both sides of the political spectrum).

Unsurprisingly, protectionist policies favoring American production can produce similar protectionist measures enacted by foreign countries. The European Union’s (EU) European Green Deal Industrial Plan (sometimes referred to as the Buy European Act), which includes the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), were both formally adopted within the last few months. The NZIA, which was agreed upon in February, is aimed at the manufacture of clean technologies in Europe and sets two benchmarks for such manufacturing in the EU: (1) that 40% of the production needed to cover the EU will be domestic by 2030; and (2) that the EU’s production will account for at least 15% of the world’s production by 2040. The NZIA contains a list of net-zero technologies, including wind and heat pumps, battery and energy storage, hydropower, and solar technologies. The CRMA, adopted on March 18, sets forth objectives for the EU’s consumption of raw materials by 2030: that 10% come from local extractions; 40% to be processed in the EU; and 25% come from recycled materials. The CRMA also provides that “not more than 65% of the Union’s annual consumption of each strategic raw material at any relevant stage of processing from a single third country.”[1] While Europe’s new acts are perhaps more geared towards raw materials and clean technology, the U.S. and Europe’s concerted efforts to focus on domestic production will be something to watch for years to come. In particular, it is worth watching whether the recent EU measures generate a response from U.S. lawmakers. If so, it could accelerate the already increasing stringency of Buy American and Buy America requirements.

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-industrial-policy/

by: Kevin P. Daly, Jeffrey J. White , Sabrina M. Galli of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more news on the Buy American Act and the European Green Deal Industrial Plan, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.

A Guide for All Medicare Whistleblowers

Becoming a whistleblower and notifying federal authorities of Medicare fraud is a big public service and can even lead to a lucrative whistleblower award. Furthermore, the chief concern for interested whistleblowers is whether they could get reprimanded at their job for blowing the whistle on healthcare fraud or even fired, but any form of whistleblower retaliation is unlawful under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act.

If you think that you have uncovered evidence of Medicare fraud and want to learn more about what could happen next, here are four things to know.

  1. There are Lots of Known Ways to Defraud Medicare

Medicare is an $800 billion federal program, but estimates are that tens of billions, if not nearly $100 billion of that is lost to fraud every year – and that estimate is widely regarded as a conservative one.

A lot of this type of health care fraud can be categorized into one of the following types of schemes, many of them having to do with fraudulent billing tactics:

  • Phantom billing, where medical goods or services are billed against Medicare even though they were never provided or the purported patient does not exist
  • Double billing for the same goods or services
  • Providing medically unnecessary healthcare
  • Buying prescription drugs with Medicare drug plan money and then reselling them
  • Upcoding, or providing a healthcare service to a patient, but then billing Medicare for a similar but more expensive one
  • Unbundling, or billing for each service independently even though they are normally charged in a discounted package because they are often performed together
  • Paying or taking financial kickbacks for referring patients to a certain healthcare provider, or to a provider that the referring party has a financial stake in

However, these are just the types of Medicare fraud that have been discovered. There are likely other ways of defrauding the program that have yet to be detected. Therefore, even if the evidence that you have uncovered does not fit squarely into one of these types of Medicare fraud does not necessarily mean that it is not a problem.

  1. What Happens After Deciding the Blow the Whistle on Medicare Fraud

Most people are not completely familiar with how other civil or criminal cases move forward in the justice system. Because whistleblower cases are different and even more nuanced and complex, even fewer people understand the process – and those that presume that they are just like other cases find themselves misinformed.

Whistleblower cases are nearly unique in that they have three parties to them:

  1. The whistleblower
  2. The government
  3. The defendant

After you have found evidence of Medicare fraud and abuse, decided to report suspected fraud and become a whistleblower, and hired a law firm well versed in federal laws to represent you, you will continue to gather evidence to support your allegations. This is a sensitive endeavor, as most whistleblowers only have access to the incriminating evidence through their employment, and their employer may be actively trying to cover up the fraudulent activity.

Being represented by an experienced whistleblower lawyer is essential for this stage of the process. They will have gone through it before and will see how to gather evidence to support your case without exposing yourself to the risk of being detected for reporting fraud.

Once you have a strong case, the next step is to present it to the law enforcement agency that would have jurisdiction over your case. Typically you would present information to the Health and Human Services Office or Office of the Inspector General (OIG) hotline. For Medicare fraud, reports are often made to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or CMS. The goal is typically to persuade agents there to intervene in your case, conduct the investigation that you started, and prosecute the fraudsters.

If the agency declines to intervene, you can still pursue the case on the government’s behalf.

  1. You Can Receive a Financial Award

One of the main incentives for whistleblowers is the award that they can receive for bringing the evidence to the attention of federal law enforcement. That award can be substantial.

Because Medicare is a federal program, most claims of Medicare fraud advance under the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq.). This federal law provides an avenue for whistleblowers who have evidence of fraud against the government.

Importantly, the False Claims Act offers quite generous whistleblower awards, even when compared to other whistleblower statutes. The amount that you receive depends on several factors, the most important of which is whether the government intervened in your case or not. If it did, you can receive between 15 and 25 percent of the proceeds of the case. If it did not and you prosecuted the case on behalf of the government, you can recover up to 30 percent of the case’s proceeds.

Other factors include:

  • Whether there are other whistleblowers who played a role in the case
  • How important the evidence was that you brought to the table
  • Whether you played a part in the Medicare fraud
  1. Your Job is Protected 

Because workplace retaliation is such a foreseeable outcome of becoming a whistleblower, and because the federal government relies so heavily on whistleblowers, it should come as no surprise that the False Claims Act and other whistleblower statutes provide legal protections in the workplace for those who engage in lawful whistleblower activities.

For Medicare fraud whistleblowers, the False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), is particularly strong. Not only does it protect you from retaliatory conduct that falls short of termination, like workplace harassment and threats to fire you, it also entitles you to significant remedies if your employer breaks the law and commits an act of reprisal.

Oberheiden P.C. © 2024
For more news on Medicare fraud whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.