NAVEX Report Reveals Increase in Whistleblower Retaliation and Reporting of Misconduct

NAVEX’s 2022 Risk & Compliance Hotline & Incident Management Benchmark Report reveals an increase in internal reporting about misconduct and an increase in allegations of retaliation.  The analysis of data from 3,470 organizations that received more than 1.37 million individual reports identified the following trends (see the full report for a discussion of additional trends and analysis of the data):

  • “More actual allegations of misconduct, rather than inquiries about policies or possible misconduct. Ninety percent of all reports in 2021 were allegations of misconduct, up from 86 percent last year and hitting an all-time high since our first benchmark report more than ten years ago.”

  • “Reports about retaliation, harassment and discrimination jumped – especially retaliation. In 2021, reports of retaliation nearly doubled . . . Taken altogether, these findings suggest employees are more attuned to workplace civility issues. That would fit with external trends such as more talk about systemic racism, income inequality and political divisions; as well as increasing protection for whistleblowers and employees’ awareness of  those protections.”

  • “Substantiation rates continue to edge upward. Overall substantiation rates rose from 42 percent in 2020 to 43 percent in 2021, and up from 36 percent a decade ago. The reports substantiated most often were data privacy concerns (63 percent), environmental issues (59 percent), and confidential and proprietary information (54 percent). The reports substantiated least often were about retaliation (24 percent).”

  • “The substantiation rate for reports of retaliation also went up slightly, from 23 percent in 2020 to  24 percent in 2021 – the highest substantiation rate seen since 2016. While steady, this substantiation rate is significantly below the overall median case substantiation rate of 43 percent in 2021. These cases, though difficult to prove, warrant attention.”

  • “Reports of harassment exceeded levels from the height of the #MeToo movement.”

Corporate Whistleblower Protections

Whistleblower retaliation remains all too prevalent.  A September 14, 2022 Bloomberg article titled Whistleblower retaliation remains all too prevalent discusses how “choosing to be a whistle-blower can also be a lonely, risky road” and identifies many deterrents to speaking up – “[t]hey may be afraid of litigation, ruining their reputations, losing security clearances or facing jail time.”

Fortunately, federal and state laws afford corporate whistleblowers remedies to combat retaliation, and whistleblower reward laws incentivize whistleblowers to take the considerable risks entailed in reporting fraud and other wrongdoing to the government.  For example, the

SEC Whistleblower Program offers awards to eligible whistleblowers who provide original information that leads to successful SEC enforcement actions with total monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million. A whistleblower may receive an award of between 10% and 30% of the total monetary sanctions collected in actions brought by the SEC and in related actions brought by other regulatory or law enforcement authorities. The SEC Whistleblower Program allows whistleblowers to submit tips anonymously if represented by an attorney in connection with their tip.

What is Whistleblower Retaliation?

Whistleblower retaliation laws prohibit a broad range of retaliatory actions against whistleblowers, including any act that would dissuade a worker from engaging in protected whistleblowing.  Examples of actionable whistleblower retaliation include:

  • Terminating a whistleblower;

  • Constructively discharging a whistleblower;

  • Demoting a whistleblower;

  • Suspending a whistleblower;

  • Harassing a whistleblower or subjecting the whistleblower to a hostile work environment;

  • Reassigning a whistleblower to a position with significantly different responsibilities;

  • Issuing a performance evaluation or performance improvement plan that supplies the necessary foundation for the eventual termination of the whistleblower’s employment, or a written warning or counseling session that is considered discipline by policy or practice and is routinely used as the first step in a progressive discipline policy;

  • Placing the whistleblower on administrative leave;

  • Threatening to take an adverse action against a whistleblower;

  • Subjecting a whistleblower to a retaliatory investigation or retaliatory surveillance;

  • Suing a whistleblower for the purpose of retaliating against the whistleblower;

  • Outing a whistleblower;

  • Intimidating a whistleblower;

  • Initiating a law enforcement investigation or facilitating an employee’s detention by U.S. ICE after the employee reported a serious injury; or

  • Discriminating against a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of whistleblowing.

The DOL Administrative Review Board has emphasized that statutory language prohibiting discrimination “in any way” must be broadly construed and therefore a whistleblower need not prove that a retaliatory act had a tangible impact on an employee’s terms and conditions of employment.

What Damages Can a Whistleblower Recover in a Whistleblower Retaliation Case?

Whistleblower retaliation can exact a serious toll, including lost pay and benefits, reputational harm, and emotional distress.  Indeed, whistleblower retaliation can derail a career and deprive the whistleblower of millions of dollars in lost future earnings.

Whistleblowers should be rewarded for doing the right thing, but all too often they suffer retaliation and find themselves marginalized and ostracized.  Federal and state whistleblower laws provide several remedies to compensate whistleblowers that have suffered retaliation, including:

  • back pay (lost wages and benefits);

  • emotional distress damages;

  • damages for reputational harm;

  • reinstatement or front pay in lieu thereof;

  • lost future earnings; and

  • punitive damages.

Combating Whistleblower Retaliation: How to Maximize Your Recovery

Whistleblower protection laws can provide a potent remedy, but before bringing a retaliation claim, it is crucial to assess the options under federal and state law and develop a strategy to achieve the optimal recovery.  Key issues to consider include the scope of protected whistleblowing, the burden of proof, the damages that a prevailing whistleblower can recover, the forum where the claim would be litigated, and the impact of the retaliation claim on a whistleblower rewards claim.

Scope of Protected Whistleblowing

There is no federal statute that provides general protection to corporate whistleblowers.  Instead, federal whistleblower protection laws protect specific types of disclosures, such as disclosures of securities fraud, tax fraud, procurement fraud, or consumer financial protection fraud.  The main sources of federal protection for corporate whistleblowers include the whistleblower protection provisions of the following:

  • The False Claims Act (FCA) — protecting disclosures about fraud directed toward the government, including actions taken in furtherance of a qui tam action and efforts to stop a violation of the FCA;

  • The Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act (DCWPA) — protecting whistleblowing about gross mismanagement of a federal contract or grant; a gross waste of federal funds; an abuse of authority relating to a federal contract or grant or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or a violation of law, rule, or regulation related to a federal contract;

  • The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) — protecting disclosures about mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, a violation of any SEC rule, or shareholder fraud;

  • The Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) — protecting whistleblowing to the SEC about potential violations of federal securities laws;

  • The Taxpayer First Act (TFA) — protecting disclosures about tax fraud or tax underpayment;

  • The Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) — protecting disclosures concerning violations of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau rules or federal laws regulating unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices in the provision of consumer financial products or services; and

  • The Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) — protecting disclosures about violations of the Bank Secrecy Act.

While most of these anti-retaliation laws protect internal disclosures (e.g., reporting to a supervisor), whistleblower protection under the DFA is predicated on a showing that the whistleblower disclosed a potential violation of federal securities law to the SEC prior to suffering an adverse action.

State law may also provide a remedy, including the anti-retaliation provisions in state FCAs.  And approximately 42 states recognize a common law wrongful discharge tort action (a public policy exception to at-will employment), which generally protects refusal to engage in illegal activity and the exercise of a statutory right.

Burden of Proof

To maximize the likelihood of winning a case (or at least getting the case before a jury), it is useful to select a remedy with a favorable causation standard (the level of proof required to link the protected whistleblowing to the adverse employment action).  SOX has a favorable “contributing factor” causation standard, i.e., the whistleblower prevails by proving that their protected whistleblowing affected in any way the employer’s decision to take an adverse action.  In contrast, the FCA and DFA require the whistleblower to prove “but for” causation, i.e., the adverse action would not have happened “but for” the protected whistleblowing (albeit there is no need to prove that it was the sole factor).

Damages and Remedies in Whistleblower Retaliation Cases

Variations in the remedies available to whistleblowers under federal anti-retaliation laws may warrant bringing more than one claim.  For example, the DCWPA authorizes an award of back pay (the value of lost pay and benefits), and the FCA authorizes an award of double back pay.  If the whistleblower’s disclosures are protected under both statutes, then the whistleblower should bring both claims.

While a prevailing whistleblower can recover back pay under both the DFA and SOX (double back pay under the former and single back pay under the latter), the DFA does not authorize special damages, i.e., damages for emotional distress and reputational harm.  In contrast, SOX authorizes uncapped compensatory damages.  Therefore, a whistleblower protected under both statutes should bring the SOX claim within the much shorter SOX statute of limitations (180 days) to recover both double back pay and special damages.

State law may also provide a remedy, and if the whistleblower can pursue both a statutory remedy and a wrongful discharge tort, the latter may offer the opportunity to seek punitive damages.

Forum Selection and Administrative Exhaustion

When selecting the optimal remedy to combat retaliation, a whistleblower should consider the forum where the claim would be tried and determine whether the claim must initially be investigated by a federal agency before the whistleblower can litigate the claim.  SOX provides an unequivocal exemption from mandatory arbitration, but Dodd-Frank claims are subject to arbitration.  Accordingly, a whistleblower protected both by SOX and Dodd-Frank should file a SOX claim within the 180-day statute of limitations to preserve the option to try the case before a jury.

Several of the corporate whistleblower protection laws require that the whistleblower file the claim initially at a federal agency and permit the agency to investigate the claim before the whistleblower can litigate the claim.  This is called administrative exhaustion, and failure to comply with that requirement can waive the claim.  In contrast, the FCA and DFA do not require administrative exhaustion.

Impact of Whistleblower Retaliation Claim on Whistleblower Rewards Claim

Another important consideration is the potential impact of a retaliation case on a qui tam or whistleblower rewards case.  Filing an FCA retaliation claim while a qui tam suit is under seal poses some risk of violating the seal, which could bar the whistleblower from recovering a relator share.  Therefore, counsel should consider filing the FCA retaliation claim under seal along with the qui tam suit.

Further, whistleblowers pursuing rewards claims at federal agencies (e.g., SEC or IRS whistleblower claims) while simultaneously pursuing related retaliation claims (e.g., a SOX or TFA claim) should assess the potential impact of the retaliation claim and the potential discoverability of submissions to the SEC or IRS on the rewards claim(s).

Although the patchwork of whistleblower protection laws fails to protect disclosures about certain forms of fraud, there are important pockets of protection.  To effectively combat retaliation, whistleblowers should avail themselves of all appropriate remedies.

© 2022 Zuckerman Law

Whistleblowers Put Magnifying Glass on Optical Lens Manufacturer’s Kickback Scheme

September 1, 2022.  The United States Department of Justice settled two civil fraud cases against an optical lens manufacturer, marketer, and distributor Essilor regarding allegations that the company violated the Anti-Kickback Statute and the False Claims Act.  Under the terms of the settlement, the optical lens companies, Essilor International, Essilor of America, Inc., Essilor Laboratories of America, Inc., and Essilor Instruments USA, paid $16.4 million.  The three whistleblowers were former district sales managers.  The whistleblowers—or relators—filed two qui tam lawsuits under the False Claims Act, and as relators, they entitled to 15-25% of the government’s recovery.

According to the allegations, the optical lens companies created incentive programs which they marketed to eye care providers.  The programs offered incentives for optometrists and ophthalmologists to steer patients to choose Essilor brand products because the providers received (unlawful) remuneration for doing so.  When a healthcare provider’s choice of medication or device is driven by a financial reward from that device’s manufacturer, that is misconduct that violates the Anti-Kickback Statute.  Since providers submitted claims to Medicare and Medicaid for Essilor optical products allegedly chosen as part of these incentive programs, those claims violated the False Claims Act.

The optical lens company has to hire an Independent Review Organization (IRO) as part of the five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) it entered into with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Independent Review Organization will review any discount programs Essilor plans to roll out in the future.  The Acting Chief Counsel at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General emphasized the impact of this case, “Kickback schemes can impact medical judgment, eroding the trust of both patients and taxpayers.”  Patients—and taxpayers—should not wonder whether their healthcare provider is recommending a particular healing modality because they are incentivized to make that recommendation.  Whistleblowers, such as the sales representatives in these two cases, can spot unlawful kickback schemes and be rewarded—properly—for reporting them.

© 2022 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP

The Supreme Court Is Poised to Weigh in on a False Claims Act Circuit Split

Three pending petitions for writ of certiorari have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve a split among the federal courts of appeals as to the pleading standard for False Claims Act (“FCA”) whistleblower claims.

The FCA creates a right of action whereby either the government or private individuals can bring lawsuits against actors who have defrauded the government. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq. Under the FCA, a private citizen can act as a “relator” and bring an action on behalf of the government in what is known as a qui tam suit. The government can elect to intervene, which means participate, in the suit; if it does not, the relator can continue to litigate the case without the direct participation of the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730. Private individuals can receive a portion of the action’s proceeds or settlement amount. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).

The petitions ask the Court to clarify the level of particularity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (“Rule 9(b)”) to plead a claim under the FCA. Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs alleging “fraud or mistake” to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”

Johnson v. Bethany Hospice and Palliative Care LLC, Case No. 21-462

In their petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioners in Johnson asked the Supreme Court to take up the issue of whether Rule 9(b) requires FCA plaintiffs “who plead a fraudulent scheme with particularity to also plead specific details of false claims.” The Eleventh Circuit earlier affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an FCA claim based on the plaintiffs’ failure to plead “specific details about the submission of an actual false claim” to the government. Estate of Helmly v. Bethany Hospice & Palliative Care of Coastal Georgia, LLC, 853 F. App’x 496, 502-03 (11th Cir. 2021).

In particular, the relators alleged that several doctors purchased ownership interests in Bethany Hospice and Palliative Care, LLC (“Bethany Hospice”) and were allocated kickbacks for patient referrals through a combination of salary, dividends, and/or bonus payments.  Id. at 498. Among other allegations, the complaint alleged that both the relators had access to Bethany Hospice’s billing systems, and, based on their review of those systems and conversations with other employees, were able to confirm that Bethany Hospital submitted false claims for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement to the government.  Id. at 502.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the allegations were “insufficient” under Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard for fraud cases.  Id. Even though the relators alleged direct knowledge of Bethany Hospice’s billing and patient records, their failure to provide “specific details” regarding the dates of the claims, the frequency with which Bethany Hospice submitted those claims, the amounts of the claims, or the patients whose treatment formed the basis of the claims defeated their FCA claim.  Id. In addition, the relators did not personally participate or directly witness the submission of any false claims.  Id. The Eleventh Circuit also found unpersuasive the relators’ argument that Bethany Hospice derived nearly all its business from Medicare patients, therefore making it plausible that it had submitted false claims to the government.  Id. “Whether a defendant bills the government for some or most of its services,” the Eleventh Circuit stated, “the burden remains on a relator alleging the submission of a false claim to allege specific details about false claims to establish the indicia of reliability necessary under Rule 9(b).”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the relators did not do so here, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case.

United States ex rel. Owsley v. Fazzi Associates, Inc., Case No. 21-936

The Sixth Circuit took a similarly hardline approach in United States ex rel. Owsley v. Fazzi Associates, Inc., 16 F.4th 192 (6th Cir. 2021), ruling in favor of a strict interpretation of Rule 9(b).  The petition for a writ of certiorari in Owsley asks the Court to take up the same question as in Johnson.

In Owsley, the relator alleged that her employer used fraudulently altered data to make its patient populations seem sicker than they actually were in order to increase Medicare payments received from the government.  Id. at 195. The complaint “describe[d] in detail, a fraudulent scheme,” and alleged “personal knowledge of the billing practices employed in the fraudulent scheme.”  Id. at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Sixth Circuit ruled that these allegations were not enough under Rule 9(b). Instead, to bring a viable FCA claim, a relator’s complaint must identify “at least one false claim with specificity.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A relator can do that in one of two ways: first, by identifying a representative claim actually submitted to the government; or second, by alleging facts “based on personal knowledge of billing practices” that support a strong inference that the defendant submitted “particular identified claims” to the government.  Id. (emphasis in original). Here, though the relator alleged specific instances of fraudulent data – such as upcoding a patient with a leg ulcer to include a malignant cancer diagnosis – she did not identify particular claims submitted to the government.  Id. at 197. “[T]he touchstone is whether the complaint provides the defendant with notice of a specific representative claim that the plaintiff thinks was fraudulent.”  Id. The Owsley relator, the court held, failed to meet that critical touchstone.

Molina Healthcare v. Prose, Case No. 21-1145

The Seventh Circuit adopted a more flexible pleading standard in United States v. Molina Healthcare of Illinois, Inc., 17 F.4th 732 (7th Cir. 2021). As in Johnson and Owsley, the petition for a writ of certiorari asks the Court to weigh in on the Rule 9(b) standard under the FCA. It also presents an additional question about the requirements for an FCA claim under the implied false certification theory.

In Molina Healthcare, the relator brought an FCA claim against Molina Healthcare (“Molina”) for violating certain requirements of its Medicaid contract. The relator alleged that Molina, which had previously subcontracted with another entity for the provision of certain nursing home services, continued to collect payment for those services from the government even though it no longer provided them. Molina Healthcare, 17 F.4th at 736. Molina Healthcare received fixed payments from the government for different categories of patients. It received the highest per capita payment for patients in nursing facilities: $3,180.30.  Id. at 737-38. The relator alleged that Molina Healthcare knowingly continued to collect this rate from the government when it no longer provided a key service to nursing home patients.  Id.

The relator brought an FCA claim against Molina based on three theories of liability: (1) factual falsity (i.e., presenting a facially false claim to the government); (2) fraud in the inducement (i.e., misrepresenting compliance with a payment condition “in order to induce the government to enter the contract”); and (3) implied false certification (i.e., presenting a false claim with the “omission of key facts” instead of “affirmative misrepresentations”).  Id. at 740-741.

The Seventh Circuit held that the relator’s allegations satisfied Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirement under all three theories. First, as to factual falsity, the Court found that the relator provided sufficient information as to the “when, where, how, and to whom” Molina made the allegedly false representations.  Id. at 741. Though the relator did not have access to the defendant’s files, the information he provided “support[ed] the inference” that Molina had submitted false claims to the government.  Id. Second, as to fraud in the inducement, the Seventh Circuit found that the relator’s “precise allegations” regarding “the beneficiaries, the time period, the mechanism for fraud, and the financial consequences” again satisfied Rule 9(b)’s standard.  Id. at 741. The complaint also included details about Molina’s chief operating officer’s statements that indicated that Molina “never intended to perform the promised act that induced the government to enter the contract.”  Id. at 741-42.  Third, as to the implied false certification theory, the court found that the plaintiff adequately alleged that Molina knowingly omitted key material facts while submitting claims to the government.  Id. at 743-44.

The Supreme Court Invites Comment from the Solicitor General

Facing what appears to be a major circuit split, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief “expressing the views of the United States” in Johnson in January 2022 and in Owsley in May 2022.

The Supreme Court invites the Solicitor General to comment on only a handful of the approximately 7,000 to 8,000 petitions for writ of certiorari that the Court receives in a year. In the 2021 Term, for example, the Solicitor General filed what it calls a “Petition Stage Amicus Brief” in only 19 casesFour Justices must vote to issue an invitation to the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General’s view on whether the Court should grant certiorari has often been extremely influential. In the 2007 Term, for example, the Court denied certiorari in every case in which the Solicitor General recommended that approach. By contrast, it granted certiorari in 11 out of the 12 cases in which the Solicitor General recommended a grant. More recent data confirm that the Solicitor General’s recommendations as to whether the Court should grant certiorari remain highly influential. One study found that between May 2016 and May 2017, the Supreme Court followed the Solicitor General’s recommended approach in 23 cases (85%). At the same time, even the act of requesting the views of the Solicitor General dramatically increases the chances that the Court will take up a case. For example, between the 1998 Term and 2004 Term, one study found that the Court was 37 times more likely to grant certiorari in cases where it had invited the Solicitor General to file an amicus brief.

The Solicitor General Urges the Court to Decline Review

On May 24, 2022, the Solicitor General filed its brief in Johnson; it has yet to comment on Owsley. The Solicitor General’s amicus brief in Johnson urges the Court to deny certiorari. The Solicitor General notes that certiorari might be warranted if the courts of appeals applied a rigid, per se rule that required relators to plead “specific details of false claims.” But instead, the brief argues that the courts of appeals have “largely converged” on an approach to FCA pleading requirements that allows relators “either to identify specific false claims or to plead other sufficiently reliable indicia” to support a “strong inference” that the defendant submitted false claims to the government. According to the Solicitor General, the “divergent outcomes” among the circuit courts are merely the result of those courts’ application of a “fact-intensive standard” to various distinct allegations.

The petitioners in Johnson filed a supplemental brief in response to the Solicitor General’s views. They argue that the Solicitor General misinterpreted the Eleventh Circuit’s pleading standard, which effectively requires a relator to allege specific details about false claims to survive a motion to dismiss. In other words, the petitioners argue that in the Eleventh Circuit, the Solicitor General’s “purported” rule that a relator can either allege details about specific false claims or identify reliable indica that false claims were presented are “one and the same.”

Though the Court did not invite the Solicitor General to comment in Molina Healthcare, the petitioners in that case also filed a supplemental brief in response to the Solicitor General’s amicus in Johnson. “Everyone but the Solicitor General agrees that the circuits are hopelessly divided over whether Rule 9(b) requires a relator to plead details of false claims,” the brief argues. The brief notes that the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits do not require plaintiffs to plead specific details of actual false claims; by contrast, the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits require relators to plead specific details. Accordingly, the brief urges the Supreme Court to resolve the “widely acknowledged circuit split” over Rule 9(b)’s pleading standards.

The Solicitor General has a history of urging the Court to reject certiorari in FCA cases. According to the petitioners’ supplemental brief in Molina Healthcare, since the 1996 Term, the Solicitor General has recommended against review in eleven out of the twelve FCA cases in which the Court invited the Solicitor General’s views. Still, the Court granted certiorari in three of the cases in which the Solicitor General recommended against review.

Given the Supreme Court’s apparent interest in the FCA pleading standard – as evidenced by its calls for the Solicitor General’s views in Johnson and Owsley – there is a chance that it will grant certiorari in at least one of the three cases pending before it. Depending on when the Solicitor General weighs in, the Court may decide to grant certiorari in the fall of 2022.

Any Supreme Court decision that clarifies the pleading standard for FCA cases will likely affect a relator’s ability to successfully litigate qui tam actions in which the government does not intervene more than in cases in which the government does intervene. When a relator files a qui tam action, the government investigates the alleged fraud. If it intervenes in that action, it can file a complaint to include evidence it has discovered in that investigation, allowing it to meet the more stringent version of the Rule 9(b) pleading standard. Relators, however, often do not have access to the same evidence that the government does, such as specific claims data, making it far harder for a relator to meet the more stringent version of pleading standard.

Until the Supreme Court decides to weigh in, qui tam relators will continue to have an easier time satisfying the requirements of Rule 9(b) in those circuits with relaxed pleading standards. In the meantime, and whether the Court takes one of these petitions or not, any FCA whistleblower should seek legal counsel to help her identify the type of factual information that would meet the pleading requirements of the courts that apply a strict pleading requirement.

Katz Banks Kumin LLP Copyright ©

If You Can’t Stand the Heat, Don’t Build the Kitchen: Construction Company Settles Allegations of Small Business Subcontracting Fraud for $2.8 Million

For knowingly hiring a company that was not a service-disabled, veteran-owned small business to fulfill a set aside contract, a construction contractor settled allegations of small business subcontracting fraud for $2.8 million.  A corporate whistleblower, Fox Unlimited Enterprises, brought this misconduct to light.  We previously reported on the record-setting small business fraud settlement with TriMark USA LLC, to which this settlement is related.  For reporting government contracts fraud, the whistleblower will receive $630,925 of the settlement.

According to the allegations, the general contractor and construction company Hensel Phelps was awarded a General Services Administration (GSA) contract to build the Armed Forces Retirement Home’s New Commons/Health Care Building in Washington, D.C.  Part of the contract entailed sharing the work with small businesses, including service-disabled, veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSB).  The construction contractor negotiated all aspects of the contract with an unidentified subcontractor and then hired an SDVOSB, which, according to the settlement agreement, Hensel Phelps knew was “merely a passthrough” for the larger subcontractor, thus creating the appearance of an SDVOSB performing the work on the contract to meet the set-aside requirements.  The supposedly SDVOSB subcontractor was hired to provide food service equipment for the Armed Forces Retirement Home building.

“Set aside” contracts are government contracts intended to provide opportunities to SDVOSB, women-owned small businesses, and other economically disadvantaged companies to do work they might not otherwise access.  Large businesses performing work on government contracts are often required to subcontract part of their work to these types of small businesses.  “Taking advantage of contracts intended for companies owned and operated by service-disabled veterans demonstrates a shocking disregard for fair competition and integrity in government contracting,” said the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington, as well as a shocking disregard for proper stewardship of taxpayer funds.

Whistleblowers can help fight fraud and protect taxpayers by reporting government contracts fraud.  A whistleblower can report government contracts fraud under the False Claims Act and become a relator in a qui tam lawsuit, from which they may be entitled to a share of the funds the government recovers from fraudsters.

© 2022 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP

SEC Awards Whistleblower Whose Tip Led to Opening of Investigation

On May 19, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a whistleblower award to an individual who voluntarily provided the agency with original information that led to a successful enforcement action.

Through the SEC Whistleblower Program, qualified whistleblowers are entitled to an award of 10-30% of the sanctions collected by the government in the enforcement action connected to their disclosure.

The SEC awarded the whistleblower approximately $16,000.

According to the award order, the whistleblower “helped alert Commission staff to the ongoing fraud and his/her tip was a principal motivating factor in the decision to open the investigation.”

In determining the exact percentage of an award, the SEC weighs a number of factors including the significance of the whistleblower’s information, the law enforcement interest in the case, the degree of further assistance provided by the whistleblower, the whistleblower’s culpability in the underlying violation, and the timelines of the disclosure.

According to the award order, the SEC considered that the awarded whistleblower “provided continuing assistance by supplying critical documents and participating in at least one subsequent communication with Commission staff that advanced the investigation.”

The SEC notes that the whistleblower did not initially make their disclosure via a Form TCR. However, the whistleblower qualified for an award because they filed a Form TCR within 30 days of learning of the filing requirement.

Since issuing its first award in 2012, the SEC has awarded approximately $1.3 billion to over 270 individuals. In the 2021 fiscal year, the program set a number of records. The SEC issued a record $564 million in whistleblower awards to a record 108 individuals.

In addition to monetary awards, the SEC Whistleblower Program offers confidentiality protections to whistleblowers. Thus, the SEC does not disclose any identifying information about award recipients.

Individuals considering blowing the whistle to the SEC should first consult an experienced SEC whistleblower attorney to ensure they are fully protected and qualify for the largest possible award.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.

IRS Announces New Director of Whistleblower Office

On May 12, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced that John W. Hinman will serve as the Director of the IRS Whistleblower Office. Hinman will oversee the agency’s highly successful whistleblower award program. Since 2007, the IRS has awarded whistleblowers over $1 billion based on the collection of over $6 billion in back taxes, interest, penalties, and criminal fines and sanctions.

“We hope that as the director Mr. Hinman will have an open door policy for whistleblowers and their advocates,” said leading whistleblower attorney Stephen M. Kohn of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto. “We look forward to working with the new director to ensure that the incredibly important tax whistleblower program properly deters fraudsters and incentivizes whistleblowers to step forward. We hope that processes are put into place that speed-up the final determinations in reward cases,” added Kohn, who also serves as the Board of Directors of the National Whistleblower Center.

The IRS Whistleblower Program has been an immense success since it was established in 2006. For example, the program incentivized the whistleblowing of Bradley Birkenfeld, the UBS banker turned whistleblower whose disclosures helped lead to the dismantling of the Swiss banking system as it existed. However, the program has recently been plagued by a number of issues, including massive delays in the issuance of whistleblower awards. According to the IRS Whistleblower Office’s most recent annual report to Congress, the IRS currently takes 10.79 years to process a whistleblower case, leading to a backlog of over 23,000 cases.

Prior to his new appointment, Hinman served as Director of Field Operations for Transfer Pricing Practice in the IRS’s LB&I Division. According to the IRS, in this position, he “oversaw field operations of the Transfer Pricing Practice economists, revenue agents, and tax law specialists who focus on complex transfer pricing issues of multinational business enterprises.” Hinman will take over as Director of the IRS Whistleblower Office from Lee D. Martin, who left the agency on April 9 to serve as the Director of the Directorate of Whistleblower Protection Programs at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about whistleblowers, visit the NLR White Collar Crime & Consumer Rights section.

Calling All Whistleblowers: Department of Justice Launches Office of Environmental Justice

Last week, the United States Attorney General announced the creation of the Office of Environmental Justice (OEJ) within the Department of Justice. The OEJ will manage DOJ’s environmental justice projects and “serve as the central hub for our efforts to advance our comprehensive environmental justice enforcement strategy” and address the “harm caused by environmental crime, pollution, and climate change.”

In his speech, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland remarked that OEJ will “prioritize the cases that will have the greatest impact on the communities most overburdened by environmental harm” in partnership with the Civil Rights Division, Office for Access to Justice, Office of Tribal Justice, and United States Attorneys’ Offices.
Whistleblowers take note: violations of environmental laws (Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act) can be a basis for a False Claims Act case.

In 2019, the DOJ settled a case against a domestic producer of Omega-3 fish oil supplements, fishmeal, and fish solubles for livestock and aquaculture feed. The producer allegedly falsely certified compliance with federal environmental laws on a loan application. Under the terms of the settlement, the fish oil producer paid $1 million. A former employee blew the whistle on their employer’s fishy business and was rewarded $200,000 as part of a qui tam lawsuit.

False certification of environmental law compliance harms taxpayers, workers, residents, and the environment for generations. The Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s Civil Division said about the case, “Companies will face appropriate consequences if they misrepresent their eligibility to participate in federal programs and divert resources from those who should receive federal support.” It’s up to employees of manufacturers, contractors, construction companies, power plants, and others who receive government funds to report environmentally hazardous misconduct, so that, as the U.S. Attorney said, “Businessmen and companies that lie to get their hands on taxpayer money will be held accountable for their actions.”

Do You Qualify to File an NHTSA Whistleblower Lawsuit?

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) recently established a whistleblower program to address safety concerns regarding motor vehicle defects, violations of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, and violations of the Vehicle Safety Act. Like other qui tam lawsuits, NHTSA whistleblowers who come forward with valuable information regarding motor vehicle safety violations may be rewarded with significant financial compensation for their bravery.

What Issues Can Be Reported Under the NHTSA Whistleblower Program?

NHTSA whistleblowers may be eligible to receive a financial reward for reporting safety violations, including:

  • Potential vehicle safety defects: Examples include engine failure, defective airbags, and faulty breaks.

  • Noncompliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: These are U.S. federal regulations regarding the design, construction, performance, and durability requirements for motor vehicles sold in America.

  • Violations of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act: This law requires motor vehicle manufacturers to follow certain safety standards to reduce the likelihood of accidents.

  • Violations of any motor vehicle safety reporting requirements

Who Can Become a NHTSA Whistleblower?

According to the NHTSA, any employee or contractor who works for a motor vehicle manufacturer, a motor vehicle parts supplier, or a motor vehicle dealership is eligible to become a whistleblower and receive protections under the Vehicle Safety Whistleblower Act.

Why Should I File a Whistleblower Lawsuit?

Employees with inside information regarding vehicle safety defects or the violation of safety regulations can play a critical role in keeping our nation’s roads safer. Additionally, NHTSA whistleblowers who offer valuable information that leads to a settlement are entitled to a portion of the recovery as a financial reward. Employees of motor vehicle manufacturers who become whistleblowers are also protected from retaliation from their employers and their identities are kept hidden.

How Are NHTSA Whistleblowers Protected?

Under the Vehicle Safety Act, motor vehicle manufacturers, parts suppliers, and dealerships are prohibited from retaliating against an employee for becoming an NHTSA whistleblower or for refusing to participate in actions that violated safety regulations. If retaliation does occur, a complaint should be made to OSHA who will further investigate the complaint.

Additionally, the U.S. Department of Transportation and NHTSA in most cases are not permitted to share any details that would disclose the identity of a whistleblower.

How Are NHTSA Whistleblowers Rewarded?

If a whistleblower shares information regarding safety defects or safety regulation violations that leads to a successful NHTSA whistleblower lawsuit, the whistleblower could be rewarded financially. Whistleblowers may receive between 10 and 30 percent of what the U.S. Department of Transportation collects from the defendant vehicle manufacturer, parts supplier, or dealership. In many cases, whistleblowers who come forward about a corporation’s illegal activities or fraud receive a significant financial reward.

Successful NHTSA Whistleblower Lawsuits

Last year, Kia Motors America agreed to pay civil penalties worth $70 million for failing to issue a timely recall for an engine crankshaft defect in certain vehicles as well as for inaccuracies in defect and compliance reports. According to the NHTSA, the defect could have potentially led to engine stalling.

Hyundai Motors agreed to pay $140 million in civil penalties last year for failing to issue timely recalls regarding a potential fuel leak that could have occurred due to a low-pressure fuel hose. Heat could have caused the fuel hose to crack over time creating an engine fire hazard.

In 2020, Daimler Trucks North America agreed to $30 million in civil penalties for violations of the Vehicle Safety Act related to a number of untimely recalls. One of the recalls involved a brake light failure that could have potentially increased the risk of an accident.

© 2022 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more content about whistleblowers, visit the NLR White Collar Crime & Consumer Rights section.

SEC Issues Three Whistleblower Awards Totaling Over $1 Million

On April 18, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued three separate whistleblower awards totaling over $1 million. Each of the awarded whistleblowers voluntarily provided the SEC with original information that contributed to the success of an enforcement action.

Through the SEC Whistleblower Program, qualified whistleblowers are entitled to awards of 10-30% of the funds collected by the SEC in the relevant enforcement action. The SEC has awarded over $1.2 billion to over 250 individual whistleblowers since issuing its first award in 2012.

One of the awards issued by the SEC on April 18 was a $700,000 award granted to joint whistleblowers. The whistleblowers provided the SEC with original information and the SEC subsequently passed this information along to another agency. The whistleblowers’ information led to the successful enforcement of actions by both the SEC and the other agency. Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s related action provisions, the whistleblowers were entitled to awards based on the sanctions collected in both actions.

According to the award order, in determining the exact percentage to award the whistleblowers, the SEC considered the following: “(i) Claimants’ information prompted Commission staff to begin an examination that led to the Covered Action, (ii) Claimants’ assistance helped focus the examination; (iii) some of the charges in the Commission’s Order were based, in part, on the information submitted by Claimants; and (iv) there was substantial law enforcement interest in the information provided, as it related to an ongoing fraud involving the misappropriation of investor funds.”

The second award from April 18 was for $450,000. The whistleblower in this case first reported the misconduct internally before providing information to the SEC. According to the award order, the whistleblower’s information “significantly contributed to an existing investigation” and “helped streamline the staff’s investigation and saved the staff time and resources.” The whistleblower also provided the SEC with additional assistance including identifying witnesses and specific events of interest.

The final award, a $45,000 award based on sanctions collected to date, was issued to a whistleblower whose information prompted the SEC to open an investigation. According to the award order, the whistleblower “participated in a voluntary interview with Commission staff” and “suffered hardships as a result of the underlying misconduct.”

On April 18, the SEC also issued a whistleblower award denial. The denial covers award claims submitted by two individuals for the same enforcement action which stemmed from an investigation based on a self-report by a company. The SEC found that the individuals did not contribute to the success of the enforcement action.

According to the denial, “[t]he staff responsible for the Covered Action credibly declared, under penalty of perjury, that it neither received nor used any of the information provided by either Claimant during the Investigation or in the Covered Action, nor did it have any communications with the Claimants. Moreover, the information the Claimants provided did not relate to the matters considered in the Investigation.”

Individuals considering blowing the whistle to the SEC should first consult an experienced SEC whistleblower attorney in order to ensure they are fully protected and qualify for the largest possible award.

Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about whistleblower awards, visit the NLR Financial, Securities & Banking section.

SEC Awards $600,000 to Whistleblower

On February 22, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a $600,000 whistleblower award to an individual who voluntarily provided the agency with original information which led to a successful enforcement action.

Through the SEC Whistleblower Program, when a qualified whistleblower’s information contributes to an enforcement action in which the SEC collects at least $1 million, the whistleblower is entitled to an award of 10-30% of the funds collected by the government. The SEC also extends anti-retaliation protections to whistleblowers and thus does not disclose any identifying information about award recipients.

In determining the exact percentage for a whistleblower award, the SEC weighs a number of factors. According to the order for the $600,000 award, the SEC considered that “[the whistleblower] provided new information that significantly contributed to the success of the Covered Action; [the whistleblower] provided substantial, ongoing assistance, including participating in an interview with Commission staff and providing helpful documents on multiple occasions; and the charges in the Covered Action were based, in part, on [the whistleblower’s] information.”

The SEC Whistleblower Program has already issued a slew of whistleblower awards in the 2022 fiscal year. Since the fiscal year began on October 1, 2021, the SEC has awarded over $100 million to over 30 individual whistleblowers.

The 2021 fiscal year was a record year for the program. During the fiscal year, the SEC received a record 12,200 whistleblower tips and issued a record $564 million in whistleblower awards to a record 108 individuals. Over the course of the year, the whistleblower program issued more awards than in all previous years combined.

Overall, since issuing its first award in 2012, the SEC has awarded approximately $1.2 billion to nearly 250 individual whistleblowers.

Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about SEC whistleblowers, visit the NLR White Collar Crime & Consumer Rights section.