California Estate Tax: Gone Today, Here Tomorrow?

California has no estate tax, but that could change in the near future. California State Senator Scott Wiener recently introduced a bill which would impose gift, estate, and generation-skipping transfer tax on transfers during life and at death after December 31, 2020.

California law requires that any law imposing transfer taxes must be approved by the voters. This means that, if the California Legislature approves the California bill, it will be put before the voters at the November 2020 election.

For a time, California imposed a “pick up tax,” which was equal to the credit for state death taxes allowable under federal law; however, federal tax legislation phased this credit out completely in 2005, effectively phasing out any California estate tax. California has not in recent memory, if ever, had a statewide gift or generation-skipping transfer tax.

Under the proposed California bill, like the federal regime, all California transfer taxes will be imposed at a 40% rate. The good news is that the taxpayer will be granted a credit for all transfer taxes paid to the federal government, so there will be no double taxation. The bad news is that, unlike the federal regime where the basic exclusion amount for each type of transfer is $11,400,000 and is adjusted for inflation, the basic exclusion amount for each type of transfer in California will be $3,500,000 and will not be adjusted for inflation. With the federal exclusion rates rising every year, advanced estate planning techniques to minimize such taxes have become something that fewer and fewer people have had to worry about. If the California bill passes, any person who has assets valued in excess of $3,500,000 could be subject to a 40% California transfer tax during life or at death. Moreover, with a full credit for federal transfer taxes, only estates between $3,500,000 and $11,400,000 will be subject to the California tax. Thus, a California resident with an estate of $100,000,000 would pay the same California estate tax as someone with an estate of $11,400,000.

As drafted, the California bill appears to have no marital deduction; however, this is most likely an oversight and should be corrected in future revisions of the California bill. The goal of the California bill is to impose transfer taxes on wealthy Californians equal to what they would have paid prior to the implementation of the increased exemption rates at the end of 2017.  As the marital deduction existed when exemption rates were lower, eliminating the marital deduction at the first death would not be aligned with the purpose of the California bill.

All transfer taxes, interest, and penalties generated by the California bill would fund the proposed Children’s Wealth and Opportunity Building Fund, a separate fund in the State Treasury, which will fund programs to help address socio-economic inequality.

 

© 2019 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP
This post was written by Joyce Feuille of Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP.
Read more news on the California Estate Tax on our Estate Planning page.

EPA Issues New Emergency Response Requirements for Community Water Systems

On March 27, 2019,  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published the Federal Register Notice for New Risk Assessments and Emergency Response Plans for Community Water Systems describing the requirements and deadlines for community (drinking) water systems to develop or update risk and resilience assessments (RRAs) and emergency response plans (ERPs) under  America’s Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) which was signed into law on October 23, 2018 and amends the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).   Additionally, as described below, preparation of an ERP will enable owners or operators of community water systems to apply for grants from EPA for fiscal years 2020 and 2021.

Covered water systems.  Community water systems that serve more than 3,300 people are covered by these requirements. EPA interprets the population served to mean all persons served by the system directly or indirectly, including the population served by consecutive water systems, such as wholesalers.

Deadlines.  Each covered Community Water System completing an RRA and ERP must send certifications of completion by the dates listed below, and then review for necessary updates every 5 years thereafter:

Population Served by the Community Water System

Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) Certification

Emergency Response Plan (ERP)

The dates below are 6 months from the date of the RRA certification, based on a utility submitting a risk assessment on the final due date. Depending on actual RRA certification, ERP due dates could be sooner.

≥100,000

March 31, 2020

September 30, 2020

50,000-99,999

December 31, 2020

June 30, 2021

3,301-49,999

June 30, 2021

December 30, 2021

Risk and Resilience Assessment Requirements.  Each covered community water system must assess the risks to, and resilience of, its system including:

  • risk to the system from malevolent acts and natural hazards
  • resilience of the pipes and constructed conveyances, physical barriers, source water, water collection and intake, pretreatment, treatment, storage and distribution facilities;
  • electronic, computer, or other automated systems (including the security of such systems) which are utilized by the system;
  • monitoring practices of the system;
  • financial infrastructure of the system;
  • use, storage, or handling of various chemicals by the system; and
  • operation and maintenance of the system.

Emergency Response Plan Requirements (ERP). No later than six months after certifying completion of its risk and resilience assessment, each system must prepare or revise, where necessary, an emergency response plan that incorporates the findings of the assessment.  The ERP must include:

  • strategies and resources to improve the resilience of the system, including the physical security and cybersecurity of the system;
  • plans and procedures that can be implemented, and identification of equipment that can be utilized, in the event of a malevolent act or natural hazard that threatens the ability of the community water system to deliver safe drinking water;
  • actions, procedures, and equipment which can obviate or significantly lessen the impact of a malevolent act or natural hazard on the public health,  safety, and supply of drinking water provided to communities and individuals, including the development of alternative source water options, relocation of water intakes, and construction of flood protection barriers; and
  • strategies that can be used to aid in the detection of malevolent acts or natural hazards that threaten the security or resilience of the system.

The Federal Register Notice indicates that EPA is not requiring water systems to use any designated standards or methods to complete RRAs or ERPs, provided all of the requirements of the SDWA and AWIA are met.  AWIA already defines resilience and natural hazards. EPA will provide additional tools to foster compliance with its provisions and baseline information regarding malevolent acts no later than August 1, 2019.  With respect to the latter, it is anticipated that the agency will include consideration of acts that may (1) substantially disrupt the ability of the system to provide a safe and reliable supply of drinking water; or (2) otherwise present significant public health or economic concerns to the community served by the system.

Potential Impacts & Next Steps.  Preparation of an ERP will enable the owners or operators of community water systems to apply for grants under the Drinking Water Infrastructure Risk and Resilience Program, under which EPA may award grants in fiscal years 2020 and 2021.  If consistent with its ERP, a community water system may apply for grant funding for projects that increase resilience, such as:

  • Purchase and installation of equipment for detection of drinking water contaminants or malevolent acts;
  • Purchase and installation of fencing, gating, lighting, or security cameras;
  • Tamper-proofing of manhole covers, fire hydrants, and valve boxes;
  • Purchase and installation of improved treatment technologies and equipment to improve the resilience of the system;
  • Improvements to electronic, computer, financial, or other automated systems and remote systems;
  • Participation in training programs, and the purchase of training manuals and guidance materials relating to security and resilience;
  • Improvements in the use, storage, or handling of chemicals by the community water system;
  • Security screening of employees or contractor support services;
  • Equipment necessary to support emergency power or water supply, including standby and mobile sources; and
  • Development of alternative source water options, relocation of water intakes, and construction of flood protection barriers.

The EPA is currently developing a comprehensive training schedule, which will include both classroom and webinar options.

 

© 2019 Van Ness Feldman LLP.
Read more water infrastructure news on our environmental type of law page.

340B Drug Ceiling Prices Now Available

On April 1, 2019, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) launched a secure website that lists the maximum price drug manufacturers may charge 340B-covered entities for 340B-eligible drug purchases (the 340B Ceiling Price Site).  Drug manufacturers and 340B-covered entities may access the 340B Ceiling Price Site through their HRSA Office of Pharmacy Affairs information system (the 340B OPAIS) account here: https://340bopais.hrsa.gov/

Since the creation of the 340B program in 1992, participating covered entities could not verify whether they received the correct price for medication purchased through the program. In 2010, as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Congress directed HRSA to create a secure database that lists the 340B ceiling price.   Nearly nine years later, HRSA launched the 340B Ceiling Price Site which allows covered entities to now access verifiable 340B drug pricing information.

The 340B ceiling price is statutorily defined as a drug’s average manufacturer price (AMP) of a drug reduced by the unit rebate amount (URA).  The URA is calculated by dividing the drug’s Medicaid drug rebate amount (DRA) by the AMP.  The 340B ceiling price can be calculated as AMP – (DRA/AMP).

To populate the 340B Ceiling Price Site, HRSA obtains AMP and URA information from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), as well as a third-party drug pricing publisher, First Databank.   Manufacturers are also tasked with providing pricing information to HRSA during quarterly price reporting windows, which will last for two weeks each calendar quarter. If there is a discrepancy between HRSA’s data and manufacturer reported data, the manufacturer may either: (1) accept HRSA’s data as its own, (2) refuse to edit the manufacturer data and provide explanations for each discrepancy, or (3) edit the manufacturer data and provide reasoning for any remaining discrepancies.  After resolving pricing discrepancies, HRSA will publish the calculated 340B ceiling price to the 340B Ceiling Price Site.

Covered entities’ access to the 340B Ceiling Price Site is limited to the covered entity’s authorizing official (AO) and primary contact (PC).  AOs and PCs are strictly prohibited from sharing 340B pricing information outside of their organization and from exporting pricing information from the 340B Ceiling Price Site. They must attest to their compliance with these obligations each time they log into the 340B Ceiling Price Site.

Although the 340B Ceiling Price Site provides covered entities with valuable pricing information, covered entities are reminded that the price they pay for 340B-eligible drugs could differ from the 340B ceiling price depending upon the covered entity’s wholesale pricing contract terms. The price paid for 340B eligible medications may vary for a number of reasons, including wholesale cost-minus/plus calculations and the availability of sub-340B ceiling pricing for drugs through the 340B Prime Vendor Program.

 

© 2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.
Read more drug pricing news on the Health Care type of law page.

Product Liability in the Internet of Things

When California enacted SB 327 last year, it became the first state to regulate Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which refer to physical devices that are connected to the internet. Beginning next January, the new law will require manufacturers of IoT devices sold in California to implement reasonable security features that protect the software, data, and information contained within them. While the law regulates only the minimum security standards for IoT devices, its definition of a “connected device” (i.e., an IoT device) may impact product liability claims because “connected devices” are physical objects and not technology. SB 327’s definition suggests that manufacturers of the software in IoT devices may not be held strictly liable for software defects, because the law aligns with and reinforces the view of most courts that software is not a product, but a service.

A broad concept, the IoT comprises billions of devices worldwide. It includes everything from cell phones and tablets to smart speakers that respond to voice commands, smart refrigerators that help keep track of the food inside them, and even smart collars that track a dog’s fitness levels. There are wearable health monitors that send a patient’s real-time medical information directly to a health care professional, and smart pills that help keep track of the time when a patient last took one. If a product can be connected to the internet, it can become an IoT device.

Among other things, SB 327 requires manufacturers of “connected devices” to equip them with “reasonable security features.” The law defines a “connected device” to include only “physical objects,” which is significant because IoT devices combine a physical object with technology that changes the nature of the device. For example, a regular lamp is not part of the IoT. But when a manufacturer installs technology that connects the lamp to the internet and allows it to be turned on or off or dimmed by a tablet or smart phone, then the lamp becomes an IoT device. As written, SB 327 may exclude manufacturers of the intangible technology – such as software – from its requirements.

Combining a physical object and an intangible technology also creates a novel issue when it comes to strict product liability principles, which typically hold that a product manufacturer may be strictly liable for a product’s defect. The first task in a strict product liability case is to identify the product. In the context of a device that has no internet connectivity, the answer is straightforward. If a ladder is defective and causes an injury, the ladder’s manufacturer may be held strictly liable because a ladder is the product. But when it comes to IoT devices, the line may be blurred. Almost always, the software part of the IoT device is “manufactured” by a separate entity from the entity that manufactures the physical object. If the IoT device proves to be defective, the question becomes which entity may be held strictly liable.

A real-world example illustrates the issue. Medical professionals today are beginning to use implantable cardiac devices that transmit data directly from the device to the health care provider, which allow the medical professional to directly monitor the patient and device (For more information on these medical devices and other issues that surround them, see our previous blog post here). The benefits of this technology are obvious. It allows for real-time observation by medical professionals, which makes patients safer and reduces the need for long visits to the doctor’s office. But internet-based monitoring also may come with some risks that the statute attempts to address. For example, as the device is connected to the internet, it may be vulnerable to unauthorized access. Additionally, a software defect could potentially misread data, corrupt information, or even cause the device to malfunction.

If the defect is in the physical object of the device, then the entity that manufactured the device may risk being held strictly liable. But if the defect is in the software, the answer is less apparent because courts have not clearly indicated whether software is a product for purposes of strict product liability. Most observers expect courts to treat software in IoT devices as a service rather than a product, because for UCC purposes courts typically treat custom-made software (like that in IoT devices) as a service rather than a good. SB 327 aligns with this view and provides additional fuel for the argument that software is not a product.

The California Legislature may have placed the burden on an IoT device’s physical manufacturer to ensure safety when it comes to data stored inside the device. But physical device manufacturers may yet argue that the software was a component product when it comes to strict liability issues. Time will tell how courts will address that argument.

 

© 2019 Schiff Hardin LLP
This post was written by Gregory Dickinson and Jeffrey Skinner of Schiff Hardin LLP.

Cincinnati City Council Passes Ordinance Prohibiting Salary History Inquiries

In a thinly veiled attempt to steal the spotlight from Cleveland, the new destination city for the National Football League, on March 13, 2019, the Cincinnati City Council passed Ordinance No. 83-2019, titled Prohibited Salary History Inquiry and Use, barring employers from inquiring about or relying on job applicants’ salary histories. It is scheduled to become effective in March 2020, and it applies to private employers with 15 or more employees in the city of Cincinnati.

The ordinance makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer or its agent to:

    1. Inquire about the salary history of an applicant for employment; or
    2. Screen job applicants based on their current or prior wages, benefits, other compensation, or salary histories, including requiring that an applicant’s prior wages, benefits, other compensation or salary history satisfy minimum or maximum criteria; or
    3. Rely on the salary history of an applicant in deciding whether to offer employment to an applicant, or in determining the salary, benefits, or other compensation for such applicant during the hiring process, including the negotiation of an employment contract; or
    4. Refuse to hire or otherwise disfavor, injure, or retaliate against an applicant for not disclosing his or her salary history to an employer.”

The ordinance does not limit employers from asking applicants “about their expectations with respect to salary, benefits, and other compensation, including but not limited to unvested equity or deferred compensation that an applicant would forfeit or have cancelled by virtue of the applicant’s resignation from their current employer.” Ordinance No. 83-2019 requires that, following a conditional offer of employment, upon request, the employer must provide the conditional offeree the pay scale for the position. The ordinance provides a private right of action to enforce the law. Remedies for violating the ordinance include “compensatory damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, the cost of the action, and such legal and equitable relief as the court deems just and proper.”

Ordinance No. 83-2019 is designed to “ensure that . . . job applicants in Cincinnati are offered employment positions and subsequently compensated based on their job responsibilities and level of experience, rather than on prior salary histories.” In reality, it reaches well beyond Cincinnati, as state and local salary history bans are proliferating. Many municipalities, cities, and states across the country have passed laws limiting salary inquiries, and legislation is pending in numerous other jurisdictions around the country.

 

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
Read more on Equal Pay issues on the National Law Review’s Labor and Employment page.

Split Over Impact of Bristol-Myers Squibb on Class Actions Deepens

Bakov v. Consolidated World Travel, Inc. is the latest salvo in the conflict over whether the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb applies in the class action context. As we have blogged in the past, Bristol-Myers concerned claims in California state court made by non-California residents, claims that were not sufficiently connected to California to qualify for specific personal jurisdiction on their own. The Court held that California state courts could not exercise specific jurisdiction over those claims even if they were packaged with claims by California residents in a mass tort action.

Bristol-Myers left two significant questions undecided: (1) whether the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause imposes the same jurisdictional limits on federal courts that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause imposes on state courts; and (2) whether Bristol-Myers’ jurisdictional limit jurisdictional limit on state court mass actions also applies to federal court class actions.

Bakov is a Northern District of Illinois decision that answers yes to both of those questions. The plaintiffs in Bakovalleged that the defendant cruise line directed another company to place calls to the plaintiffs without their consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. They sought certification of a nationwide class action. The court certified a class of Illinois residents but refused to certify a nationwide class, holding that under Bristol-Myersthe court did not have specific jurisdiction over the claims of non-Illinois residents. Courts have reached sharply different conclusions as to whether the jurisdictional limit set forth in Bristol-Myers applies to class actions. Bakovjoins the minority in concluding it does.

Bakov v. Consolidated World Travel, Inc., No. 15 C 2980, 2019 WL 1294659 .

 Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A.

This post was written by Nathaniel G. Foell and D. Matthew Allen of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A.

Read more Class Action analysis  on the litigation type of law page.

Maryland Proposes New Telehealth Psychology and Therapy Rules

Two Maryland licensing boards – the Board of Examiners of Psychologist and the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists – issued a pair of proposed rules setting forth practice standards for mental health services delivered via telehealth technologies. The Boards previously did not have specific practice standards or rules unique to telehealth. Once finalized, psychologists, counselors, and therapists using telehealth in their services should read and apply these new requirements to their operations and service models.

The proposed rules closely mirror each other. Both apply to professionals delivering care to patients located in Maryland. Both allow a wide range of modalities, defining telehealth as the “use of interactive audio, video or other telecommunications or electronic media,” but excluding an audio only telephone conversations, email, fax or text.  Both rules prohibit treatment based solely upon an online questionnaire.

The Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists rule allows therapists to conduct the initial patient evaluation via telehealth. The Board of Psychology rule requires an in-person initial evaluation unless the psychologist or psychologist associate documents in the record the reason for not meeting in person. (The rule doesn’t enumerate a list of acceptable or unacceptable reasons; it simply requires the reason to be documented.)

Professionals must confirm the identity of the client/patient, as well as the client’s location and contact information. The professional must also identify contact information for emergency services at the client’s location. Curiously, the rule issued by the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists refers to the client’s location as the “practice setting.” While this could raise a suggestion that the client must be physically located in a clinical practice setting, it is more likely a drafting error because there is no mention of any originating site requirements in the rule.

Professionals must also identify everyone at the client’s location and confirm those individuals are permitted to hear the client’s health information. The use of the term “permitted” as opposed to “authorized or “legally authorized” and the absence of reference to any state or federal privacy law, suggests another person’s presence is subject to the client’s permission and not legal authority.

With regard to client consent to telehealth services, the Board of Psychology rule requires “written informed consent,” whereas the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists rule requires the client’s “written and oral acknowledgement.” Both rules state that the standard for services delivered via telehealth is the same as services delivered in-person.

The Boards are considering comments and Maryland providers are awaiting the final regulations.  We will continue to monitor further developments including the passage of these final rules and any changes.

 

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP
This post was written by Emily H. Wein and Nathaniel M. Lacktman of Foley & Lardner LLP.

SEC Adopts FAST Act Disclosure Simplification and Modernization Amendments

On March 20, 2019, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted amendments to modernize and simplify Regulation S-K’s disclosure requirements and related rules and forms, as required by the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act. The amendments were proposed by the SEC in October 2017. The SEC adopted most of the amendments as proposed and some of the amendments with modifications, and elected not to adopt certain proposed amendments at all.

The SEC intends for the amendments to improve the readability and navigability of company disclosures and to discourage repetition and disclosure of immaterial information. These amendments complement other recent amendments adopted by the SEC to simplify disclosure, such as in the Disclosure Update and Simplification Final Rule that became effective in November 2018.

Below are brief summaries of some of the more significant amendments:

Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A) 

(Regulation S-K, Item 303 and Form 20-F). Registrants may omit discussion of the earliest of three years in the MD&A if they already discussed that year in any of their prior EDGAR filings that required such discussion. Registrants who elect not to include a discussion of the earliest year must include a statement that identifies the location in the prior filing where the omitted discussion may be found.

Description of Property (Regulation S-K, Item 102)

Registrants must provide disclosure about physical property only to the extent that the property is material to the registrant’s business.

Risk Factors (Regulation S-K, Item 503(c) (moved to new Item 105))

The examples are deleted from the risk factors item to emphasize the principles-based nature of this disclosure requirement.

Material Contracts Two-Year Look Back (Regulation S-K, Item 601(b)(10))

Only “newly reporting registrants” are required to file fully performed material contracts that the registrant has entered into within two years of the applicable registration statement or report.

Redaction of Confidential Information in Material Contracts (Regulation S-K, Items 601(b)(10) and 601(b)(2) and investment company registration forms)

Registrants may omit or redact confidential information from their filed material contracts without submitting a confidential treatment request to the SEC if the confidential information (i) is not material and (ii) would likely cause competitive harm to the registrant if publicly disclosed. This amendment is effective upon the rule’s publication in the Federal Register.

New Form 10-K Exhibit (new Regulation S-K, Item 6(b)(4)(iv)).

Registrants are required to file an additional Exhibit to Form 10-K containing the description of the registrant’s securities required under Regulation S-K, Item 202(a)-(d) and (f).

Schedules and Attachments as Exhibits (Regulation S-K, Item 601(a)(5) and investment company forms).

Registrants are no longer required to file attachments to their material agreements if such attachments do not contain material information or were not otherwise disclosed.

Hyperlinks (Securities Act Rule 411(b)(4); Exchange Act Rules 12b-23(a)(3) and 12b-32; Investment Company Act Rule 0-4; and Regulation S-T Rules 102 and 105).

Registrants are no longer required to file as an exhibit any document that is incorporated by reference in the filing, but instead registrants must provide a hyperlink to such document.

Financial Statements: Incorporation by Reference and Cross-Reference (Forms 8-K, 10-Q, 10-K, 20-F, and 40F).

Financial statements are prohibited from incorporating by reference, or cross-referencing to, information outside the financial statements (including in other parts of the same filing), unless otherwise specifically permitted by the SEC’s rules, U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or International Financing Reporting Standards, as applicable.

Cover Page (Forms 8-K, 10-Q, 10-K, 20-F, and 40F).

Registrants are required to disclose on the form cover page the national exchange or principal U.S. market for their securities, the trading symbol, and the title of each class of securities. Additionally, registrants are required to tag all cover page information using Inline XBRL. This cover page Inline XBRL requirement has a three-year phase-in compliance period identical to the phase-in compliance period for the SEC’s Inline XBRL rules adopted in 2018, with large accelerated filers required to comply beginning with fiscal periods ending on or after June 15, 2019.

Section 16 Disclosure (Regulation S-K, Item 405 and Form 10-K).

The caption for reporting delinquent reporting under Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act is changed from “Section 16(a) Beneficial Ownership Reporting Compliance” to “Delinquent Section 16(a) Reports,” and the checkbox on the cover page of Form 10-K related to such delinquencies is eliminated. Additionally, registrants are allowed to rely on Section 16 reports filed on EDGAR (as opposed to only paper copies of reports).

Investment Companies.

The adopted amendments include parallel amendments to several rules and forms applicable to investment companies and investment advisers, including amendments that require certain investment company filings to include a hyperlink to each exhibit listed in the filings’ exhibit index and that require registrants to submit such filings in HyperText Markup Language (HTML) format. The requirements that all investment company registration statements and Form N-CSR filings be made in HTML format and comply with the hyperlink rule and form amendments applies to all filings made on or after April 1, 2020.

Except as otherwise noted, the amendments will be effective 30 days from publication in the Federal Register.

The above summaries are not comprehensive and provide only highlights of certain amendments. They do not reflect all of the amendments nor all of the rules and forms that are affected by the amendments.

 

© 2019 Schiff Hardin LLP

U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Whether Courts Must Defer to an Agency’s Interpretation of its Regulations – a Judicial Policy That Recently Resulted in Dismissal of Litigation Over ‘No Sugar Added’ Claims on 100% Juices

The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments on March 27, 2019 about whether to overturn the principle of judicial review of federal agency actions that requires a federal court to yield to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation that the agency has promulgated.  Under this policy, known as ‘Auer deference’ from the 1997 case Auer v. Robbins, a court must yield to an agency’s interpretation of its own unclear regulation unless the court finds that the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”

Auer deference was the basis for successful defendant motions to dismiss over the past year in a number of class actions concerning ‘No Sugar Added’ claims on 100% juices.  We reported, for example, on the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of Odwalla, in Wilson v. Odwalla Inc. et al. (Case Number 2:17-cv-02763) based on the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) interpretation of paragraph (c)(2)(iv) of 21 CFR 101.60 (“Nutrient content claims for the calorie content of foods”) as permitting juice with no added sugar to be considered a substitute for juice with added sugar and similar sugar-sweetened beverages.

Based on the Justices’ comments in the recent hearing, it is not clear if Auerdeference will be intact at the end of June, by which time a ruling is expected.  Many food product labels could face renewed attacks under state consumer protection and false advertising laws if courts are no longer bound by FDA’s interpretation of ambiguous regulatory requirements, including the use of ‘no sugar added” under the regulation on nutrient content claims.

 

© 2019 Keller and Heckman LLP

IRS Periods of Limitation on Refunds, Assessment of Tax, and Collection

Statutes of limitation prescribe a period of limitation for the bringing of certain types of action. There are three such statutes of limitation that come into play when dealing with the Internal Revenue Service. These limitations periods relate to tax refunds, IRS examination and assessment, and IRS collections.

How long do you have to file a claim for refund?

Under IRC 6511(a), a taxpayer has three years from the date of filing a tax return to claim a credit or refund, or two years from the date the tax was paid, whichever is later. If a taxpayer files his/her return or makes payment prior to the date prescribed for doing so, the return or payment is considered filed or paid on that last day for doing so. Further, for claims for refund not filed within the three year period, the amount of the refund is limited to the portion of the tax that was paid within the two years preceding the filing of the claim. IRC 6511(b). There are exceptions to these general rules, however, and you should consult with a tax attorney to see if those exceptions apply in your case.

The IRS estimates that it has $1.4 billion in refunds for taxpayers that did not file an income tax return (Form 1040) for the 2015 tax year. In order to be entitled to their refunds, most taxpayers must file their 2015 return no later than April 15, 2019. If the 2015 tax return is not filed by that date, the tax refund will become property of the U.S. Treasury.

How long does the IRS have to audit your return? 

Generally speaking, the IRS has three years from the due date of your tax return or three years from the date it was filed, whichever is later, to audit your return and make an assessment. However, there are exceptions that may apply to extend the audit period:

  1. If there is a substantial omission of gross income, then the IRS has six years to make an assessment. A substantial omission of gross income is one that amounts to more than 25 percent of the amount reported on the tax return.
  2. If the additional tax is related to undisclosed foreign financial assets and the omitted income is more than $5,000, the IRS has six years to make an assessment.
  3. The statute of limitation is open indefinitely if the taxpayer has filed a false or fraudulent tax return.

Keep in mind, the statute of limitation on assessment does not start to run until a tax return has been filed. If a tax return has not been filed, the statute for assessment remains open.

How long can the IRS collect a tax liability?

Generally speaking, the statute of limitation for the IRS to collect on a tax debt, plus penalties and interest, is 10 years from the date of assessment. Note that this is 10 years from the date of the assessment, not 10 years from the due date of the return. In addition, this 10-year period can be suspended under certain circumstances, including:

  • if the taxpayer has filed for bankruptcy protection, plus an additional six months
  • if the taxpayer resides outside of the US for at least six months
  • if the taxpayer files a request for a collection due process hearing
  • if the taxpayer files a claim for innocent spouse relief
  • if the taxpayer files for an offer-in compromise (OIC)
  • while there is a pending installment agreement request

Finally, the IRS can take action to collect beyond the 10-year limitation period by filing suit to reduce the assessments to judgment.

© 2019 Varnum LLP
This post was written by Angelique M. Neal of Varnum LLP.