Category: Uncategorized

Supreme Court Will not Disturb Ruling that a False Rumor about “Sleeping Your Way to a Promotion” can be a Hostile Work Environment

The U.S. Supreme Court decided not to review an appellate court decision that held a false rumor about a woman “sleeping” her way to a promotion can give rise to a hostile work environment claim.  This means that the February 2019 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Parker v. Reema Consulting Services, Inc. will stand.  In Parker, the Fourth Circuit held that, where an employer participates in circulating false rumors that a female employee slept with her male boss to obtain a promotion, this constitutes Title VII gender discrimination.

Parker’s Discrimination Claim

Evangeline Parker started worked for Reema Consulting Services, Inc., (“RCSI”) at its warehouse facility as a low-level clerk.  She was promoted six times, ultimately rising to Assistant Operations Manager.  About two weeks after she was promoted to a manager position, she learned that some male employees were circulating “an unfounded, sexually-explicit rumor about her” that “falsely and maliciously portrayed her as having [had] a sexual relationship” with a higher-ranking manager to obtain her management position.

The rumor originated with another RCSI employee who was jealous of Parker’s achievement, and the highest-ranking manager at the warehouse facility participated in spreading the rumor.  Parker’s complaint alleged that as the rumor spread, she “was treated with open resentment and disrespect” from many coworkers, including employees she was responsible for supervising.

At an all-staff meeting at which the rumor was discussed, the warehouse manager slammed the door in Parker’s face and excluded her from the meeting.  The following day, the warehouse manager screamed at Parker and blamed her for “bringing the situation to the workplace.” He also stated that “he could no longer recommend her for promotions or higher-level tasks because of the rumor” and that he “would not allow her to advance any further within the company.”  A few days later, the warehouse manager “lost his temper and began screaming” at Parker, and Parker then filed an internal sexual harassment complaint with RCSI Human Resources.  Shortly thereafter, RCSI gave Parker two warnings and terminated her employment.

Lawyer pointingParker brought a discrimination claim, alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment.  The district court dismissed her claim on the grounds that 1) the harassment was not based upon gender and instead based upon false allegations of conduct by her, and 2) the conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered the conditions of Parker’s employment because the rumor was circulated for just a few weeks.  Judge Titus found, “Clearly, this woman is entitled to the dignity of her merit-based promotion and not to have it sullied by somebody suggesting that it was because she had sexual relations with a supervisor who promoted her.”  However, he continued “that is not a harassment based upon gender.  It’s based upon false allegations of conduct by her.  And this same type of a rumor could be made in a variety of other context[s] involving people of the same gender or different genders alleged to have had some kind of sexual activity leading to a promotion.”  Ultimately, Judge Titus held that “the rumor and the spreading of that kind of a rumor is based upon conduct, not gender.

Gender-Based Rumors Can Constitute Sex Harassment

Taking into account all of the allegations of the complaint, including the sex-based nature of the rumor and its effects, the Fourth Circuit held that the rumor that Parker had sex with her male superior to obtain a promotion was gender-based in that it implied that she “used her womanhood, rather than her merit, to obtain from a man, so seduced, a promotion.”  The court found that the rumor invoked “a deeply rooted perception — one that unfortunately still persists — that generally women, not men, use sex to achieve success.”  This double standard precipitated by negative stereotypes regarding the relationship between the advancement of women in the workplace and their sexual behavior can cause superiors and coworkers to treat women in the workplace differently from men.  Thus, the rumor about Parker sleeping her way to a promotion constituted a form of sexual harassment.

The Fourth Circuit also held that Parker sufficiently alleged severe or pervasive harassment:

[T]he harassment was continuous, preoccupying not only Parker, but also management and the employees at the Sterling facility for the entire time of Parker’s employment after her final promotion.  The harassment began with the fabrication of the rumor by a jealous male workplace competitor and was then circulated by male employees.  Management too contributed to the continuing circulation of the rumor.  The highest-ranking manager asked another manager, who was rumored to be having the relationship with Parker, whether his wife was divorcing him because he was “f–king” Parker.  The same manager called an all-staff meeting, at which the rumor was discussed, and excluded Parker.  In another meeting, the manager blamed Parker for bringing the rumor into the workplace. And in yet another meeting, the manager harangued Parker about the rumor, stating he should have fired her when she began “huffing and puffing” about it.

Implications

Parker correctly recognizes that gender-based stereotypes can prevent women from advancing in the workplace and that Title VII bars employers from using negative gender stereotypes to harass employees.

© 2019 Zuckerman Law

ARTICLE BY Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
More on workplace harassment via the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

President Trump Issues Proclamation Suspending Entry of Immigrants Who May Burden the U.S. Healthcare System

On Oct. 4, 2019, President Trump issued a Proclamation, that will be effective on Nov. 3, 2019, suspending the entry of immigrants who will financially burden the United States healthcare system. The reasoning behind the issuance of this Proclamation is to not burden American taxpayers with immigrants who utilize the U.S. healthcare system without payment and who allegedly contribute to overcrowding of emergency rooms and hospitals. The Proclamation includes a reference to data that shows lawful immigrants being three times more likely than U.S. citizens to lack health insurance, and while the United States will still continue to welcome immigrants, the country must protect its own citizens.

President Trump, through the Proclamation, declares the following:

    1. – The immediate suspension of immigrants entering the United States who does not have approved health insurance, within 30 days of entry, or unless the alien possesses the financial resources to pay for medical costs. Approved health insurance is defined in the Proclamation, which can be found here.
    2. – The Proclamation only applies to those who are seeking immigrant visas, as opposed to those seeking nonimmigrant visas.
      1. The Proclamation will not apply to those who hold a valid immigrant visa issued before the effective date of the proclamation; those who are seeking to enter the United States pursuant to a Special Immigrant Visa, who is a national of Afghanistan or Iraq, or any alien who is the child of a U.S. citizen seeking to enter the U.S. pursuant to the following categories: SB-1, IR-2, IR-3, IR-4, IH-3, IH-4, and IR-5 (with limitations).
      2. b. The Proclamation will also not apply to those aliens under 18, and any other aliens whose entry would be in the national interest.
      3. c. The Proclamation will not affect those who are lawful permanent residents (e.g., already received green cards), and will not affect eligibility regarding asylum, refugee status, etc.
    3. – The Proclamation will be implemented and enforced immediately, and a report must be submitted within 180 days of the effective date.

 

©2019 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

For more on the topic, see the National Law Review Immigration Law page.

Second Circuit Confirms Arbitration Awards That Are (Literally) Out of This World

Arbitration over whether a South Korean company or a Bermuda company headquartered in Hong Kong owns a geostationary satellite in light of an order from a South Korean regulatory agency can be complicated. The Second Circuit recently affirmed a decision confirming an arbitration award adjudicating ownership of the satellite in question and awarding damages related to a party’s failure to obtain regulatory approvals necessary to complete the sale over claims that the arbitration panel exceeded its power, disregarded the law, and violated public policy.

KT Corp., a Korean company, agreed to sell a satellite to ABS Holdings Ltd., a Bermuda company headquartered in Hong Kong. The companies signed a purchase agreement to convey the title to the satellite and an operations agreement under which KT agreed to operate the satellite on behalf of ABS. Both agreements contained New York choice-of-law provisions and mandatory arbitration clauses. The purchase agreement required KT to obtain and maintain all necessary licenses and authorizations for the sale and the continued operation of the satellite.

The sale was completed and title to the satellite was transferred.

Nearly two years later, a South Korean regulatory agency issued an order declaring the purchase agreement null and void because KT had failed to obtain a required export permit. The agency canceled KT’s permission to use certain frequencies to operate the satellite.

KT and ABS arbitrated who held title to the satellite and whether KT had violated the purchase agreement before a panel of the International Chamber of Commerce. In two awards, the panel concluded that ABS held title to the satellite because title had lawfully passed when the conditions precedent to the purchase agreement were completed when there was no requirement that KT obtain an export permit. And even if that was not the case, the panel concluded, the regulatory order had no effect because it was issued retroactively without notice to the parties in violation of New York law, and KT breached its obligations by failing to obtain all the approvals necessary for the continued operation of the satellite (even though an export permit may not have been required for the sale of the satellite, one was necessary to maintain the satellite’s operations).

KT petitioned the Southern District of New York to vacate the award, and ABS petitioned the court to confirm it. The district court granted ABS’ petition and confirmed the panel’s award.

The Second Circuit affirmed. KT argued that the panel had exceeded its authority and that the award disregarded the law and violated public policy. KT claimed that the panel’s conclusion that the regulatory order was without effect violated due process principles. The court disagreed, noting that KT had not challenged the order, its counsel had questioned its validity, and the panel did not rest on the validity of the order; the panel referenced the propriety of the order as an alternate basis for its primary conclusion that title to the satellite properly changed hands. The court also rejected KT’s argument that the panel had disregarded New York contract law. Regarding public policy, although the court recognized that it is the public policy of the United States to enforce foreign judgments that are not repugnant to U.S. policy, it was unclear whether that public policy extended to foreign regulatory orders, and it was not even clear that the regulatory order in this case was enforceable under South Korean law according to KT’s expert.

KT Corp. v. ABS Holdings, Ltd., No. 18-2300 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2019).

©2011-2019 Carlton Fields, P.A.

ARTICLE BY Brendan N. Gooley of Carlton Fields.
For more arbitration decisions, see the National Law Review ADR / Arbitration / Mediation page.

SCOTUS Case Watch 2019-2020: Welcome to the New Term

The Supreme Court of the United States kicked off its 2019-2010 term on October 7, 2019, with several noteworthy cases on its docket. This term, some of the issues before the Court will likely have great historical significance for the LGBTQ community. Among these controversies are whether the prohibition against discrimination because of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses discrimination because of sexual orientation. In addition, the Court is slated to consider Title VII’s protections of transgender individuals, if any. Here’s a rundown of the employment law related cases that Supreme Court watchers can expect this term.

Title VII and Sexual Orientation

In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618 and Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 the Court will consider whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII. Oral argument for these consolidated cases is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Transgender Employees

In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 18-107, the Court agreed to decide whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Oral argument for this case is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Age Discrimination

In Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 the Court will consider a provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 regarding federal-sector coverage. The provision at issue requires employers taking personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or older to free from “discrimination based on age.” The issue is whether the federal-sector provision requires a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of a challenged personnel action. A date has not yet been set for oral arguments in this case.

Employee Benefits

In Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, No. 18-1116 the Supreme Court agreed to settle an issue concerning the statute of limitation in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The three-year limitations period runs from “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The question for the Court is whether this limitations period bars suit when the defendants in a case had disclosed all relevant information to the plaintiff more than three years before the plaintiff filed a complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information. Oral arguments, in this case, are scheduled for December 4, 2019.

We will report in further details on these cases once the Supreme Court issues its rulings.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Resist the Urge to Access: the Impact of the Stored Communications Act on Employer Self-Help Tactics

As an employer or manager, have you ever collected a resigning employee’s employer-owned laptop or cellphone and discovered that the employee left a personal email account automatically logged in? Did you have the urge to look at what the employee was doing and who the employee was talking to right before resigning? Perhaps to see if he or she was talking to your competitors or customers? If so, you should resist that urge.

The federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq., is a criminal statute that makes it an offense to “intentionally access[ ]without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided[ ]and thereby obtain[ ] . . . access to a[n] . . . electronic communication while it is in electronic storage  . . . .” It also creates a civil cause of action for victims of such offenses, remedied by (i) actual damages of at least $1,000; (ii) attorneys’ fees and court costs; and, potentially, (iii) punitive damages if the access was willful or intentional.

So how does this criminal statute apply in a situation in which an employee uses a personal email account on an employer-owned electronic device—especially if an employment policy confirms there is no expectation of privacy on the employer’s computer systems and networks? The answer is in the technology itself.

Many courts find that the “facility” referenced in the statute is the server on which the email account resides—not the company’s computer or other electronic device. In one 2013 federal case, a former employee left her personal Gmail account automatically logged in when she returned her company-owned smartphone. Her former supervisor allegedly used that smartphone to access over 48,000 emails on the former employee’s personal Gmail account. The former employee later sued her former supervisor and her former employer under the Stored Communications Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim, arguing, among other things, that a smartphone was not a “facility” under the statute.

While agreeing with that argument in principle, the court concluded that it was, in fact, Gmail’s server that was the “facility” for purposes of Stored Communications Act claims. The court also rejected the defendants’ arguments (i) that because it was a company-owned smartphone, the employee had in fact authorized the review, and (ii) that the former employee was responsible for any alleged loss of privacy, because she left the door open to the employer reviewing the Gmail account.

Similarly, in a 2017 federal case, a former employee sued her ex-employer for allegedly using her returned cell phone to access her Gmail account on at least 40 occasions. To assist in the prosecution of a restrictive covenant claim against the former employee, the former employer allegedly arranged to forward several of those emails to the employer’s counsel, including certain allegedly privileged emails between the former employee and her lawyer. The court denied the former employer’s motion to dismiss the claim based on those allegations.

Interestingly, some courts, including both in the above-referenced cases, draw a line on liability under the Stored Communication Act based on whether the emails that were accessed were already opened at the time of access. This line of reasoning is premised on a finding that opened-but-undeleted emails are not in “storage for backup purposes” under the Stored Communications Act. But this distinction is not universal.

In another 2013 federal case, for example, an individual sued his business partner under the Stored Communications Act after the defendant logged on to the other’s Yahoo account using his password. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff on that claim, and the defendant filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The defendant argued that she only read emails that had already been opened and that they were therefore not in “electronic storage” for “purposes of backup protection.” The court disagreed, stating that “regardless of the number of times plaintiff or defendant viewed plaintiff’s email (including by downloading it onto a web browser), the Yahoo server continued to store copies of those same emails that previously had been transmitted to plaintiff’s web browser and again to defendant’s web browser.” So again, the court read the Stored Communications Act broadly, stating that “the clear intent of the SCA was to protect a form of communication in which the citizenry clearly has a strong reasonable expectation of privacy.”

Based on the broad reading of the Stored Communications Act in which many courts across the country engage, employers and managers are well advised to exercise caution before reviewing an employee’s personal communications that may be accessible on a company electronic device. Even policies informing employees not to expect privacy on company computer systems and networks may not save the employer or manager from liability under the statute. So seek legal counsel if this opportunity presents itself upon an employee’s separation from the company. And resist the urge to access before doing so.

© 2019 Foley & Lardner LLP
For more on the Stored Communications Act, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law page.

DOJ Policy Review of SEPs May Have Big Implications for Company Environmental Settlements

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is in the midst of a comprehensive policy review regarding the use of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) in settlements of environmental enforcement actions. This review could potentially have far-reaching implications for companies that seek to settle such actions brought by either the federal government, or in the case of a citizen suit, a non-governmental organization (NGO). It remains to be seen if the ongoing SEP policy review will result in additional limits on the use of SEPs in settlement, thus limiting the flexibility in achieving penalty mitigation that has been a hallmark of environmental enforcement case resolutions for nearly three decades.

SEPs have been popular among both governmental and non-governmental defendants in enforcement cases for nearly thirty years. SEPs allow settling parties to mitigate a portion of a civil penalty in exchange for performance of environmentally beneficial projects. Under long standing SEP policy, settling parties can receive up to a maximum of 80 percent credit towards mitigation of a portion of a civil penalty for funds expended in performance of SEPs. This policy has proven popular in local communities that benefit from the projects, and these benefits are something that is beyond what is required to achieve compliance with the law. In the early 1990s, SEPs tended to be the exception to the norm of environmental enforcement settlements. But during the later 1990s, SEPs became quite common – even typical.

It is possible that the current ongoing review of SEP policy could result in greater scrutiny of use of SEPs in settlements with companies. Further restrictions on the use of SEPs could take many forms, including limitations on the funds expended, greater scrutiny of the nexus of the SEP to the underlying violations, and even potential elimination of the use of SEPs altogether. Typically, settling parties would much prefer including a SEP as part of a settlement, rather than simply paying all of its out-of-pocket costs as a civil penalty, so further restrictions or elimination of SEPs altogether would not be a positive development for the regulated community.

It is clear that the current administration takes a much more skeptical view of the appropriateness of SEPs than any prior administration. This past August, Assistant Attorney General for the Environment and Natural Resources Division (ENRD) Jeffrey Clark issued a memorandum to all ENRD Section Chiefs outlining new limits on the use of SEPs. Under the new policy, the use of SEPs is prohibited in settlements involving state and local governments, which gives less flexibility to both state and local governments as well as DOJ enforcement attorneys in determining appropriate resolution of enforcement cases.

This latest SEP policy memorandum builds on last November’s memorandum from the Attorney General outlining policies and procedure for civil consent decrees and settlements with state and local governments. This November memorandum included a directive that consent decrees “must not be used to achieve general policy goals or to extract greater or different relief from than could be obtained through agency enforcement authority or by litigation the matter to judgment.” Part of the intent of the outlined policy was to ensure accountability of state and local governments as to their policy goals.

Building on this in reference to SEPs, Clark stated “A clearer example of a form of relief that falls within the prohibition in the November 2018 Policy is difficult to imagine.” Clark left open the possibility of limited case-by-case exceptions to the broader policy of the prohibition, under certain limited conditions, pending his further overall review of SEP policies. But Clark further stated that even if certain limitations are satisfied, “there is no guarantee that I will recommend approval . . . “of including a SEP as part of a settlement with a state or local government.”

© 2019 Schiff Hardin LLP

For more Supplemental Environmental Project issues, see the National Law Review Environmental, Energy & Resources law page.

Happy New Year! – Prepare to Track Time of More Employees or Increase Salaries

The US Department of Labor finally released its highly anticipated changes to the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). This rule, which goes into effect on January 1, 2020, will make more employees eligible for overtime because it updates the minimum salary thresholds necessary to exempt certain employees from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime pay requirements, as it will:

  • Raise the salary level from the current $455 per week to $684 per week (or $35,568 per year for a full-year worker)
  • Raise the total annual compensation level for highly compensated employees from the current $100,000 per year to $107,432 per year
  • Allow employers to use nondiscretionary bonuses and incentive payments (including commissions) that are paid at least annually to satisfy up to 10 percent of the salary level
  • Revise the special salary levels for workers in US territories and in the motion picture industry

This means all employees who are paid a salary falling below the new salary threshold will be non-exempt beginning on January 1, 2020. Said another way, these employees will be eligible for overtime for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek.

Remind Me About the Exemptions Affected

The FLSA generally requires employees to be paid at least minimum wage for every hour worked, and overtime (time and a half) for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. Certain employees are “exempt” from the FLSA’s minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping requirements. Key here are the “white collar” exemptions, namely the executive, administrative, and professional exemptions, which depend on three things:

  1. The employee must be paid on a “salaried basis,” meaning the employee receives a fixed, guaranteed minimum amount for any workweek in which the employee performs any work. This means there can be no change in salary regardless of the hours worked.
  2. The employee must be paid a minimum salary of, as of January 1, 2020, $684 per week ($35,658 annually).
  3. However, paying a sufficient salary is not enough — the employee must also perform exempt job duties under one of the exemptions to satisfy this test. (Notably, the new rule did not make any changes to the job duties test, despite ambiguity and years of employer confusion.)

Let’s reiterate this important point again: to be exempt under one of these exemptions, all three prongs above must be satisfied.

I’m Busy — Can I Deal with This Later?

We wouldn’t recommend that. It’s time to start preparing because there are many moving parts when making classification decisions, and, as we all know, 2020 will be here sooner than we think. Also, we suspect these won’t be unilateral decisions made by the human resources department but that others will need to be involved; for most companies, that won’t happen overnight, as it may require significant analysis of the budgetary impact of potential salary increases before employee classifications can be finalized.

So what can you do now? We suggest you start by identifying employees who are currently classified as exempt but whose salaries fall below the new $684 weekly salary. Then, try to estimate the number of hours worked by the employee each workweek, which may be more difficult than it sounds, since exempt workers typically don’t track their time. Depending on the employee’s salary and the number of hours worked, you’ll want to consider whether you’re going to raise the employee’s pay to meet the new threshold or reclassify the employee as non-exempt and pay overtime; and, if you’re going to reclassify the employee, you’ll have to determine how and what the employee will be paid. You should go through the same analysis for those employees who are classified as exempt under the highly compensated employee exemption if their annual salary falls below the new $107,432 threshold.

Think you’re done? Wait, there’s more! Once you identify employees who will be reclassified, you’re going to need to craft your message to explain the changes and new expectations. You may need to develop new policies and/or train the newly non-exempt employees (and possibly their supervisors) on the company’s timekeeping policies as well as on the consequences for failing to follow them. Remember that the FLSA provides strict record-keeping requirements for employers to track the working hours of non-exempt employees. And you may be faced with the need to soothe the egos of employees who feel like being paid hourly is beneath them. (We know this sounds silly, but these morale concerns are real.)

Finally, if you have concerns about the classification of any of your other employees, or if it has simply been awhile since your employee classifications were reviewed, this is a prime time to conduct a general audit of your wage and hour practices. With many employees across the country, and likely within your own organization, being reclassified and becoming eligible for overtime come January 1, you’ll be able to make changes to the classification of other employees who may not meet any exemptions while drawing less attention.

© 2019 Jones Walker LLP

For more on the New DOL Overtime Rule, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

U.S. Department of Labor Comply Chain App Provides Important Tools for Labor Compliance in Global Supply Chains

As shown in the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) Bureau of International Labor Affairs’ International Child Labor & Forced Labor Reports, the use of child labor, forced labor, and child forced labor remains a tragically persistent concern worldwide.

To help companies understand these risks and work to eliminate child labor and forced labor, the DOL developed the mobile app Comply Chain: Business Tools for Labor Compliance in Global Supply Chains in 2017.  Recent updates to the Comply Chain app include more robust search and bookmark functions and English, Spanish, and French versions.

The free app, which is available here as a web app and can be downloaded here for iPhone and Android devices, is designed to help businesses develop a social compliance system and mitigate the risks of child and forced labor in global supply chains.  The app provides detailed, practical information about creating and maintaining a social compliance program, broken out into eight steps: (1) Engage Stakeholders and Partners; (2) Assess Risks and Impacts; (3) Develop a Code of Conduct; (4) Communicate and Train Across Your Supply Chain; (5) Monitor Compliance; (6) Remediate Violations; (7) Independent Review; and (8) Report Performance.  For each step, the app includes learning objectives, key terms, topics to explore, and additional resources, as well as detailed case studies of best practices.

The DOL has also developed the Sweat & Toil mobile app, which allows employers to access comprehensive research about child labor and forced labor, sorted by country and industry.  The Sweat & Toil app can be downloaded for free here for iPhone and Android devices.

Taken together, these DOL resources provide companies with critical information and a robust set of tools to build effective labor compliance programs for global supply chains.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more labor concerns, see the Labor & Employment law page on the National Law Review.

Job Applicant Pay History Inquiries Now Off-Limits in Illinois

As of September 29, 2019, Illinois employers may not ask job applicants or their prior employers about salary history. The change comes after Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker signed an amendment to the Illinois Equal Pay Act of 2003.

The New Requirements

The Illinois Equal Pay Act of 2003 made it illegal to pay employees differently on the basis of sex or the employee’s status as an African American, subject to exceptions. The impetus behind the law is to address historic pay disparities for the same or substantially similar work. The amendment now takes the law a step further to address the practice of using pay histories of applicants to set wages (including benefits and other compensation). Specifically, the amendment makes the following additions to the Illinois Equal Pay Act of 2003:

  • Employers, including employment agencies, may not screen out applicants on the basis of their current or prior wage history by setting a maximum or minimum wage level that applicants must satisfy.
  • Employers may not request or require disclosure of an applicant’s wage history as a condition of employment.
  • More specifically, employers may not request or require disclosure of an applicant’s wage history as a condition of being considered for employment, being interviewed, continuing to be considered for employment, or receiving a job offer.
  • Employers may not seek the wage history of an applicant from any current or prior employer.

If an applicant voluntarily discloses his or her pay history this does not create a violation. However, the employer cannot then use the voluntarily disclosed pay history in consideration of employment, an offer of compensation, or setting future wages, benefits, and other compensation.

What Are Employers Permitted to Do?

While employers cannot look into the wage histories of applicants, they are still permitted to share salary and benefit information about the position the applicant seeks. Employers can also discuss salary expectations with applicants without running afoul of the law.

Employers with Illinois employees should review their recruitment and compensation practices, including paper applications and online forms, to remove any references and requests regarding an applicant’s pay history. Further, human resources employees should be trained on appropriate recruitment procedures for Illinois employees.

©2019 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

For more state salary history bans, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Mayo Clinic Reports Vaping Injuries Resemble Chemical Burns

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced that over 1,000 people became ill from vaping e-cigarettes, including 18 deaths. Now, research by the Mayo Clinic of Arizona suggests the lung damage may be the result of chemical burns.

The CDC announced that 77% of the injured vapers were using e-cigarettes with tobacco and THC products, and 17% were using only nicotine. The CDC partnered with state-based health care services and research hospitals to try to determine the cause of the recent spike in vaping lung damage cases.

The Mayo Clinic of Arizona is one of the first to release data derived from recent cases. The research team tested lung biopsy samples from 17 patients, including two who have since died from the condition. All 17 biopsies suggested that the lung injuries were most likely caused by “direct toxicity or tissue damage from noxious chemical fumes.” These fumes are generated from the vaporized e-cigarette liquids. Researchers said it does not appear that the build-up of lipids, reported earlier as a possible cause of the lung damage, was a factor in these 17 patients.

According to Dr. Larsen, the senior author of the study, “It would seem prudent based on our observations to explore ways to better regulate the industry and better educate the public, especially our youth, about the risks associated with vaping.”

COPYRIGHT © 2019, STARK & STARK

For more on vaping regulation, see the Nationa Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.