Uncategorized Archives - Page 48 of 179

Ruling in First CWA Case to Rely on EPA’s Interpretive Statement on Groundwater Releases

On November 26, a federal district court judge in Massachusetts held that releases of pollutants reaching surface waters through groundwater do not require permits under the Clean Water Act (CWA), “irrespective of any hydrological connection to navigable waters.” Conservation Law Foundation Inc. v. Longwood Venues and Destinations Inc. et al., 1:18-cv-11821. The decision comes less than three weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, No. 18-260, in which the justices have been asked to decide whether the CWA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting requirement applies to releases that traverse nonpoint sources—like groundwater—before entering navigable waters.

In 2018, a citizen suit was filed against the owners of the Wychmere Beach Club claiming that the Beach Club’s wastewater treatment facility (in particular, the facility’s 22 leach pits located near the shoreline) discharged nitrogen into the groundwater and subsequently into Wychmere Harbor, a navigable water located off Cape Cod. The complaint accused the Beach Club of violating the CWA by discharging pollutants into the harbor and failing to obtain a federal permit for these releases. The Beach Club argued that it was not liable under the CWA because it released nitrogen into groundwater, rather than directly into the harbor, and that such a release is not covered by the CWA.

Unlike the decisions from the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits that have addressed this issue, Longwood is the first case to rely on the April 2019 Interpretive Statement in which EPA concluded that releases traversing groundwater are categorically excluded from the requirement to obtain an NPDES permit. The court concluded that the CWA is ambiguous on the question of whether the statute requires permits for releases that reach surface waters via groundwater. The court then deferred to EPA’s Interpretive Statement under Chevron Step Two after concluding that EPA reasonably decided to exclude releases through groundwater from the NPDES program.

Citing the resultant ambiguity from dueling CWA directives; namely, that the federal government has jurisdiction over the waters of the United States while the states are primarily tasked with groundwater regulation, the court turned to EPA’s April 2019 interpretation of the statute to answer the question of whether – and to what extent – the CWA applies to releases into groundwater that carries pollutants into navigable waters. Finding the agency’s analysis reasonable, the court deferred to EPA’s conclusion that releases of pollutants into groundwater do not constitute point source discharges subject to the NPDES program or permitting requirements.

Until the Supreme Court issues a decision in Maui (expected before the end of June 2020), courts and regulated entities will continue to search for guidance on how the CWA applies to mediated releases of pollutants to surface waters. The Longwood decision’s approach—relying on EPA’s recent guidance—applies only to groundwater and offers no comfort to litigants in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.

ARTICLE BY Richard S. Davis, Eric L. Klein, Timothy M. Sullivan, Megan L. Morgan and Andrew C. Silton of Beveridge & Diamond PC.

More on the Clean Water Act can be found in the National Law Review Environmental, Energy & Resources Law area.

What to Know About FDA’s Recent Statements on CBD

Last week FDA issued a public release on CBD titled, “What You Need to Know (And What We’re Working to Find Out) About Products Containing Cannabis or Cannabis derived Compounds, Including CBD.”

The FDA document does not break much new ground, though it emphasizes again FDA’s concern with the safety of CBD, some of which comes from FDA’s review of the CBD-based epilepsy drug Epidiolex. FDA does not believe it has enough information about certain aspects of CBD, such as what happens if someone takes CBD daily for sustained periods. In addition, FDA specifically identifies as a potential harm the use of CBD with alcohol because of the increased risk of sedation and drowsiness, which can lead to injuries. FDA, in addition to issuing this document, sent 15 warning letters to companies marketing CBD products that FDA views as unapproved drugs primarily because of the drug like claims made for such products.

FDA appears to be on a path toward considering a regulation to allow the marketing of CBD in conventional foods or as a dietary supplement. This approach will likely take a long time—perhaps some 2-4 years—absent legislative changes that do not appear likely in an election year. In the meantime, FDA continues to view putting into interstate commerce a food to which CBD has been added or to market CBD as or in a dietary supplement as a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act).

ARTICLE BY Christopher M. Lahiff and Marc E. Sorini of McDermott Will & Emery.

For more on the FDA and CBD regulation, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food and Drug Law section.

Court to Consider Whether California Ride Share Drivers Who Make Airport Runs Are Exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act

On November 26, 2019, San Francisco Superior Court Judge Richard B. Ulmer ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) might not apply to Uber drivers who are engaged in interstate commerce while driving passengers to or from international airports.

In his claims before the Division of Labor Standards and Enforcement (“DLSE”), driver Sangam Patel (“Patel”) seeks recovery of unpaid wages, overtime pay, vacation pay, meal and rest break premiums, and unpaid business expenses allegedly owed by Uber. Uber petitioned to compel arbitration of Patel’s (“Patel”) claims under the FAA.

The Labor Code provides a right to bring an action to collect wages notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration agreement. Cal. Lab. Code § 229. If the FAA applies, a written arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA applies to any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” that contains an arbitration provision. Id. The FAA does not apply, however, to “contracts of…workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Id., at § 1.

Notably, there is a distinction between the term “involving” for purposes of section 2 and the term “engaged in” for purposes of section 1.

As the California Court of Appeal explained earlier this year in Muller v. Roy Miller Freight Lines, LLC (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1056, 1062, “the [United States] Supreme Court reasoned the plain meaning of ‘engaged in’ interstate commerce in section 1 is narrower in scope than the open-ended phrase ‘involving’ commerce in section 2. Unlike section 2’s reference to ‘involving commerce,’ which ‘indicates Congress’ intent to regulate to the outer limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause’ and thus is afforded an ‘expansive reading,’ section 1’s reference to ‘engaged in commerce’ is ‘narrower,’ and therefore ‘understood to have a more limited reach,’ requiring ‘a narrow construction’ and a ‘precise reading.’” (Internal citations omitted.)

Uber argued that the FAA applies to its arbitration provision because it involves commerce as the Uber app is available to riders and transportation providers in over 175 cities across the United States. Relying on precedent that stands for the proposition that workers need only engage in activities that affect interstate commerce to be considered “engaged in interstate commerce,” the Labor Commissioner argued that Uber drivers such as Patel engage in interstate commerce when they transport passengers to and from international airports, thus rendering the FAA inapplicable.

The argument is similar to that raised Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc. earlier this year, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected Uber’s argument that a group of New Jersey drivers suing for unpaid overtime wages were required to arbitrate their claims. The Singh Court found that transportation workers who transport passengers may be exempt from the FAA if they are engaged in interstate commerce. Singh claimed that he frequently transported passengers on the highway across state lines, between New York and New Jersey. In light of the factual dispute as to whether Uber drivers engaged in interstate commerce, the Third Circuit sent the case back to the district court to decide, after discovery on the issue, whether Singh and the proposed class of Uber drivers engaged in interstate commerce. If they did, the FAA would not apply.

Consistent with the Third Circuit in Singh, Judge Ulmer granted the Commissioner’s request for limited discovery on the issue of whether Uber drivers engage in interstate commerce. Following that discovery, Uber may then re-calendar its petition for hearing.

The case bears watching as it may provide employees in some industries with arguments to try to circumvent the otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements that they signed with their employers. Ultimately, if Uber drivers are found to be engaged in interstate commerce such that the FAA is inapplicable, the FAA would not preempt their right to file suit under Labor Code section 229 notwithstanding any private agreement to arbitrate. But section 229 only applies to actions to collect due and unpaid wages. Any other claims – such as claims for missed meal or rest periods, failure to reimburse business expenses, or failure to provide accurate wage statements – would not be covered and, thus, should still be subject to a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. It will be interesting to see if and how that issue is addressed.

ARTICLE BY Vanessa K. Manolatou of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

More on the Federal Arbitration Act can be found on the National Law Review ADR, Arbitration and Mediation law page.

Employee Advocacy for Nonemployee, Unpaid Interns Is Not Protected by National Labor Relations Act

Unpaid interns are not “employees” as defined by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and employee advocacy on their behalf is not protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has ruled. Amnesty International of the USA, Inc., 368 NLRB No. 112 (Nov. 12, 2019).

The NLRB also concluded the employer’s expression of frustration and disappointment with its employees’ actions on behalf of the interns was not an unlawful implied threat.

Background

Amnesty International is a nonprofit advocacy organization that typically hires 15 unpaid interns to volunteer each academic semester.

In February 2018, a group of interns, assisted by an employee, circulated a petition requesting the organization pay them for their volunteer work. Nearly all the organization’s employees signed the petition. At the same time, the organization’s executive team was considering a paid intern program with only three interns.

On April 2, 2018, unaware of the unpaid intern’s petition, the Executive Director of the organization shared the organization’s plans for a paid internship program during an employee meeting. The unpaid interns sent their petition to the Executive Director the next day.

On April 9, 2018, the Executive Director held separate meetings with the current interns and the employees who signed the petition to announce plans to implement the paid internships that fall. The employees reacted negatively and expressed concern about the reduced number of interns. The Executive Director stated that she was disappointed the employees did not take advantage of the organization’s open-door policy to discuss the matter with management before using a petition. The Executive Director also stated that she viewed the petition as adversarial and felt it threatened litigation.

On May 9, 2018, the employee who assisted the unpaid interns with their petition met privately with the Executive Director. The employee recorded the conversation. The Executive Director stated she was “very embarrassed” that her employees felt unable to approach her about the issue and “disappointed that she did not ‘have the kind of relationship with staff’ that she thought she had.” The Executive Director said that it would have been “really helpful” to know about the intern’s interest in paid internships in advance and that the employee could have told the interns to “give me a heads-up to let me know it’s coming.” The Executive Director indicated that a petition “sets off a more adversarial relationship” and is not effective when the demand could “be met without applying that pressure.” She further stated, “you could try talking to us before you do another petition.”

Administrative Law Judge Decision

After a trial, ALJ Michael A. Rosas held that the employees had engaged in protected activity under Section 7 of the NLRA by joining the interns’ petition. He also determined the organization violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by: (1) instructing employees to make complaints orally before making them in writing; (2) threatening unspecified reprisals because of the employees’ protected concerted activity; (3) equating protected concerted activity with disloyalty; and (4) requesting employees to report to management other employees who are engaging in protected concerted activity. He dismissed the allegation that the Executive Director’s statements “impliedly threatened to increase employees’ workloads as a result of the petition.”

NLRB Decision

The NLRB reversed the ALJ’s conclusions and dismissed the complaint.

Holding that “[a]ctivity advocating only for nonemployees is not for ‘other mutual aid or protection’ within the meaning of Section 7,” the NLRB reasoned that the unpaid interns were not employees because they did not “receive or anticipate any economic compensation from [Amnesty International].”

The NLRB also held that the Executive Director’s statements did not coerce the employees. It concluded the Executive Director’s statements fell within Section 8(c) of the NLRA, which permits employers to express views, arguments, or opinions that are not accompanied by coercion (e.g., threats or promises of benefits). Considering the timing of the petition and the employees’ reaction, the NLRB determined that the Executive Director’s “opinions about how to handle petitions in the future to be, at most, suggestions, rather than commands or even direct requests.” Her statements “clearly expressed her frustration that, as a result of the lack of communication, management’s attempt to provide a positive response to the … petition had instead resulted in a backlash from employees.” However, the comments did not rise to the level of conveying anger, threaten reprisal, or accuse the employees of disloyalty, the NLRB ruled. Therefore, it concluded they did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.

***

The NLRB has been signaling a hesitancy to impose obligations on employers outside the traditional employment context. It has proposed exempting paid undergraduate and graduate students from the NLRA, for example. Over the last several years, as employers are forced by the low employment rate to increase their use of nonemployees, unions have increased their efforts to expand the NLRA’s reach by organizing non-traditional workers, including temporary campaign workers and graduate students.

ARTICLE BY Catherine A. Cano, Laura A. Pierson-Scheinberg, Howard M. Bloom and Philip B. Rosen of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Read more about NLRB rulings on the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Japan’s New Crypto Regulation – 2019 Amendments to Payment Services Act and Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of Japan

Japan will fundamentally change its crypto asset regulations effective in spring of 2020.

In May, 2019, the National Diet, the Japanese national legislature, passed an amendment bill to the Payment Services Act (the “PSA”) and the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (the “FIEA”), which was promulgated on June 7, 2019 (the “2019 Amendment”). The 2019 Amendment will become effective within one year from promulgation, following further rulemaking by the Japan Financial Services Agency (the “JFSA”) to implement the 2019 Amendment, which is anticipated sometime soon and includes public comment process.

Key Takeaways of the 2019 Amendment

The 2019 Amendment, coming into force within one year of the promulgation, will bring certain significant and fundamental changes to how crypto assets are regulated in Japan. Key takeaways are:

Crypto asset margin trading and other crypto asset derivative transactions will become subject to Japanese regulations on derivative transactions generally. Broker-dealers and exchanges will likely need to revisit and update their registration status and policies and procedures. While it may be possible to rely on a limited grandfathering provision for 6 months after the effective date, a notification must be submitted to a relevant local Finance Bureau within two weeks after the effective date of the 2019 Amendment.
Certain crypto assets distributed through distributed ledger technologies (such as blockchain) will be expressly regulated as Type I securities. Consequently, solicitation and offering of such crypto assets, including Initial Coin Offerings, to Japanese investors will require careful review and structuring to avoid any regulatory pitfalls.
Crypto asset-related custodial activities will be subject to licensing.
Crypto asset trading activities will be subject to various prohibitions on unfair trading and practices.
A detailed rulemaking process will follow and involve opportunities to submit comments during the public consultation process.

ARTICLE BY Tsuguhito Omagari of K&L Gates.

More on cyprocurrency regulation on the National Law Review Financial Institutions & Banking law page.

‘ABC Test’ for Independent Contractors Set to Take Effect in California Jan. 1

As 2019 draws to a close, every business with a California presence should consider evaluating its workforce in the Golden State to ensure compliance with AB 5, which will be effective Jan. 1, 2020.

Through AB 5, the California legislature codified and expanded the reach of the so-called “ABC Test” for determining whether a worker should be classified as an independent contractor. This new law expands the reach of the California Supreme Court’s Dynamex decision which applied to coverage under the California Industrial Welfare Commission’s Wage Orders. AB 5 applies this new test to businesses under the California Labor Code and the California Unemployment Insurance Code.

Currently, California businesses are subject to a variety of tests of employee status, depending upon the law in question. Under most federal and California laws, the common law agency test applies. For workers’ compensation laws, the California Supreme Court adopted an “economic realities” test 30 years ago in S.G. Borello & Sons v. Department of Industrial Relations.

However, as of Jan. 1, 2020, the default standard for independent contractor treatment will be the ABC Test.

The ABC Test significantly narrows the scope of work for which businesses may classify workers as independent contractors, rather than employees, and expands the application of this new standard to nearly all employers doing business in California.

Businesses that do not adapt to the ABC Test may face an increased risk of claims from workers asserting that they were misclassified as independent contractors, on an individual and class or collective basis.

ABC Test Explained

Under the ABC Test, a worker is assumed to be an employee unless the business demonstrates:

A. That the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in performing the work, both in the contract for performance and in fact

B. That the worker performs work that is outside of the usual course of the hiring entity’s business

C. That the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring entity

It is Prong B of the test that will likely cause the most difficulty for companies that regularly engage independent contractors.

Prong B excludes from the assumption of employee status workers who perform duties outside the “usual course of the hiring entity’s business.” While AB 5 does not specifically define the phrase, many businesses use contractors to help them perform their regular business. California courts are expected to be tasked with interpreting the scope of this requirement.

Many industries lobbied hard to obtain exemptions from the ABC Test. The new statute excludes seven different categories of occupations or business, each with its own separate test for qualifying for the exclusion. These exclusions cover diverse occupations ranging from professionals such as architects and lawyers to non-professionals such as grant writers, tutors, truck drivers, and manicurists. Each category has a slightly different requirement to qualify for the exclusion from the ABC Test. However, qualifying for the exclusion from the ABC Test merely defaults the workers to a determination under the Borello test. Complicating matters further is that for all these occupations, a determination of employee status under federal law, such as under the National Labor Relations Act, likely remains under the common law agency test.

Application and Enforcement

While the California Labor Commissioner is officially tasked with enforcing many of the provisions of AB 5, claims of worker misclassification will more commonly be asserted in private civil actions either individually or on a class basis. In other words, companies will increasingly see independent contractors bring claims for wage and hour law lawsuits or class actions (i.e. overtime claims, meal and rest break claims, wage statement claims, etc.).

Employer Takeaways

Although several industry groups are expected to challenge the new law, businesses operating in California should review and update their practices relative to independent contractors before Jan. 1, 2020 – whether through potentially reclassifying independent contractors as employees or revising independent contractor agreements.

ARTICLE BY Scott J. Witlin, John F. Kuenstler, Mark Wallin, Peter J. Wozniak and Kenneth J. Yerkes of Barnes & Thornburg LLP.

More on independent contractor compliance via the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

FDA Issues Warnings to 15 Companies for Illegally Selling Products Containing CBD

On November 25, 2019, the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) published a press release, published a revised Consumer Update, and announced the issuance of new warning letters to 15 companies for illegally selling and marketing various products containing hemp-derived cannabidiol (“CBD”).

To quote the FDA:

“Today’s actions come as the FDA continues to explore potential pathways for various types of CBD products to be lawfully marketed. This includes ongoing work to obtain and evaluate information to address outstanding questions related to the safety of CBD products, while maintaining the agency’s rigorous public health standards. The FDA plans to provide an update on its progress regarding the agency’s approach to these products in the coming weeks.”

In the meantime, however, these steps appear to be an effort to stem the tide of proliferation of CBD products on the market – and the growing consumer demand for those products. It is great that the FDA intends to provide an update on its efforts to develop a regulatory pathway for CBD products under the Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act (“FD&C Act”). But, it is frustrating that the FDA still refuses to identify a set date for that update – or, to publicly commit to a meaningful resolution of the regulatory uncertainty that persists for CBD products today.

A Reminder: Don’t Make Unsubstantiated Claims

As made clear in prior FDA warning letters – and the 15 letters released on November 25th – there continues to be significant regulatory risk in the labeling and marketing of CBD products for sale in interstate commerce. However, the FDA’s enforcement efforts still appear to be focused on companies and products that engage in the most egregious violations of the FD&C Act – including those making disease claims and those marketed to (or for use by) children and other vulnerable populations.

Among other things, this round of warning letters address the following major issues:

Marketing products for use by children and other vulnerable populations.
Including a supplements facts panel on product labels, which indicated the company’s intention to market the product as a dietary supplement.
Marketing products that are intended for use in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of diseases and/or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.
Posting materials on the companies’ social media websites that link to a third party’s content indicating that CBD can be used in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of diseases and/or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.
Misbranding products intended to be marketed as drugs.
Marketing human and animal food containing CBD in interstate commerce.
Marketing unapproved new animal drugs by selling pet products containing CBD that are intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in animals and/or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of animals.

Many of these issues have been referenced in prior actions and warning letters released by the FDA. By now, it should be clear to all market participants that it is illegal (and irresponsible) to market your CBD products as a cure for cancer, Alzheimer’s, diabetes, or other medical diseases, ailments, or conditions. CBD companies should heed this clear warning and stop the practice. Just don’t do it.

The New Concerns

This round of enforcement action seems to signal that the FDA is taking a more aggressive stance on its view of CBD health and safety issues. The press release and the consumer update both indicate that the FDA has broad safety concerns about CBD products, that there exist many unanswered questions and data gaps about CBD toxicity, and that some of the data available to the FDA raises serious concerns about potential harm from CBD.

The consumer update contains troubling statements like “CBD has the potential to harm you, and harm can happen even before you become aware of it,” and “CBD can cause liver injury.” But, no direct evidence or substantiation for these claims is linked to the consumer update or press release. Instead, the consumer update attempts to draw a corollary line between the data obtained from trials performed in connection with one FDA-approved CBD drug and the non-pharmaceutical products available on the market today. Equating that data against the products available to consumers today does not produce an apples-to-apples comparison. There are likely different scientific outcomes from, and different levels of toxicity caused by, the delivery of high dosages of concentrated CBD to mice in a clinical laboratory setting versus the relatively low dosages of CBD found in many food and supplement products available to consumers today.

More scientific research is absolutely needed on the efficacy and safety of CBD used in products intended for human consumption. And that research will come in time. But, the information released by the FDA this week appears to be an overstatement of the potential health risks associated with CBD products – at least, as they are known today. There are health risks associated with bad products – and there are bad products on the market today – but that merely highlights the need for clear regulatory guidance from the FDA.

The Future of CBD

The FDA recognizes that there is a significant public interest in CBD. It also recognizes that there are reports of CBD products containing potentially harmful contaminants, such as pesticides and heavy metals. Yet, despite that strong interest and recognition of a need for regulation in the industry, the FDA has delayed its development and implementation of meaningful regulatory guidance for CBD companies. That continuing delay does a disservice to the industry and to the general public.

Companies that cut corners and sell CBD products containing potentially harmful substances need to be regulated out of existence. Consumers deserve to know that the CBD brands they purchase and use have been responsibly grown, responsibly and safely manufactured, and are free from potentially harmful substances, like heavy metals and pesticides. And well-intentioned, responsibly operating CBD companies need and deserve clear regulatory guardrails within which they can safely – and legally – operate their business.

Unfortunately, it appears that regulatory uncertainty will continue to persist until there is more scientific data to support the safety and efficacy of CBD in consumer products. Obtaining that additional research and data will take time, so the industry may face a long slog until the FDA identifies a clear, detailed regulatory “pathway forward” for CBD. Until then, it is important for CBD companies to carefully consider the FDA’s position on CBD and the warnings sent this week, and to incorporate those factors into their internal compliance practices as they develop, produce, advertise, and sell their products in interstate commerce.

ARTICLE BY Tyler J. Russell and Allen N. Trask, III of Ward and Smith, P.A.

For more on cannabidiol/CBD regulation, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

The Rise Of Digital Services Taxes

Governments are coming after online businesses. Multinational clients that provide online advertising services, sell consumer data, or run online intermediary platforms should prepare themselves for the imminent arrival of digital services taxes (DSTs) on revenues from digital activities.

IN DEPTH

Having failed to reach an EU-wide unanimous consensus on an earlier EU Commission proposal for a DST Directive, certain EU countries, including Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, decided to go it alone and introduce DSTs unilaterally into their own national tax systems. These decisions were driven primarily by a perception that larger multinationals, many of which have highly digitalised operations, are not paying their “fair share” of taxes globally. In addition, a growing consensus has emerged in recent months that “market jurisdictions” should have the right to tax, because those markets—namely, the countries where the users and consumers are based—ultimately create value for online businesses.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) takes a neutral view on the use of DSTs by its members, in that it neither recommends nor discourages them. Member countries that do decide to adopt a DST should

Comply with international obligations
Ensure the DST is temporary and narrowly targeted
Minimise over-taxation, cost, complexity, and compliance burdens
Ensure the DST has a minimal adverse impact on small businesses.

The French DST is already in force. The Italian DST is in draft form, with the government intending for it to enter into force in January 2020, while other DST regimes, including that of the United Kingdom, are expected to come into force some time during 2020. None of these national rules seem to have complied with the OECD guidelines, and there are several practical challenges for businesses that are common across all three regimes.

Identifying Taxable Revenues and Services

In France, each company belonging to a group that derives gross revenues from digital services exceeding €750 million on a worldwide basis, and €25 million in France, is subject to French DST at a rate of 3 per cent. French DST is assessed at the company level only, based on gross revenues derived from digital services deemed to be provided in France during the previous calendar year. This is calculated as the gross revenues derived from taxable digital services, multiplied by the proportion of French users over the total number of users of the taxable digital services.

As it currently stands, the Italian DST would apply to Italian resident and non-resident companies that, at the individual or group level, earned during a calendar year a total amount of worldwide revenues of over €750 million, and an amount of revenues derived from digital services provided in Italy of over €5.5 million.

Only groups with annual worldwide revenues above £500 million and UK revenues above £25 million would be affected by the UK DST, with the first £25 million of UK revenues being exempt. The UK DST would be calculated on a group-wide basis and apportioned pro rata to each group member. Groups with low operating margins may opt for a “safe harbour” alternative DST calculation, based on the group’s operating margin.

Identifying Taxable Services

The taxable services that fall within the scope of the French, Italian, and UK DSTs are broadly similar and include

The provision of a social media platform
Search engines
Any online marketplace
Online advertising business, including those that use or sell individual users’ data

It is noteworthy that digital platforms for the provision of payment services, communication services, crowdfunding services, or digital content, as well as self-operated digital platforms for the direct sale of goods and services, are specifically beyond the scope of the French and UK DST.

The issues that arise are also broadly similar. There are likely to be conflicts regarding dual-purpose platforms, i.e., those that include both taxable and exempt digital services. The fact that the lists are not exhaustive and that the DSTs will apply to all revenues received in connection with a relevant DST activity means that affected businesses will need to analyse the nature of the revenue streams and the activities from which they are generated, and each case will turn on its own facts. This will entail a substantial administrative burden for affected businesses, as well as a lack of certainty over potential DST filing obligations.

Identifying Users

Both France and Italy consider the location of users to be based on the location of the electronic device when the user accesses the digital services. The United Kingdom intends to determine that someone is a UK user if, it is reasonable to assume, they are normally located or established in the United Kingdom.

France and Italy will use IP addresses, wi-fi connections, GPS data, etc., plus reference to that user’s personal data and place of residence; while the UK plans to extrapolate user location from data such as delivery addresses, payment details, IP addresses, contractual evidence, or the address of properties for rent or location of goods for sale.

There are many problems with these approaches. At the most basic level, different data sources can provide conflicting evidence of a user’s location, and IP addresses can be easily manipulated. Businesses will, therefore, need to come to a reasonable, evidence-based conclusion on the likelihood of that user’s location, further adding to their administrative burden and broadening the scope to make a mistake. The use of personal data and place of residence are also likely to trigger data protection issues under the EU General Data Protection Regulations.

Potential Double Taxation and Reimbursements

There is a risk of double taxation if another jurisdiction imposes a DST on the same revenues, for example as a result of inconsistencies between one set of national rules and those of another jurisdiction regarding user location or taxing rights. DST is however generally deductible for corporate income tax purposes.

France’s President Macron stated at the 2019 G7 that any excess of French DST over the new international DST being brokered by the OECD would be refunded. He did not, unfortunately, give much detail as to how and under what limitations this refund will take place.

The Italian draft DST provisions do not include any specific rule on this aspect and, although they seem to propose a sunset clause according to which the Italian DST is automatically repealed when the new OECD-agreed corporate income tax enters into force, there does not appear to be scope for a retroactive reimbursement of the difference (if any) between the Italian DST and such future corporate income tax.

The draft UK DST rules disregard 50 per cent of UK revenues from cross-border transactions between a buyer and a seller through an online marketplace where the non-UK party is in another DST jurisdiction. But this does not fully resolve the issue of potential double taxation if the other jurisdiction imposes a DST on the same revenues, for example due to inconsistencies between the UK national rules and those of the other DST jurisdiction regarding user location and/ or taxing rights.

The UK DST will also not be creditable against either corporation tax, income tax under the Offshore Receipts in respect of Intangible Property regime, or diverted profits tax; although it should generally be deductible for corporation tax purposes as a trading expense. Unlike France or Italy, neither the draft legislation nor HMRC guidance mentions the possibility of a retroactive reimbursement of the UK DST once the OECD’s long-term solution for a revised corporate income tax has been agreed and implemented by member countries.

The US Response

The US administration takes a hostile view of DST proposals generally, as evidenced by a recent investigation into whether the French DST discriminates against US businesses. This could lead to retaliatory US tariffs being imposed on imports from France and punitive US tax charges on French companies doing business in the United States.

Other DSTs, including those of the United Kingdom and Italy, can probably expect similar responses from the United States. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson has indicated his support in principle for a UK DST or a similarly targeted tax. He has also indicated that the structure of this tax would be on the table in any trade negotiations with the United States, and the future of the current draft Finance Bill hinges on the result of the UK general election in December, so there is currently very little certainty as to whether UK DST will take effect at all.

For now, the best course of action for affected businesses is to assume that all DSTs will take effect as planned and prepare accordingly, notwithstanding any current legislative or political uncertainty.

ARTICLE BY James Ross, Andrea Tempestini, Antoine Vergnat, Alessio Persiani, Romain Desmonts and Sarah Gabbai of McDermott Will & Emery.

More on digital taxation on the National Law Review Tax law page.

DOJ Seeking to End Movie Studio and Theater Antitrust Decrees amidst Streaming Competition – A New Opportunity in Theatrical Distribution?

For the film and media distribution industries, this year has been action-packed. Production budgets are skyrocketing and new digital services have been announced or are launching with each passing month. The streaming wars are upon us. Moreover, the FCC recently voted to treat streaming services as “effective competition” to traditional cable providers (or MVPDs), thereby triggering basic cable rate de-regulation in parts of Hawaii and Massachusetts.

The distribution landscape took yet another unexpected legal twist this week. On November 18, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim announced that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice would ask a federal court to terminate the “Paramount Consent Decrees” (the “Decrees”), which have prohibited movie studios from engaging in certain distribution practices with movie theaters since the 1940s. The DOJ filed a motion to terminate the Decrees in federal court in the Southern District of New York on November 22, 2019. Notably, the DOJ cites streaming services and new technology as a few of the many reasons that the Decrees may no longer be necessary in what the DOJ official sees as today’s highly competitive, consumer-driven content market. Given the volatility of the content licensing space, film licensors and licensees will have to carefully consider how the DOJ’s actions will affect their content rights and options going forward.

By way of background, the Decrees emerged out of the landmark 1948 Supreme Court antitrust case, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. Prior to the case, top Hollywood studios frequently owned movie theaters (thus, owning both the means of production and distribution). This vertical integration led to lower distribution costs for the studios and gave them pricing power and the ability to discriminate about which theaters distributed their films. Not surprisingly, smaller, independent theaters struggled to survive. The problem was exacerbated by studios engaging in practices such as “block-booking” (requiring theaters to distribute all or none of the studio’s slate of films) and overbroad “clearances” (restrictions on the time which must elapse between particular runs of a film), as well as alleged horizontal conspiracies between the studios and theaters on matters like minimum ticket pricing. As part of the Decrees, the defendant studios were restricted or prohibited from engaging in these practices and were required to divest certain interests in their theaters.

The DOJ’s November 22nd motion may not come as a surprise, as the DOJ first announced that the Decrees were under review in August 2018, after which several industry players, including the National Association of Theatre Owners (NATO), submitted comments. In particular, NATO argued, despite how streaming and technology might increase competition, that block-billing would still adversely impact independent or local chains that exhibit fewer films and may not be able to afford larger blocks of films.

Delrahim summed up the DOJ’s position, stating, “the [D]ecrees, as they are, no longer serve the public interest, because the horizontal conspiracy – the original violation animating the decrees – has been stopped. […] Changes over the course of more than half a century also have made it unlikely that the remaining defendants can reinstate their cartel.” In particular, the DOJ argued that the competitive concerns of the 1940s no longer exist because the movie marketplace has changed so drastically, citing how film distributors have become less reliant on theatrical distribution with the advent of streaming. According to the DOJ, colluding to limit theatrical film distribution in today’s market “would make no economic sense.” In addition to streaming services, Delrahim also cited new theatrical release business models (such as flat-fee multi-ticket pricing) as increasing competition and innovation in film distribution.

The DOJ acknowledged NATO’s concerns in part and asked the court to implement a two-year sunset on block-booking and circuit dealing (licensing to all theaters under common ownership, as opposed to on a theater-by-theater basis). Whether terminating the Decrees would decrease innovation, neither the motion papers nor Delrahim venture to guess. Delrahim noted that antitrust enforcers need not predict the future but need only recognize that changes are occurring. He added that practices covered by the Decrees would not become per se lawful, but would rather be subject to review under the rule of reason standard.

Commentators are split on whether termination of the Decrees that have shaped Hollywood for decades will lead to any significant change for the movie business. One thing that is important to note is that the Decrees did not outright prohibit vertical integration of studios and theaters – the defendant studios could (and did) acquire theaters after proving that such acquisitions would not unreasonably restrain trade. Further, only those studios party to the Decrees remain subject to their restrictions, meaning many of today’s top studios (that now typically own a vast portfolio of traditional and digital entertainment properties) were non-existent or much smaller in the 1940s and have not been subject to the Decrees.

While it remains to be seen how this development will play out, it is noteworthy for digital providers because it may breathe extra life back into the theatrical release window. With mammoth streaming deals inked every week, the value of the theatrical release window was seemingly diminishing for some films. But now that many studios are forgoing third-party licensing fees and instead retaining their content for their own streaming platforms, studios may begin to ask whether added revenues from ownership of a theater chain could be a potential new source of revenue and a way to gain additional control of the theatrical window. Meanwhile, the effect of lifting the Decrees may not necessarily lead to a flurry of acquisitions, as other studios involved in direct-to-consumer streaming campaigns may not have the capital or desire to exploit the termination of the Decrees. Major theater chains will likely seek to strengthen relationships with studios, while independent theaters will look for ways to succeed despite potentially rising costs.

With all of these developments, studios and media platforms will also need to carefully consider how to protect their interests when handling their licensing arrangements, given the volatility in this space and keeping in mind the two-year sunset (assuming the DOJ succeeds) on block-booking and circuit dealing. While some distributors may be looking for long-term, exclusive content deals as they roll-out their streaming services, studios and content providers may seek flexibility as their distribution options are changing day-to-day.

ARTICLE BY Kevin P. Milewski of Proskauer Rose LLP.

More on entertainment distribution on the National Law Review Entertainment, Art & Sports law page.

Ferrero Successfully Enforces the Tic Tac Shape Mark in Italy

Many of us had a Tic Tac box in our pockets as kids, no matter the country we grew up in. Ferrero Spa (“Ferrero”), the Italian manufacturer of Tic Tac (and lots of other delicious confectionary products) registered the Tic Tac box as a trade mark in several jurisdictions, including Italy.

After succeeding before the CJEU in the invalidation action against BMB sp. z o.o. earlier this year (click here), in a recent case brought before the Italian courts, Ferrero successfully defended its shape marks, despite the invalidity claim brought by S.r.o. Mocca spol. (“Mocca”), a Czech company selling Bliki-branded mints in an identical container.