Category: Uncategorized

New NLRB Rule Defining Joint-Employer Status to Take Effect

The National Labor Relations Board has announced the issuance of its final rule governing joint-employer status. The new rule, which was first proposed in September 2018 and has been the subject of extensive public comment, will become effective April 27, 2020.

The critical elements for finding a joint-employer relationship under the new rule is the possession and the exercise of substantial direct and immediate control over the terms and conditions of employment of those employed by another employer.  The essence of the new rule is described in the Board’s February 25, 2020 press release:

To be a joint employer under the final rule, a business must possess and exercise substantial direct and immediate control over one or more essential terms and conditions of employment of another employer’s employees. The final rule defines key terms, including what are considered “essential terms and conditions of employment,” and what does, and what does not, constitute “direct and immediate control” as to each of these essential employment terms. The final rule also defines what constitutes “substantial” direct and immediate control and makes clear that control exercised on a sporadic, isolated, or de minimis basis is not “substantial.”

Evidence of indirect and/or contractually reserved control over essential employment terms may be a consideration for finding joint-employer status under the final rule, but it cannot give rise to such status without substantial direct and immediate control. Importantly, the final rule also makes clear that the routine elements of an arm’s-length contract cannot turn a contractor into a joint employer.

The new rule marks a return to a standard similar to that which the Board followed from 1984 until 2015.  In 2015, in Browning-Ferris Industries, the Board adopted a much more liberal test under which a finding that the putative joint employer possessed indirect influence and the ability (including through a reserved contractual right) to influence terms and conditions, regardless of whether the putative joint employer actually exercised such influence or control, could result in it being held to be a joint-employer of a second employer’s employee.

As a practical matter, the standard under the Board’s new rule should make it much more difficult to establish that a company is a joint-employer of a supplier, contractor, franchisee, or other company’s employees. The new rule will mean that a party claiming joint-employer status to exist will need to demonstrate with evidence that the putative joint-employer doesn’t just have a theoretical right to influence the other employer’s employees’ terms and conditions of employment, but that it has actually exercised that right in a substantial, direct and immediate manner.

This new rule is likely to make it much more difficult for unions to successfully claim that franchisors are joint-employers with their franchisees, and that companies are joint-employers of personnel employed by their contractors and contract suppliers of labor, such as leasing and temporary agencies.

©2020 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

For more on the Joint-Employer Rule see the National Law Review Labor & Employment Law section.

Sticks and Stones May Break Bones, But Words May Constitute Unlawful Discrimination

In recent months, there have been several news stories about the legal implications of inappropriate and/or offensive language in our society, generating discussion about whether such language is, or should be, unlawful in certain circumstances.  This past fall, the Massachusetts Legislature held a committee hearing on a widely-publicized bill which sought to penalize the use of “bitch,” by imposing a fine of up to $200 for any person who “uses the word ‘bitch’ directed at another person to accost, annoy, degrade or demean” another person.

While this proposed legislation, fraught with Constitutional issues involving the exercise of free speech, was largely decried and gained no traction, it does highlight an important question: In what circumstances may offensive and demeaning comments constitute unlawful discrimination?  In fact, in January, Chief Justice John Roberts, during oral arguments in Babbe v. Wilkie, asked the hypothetical question whether the phrase “OK Boomer” would qualify as age discrimination.

The answer to Chief Justice Robert’s question is not a bright-line “yes” or “no.” Context matters. For example, in connection with a hostile work environment claim, one of the central legal issues is whether the conduct in question was severe or pervasive. As a general rule, a single, isolated comment will not be actionable as creating a hostile work environment, but in some instances, it may. See Augis Corp. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 408-409 (2009) (noting that a supervisor who calls a black subordinate a f***ing n***** “has engaged in conduct so powerfully offensive that the MCAD can properly base liability on a single instance”).

Courts do not impose a numerosity test. Rather, the legal analysis is focused on whether the discriminatory comments “intimidated, humiliated, and stigmatized” the employee in such a way as to pose a “formidable barrier to the full participation of an individual in the workplace.” See Thomas O’Connor Constructors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 560–61(2008); Chery v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 179, 193 (D. Mass. 2015) (noting that, in the context of a hostile work environment based upon race, “[i]t is beyond question that the use of the [“N” word] is highly offensive and demeaning, evoking a history of racial violence, brutality, and subordination”).

Similarly, in the context of a disparate treatment claim (e.g., allegations that employee was terminated based on unlawful age bias), evidence that the decision-maker referred to the employee as a “Boomer” should not be evaluated in a legal vacuum. Rather, this evidence may be presented to the jury as just one piece of a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” from which a fact-finder could properly determine that the termination decision was driven by discriminatory animus based upon age. See Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2016).

So, while sticks and stones may break bones, words also do harm and depending upon the circumstances, may result in legal claims and liability.

© 2020 SHERIN AND LODGEN LLP

For more on Free Speech, see the National Law Review Constitutional Law section.

Wisconsin Supreme Court: “Retroactive Defense” Can Satisfy An Insurer’s Duty to Defend

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has issued numerous decisions over the past few years regarding an insurer’s duty to defend its insured under liability insurance. On February 13, 2020, the Court added Choinsky v. Germantown School District, Case No. 2018AP116, 2020 WI 13, where it clarified one of the four recognized procedures for insurance carriers to contest coverage while avoiding a breach of the duty to defend.  The four procedures are: (1) defend under a reservation of rights; (2) defend under a reservation of rights but seek a declaratory judgment on coverage; (3) enter into a nonwaiver agreement with the insured where the insurer preserves its right to contest coverage; and (4) file a motion to bifurcate and stay the liability determination until coverage is determined.  Choinsky addressed a wrinkle to option 4, where the insurer files the appropriate motions but the circuit court denies the stay.

In Choinsky, retirees of the Germantown School District brought a class action in 2013 after a District decision caused them to lose their long term care benefit.  The retirees alleged breach of contract, breach of implied contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel.  The District tendered the defense to its insurer, which the insurer denied a week later.  Then, following option 4, the insurer promptly moved to intervene in the pending suit, to bifurcate the coverage and liability issues, and to stay a liability determination until coverage was decided.  Almost three months later, the circuit court granted the motion to intervene and bifurcate, but denied the motion to stay.  The insurer then agreed to retroactively defend from the date of tender until coverage was resolved.  As a result, the District had to defend itself on both coverage and liability for approximately five months and was later reimbursed only for its attorney fees on the liability defense.

After two motions by the insurer for summary judgment were denied, coverage was tried to a jury in April 2016.  The jury found that the District decision makers had acted negligently, and the circuit court accordingly determined that there was a duty to defend.  After the liability trial resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the District, the District moved again for attorney fees it incurred in proving coverage pursuant to Elliott v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992), and Newhouse v. Citizens Security Mutual Insurance Co., 176 Wis. 2d 824, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993).  The circuit court denied that motion, reasoning that since the insurer had followed a judicially-sanctioned approach to the coverage determination, it could not be held liable for breach of contract.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The District argued to the Supreme Court that its insurer should be on the hook for the fees the District expended in proving coverage because the insurer initially refused to defend and cannot cure that choice by agreeing to defend six months later.  It further argued that there was a breach since the insurer didn’t start paying defense fees for almost one year after tender.  The Supreme Court held that the insurer had taken “timely” action when it responded to the tender within one week and when the insurer sought to intervene in the liability case.  The Court said that the time it took the circuit court to decide the motion for stay and then the denial of a stay caused the problem, and urged circuit courts to give these issues priority on their dockets.

The Court also concluded that any damage to the District for the insurer’s initial coverage denial was remedied by the insurer reimbursing for attorney fees retroactive to the date of tender, stating that in the situation presented “the insurer must defend its insured under a reservation of rights so that the insured does not have to pay to defend itself on liability and coverage at the same time.  Additionally, the insurer must reimburse its insured for reasonable attorney fees expended on a liability defense, retroactive to the date of tender.” 2020 WI 13, ¶ 19.

In his dissent, Justice Kelly criticized the majority: “I don’t agree, however, that an insurer can buy its way out of its breach of [the duty to defend] by reimbursing its insured for defense costs.” 2020 WI 13, ¶ 47.  He noted that the District did not receive a defense for over 5 months, and he called the retroactive payments a new concept that will incentivize insurers to refuse the duty defend between tender and resolution of coverage issues.  In doing so, the insurer “risks nothing doing so because, in the worst case, it simply pays for the defense it refused to provide.” 2020 WI 13, ¶ 56.

All coverage matters are fact-specific, and time will tell how prophetic Justice Kelly’s warning turns out to be.  The insurer in Choinsky acted in a timely fashion by responding within weeks of tender.  If an insurer takes a longer time to respond, a court might come to a different conclusion.  And while the Supreme Court again “encouraged” all circuit courts to decide motions to bifurcate and stay expeditiously, that is not always possible.  Some motions can, for one reason or another, take longer than in Choinsky and some types of claims really can’t be stayed. Environmental cases, for example, can be triggered by a “responsible party” letter from the Environmental Protection Agency or the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 92, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  It is difficult to imagine how an environmental investigation could be stayed while coverage is decided.

For now, under Choinsky it appears acceptable that an insured may be forced to defend itself on two fronts for five months– however there is no set rule and, as a result, could that mean that 10 or even 12 months is acceptable?  What if a dispute then arises over the reasonableness of fees and that dispute lasts a year and there is no payment for 24 months?  There is room to test the limits, but Choinsky suggests a safe harbor for insurers of at least a few months if insurers file “timely” bifurcation and stay motions.  Insureds should be aware of Choinsky and push to minimize the time they subject to simultaneously defending coverage and liability.

© 2020 Davis|Kuelthau, s.c. All Rights Reserved

EMPLOYERS BEWARE: $2.4M Jury Verdict Serves as a Reminder of the Duty Employers Owe to Their Employees

A recent New Jersey Superior Court case involving PNC Bank as a defendant should serve as an eye-opening reminder to all employers that it has a duty to maintain a safe and healthy workplace for all employees, free from harassment, discrimination and any other tort or prohibited conduct. Notably, this duty to maintain a safe and healthy workplace not only applies to the eradication of wrongdoing by employees, but also affords protection to employees from improper acts of non-employees such as customers, clients, vendors, independent contractors, etc.

Following a jury trial in Essex County, PNC Bank was deemed liable in the amount of $2.4 million in damages, consisting of both back and front pay, as well as past and future emotional distress damages, awarded to a former employee who claimed she was the victim of a sexual assault/gender discrimination by a bank customer in 2013. The Plaintiff argued that the customer in question was known by the Bank to have groped and harassed others in the past, yet the Bank did not take the appropriate, remedial measures to ensure her safety and prevent it from happening again.

Although the Bank claims that it had no such knowledge of the prior bad acts of the customer and had no way of knowing any such assault would occur towards the Plaintiff, the jury clearly did not accept that defense.

This case is yet another example on how important it is to have a well-established and widely distributed anti-harassment and discrimination policy and training for all staff in the workplace, applicable to all those susceptible to harassment or discrimination in the workplace, whether it be by fellow employees or otherwise, such as customers or guests.

© 2020 Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C. All Rights Reserved

For more about employer responsibilities, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law section.

Proposed Class Action Lawsuit Claims Arizona Beverage’s Gummies are Not “All Natural” Because They Contain Synthetic Ingredients

On February 11, 2020, Christopher Silva, a New York resident, filed a proposed class action lawsuit against Hornell Brewing Co. Inc., Arizona Beverages USA LLC, Beverage Marketing USA, Inc., and Arizona Beverage Co. (“Defendants”) over defendants’ “all natural” gummy snacks.

The plaintiff claims that defendants’ advertising and marketing campaign is false, deceptive, and misleading because the gummies contain several synthetic ingredients, such as ascorbic acid, citric acid, gelatin, dextrose, glucose syrup, and modified food starch.  Silva seeks to represent a New York class and individual classes for all 49 other states.

In the complaint, Silva cited to the United States Department of Agriculture’s Draft Guidance Decision Tree for Classification of Materials as Synthetic or Nonsynthetic (natural).  Per that guidance, a substance is natural – as opposed to synthetic – if (a) it is manufactured, produced, or extracted from a natural source (i.e. naturally occurring mineral or biological matter); (b) it has not undergone a chemical change (i.e. a process whereby a substance is transformed into one or more other distinct substances) so that it is chemically or structurally different than how it naturally occurs in the source material; or (c) the chemical change was created by a naturally occurring biological process such as composting, fermentation, or enzymatic digestion or by heating or burning biological matter.

Silva noted that while the synthetic ingredients are all listed on the back of the package, reasonable consumers are not expected or required to review the ingredients list on the back in order to confirm or debunk defendants’ prominent front-of-the-product claims.  The package in question includes the phrase “All Natural” on the packaging behind the words, “Arizona” and “fruit snacks.” We will continue to monitor any developments.

© 2020 Keller and Heckman LLP

For more on food ingredient labeling regulation see the National Law Review Biotech, Food and Drug law section.

Coronavirus: Employers Should Plan, Not Panic

Coronavirus, whose formal name is COVID-19, has been the subject of much media attention since the first outbreak in Wuhan, China, late last year.  Just like recent outbreaks of the swine flu, the avian flu, SARS and the West Nile virus, each new “bug” creates fear surrounding a previously unknown threat.  While there are tens of thousands of cases in China, as of February 19, 2020, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), there were 15 confirmed cases of coronavirus in the U.S.  The confirmed cases were limited to seven states located on the perimeter of the country.

According to the CDC, coronaviruses are a large family of viruses that are common in many different species of animals, including camels, cattle, cats and bats. Rarely, animal coronaviruses can infect and then spread between people.

To put the current coronavirus outbreak in context, the CDC estimates there have been between 26 MILLION and 36 MILLION cases of flu in the U.S. this season and an estimated 15,000 to 36,000 deaths.  In fact, this year’s flu season is the worst in almost 20 years.  While the majority of these deaths and hospitalizations have occurred in people over age 65, this year’s flu has impacted children and younger adults in greater numbers than usual.

While no one knows for sure the extent to which the coronavirus will take hold in the U.S., employers should take steps now to plan ahead so that they will be able to maintain normal business operations.  The challenges for any business facing coronavirus or any other disease outbreak involve a multitude of conflicting legal obligations.  Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) and similar state laws, employers have a general duty and obligation to provide a safe and healthy work environment, even when the work occurs outside the employer’s physical premises. Furthermore, under these health and safety laws, employers must not place their employees in situations that are likely to cause serious physical harm or death.

Conversely, overreacting by implementing broad-based bans and making business decisions about employees that are not based on statistical realities could get an employer sued under laws that prohibit discrimination based upon disability (perceived or real) and national origin discrimination, among others.

Properly planning for and implementing plans to deal with the coronavirus is legally and operationally complex.  Listing all of the considerations for such plans are too numerous for this brief blog article. By way of example, employers who have operations in Hubei Province in China, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, will face far more difficult and complex challenges than an employer with a single facility in the middle of the U.S.  However, at a minimum here are some things every business should be doing:

  • If you have not already done so, institute a ban on all business travel to China.  This may be a moot point given the cancellation of most flights into and out of mainland China.  Under the circumstances, it is also totally appropriate to require that any of your employees who choose to travel to China for personal reasons notify a designated company official and let the official know of their plans.

  • If employees must use a company-designated travel agent to arrange business travel, get the agent to provide reports on all international business travel.  But don’t overreact and implement a broad-based travel ban to countries that do not pose a risk of harm.  However, if an employee expresses fear of any international travel, have a rational discussion and review the relevant outbreak statistics to see if those fears are real or inflated.  Even if fears are irrational, consider the negative impact on employee morale by forcing someone to travel.

  • Designate a management official to check the CDC website daily to see the latest tracking of the virus’ spread.  This person should be the in-house resource and should be involved in ban or no-ban decisions.

  • If an employee has been to a real coronavirus “hotspot,” consider making him or her stay home for the full 14-day incubation period.  Whether employees work remotely or do not work, the decision whether they should be paid to stay home during this time is an individualized determination.  However, employers need to be flexible and should consider bending the rules if they want to appear humane and seriously concerned about health issues.  If employers force someone to stay home for two weeks without pay or make them use precious PTO, they may push people to hide where they have been, which will defeat planning to ensure that management is taking all reasonable steps to prevent the spread through the workplace.

  • Do not panic or overreact but rather engage in sound business contingency planning.  Begin by developing contingency plans based upon the industry you are in, the size of your business and how you will operate in the event absenteeism rates greatly exceed those of a normal flu season.

  • Use this opportunity to communicate with your employees about seasonal flu prevention strategies, such as minimizing contact and engaging in sound hygiene and sanitation.  As the statistics above demonstrate, seasonal flu poses a far greater and more immediate threat to your employees’ health than does the coronavirus.

  • Develop a plan for communicating with your employees if a major pandemic breaks out, regardless of where they are located, including the workplace, at home or on the road.
    Regardless of how bad things may get, it is important that management not panic or overreact.  Plan for worst case scenarios now so you can effectively respond to what will likely be a rapidly changing situation. To do this, your management should anticipate and prepare for how you will answer the plethora of questions that will almost certainly be raised.

Proper planning for and dealing with individualized employee situations implicates a whole range of employment laws, such as ADA, GINA, OSHA, Title VII, ERISA, as does the nature of your business.  To deal with these legal issues, you should consult with your attorney.

Finally, there are a variety of web-based resources available to assist you in planning, preparation, and monitoring the spread of the coronavirus on a global basis, including the CDC at www.cdc.gov, OSHA at https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/covid-19/, and the World Health Organization https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019.

© 2020 Foley & Lardner LLP

For more on the coronavirus see the National Law Review Health Law & Managed Care section.

EPA Registers New Uses for Existing Products to Help Reduce the Spread of Candida auris

On February 12, 2020, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced the availability of 11 products that have been approved for use to disinfect surfaces against the emerging multidrug-resistant fungus Candida auris (C. auris).  C. auris can cause severe infections and spreads easily among hospitalized patients and nursing home residents.  The 11 products are approved for use against C. auris to disinfect surfaces in hospitals, nursing homes, and other healthcare facilities, to help reduce patient infections.  There were no antimicrobial pesticide products registered specifically for use against C. auris prior these new use registrations.

EPA worked in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other federal partners to ensure that the products would be effective against C. auris.  Previously, on October 16, 2019, EPA had granted public health exemptions under the provisions of section 18 of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) as amended, to the CDC, for uses of antimicrobial products, on hard, nonporous surfaces in healthcare settings for disinfection from C. auris.

The 11 products that are now registered for use against C. auris are:

  •  Avert Sporicidal Disinfectant Cleaner (EPA Reg. No. 70627-72);
  •  Blondie (EPA Reg. No. 67619-24);
  •  Dagwood (EPA Reg. No. 67619-25);
  •  Micro-Kill Bleach Germicidal Bleach Wipes (EPA Reg. No. 37549-1);
  •  Oxivir 1 (EPA Reg. No. 70627-74);
  •  Oxivir 1 Wipes (EPA Reg. No. 70627-77);
  •  Oxivir Wipes (EPA Reg. No. 70627-60);
  •  Oxycide™ Daily Disinfectant Cleaner (EPA Reg. No. 1677-237);
  •  Virasept (EPA Reg. No. 1677-226);
  • Wonder Woman Formula B Germicidal Wipes (EPA Reg. No. 9480-12); and
  •  Wonder Woman Formula B Spray (EPA Reg. No. 9480-10).

Because there are few products with C. auris claims at this time, CDC and EPA have identified additional products that are effective against C. auris. Although these products do not yet have formal EPA-registered claims for C. auris, testing at CDC has confirmed they are effective against C. auris.  The label on the product will not include instructions for C. auris.  CDC guidance states to “follow the instructions provided for C. albicans, if included, or else follow those for fungicidal activity.” These products include:

  •  Oxivir TB Spray (EPA Reg. No. 70627-56); and
  •  PDI Super Sani-Cloth (EPA Reg. No. 9480-4).

The CDC Guidance further states that, if none of the above-listed products are available, or any of the EPA-registered products that are newly approved for the specific claims against C. auris, CDC recommends use of an EPA-registered hospital-grade disinfectant effective against Clostridioides difficile spores, because CDC believes these products have been used effectively against C. auris (List K).

Additional information on C. auris is available on EPA’s website and CDC’s website.

©2020 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

For more on EPA disinfectant registrations, see the National Law Review Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

Choosing a Trustee for Your Children – Should Foreign Family Members Apply?

Often the most difficult decision parents need to make when writing a Will is whom to appoint as the trustee for their children. The choice becomes particularly tricky for clients whose families live outside the U.S. since choosing a foreign trustee will cause the children’s trusts to be classified under U.S. income tax laws as “foreign trusts” – with lots of ensuing complications.

Under the Internal Revenue Code, trusts are by default “for­eign trusts” for U.S. income tax reporting purposes unless a U.S. court exercises both primary supervision over the administration of the trust (the “court test”), and one or more U.S. persons have authority to control all substantial decisions of the trust (the “control test”). The choice of a foreign trustee causes the trust to flunk the control test because a non-U.S. person controls substantial decisions of the trust. Being classified as a foreign trust results in some problematic U.S. income tax consequences. For example:

  •  U.S. beneficiaries who receive distributions from the trust will be taxed to the extent that any trust income, including foreign-source income and capital gains, is included in the distribution. Normally, non-U.S. source income and realized capital gains are not deemed to constitute any part of a distribu­tion to a beneficiary unless specifically allo­cated to a beneficiary. The foreign trust rules change this tax treatment such that non-U.S. source income, as well as capital gains, are deemed to be part of any taxable income distributed to a U.S. beneficiary.
  • Trust income not distributed in the year it is earned becomes undistributed net income (UNI). If, in a later year, a trust distribution to a U.S. beneficiary exceeds that year’s trust income, the distribution carries out UNI and is deemed to include the accumulated income and capital gains realized by the foreign trust in prior years. These gains do not retain their character but rather are taxable to the U.S. beneficiary at ordinary income tax rates.
  • Also, to the extent that a distribution to a U.S. beneficiary exceeds the current year’s trust income, a non-deductible interest charge will be assessed on the tax that is due with respect to the accumulated income and capital gains that are now deemed distributed. This charge is based upon the interest rate imposed upon underpayments of federal income tax and is compounded daily.
  • Finally, accumulated income and capi­tal gains are taxable to the U.S. beneficiary at the beneficiary’s ordinary income tax rate for the years during which it was earned under a complex formula designed to capture the U.S. tax that would have been payable if the accumulations had been distributed in the years earned – called the “throwback tax”.

Foreign trusts also trigger additional reporting obligations that carry heavy pen­alties for failure to comply. A U.S. beneficiary who receives a distribution from a foreign trust must file Form 3520 (“Annual Return to Report Transactions with Foreign Trusts”) reporting the distribution and the character of the distribu­tion. The failure-to-file penalty is equal to 35 percent of the gross distribution.

Recognizing, however, that a domestic trust can inadvertently become a foreign trust through changes in the identity of the trust­ee – such as a trustee’s resignation, disability, or death (but not removal) or the trustee ceasing to be a U.S. person (i.e. change of residency or expatriation) – U.S. Treasury Regulations pro­vide for a 12-month period within which to cure the unintentional conversion. The trust can replace the foreign trustee with a U.S. per­son trustee, or the foreign person can become a U.S. person during these 12 months. The foreign per­son can effectuate the cure simply by making the United States his place of residence; he need not become a U.S. citizen.

Rather than rely upon the 12-month cure period, however, a trust agreement should provide for a means to remove a non-U.S. person trustee to assure that the trust qualifies as a domestic trust. Trustee removal and appointment provisions are critical but should be reserved to individuals or entities in the United States. These powers can also create inadvertent gift and estate tax issues, so consulting a qualified trusts and estates lawyer to draft them is critical.

To avoid these problems, it might seem to make sense to allow the for­eign trustee to appoint a U.S. co-trustee or to grant certain reserved powers over the trust to a foreign family member in lieu of naming them as trustee (for example, reserving to them the power to remove and replace the U.S. trustee.) But this will not solve the problem. A trust is defined as foreign unless it satis­fies both the court test and the control test.

  • The safe harbor provisions of the court test require that the trust must “in fact” be administered exclusively within the United States, meaning that the U.S. trustee must maintain the books and records of the trust, file the trust tax returns, manage and invest the trust assets, and determine the amount and timing of trust distributions.
  • The safe harbor provisions of the control test provide that, in addition to making decisions related to distributions, the U.S. trustee must be entirely responsible for a laundry list of decisions including selecting beneficiaries, making investment decisions, deciding whether to allocate receipts to income or principal, deciding to termi­nate the trust, pursue claims of the trust, sue on behalf of or defend suits against the trust, and deciding to remove, add or replace a trustee or name a successor trustee.

And just to be sure, a well-written document should include a backstop provision that requires the trust to always qualify as a U.S. trust for income tax purposes and to have a majority of U.S. trustees. The inclusion of such a provision, at the very least, alerts those administering the trust to consider these issues before making any changes to the trustee or after an inadvertent change in trustees has occurred.

The increase in cross-border families and multinational asset portfolios have added complexities to the financial planning of families. Familiarity with the impact that these rules may have to existing or proposed estate plans is critical when designing a comprehensive plan for clients.

© 1998-2020 Wiggin and Dana LLP

For more on wills and inheritance trusts, see the National Law Review Estates & Trusts law section.

JUUL Faces New Lawsuit Over Marketing Tactics

Marketing to youth has long been part of the tobacco industry’s strategy to keep a steady influx of customers. However, since the Joe Camel lawsuit in 1997, tobacco companies have increasingly been under fire for targeting underage consumers. Most disavow these intentions, but from time to time, a company will draw attention to these kinds of tactics. Most recently, the vaping pioneer, JUUL, has been pinpointed.

Despite assertions that they had never marketed their products to children or teenagers, a recent New York Times article reports that JUUL purchased ad space on youth-centered websites like Nickelodeon, the Cartoon Network, Seventeen magazine, and educational sites for students as young as middle school.

This report highlights a new lawsuit filed by the Massachusetts attorney general, Maura Haley, on February 12, 2020. The suit indicates that JUUL was targeting underage demographics during its early launch period between June 2015 and early 2016.

Efforts to target this demographic were deliberate according to the lawsuit. JUUL rejected an initial marketing proposal that aimed to attract adult smokers by using vintage 1980s technology. Instead, they produced a campaign featuring youthful models and sought to enlist millennials, Gen Z celebrities, and Instagram influencers to increase appeal to younger consumers.

“This is the first real window into JUUL’s original marketing plan, and what it did to target our kids — target our kids. That’s what we’re talking about,” Healey said at a press conference. “JUUL’s own documents show that the company intentionally chose fashionable models and images that appeal to young people for its ads. They tried to recruit celebrities and social media influencers like Miley Cyrus and Kristen Stewart to promote its products. It purchased ad space and websites for kids, such as Nickelodeon, Seventeen, and Cartoon Network. It’s sold and shipped e-cigarettes to underage kids in Massachusetts through its website. And it worked.”

Equally – if not more – troubling are charges that these ads were placed in paid advertising positions across a wide range of websites intended for underage audiences. Sites include:

Educational sites: basic-mathematics.com, mathplayground.com, mathway.com, onlinemathlearning.com, and purplemath.com, socialstudiesforkids.com, and schcollegeconfidential.com

Gaming sites for young girls: dailydressupgames.com, didigames.com, forhergames.com, games2girls.com, girlgames.com, and girlsgogames.com

General game and craft sites for young children: allfreekidscrafts.com, hellokids.com, and kidsgameheroes.com

The report also alleges that JUUL had given e-cigarettes to consumers who provided high school students’ email addresses.

Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, among other national anti-smoking organizations applauded the lawsuit. Matthew Myers, president of the organization, commented that “What is remarkable is the extent to which a single company, drove this train and the extent to which the decisions of that company were knowing, conscious and intentional with disregard for the health and safety of our kids.”

JUUL executives have yet to address the specific charges in the complaint. Company spokesperson Austin Finan has only commented that, “While we have not yet reviewed the complaint, we remain focused on resetting the vapor category in the U.S. and earning the trust of society by working cooperatively with attorneys general, regulators, public health officials, and other stakeholders to combat underage use and transition adult smokers from combustible cigarettes.”

Public sentiment has turned against JUUL as more information comes to light about the dangers of vaping and concern over what has been called “an epidemic” of underage vaping by the federal government. According to a 2019 CDC study, e-cigarette use was reported at 27.5% among high school students and 10.5% among middle school students. The company has strongly rejected claims that it has focused its marketing on youth and maintains its position that its sole goal is to help adult smokers transition to a safer option.

 

COPYRIGHT © 2020, STARK & STARK

For more on tobacco/vape product regulation, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug Law section.

Healthy Habits for You and Your Company: File Your Annual Reports, Replace Your Air Filters, and Renew Your DMCA Agent Registration

Businesses and people alike each have recurring routine tasks they need to perform to stay in good shape. Every year we prepare corporate filings, undergo our necessary medical examinations, and file our taxes.1 And starting in December 2019, companies began adding a new task to this checklist: renewing their DMCA Agent registration. Is your company prepared?

The DMCA can protect your website from its users’ copyright infringement.

Anyone with a website that allows users to post content to the site, even in a simple comment section, risks liability for copyright infringement based on those users’ posts. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) helps website owners mitigate that risk. If you operate a site and you comply with the safe harbor criteria, the DMCA shields you from copyright liability. The DMCA isn’t limited to internet service providers; its safe harbor offers websites an immensely valuable protection against costly and lengthy copyright infringement lawsuits. A registered Agent is only one of the many required elements needed for DMCA compliance, but it’s a crucial requirement that’s easy to overlook.

Congress passed the DMCA in 1998 to strike a balance between protecting the dynamic creativity of internet users and enforcing federal copyright protection. And regardless of whether you think Congress managed to find that balance, the DMCA sets the standard for statutory copyright enforcement on the internet—users ignore it at their peril. Websites that don’t comply with the DMCA must2 screen every comment and post submitted to the site by anyone for potential copyright violations, because the site can be held directly liable for any infringing submissions.3 On the other hand, DMCA compliance makes the website essentially immune from its users’ infringement.

Social media networks are the most obvious beneficiaries of DMCA safe harbor protection. Can you imagine if Facebook or Twitter needed to pre-screen every single post or tweet before it went live? In exchange for this safe harbor protection, the DMCA requires businesses to (among other things) create and enforce copyright takedown procedures for copyright holders to use when they spot potentially infringing content on the website.4

The Designated Agent is a key part of DMCA compliance.

Every organization that seeks safe harbor protection needs to designate an Agent as the organization’s point of contact for takedown notices. The designation is submitted to the U.S. Copyright Office, where it’s published on a searchable database. The designated Agent (which can be one person or an entire department) is then responsible for receiving all of the company’s DMCA takedown notices and then ensuring that they are acted upon.

Each Agent designation is effective for three years. Whenever the designated Agent’s information is updated with the Copyright Office, the three-year clock starts over. But if a three-year period ends without an update or renewal, the designation becomes invalid and the organization’s DMCA safe harbor protection ends with it.

You don’t want to forget about your renewal and you shouldn’t wait three years between checkups.

Fortunately, it’s pretty simple to figure out when your company’s Agent designation will expire. You can check the date that your organization’s Agent was last updated by searching the DMCA Designated Agent Directory and clicking on the name of the Service Provider.5 Add three years to the displayed effective date, and that’s your deadline.

You could, in theory, set a calendar reminder for every three years and forget about the DMCA in the interim, but we don’t recommend it. What if your Agent takes a leave of absence or leaves the company? What if your company reorganizes and the designated department is renamed (or gets lost in the transition)? We recommend that you check your Agent’s status at least once a year, just to be safe. It only takes a moment to do.

When in doubt, check with your attorneys to make sure that your rights are still being protected.

There’s much more to DMCA protection beyond Agent registration. Copyright law is constantly evolving—especially when it comes to the internet. DMCA safe harbor protection has many requirements beyond just having a designated Agent, and there’s a lot at risk if your company doesn’t qualify for the safe harbor. You can’t “undo” a gap in safe harbor protection, but you can close the door on future liability. That’s a door you want to keep shut. As your business’s online presence grows, so does its exposure to potential liability.

So when you’re checking your DMCA Agent registration, don’t just tick the box and wait until the next year. Take the time to consider your DMCA protocols. If your company’s DMCA compliance protocols aren’t up to date and compliant, your safe harbor is in jeopardy. What about the company’s future needs? If your company’s online presence will be growing, is your designated Agent capable of handling an increased caseload of takedown notices? This is an area where it’s better to be safe than sorry.

References:

1 This article is not meant to provide specific legal or medical advice. If you would like more specific legal advice, please contact an attorney. If you’re looking for specific medical advice, you’re reading the wrong article.
2 Or at least they really, really should.
3 Damages for copyright infringement are no joke. A successful plaintiff can receive their actual damages while also forcing the infringer to disgorge its profits from the infringement, or can alternatively obtain statutory damages of up to $150,000 per infringed work.
4 Many articles could be (and have been) written on abusive and overzealous DMCA takedown notices, especially since the development of automated takedown services that can act without human interaction. For brevity’s sake, this article won’t dive into those deep waters.
5 If you run a website, you should assume that you’re a service provider under the DMCA.

Copyright © 2020 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite. A Professional Association. All Rights Reserved.

For more on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law section.