IRS Expands Ability of Safe Harbor Plan Sponsors to Make Mid-Year Changes

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently issued Notice 2016-16, which provides safe harbor 401(k) plan sponsors with increased flexibility to make mid-year plan changes.  Notice 2016-16 sets forth new rules for when and how safe harbor plan sponsors may amend their plans to make mid-year changes, a process which traditionally has been subject to significant restrictions.

Background

“Safe harbor” 401(k) plans are exempt from certain nondiscrimination tests (the actual deferral percentage (ADP) and actual contribution percentage (ACP) tests) that otherwise apply to employee elective deferrals and employer matching contributions.  In return for these exemptions, safe harbor plans must meet certain requirements, including required levels of contributions, the requirement that plan sponsors provide the so-called “safe harbor notice” to participants, and the requirement that plan provisions remain in effect for a 12-month period, subject to certain limited exceptions.

Historically, the IRS has limited the types of changes that a safe harbor plan sponsor may make mid-year due to the requirement that safe harbor plan provisions remain in effect for a 12-month period.  The 401(k) regulations provide that the following mid-year changes are prohibited, unless applicable regulatory conditions are met:

  • Adoption of a short plan year or any change to the plan year

  • Adoption of safe harbor status on or after the beginning of the plan year

  • The reduction or suspension of safe harbor contributions or changes from safe harbor plan status to non-safe harbor plan status

The IRS has occasionally published exceptions to the limitations on mid-year changes.  For example, plan sponsors were permitted to make mid-year changes to cover same-sex spouses following the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in United States v. Windsor in 2013.

Aside from these limited exceptions, safe harbor plan sponsors were generally not permitted to make mid-year changes.  This led to some difficulties for plan sponsors, particularly in situations where events outside the plan sponsor’s control might ordinarily cause a plan sponsor to want to make a mid-year plan change.

Permissible Mid-Year Changes

Notice 2016-16 clarifies that certain changes to safe harbor plans made on or after January 29, 2016, including changes that alter the content of a plan’s required safe harbor notice, do not violate the safe harbor qualification requirements simply because they occur mid-year.  A “mid-year change” for this purpose includes (1) a change that is first effective during a plan year, but not effective at the beginning of a plan year, or (2) a change that is effective retroactive to the beginning of the plan year, but adopted after the beginning of the plan year.

Mid-year changes that alter the plan’s required safe harbor notice content must meet two additional requirements:

  1. The plan sponsor must provide an updated safe harbor notice that describes the mid-year change and its effective date must be provided to each employee required to receive a safe harbor notice within a reasonable period before the effective date of the change.  The timing requirement is deemed satisfied if the notice is provided at least 30 days, and no more than 90 days, before the effective date of the change.

  2. Each employee required to be provided a safe harbor notice must also have a reasonable opportunity (including a reasonable time after receipt of the updated notice) before the effective date of the mid-year change to change the employee’s cash or deferred election.  Again, this timing requirement is deemed satisfied if the election period is at least 30 days.

Mid-year changes that do not alter the content of the required safe harbor notice do not require the issuance of a special safe harbor notice or a new election opportunity.

Prohibited Mid-Year Changes

Certain mid-year changes remain prohibited, including:

  • A mid-year change to increase the number of years of service that an employee must accrue to be vested in the employee’s account balance under a qualified automatic contribution arrangement (QACA) safe harbor plan

  • A mid-year change to reduce the number of employees eligible to receive safe harbor contributions

  • A mid-year change to the type of safe harbor plan, such as changing from a traditional 401(k) safe harbor plan to a QACA

  • A mid-year change to modify or add a matching contribution formula, or the definition of compensation used to determine matching contributions if the change increases the amount of matching contributions

  • A mid-year change to permit discretionary matching contributions

In addition, mid-year changes that are already subject to conditions under the 401(k) and 401(m) regulations (including changes to the plan year, the adoption of safe harbor status mid-plan year, and the reduction or suspension of safe harbor contributions, as described above) are still prohibited, unless applicable regulatory conditions are met.  These changes are also not subject to the special notice and election opportunity requirements.

Conclusion

Notice 2016-16 fundamentally changes the rules regarding mid-year changes to safe harbor 401(k) plans.  Prior to Notice 2016-16, mid-year changes were assumed to be impermissible, subject to the limited exceptions described above.  Going forward, however, mid-year changes that are not specifically prohibited are permitted, so long as the notice requirements, where applicable, are met, and other regulatory requirements are not violated.

Notice 2016-16 should prove particularly helpful for safe harbor plan sponsors that have struggled with the limitations imposed on safe harbor plans by the inability to make mid-year changes when non-safe harbor plans would do so (for example, if a record-keeper changes administrative procedures or other events outside the plan sponsor’s control require mid-year changes).  However, safe harbor plan sponsors wishing to make mid-year changes will still need to consult with advisors to determine whether a proposed amendment is permissible, or whether the amendment is subject to additional regulatory requirements.  In addition, plan sponsors wishing to make a mid-year change that would alter the plan’s required safe harbor notice content must assume the additional cost of issuing a special safe harbor notice and must plan ahead to make sure the supplemental notice is delivered on time.

The IRS is also requesting comment on additional guidance that may be needed with respect to mid-year changes to safe-harbor plans, and specifically as to whether additional guidance is needed to address mid-year changes relating to plan sponsors involved in mergers and acquisitions or to plans that include an eligible automatic contribution arrangement under Section 414(w) of the Internal Revenue Code.  Comments may be submitted in writing not later than April 28, 2016.

EPA Proposal Acknowledges Areas With Dangerous Air Pollution, But Leaves Some Out and Has Failed to Step in When States Haven’t Protected Residents

EPATwo weeks ago, the Environmental Protection Agency published proposals to designate 12 areas of the country—including Alton and Marion, Illinois; Jefferson and Posey, Indiana; DeSoto Parish, Louisiana; Anne Arundel and Baltimore, Maryland; St. Clair, Michigan; Franklin, Missouri; Muskogee, Oklahoma; and Freestone, Rusk, and Titus, Texas—as “nonattainment” for the dangerous pollutant sulfur dioxide, or SO2.  While EPA won’t finalize the designations until July, what needs to happen next is for the agency to recognize that there are far more than 12 areas across the United States that are in need of having their air cleaned up.

But to explain the importance of all this, we need to back up a bit.  One of the most powerful tools under the Clean Air Act for protecting the air we breathe is something called an “ambient air quality standard.”  The way it works is this: EPA follows the science and determines the level for certain pollutants above which it’s unsafe for human health, and then issues standards for those pollutants.  For SO2 pollution, it’s 75 parts per billion.  EPA then determines what parts of the country have safe air quality, and what parts have air quality worse than the standard.  These latter areas are called “nonattainment,” and the Clean Air Act imposes strict requirements on states to fix their air quality problems, and directs EPA to step in and handle things if states don’t shoulder their responsibility.

Although EPA set the SO2 standard in 2010, since then, implementation has been stymied.  EPA hasn’t designated many areas, and even with the areas it has already designated as nonattainment, states have almost universally failed to develop the required plans to reduce SO2 pollution and EPA has failed to step in solve the problem expeditiously–including in Detroit, Michigan.  The consequence is that hundreds of thousands of residents are regularly breathing levels of pollution the agency knows causes severe public health impacts, particularly on children and the elderly.

SO2 is a nasty pollutant.  Exposure to even low concentrations for even short durations (as little as five minutes) can trigger asthma attacks and respiratory distress. In fact, studies show correlations between short-term exposure and increased visits to emergency departments and hospital admissions for respiratory illnesses, particularly in at-risk populations including children, the elderly, and asthmatics.  In places like Detroit, where everybody—EPA, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, and the polluters themselves—know that the air is unsafe, the asthma rates are high, the public is suffering, but state and EPA action is both missing and overdue.

We know how to fix this problem. Almost all SO2 pollution comes from a tiny handful of sources: coal-fired power plants.

sierra20clubThat means that restoring clean air is as simple as modeling the pollution from the few hundred remaining coal plants in the country, and ensuring that they have emission limits in place that protect our air and our communities.

But why use modeling instead of air monitors to assess the safety of the air we breathe?  Two reasons: First, when almost all the pollution comes from just a few large sources, modeling is actually much faster, cheaper, and more accurate than setting up a monitoring network and waiting years for the data to come in.  EPA has carefully developed modeling software for this purpose, and has subjected it to more rigorous field testing than any other modeling tool it has ever created.

Second, the sad fact is that the nation’s air monitoring network for SO2 pollution is woefully inadequate.  During the Reagan administration, the U.S. had roughly 1,500 SO2 pollution monitors, which sounds like a lot, until you realize just how big a country the U.S. is—there are more than 3,000 counties in the U.S.  But since then, the number has dropped even further, to less than 450 (in a country spanning 3.8 million square miles!).  And none of them are where they need to be to keep an eye on peak concentrations of SO2 pollution: they are often miles away from large polluting sources or are in places like offshore islands, where the air they measure is a lot cleaner than the air we actually breathe.

This is what is so critical about EPA’s proposals: the new designations would be based on modeling.

Of course, not everybody is likely to be happy about this.  Plenty of states and industry submitted modeling to EPA (rather suspiciously, industry modeling rather universally shows impacts just below the limit), but oftentimes such analysis was skewed towards hiding the true impacts of the pollution.  In some cases, states submitted modeling not of what power plants actually emitted, but what the state wished they had emitted. In others, states or industry modelers used unapproved software add-ons that cripple the model and unsurprisingly yield results purporting air quality to be much better than it actually is.  This is a bit like calculating how much you’d have in your savings account if you’d been stashing away a lot more money than you actually had, and pretending the bank gave you a much better interest rate than it actually did.  It might be a fun exercise, but it has little to do with reality.

Nor did EPA go as far as it should.  While EPA in this round of proposed designations was looking at just 66 areas total, many more than the 12 it identified as having bad air should be considered as “nonattainment” for SO2 pollution.  Places like Gibson County in Indiana, and additional parts of Illinois, Michigan, Louisiana, Ohio, and regions in Texas all have unsafe air quality because of coal plants, and EPA should designate them in nonattainment as well.

The first step in fixing a problem is recognizing that there is a problem, so EPA should not shy away from calling a spade a spade and finalizing nonattainment designations for these areas. And, where problems have already been identified–such as in Detroit–EPA should stop sitting on its hands and move expeditiously to protect the breathing public.

Article By Zack Fabish of Sierra Club

SCOTUS Decision Affects Diversity Jurisdiction of Business Trusts

Many registered investment companies and real estate investment trusts are organized as business trusts. Certain states, such as Maryland, Delaware, and Massachusetts have been hospitable to such entities, and therefore are home to many of these entities. In some states, such as Massachusetts, the entities are formed as common-law trusts, while in others there is a statutory authorization for the formation of a business trust. However, unlike corporations which exist as “persons” for the purpose of legal actions, there have been questions raised as to whether business trusts have a separate legal existence.

The issue of whether a trust is a separate legal entity can impact how trusts access courts.  In a decision that could significantly impact the way in which business trusts determine the forum in which they sue or are sued, on March 7, 2016 the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case involving Americold Realty Trust. In that decision, the Court held that, unlike a corporation, a trust does not have a separate legal existence for the purpose of determining the citizenship of the entity.

The decision reaffirmed that a corporation is a citizen of the state in which it is organized (and the state in which it maintains its principal office, if different).  However, in an 8-0 decision, the Court held that trusts are not separate legal entities with a defined state of citizenship.  Rather, the citizenship of a business trust will be determined by where the beneficiaries of the trust are located.  For a large, publicly-owned business trust, such as a registered investment company or a REIT which have shareholders scattered in many or all of the states, that may effectively destroy any basis for such a trust to use diversity of citizenship to affect federal court jurisdiction.  If sued, this could force such entities to litigate in jurisdictions where the trust is not organized and does not maintain an office because an isolated shareholder resides in that jurisdiction.

While there may be little that investment companies or REITs can do to alter the impact of this decision, it will be interesting to see if the state laws authorizing such trusts can be revised in a way that may impact the consequences of this decision.

©2016 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Financial Services Sector Implications of ‘Brexit

Should Britain decide to leave both the EU and EEA as a result of a “Brexit” vote on 23 June 2016, the impact on UK and EU financial services firms could be significant.

The City of London is Europe’s key financial centre and one of the world’s leading financial centres. As such, asset managers, investment banks, retail banks, broker-dealers, corporate finance firms, and insurers choose the United Kingdom to headquarter their businesses, anchoring themselves in a convenient time zone and location from which to access the European and global markets.

A central plank of the European Union’s vision for a single market in financial services is that financial services firms authorised by their local member state regulators may carry on business in any other member state by establishing a local branch or by providing services on a cross-border basis without the need for separate authorisation in every host state. UK-based regulated asset managers (e.g., long-only, hedge fund, and private equity), banks, broker-dealers, insurers, Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS) funds, UCITS management companies, and investment managers of non-UCITS (known as alternative investment funds or AIFs) have a passporting right to carry on business in any other state in the European Economic Area (EEA) in which they establish a branch or into which they provide cross-border services, without the need for further local registration. Passporting also facilitates the marketing of UCITS and AIFs established in the EEA (EEA AIFs) into other member states.

Members of the EEA (which comprises the 28 EU member states and Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland) are subject to the benefits and burdens of the financial services single market directives and regulations, including passporting rights. One outcome of a vote to leave the European Union in the UK referendum to be held on 23 June 2016, would be that the UK leaves the EU but decides to remain in the EEA (with a similar status to, say, Norway)—in which case the impact of a “Brexit” on the financial sector would likely be minimal. Another outcome would be that the UK finds it unpalatable politically to leave the EU whilst remaining in the EEA and therefore decides to leave both the EU and the EEA; it is this scenario that would have significant impact on both UK and EU financial services firms.

Effect on Passporting for UK Financial Services Firms

According to figures released by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in December 2015, more than 2,000 UK investment firms carrying on Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) business (e.g., portfolio managers, investment advisers, and broker dealers) benefit from an outbound MiFID passport, and nearly 75% of all MiFID outbound passporting by firms across the EEA is undertaken by UK firms into the EEA. Notably, according to the EBA, 2,079 UK firms use the MiFID passport to access markets in other EEA countries, and the next two highest totals in the EBA list are Cyprus (148 firms) followed by Luxembourg (79 firms). EEA-wide, there are around 6,500 investment firms authorised under MiFID. The United Kingdom, Germany, and France are the main jurisdictions for more than 70% of the MiFID investment firm population of the EU; more than 50% are based in the UK.

We consider that these figures suggest that Continental consumers potentially stand to lose more than UK consumers in terms of the cross-border provision of financial services in the event of a Brexit, which could be a driver for the UK being given a special deal to permit access to continue, although this needs to be weighed against the political imperative that the remaining EU countries would likely feel against being seen as being too accommodating to a country leaving the EU.

In the event of a Brexit where the United Kingdom leaves the EEA, unless special arrangements for the UK were to be agreed between the UK and the EU, and subject to the more detailed comments below, UK firms would cease to be eligible for a passport to provide services cross-border into, or establish branches in, the remaining EEA countries (rEEA) and to market UCITS and AIFs across the rEEA. Instead, local licences would be required, and the use of relatively low-cost branches in multiple member states may have to be reassessed. UK-authorised firms no longer able to passport into the rEEA but wishing to do so would need to consider moving sufficient of their main operations to an rEEA jurisdiction in order to qualify for a passport.

Effect on UK Financial Services Regulatory Law

The EU is a major source of UK financial services regulatory law. Recent UK parliamentary research estimates that EU-related law constitutes one-sixth of the UK statute book. That figure does not include the deposit of more than 12,000 EU “regulations” which take direct effect in each member country (including the UK) in contrast to EU “directives” which must be implemented or “transposed” in local law by each country; EU regulations would cease to apply in the UK post-Brexit. In addition, it would be necessary for the UK to renegotiate or reconfirm a series of EU negotiated free-trade deals that would not automatically be inherited by the UK upon Brexit. Post-Brexit, the UK would need to legislate to “renationalise” voluminous laws rooted in the EU and fill any regulatory gaps in UK legislation once the EU treaties ceased to apply.

It would be open to the UK merely to incorporate directly applicable EU regulations into UK law. This might be the easiest course of action, given the volume and breadth of issues which would need to be addressed by the UK government in the event of a vote to leave the EU.

Accordingly, in contrast to the impact that the UK leaving the EEA would have on passporting, the UK regulatory environment for financial services firms may not change dramatically in the event of a Brexit, at least in the short-term. Furthermore, any subsequent changes to the UK regime are more likely than not to be deregulatory in nature and therefore favourable to UK firms. In relation to the AIFMD, to take one example, the UK government would have the option to introduce a more tailored and proportionate regime for fund managers managing AIFs with lower risk profiles.

Pre-Referendum Planning

Planning for a Brexit is difficult without knowing what a post-Brexit landscape would look like (as yet, this is a “known unknown”). However, in the run up to the UK referendum, it seems prudent for UK financial institutions to consider the impact of a Brexit on the terms of any new contracts being entered into and, if relevant, seek to make provision for a Brexit (e.g., by including Brexit in a force majeure provision; providing for termination rights in the event of a Brexit and adapting references to the EEA to continue to cover the UK, if appropriate).

Passporting aside, UK firms will also need to assess the practical issues that would arise in the event of a Brexit. For instance, investment strategies that permit investments in the EEA may need to be amended in order for investments in the UK to continue to be permitted. Similarly, a Brexit may impact the terms of product distribution agreements and other service agreements.

Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)

If the UK were to leave the EEA, then, potentially: UK AIFMs would be treated as non-rEEA AIFMs, marketing by UK AIFMs of AIFs to rEEA investors would have to be undertaken on the basis of member state private placement regimes, and UK AIFMs would no longer be able to manage (from the UK) an AIF established in an rEEA member state without being locally authorised in that member state to do so. Further, UK AIFMs that utilise AIFMD passports for MiFID investment services to provide segregated client portfolio management and/or advisory services on a cross-border basis would cease to be able to use those passports. Conversely, rEEA AIFMs that seek to manage or market AIFs in the UK or provide MiFID investment services to clients in the UK in reliance on AIFMD passports would no longer be able to do so.

However, unlike other single-market directives, the AIFMD provides for its regime to be extended to non-EEA managers, and this offers a potential “third way” should the UK not remain in the EEA. If the UK were to leave its current AIFMD compliant regime in place, it ought to be technically straightforward, following a Brexit, for the AIFMD to be extended to the UK. In this scenario, UK AIFMs could continue to be authorised under the regime and be entitled to use the AIF marketing and management passports (a non-rEEA manager passport). This possibility may influence the UK government to leave the current UK regime unchanged in the event of a vote to leave the EU. However, any such extension of the AIFMD would require a positive opinion from the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and a decision by the EU Commission, so there would be a political dimension to it that would likely introduce uncertainty.

It is important to note, though, that the use by a UK AIFM of a non-rEEA manager passport would be subject to a number of conditions prescribed by the AIFMD that would have material practical implications. In particular,

  • a UK AIFM would need to be authorised by the regulator in its rEEA “member state of reference” (this would be determined in accordance with the AIFMD by reference to where in the rEEA the manager is proposing to manage and/or market funds). This regulator could not be the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), so the use of a non-rEEA manager passport would involve dual regulation and supervision—by the FCA in the UK and by a regulator in an rEEA country in relation to compliance with the directive for funds managed or marketed in rEEA countries (the guidance and approach to application and interpretation of the directive by the regulator and local rules in the member state of reference may well differ from that of the FCA);

  • it would be necessary to establish a legal representative in the member state of reference in order to be the contact point between the manager and rEEA regulators, and the manager and rEEA investors. The legal representative would be required to perform the compliance function relating to funds managed or marketed in rEEA countries; and

  • disputes with rEEA investors in a fund managed/marketed by a manager using a non-rEEA manager passport would need to be “settled in accordance with the law of and subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State”—this would preclude the use of UK courts as a forum for disputes with investors.

UK AIFMs should also note that the AIFMD does not provide for a non-rEEA manager passport to cover the provision of MiFID investment services on a cross-border basis. Accordingly, even if the AIFMD were to be extended to the UK so that UK AIFMs could use a non-rEEA manager passport to manage and/or market AIFs in the rEEA, in the event of the UK not remaining in the EEA, UK AIFMs providing cross-border MiFID investment services within the rEEA (e.g. discretionary management/advisory services for separate account clients) may need to think about where the services are in fact being provided and whether local authorisation would be required to continue the provision of those services. For the provision of MiFID investment services, this would re-establish the position prior to the implementation of the Investment Services Directive (the precursor of MiFID) in the mid-1990s.

Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS)

A UCITS fund must by definition be EEA domiciled, as must its management company. Currently, both UCITS funds and their EEA managers benefit from the passport. UCITS funds are passportable into any other member state for the purposes of being marketed locally to the public and management companies can set up branches and/or provide services cross-border into other member states (e.g., a UK-based management company can provide management services to a UCITS fund based in any other EEA country such as, for example, Ireland or Luxembourg). UK UCITS funds and management companies established pre-Brexit would no longer qualify as UCITS post-Brexit. UK-based UCITS funds would no longer be automatically marketable to the public in the rEEA and would therefore become subject to local private placement regimes. Conversely, a UCITS fund established, say, in Ireland or Luxembourg, would no longer be marketable in the UK to the general public, and a management company based in Ireland or Dublin would no longer be entitled to provide management services to a UK-based UCITS fund.

Accordingly, consideration would need to be given to migrating UK UCITS funds to an rEEA country. Otherwise, UK UCITS funds would become subject to the AIFMD regime instead of the UCITS regime and would be subject to additional restrictions and unavailable to most types of retail investor. UK UCITS management companies would have to migrate to rEEA in order to continue to benefit from the passport.

The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)

MiFID gives EEA investment firms authorised in their home EEA country a passport to conduct cross-border business and to establish branches in other EEA countries, free from additional local authorisation requirements. MiFID prohibits member states from imposing any additional requirements in respect of MiFID-scope business on incoming firms that provide cross-border services within their territory, but does allow host territory regulators to regulate passported branches in areas such as conduct of business.

UK-regulated firms that undertake MiFID business would no longer be able to rely on the passport to undertake MiFID business in rEEA and might have to restructure accordingly. Conversely, rEEA firms that seek to undertake MiFID business in the UK would no longer be able to do so and might also have to restructure. However, in contrast to UCITS, that outcome is potentially leavened by the new third-country regime indicated by the recast Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II).

The impact on the provision of cross-border MiFID investment services might be diluted by the regime under MiFID II permitting non-EEA firms to provide investment services to professional clients on a pan-EEA basis upon registration with ESMA, but this would not be an immediate solution, as it would be subject to ESMA making an equivalence determination under MiFID II in relation to the UK, and the timing would be highly uncertain (in particular, MiFID II seems unlikely to come into effect until January 2018, which will be 18 months after the UK referendum). The UK could implement an equivalent regime (in practice, largely by not repealing or amending its EU-generated legislative inheritance and “renationalising” it) to secure its status as an “equivalent” third country with which EEA firms can do business. However, it seems unlikely, given the technical difficulties and delays being experienced generally by ESMA in relation to MiFID II implementation, that an equivalence determination for any non-EEA firms will be high on the agenda until sometime following January 2018.
UK financial institutions would need to consider the regulatory perimeter in each rEEA country in which a financial institution wishes to undertake business. Conversely, rEEA financial institutions would need to consider the UK perimeter to identify what activities by them in the UK would engage a registration requirement locally in the UK.

On the other hand, equivalency considerations aside, the proposals under MiFID II for the unbundling of research and trading fees would fall away in the UK and remain in the rEEA. The unpopular cap on bonuses for systemically important banks and investment firms brought in by the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) would also fall away in the UK but remain in the rEEA. Notably, the EBA has recently indicated that the bonus cap should be imposed on all firms subject to the CRD, which would implicate a huge increase in the number of banks and investment firms subject to the cap. On 29 February, it was announced that FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority had decided to reject that advice on the basis of proportionality. Accordingly, even without a Brexit, the UK is already implementing a policy which should put it at a competitive advantage to other EEA countries that decide to follow the EBA’s guidelines.

Under MiFID, EEA countries must permit investment firms from other EEA countries to access regulated markets, clearing and settlement systems established in their country. Post-Brexit, UK investment firms would no longer be able to rely on those provisions, but nor would rEEA firms looking to access the UK. It is precisely this possibility of “mutually assured destruction”—combined with the UK’s status as Europe’s leading financial centre—that could drive some hard bargaining post-Brexit by both sides towards a constructive outcome in favour of continuing integrated financial markets and services.

The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)

EMIR applies to undertakings established in the EEA (except in the case of AIFs, wherever established, where it is the regulatory status of the manager under AIFMD which is key) that qualify as “financial counterparties” or “non-financial counterparties.” Since, post-Brexit, a UK undertaking would no longer be established in the EEA, under EMIR, UK undertakings that are currently financial counterparties or non-financial counterparties would become third-country entities (TCEs) for EMIR purposes.

Post-Brexit, UK undertakings—along with other TCEs—would not be able to avoid EMIR altogether, as a number of its provisions have extraterritorial effect, including in relation to key requirements such as margin for uncleared trades and mandatory clearing. The trade reporting obligation, however, does not apply to TCEs. The UK government would need to consider whether to introduce similar reporting requirements domestically, particularly given the size and importance of the UK derivatives market. If UK undertakings became TCEs, they would be required to determine whether they would be financial counterparties or non-financial counterparties if they were established in the rEEA, an exercise which would be straightforward.

In any event, UK undertakings subject to the clearing and margin requirements of EMIR pre-Brexit would remain subject to such requirements when entering into derivatives transactions with rEEA firms post-Brexit. Importantly, the exemption from the forthcoming mandatory clearing requirement for UK pension scheme trustees would cease to apply post-Brexit. Accordingly, a UK pension scheme would no longer be able to rely on the EMIR exemption when entering an OTC derivative contract with an rEEA counterparty.

The City of London boasts some of the world’s largest clearing houses, and at least three of them are currently permitted under EMIR to provide clearing services to clearing members and trading venues throughout the EEA in their capacity as ESMA-authorised central counterparties (CCPs). Post-Brexit, however, a UK CCP would become a third-country CCP. Under EMIR, a third-country CCP can only provide clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in the EEA where that CCP is specifically recognised by ESMA. This would require, among other things, clearing houses operating out of London to apply to ESMA for recognition, the European Commission to pass an implementing act on the equivalence of the UK’s regime to EMIR, and relevant cooperation arrangements to be put in place between the rEEA and the UK—a lengthy process overall. Financial institutions based in rEEA will certainly want to continue to access UK regulated markets and CCPs.

Copyright © 2016 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

What Does the US Supreme Court Ruling Mean for Local Affordable Housing Laws?

On February 29, the US Supreme Court denied certiorari in California Building Industry Association v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435 (2015), and leaves standing a unanimous decision by the California Supreme Court upholding the city of San Jose’s affordable housing ordinance.

San Jose’s ordinance compels all developers of new residential development projects with 20 or more units to reserve a minimum of 15 percent of for-sale units for low-income buyers, and the price of those units cannot exceed 30 percent of the buyers’ median income. The ordinance requires these restrictions to remain in place for 45 years. Alternatively, the developer can pay the city a fee in lieu. The California Building Industry Association argued that the ordinance was an unlawful exaction in violation of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), and Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). In a June 15, 2015 decision, the California Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the ordinance is not an exaction because it does not require a developer to give up a property interest, but instead a typical zoning restriction subject to rational basis review.

In concurring with the US Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in this case, Associate Justice Clarence Thomas acknowledged the important issues raised in California Building Industry Association, perhaps signaling the Court may revisit this issue. In particular, Justice Thomas stated, “For at least two decades . . . lower courts have divided over whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases where the alleged taking arises from a legislatively imposed condition rather than an administrative one. . . . I continue to doubt that ‘the existence of a taking should turn on the type of governmental entity responsible for the taking. . . . Until we decide this issue, property owners and local governments are left uncertain about what legal standard governs legislative ordinances and whether cities can legislatively impose exactions that would not pass muster if done administratively.”

Ultimately, however, Justice Thomas determined that California Building Industry Association did not provide an opportunity to decide the conflict: “The City raises threshold questions about the timeliness of the petition for certiorari that might preclude us from reaching the Takings Clause question. Moreover, petitioner disclaimed any reliance on Nollan and Dolan in the proceedings below. Nor did the California Supreme Court’s decision rest on the distinction (if any) between takings effectuated through administrative versus legislative action.”

The denial of certiorari leaves in place similar “inclusionary” affordable housing programs that have been adopted in more than 170 California municipalities.

©2016 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

Taco Bell Employees Likely Are Not Celebrating Their “Victory” in California Meal and Rest Period Class Action

More than a few media sources have reported on the March 10, 2016 wage-hour “victory” by a class of Taco Bell employees on meal period claims in a jury trial in the Eastern District of California.  A closer review of the case and the jury verdict suggests that those employees may not be celebrating after all — and that Taco Bell may well be the victor in the case.

The trial involved claims that Taco Bell had not complied with California’s meal and rest period laws. The employees sought meal and rest period premiums and associated penalties for a class of employees that reportedly exceeded 134,000 members.

Now, it is certainly true that, at trial, a class of employees prevailed on a claim that Taco Bell did not comply with California meal period laws for a limited period of time (2003-2007), when Taco Bell reportedly provided employees with 30 minutes of pay when they were not able to take meal periods, rather than the full one-hour of pay provided for by California law.

And it is certainly true that the class of employees was awarded approximately $496,000 on that claim.

But as it appears that there were more than 134,000 employees in the class, a few punches on the calculator show that, on average, each employee would receive approximately $3.

Perhaps more importantly, while it may have lost on that one claim, Taco Bell prevailed on the remaining claims in the case where the class alleged that Taco Bell had violated both meal and rest period laws as to its employees, including a claim that Taco Bell had not provided meal periods in compliance with the law for a period of approximately 10 years (2003-2013).   That claim alone likely would have resulted in a jury verdict of several million dollars had the employees prevailed on it.  But they did not.  Taco Bell did.

In other words, in a case where the employees were presumably asking a jury for several millions of dollars for alleged violations dating back to George W. Bush’s first term as President, they were only awarded approximately $496,000.

In the grand scheme of a class action, where employers must constantly weight the costs of litigation with the benefits of settlement, that is a small sum.  It is likely an amount Taco Bell gladly would have paid to settle the case.  In fact, one would have to speculate that $496,000 is likely much less than the amount Taco Bell actually offered the employees and their attorneys to resolve the case in mediation or otherwise.

So while the media may be reporting that this is a “victory” for Taco Bell employees, those employees, who will receive $3 each on average, may not see it that way.  Instead, they may well be questioning the lead plaintiffs and their attorneys about how much Taco Bell offered at the settlement table, if it was rejected, and why.

(And before anyone responds, “But the employees’ attorneys will get their attorneys fees,” we’re talking about the recovery for the employees themselves. If the real victors in the case are the attorneys, that’s another issue, isn’t it?)

©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

NIOSH Issues Suggestions to Help Workers Adapt to the Time Change

Spring is in the air and with it comes the time change to account for daylight savings.  Do not forget to set your clocks forward one hour this Sunday, March 13, 2016 or at least be ready for your smart devices to change their time spontaneously.

However, according to NIOSH, the time change can create real risks to workplace health and safety:

It can take about one week for the body to adjust the new times for sleeping, eating, and activity (Harrision, 2013). Until they have adjusted, people can have trouble falling asleep, staying asleep, and waking up at the right time. This can lead to sleep deprivation and reduction in performance, increasing the risk for mistakes including vehicle crashes. Workers can experience somewhat higher risks to both their health and safety after the time changes (Harrison, 2013). A study by Kirchberger and colleagues (2015) reported men and persons with heart disease may be at higher risk for a heart attack during the week after the time changes in the Spring and Fall.

Employers are encouraged to remind workers of the upcoming time change and that it can have effects on the mind and body for several days following the change.  NIOSH suggests that employees should consider reducing demanding physical and mental tasks as much as possible the week of the time change to allow oneself time to adjust.  See all of NIOSH’s guidance here.

Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.

April 2016 Visa Bulletin Release

visaThe Department of State (DOS) has released the April 2016 Visa Bulletin, with the Application Final Action Date chart for employment-based applications reflecting some substantial movement. The 2nd preference category for China-mainland born applicants has moved ahead one month to Sept. 1, 2012, and for India born applicants it has moved ahead a few weeks to Nov. 8, 2008. The 3rd preference and Other Workers categories have moved ahead at least one month for all applicants. The Final Action Date cut-off for China-mainland born applicants is now Feb. 1, 2014, for all 5th preference category applicants. There was no movement in the Dates for Filing chart for employment-based categories.

The family-based categories also showed slight movement in the Application Final Action Date chart, but there was no movement in the Dates for Filing chart.

As reported, last month prospective adjustment of status applicants were advised to use the Application Final Action Date chart to determine their eligibility to file applications, despite previous guidance that the Dates for Filing chart could be used. USCIS has not yet advised which April 2016 charts should be referred to in filing adjustment of status applications for family- or employment-based petitions, but anticipates that this information will be released within the week.

©2016 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

DHS Announces Final Rule on STEM OPT Employment Authorization

The final rule adds employer obligations to the STEM OPT program.

The US Department of Homeland Security has released an advance version of its long-anticipated final rule that expands employment authorization for foreign students with science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) degrees. The rule, which will be published in the Federal Register on March 11 and take effect on May 10, 2016, will allow such students to extend their period of optional practical training (OPT) by an extra 24 months, for a total of 36 months of OPT employment authorization. Previously, students in STEM fields were allowed a total of 29 months of OPT. Foreign students with degrees in non-STEM fields will continue to be limited to 12 months of OPT.

The rule also improves and increases oversight over STEM OPT extensions by, among other things, requiring that employers implement formal training plans, adding wage and other protections for STEM OPT students and US workers, and allowing extensions only to students with degrees from accredited schools. The rule also allows US Immigration and Customs Enforcement to conduct site visits to employers of STEM OPT holders to ensure that the rule’s requirements are being complied with.

Previous 17-month STEM OPT employment authorizations issued before May 10 will remain valid until their expirations. Starting May 10, STEM students will have a chance to apply for an additional seven months of OPT.

Copyright © 2016 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Exclusive Study Analyzes 2015 IPOs

Proskauer’s Global Capital Markets Group presents the third annual IPO Study, a comprehensive analysis of U.S.-listed initial public offerings in 2015 and identification of three-year comparisons and trends of U.S.-listed initial public offerings over the same period.

The study examines 90 U.S.-listed 2015 IPOs with a minimum initial deal size of $50 million, and includes industry analysis on health care; technology, media & telecommunications; energy & power; financial services; industrials and consumer/retail. The study also includes a focus on foreign private issuers. It also makes year-over-year comparisons of extensive data about deal structures and terms, SEC comments and timing, financial profiles, accounting disclosures, corporate governance and deal expenses.

Underlying the study is the global Capital Markets Group’s proprietary IPO database, which is a valuable resource for sponsors and companies considering an IPO as well as for IPO market participants and their advisors.

Download Proskauer’s 2016 IPO Study