Fourth Circuit Allows Casino Workers to Proceed With Putative Class and Collective Action For Unpaid Training Time at “Dealer School”

The Fourth Circuit recently decided in Harbourt v. PPE Casino Resorts Maryland, LLC that casino workers may proceed with a putative class action alleging that their unpaid attendance at a Maryland casino’s “dealer school” violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Maryland wage laws.

Background

Plaintiffs alleged that the Casino advertised for dealer positions after Maryland authorized the operation of table games.  The Casino invited approximately 830 applicants, including the named plaintiffs, Claudia Harbourt, Michael Lukoski and Ursula Pocknett, to attend a free twelve-week “dealer school” to be “held in conjunction with Anne Arundel County Community College” and aimed at teaching them “how to conduct table games” at the Casino.

The dealer school was scheduled for twenty hours per week over twelve weeks. Plaintiffs alleged that the advertised community college had no involvement in the school and the Casino authored the materials and provided the instruction.  Attendees completed new hire paperwork, submitted to a drug test and provided the Casino with information to conduct background checks required for the attendees to obtain gambling licenses.

Plaintiffs Harbourt and Pocknett attended the dealer school for eight and eleven weeks, respectively, and were not paid for their attendance.  Plaintiff Lukoski attended the dealer school for the full twelve weeks and began working as a dealer at the Casino.  He received minimum wage of $7.25 per hour for the last two days of his attendance at the dealer school.

Plaintiffs filed a putative class and collective action lawsuit asserting violations of the FLSA and Maryland wage laws claiming their time spent at the dealer school was compensable.  The district court granted the Casino’s motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiffs “failed to show that the primary beneficiary of their attendance at the training was the Casino rather than themselves” and therefore the time spent at the dealer school was not compensable.

Decision on Appeal

The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that those who attended the training school were employees performing “work” for the Casino within the meaning of the FLSA and Maryland wage and hour laws.  The Court relied on the Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Casino received an immediate benefit in a trained workforce of over 800 dealers, “the training was unique to the Casino’s specifications and not transferrable to work in other casinos” and attendees were paid minimum wage for the last two days of the dealer school, which suggested that the Casino considered the attendees working for at least those two days.  The Fourth Circuit also found sufficient allegations to conclude that the Casino “conceived or carried out” the dealer school in an effort to avoid paying minimum wage by advertising that the school was associated with a community college, when in fact the college had no involvement.

Takeaway

While the Fourth Circuit did not express an opinion about the likelihood of Plaintiffs’ success on the merits and noted that “[t]he fact that table games were not in operation during the training well may prove an insurmountable obstacle[,]” Harbourt is an important reminder for employers that  training may constitute compensable time under the FLSA and state wage and hour laws, particularly where the primary purpose of the training is to benefit the employer.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

Why Law Schools Must Change to Produce More Hirable Attorneys

effective networking, law students

Recently, I had the great pleasure of speaking at a Chicago Bar Association event for young attorneys on the topic of networking. After about 20 minutes I observed how ravenously everyone was taking notes and the deep level of attentiveness that I was receiving from the participants. While this is not unique to me as a speaker in the legal space, there was something different in the eyes of audience. Fear.

Once the program concluded, I stuck around to chat with the attendees to better understand their mindset.  A few of the comments were, “I have no idea how to network and am just trying to put myself out there.” And, “They never taught me any of this in law school.”  One first-year lawyer even remembered an adjunct professor saying, “If you’re not networking, you’re not working.” The same lawyer then thanked me for my presentation where I explained and demonstrated different ways to actually do it.

Over the past 10 years I have spoken at a number of young attorney events, but the fear and confusion on this day was palpable. For over 200 years, law schools have focused on teaching the law in order to produce scholarly advocates to protect the rights of his or her clients.  There was never a need to teach networking or how to run a solo practice because lawyers were employed at firms where the sole focus was gaining experience as a lawyer. There was also an abundance of opportunities to get a job.

In economics, we all learned about supply and demand. In the case of the legal space today, the supply of lawyers is overtaking the demand. Especially in the case of the new grads and younger lawyers.  With the legal landscape changing, it would only make sense that the law schools must change as well.  One attorney I interviewed was even involved in a 2014 ISBA report that demonstrated with clarity that law schools just aren’t preparing their students for the challenging legal marketplace that currently exists.

Fortunately, I did uncover that there are some adjunct professors and internal programs that mention and discuss networking with their students, but it’s just not enough. Networking is a learned skill that involves planning and processes to gain traction and ensure positive results. These skills can be used for the job search, deciding to go solo or to be used as an ongoing activity to grow a book of business once you’ve gained enough experience.  Even the simple skill of asking questions and listening to someone’s answers will be critical to a lawyer’s ongoing success and sustainability.

If a law school was to engage its students in a course on effective networking, here are three core elements that I believe should be included:

  • Element #1: Learn how to write a plan.  All law school students need to learn how to develop a written plan for finding a job or going out on their own.  They say, “Failing to plan is a plan to fail.” It is imperative that students learn how to develop and write a plan to better prepare for any eventuality. If the job market were tight, it would be helpful to have developed inside connections to find a good firm or company to work for. If there were struggles to find the right job, then developing a plan to partner with other solo’s to develop some business would be valuable. Whatever the situation, ones ability to develop a plan will be the break-through moment for someone wanting a career in the legal space.
  • Element #2: You’re young, learn how to use social media. In the age of anytime information and promotion, anyone can use social media to improve their ability to find a job or increase exposure in the marketplace. LinkedIn for example allows its users to connect on the site and find inside connections that normally would be hidden. For example, if we were friends and connected on LinkedIn, you could search through my connections to see the wide variety of general counsels and hiring lawyers that I know. Asking me for an inside channel into these contacts is infinitely more effective than sending out cold resumes to job postings or firms you are interested in.
  • Element #3: Learn the basics or you will destroy your free time. As someone who has killed hundreds of hours by networking inefficiently, I can attest to the importance of structure and processes to follow when networking. These methodologies can be found through books, firm mentors or teachers like myself. For many attorneys in school this would be important because it’s not about whom you know anymore but rather how you leverage the relationships with whom you know. Failure to properly give and receive value in a structured way within your network can lead to countless unproductive hours at events and coffee meetings.  While it’s true that relationships take time, how much time and with whom you invest is in question.

Whether you are currently enrolled in law school, a recent grad or someone who is billing 2000 hours a year for someone else’s clients at your firm, learning to plan and execute on your networking has never been more important. I know that the law schools today are aware of the need for networking classes, but they just haven’t fully committed to the idea. My hope is that with further awareness and forward-thinking deans, graduates will be better equipped to acquire the jobs they are looking for.

Copyright @ 2016 Sales Results, Inc.

OSHA Issues New Illness and Injury Recordkeeping Rule That Casts Doubt upon Commonplace Employer Drug Testing and Safety Incentive Policies

osha-logoAnnouncing a series of requirements that will begin to take effect August 10, 2016, OSHA released, on May 11th, its final rule to “modernize injury data collection to better inform workers, employers, the public and OSHA about workplace hazards.” Tellingly, OSHA acknowledges in its accompanying press release that the rule is intended to “nudge” employers to enhance methods to prevent workplace injuries and illnesses. Apparently, OSHA is proceeding under the assumption that all employers, regardless of past safety history, require an external push to enhance workplace safety efforts. Included within the rule are a number of alarming pronouncements—discussed more fully below—regarding routine employer safety practices such as drug testing and incentive policies that may necessitate changing long-established routines.

Overview of the New Injury and Illness Recording and Reporting Requirements

Signaling a stark departure from traditional injury recording and reporting practices whereby employers track and maintain such information internally, the new rule will require thousands of employers to electronically submit these records to OSHA each year. OSHA will then publish this data online in a format that anyone with access to the internet—including competitors, prospective employees, shareholders, union organizers and disgruntled former employees—can presumably search, filter and copy for their own use, including further public dissemination. The data submission obligations will be phased in over two years, as employers with 250 or more employees must submit the required 300A Annual Summary by July 1, 2017, and employers with 20 to 249 employees in “high-hazard” industries must submit their 2016 and 2017 300A Summaries by July 1, 2017 and 2018, respectively.

Employers operating in State Plan states are covered, too, as the OSHA-approved state programs must adopt “substantially identical” requirements within six months. Accordingly, employers in California, Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan and Virginia—among others—should begin preparations to comply with the new rule.

Although a portion of the rule does not go into effect until next year, employers must comply beginning August 10, 2016 with requirements relating to employee involvement in employer recordkeeping systems and discrimination/retaliation prevention. Although much of the attention paid to the new rule has focused on the electronic submission requirements, OSHA’s commentary surrounding the discrimination prohibition suggests that this section may ultimately force employers to make changes to long-standing practices surrounding post-accident drug testing and safety incentive efforts.

The employee involvement portion of the rule, set forth at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.35, explicitly requires employers to “inform each employee how he or she is to report a work-related injury or illness” and “establish a reasonable procedure for employees to report work-related injuries and illnesses promptly and accurately.” A procedure is not reasonable, according to the new rule, if it would “deter or discourage a reasonable employee from accurately reporting a workplace injury or illness.” Further, employers must inform employees that they have the right to report injuries and illnesses, in addition to advising them that their employer is “prohibited from discharging or in any manner discriminating against [them] for reporting work-related injuries or illnesses.”

OSHA Takes Aim at Post-Injury Drug Testing and Safety Incentive Policies

Taking a position in the final rule that is sure to alarm a wide range of employers, OSHA announced that “blanket post-injury drug testing policies deter proper reporting” of injuries. Although the rule does not make across-the-board drug testing a per se violation, OSHA instructs employers to utilize post-injury drug testing only where “there is a reasonable possibility that drug use by the reporting employee was a contributing factor to the reported injury or illness,” and only where “the drug test can accurately identify impairment caused by drug use.” OSHA suggests that employees who report bee stings, repetitive strain injuries or other injuries where drug use could not reasonably have contributed to the occurrence, should not be tested. Creating greater uncertainty, OSHA warns employers that even when the decision to conduct a post-injury drug test is reasonable, the agency may nevertheless conclude that the testing unlawfully deterred injury reporting and constituted retaliation if the drug testing procedure itself is punitive or embarrassing to the employee, whatever that means.

OSHA recognizes, however, that employers that conduct post-accident testing mandated by federal regulations (e.g., interstate transportation) or pursuant to state workers’ compensation laws, many of which include “drug-free workplace” incentive programs, are not affected by the new rule. As such, an employer’s efforts to comply with applicable federal regulations or state laws will not be viewed as retaliatory.

The new rule similarly takes aim at another behavior the agency has long sought to discourage—employer safety incentive and disincentive policies and practices. While this will not come as a surprise to most employers (particularly those who recall the “Fairfax Memo” issued in March, 2012, see https://www.osha.gov/as/opa/whistleblowermemo.html), the language found in the rule will likely force many employers back to the drawing board in an effort to develop new policies intended to enhance workplace safety without incurring the wrath of OSHA. In the meantime, employers would be well advised to avoid using an incentive program to “take adverse action, including denying a benefit, because an employee reports a work-related injury or illness, such as disqualifying the employee for a monetary bonus or any other action that would discourage or deter a reasonable employee from reporting the work related injury or illness.” One would assume that this could encompass the month-end pizza party promised to employees if there are no recordable injuries and then abruptly canceled because an employee reports an injury.

In contrast, OSHA instructs that if “an incentive program makes a reward contingent upon, for example, whether employees correctly follow legitimate safety rules rather than whether they reported any injuries or illnesses, the program would not violate this provision.” The rule thus favors positive reinforcement, such as paying a bonus for serving on a safety committee or submitting a safety suggestion adopted by the company, at the same time that it prohibits the imposition of consequences for engaging in protected activities such as reporting an illness or injury.

What Should You Do Now?

  • Consider modifying your drug and alcohol testing policies to allow for discretion on obvious cases in which drug use or testing are clearly unrelated to an employee’s injuries and revisit the reasonableness of your drug testing procedures with your employment attorney. Be mindful, however, that with discretion comes the potential for inconsistent application of the policies and follow-on disparate treatment claims.

  • Examine your safety incentive and disincentive policies and practices with a critical eye, asking whether the policies and/or practices could be perceived as deterring or discouraging employees from reporting an injury or illness. Certain management bonus plans may similarly be viewed as incentivizing managers to discriminate against employees who report illnesses and injuries if the effect of doing so negatively impacts the manager’s bonus eligibility (i.e., where the bonus is tied to the OSHA recordable rates). If the potential for either conclusion exists, consider discontinuing or revising those policies and/or practices.

  • Begin preparations to switch from paper-based recordkeeping methods to an electronic system compatible with OSHA’s data submission portal.

  • Train the individuals responsible for injury and illness recordkeeping and reporting so they fully understand the new rule.

Article By Aaron R. GelbJ. Kevin HennessyCaralyn M. Olie & Thomas H. Petrides of Vedder Price

© 2016 Vedder Price

Google Tries “Pretty Woman” Tactic in Oracle Copyright Suit

I’m not sure Julia Roberts’ use of that blonde wig and eighties cut-out dress when she Google versus Oracleleaned against Richard Gere’s car in Pretty Woman should be considered “fair use,” but perhaps a court might say otherwise. How does Julia’s transformation from wayward to womanly in that iconic 1990 film come into play in a fight between tech giants Google and Oracle over the use of copyrighted java? Because they both hinge on “transformative use.”

Google’s going to trial again? Say it isn’t so. I have to wonder how many lawyers Google, alone, employs. But, if you’re going to stand as one of the front-runners in today’s fast-paced, internet-driven services market, you have to be prepared for lawsuits. Google has been fending off some serious claims by Oracle in a copyright suit filed in San Francisco since 2010, but when the focus of the debate turned to expert witness testimony, we wanted to highlight the matter for discussion and debate. Oracle initially sued Google claiming improper use of copyrighted Java, particularly Google’s use of its application programming interfaces (“APIs”) on its Android platform, to allow developers who are familiar with Java to quickly convert their web apps to Android.  Oracle is now reportedly seeking royalty damages in excess of $8 billion.

Initially Google argued, and the trial court agreed, that APIs were not subject to copyright. That ruling, however, was overturned by the Federal Circuit on appeal, which means Google’s remaining defense is whether its use of the APIs was “transformative,” which would make it acceptable under the Fair Use Doctrine. What standard of “transformative use” are the parties looking to?  2 Live Crew and their ripping parody of “Pretty Woman” in their 1989 album, “As Clean As They Wanna Be.” Please tell me you’re envisioning that iconic cover right now. Apparently the Supreme Court in a 1994 ruling, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., found 2 Live Crew’s version of “Pretty Woman” so creative and original that it qualified as “fair use,” not copyright infringement. Oracle is arguing the opposite by claiming Google’s use of the Java APIs did nothing to transform the code. Google simply plugged it into to a larger body of work, but in no way altered it, which does not qualify, according to Oracle, as transformative.

Oracle has sought to exclude the testimony of Google’s computer science expert from opining that Google’s use of the Java code altered it sufficiently to qualify as a transformative use, claiming his opinion “flies in the face” of the Federal Circuit’s finding that Google was wrong in claiming its use was transformative simply because it incorporated other elements in the Android system. Google has fought back, stating the Federal Circuit never decided whether the work was transformative and specifically remanded the case so that issue could be decided by a jury. Are you finding both of those arguments a bit rambling and repetitive? Apparently so did the trial court judge when he lamented his role as the gatekeeper who has to “excise every detail of expert testimony on a granular level.” With reams of lawyers on either side fighting over every detail and every dollar, however, that is probably precisely what he will have to do.

If you feel it may be hard, not being a computer science guru, to make a determination as to whether Google’s use of the Java at issue was “transformative,” imagine how the jury is going to feel. In May, 2012, a jury found Google had infringed Oracle’s copyrights but they could not decide whether use of the code in question was “fair.” This will be the second trial and second jury that attempts to answer this question. It will require an expert with exceptional communication skills, who is as persuasive as Julia, to effectively break this Java jumble down and win over the potentially tech-savvy, but stubborn “Richards” in the jury box. That’s the expert we would find for them, anyway, if Google gave us a call.

© Copyright 2002-2016 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

DOL Announces Final Rule on Salary Threshold for Exempt White-Collar Employees

Today, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) announced its final rule on the minimum salary that white-collar employees must be paid to qualify as exempt from the overtime requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The new rule raises the current salary level that such employees must receive in order to qualify as “exempt” from $23,660 annually, to $47,476 annually. The new rule takes effect December 1, 2016.

Under current DOL regulations, most white collar employees – executives (supervisors), administrative employees, and professionals – are exempt from the FLSA overtime rules and need not be paid overtime for hours worked over 40 in a workweek if they satisfy two conditions. First, they must perform “exempt” duties as defined by the DOL regulations. Second, they must be paid a guaranteed salary of at least $455 per week, or about $23,660 annually.

The new rule, first proposed in a slightly different form back in 2015, raises the salary level significantly to $913 per week, or about $47,476 annually. This new salary level is set at the 40th percentile of weekly earnings for full-time salaried workers in the lowest income Census region (currently the South). This number is less than the $970 per week, or about $50,440 annually, that the DOL had originally proposed. In addition, the DOL will now permit up to 10 percent of the salary level to come from non-discretionary bonuses and incentive payments (including commissions).

This new threshold of $913 per week/$47,476 annually will be tied to the 40th percentile for full-time salaried workers in the lowest income Census region going forward, and will be updated every three years. It is currently expected to rise to more than $51,000 annually when the first update takes effect on January 1, 2020.

In addition, under the new rule the salary level for employees who qualify for the “highly compensated employee” exemption will rise from $100,000 per year to $134,004 per year. This level is the annual equivalent of the 90th percentile of full-time salaried workers nationally.

One change contemplated by the DOL when the agency first proposed this new rule back in 2015 will not take effect: changes to the “duties” test. The DOL has announced that the final rule will leave the existing duties tests for the executive, administrative, and professional exemptions in place.

The DOL estimates that 4.2 million additional workers will become eligible for overtime as a result of this rule change, including approximately 101,000 workers in the State of Michigan. This is estimated to raise total wages for American workers by approximately $12 billion over the next 10 years.

Many employers will be impacted by this new rule, as many employers have at least one “exempt” employee who is paid less than $47,476 annually. Thus, employers should scrutinize their workforces carefully to determine if changes in exempt status are necessary. Options include:

  • increase the salary of an employee who meets the duties test to at least $47,476 annually to retain his or her exempt status;

  • convert the employee to non-exempt status and pay an overtime premium of one-and-one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for any overtime hours worked;

  • convert the employee to non-exempt status and reduce or eliminate overtime hours;

  • convert the employee to non-exempt status and reduce the amount of pay allocated to base salary (provided that the employee still earns at least the applicable hourly minimum wage) and add pay to account for overtime for hours worked over 40 in the workweek, to hold total weekly pay constant; or

  • use some combination of these responses.

Given the significance of these changes, and the expected impact on the American workforce, employers are encouraged to consult with legal counsel to discuss their options and strategies for implementing changes, if necessary.

Religious Freedom Regarding ACA Contraceptive Mandate Still In Limbo

On May 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court offered only limited guidance on the challenges to the religious “accommodation” procedure under the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) contraceptive mandate. Numerous faith-based institutions had challenged the mandate and the procedural requirements for seeking an exemption on religious grounds as violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment of the federal Constitution. In an unusual (but not unprecedented) move, the Court relied on confirmations from both sides that an alternative solution may resolve this dispute, and remanded the cases back to the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits to allow the parties to work it out. Zubik v. Burwell578 U.S. ___ (2016).

Religious Objection Form At Issue

Under the ACA, organizations providing health insurance to their employees must cover certain FDA-approved contraceptives as part of their health plans. Federal regulations, however, permit organizations to object to providing contraceptives on religious grounds. To avoid recourse for failing to provide mandated contraceptive coverage, such organizations must provide a form, either to their insurer or to the federal government, stating their religious objection.

Numerous faith-based nonprofit organizations, including the Little Sisters of the Poor Home For the Aged in Denver, argue that the ACA’s procedures require them to be complicit in providing services that violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. In various federal courts throughout the country, these religious institutions filed lawsuits challenging the legality of having to submit the religious objection form. After various appellate courts weighed in, the cases were consolidated for the Supreme Court to decide.

Court Sought Alternate Solutions

In late March, the Court asked both sides to come up with new proposals on how the female employees of these nonprofit organizations could receive cost-free contraceptive coverage without burdening the organizations’ religious  freedoms. After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Court concluded that both sides confirmed there was a feasible option to provide contraceptive coverage through the organizations’ insurance companies without any objection notice from the religious parties.

In its per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the judgments and remanded the cases back to the respective appellate courts to allow the parties “an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.” The Court stated that the parties should be given “sufficient time to resolve any outstanding issues between them.”

The Court, including the concurrence by Justice Sotomayor joined by Justice Ginsburg, emphasized that it was not ruling on the merits of the case and that the lower courts should not read anything into the Court’s opinion as leaning one way or the other. As it relates to the nonprofits in this case, the Court stated that the government has notice that they object on religious grounds so no further notice is required going forward. It also emphasized that the government should not fine or penalize the nonprofits.

What It Means

The Supreme Court’s failure to decide the legal issues surrounding the ACA’s contraceptive mandate and the religious “accommodation” means that numerous federal appeals courts will individually address whether the parties can come up with a mutually satisfactory resolution of the cases. It is unclear whether any of the courts will have to decide the legal issues (again). In any event, the very real possibility is that one or more cases could end up before the Supreme Court in a later session.

Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.

The Latest in the NLRB Handbook Saga? Another Unlawful Recording Policy Fails to Pass Muster

Whole-Foods-Market.jpgLast month, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) yet again shed further light on its analysis – and increased scrutiny – of employers’ handbook policies.  The NLRB’s decision in T-Mobile USA, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 171 (Apr. 29, 2016), serves as a follow-up to an earlier decision with respect to rules restricting employees’ use of recording devices.  We talked about the T-Mobile decision in our post last week and thought we would continue the discussion by elaborating on another of the board’s decisions on recording rules.

In one of many recent decisions scrutinizing employer handbook policies, the board in Whole Foods evaluated an employer rule prohibiting the use of recording devices on company premises.  Whole Foods, 363 NLRB No. 87 (Dec 24, 2015).  The NLRB specifically explained that it was not holding that all rules regulating recordings are invalid.  Rather, the board found “only that recording may, under certain circumstances, constitute protected concerted activity under Sec. 7 and that rules that would reasonably be read by employees to prohibit protected concerted recording violate the Act.”  Id. at *3, n.9.  The NLRB further explained that employers are not prohibited from maintaining rules restricting or prohibiting employee use of recording devices, but they must be narrowly drawn so that employees understand that Sec. 7 activity is not restricted.  This was the board’s issue with respect to the Whole Foods policy, as it found the rules to be overly broad.  The board relied on the fact that the rules applied regardless of the type of activity engaged in and that it covered all recordings.

The T-Mobile decision, which we wrote about last week, provides additional insight on how to interpret Whole Foods.  In T-Mobile USA, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 171 (Apr. 29, 2016), the board found the following policy to be unlawful:

To prevent harassment, maintain individual privacy, encourage open communication, and protect confidential information, employees are prohibited from recording people or confidential information using cameras, camera phones/devices, or recording devices (audio or video) in the workplace. Apart from customer calls that are recorded for quality purposes, employees may not tape or otherwise make sound recordings of work-related or workplace discussions. Exceptions may be granted when participating in an authorized [] activity or with permission from an employee’s Manager, HR Business Partner, or the Legal Department. If an exception is granted, employees may not take a picture, audiotape, or videotape others in the workplace without the prior notification of all participants.

Id. at *4.  The administrative law judge found that T-Mobile had set forth valid, nondiscriminatory rationales for the rule, including maintaining a harassment-free work environment and protecting trade secrets, and that the rule was narrowly tailored to these interests.  However, the NLRB reversed, noting that “[t]he rule does not differentiate between recordings that are protected by Section 7 and those that are not, and includes in its prohibition recordings made during nonwork time and in nonwork areas.”  Id. at *5.  Notably, though, the policy did state that the restriction is limited to recordings “in the workplace.”

With respect to the policy justifications alleged, the board conducted the following analysis:

  1. Harassment: T-Mobile asserted that its recording prohibition was in place to prevent harassment and noted that, under federal and state laws, employers have an affirmative obligation to prevent harassing conduct. However, the NLRB found that the recording prohibition was not narrowly tailored to this interest.  The board noted that it neither cited laws regarding workplace harassment nor specified that the restriction is limited to recordings that could constitute unlawful harassment.

  1. Confidential information: T-Mobile asserted as an additional justification its interest in protected confidential information in the workplace. The NLRB noted that the employer’s other policies defined “confidential information” as inclusive of employee information such as employee contact information and wage and salary information.  The board also cited Whole Foods and said that the employer’s interest in protecting confidential information was too insufficient to justify the broad prohibition on recording.

While Whole Foods indicated that such policies are not per se unlawful, the T-Mobile decision makes clear that simply inserting business justifications into the policy will not distinguish the lawful from the unlawful.  The board seems to be closely scrutinizing the justifications and requiring detailed explanations thereof.  The decisions in T-Mobile and Whole Foods indicate that the NLRB will also require that a rule carve out recordings that would be considered protected activity under the Act, and it appears – at least for now – that rules which fail to do so will be struck down.  T-Mobile teaches us that, while recording rules are still lawful in some circumstances, the rules must be especially specific with regard to their application and justifications.  Employers should continue to closely monitor NLRB decisions to stay up-to-date on all decisions analyzing employer handbook policies.

© 2016 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

European Commission Gives Portugal Two Months To Address Issues With Biofuel Law Compliance

On April 28, 2016, the European Commission (EC) encouraged Portugal to become fully compliant with the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive) through the release of an April infringements fact sheet. The Directive has set the goal of 20 percent of the European Union’s (EU) 2020 energy consumption coming from renewable energy, with each Member State consuming at least ten percent renewable energy. Biofuels used in reaching this goal must meet a set of harmonized sustainability requirements, and must be treated equally by Member States regardless of the country of origin. Portugal has been sent a reasoned opinion urging it to stop favoring biofuels produced in Portugal over those produced in other countries, and to reduce sustainability requirements that are not warranted by the Directive. Portugal has two months to address these concerns, or else it could be sent to the Court of Justice of the EU.

©2016 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

Whistleblower Wins Big in Case that Tests Limits of Confidentiality Agreements

Intimidation Of Whistleblower

Confidentiality agreements are common in corporate America. Many companies require new employees to sign them as part of the hiring process. In some industries like healthcare, privacy policies are elevated to a legal requirement. Can these agreements be used to stop an employee from reporting his or her employer for fraud or turning documents over to an attorney? The answer is “no” but there are some limits on what an employee can take and do with the information. The most recent case to examine the issue comes from the Northern District of Illinois.

On May 9th, U.S. Magistrate Judge Sidney Schenkier dismissed a counterclaim brought by LifeWatch Services against a whistleblower in a federal False Claims Act case.

Matthew Cieszynski was a certified technician working for LifeWatch. His job was to conduct heart monitoring tests. LifeWatch conducts remote heart monitoring testing throughout the United States. Patients can wear heart monitor devices anywhere in the world and have those devices monitored through telemetry. Cieszynski’s job was to look for unusual or dangerous heart arrhythmias. The testing results would be passed to the patients’ cardiologists who use the data to diagnose and treat various heart ailments.

When first hired by the company in 2003, Cieszynski signed a confidentiality agreement that said in part, “you agree that both during your employment and thereafter you will not use for yourself or disclose to any person not employed by [LifeWatch] any Confidential Information of the company…” The agreement also restricted Cieszynski’s ability to access computer systems and records or remove information from the company’s premises.

In 2006, Cieszynski signed a HIPAA confidentiality statement.

Years later, Cieszynski became concerned that LifeWatch was sending some of the heart monitoring work offshore to India in violation of Medicare regulations. He became especially concerned that some of the Indian workers were not properly certified to review and interpret the heart monitoring data.

In 2012, Cieszynski believed that a patient died because of an improper diagnosis made by an unlicensed offshore technician. That is when he became a whistleblower and filed a False Claims Act lawsuit in federal court. In order to file his lawsuit, he provided what he believed were important company documents to his lawyer. Those were later turned over to the government.

Under the Act, complaints are filed under seal and served on the government instead of the defendant. This allows regulators and prosecutors to investigate the merits of the case in secret. Usually the case is unsealed when the government decides to intervene or allow the whistleblower’s counsel to pursue the case. Until unsealed, the whistleblowers identity is not disclosed.

When the complaint was unsealed, LifeWatch Services discovered that Matt Cieszynski was the person who brought the suit.  Their response was to file a counterclaim against Cieszynski for violating his employment agreement and the separate HIPAA nondisclosure agreement.

On May 9th, Magistrate Judge Schenkier dismissed LifeWatch’s counterclaim in a case widely watched by both members of the plaintiffs and defense whistleblower bar.

In dismissing the counterclaims, Judge Schenkier discussed the “strong policy of protecting whistleblowers who report fraud against the government.”

The court recognized the legitimate need for companies to protect confidential information. Those needs must be carefully balanced against the need to prevent “chilling” whistleblowers from coming forward, however.

In deciding that the counterclaim against Cieszynski should be dismissed, the court examined a number of factors. Those include:

  • What was the intent of the whistleblower when taking the documents? Here Cieszynski took them for the sole purpose of reporting what he believed to be fraud. There was no evidence that he sought to embarrass the company.

  • How broad was the disclosure? In this case there was no disclosure to the public or competitors. Cieszynski only provided documents to his lawyer and the the government.

  • The scope of the documents taken from the employer. Although LifeWatch claimed Cieszynski took more documents than were necessary to prosecute his case, the court said it wouldn’t apply hindsight and require a whistleblower to know exactly what documents the government might need. Since the documents were reasonably related to what the government could need, Judge Schenkier elected not to second guess Cieszynski.

There are limits to what a person can take and what he or she can do with those documents. For example, disclosing trade secrets to competitors or releasing sensitive healthcare information to the public will not likely elicit sympathy from the court.

In a case like this, however, courts will give the benefit of doubt to the whistleblower. Especially when there has been no public disclosure and no real harm to the defendant. Although LifeWatch claimed harm, the court found the only harm was the “fees and costs associated with pursuing the counterclaim – which is a self-inflicted wound.”

Corporate counsel should think long and hard before bringing counterclaims against whistleblowers. Not only are courts generally unsympathetic to these challenges, the fee shifting provisions of the False Claims Act can make these cases expensive for the defendants. Under the False Claims Act, defendants must pay the relator’s (whistleblower) lodestar legal fees if the relator prevails.

Article By Brian Mahany of Mahany Law

© Copyright 2016 Mahany Law