Tax Archives - Page 12 of 32 - The National Law Forum

Key Tax Changes in the American Health Care Act

The American Health Care Act (“AHCA”), passed by the House of Representatives on May 4, 2017, repeals many of the taxes added by the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and makes changes to other tax rules. Some of the notable changes proposed to be made to the Internal Revenue Code are:

1. The individual mandate to maintain health insurance and the employer mandate to offer health insurance remain in the Code, but the taxes are “zeroed out” effective retroactively to 2016.

2. The following taxes, fees, credits and limitations are repealed as of the year shown below:

· The net investment income tax (NIIT) (2017)

· The 0.9% additional Medicare tax (2023)

· The small employer health insurance credit (2020)

· The $2500 limitation on contributions to a health flexible spending account (FSA) (2017)

· The annual fee on branded prescription drug sales (2017)

· The medical device excise tax (2017)

· The annual fee on health insurance providers (2017)

· The elimination of a deduction for expenses allocable to the Medicare Part D subsidy (2017)

· The 10% tanning salon tax (June 30, 2017)

3. The “Cadillac” tax on high cost health plans is delayed until 2026.

4. Individuals may be reimbursed for over-the-counter medications under a health savings account (HSA), health FSA or a health reimbursement arrangement (HRA) (2017).

5. The penalty tax on withdrawals from an HSA not used for a qualified medical expense is reduced from 20% to 10% (2017).

6. The bill would replace the current ACA premium tax credit with a new refundable, advanceable tax credit effective January 1, 2020. The credit could be applied toward the cost of any eligible health insurance coverage, whether purchased on or off the Exchange. The credit is age-based as follows:

Age	Annual Credit
Under 30	$2,000
30 – 40	$2,500
40 – 50	$3,000
50 – 60	$3,500
60 and over	$4,000

The maximum credit for a family is $14,000. The credit is adjusted each year by CPI + 1%.

The credit is phased out depending on the individual’s modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) for the year. It begins phasing out for an individual with income of $75,000 ($150,000 for joint filers) by $100 for every $1,000 in income above those thresholds. The MAGI dollar limitations are also indexed for inflation beginning in 2021. To be eligible to claim the credit, the individual must be covered by “eligible health insurance,” not be eligible for “other specified coverage” (including employer coverage or a government sponsored health program) and be a U.S. citizen or a qualified alien.

7. The bill would make the following changes to health savings accounts, effective in 2018:

§  The maximum contribution to an HSA would be increased to the out-of-pocket maximum (in 2017, $6,550 for self-only and $13,100 for family coverage).  Under current law, HSA contributions are limited to $3,400 for self-only and $6,750 for family coverage.
§  Both spouses could make a “catch-up” contribution to the same HSA.  Under current law, each spouse must have his or her own HSA.
§  If an HSA is established within 60 days after coverage under a high deductible plan begins, the individual could be reimbursed for medical expenses incurred within that 60-day period.  Under current law, an individual cannot be reimbursed for any expense incurred before the HSA is established.

The bill now moves to the Senate where significant changes are expected.

This post was written by Cynthia A. Moore of Dickinson Wright PLLC.

Trump Tax Reform Proposal

On April 26, 2017, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and National Economic Council Director Gary Cohn introduced the Trump Administration’s tax reform proposal (the “Trump Proposal”) in a briefing. The proposal appears to borrow heavily from the tax reform plan put out by Mr. Trump during his presidential campaign with the significant exception that this reform proposal advocates adoption of a territorial tax system.

The proposal, set forth in a bulleted one-page document, was notably short on detail, and Secretary Mnuchin stated that many details will be finalized in subsequent discussions with Congress. Below, we highlight the major components in the Trump Proposal that we anticipate will be of the greatest interest to our clients.

Major Proposals

Reduce the number of individual tax rate brackets. Under the Trump Proposal, the top rate for individual income tax would go down to 35 percent from its current rate of 39.6 percent (which is above the top rate of 33 percent proposed by Mr. Trump during his presidential campaign). The number of tax brackets would also be reduced from seven to three (10 percent, 25 percent, and 35 percent). Effectively, these changes would reduce income tax rates for most individual taxpayers, though no determination has been made on the income levels where these brackets would be set.

Expanded standard deduction. The standard deduction for individuals would be doubled under the Trump Proposal, which would effectively create a zero rate for many lower income taxpayers. Additionally, a higher standard deduction would reduce the number of taxpayers who would use itemized deductions, thus simplifying the return filing process for many taxpayers.

Eliminate most individual deductions. Secretary Mnuchin noted that most individual deductions will be eliminated, with the exception of the mortgage interest deduction and the charitable contribution deduction. This change may prove controversial because it repeals the deduction for state and local income taxes.

Other individual provisions. Consistent with the Trump campaign’s position, the proposal also would repeal the alternative minimum tax, the estate tax, and the Affordable Care Act’s 3.8 percent tax on net investment income.

Adoption of a territorial system. The Administration would also shift the United States to a territorial tax system, a proposal that was also advocated in the House Republican Tax Reform Blueprint (the “House Blueprint”)¹ released last year, as a way to “level the playing field” for U.S. companies. A territorial tax system generally would exempt from taxation the foreign earning of U.S. headquartered companies. This is a significant change from an early Trump campaign position that advocated a worldwide tax system without deferral.

One-time repatriation tax. The Trump Proposal includes a one-time repatriation tax on the foreign earnings of U.S. companies, which is consistent with the Trump campaign position. However, in his remarks, Secretary Mnuchin did not give a specific repatriation rate even though the Trump Administration in prior comments has advocated for a 10 percent repatriation rate. This may suggest that the Administration is moving to the House Blueprint’s suggested bifurcated rates of 3.5 percent for foreign earnings and profits invested in “hard” assets and 8.75 percent for earnings and profits held as cash equivalents.

15 Percent business income rate and treatment of pass-through entities. The Trump Proposal would impose a 15 percent rate on all business income, including corporations and individuals receiving business income from S corporations, partnerships and other pass-throughs. It is uncertain whether this 15 percent rate will apply to all pass-through income. Secretary Mnuchin has previously stated that the 15 percent business rate would apply to small business income but would not be “a loophole for people that should be paying a higher rate.”

No mention of a cash-basis tax system or the border adjustability tax. The Trump Proposal did not contain any discussion of a cash-basis tax system or the border adjustability approach under the House Blueprint. Under the tax reform proposals of the Trump campaign, U.S. manufacturers would have been allowed to elect full and immediate expensing (subject to loss of the interest deduction) or retain current law depreciation and interest deductions. The Trump Proposal did not contain this earlier campaign proposal. On the issue of the border adjustable tax, Secretary Mnuchin noted that the Administration was continuing discussions with the House. Because the Trump Proposal briefing only provided a general overview of the Administration’s proposals, it is possible that President Trump could endorse either of these ideas at a later date.

At this point, it remains unclear how the Trump Proposal will affect the current tax policy debate or the ongoing tax reform process.

ARTICLE BY Ed McClellan, Dirk J.J. Suringa & Michael J. Caballero of Covington & Burling LLP

^{1 The House Republican tax reform proposal is formally titled “A Better Way: A Pro-Growth Tax Code for All Americans.”}

Prepared for the Border Adjustment Tax? A U.S. and Global Perspective

We have been monitoring the potential impact of the Border Adjustment Tax (BAT) across a number of jurisdictions.

In our 14 February 2017 update, we commented that issues regarding the legality of BAT and the serious and significant international implications of its application meant that the introduction of BAT was uncertain.

In this further update we consider further the issues being raised in the United States about the BAT, look at potential challenges to the BAT by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and consider what the BAT may mean for jurisdictions outside the U.S. trading with U.S. business.

U.S. concerns

The BAT is part of a comprehensive tax reform plan that would shift the U.S. system from an income tax to a cash-flow destination based consumption tax. It would operate by exempting gross receipts from exports from U.S. federal income tax, and denying any deductions for the cost of imports. The BAT would apply to sales and imports of products, services and intangibles, and affect all forms of businesses, including corporations, “pass-throughs” and sole proprietorships.

The blueprint is vague as to whether the BAT applies to financial transactions and advice. The expectation is that financial transactions will be exempted from the BAT base in some form, but that investment management services would be included in the base.

The policy of the BAT is to incentivize business activity in the U.S. by effectively penalizing imports and subsidizing exports. It is intended to discourage corporate inversions and erosion of the U.S. tax base by making transfer pricing issues moot. It also is estimated to pay for one-third of the cost of the overall tax reform bill.

The U.S. business community is pushing for tax reform in order to make U.S. companies more competitive in a global marketplace. However, because the BAT rewards exporters and punishes importers, the proposal has ironically divided the very business community that is driving reform. While importers could potentially have a larger tax liability than book income, exporters could potentially experience a negative tax situation, since their costs would remain fully deductible (assuming they were not imported). The controversy extends beyond the business community. Consumer groups fear the BAT will result in higher prices. Importers fear U.S. consumers would work around the tax by buying directly from offshore vendors. The BAT could spur increased mergers and acquisitions, as net exporters seek companies with income sufficient to offset negative taxable incomes.

House Republicans, who proposed the BAT, say the value of the U.S. dollar will increase concomitantly with the tax increase, effectively increasing the buying power of importers and thus mitigating the impact of the BAT. Economists and other analysts are mixed in their reaction as to how the dollar will react. Since many international contracts are denominated in the U.S. dollar and because many currencies are not free floating, it is unclear to what extent any fluctuation in the dollar will offset the impact of the BAT.

Further, it is unclear whether the Trump Administration will endorse the BAT. There have been mixed messages from the White House, but President Trump has made it clear he would like to impose some sort of levy on imports to level the playing field for U.S. businesses and to bring jobs back to the U.S.

WTO Implications

While the focus has been on the impact on U.S. businesses and consumers, there are significant and serious international implications of the BAT. It is unclear whether the BAT would violate WTO protocols and a challenge from the WTO seems almost certain.

The WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) only allows border adjustability for taxes imposed on products, the most common of these being value added taxes, sales tax and stamp duties. Whilst there seems to be some argument that a BAT is similar to a value added tax as it is focused on destination based consumption, the majority of commentators disagree with this analysis saying that the proposed BAT is a true corporate tax which in effect imposes a discriminatory subsidy in favour of net exporters. Further, the SCM Agreement prohibits the subsidizing of exports and of the use of domestic over imported goods.

Article II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prohibits charging tariffs in excess of those in each country’s tariff schedule. The denial of deductions for the cost of imports could be considered equivalent to a tax on the imports themselves. In WTO terms, this could be viewed as the imposition of tariffs in excess of those provided for in the U.S. schedule or might violate the Article II requirement not to impose “other” duties or charges on imports. Article III of the GATT, which sets forth what are known as “national treatment” principles, generally requires that imports be treated no less favorably than domestically-produced goods. To the extent the BAT permits certain deductions (such as the cost of domestic wages), and thus generates lower tax rates for domestically-produced goods, while denying the same deductions for the same imported products, it would seem to violate the basic national treatment rules of the WTO.

The Effects of the BAT will extend far beyond the U.S. border

The European Union (EU) has already clarified it will not stand by without taking responsive action. Officials from jurisdictions like Canada, Mexico and Germany, have indicated their disapproval and concerns about the BAT. The impact on tax treaties, intended to prevent double taxation, is unclear. Many think a U.S. exemption from taxation of exports will result in a shift of the location of taxation, with non-U.S. jurisdictions taking custody of the income and taxing it. Countries around the world are concerned about how the denial of a deduction for the cost of imports and the strengthening of the U.S. dollar will affect the demand for their products, and their ability to afford products from the U.S.

Being a destination based cash flow tax, the BAT is not consistent with a corporate tax system, it goes against current principles of international taxation underlying the double tax treaties, and is not in alignment with the more recent global Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Rules (BEPS) initiatives launched by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), Australia and the European Union.

Initial observations as to the BAT:

Granting a corporate income tax exemption on income derived from exports leads to a reduction of the income tax base and qualifies economically as a subsidy.
Disallowing a deduction for expenses relating to imports from the U.S. corporate tax base is effectively an increase of the tax base.
Due to its nature as a destination-based (cash-flow) tax, it is often compared to the European style value added tax (VAT) or the Australian goods and services tax (GST). However, the proposed BAT substantially differs from VAT and GST, e.g., in that:
- VAT and GST is typically economically neutral for most businesses; and
- end-consumers bear the same VAT burden irrespective of whether the services and supplies originate from the domestic market or from abroad.
Materially, the BAT appears to be a customs duty collection tool dressed in an income tax garment.

Economically, it has been said that BAT will eventually be trade neutral, due to the expected increase of the value of the U.S. dollar, however the value of a currency is also influenced by many other factors. In addition, it may be questioned whether (potential) effects on the exchange rate can be taken into consideration when analyzing and discussing the application of existing domestic and international tax law.

It is too early to finally assess the potential reaction of other countries on a potential enactment of the BAT by the U.S. In case of an enactment, many details will have to be better understood such as whether and how cross-border income payments from outside the U.S. (e.g., interest, royalties, dividends) will be subject to tax but exempted or rather be excluded from tax. In case of substantial frictions with the current tax systems, the reaction in Europe for example, may be a combination of both, a reaction at EU level as well as consequences drawn by individual member states.

Some states may question the income tax nature of the BAT or deny certain benefits such as treaty benefits based on applicable “subject-to-tax” clauses or alike. Whether or not certain states will go beyond that by requesting changes to the existing Double Taxation Treaties or their interpretation remains to be seen. Why for example should a country apply reduced withholding tax rates on royalties or alike if the respective income is not taxed in the U.S. for reasons of impeding the free trade between the U.S. and that particular country?

BAT may well also impact the current approach to globally harmonize the common understanding of fair international taxation, including the battle against the so-called BEPS which was triggered by biased rules governing international taxation.

Australia

Australia has been an early adopter for many of the OECD BEPS measures. It has recently passed legislation to implement a diverted profits tax, similar to that in the United Kingdom, a “Netflix” tax being a GST on intangible supplies via a digital platform operator by non-resident suppliers to Australian consumers. It has also introduced the Multinational Anti Avoidance Law to combat tax avoidance by multinational companies operating in Australia.

These measures show an increasing focus on cross border flows of business, and a move toward a destination model of taxing rather than an origination model. That is consistent with the BAT principles. However, given that the U.S. is Australia’s biggest trading partner and a destination of choice for many Australian companies seeking to expand globally, the impact of the BAT for Australian business cannot be underestimated.

While much of the focus in the U.S. has been on the impact of BAT on the import and expect of manufactured goods and products, cross border utilisation of intellectual property, intangibles, and management and head office charges are likely to be an area of ongoing focus as the BAT works its way through the legislative agenda.

France

The BAT could jeopardise the application of the tax treaty entered into by the U.S. and France. According to the most recent case law of the French high administrative court (Conseil d’Etat), treaty benefits must only be granted where there is an effective double taxation. If a French company pays a royalty to a U.S. company, such royalty will be exempt in the U.S. and the French revenue may take the view that the treaty does not apply. French domestic withholding tax of 30% may apply accordingly.

The BAT would clearly contradict some of the provisions of this treaty. By way of example, Article 7 provides that in determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be allowed as deductions expenses which are reasonably connected with such profits, whether incurred in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere.

Germany

Germany has also been an early adopter of the BEPS rules – to the extent such rules were not already enacted before as German rules fighting cross-border base erosion and profit shifting were already rather sophisticated.

A mere reduction of the U.S. corporate income tax rate itself should generally not be of a concern from a German tax perspective. However, for purposes of the application of the Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and Passive Foreign Investment Company (PFIC) rules pursuant to the German Foreign Tax Act, there will be an issue where the effective corporate income tax burden in the U.S. drops below 25%, measured by German tax standards.

However, Germany would certainly not welcome substantial single-sided impediments on the free trade imposed by BAT or other means.

United Kingdom

For United Kingdom businesses that export to the U.S., the introduction of a BAT could have far reaching consequences for sales, FX strategy and business organisation.

One area of particular difficulty relates to cross-border financial services (UK outbound and inbound): it is not yet clear how a BAT would deal with these (VAT systems are themselves complex in this area). Useful practical strategies may be drawn by U.S. businesses in conjunction with advisers both in the U.S. and jurisdictions with VAT systems, like the United Kingdom, as and when any BAT reform is rolled out in detail.

On a more general level, tax issues have gained a higher profile in the UK over the last few years. Like many other jurisdictions the UK is actively adopting the recommendations of the OECD’s BEPS initiative and actively encouraging EU policy to endorse the same. The UK’s implementation of these OECD recommendations has resulted in the UK seeking to tax profits created in UK, and trying to ensure that where value has been created in the UK that value is not artificially diverted for tax purposes to offshore jurisdictions.

The current UK Government’s enthusiasm for these OECD initiatives (and the automatic exchange of tax information including private tax rulings) is a continuation from the previous administration, faces little or no political opposition and is not in any way contaminated by BREXIT.

It can be noted that the OECD BEPS initiative’s overarching economic goal to ensure that value is taxed where it is created (not located) in fact, with increased attribution to human resource (rather than capital or IP), is not necessarily incompatible with the political objective of the Blueprint to increase value creation in the U.S. (and taxing it there).

Global high brand value service and product suppliers, and other businesses which are head-quartered outside of the UK, argue that the value of their sales derives from their domestic jurisdictions where their global high value brand products or IP was developed and where their technicians, designers, board etc. are based. As a result, value is not derived from a UK based sales centre, the services of which, if outsourced, would only cost a small amount in fees or commissions. It will be interesting to see how the lobby groups for U.S. based multinationals and a post-BREXIT UK each respond to the EU Commission’s state aid challenges, which were aimed at preventing low EU tax on EU sales. It may prove harder to resist greater taxation in the EU if there is no domestic tax in the U.S. in relation to the EU operations.

In addition to the policy arguments there are also technical issues with how the UK’s value based approach will sit with the proposed destination based approach in the US. For example, the U.S.-UK double tax treaty currently deals with direct taxes (such as federal profits, income and gains taxes) and is predicated on traditional tax bases such as residence and source and does not address indirect taxes (like VAT) at all. How this will be applied in the context of the U.S.-UK double tax treaty is not clear.

Conclusion

Given both the uncertainty regarding the intricacies and workings of the BAT as well as how it will interact with existing Double Tax Treaties, the introduction and operation of the BAT remains unclear

The impact of the proposed tax on net importers vs net exporters divides the business community and creates further uncertainty in an already uncertain economy. The same applies to the consequences on the application and interpretation of domestic tax and international tax law outside the U.S. It is hoped that detailed legislation as well as commentary addressing the concerns of the U.S. domestic and international community will go some way in resolving these issues in a time efficient manner.

ARTICLE BY Betsy-Ann Howe, Mary Burke Baker, Rainer Schmitt, Bertrand Dussert, Giles Bavister & Stacy J. Ettinger of K&L Gates

IRS Dirty Dozen for 2017, Tax Shelters, and Captive Insurance: Attacking Past Problems Using a Voluntary Disclosure Strategy

House, Money, The IRS summarized its annual “Dirty Dozen” List of Tax Scams for 2017 in February. Practitioners and taxpayers should pay particular attention. The IRS is broadcasting their playbook. This list includes two principal types of tax matters: (1) scams that are intended to victimize taxpayers directly, and (2) scams in which taxpayers voluntarily – or unwittingly – agree to participate. The first set of scams includes identity theft, phone scams, and things like solicitations from fake charities. These items often result from direct attacks on taxpayers. The second set of scams typically involves a taxpayer’s voluntary participation, but there often are misunderstandings and reliance questions that can be very important to the resolution of the issue. Whatever the source, each problem creates a set of issues that taxpayers, their CPA advisors, and experienced tax counsel should evaluate very carefully.

Abusive Tax Shelters – Including Captive Insurance – Make the Dirty Dozen List…Again

Key among the scams that make the “Dirty Dozen” list is the abusive tax shelter. Abusive tax shelters have been a perennial target of the IRS for decades, and the IRS annually reaffirms its commitment to uncovering and stopping complex tax avoidance/evasion schemes.

One abusive tax shelter that repeatedly makes itself a topic for the IRS is the captive insurance structure. Captive insurance is a perfect example of a structure that can be fully defensible, fully abusive, or somewhere between the two. In many cases, captive insurance can be a legitimate business activity; however, often an ill-advised taxpayer will implement a plan that is attacked by the IRS as “abusive” because it was not properly designed.

Captive insurance generally is a legitimate, legislatively-approved tax structure. However, the IRS often determines that an abuse has occurred with respect to certain small or “micro” captive insurance companies. Federal tax law allows businesses to create “captive” insurance companies to protect against certain risks. The insured business claims tax deductions for premiums paid for the insurance policies, and the premiums are paid to a captive insurance company that normally is owned by the same owners of the insured business. The captive insurance company, in turn, can elect to be taxed only on the investment income from the pool of premiums, excluding taxable income of up to $1.2 million per year in net premiums.

In the type of structure that is likely to be classified as abusive, promoters persuade closely-held entities to create captive insurance companies. The promoters assist with creating and “selling” “insurance” binders and policies from the captive to the business to cover either ordinary business risks, or implausible risks, and charging high premiums while maintaining market rate commercial coverage with traditional insurers.

The promoted structure often results in premiums equal to the $1.2 million annually to take full advantage of the tax code provision. Underwriting and actuarial substantiation for the insurance premiums often do not exist, and the promoters manage the captive insurance companies in exchange for significant fees.

There are myriad variations of legitimate captive structures, and taxpayers should carefully evaluate any existing or proposed captive insurance program. Like other structures that are designated to be “abusive,” a captive insurance structure can result in a protracted and costly audit – and potentially a criminal investigation – if it is discovered by the IRS.

A clear warning sign to practitioners is when their client is advised to exclude you from analysis or review of the strategy or product.

Taking a Proactive Approach to Tax Issues: Considering a Voluntary Disclosure Strategy

It is the specter of exposure, including both investigations and costly audits, that reminds us of the alternative to simply sitting back and waiting for the government to audit: a voluntary disclosure. A voluntary disclosure may be used to address past reporting, non-reporting, or mis-reporting, and may be a viable strategy for many types of missteps – both the types specifically referenced by the IRS in its “Dirty Dozen,” and other items that create similar audit risks. The voluntary disclosure alternative is not an unconditional surrender, and it is not without risk, but a well thought-out, designed, and implemented voluntary disclosure can minimize costs, penalties, and the time involved in addressing problems. A thoughtfully designed voluntary disclosure strategy can offer material benefits, but it should never be implemented until after there has been comprehensive analysis conducted in an attorney-client privileged environment.

ARTICLE BY Eric M. Nemeth & Wayne D. Roberts of Varnum LLP

Congress Set to Embark on Ambitious Tax Reform Package in First 100 Days of Trump Administration Fundamental Tax Reform

The 2016 elections have laid the foundation for the most significant Congressional tax reform effort since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In the past several years, the leadership of the Congressional tax-writing committees (i.e., the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee) have produced the blueprint for tax reform. More recently, President-elect Trump offered his own tax reform package and pledged to work with the Congress to enact tax reform this year. Against this backdrop, we anticipate that the House Ways and Means Committee will move a comprehensive tax reform bill during the first 100 days of the Trump administration. The Senate Finance Committee will likely move at a slower pace, but its leadership is equally committed to tax reform this year.

While the final version of the tax reform legislation is still under development, it may include the following elements:

a compressed rate structure for individuals with a top rate of 33 percent on ordinary income, a 50 percent deduction for investment income, and a corresponding reduction in the availability of various personal credits, deductions, and exclusions
a top corporate rate of 20 percent (although Trump has called for a rate as low as 15 percent) together with a similar reduction of various business tax preferences and credits
a general elimination of depreciation in favor of immediate expensing for depreciable business assets
a repeal of the estate tax and replacement with, for example, a capital gains tax on death, and
a transition to a territorial international tax system under which foreign profits of American companies would generally not be subject to U.S. tax, together with a deemed repatriation provision for previously accumulated earnings

As a result, this legislation will likely impact virtually every taxpayer in the United States.

ARTICLE BY Jesse (Jay) Adams, William (Bill) Backstrom, Andre Burvant, John F. Fletcher, Matthew A. Mantle & Justin Stone of Jones Walker LLP

2016 Tax Court Opinions – A Year In Review

Several notable tax court opinions were issued 2016 dealing with a variety of substantive and procedural matters. In our previous post – Year in Review: Court Procedure and Privilege – we discussed some of these matters. This post addresses some additional cases decided by the court during the year and highlights some other cases still in the pipeline.

Transfer Pricing

Transfer pricing remains a hot topic in litigation. As discussed here, here and here the Tax Court accepted and rejected taxpayer arguments in several high-profile cases.

We have also written frequently on the 3M case, which involves whether the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) blocked income regulations are valid. That case has been submitted fully stipulated to the Tax Court and all briefs have been filed. For prior coverage, see here, here, and here.

Point: Transfer pricing is a point of emphasis with the IRS. Given that slight changes to a taxpayer’s transfer pricing methodologies can produce substantial adjustments, taxpayers need to continue to monitor judicial developments in the area. This includes not only how courts view the arm’s length standard, but also taxpayer challenges to the IRS’s rulemaking authority.

The Administrative Procedures Act and Deference to IRS Interpretations

Following the Supreme Court’s 2011 Mayo opinion, taxpayers have increasingly turned to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to challenge IRS actions. In addition to the posts linked above regarding APA challenges in transfer pricing cases, we have written about the QinitiQ and Ax cases dealing with whether an explanation provided in a notice of deficiency is insufficient under the APA. See here and here]. Additionally, the Supreme Court provided guidance in a non-tax case regarding the proper application of the APA in the analysis of the validity of agency regulations.

Another area we have frequently posted on is the level of deference afforded to IRS interpretations. Discussions of general deference principles and cases decided in 2016 can be found here, here, here, here, and here]. Additionally, as we noted here, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide the limits of Auer deference.

Practice point: Whether the IRS’s position in published or unpublished guidance is afforded deference, and, if so, the appropriate level of deference, is important to taxpayers both in planning their transactions and defending them before the IRS and the courts. This area continues to evolve, particularly in the area of Auer deference, and taxpayers need to be aware of new developments.

Information Reporting Requirements

The IRS’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program remains a tool for noncompliant taxpayers to come to the IRS to resolve outstanding tax reporting matters. For an update on this subject, see here. The release of the Panama Paper in April 2016, which we wrote about here received considerable attention. A recent opinion out of a district court in California also provided more guidance on the willful standard for failure to file foreign information reporting forms. See here.

Practice point: OVDP remains open, but it could be closed by the IRS at any time. Noncompliant taxpayers need to consider all options in this area, and should consider which option might be best depending on their specific situation.

Penalties

The IRS has been increasingly asserting penalties in cases. We recently discussed here some of the penalty procedural rules at issue in the Graev case. We also discussed the substantial authority defense, as applied by the Fifth Circuit in Chemtech Royalty Associates. See here.

Point: Taxpayers who are facing penalty determinations and assessments should consider whether they may have any procedural challenges to the IRS’s method of approval and assessment of penalties, in addition to considering the more standard, substantive defenses like reasonable cause and substantial authority. It is important to adequately document your position prior to taking a tax return position to avoid any initial assertion of penalties by the IRS.

ARTICLE BY Todd Welty, P.C., Laura L. Gavioli, P.C., Elizabeth Erickson, Andrew R. Roberson & Kevin Spencer of McDermott Will & Emery

New Partnership Tax Audit Rules: Ready or Not, Here They Come!

On November 2, 2015, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, (the Act), H.R. 1314, 114 Congress/Public Law No. 114-74, made significant changes to the rules governing US federal income tax audits of partnerships (New Audit Rules). The New Audit Rules are codified at Internal Revenue Code Sections 6221 through 6241. On August 4, 2016, the IRS released temporary and proposed regulations relating to certain aspects of the New Audit Rules. And, on December 6, 2016, technical corrections to the New Audit Rules (Technical Corrections) were introduced in both the House of Representatives, H.R. 6439, and in the Senate, S. 3506.

The New Audit Rules take effect for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2018, and are intended to facilitate Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits and adjustments with respect to certain types of partnerships. In the wake of the New Audit Rules, all partnerships should evaluate whether their agreements (existing as well as those in the negotiation stages) address the new rules.

The New Audit Rules apply broadly to partnerships with 11 or more partners at any one time during the tax year. A partnership is also subject to the rules if any of its partners is a partnership, a limited liability company which is treated as a partnership or as a disregarded entity (it is expected that additional guidance will be released in the future to allow a “look through” to the regarded member of a disregarded entity, but that guidance has not yet been issued), a trust, a nominee, a nonresident alien or an S corporation. Partnerships with 100 or fewer partners, however, may be eligible to elect out of the New Audit Rules. Recommended Action: The partnership agreement should address the election out and if the election out is intended to be perpetual, the agreement might include a covenant to remain under 100 partners.

The New Audit Rules provide for tax adjustments at the partnership rather than the partner level. Technical Corrections would focus the adjustments to amounts or items relevant in determining the income tax liability of any person (e.g., partnership items, affected items, and computational items). Mechanically, the partnership may cause its current partners to bear the tax liability or may “push out” the tax liability to the persons who were partners during the reviewed year. The election must be made no later than 45 days after receipt of a notice of final partnership adjustment. If the push out election is made, the interest rate on imputed underpayments is determined at the partner level and is 2 percent higher than the rate for imputed underpayments which are not pushed out. Technical Corrections would provide guidance with respect to the push out election for tiered partnerships. Recommended Action: Consider whether the push out election should be mandatory, and if so, amend the partnership agreement accordingly.

The TMP is no more! Under the New Audit Rules, the partnership designates a “partnership representative.” The partnership representative has the sole authority to act on behalf of the partnership in an audit. The partnership and the partners are bound by the actions taken by the partnership representative on behalf of the partnership. The partnership representative does not need to be a partner in the partnership. Recommended Action: Consider amending the partnership agreement to define the standards for selecting, terminating and replacing the partnership representative. Consider amending the partnership agreement to require the partnership representative to consult with the partners with respect to key issues, such as extending the statute of limitations, settling an audit, filing a petition for readjustment and making the push out election.

A partnership may elect to apply the New Audit Rules to any of its partnership returns filed for a partnership taxable year beginning after November 2, 2015, and before January 1, 2018. Temporary Regulations § 301.9901-22T provide time, form and manner for a partnership to elect into the New Audit Rules. Recommended Action: Consider whether there is any benefit to electing to apply the New Audit Rules before the mandatory application date. The benefits of electing early application of the New Audit Rules may include a more efficient audit process and the ability to cause current year partners to bear the tax liability following an adjustment. If your partnership is tiered with partnerships as partners, electing into an entity level tax may obviate the need to issue amended Forms K-1 and having to amend multiple federal and state returns due to an IRS adjustment.

ARTICLE BY Kevin Spencer, Madeline M. Chiampou & Kristen E. Hazel of McDermott Will & Emery

US Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl

This morning, the US Supreme Court announced that it denied certiorari in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, which was on appeal from the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The denied petitions were filed this fall by both the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) and Colorado, with the Colorado cross-petition explicitly asking the Court to broadly reconsider Quill. In light of this, many viewed this case a potential vehicle to judicially overturn the Quill physical presence standard.

Practice Note: Going forward, the Tenth Circuit decision upholding the constitutionality of Colorado’s notice and reporting law stands, and is binding in the Tenth Circuit (which includes Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, Kansas and Oklahoma as well). While this development puts an end to this particular kill-Quill movement, there are a number of other challenges in the pipeline that continue to move forward.

In particular, the Ohio Supreme Court recently decided that the Ohio Commercial Activity Tax, a gross-receipts tax, is not subject to the Quill physical presence standard. A cert petition is expected in this case, and could provide another opportunity for the US Supreme Court to speak on the remote sales tax issue. In addition, litigation is pending in South Dakota and Alabama over economic nexus laws implemented earlier this year. A motion hearing took place before the US District Court for the District of South Dakota last week on whether the Wayfair case should be remanded back to state court. If so, the litigation would be subject to the expedited appeal procedures implemented by SB 106 (2016), and would be fast tracked for US Supreme Court review. Tennessee also recently adopted a regulation implementing an economic nexus standard for sales and use tax purposes that directly conflicts with Quill that is expected to be implemented (and challenged) in 2017. While Governor Bill Haslam has praised the effort, state legislators have been outspoken against the attempt to circumvent the legislature and impose a new tax. Notably, the Joint Committee on Government Operations still needs to approve the regulation for it to take effect, with the economic nexus regulation included in the rule packet scheduled for review by the committee this Thursday, December 15, 2016.

All this action comes at a time when states are gearing up to begin their 2017 legislative sessions, with many rumored to be preparing South Dakota-style economic nexus legislation for introduction. While DMA is dead as an option, the movement to overturn Quill continues and the next few months are expected to be extremely active in this area.

ARTICLE BY Stephen P. Kranz, Mark Yopp & Eric Carstens of McDermott Will & Emery

Base Erosion Profit Shifting Multilateral Agreement

The most recent element of the ongoing global dispute resolution process is the late November 2016 release of the so-called multilateral instrument (MLI), a cornerstone of the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project. It is an ambitious effort of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to impose its will on as many countries as possible. The explanation comprises 85 single-spaced pages and 359 paragraphs. The MLI draft itself is 48 similar pages. The purpose of the MLI is to facilitate implementation of the BEPS Action items without having to go through the tedious process of amending approximately two thousand treaties.

In essence, the MLI implements the BEPS Action items in treaty language. While consistency is obviously an intended result, the MLI recognizes the reality that many countries will not agree to all of the provisions. Accordingly, countries are allowed to sign the agreement, but then opt out of specific provisions or make appropriate reservations with respect to specific treaties. This process is to be undertaken via notification of the “depository” (the OECD). Accordingly, countries will be able to make individual decisions on whether to update a particular treaty using the MLI.

There are a variety of initial questions to be addressed by each country, including:

Does it intend to sign the MLI?
Which of its treaties will be covered?
Will treaty partners agree?
What provisions will be included or opted out of? If there is an opt out, the country is supposed to advise the depository of how this impacts each of its treaties. This will be a time-consuming process.
How will it negotiate with specific treaty partners with respect to the various technical provisions of the MLI?

The arbitration provisions are intended to implement the BEPS Action 14 recommendations, focused on mandatory binding arbitration. These provisions would apply to a bilateral treaty only if both parties agree. The arbitration articles provide an outline of arbitration procedures, allowing the competent authorities to vary the procedures by mutual agreement. The form of the proceeding provides a default for “last best offer” (or “baseball style”). The parties may also agree to a “reasoned decision” process, which is stated to have no precedential value. If the parties do not agree on either of these forms of proceeding, the competent authorities should endeavor to reach agreement on a form. If there is no agreement, then the arbitration provisions are inapplicable.

Whether the US or other countries will sign the MLI, it seems apparent that the net result will be a period of chaos in treaty relationships, as there will inevitably be: (1) signers and non-signers; (2) reservations; (3) opt outs; etc.

In a world in which the list of countries zealously seeking to protect their tax bases and making proposals to increase domestic tax revenues (following BEPS and related guidance), continually expands, it seems apparent that dispute resolution processes will need to evolve to resolve the tsunami of disputes that are expected to materialize. If this is not the case, then countries and MNEs alike will incur prejudice to their respective interests.

Accordingly, these dispute resolution issues should be on the agenda for consideration as effective tax rate strategies are revisited in the post-BEPS world.

ARTICLE BY Cym H. Lowell of McDermott Will & Emery

Trump Administration: Tools to Modify Current Tax Guidance

The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th President of the United States, along with the Republican control of the majority of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, has raised the possibility that current Treasury regulations may be modified or nullified. The Trump Administration can consider one of two methods to do so:

The IRS/Treasury may issue new, and simultaneously withdraw existing, Treasury regulations, or
Congress can act under the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) to strike down Treasury regulations.

The easier of the two methods for the IRS/Treasury to modify or nullify current Treasury regulations would be to withdraw existing temporary and/or final Treasury regulations and issue new proposed Treasury regulations. In doing so, the IRS/Treasury, similar to other administrative agencies, must satisfy the current interpretations of the Administrative Procedure Act. Typically, this requires a notice and comment period for new proposed Treasury regulations prior to finalization of the Treasury regulations. In addition, the IRS/Treasury generally needs to acknowledge that it is changing its policy when withdrawing the Treasury regulations and state the reasons for the change, though it does not need to prove that its new policy is better than its old policy.

As an alternative, Congress can act under the CRA to strike down Treasury regulations. Under the CRA, Congress may act by passing a joint resolution to disapprove Treasury regulations, although the President can veto the disapproval. From the time a CRA report is submitted, Congress has 60 legislative days to review the rule (60 session days in the case of the Senate and 60 legislative days in the case of the House of Representatives). If an agency rule is promulgated when there are 60 or fewer legislative days remaining in the legislative session, the rule is also subject to review under the CRA in the following Congressional session. Congress may be hesitant to use this approach because once a Treasury regulation has been disapproved, the agency generally cannot issue a rule that is substantially the same. Because of these procedural difficulties, it should not be surprising that the CRA has rarely been used to override administrative regulations.

We can expect the Trump Administration to consider the modification of numerous Treasury regulations, including the recently issued debt-equity regulations under I.R.C. section 385 (view our previous memo here) and the anti-inversion regulations under I.R.C. section 7874 (view our previous memo here), and we would generally expect that it would issue new, and withdraw existing, Treasury regulations to achieve its objectives.

ARTICLE BY Mark P. Howe, Richard M. Nugent, Gary T. Silverstein, Linda Z. Swartz & Edward S. Wei of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Category: Tax

Key Tax Changes in the American Health Care Act

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