Category: Supreme Court

How The U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling On College Affirmative Action Programs May Impact Private Employers

The U.S. Supreme Court in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College decided that the race-based admissions programs at Harvard College and the University of North Carolina (the “Schools”) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court answered the question for publicly funded schools, it is an open question whether, and how, the Court’s decision will impact affirmative action and diversity programs for private employers, as discussed in more detail below.

Overview

The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, that no State shall “deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” Among other things, the clause protects people regardless of their race. A limited exception that permits race-based action by the government is permissible if such action can survive a rigorous standard known as “strict scrutiny.” Under that standard, race-based conduct is permissible only if the government can establish a “compelling government interest” and the race-based action is “narrowly tailored” to achieve that established interest.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Schools’ race-based admissions programs failed strict scrutiny. In support of their race-based admissions programs, the Schools asserted the following educational goals as their compelling interests:

  • Training future leaders in the public and private sectors/preparing engaged and productive citizens and leaders.
  • Preparing graduates to adapt to an increasingly pluralistic society/broadening and refining understanding.
  • Better educating students through diversity/enhancing appreciation, respect, and empathy, cross-racial understanding, and breaking down stereotypes/promoting the robust exchange of ideas.
  • Producing new knowledge stemming from diverse outlooks/fostering innovating and problem solving.
  • Preparing engaged and productive citizens and leaders.

The Court noted that although these goals were laudable, they were too amorphous to pass muster under the strict scrutiny standard. The Court recognized that a court would have no way to know whether leaders have been adequately trained; whether the exchange of ideas is sufficiently robust, or whether, and in what quantity, racial diversity leads to the development of new knowledge. In other words, the Court took issue with the fact that the asserted interests could not be measured in any meaningful, quantifiable way.

In addition, the Court found there was no meaningful connection between the Schools’ use of race in the admissions process and the claimed benefits. For example, the Court noted that while diversity may further the asserted interests, the Schools failed to establish that racial diversity would. The Court took particular issue with what it viewed as the overbroad and arbitrary nature of the Schools’ race considerations as they were underinclusive (for example, failing to distinguish between South Asians or East Asians, or define what Hispanic means, or account at all for Middle Eastern applicants). The Court reasoned that the overbroad, arbitrary, and underinclusive racial distinctions employed by the Schools undermine the Schools’ asserted interests—essentially noting that the Schools’ race-based admissions programs sought to “check the diversity box” rather than obtain a truly diverse (racially or otherwise) student body.

In addition to the School’s programs’ failure to survive strict scrutiny, the Court also recognized that the Schools’ race-based admissions processes promoted stereotyping, negatively impacted nonminority applicants, and, contrary to Court precedent, did not have a durational limit or any cognizable way in which to adopt a durational limit.

Supreme Court Precedent

The Court’s decision rested largely on two prior cases addressing race-based admission programs in higher education: Regents Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). As a guiding principle, the Court noted that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars admissions programs that use race as a stereotype or a negative.

In Bakke, while rejecting other asserted interests, the Court explained that obtaining the educational benefits associated with having a racially diverse student body was “a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education,” provided that certain guardrails were in place. This is despite the Court’s recognition that racial preferences cause serious problems of justice. The Court said that race only could operate as “a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file” and the weight afforded to race must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant.”

In Grutter, the Court decided “student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions,” provided that sufficient limitations were in place—notably, that under no circumstances would race-based admissions decisions continue indefinitely. The Court cautioned that, because the use of race was a deviation from the norm of equal treatment, race-based admissions programs must not result in “illegitimate . . . stereotyping,” must not “unduly harm nonminority applicants,” and must be “limited in time.”

The Court’s Additional Considerations

Of critical importance to the Court’s ruling was the fact that neither School’s race-based admissions program had an articulable end point. The Court noted that the Schools’ arguments to overcome the lack of a definite end point were, essentially, “trust us, we’ll know when we’re there.” Yet such arguments, the Court held, were insufficiently persuasive to offset the pernicious nature of racial classifications. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, who joined the majority opinion, took additional issue with the Schools’ “trust us” arguments in separate concurrences, noting (1) their view of the Schools’ histories of harmful racial discrimination, and (2) that courts are not to defer to the morality of alleged discriminators.

Additionally, the Court took issue with the logical necessity that, in any instance when a limited number of positions are available, a race-based “plus factor” for applicants of a certain race is a negative for applicants who do not belong to the favored race. “How else but ‘negative’ can race be described if, in its absence, members of some racial groups would be admitted in greater numbers than they otherwise would have been?” In this, the Court recognized that equal protection is not achieved through the imposition of inequalities.

Impact on Private Employers

The Supreme Court’s recent decisions have no direct legal impact on private employers. The Court based its decision on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the Schools under Title VI, which does not intrinsically apply to private companies; it is Title VII and analogous state and local laws that apply to private employers (not Title VI) and prohibit private employers from discriminating against employees and applicants on the basis of race (and other protected characteristics). In employment, the law has always prohibited any consideration of race in decision-making, such as who to hire or who to promote, except in extremely narrow and limited situations but, even then, quotas and set-asides are strictly prohibited.

While not directly applicable, it is highly likely that the Court’s decision will spawn new challenges to private employer diversity and inclusion programs, and the Court’s rationale will be referenced as an indicator of how the Court will view such programs under Title VII. Even before the Court’s decision, the legal landscape around an employer’s use of affirmative action plans to aid in making employment decisions was murky. Generally a private employer’s affirmative action plan is permissible under Title VII in two scenarios: (1) if the plan is needed to remedy an employer’s past discrimination, and (2) if the plan is needed to prevent an employer from being found liable under Title VII’s disparate impact prohibitions (which operate to prohibit facially neutral policies that nevertheless disproportionately disadvantage certain groups).

Regarding the latter scenario, it is unlikely the Court’s ruling will have much if any impact. For an affirmative action plan to survive scrutiny on this basis, an employer must first prove a disparate impact case against itself: it must identify a specific policy, prove that such policy has a disparate impact on a certain group, and either show that the policy is not justified by business necessity or show that there is a viable alternative that both (a) accounts for the employer’s business necessity, and (b) has less of a disparate impact on the affected group. Then, the employer must prove how its affirmative action steps offset the disparate impact. There is nothing in the Court’s opinion that suggests an employer’s effort to remedy an ongoing Title VII violation would itself be a violation of Title VII.

However, there is language in the Court’s opinion that suggests an affirmative action plan implemented in the former scenario could be problematic, especially if it is not designed carefully. Indeed, a number of lower court decisions even before the Supreme Court’s recent ruling have struck down employer affirmative action programs. Permissible affirmative action programs are typically implemented to remedy past racial imbalances in an employer’s workforce overall, and are not tied to past discrimination against an identifiable employee or applicant. At the close of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion, it admonished Justice Sotomayor’s dissent wherein she proposed a world where schools consider race indirectly, through, for example, essays submitted alongside applications. The Court noted that such would nevertheless violate the Constitution, and clarified that admission decisions can rely on the content of application essays, but that such decisions must be based on an individual applicant’s character or experiences, and not based on the applicant’s race. Similarly, Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, recognized that “[w]hatever their skin color, today’s youth simply are not responsible for instituting the segregation of the 20th century, and they do not shoulder the moral debts of their ancestors.” Accordingly, challenges to affirmative action plans that attempt to remedy past discrimination generally, by using race in its decision-making may find purchase in the Court’s closing sentiments and Justice Thomas’s concurrence. Although a standard less exacting then “strict scrutiny” is used to evaluate discrimination claims under Title VII, the sentiment expressed by Members of the Court could make the judiciary increasingly skeptical of affirmative action programs that resemble those used by the Schools. In any event, the possibility of being able to continue to use affirmative action plans in the strict sense to increase diversity in an employer’s workforce is likely little comfort to private employers, as few will want to prove a discrimination case against themselves to justify a diversity program.

Additionally, employers’ diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs may be the subject of challenges based on the Supreme Court’s skepticism of the benefits of “racial” diversity, as opposed to diversity on less-pernicious characteristics. For example, DEI programs that seek to increase racial diversity based on broad racial definitions may be subject to challenges because of their overbreadth or purportedly arbitrary nature. And DEI programs that highlight racial diversity, rather than, for example, diversity based on socio-economic, ideological, or experiential characteristics may suffer challenges to their legitimacy in reliance on the Supreme Court’s implication that there may be no identifiable tether between “racial” diversity and the purported benefits of diversity as a concept.

Of course, to the extent private employers with affirmative action plans have contracts with government entities and/or receive government funding, affirmative action plans under the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”), require targeted diversity recruiting efforts, aimed at increasing the diversity of applicant pools, although this also does not permit race (or other protected traits) to be used in decision-making.

Practical Tips For Employers

The Court’s decision applies to affirmative action programs in the college setting and applies an analysis under the Equal Protection Clause that does not directly apply to private employers. The decision also deals with very different scenarios where colleges and universities directly used race as a criteria for admissions. As noted, this has generally never been permitted in the employment context and, as a result, the rules of the road for implementing DEI programs have not changed, although they may evolve through future legal challenges in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions. There are still countless ways that private employers can design and implement lawful DEI programs. Below are just a few examples employers may consider:

  • Reiterate D&I as a priority in meetings, conferences, and other communications.
  • Implement recruiting programs to diversify your talent pool.
  • Incentivize employees to refer diverse candidates for openings.
  • Support employee resource groups, mentoring programs, and leadership training.
  • Educate your managers and supervisors on unconscious bias.
  • Encourage diversity in suppliers and business partners.
  • Tie D&I efforts (not results) to managerial performance evaluations.
  • Under the privilege of working with counsel, monitor changes in workforce demographics and conduct pay audits.
  • Consider modifying the goal of DEI programs to seek diversity based on broader characteristics that do not involved protected classes, such as experiences, economic background, or worldview.

Conclusion

The Court’s decision is a landmark ruling that will alter the landscape of college and university admissions. And it will almost certainly spawn new challenges beyond the classroom and into the workplace.

However, the decision does not legally require private employers to make changes to their existing DEI programs if such practices comply with already-existing employment laws. Employers can still implement diversity and inclusion programs and promote diversity within their workplaces but, as has always been the case, employers should tread carefully in designing and implementing these programs. Employers would do well to engage counsel to review such programs and initiatives for possible concerns in light of the Court’s decision, as well as existing precedent in the employment context.

Copyright © 2023, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

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Supreme Court Upholds State Courts’ Power of Judicial Review Over Election Matters

On June 27, 2023, the United States Supreme Court upheld a decision by North Carolina’s highest court holding that the North Carolina legislature went too far in gerrymandering voting district maps. The Court affirmed the authority of state courts to review the decisions of state legislatures on election matters, rejecting the “independent state legislature theory.” The theory, taken to its extreme, is that no branch of state government can question a state legislature’s decision regarding any federal election.  The ruling is an encouraging sign for states like Arizona, Illinois, and Michigan, where independent redistricting commissions have created, or are creating, new maps intended to represent non-partisan, or less partisan, boundary drawing and citizen-driven ballot initiatives to protect voters’ rights.

The plaintiffs in Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. ___ (2023), were groups and individuals challenging North Carolina’s 2021 congressional districting map, which they viewed as unacceptable gerrymandering, created to favor Republican candidates. The legislative defendants asserted that in creating the new map, they had exercised the authority established by the “Elections Clause” in Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution that provides that state legislatures shall prescribe, “the Times, Places and Manner of” federal elections. Although North Carolina judges had found the new map to be “a partisan outlier intentionally and carefully designed to maximize Republican advantage in North Carolina’s Congressional delegation,” the legislative defendants argued the map was beyond the reach of judicial review. The Supreme Court had to decide whether “the Elections Clause insulates state legislatures from review by state courts for compliance with state law.” Moore, slip opinion at p 11.

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts began the analysis by citing our country’s long-standing legal tradition of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative acts. The majority opinion noted the 1787 decision in Bayard v Singleton, where the North Carolina Supreme Court found a law banning British loyalists from challenging property seizures was unconstitutional. The opinion goes on to review many decades of decisions where courts have considered the “interplay between state constitutional provisions and a state legislature’s exercise of authority under the Elections Clause.” Moore, slip opinion at p 15.

Looking at the other side of the case, the Court examined the legislative defendants’ arguments about the impact of the Election Clause. Rejecting Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent, Roberts addressed the concept known as “independent state legislature theory” which contends that, “because the Federal Constitution gives state legislatures the power to regulate congressional elections, only [the Federal] Constitution can restrain the exercise of that power.” Id at 18. The historical references supporting this theory are debunked in the Moore decision, and many commentators have stated the decision in Moore slams the door on the extreme view that state legislative acts around federal elections are not subject to review by state courts.

The Moore decision, however, refers to a need to balance competing interests: “Although we conclude that the Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures from the ordinary constraints imposed by state law, state courts do not have free rein.” Moore, slip opinion at p 26.  The opinion goes on to note:

We do not adopt these or any other test by which we can measure state court interpretations of state law in cases implicating the Elections Clause… We hold only that state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elections.

Id. p 28-29. It therefore remains to be seen how difficult it will be to challenge state legislatures in their future attempts at partisan district drawing in state courts.  Paying homage to the Supreme Court decision in Bush v Gore, it also leaves open the question of when federal courts may find that a state court has transgressed the “ordinary bounds of judicial review.” And, Moore leaves the Court’s holding in Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484 (2019) that partisan gerrymandering claims brought in federal court are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond their reach.

Nevertheless, taken in the context of other decisions reached this term, such as the Alabama districting case implicating the Voting Rights Act (Allen v Milligan), the recent decision in Moore gives comfort to many traditionalists who have been increasingly fearful of sudden and/or extreme changes to norms in American jurisprudence.

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EPA and Army Corps Issue New “WOTUS” Rule While Supreme Court Considers Jurisdiction Over Adjacent Wetlands

Yesterday, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the US Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (together, the Agencies) published a final rule revising the definition of “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) subject to federal regulation and permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act (CWA).  This rule is the latest attempt by the Agencies to craft a durable rule defining WOTUS.  The new rule, which largely mirrors the 2021 proposal, asserts a broader geographic scope of federal jurisdiction than the 2020 Navigable Waters Protection Rule (NWPR).  In particular, the Agencies adopt the broadest possible interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos (through incorporation of both the plurality’s “relatively permanent” test and Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test).  The final rule would, for the first time, codify aspects of the Agencies’ 2008 Rapanos Guidance and would rely on the significant nexus test’s case-by-case approach for evaluating jurisdiction for tributaries, wetlands, and other waters.  The Agencies released the final rule while the Supreme Court considers the scope of CWA authority over a major category of WOTUS, “adjacent wetlands,” in Sackett v. EPA, and the Supreme Court could hand down a decision in the coming months that could require changes to the rule.

For project proponents, the new rule would likely mean more features would be subject to regulation under the CWA, and projects that might have previously qualified for nationwide permits may no longer meet the acreage limits and would instead require an individual permit.  Also, case-by-case significant nexus determinations could result in lengthy reviews with uncertain and inconsistent results.

The final rule will go into effect on March 20.  While the Agencies previously characterized this rule as Phase 1 of a two-step process to enact a new WOTUS definition, EPA recently indicated that it is not currently planning a major second phase.

Summary of Final Rule

The rule defines WOTUS to include:

  1. Traditional navigable waters (TNWs), the territorial seas, and interstate waters.  TNWs include large rivers and lakes and tidally influenced waterbodies used in interstate or foreign commerce.  Interstate waters are rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across, or form part of, State boundaries.  The TNW definition (i.e., all waters currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide) is consistent with the text of the 1986 regulations and the NWPR.  However, the preamble indicates that the Agencies plan to include “waters currently being used for … commercial waterborne recreation (for example, boat rentals, guided fishing trips, or water ski tournaments),” which appears to broaden the scope of TNW waters.
  2. Impoundments of WOTUS.  The final rule retains the provision in the 1986 regulations that defines WOTUS to include impoundments of WOTUS.  The preamble defines impoundments as “created by discrete structures (often human-built) like dams or levees that typically have the effect of raising the water surface elevation, creating or expanding the area of open water, or both.”  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,066.
  3. Tributaries.  The final rule extends jurisdiction to tributaries of categories 1 and 2 waters if the tributary meets either the Agencies’ new formulation of the relatively permanent or the significant nexus standards from Rapanos (discussed in more detail below).  Ephemeral streams that meet the significant nexus test would be jurisdictional tributaries.  In this respect, the rule is much broader than the NWPR, which categorically excluded ephemeral tributaries from jurisdiction.
  4. Adjacent wetlands.  The rule retains the definition of “adjacent” from the 1986 regulations meaning “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” and adds language that adjacent wetlands are considered WOTUSifthey meet the relatively permanent or significant nexus standards.  The NWPR had narrowed the definition of adjacent wetlands to include only those wetlands that abutted or otherwise had a direct surface connection to other jurisdictional waters in a typical year.  The final rule creates a broader category of adjacent wetlands, leading to additional regulatory requirements for activities that cross or impact such features.
  5. Other waters.  The rule asserts jurisdiction over “other waters” under the relatively permanent and significant nexus standards from Rapanos.  Under this provision, which essentially serves as a “catch-all” category, “intrastate lakes and ponds, streams, or wetlands” not identified in categories 1-4 can be assessed for jurisdiction under the relatively permanent standard or significant nexus standard.  This list is intended to be exclusive, 88 Fed. Reg. at 3,100, but broad enough to include a large variety of water types (e.g., prairie potholes, sloughs, playa lakes, etc.).  This category is a clear departure from the 2008 Rapanos Guidance, which did not assert jurisdiction over “other waters” based on the relatively permanent waters or significant nexus standards.

Exclusions.  The final rule provides a list of features that are excluded even where they would otherwise qualify as jurisdictional impoundments, tributaries, adjacent wetlands, or other waters.  Importantly, features that qualify as category 1 waters (TNWs, territorial seas, and interstate waters) cannot be excluded even if they meet the criteria of the exclusions provided.  Key non-jurisdictional waters or exclusions include waste treatment systems, ditches, prior converted cropland, artificially irrigated areas, artificial lakes or ponds, and swales and erosional features.  The list of exclusions is similar to the list provided in the 2015 WOTUS Rule and 2020 NWPR, although it does not provide the clear definitions that were included in the NWPR and in some instances changes the exemption based on preamble interpretations.

Key Definitions. The rule also includes a number of important definitions.

  • The “relatively permanent standard” asserts jurisdiction over relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing waters connected to category 1 waters, and waters with a continuous surface connection to such relatively permanent waters or to category 1 waters.  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,006.  The final rule does not define or quantify what constitutes “relatively permanent” flow.  The preamble states that the relatively permanent standard encompasses surface waters that have flowing or standing water year-round or continuously during certain times of the year.  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,084.
  • The significant nexus standard asserts jurisdiction over waters that, either alone or in combination with similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affectthe chemical, physical, or biological integrity of category 1 waters.  In a change from the proposal, the final rule defines “significantly affect” to mean “a material influence on the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of [category 1] waters.”  To determine whether waters, either alone or in combination with similarly situated waters in the region, have a material influence on the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of category 1 waters, the Agencies will assess the  list of functions and factors, including, for example contribution of flow, distance from a category 1 water, and hydrologic connections.  The preamble states distance from a category 1 water and hydrology—will generally be given the greatest weight in the assessment.  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,120.  The new significant nexus standard will likely allow for broader assertions of jurisdiction because it allows the Agencies to aggregate all tributaries and adjacent wetlands within a particular geographic area and evaluate whether they have a “material influence” on category 1 waters based on a case-by-case application of the enumerated factors and functions.  This type of case-by-case significant nexus analysis has resulted in lengthy review times as well as unpredictable and inconsistent results.

Existing Jurisdictional Determinations

Landowners may obtain a jurisdictional determination in the form of either: (1) an approved jurisdictional determination (AJD), which is a Corps document identifying the limits of WOTUS on a parcel; or (2) a preliminary jurisdictional determination (PJD), which is a non-binding document in which an applicant can assume all waters will be treated as jurisdictional without making a formal determination.

The Agencies take the position that AJDs issued pursuant to the NWPR may not be relied upon in making new permit decisions.  According to the preamble, because the NWPR was vacated by two district courts, NWPR AJDs “may not reliably state the presence, absence, or limits of [WOTUS] on a parcel and will not be relied upon by the Corps in making new permit decisions.”  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,136.  The Agencies take the position that AJDs issued under earlier WOTUS definitions—except those AJDs issued under the NWPR—remain valid until the AJD’s expiration date.  Also, the new rule will govern any pending requests for AJDs, if the AJD is issued on or after the effective date of the rule (March 20, 2023).

In contrast to AJDs, PJDs are advisory in nature and have no expiration date.  The preamble clarifies that the new WOTUS rule has no impact on existing PJDs.

Potential Litigation and the Sackett Case

Multiple challenges to the new rule are likely to be filed in district courts across the country.  The state of Texas and an industry coalition immediately filed suits in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, and other suits are likely.  At the same time, the Supreme Court’s pending decision in Sackett may have implications for the durability of provisions of the rule.

Many commenters recommended that the Agencies defer issuing a final rule until the Supreme Court issues a decision in Sackett—a case in which the issue before the Court is “the proper test for determining whether wetlands are [WOTUS] under the [CWA].”  A decision in the Sackett case is expected in the next few months.  Perhaps trying to insulate the rule from a potentially unfavorable Supreme Court decision, the Agencies assert in the preamble the severability of the individual provisions of the rule.  The preamble states, “if a court were to determine that a wetland cannot be treated as adjacent if it is separated from a jurisdictional water by road or other barrier, the agencies intend that other categories of wetlands within the rule’s definition of ‘adjacent’ would remain subject to jurisdiction.”  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,135.  Although it is not clear how the Supreme Court will rule in Sackett, it is possible that the decision could require the Agencies to make changes to the new WOTUS definition or face legal challenges.

Article By Kerry L. McGrath, Brian R. Levey, Andrew J. Turner, Karma B. Brown, Deidre G. Duncan, and Matthew Z. Leopold of Hunton Andrews Kurth

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Copyright © 2023, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

The Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege Over Dual-Purpose Communications

The Supreme Court will evaluate the scope of attorney-client privilege when applied to communications shared between counsel and client that involve both legal and non-legal advice (“dual-purpose communications”). The decision of the highest court will have long-lasting implications for both business organizations and their retained counsels. The potential outcome of this case cannot be understated.

In this matter, the grand jury issued subpoenas to an anonymous law firm seeking documents related to the government’s investigation of the firm’s client. The law firm had provided both legal and business services to the client by advising on tax-related legal issues and preparing the client’s annual tax returns. When the law firm and client (“Petitioners”) withheld certain correspondence on the grounds that they were protected by attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, the government moved to compel the production of those documents. The district court held that, while the correspondence contained a “dual-purpose,” they were not protected by attorney-client privilege because the primary purpose of the correspondence was to obtain business tax advice and not legal advice.

On appeal, Petitioners argued that the appellate court should apply the “because of” test rather than the “primary purpose” test. The “because of” test asks whether the dual-purpose correspondence was made because of a need for legal advice. The application of this test would expand the scope of attorney-client privilege and protect the correspondence at issue. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected Petitioners’ argument and affirmed the district court’s decision. Petitioners appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 3, 2022.

The Supreme Court’s decision in In re Grand Jury 21-1397 will be of particular significance for in-house counsels who regularly provide both business and legal advice to their employers. For outside counsels, the outcome of this case will shed light on the standard to be applied for asserting privilege over dual-purpose communications. Oral argument occurred on January 9, 2023 at the Supreme Court.

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Top Legal News of 2022: A Review of the Most Notable and Newsworthy Thought Leadership from the National Law Review’s Contributors

Happy New Year from the National Law Review! We hope that the holiday season has been restful and rejuvenating for you and your family. Here at the NLR, we are wrapping up the second season of our legal news podcast, Legal News Reach. Check out episode seven here: Creating A Diverse, Equitable and Inclusive Work Environment with Stacey Sublett Halliday of Beveridge & Diamond! A few weeks ago, we also announced the winners of our 2022 Go-To Thought Leadership Awards! Each year, around 75 recipients are selected for their timely and high-quality contributions to the National Law Review. This year’s slate of winners was particularly competitive – to see the full list, check out our 2022 National Law Review Thought Leadership Awards page.

As we look forward to a bright and busy 2023 for the legal industry, it is more prudent than ever to review the previous year and all that came with it. 2022 was a chaotic and monumental year for not only the legal profession, but for the world at large. The invasion of Ukraine, global supply chain issues, and the ongoing coronavirus pandemic were only some of the many challenges all industries and sectors faced. In the United States, companies and employers dealt with enormous changes at every level, including but not limited to the reversal of Roe v. Wade, shifting attitudes toward cannabis legalization, and ever-changing standards for COVID-19 vaccinations.

Read on below for some thought leadership highlights from this past year, and for a reminder of all that we’ve passed through in 2022:

January

Most prominently in 2022, the US Supreme Court handed down substantial rulings for coronavirus vaccine mandates, which affected not only healthcare workers but all employers across the country. With a 6-3 majority, SCOTUS stayed the Biden Administration’s OSHA Emergency Temporary Standard that applied to all private employers, but simultaneously ruled in a 5-4 majority that issued a 5–4 unsigned majority that vaccine mandates for medical facilities and medical workers can remain.

January also saw noteworthy changes to labor law in the United States, inviting a handful of significant standard changes for all employers. At the end of 2021 and early in 2022, the NLRB considered cases that altered the standard for determining independent contractor status, as well as the standard that established whether a facially neutral work rule violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act. These changes also paved the way for briefings on determining appropriate bargaining units.

Read January 2022’s thought leadership focusing on Labor and Employment law and the related Supreme Court rulings  below for more information:

Supreme Court Stays Private Vaccine Mandate; Upholds Requirement for Certain Healthcare Workers

On Again, Off Again Vaccine Mandates: What Should Employers Do Now?

NLRB Rings in the New Year by Inviting Briefing on Multiple, Far-Reaching Standards Impacting Employers

February

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a large-scale ground invasion of Ukraine, leading to considerable damage and loss of life and throwing the geopolitical landscape into chaos. Both in February and in the months since, the Russia-Ukraine war has placed an extraordinary  strain on the global supply chain and businesses around the world, as the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have continued to enforce sanctions and trade regulations. Companies must be careful to comply with these orders as the political landscape continues to change and learn how to juggle the dual headaches of the lingering COVID crisis and evolving Ukrainian war

Domestically, President Biden nominated Ketanji Brown Jackson to the US Supreme Court. Succeeding Justice Stephen Breyer, Judge Jackson graduated magna cum laude from Harvard University in 1992 and cum laude from Harvard Law in 1996 and has since served as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. She is the first African American woman to serve on the United States’ highest court of law.

Read select thought leadership articles below for more information:

President Biden Nominates D.C. Circuit Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson to U.S. Supreme Court

Russian Invasion of Ukraine Triggers Global Sanctions: What Businesses Need to Know

Consequences from the Ukrainian Conflict

March

March of 2022 saw the long term  impacts from the military conflict in Ukraine emerge locally and around the world. Sanctions continued to affect businesses, leading to global supply chain slowdowns and difficulties in manufacturing and shipping and new immigration changes and challenges. In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission “SEC” issued new and noteworthy regulations regarding Environmental, Social & Corporate Governance “ESG” and climate change disclosures for public companies. The Supreme Court also heard oral argument for a large slate of cases, perhaps most notably in ZF Auto. US v. Luxshare, Ltd. and AlixPartners v. The Fund for Prot. of Inv. Rights in Foreign States, which interpreted provisions of Title 28 of the US Code’s (“Section 1782”) reach in seeking US-style discovery from a interested party to a foreign proceeding and whether or not ection 1782 can be used to obtain key information for private international arbitrations.

Read key thought leadership articles published in March for more details:

SEC Issues Long-Awaited Proposed Rule on Climate Disclosures

U.S. Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument on Circuit Split Over Scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Obtaining Discovery in International Arbitrations

The Effects of the Military Conflict in Ukraine on Supply Contracts

April

In April of 2022, the Biden Administration made notable changes to the National Environmental Policy Act, better known as NEPA, which had been substantially altered under the Trump Administration. A number of key provisions were returned to their pre-Trump state in order to better center the administration’s larger focus on environmental justice. Also of note, a US court for the first time contested the Center for Disease Control’s  “CDC’s” travel mask mandate, on the grounds that it exceeded the CDC’s Statutory Authority under the Administrative Procedure Act “the federal APA”. This ultimately led to a vacating of the COVID travel mask mandate on a nationwide basis.

Elon Musk announced his intention to purchase Twitter in April of 2022, as well. Twitter ultimately adopted a shareholder rights plan, known as a poison pill, in hopes of preventingMusk’s hostile takeover. Poison pills are widely regarded as the an effective but a draconian anti-takeover defense available.

Read select  thought leadership articles below for more information:

Biden Administration Walks Back Key Trump Era NEPA Regulation Changes

Twitter Board of Directors Adopts a Poison Pill

Administrative Law Takeaways from the Federal Travel Mask Mandate Decision

May

On May 17th, the first case of Monkeypox in the United States was reported in Massachusetts. In response, the Environmental Protection Agency “EPA” and the federal government implemented a number of policy changes in hopes of preventing a wider spread, including the speedy authorization of anti-Monkeypox claims for certain registered pesticides and disinfectant products.

The SEC and administrative law at large received a considerable blow after the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Jarkesy v. SEC. The Fifth Circuit Court held that the SEC in-house courts violated a series of constitutional protections, which may result in far-reaching impacts for how administrative bodies are used to regulate in the future. Additionally in May, the Senate confirmed Commissioner Alvaro Bedoya for the Federal Trade Commission “FTC”, shifting the balance of power back at the Commission in favor of the Democratic Party.

Read the following highlighted thought leadership articles published in May  for more information:

EPA Authorizes Anti-Monkeypox Claims for Pre-Designated Disinfectant Products

Fifth Circuit Holds That SEC Administrative Law Courts Are Unconstitutional

Big News at The FTC: Democrats Finally Get the Majority Back

June

In June of 2022, the Supreme Court released its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson, reversing Roe v. Wade’s 50-year precedent of ensuring abortion as a  protected right. Dobb’s is a  momentous decision and has resulted in a myriad of complex issues for employers, healthcare providers and individuals, including the updating of employee policies, healthcare provisions, ethical and criminal considerations for healthcare providers and the protection of personal data, and ultimately represents a massive shift away from women’s bodily autonomy in the United States. And the partial advance leak of the Dobb’s ruling, added to the myriad of concerns about the stability and public perception of the Supreme Court.

Other notable litigation and legislation in June included the passing of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, subjecting the importers of raw materials from China to new enforcement provisions. The Supreme Court also ruled in West Virginia v. EPA, limiting the SEC’s ability to enforce ESG requirements on public companies. The West Virginia v. EPA ruling  presents a considerable obstacle for the Biden Administration’s ongoing climate goals.

Read select legal news  articles below for more information:

Employment Law This Week: SCOTUS Overturns Roe v. Wade – What Employers Should Consider [VIDEO]

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Enforcement Starts on Imports from China and on Imports with China Origin Inputs

Implications of West Virginia v. EPA on Proposed SEC Climate Rules

July

July of 2022 saw a great deal of changes for the Equal Opportunity Commission’s “EEOC’s” COVID testing guidance for employers. The largest change is determining if testing is needed to prevent workplace transmission and interpreting the business necessity standard under the American with Disabilities Act “ADA”.. The labor law landscape around the country also saw an increased focus on pay transparency laws – most notably, New York state passed a bill requiring employers to post salary or wage ranges on all job listings. Notably, this law is quite similar to one already in effect in New York City and Washington state, Colorado, and Jersey City.

Beginning most prominently in July, the cryptocurrency world also found itself under increased scrutiny by the federal government. Of note this month, the SEC filed a complaint against certain Coinbase employees, alleging insider trading and claiming that these employees had tipped off others regarding Coinbase’s listing announcements. This move was one of the more aggressive moves made by the SEC toward the digital asset industry.

Read select legal thought leadership articles published in July for more information:

EEOC Revises COVID-19 Testing Guidance for Employers

SEC v. Wahi: An Enforcement Action that Could Impact the Broader Crypto / Digital Assets Industry

Pay Transparency Laws Are All The Rage: Looks Like New York State Is Joining the Party

August

On August 12, 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act (“IRA”) was passed by Congress, representing enormous changes for industries across the country. Perhaps most notably, the landmark legislation contained new government incentives for the clean energy sector, creating tax incentives for renewable energy projects that previously did not exist. The Act also included 15% alternative minimum corporate tax and a 1% excise tax on stock buybacks to raise government revenue.

The Inflation Reduction Act also provided significant funding for tribal communities, including but not limited to the reduction of drug prices, the lowering of energy costs, and additional federal infrastructure investments. While the funding is not as significant as COVID relief from previous years and there are still some remaining hurdles, the IRA provides groundbreaking new opportunities for Native communities, including those in Alaska and Hawaii.

Read the select legal articles published in August for more information:

The Inflation Reduction Act: How Do Tribal Communities Benefit?

The Inflation Reduction Act: A Tax Overview

Relief Arrives for Renewable Energy Industry – Inflation Reduction Act of 202

September

In September of 2022, Hurricane Ian made landfall in the United States, caused substaintial property damage and loss of life despite preparations ahead of time. After addressing safety concerns, policyholders began reviewing their insurance policies, collecting documentation and filing claims. In addition to filing claims for property damage, corporate policyholders also filed claims for business interruption and loss of business income.

Lawsuits opposing the remaining COVID-19 vaccine mandates also continued throughout the month of September, exceeding 1,000 complaints nationally. Previously, lawsuits had largely targeted the Biden Administration, but additional focus was also directed toward large employers with vaccine mandates.

Of global significance, Queen Elizabeth II, the UK’s longest reigning monarch, passed away at 96 years old. Her funeral was held September 19, 2022, and was a national holiday in the United Kingdom marking the last day of public mourning.

Read following key thought leadership articles on Hurrican Ian, UK Bank Holiday due to the Sovereign’s passing and Employer’s COVID Mandate headaches  for more information:

Hurricane Ian – Navigating Insurance Coverage

Bank Holiday Announced for Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II’s State Funeral

Challenges Against Employer COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates Show No Sign of Slowing

October

October saw forward movement in environmental justice, cannabis decriminalization, and Artificial Intelligence  “AI” regulation. The EPA launched their new Office of Environmental Justice and External Civil Rights, to work with state, local, and tribal partners providing financial and technical support to underserved communities disproportionately impacted by the ill effects of climate change. The EPA’s new office has 200 staff members across 10 regions and is expected to provide a unifying focus on civil rights and environmental justice for the EPA and federal government as a whole.

President Biden’s pardon of federal marijuana charges and mandate to review the plant’s Schedule I status signaled a shift in cannabis regulation, with the president urging state officials to follow his example and consider the contrast between wealthy cannabis business owners and those imprisoned for possession in the recent past.

Later in the month, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy addressed the swell of artificial intelligence technology with their Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, which provides guidelines to prevent privacy violations, implicit bias, and other forms of foreseeable harm.

Read selected thought leadership articles below for more information:

EPA Launches Their New Office: What Does the Office of Environmental Justice and External Civil Rights Mean for Companies and ESG in the United States?

“Up in Smoke?” President Biden Announces Pardons and Orders Review of Cannabis Classification

The White House’s AI Bill of Rights: Not for the Robots

November

November was dominated by a nail-biting midterm election season, a cryptocurrency catastrophe, and NDA (Non Disclosure Agreement) reform. While the midterms did not result in a Red Wave as expected, Republicans were able to regain a small majority in the House of Representatives, with the Senate remaining in Democratic control.

The digital finance world was considerably less stable, with the second largest cryptocurrency trading platform, FTX, filing for bankruptcy three days after its lawyers and compliance staff abruptly resigned. The collapse brought into stark relief the importance of solidifying the cryptocurrency custody and insurance landscape.

Also of note, President Biden signed the Speak Out Act, rendering unenforceable nondisclosure and nondisparagement agreements signed prior to incidents of sexual harassment or assault. The law’s passage offers employers the opportunity to review their states’ more robust laws in this area and ensure clauses meant to protect trade secrets and proprietary information don’t inadvertently create issues for sexual misconduct claimants.

Read select  thought leadership articles below fora deeper dive:

2022 Midterm Election Guide

The Spectacular Fall of FTX: Considerations about Crypto Custody and Insurance

Nondisclosure and Nondisparagement Agreements in Sexual Harassment and Assault Cases: Speak Out Act Heads to President’s Desk

December

In December, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released their hotly anticipated “Green Guides” amendment proposals, intended to combat greenwashing amidst growing demand for environmentally friendly products. The amended Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims would impose stricter standards for the use of terms such as “recyclable,” “compostable,” “organic,” and “sustainable” in advertising and on packaging.

Meanwhile, Congress narrowly avoided a railroad worker strike by passing Railway Labor Act legislation affirming all tentative agreements between rail carriers and unions. The contracts included a roughly 24% increase in wages over 4-5 years, along with an extra day of leave. Biden promised to address paid leave further in the near future.

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) closed out 2022 with a number of impactful decisions favoring workers. Employees have expanded remedies for National Labor Relations Act violations and protection during Section 7 questioning, while employers have the burden of proof when seeking to expand micro-units or deny union protestors.

Read select legal thought leadership pieces below for more details:

Congress Votes to Impose Bargaining Agreement to Avoid Nationwide Railroad Strike

FTC Starts Long-Awaited Green Guides Review

NLRB Issues Flurry of Blockbuster End-of-Year Decisions (With More to Come?) (US)

Thank you to our dedicated readers and as always to our highly regarded contributing authors and our talented NLR editorial staff for working day in and day out to produce one of the most well read and reputable business law publications in the US.  Have a happy 2023!

Copyright ©2023 National Law Forum, LLC

SCOTUS Takes a Pass on “Gap Time” Dispute

It’s two months into argument season at the Supreme Court, and we’re always keeping our fingers crossed that the justices will take up a wage and hour issue and clear up some ambiguities in the law or a circuit split.

Top billing this SCOTUS term goes to Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt, in which the Court will address whether a supervisor who earned more than $200,000 a year but was paid on a daily basis is exempt from the overtime laws as a “highly compensated employee” under 29 C.F.R. § 541.601, notwithstanding the salary basis rules in 29 C.F.R. § 541.602 and 29 C.F.R. § 541.604.  The Court held arguments on October 12, and you can read the transcript here.  We’ll report on that decision as soon as it’s published.

This week’s news is a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in Cleveland County, North Carolina v. Conner, a case about gap time.  The plaintiff in the case—an EMT worker—was paid under a fairly complex set of ordinance-based and contractual terms, but the gist of her claim was that the county shorted her on straight-time pay she was owed under her contract, and by doing do violated the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The district court dismissed the claim, on the ground that the FLSA governs minimum wage and overtime pay, but not straight-time pay (assuming no minimum wage violation).  On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit noted that “there are situations … that fall between [the minimum wage and overtime] provisions of the FLSA.  It explained:

In addition to seeking unpaid overtime compensation, employees may seek to recover wages for uncompensated hours worked that fall between the minimum wage and the overtime provisions of the FLSA, otherwise known as gap time ….  Gap time refers to time that is not directly covered by the FLSA’s overtime provisions because it does not exceed the overtime limit, and to time that is not covered by the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions because … the employees are still being paid a minimum wage when their salaries are averaged across their actual time worked.  (Internal citations and alterations omitted.)

The Court of Appeals differentiated between two types of gap time—“pure gap time” and “overtime gap time”—with the former referring to unpaid straight time in a week in which an employee works no overtime, and the latter referring to unpaid straight time in a week in which the employee works overtime.  The court noted, correctly, that no provision of the FLSA addresses gap time of either type, and that there is no cause of action under the FLSA for “pure gap time” absent a minimum wage or overtime violation by the employer.  Such claims would arise, if at all, under state law.

On the other hand, the circuit court noted that courts are divided on whether an employee can bring an “overtime gap time claim” under the FLSA.  While the statute itself is silent on the issue, the U.S. Department of Labor’s interpretation of the FLSA—set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 778.315—states that:

[C]ompensation for … overtime work under the Act cannot be said to have been paid to an employee unless all the straight time compensation due him for the nonovertime hours under his contract (express or implied) or under any applicable statute has been paid.

In its simplest sense, the argument for recognizing “overtime gap time” claims under the FLSA is this:  Say an employer promises an overtime-eligible employee base pay of $1,000 per week for up to 40 hours of work, and the employee works more than 40 hours in a given week.  In that scenario, the employee’s hourly overtime rate would by $37.50 ($1000 ÷ 40 yields a regular rate of $25, and time-and-a-half on $25 is $37.50).  But if the employer only pays the employee $800 in base pay for the week and not the promised $1,000, the regular rate becomes $20 ($1000 ÷ 40) and the hourly overtime rate becomes $30 (time-and-a-half on $20).  So the employee is short-changed $7.50 on each overtime hour, which the Fourth Circuit found violates 29 C.F.R. § 778.315 and the spirit, if not the letter, of the FLSA.

“Pure gap time” is different, in this important sense:  it only arises when the employee has not worked any overtime in the week.  So there is no possibility of short-changing the employee on overtime pay, and—assuming the employee has, on average, received the minimum wage for all hours worked that week—no other provision of the FLSA that provides any relief.  (The employee is ostensibly free to seek relief under an applicable state wage payment law or common law for failure to pay promised compensation.)

The Fourth Circuit concluded that 29 C.F.R. § 778.315 has the “power to persuade,” and therefore is entitled to “considerable deference” under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  As such, the court held that “overtime gap time claims” are indeed cognizable under the FLSA, and that “courts must ensure employees are paid all of their straight time wages first under the relevant employment agreement, before overtime is counted.”  The court acknowledged a circuit split on the issue, with the Second Circuit declining to afford deference to 29 C.F.R. § 778.315 and rejecting “overtime gap time” claims as lacking a statutory basis (“So long as an employee is being paid the minimum wage or more, [the] FLSA does not provide recourse for unpaid hours below the 40–hour threshold, even if the employee also works overtime hours the same week.”).

The county filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, presenting not only the question of whether the FLSA permits “overtime gap time” but also seeking clarification on how federal courts should apply the Skidmore doctrine to agency interpretations such as 29 C.F.R. § 778.315.  The Supreme Court denied the petition on December 12, leaving both questions for another day.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more Employment Law News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Supreme Court to Consider First Amendment Protection for Parody Dog Toy

The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to consider the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment to commercial parody products that feature the unauthorized use of another party’s trademark(s). Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, Case No. 22-148 (Supr. Ct. Nov. 21, 2022) (certiorari granted). The questions presented are as follows:

  1. Whether humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead receives heightened First Amendment protection from trademark-infringement claims.
  2. Whether humorous use of another’s mark as one’s own on a commercial product is “noncommercial” under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C), thus barring as a matter of law a claim of dilution by tarnishment under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.

This is the second time Jack Daniel’s has filed a petition for certiorari in connection with this case. The Supreme Court first considered the matter in January 2021, following the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate and remand the district court’s finding of trademark infringement, reverse the judgment on dilution and uphold the validity of Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress rights.

The case then returned to the district court, which granted summary judgment to VIP Products. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and then Jack Daniel’s filed its second petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court will seek to settle the long-standing split amongst the US Courts of Appeal regarding the proper analysis for parody in trademark infringement and dilution claims and the scope of protection afforded to it via the First Amendment.

For more Supreme Court and Litigation News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

U.S. Supreme Court Refuses Review of Case Involving Technical Issue With Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge

Refusing to weigh in on the impact of a plaintiff’s failure to verify her discrimination charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the U.S. Supreme Court lets stand the lower court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s failure to verify her charge barred her from filing a lawsuit. Mosby v. City of Byron, No. 21-10377, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 10436 (11th Cir. Apr. 18, 2022), cert. denied, No. 22-283 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2022).

Background

Rachel Mosby served as the fire chief of Byron, Georgia, for 11 years. One month after she came out as transgender, the city fired her.

Mosby filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Title VII states that charges filed “shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. This process is called “verification.” The parties did not dispute that Mosby did not properly verify her charge.

The City of Byron submitted a position statement with the EEOC on the merits of Mosby’s claim, but it did not raise the fact that Mosby failed to verify her charge. Mosby never amended her charge to meet the verification requirement.

After receiving a “right to sue” letter from the EEOC, Mosby sued the City of Byron. Before answering Mosby’s complaint, the City of Byron moved to dismiss because Mosby failed to verify her charge, requiring dismissal as a matter of law. After converting the City’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, the district court held the failure to verify the charge barred Mosby’s Title VII and ADA claims.

Jurisdictional or Procedural?

Whether EEOC’s charge filing requirements are prerequisite to filing a lawsuit is jurisdictional or procedural remains in dispute. While procedural requirements can be waived or cured, jurisdictional requirements cannot. In 2019, the Supreme Court provided guidance in Fort Bend City v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, in which it held that a charge’s lack of verification does not strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to consider in a subsequent federal lawsuit. Unlike a jurisdictional issue, the Court reasoned, the lack of verification can be waived or forfeited by the parties. Accordingly, the Court held that an employer forfeited the issue of verification when it failed to raise it promptly at the outset of litigation.

Eleventh Circuit’s Reasoning

In appealing the dismissal of her claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (which has jurisdiction over Alabama, Florida, and Georgia), Mosby argued that Fort Bend required a finding that the City of Byron waived its verification defense because it did not raise the defense in its position statement submitted with the EEOC. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. In the Supreme Court decision, the Eleventh Circuit said, Fort Bend City did not raise the verification defense until four years and “an entire round of appeals all the way to the Supreme Court” had passed. By contrast, the City of Byron raised the defense in a pre-answer motion to dismiss before causing “a waste of adjudicatory resources.”

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, holding that “a charge neither filed under oath or affirmation nor subsequently cured by amendment fails to satisfy the statutory requirement that an employee submit [her] charge to the Commission.” The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 2021, making these the only two circuits that have addressed the issue. See Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333.

Takeaway for Employers

An employer responding to a charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC should evaluate whether the claimant properly verified the charge. If not, preserve the defense by raising it as soon as practicable at the EEOC charge stage and in any ensuing litigation.

Article By Stephanie L. Adler-Paindiris and Stephanie E. Satterfield of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more litigation and Supreme Court legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

Supreme Court Questions Whether Highly Compensated Oil Rig Worker Is Overtime Exempt

On October 12, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States heard oral arguments in a case regarding whether an oil rig worker who performed supervisory duties and was paid more than $200,000 per year on a day rate basis is exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The case is especially significant for employers that pay exempt employees on a day rate. It could have a major impact on the oil and gas industry in the way that it recruits, staffs, and compensates employees who work on offshore oil rigs and at remote oil and gas work sites. In addition, depending on how the Supreme Court rules, its decision could have much broader implications.

During the arguments in Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt, the justices questioned whether, despite the employee’s high earnings, he was eligible for overtime compensation because he was paid by the day and not on a weekly salary basis. There is no express statutory requirement that an employee be paid on a “salary basis” to be exempt from overtime requirements, but such a requirement has long been included in the regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) applicable to the FLSA’s white-collar exemptions. Notably, Justice Brett Kavanaugh suggested during the arguments that the regulations may be in conflict with the text of FLSA, although Helix did not raise this issue in its petition for certiorari.

Background

The case involves an oil rig “toolpusher,” an oilfield term for a rig or worksite supervisor, who managed twelve to fourteen other employees, was paid a daily rate of $963, and earned more than $200,000 annually. Between December 2014 and August 2017, when Michael Hewitt was discharged for performance reasons, he worked twenty-eight-day “hitches” on an offshore oil rig where he would work twelve-hour shifts each day, sometimes working eighty-four hours in a week. After his discharge, Hewitt filed suit alleging that he was improperly classified as exempt and therefore was entitled to overtime pay. The district court ruled in favor of Helix.

In September 2021, a divided (12-6) en banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Hewitt was not exempt from the FLSA because his payment on a day-rate basis did “not constitute payment on a salary basis” for purposes of the highly compensated employee (HCE) exemption that is found in the FLSA regulations.

The Fifth Circuit further concluded that the employer’s day-rate pay plan did not qualify as the equivalent of payment on a salary basis under another FLSA regulation because the guaranteed pay for any workweek did not have “a reasonable relationship” to the total income earned. In other words, the court found that the employee was not exempt because the $963 he earned per day was not reasonably related to the $3,846 the employee earned on average each week.

Oral Arguments

Oral arguments at the Supreme Court focused on the interplay between the DOL’s HCE regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.601, and another DOL regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b), which states that an employer will not violate the salary basis requirement under certain limited circumstances even if the employee’s earnings are computed on an hourly, daily, or shift basis.

At the time of Hewitt’s employment, the HCE exemption required an employee to be paid at least $455 per week on a “salary or fee basis” and to earn at least $100,000 in total annual compensation. Those threshold amounts have since been increased to $684 per week and $107,432 per year.

The other regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b), states that an employee whose earnings are “computed on an hourly, a daily or a shift basis” may still be classified as exempt if the “employment arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least the minimum weekly required amount paid on a salary basis regardless of the number of hours, days or shifts worked, and a reasonable relationship exists between the guaranteed amount and the amount actually earned. The reasonable relationship test will be met if the weekly guarantee is roughly equivalent to the employee’s usual earnings at the assigned hourly, daily, or shift rate for the employee’s normal scheduled workweek.”

Hewitt earned double the minimum total compensation level for the HCE exemption. Since the minimum salary level for the exemption was only $455 per week, and Hewitt was guaranteed that he would be paid at least $963 per week for each week he worked at least one day, Helix argued that he was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements because the HCE exemption was completely self-contained and to be applied without regard to other regulations, including the “salary basis” test and the minimum guarantee regulation. Hewitt argued that the HCE exemption required compliance with either the “salary basis” test or the minimum guarantee regulation since he was admittedly paid on a day rate basis.

However, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson suggested that it was not that simple. Justice Jackson said the question of salary basis is more about the “predictability and regularity of the payment” for each workweek. “What he has to know is how much is coming in at a regular clip so that he can get a babysitter, so that he can hire a nanny, so that he can pay his mortgage,” Justice Jackson stated. Justice Jackson echoed the language of the salary basis test requiring that an exempt employee be paid a predetermined amount for any week in which she performed any work.

Similarly, Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked Helix, “so what you’re asking us to do is take an hourly wage earner and take them out of 604, which is the only provision that deals with someone who’s not paid on a salary basis.” Justice Sotomayor additionally raised the FLSA’s goal of “preventing overwork and the dangers of overwork.”

In contrast, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that Hewitt’s high annual compensation relative to the average worker is a strong indication that he was paid on a salary basis and should be exempt. “The difficulty is just, for the average person looking at it, when someone makes over $200,000 a year, they normally think of that as an indication that it’s a salary,” Justice Thomas stated.

Justice Kavanaugh asked if the issue of whether the DOL regulations conflict with the FLSA is being litigated in the courts. He said, “it seems a pretty easy argument to say, oh, by the way, or maybe, oh, let’s start with the fact that the regs [sic] are inconsistent with the statute and the regs [sic] are, therefore, just invalid across the board to the extent they refer to salary.” He further stated, “if the statutory argument is not here, I’m sure someone’s going to raise it because it’s strong.”

Key Takeaways

It is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will rule in this case. A decision that requires strict adherence to the regulation’s reasonable relationship test, even when the minimum daily pay far exceeds the minimum weekly salary threshold, would have a significant negative impact on the manner in which certain industries compensate their workers. It also could lead to even more litigation by highly compensated employees, many of whom make more money without receiving overtime pay than what many people who currently are paid overtime compensation make.

Depending upon its breadth, a decision that the regulations are in conflict with the statutory text of the FLSA could provide a roadmap for additional challenges to other parts of the regulations. This could have a wide-ranging impact, as the DOL currently is in the process of preparing a proposal to revise its FLSA regulations. Then again, if a future litigant takes up Justice Kavanaugh’s invitation to challenge whether the salary regulations are overbroad compared to the language of the FLSA, the current effort to revise the regulations regarding exemptions for executive, administrative, and professional employees may be moot.

Article By Andrew P. Burnside, Steven F. Pockrass, and Zachary V. Zagger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

For more supreme court and litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Supreme Court Takes Up FLSA High Earners Exemption

On October 12, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a case that considers whether a supervisor who earned over $200,000 annually may still be eligible for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The case centers on the interpretation of the regulatory scheme surrounding highly compensated employees and their exemption status under the FLSA.

The Plaintiff in the case was a worker in a supervisory role on an oil rig and his compensation was based on a daily rate. The plaintiff argued that his daily rate of pay did not constitute a salary.  Prior to the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit en banc agreed with the Plaintiff and found that he was not paid a salary such that he was not an exempt employee under the FLSA.

This case has implications for how employers will pay workers, and whether there is potential exposure for overtime claims, even for highly compensated employees.

For more Labor and Employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California