Category: Supreme Court

Supreme Court Rules Against Freezing "Untainted" Assets

In a ruling that could have far-reaching implications for criminal defendants’ right to counsel of their choice, the Supreme Court decided on March 30, 2016 that the government cannot freeze “untainted” assets that are not related to any alleged wrongdoing. Reaching this conclusion, the Court overturned an Eleventh Circuit decision affirming an order freezing a defendant’s assets that, while not obtained as a result of, or traceable to, the criminal conduct alleged, represented property of “equivalent value” to the illegal proceeds.

Writing for the majority in Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Roberts, Ginsburg and Sotomayor, drew a bright constitutional line, rooted in principles of property law, between tainted and untainted assets.  The Court stated that the latter “belongs to the defendant, pure and simple.  In this respect, it differs from a robber’s loot, a drug seller’s cocaine, a burglar’s tools, or other property associated with the planning, implementation, or concealing of a crime.”  Weighing these property rights, together with the “fundamental character” of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, against the government’s stated interests, the Court reasoned that “in our view, insofar as innocent (i.e., untainted) funds are needed to obtain counsel of choice, we believe that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the court order that the Government seeks.”

The Court found further support for its decision in the fact that, absent the ability to use untainted funds to secure counsel, “[t]hese defendants, rendered indigent, would fall back upon publicly paid counsel, including overworked and underpaid public defenders” and that “increasing the government-paid-defender workload [would] render less effective the basic right the Sixth Amendment seeks to protect.”

The majority’s opinion also sought to address the concerns of the dissenting justices that, given the fungible nature of money, “sometimes it will be difficult to say whether a particular bank account contains tainted or untainted funds.”  Justice Breyer noted that “the law has tracing rules that help courts implement the kind of distinction we require in this case.”

Notably, while the petitioner’s assets in Luis had been frozen under a statute applying to violations of health care laws,” see 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a), the same statute also applies to a wide range of white collar crimes, including bank theft and bribery, as well as money laundering.

Article By Glen A. Kopp & David A. Shargel of Bracewell LLP

© 2016 Bracewell LLP

Supreme Court Rules Public Sector Union Agency Fees Still Alive

The U.S. Supreme Court was equally divided 4-to-4 on a case that asked the Justices whether to overturn long-established law that allows a public sector union to charge an agency or service fee to those employees who choose not to join the union. With the Court equally split, the lower court’s decision is automatically affirmed, and public sector unions can continue to charge agency fees to employees who do not join the union.

Overturning Abood Appeared A Real Possibility

In the 1977 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education decision, the Supreme Court ruled that unions could charge an agency fee to public employees who chose not to join the union to cover the union’s costs to negotiate a contract that covers all the public employees. For over thirty years, that has been settled law. In 2014, however, the Court suggested it might be willing to overturn Abood, questioning its analysis on several grounds, including whether a mandatory agency fee violates a non-union member’s First Amendment right to free speech.

That apparent willingness to overturn Abood set up the First Amendment challenge to public union agency fees in this term’s case of Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association. At the oral argument in Friedrichs in January, the Court’s more conservative Justices appeared ready to overrule Abood. Even the four more liberal Justices appeared to concede that the First Amendment argument may be tough to uphold but instead focused on the importance of not overturning prior rulings unless there is a compelling reason to do so. The long-standing Abood precedent appeared in jeopardy.

Justice Scalia’s Death Creates Stalemate 

Justice Antonin Scalia’s unexpected death in February left the Court at a 4-to-4 stalemate in Friedrichs. With the even split, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling applying Abood stands.

Opponents of unions and the Abood decision will have to wait for another case to work its way through the judicial system to raise the issue for consideration by a future Court. Of course, depending on who fills Justice Scalia’s vacancy, the majority of Justices may no longer have an appetite to reconsider Abood. We’ll all have to wait and see. In the meantime, public sector unions may continue to charge agency fees to those employees not paying union dues.

Article By Jason S. Ritchie of  Holland & Hart LLP

Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.

Ohio v. Sierra Club: The Integrity of the Clean Air Act

EPAYesterday, the Supreme Court of the United States announced it will not grant Certiorari in Ohio v. Sierra Club, et al. In this case, the Sixth Circuit found an area must adopt required pollution-control measures before the EPA can designate it as having satisfied the law’s health-based pollution standards.

In 1997, the EPA created the National Ambient Air Quality Standards of fine particulate matter in the air.  When the EPA created these standards, regions were designated as having met, or not met the air quality standards.  In order to meet the standards, states were required to adopt “reasonable measures and technologies” to reduce the pollution in the problematic areas.  In 2011, the EPA deemed Ohio to have met the appropriate standards because the air quality had improved. Ohio, however, had never created a pollution regulatory plan as the Clean Air Act required. In response, the Sierra Club filed suit alleging the EPA acted illegally by designated the areas as having met air quality standards.

Creating a pollution regulatory plan is crucial, according to Sanjay Narayan, the managing attorney for the Sierra Club on the case.  Before 1990, the Clean Air Act had no requirement that states produce an implementation plan.  According to Narayan, the expectation was “we [the EPA] don’t care how you get there, we aren’t going to tell you how to get there, we’re just going to check in at the deadline and expect you to have made it. And what happened was that the vast majority of the states did not meet the deadline.”

Narayan describes the implementation plan as “a show your math” requirement. This has been very useful in helping states create lasting change in their air quality–by creating a regulatory framework that shows how they can reduce air pollution, the states are more likely to meet their deadline.  Narayan points out “It’s also useful for other areas to know what worked and what successful areas did.  Here’s what turned out to be cost effective, that kind of record is tremendously useful as we move forward on what was meant to be a nation-wide campaign for healthy air for the public.”

In  Ohio v. Sierra Club, there are a few details to consider.  Pollution decreased, and that’s the goal.  However, it might not be that simple.  In the years preceding Ohio’s drop in air pollution, the economy crashed.  Narayan draws comparisons to the Beijing Olympics, saying, “When people aren’t running their [industrial] plants for economic reasons, the air cleans up a little bit.  But it turns around quickly once you turn the plants back on.”  However, Ohio did meet the standard, and according to Narayan, to comply with the Clean Air Act they’d simply need to go back and show their work.  He says, “They did meet the standard, and they say they have all the controls they need in place.  There is a procedural step that Ohio hasn’t taken, and it shouldn’t be hard for Ohio to take it.”

The Sixth Circuit decision that currently stands requires Ohio to take those regulatory steps. In the current case, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the entire portion of the Clean Air Act must be followed, and that it wasn’t enough for Ohio to have simply met the standards.  Ohio has appealed to the Supreme Court.

Narayan says, “It’s about the integrity of the clean air act.”  These requirements are crucial in ensuring the air gets cleaned up in a timely manner.  Narayan says, Decades of experience has shown us that without these requirements, states miss deadlines, air pollution lasts for much longer than it should and the public really suffers.  The pollution sends kids to the hospital with asthma, it creates respiratory disease in the elderly-delay is a disaster for public health.”

Article By Eilene Spear & Nicole Cudiamat Minnis of The National Law Review / The National Law Forum LLC
Copyright ©2016 National Law Forum, LLC

Supreme Court Agrees to Review the Appropriate Measure of Design Patent Damages

On March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Samsung Electronics Co.’s appeal regarding what it must pay Apple Inc. for infringing the design of Apple’s iPhone. This will mark the first time in over a century that the Supreme Court will hear a case involving design patents.

In 2012, a jury found that Samsung infringed Apple utility and design patents and awarded Apple $1.05 billion in damages. On appeal, damages were nearly cut in half to $548 million, which Samsung later agreed to pay to settle the dispute, all the while reserving its right to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Samsung has challenged the Federal Circuit’s decision that the company must pay its entire profits from smartphones that infringed Apple’s design patents, which amounted to $399 million. In making the damages determination, the Federal Circuit relied on Section 289 of the Patent Act, which dates to the 19th century and provides in relevant part: “[w]hoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit.” 35. U.S.C. § 289 (emphasis added).

A number of tech companies, including Google and Facebook, submitted a brief in support of Samsung’s petition. In the brief, those companies argued that Section 289 is outdated and when enacted, failed to contemplate “products with significant functional features at all.” Thus, Section 289 is obsolete and should not govern awards involving the complex products available today.

When the Court hears the case later this term, the specific question it will address is, “Where a design patent is applied to only a component of a product, should an award of infringer’s profits be limited to those profits attributable to the component?”

Article by Kevin P. Moran & Joseph P. Serge of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP
© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

President Obama Announces Merrick Garland as Nominee to United States Supreme Court

In a ceremony in the White House Rose Garden President Obama nominated Merrick Garland to replace Scalia’s on the United States Supreme Court.  Garland would be the 113th justice, and he is a moderate circuit court judge who is well-respected by both Republicans and Democrats.

Finding Scalia’s replacement has already been contentious, but Garland is uniquely situated to handle the politics at hand.  In the mid-90’s, Garland faced a lengthy political battle that delayed his confirmation for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Obama has made it clear that he intends to fulfill his constitutional responsibility to nominate a Supreme Court Justice, despite calls that the decision wait for the next president.  Obama, in an email to his supporters indicated three tenets in his decision-making process.  He said he was looking for, “an independent mind, unimpeachable credentials and an unquestionable mastery of law” as well as an understanding of the limits of the court and that “justice is not about abstract legal theory, nor some footnote in a dusty casebook.”

Garland’s career has encompassed these tenets, as he used the law in emotional and difficult situations.  In 1995, he coordinated the Justice Department’s response to the Oklahoma City Bombing, immediately arriving on scene.  His hard work and dedication in that role helped cement his reputation and earned him respect on both sides of the aisle. In his formal announcement in the White House Rose Garden this morning, President Obama described Garland as:

More than just a brilliant legal mind. He is someone who has a keen understanding that justice is about more than abstract legal theory. More than some footnote in a dusty casebook. His life experience…informs his view that the law is more than an intellectual exercise. He understands the way the law affects the daily reality of how the law affects people’s lives in a big complicated democracy and rapidly changing times.

Garland, at 63, is an older nominee.  As a centrist nominee he has been on the list of potential nominees for years. Obama has made it clear that he thinks the Senate should move quickly to consider the nomination, as Garland is a qualified and suitable candidate for the job.  However, the nomination could be contentious, as Republican Senators have indicated an unwillingness to consider a candidate.  Additionally, with the court being evenly split, Garland, if confirmed, would be the deciding vote on many issues.

The White house has created a twitter handle @SCOTUSnom to provide up-to-date information on the nomination process.

Article By Eilene Spear of The National Law Review / The National Law Forum LLC

©2016 National Law Forum, LLC

SCOTUS Decision Affects Diversity Jurisdiction of Business Trusts

Many registered investment companies and real estate investment trusts are organized as business trusts. Certain states, such as Maryland, Delaware, and Massachusetts have been hospitable to such entities, and therefore are home to many of these entities. In some states, such as Massachusetts, the entities are formed as common-law trusts, while in others there is a statutory authorization for the formation of a business trust. However, unlike corporations which exist as “persons” for the purpose of legal actions, there have been questions raised as to whether business trusts have a separate legal existence.

The issue of whether a trust is a separate legal entity can impact how trusts access courts.  In a decision that could significantly impact the way in which business trusts determine the forum in which they sue or are sued, on March 7, 2016 the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case involving Americold Realty Trust. In that decision, the Court held that, unlike a corporation, a trust does not have a separate legal existence for the purpose of determining the citizenship of the entity.

The decision reaffirmed that a corporation is a citizen of the state in which it is organized (and the state in which it maintains its principal office, if different).  However, in an 8-0 decision, the Court held that trusts are not separate legal entities with a defined state of citizenship.  Rather, the citizenship of a business trust will be determined by where the beneficiaries of the trust are located.  For a large, publicly-owned business trust, such as a registered investment company or a REIT which have shareholders scattered in many or all of the states, that may effectively destroy any basis for such a trust to use diversity of citizenship to affect federal court jurisdiction.  If sued, this could force such entities to litigate in jurisdictions where the trust is not organized and does not maintain an office because an isolated shareholder resides in that jurisdiction.

While there may be little that investment companies or REITs can do to alter the impact of this decision, it will be interesting to see if the state laws authorizing such trusts can be revised in a way that may impact the consequences of this decision.

Article By Steven M. Felsenstein of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

©2016 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

What Does the US Supreme Court Ruling Mean for Local Affordable Housing Laws?

On February 29, the US Supreme Court denied certiorari in California Building Industry Association v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435 (2015), and leaves standing a unanimous decision by the California Supreme Court upholding the city of San Jose’s affordable housing ordinance.

San Jose’s ordinance compels all developers of new residential development projects with 20 or more units to reserve a minimum of 15 percent of for-sale units for low-income buyers, and the price of those units cannot exceed 30 percent of the buyers’ median income. The ordinance requires these restrictions to remain in place for 45 years. Alternatively, the developer can pay the city a fee in lieu. The California Building Industry Association argued that the ordinance was an unlawful exaction in violation of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), and Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). In a June 15, 2015 decision, the California Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the ordinance is not an exaction because it does not require a developer to give up a property interest, but instead a typical zoning restriction subject to rational basis review.

In concurring with the US Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in this case, Associate Justice Clarence Thomas acknowledged the important issues raised in California Building Industry Association, perhaps signaling the Court may revisit this issue. In particular, Justice Thomas stated, “For at least two decades . . . lower courts have divided over whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases where the alleged taking arises from a legislatively imposed condition rather than an administrative one. . . . I continue to doubt that ‘the existence of a taking should turn on the type of governmental entity responsible for the taking. . . . Until we decide this issue, property owners and local governments are left uncertain about what legal standard governs legislative ordinances and whether cities can legislatively impose exactions that would not pass muster if done administratively.”

Ultimately, however, Justice Thomas determined that California Building Industry Association did not provide an opportunity to decide the conflict: “The City raises threshold questions about the timeliness of the petition for certiorari that might preclude us from reaching the Takings Clause question. Moreover, petitioner disclaimed any reliance on Nollan and Dolan in the proceedings below. Nor did the California Supreme Court’s decision rest on the distinction (if any) between takings effectuated through administrative versus legislative action.”

The denial of certiorari leaves in place similar “inclusionary” affordable housing programs that have been adopted in more than 170 California municipalities.

Article By Bryan K. Brown, Cynthia L. Burch, David P. Cohen & Kenneth G. Lore

©2016 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

Supreme Court Stays Clean Power Plan

On February 9, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision staying implementation of the Clean Power Plan until the D.C. Circuit rules on challenges to the Plan. The Court left open the possibility that it would review the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate decision.

The decision delays President Obama’s Climate Action Plan. The Clean Power Plan is its key climate change rule. It requires states and utilities to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by generating less electricity from coal, and more from lower carbon-emitting sources like natural gas, or zero-carbon sources like solar and wind. The Plan has an ambitious goal: to reduce CO2 emissions 32% below 2005 levels by 2030.

Some relevant background: On January 21, 2016, the D.C. Circuit refused to stay the Clean Power Plan while litigation is pending before it. Opponents of the rule, including 29 states and state agencies and several industry and trade groups, appealed that decision to the Supreme Court.

The stay will be in place at least until the D.C. Circuit rules on the pending challenges, likely late this year. Briefing deadlines are in April, and oral argument is scheduled in early June. The Supreme Court’s stay order will also remain in effect if the Court decides to review the D.C. Circuit’s decision, which it is expected to do, regardless of the outcome.

What are the implications of the stay? In the short term, the September 6, 2016 deadline for states to either submit their state plans or request a two-year extension will be postponed.

The Supreme Court’s action was unusual. The 5-4 vote suggests that the Court was persuaded that the significant challenges to the rule and the economic consequences of implementing it outweighed EPA’s interests in addressing climate change this year.

Article By Jane E. Montgomery & Amy Antoniolli of Schiff Hardin LLP

© 2016 Schiff Hardin LLP

U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Review Obama Immigration Action Case

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed today to hear a case challenging President Barack Obama’s executive action on immigration. The Supreme Court will decide whether President Obama can proceed with plans to defer deportation and provide work authorization to millions of individuals currently in the United States without lawful status.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Texas et al. v. U.S. et al. today and indicated that it will take up an additional issue on whether the Obama administration’s action violates a constitutional clause that requires the president to faithfully execute the law (i.e., the Take Care Clause in Article II of the Constitution). The Court will hear arguments this April and a decision is likely to be issued this June, before the end of the Court’s current session.

In November 2014, the Obama Administration issued new policies allowing certain undocumented immigrants to apply for deferred action and work authorization allowing them to remain and work legally in the United States.  These programs were to apply to certain individuals brought to the U.S. when they were under the age of sixteen (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), and also to undocumented individuals who are parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent resident children (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents).  Twenty six states filed suit to stop these policies from being implemented in December 2014. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction in February 2015, and, on November 9, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction. The Obama administration petitioned the Supreme Court on November 20, 2015 seeking immediate review of the Fifth Circuit’s decision

Article By Cynthia Liao of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

Supreme Court Rules TCPA Class Action Not Mooted by Unaccepted Settlement Offer to Named Plaintiff

Today the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that a company’s unaccepted offer of complete relief to a named plaintiff in a putative class action does not moot the plaintiff’s case. Before the ruling, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, there was disagreement among the Courts of Appeals over whether an unaccepted offer can moot a plaintiff’s claim, thereby depriving federal courts of Article III jurisdiction. While not specific to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), this issue is common to cases involving statutes like the TCPA because damages are statutorily set and thus easily calculated. Under this ruling, a company facing a TCPA class action lawsuit cannot moot the case by offering complete relief to the named plaintiff before class certification.

Background on the Case

In Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, the U.S. Navy hired a nationwide advertising and marketing communications agency to execute a multimedia recruiting campaign that involved text messages. The marketing agency then hired a vendor to generate a list of cellular telephone numbers geared towards the Navy’s target audience who had consented to receive solicitations by text message. Under this campaign, the vendor sent text messages to over 100,000 recipients. One of those recipients was the named plaintiff, who alleged that he had not consented to receive the text message, and that the advertising agency violated the TCPA by sending the message (and perhaps others like it).

Before the deadline to file class certification, the advertising agency filed an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The agency offered the named plaintiff complete relief – including his costs and $1,503 per text message that he could show he received. Note that the maximum the plaintiff could recover under the TCPA is $1,500 per text message plus the costs of filing suit. The plaintiff did not accept the settlement offer and allowed the Rule 68 submission to lapse after the time, 14 days, specified in the Rule.

The take-away from this important Supreme Court decision is that an unaccepted settlement offer has no force. Like other unaccepted contract offers, it creates no lasting right or obligation. Because plaintiff’s individual claim was not made moot by the expired settlement offer, the claim retained its vitality during the time to determine whether the case could proceed on behalf of the class.

Article By Robert V. Spake, Jr. of Polsinelli PC

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California