Texas Supreme Court Makes Enforcement of Noncompete Agreements Easier for Employers

Posted this week at the National Law Review by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP  a good recap of the Texas Supreme Court decision which clarifies the standards for enforcing noncompete agreements: 

On June 24, the Texas Supreme Court issued a long-awaited decision clarifying the standards for enforcement of noncompete agreements under the Texas Business and Commerce Code. In Marsh USA Inc. and Marsh & McLennan Cos. v. Rex Cook, the court considered whether an employee’s receipt of stock options could sustain an agreement that prohibited the employee from soliciting or accepting business from certain customers of Marsh McLennan (Marsh).

Noncompete agreements, which include prohibitions on working for a competitor and limitations on an employee’s ability to solicit customers, are governed in Texas by the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Under that statute, such agreements may be enforced only if they contain reasonable limitations with respect to geography, time, and scope of activity to be prohibited and only if they are “ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement.” Texas courts, as well as practitioners and employers, have struggled with this latter requirement. The Cook case represents a significant change in Texas law and a departure from the Texas Supreme Court’s previous analysis of noncompete agreements.

Under previous court decisions, the analytical focus was on the type of consideration provided by the employer in exchange for the employee’s promise to refrain from competing. Specifically, a Texas employer seeking to enforce a noncompete agreement must have been able to show that the consideration it provided to the employee “gave rise to an interest” in restraining competition. For example, an employer’s promise of trade secrets or confidential information was deemed sufficient consideration to support a noncompete agreement whereas simple cash consideration was not.

In Cook, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether an employer’s grant of stock options satisfied the “ancillary” prong of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Cook joined Marsh in 1983 and signed an agreement under which he could exercise certain stock options in exchange for signing an agreement limiting his ability to solicit or accept business from clients of Marsh with whom he had business dealings during his employment. Cook thus signed the noncompete agreement not when he was provided the original grant of stock options, but rather when he chose to exercise the options.

After his separation from employment with Marsh, Cook went to work for a competitor. He thereafter was sued by Marsh for breach of his contract and for breach of fiduciary duty. Cook filed a motion for summary judgment in the district court on the grounds that the agreement was unenforceable under the Texas Business and Commerce Code. The trial court granted Cook’s motion and an appellate court affirmed that ruling.

The Texas Supreme Court, in a 6-3 opinion, disagreed with the lower courts and reversed the grant of summary judgment. Significantly, the court overruled previous authority that focused on the type of consideration provided by the employer and the assessment of whether or not that consideration “gives rise” to an interest in restraining competition. Rather, the court construed the Texas Business and Commerce Code as requiring simply that there be a nexus between the noncompete agreement and the employer’s interests, holding that the noncompete agreement “must be reasonably related to the [employer’s] interest worthy of protection.” The court emphasized Cook’s high-level executive position with the company and found that, by providing an ownership interest in the company, the stock options provided to Cook were “reasonably related to the company’s interest in protecting its goodwill, a business interest the [Texas Business and Commerce Code] recognizes as worthy of protection.” The noncompete was thus enforceable on that basis.

As a practical matter, Cook should make enforcement of noncompete agreements easier in Texas. The decision represents a shift from the previous, more technical focus on the type of consideration provided in the noncompete agreement to a more generalized assessment of the employer’s interests in restraining competition. Cook follows a trend of other recent Texas Supreme Court cases that have found that the enforcement of noncompete agreements should be decided in the context of the overall purpose of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, which is to provide for reasonable restrictions that protect legitimate business interests.

Copyright © 2011 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Don't Gamble with My Money: When a Lawsuit Seeks Damages in Excess of Policy Limits, What Are the Insured's Rights in Illinois?

Posted this week at the National Law Review by Daniel J. Struck and Neil B. Posner of Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein P.C.  a good overview of R.C. Wegman Construction Company v. Admiral Insurance Company which help address the issues involved with insurance claims in excess of policy limits in Illinois: 

In general, if a lawsuit is covered or potentially covered by a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy, the insurer has a duty to defend that claim. If the insurer provides that defense without reserving its rights to deny coverage, the insurer is entitled to select defense counsel and control the defense. But when the insurer defends under a reservation of rights, that reservation may create a conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured.

The leading Illinois Supreme Court case on this subject is Maryland Casualty v. Peppers, decided in 1976. According to Peppers, when an insurer defends an insured, but reserves the right to deny coverage based on an exclusion in the insurance policy (the applicability of which could be established during the course of defending the insured), there is a conflict of interest that gives the insured the right to select independent counsel to defend it at the insurer’s expense. But the Illinois Supreme Court did not say that this is the only conflict of interest that could give rise to the insured’s right to select independent defense counsel.

In R.C. Wegman Construction Company v. Admiral Insurance Company, decided in 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit answered a question that has vexed Illinois insureds for a long time. Although the case involves a relatively uncommon set of facts, the court’s ruling in Wegman recognizes the conflicting interests that can arise between insureds and insurers when an insured faces a claim in which there is a “non-trivial probability” that there could be a judgment in excess of policy limits.

The Nuts and Bolts of Wegman

R.C. Wegman Construction Company was the manager of a construction site at which another contractor’s employee was seriously injured. Wegman was an additional insured under a policy issued by Admiral Insurance to the other contractor. When the worker sued Wegman, Admiral acknowledged its duty to defend, apparently without reserving any rights, and undertook the control of Wegman’s defense. The Admiral policy provided $1 million in per-occurrence limits of liability. Although it soon became clear that there was a “realistic possibility” that the underlying lawsuit would result in a settlement or judgment in excess of the policy limits, Admiral never provided this information to Wegman.

Shortly before trial, a Wegman executive was chatting about the case with a relative who happened to be an attorney. That relative pointed out the risk of liability in excess of policy limits, and mentioned that it was important for Wegman to notify its excess insurers. But by then it was too late, and the excess insurer denied coverage because notice was untimely. A judgment was entered against Wegman for more than $2 million. Wegman sued Admiral for failing to give sufficient warning of the possibility of an excess judgment so that Wegman could give timely notice to its excess insurer. According to the Seventh Circuit, the key issue was whether this situation—in which there was a risk of judgment in excess of the limit of liability, and where the insurer was paying for and controlling the defense—gave rise to a conflict of interest.

Admiral’s explanation for failing to inform Wegman was ultimately part of its downfall. Because there were other defendants in the underlying lawsuit, there was a good chance that Wegman would not be held jointly liable and that if a jury determined that Wegman was no more than 25% responsible for the worker’s injury, Wegman’s liability would have been capped at 25% of the judgment. Admiral’s trial strategy was not to deny liability, but to downplay Wegman’s responsibility. Admiral, however, never mentioned this litigation gambit to Wegman!

In the Seventh Circuit’s view, this was a textbook example of “gambling with an insured’s money.” And that is a breach of an insurer’s fiduciary duty to its insured.

When a potential conflict of interest arises, the insurer has a duty to notify the insured, regardless of whether the potential conflict relates to a basis for denying coverage, a reservation of rights, or a disconnect between the available limits of coverage and the insured’s potential liability. Once the insured has been informed of the conflict of interest, the insured has the option of hiring a new lawyer whose loyalty will be exclusively to the insured. In reaching its Wegman conclusion, the Seventh Circuit cited the conflict-of-interest rule established by the Illinois Supreme Court’s Peppersdecision. Thus, a potential conflict of interest between an insured and an insurer concerning the conduct of defense is not limited to situations in which the insurer has reserved its rights.

In rejecting Admiral’s arguments, the Seventh Circuit explained that a conflict of interest (1) can arise in any number of situations and (2) does not necessarily mean that the conflicted party—the insurer—has engaged in actual harmful conduct. A conflict of interest that permits an insured to select independent counsel occurs whenever the interests of the insured and the insurer are divergent, which creates a potential for harmful conduct.

The conflict between Admiral and Wegman arose when Admiral learned that a judgment in excess of policy limits was a “non-trivial probability.” When confronted with a conflict of this type, the insurer must inform the insured as soon as possible in order to allow the insured to give timely notice to excess insurers, and to allow the insured to make an informed decision as to whether to select its own counsel or to continue with the defense provided by the insurer.

Looking Beyond Wegman

The fact pattern discussed in Wegman, however, is not the only situation in which there may be a conflict of interest between an insurer and an insured concerning the control of the defense. Under the supplemental duty to defend in a CGL policy, an insured is entitled to be defended until settlements or judgments have been paid out in an amount that equals or exceeds the limits of liability. The cost of defense does not erode the limits of liability, which means that the supplemental duty to defend is of significant economic value to an insured.

The following hypothetical situations (involving an insured covered by a CGL policy with $1 million in per-occurrence and aggregate limits of liability and a supplemental duty to defend) illustrate the economic value of the duty to defend:

  • The insured is sued 25 times in one policy year. In each instance, the insurer acknowledges coverage and undertakes to defend the lawsuits. Each lawsuit is dismissed without the insured becoming liable for any settlements or judgments. The total cost of defending these 25 lawsuits is $1.5 million. The limits of liability are completely unimpaired with $1 million in limits of coverage remaining available.
  • The insured is a defendant in dozens of lawsuits alleging that one of the products it sells has a defect that has caused bodily injury. The insurer agrees to defend. The lawsuits are consolidated, and the costs of defense accumulate to more than $2.5 million. Eventually, there is a global settlement of the lawsuits for $1 million. Thus, a total of $3.5 million has been paid out on an insurance policy with a $1 million limit of liability.
  • The insured is involved in a catastrophic accident for which he was solely responsible and in which four other people were permanently disabled. Each of the victims files a lawsuit and the realistic projected liability exposure to each victim is $1.5 million—or $6 million collectively. Shortly after the complaints are filed (and before there has been any significant discovery or investigation), three of the plaintiffs make a joint offer to settle their claims for a collective $1 million. The insurer and the insured both believe that this is an outstanding settlement opportunity, but the fourth plaintiff wants her day in court. If the insured agrees to this promising settlement opportunity, the limits of liability will be exhausted, the duty to defend will be extinguished, and the insured will be forced to pay for his own defense or rely on his excess insurance to reimburse him for defense costs.

Any insured who has been in the position of defending against either a serious claim or a multitude of smaller claims will understand that the supplemental duty to defend under a CGL policy may have much greater economic value than the limit of liability alone.

In these kinds of situations—when either the potential liability exceeds policy limits or there are multiple claims against the insured such that the economic value of the defense is worth more than the limit of liability—who should be allowed to control the defense of claims against the insured? In prior cases (Conway v. County Casualty Insurance Company [1992] and American Service Insurance Company v. China Ocean Shipping Co. [2010]), Illinois courts concluded that an insurer cannot be excused of any further duty to defend by paying out its remaining limits to the plaintiffs or by depositing its policy limits into court. But this rule does not address the conflict of interest when (1) it is in the insurer’s financial interest to avoid the potentially unlimited expense of defending its insured but (2) it is in the insured’s interest to continue receiving a defense that may have greater financial value than the limits of liability of a primary CGL policy.

Thanks to the Wegman decision, there is now some authority acknowledging that the insured’s right to select independent counsel may exist even if the insurer defends without a reservation of rights. The court recognized that the insurer-insured relationship and the right to control the defense is fraught with potential conflicts. Therefore, it is more important than ever for insureds to protect their interests.

Editor’s note: For more on the insured’s right to a defense, see “Policyholders and the Right to a Defense: Don’t Be Left Holding the Bag.”

© 2011 Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C.

 

California and Florida Lead Trend of New State-Level Iran Sanctions

Posted this week at the National Law Review by Reid Whitten  of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP a good summary of recent  state legislation targeting potential contractors that deal with Iran.  

On June 2, 2011, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed a new state law prohibiting Florida government entities from contracting with companies invested in Iran’s petroleum energy sector.  Florida’s law, and a similar California law that went into effect on June 1, 2011, announce a coming trend of state laws targeting potential contractors that also deal with Iran.  These two laws, and several others on the horizon, present pitfalls for unwary companies as well as unique opportunities for informed, well-advised businesses.

On July 1, 2010, President Obama signed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”) into law.  CISADA targets companies invested in Iran’s petroleum sector through provisions prohibiting the U.S. Government from contracting with such companies.  CISADA also permits the states to enact similar prohibitions against state contracts with companies invested in the Iranian petroleum sector.  Within months of enactment of the U.S. law, California and Florida passed their own laws, citing the desire to put further economic pressure on such companies. The legislatures of Oregon, Kansas, and other states are considering similar actions. Arizona also has a prohibition on contracting with companies invested in Iran that became law as part of a 2008 divestment act. Companies, particularly non-U.S. companies, intending to bid on state government contracts need to pay close attention to individual state statues, and review their own investments for connections to Iran’s petroleum energy sector.  U.S.-organized companies are unlikely to have such investments because (except in very narrow circumstances) the pre-existing U.S. economic embargo against Iran prohibits them.

On September 30, 2010, California passed the Iran Contracting Act of 2010 (“California Act”) requiring, among other actions, that the California Department of General Services compile a list of persons or companies involved in business or investment activities in Iran.  The California Act also declares that any person identified as having business or investment activities of $20 million dollars or more in the energy sector of Iran “is ineligible to, and shall not bid on, submit a proposal for, or enter into or renew, a contract with a public entity for goods or services of one million dollars ($1,000,000) or more.”  See Cal. Pub. Contr. § 2203(a)(1) (West 2010). Companies that are notified of their designation as doing significant business in Iran’s petroleum energy sectors must demonstrate to the government’s satisfaction that they should not be so designated. If they fail to do so, they will be subject to the contracting prohibition.

Similarly, the Florida Scrutinized Companies law (“Florida Act”) will take effect July 1, 2011. Under a 2008 Iran divestment act, Florida’s State Board of Administration maintains a “Scrutinized Companies with Activities in the Iran Petroleum Energy Sector List” (“Scrutinized Companies List”). The Florida Act prohibits a Florida state agency or local governmental entity from contracting for goods and services of more than $1 million dollars or more with any company on the Scrutinized Companies List.

The Florida Act requires contractors to certify that they are not on the Scrutinized Companies List before submitting a bid for, entering into, or renewing a contract with, a state agency or local government entity. In addition, any contract entered into or renewed on or after July 1, 2011 must contain a provision allowing for termination of that contract if the company is found to have submitted a false certification. Further, the bill would require the Florida state government to bring a civil action against any company that does not disprove a determination of false certification within a specified time.

The state laws present both a concern and an opportunity for contracting companies. Concerns, in particular, arise because states lack substantial experience in administering international sanctions policy. As a result, Companies may be mistakenly designated as a business significantly invested in Iran’s energy petroleum industry. Individual state resources, already spread thin, may not provide the means accurately to designate the correct companies falling under the new laws’ prohibitions. States are likely to borrow names of possible target companies from Federal CISADA actions and from one another, sometimes without independently verifying the alleged reasons for designating a company. Additionally, we have seen instances of private groups (such as human rights and anti-nuclear activists groups) distributing inaccurate lists of companies alleged to be violating CISADA.

Contracting companies may be presented with an opportunity, however, to get ahead of this trend of state sanctions in a number of ways. If a company receives notice that it is under scrutiny from one state, that company and its counsel can prepare a response that is both tailored and general;  a response that not only answers the initial notice but that can also be repeated to respond to any other notices it might receive from other states in the future. Companies may also have opportunities to communicate with the state administrators of these new laws about their application. Many of these administrators may not have extensive substantive experience with international sanctions policy;  therefore, companies and their counsel, particularly counsel with experience in international sanctions work, would be in a strong position to discuss with state officials the laws and the means of implementation.

Companies intending to contract with any state agencies need to pay close attention to the changing landscape of state-level sanctions laws and remain aware of the continuing risks and opportunities that landscape presents.

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

 

Selling the Main Street Fairness Act: A Viable Solution to the Internet Sales Tax Problem

Congrats to Michael J. Payne, CPA of Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law   one of the winners of the 2011 Spring National Law Review Student Legal Writing Contest.  Michael’s topic addresses the tremendous struggle in the regulation of sales tax collection on interstate internet purchases.

  I.  Introduction

States have long faced issues related to collecting sales and use tax when the seller lives in another state. Initially, disputed transactions involved purchases from mail-order catalogs and telephone orders, but with the advent and explosion of the World Wide Web, states now face a tremendous struggle in the regulation of sales tax collection on interstate internet purchases.

Today, fierce debates between internet retailers, states, and consumers regarding sales taxes on internet purchases are commonplace, yet the key issues remain unresolved. Retailers purport to be exempt from state sales tax requirements when they do not have a physical presence in the state in which their customers reside; states argue sales taxes are due regardless of physical presence; and consumers just want to find the best deal when making purchases, which often means they seek out ways to avoid paying sales taxes altogether.

As a result of fast-moving technological advances and slow-moving legislative actions, a substantial gap has developed in nearly every state between sales tax revenue due and collected. A study from the University of Tennessee estimated that between 2007 and 2012, states will sustain over $52 billion in losses from uncollected taxes on e-commerce sales.1 In addition to enlarging state budget shortfalls, untaxed interstate sales create an unfair advantage to online sellers who are relieved from the onerous sales tax collection duties imposed on in-state and traditional brick-and-mortar sellers. Thus, online sellers can offer discounts on products purchased from out-of-state residents while still earning higher profits than their in-state competitors.

Two significant constitutional hurdles restrict state regulation of interstate sales taxation: the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause, with the former causing the majority of current problems. This article focuses primarily on resolving the Commerce Clause concerns and attempts to reconcile the interests of sellers, consumers, and states. It then proposes the adoption of a bill that was recently introduced in the House of Representatives: the Main Street Fairness Act.2

II.  Background

A.  The Mechanics of Internet Sales Taxation

A basic understanding of common Internet sales taxation is needed to grasp the ideas discussed in this article. As a general rule, purchasers of merchandise must pay a transaction tax to the state in which they reside, provided that state imposes a sales or use tax.3 When the retailer collects the tax on behalf of the consumer and remits it to the state, it is called a sales tax.When a retailer fails to collect a sales tax, the consumer is obligated to report her purchase to the state and pay an equivalent use tax. The process is simple when the seller is in the same state as the purchaser: the seller collects taxes on local sales and remits them to the state. The more complicated and increasingly more common scenario is when the seller operates from another state; this situation has been the topic of numerous cases, statutes, opinion columns, Internet blogs, and scholarly articles, including this one.

Although state taxation of internet sales is a modern issue, courts have long debated whether the Constitution’s Commerce Clause limits the ability of a state to apply its sales and use tax provisions to out-of-state retailers.4 This Part describes the most significant cases.

B.  National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois

In 1967, the Supreme Court considered whether a state could require a mail order company to collect and remit sales taxes on sales to residents of that state when that company had no physical presence in the state. In National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois,5 the taxpayer was a mail order company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Missouri. It was licensed to do business only in those states. The taxpayer maintained no office or warehouse in Illinois, had no employees, agents, or salespeople there, and conducted no significant advertising there. Moreover, all contacts the company had with the residents of the state were through the mail or a common carrier. Illinois attempted to require the taxpayer to collect and remit sales and use taxes from Illinois residents who purchased the company’s goods by mail order.

The Court held that the Commerce Clause requires “some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax.” Mail order transactions alone do not create that minimum connection. The Court reasoned “[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy free from . . . unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.”6

C. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota

Twenty-five years after National Bellas Hess, the Court affirmed in part its prior decision when it faced a similar set of facts in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.7 In Quill, North Dakota attempted to require the taxpayer, a Delaware corporation with no significant tangible property or employees in North Dakota, to collect and remit use taxes from sales to North Dakota customers. The taxpayer solicited business through catalogs and flyers and delivered all its merchandise by mail or common carrier from out-of-state locations. The State argued that its statute subjecting every retailer that solicits business in the state to the tax was constitutional when the retailer had “engage[d] in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.”

The Court disagreed, recognizing two constitutional barriers to a state’s ability to force out-of-state retailers to collect and remit sales taxes: the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. The Court distinguished the Due Process Clause from the Commerce Clause, explaining:

Although the “two claims are closely related,” the Clauses pose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the States. Accordingly, while a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause. The two constitutional requirements differ fundamentally, in several ways. . . . [W]hile Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the States and thus may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce, it does not similarly have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause.8

The Court concluded that because Quill had purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota, it established minimum contacts with the State, and thus the Due Process Clause did not prohibit the State from imposing its use tax against Quill.

The Court next considered whether the state statute ran afoul of the Commerce Clause. It recognized Congress’ constitutional authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,”9 but also recognized that the “dormant” Commerce Clause10 reserves to Congress the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce even when it has not spoken directly on a subject. The dormant Commerce Clause requires that the retailer have a “substantial nexus” with the state before the state can force the retailer to collect and remit sales taxes, which often translates into a bright line physical presence test.

The Court held that North Dakota did not have the power to impose sales taxes on Quill because Quill had no physical presence in the state. It also found that the state’s taxation would unduly burden interstate commerce, noting that “similar obligations might be imposed by the nation’s 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions,” thus vastly increasing the complexity of sales tax compliance for interstate retailers.

D. Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement

In the shadow of the Quill decision, a new and far-reaching mode of commerce arose: the World Wide Web. Many retailers no longer needed to send catalogs to solicit sales. Instead, they could simply set up websites, make them apparent to search engines, and wait for customers to come to them. The following chart illustrates the historic growth of the Internet:

Year Estimated Number of Websites Estimated Percentage of U.S. Households with Internet Access E-Commerce sales
1992 (Quill)

< 30

< 25%

n/a

2000 (SSUTA)

17,000,000

50%

$27.6 billion

2010

249,000,000

77%

$202.6 billion

The monumental growth in online sales has contributed to the two major problems currently associated with the taxation of remote sales: administrative burdens to sellers and lost revenues to states from general noncompliance. In 1999, state and local governments from twenty-six states responded to these by banding together and implementing a new sales tax system. The group’s goal was to create and implement a method to unify and simplify the collection and remittance of sales taxes across the country, an effort that culminated in the Streamlined Sales Tax Project.11

The Project works through two steps. First, states voluntarily join the Streamlined Sales Tax Agreement by adopting its provisions as state law and conforming to the tax administration procedures set for by the Agreement. Second, interstate retailers voluntarily register with the Project’s online system. Sellers only register once and are thenceforth obligated to collect and remit sales taxes to member states when they sell products to residents of those states.

The Agreement reduces the administrative burden of tax compliance by focusing on two main goals: uniformity and simplification. The Agreement promotes uniformity in multistate sales tax collection at five levels: terminology, tax bases, registration, sourcing, and reporting. It simplifies sales tax collection and reporting by focusing on four areas: limited tax rates, seller liability for incorrectly reported exemptions, simplified tax forms, and electronic tax remittances. Additionally, it provides for sales tax software that, if used, would provide immunity to users from audits and corresponding liability.

A. Congressional Efforts to Regulate Internet Sales Taxes

Although states have been very active recently in attempting to regulate sales tax collection for out-of-state retailers, the power to regulate taxation of interstate commerce ultimately lies in Congress’s hands, as established by the Commerce Clause and reiterated in Quill. Since Quill, Congress has attempted several times to pass legislation that would provide federal authorization for states to mandate sales tax collection from out-of-state retailers, thus allowing states to bypass the substantial nexus requirement imposed by Quill.12 However, each bill that has been proposed has expired without being voted on by the House or Senate.

B. Recent State Efforts to Bypass Quill’s Substantial Nexus Requirement

Dissatisfied with Congressional efforts (or lack thereof) to increase cooperation with sales tax laws, states have attempted in various ways to establish a substantial nexus between online retailers and their state and thereby satisfy the requirements of the Commerce Clause.

a.  Borders Online v. State Board of Equalization

In 2005, the California Court of Appeals held in Borders Online v. State Board of Equalization that Borders’ retail stores in the state acted as authorized representatives of the associated online store when those stores accepted refunds of personal property sold by the internet retailer, thus establishing a nexus sufficient for the imposition of sales and use taxes under the Commerce Clause.13

After Borders, remote sellers in California sought clarification on whether their particular fact situations produced sufficient nexus to subject them to California state and local taxation. Courts look at various factors to determine the level of nexus,14 and consider these factors concurrently. An increasingly relevant factor that courts have examined is the presence of a company’s affiliates in a state, or “attributional nexus.” Courts have long looked at attributional nexus as a way to satisfy the Commerce Clause requirements, although the issue has never been directly addressed by the United States Supreme Court.

b.  Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Department of Taxation and Finance

Most recently, a New York trial court, later affirmed by the New York Appellate Division, weighed in on attributional nexus in Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Department of Taxation and Finance.15 In 2008, New York attempted to curtail lost revenues from internet sales by amending the definition of “vendor” in its tax law, thus requiring each of Amazon’s Associates to collect sales taxes. Amazon then brought suit claiming that the Provision violated the Commerce Clause by imposing tax collection obligations on out-of-state entities that had no substantial nexus with the state. The court dismissed Amazon’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action, holding that the statute is not unconstitutional facially or as-applied. The court took a broad view of the substantial nexus requirement when it held that Amazon had created a substantial nexus with the State, even though Amazon had no offices, property, employees, or agents in the state. The court noted that physical presence “need not be substantial;” however, there must be “more than a slight presence.”

SinceAmazon, many New York retailers have terminated associations with in-state retailers and local affiliates to avoid being subject to sales tax collection. One website purports to list sellers that have removed New York affiliates after the passage of New York’s legislation, naming almost sixty remote sellers.16 The list includes some large companies such as Overstock, KB Toys, ShopNBC, CafePress, and Fingerhut. As a result, the statute may have actually hurt local retailers, the very group it was trying to protect by leveling the sales tax playing field.

c.  The Bordersand AmazonFallout

The Amazon ruling has influenced other states to pass similar legislation in attempts to collect their own “Amazon tax.” For instance, in 2009, Rhode Island passed a statute that requires online merchants generating more than $5,000 in sales through in-state affiliates to register and collect sales tax on all its taxable sales in Rhode Island.17 Like the New York law, Rhode Island’s statute requires that the seller enter an agreement with a Rhode Island resident before the seller would be subject to sales tax collection.

Following the lead of New York and Rhode Island, North Carolina passed a statute18 enacting its own Amazon tax with a $10,000 floor, explaining that the new law codifies the United States Supreme Court’s 1960 decision in Scripto v. Carson that a state “may require tax collection by a remote retailer that had contracts with ten independent contractors in the state who solicited orders for products on its own behalf.”19 North Carolina simultaneously modernized its previous terminology by replacing “mail order” with “remote sales.”20 Similar statutes were introduced in eleven other states.21

Colorado took its sales tax collection efforts a step further. In addition to enacting its own “Amazon tax,” Colorado’s H.B. 1193 (2010) would require sellers that do not collect sales taxes to send customers that purchase products online annual statements listing total purchases.22 Retailers would also send a copy of all purchases to Colorado’s Department of Revenue so that residents may be held accountable for unpaid use taxes.23 The bill would authorize Colorado’s Executive Director of the Department of Revenue to issue a subpoena to an out-of-state retailer if that retailer refuses to voluntarily furnish that information. However, this statute is the subject of a recent lawsuit brought by the Direct Marketing Association. A federal court for the District of Colorado recently granted DMA’s motion for preliminary injunction against Colorado, holding that its statute “discriminates patently against interstate commerce” and imposes undue burdens on retailers.24

Oklahoma took a different approach to regulating sales tax collection from out-of-state sellers.25 The Oklahoma law obligates certain remote sellers to post on their websites, catalogs, and invoices notice of consumers’ obligations to pay Oklahoma use tax on electronic and mail order purchases of tangible personal property.26 Oklahoma’s law has been criticized as superfluous in application to internet and mail order sellers that have physical presence in the State because current Oklahoma use tax statutes already impose the obligation on those sellers to collect use taxes. Furthermore, the law is criticized as unconstitutional when applied to out-of-state sellers that have no physical presence in the State, because Quill’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause would prohibit Oklahoma from enforcing tax collection responsibilities on a seller with no physical presence in the state.

d.    The Case for a Federal Solution

A uniform federal solution is superior to progressive state-by-state attempts to collect sales and use taxes for three reasons. First, states are tiptoeing on the edge of a river of constitutionally-protected consumer privacy matters. Second, strict enforcement of use tax laws at an individual level is hardly tenable given the historic lack of enforcement and the resulting lack of personal accountability. The proposed solutions impose real burdens on people and will discourage online purchases. Can you recall everything you have purchased online in the last year? In the last five years? You may have to if you are in a progressive sales tax collection state. It is much simpler and more intuitive for consumers to pay the tax up front as one swift transaction than to log their purchases, store the information, and file a use tax return with their payment at some later date. The increased hassles of recording each purchase could drive people back into brick-and-mortar stores, nullifying the efforts of Amazon and other remote sellers. For this reason, remote sellers should embrace the Main Street Fairness Act as a means to create certainty and consistency in the marketplace.

Finally, the trending methods of sales and use tax enforcement are completely inefficient. This is a situation in which it makes sense to take collective federal action rather than pursue state collection efforts at the individual taxpayer level. States would be forced to allocate substantial resources toward collection efforts while receiving no greater benefit than if the tax had been collected at the time of sale. With the Main Street Fairness Act, states would incur virtually no additional costs of expansion and would continue to use their existing collection methods. States are already entitled to collect these taxes whether in the form of sales or use taxes; why not utilize retailers with software and systems already in place?

The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has argued that states’ implementation of the “Amazon law” could be an effective means to require sales tax collection from internet sellers that use affiliate programs.27 However, the Center observed, Amazon laws are only a partial solution to the broader sales tax problem. Not every internet retailer operates an affiliate program, so the Amazon law does nothing to spur collection efforts from the numerous vendors who advertise by other means. The Center concluded that a comprehensive solution will require a federal law empowering states and localities that have streamlined their sales tax collection efforts to require all large remote sellers to collect sales taxes. This would allow states to force collection on remote sellers regardless of whether the sellers have a physical presence in their customers’ states. Such a federal grant of commerce power is the precise objective of the Main Street Fairness Act of 2010.

III.  Main Street Fairness Act

The Main Street Fairness Act, sponsored by former Representative Bill Delahunt (D-MA), seeks to “promote simplification and fairness in the administration and collection of sales and use taxes.”28 It would do so by allowing states to force “remote sellers” (companies that sell products online, by mail order catalogs, cable TV shopping, telephone, etc.) to collect sales and use taxes from customers and remit them to states. States acting alone do not have the authority to require a seller with no physical presence in the state to collect taxes on sales to that state’s residents. However, Congress affirmatively possesses the authority to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States and Congress may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce. The Main Street Fairness Act would grant states explicit authority to burden interstate commerce by allowing states to mandate collection and remittance of taxes on remote sales to their residents.

Why should Congress give the Main Street Fairness Act a second glance when a form of the current bill has essentially been rejected every other year for the last seven years? This section will focus on three ways the Main Street Fairness Act would benefit interstate commerce: (1) it would provide states a tool to enforce active yet frequently disobeyed laws regarding sales and use tax reporting and payment; (2) it would level the playing field between Main Street and “e-street;” and (3) it would help to close the enormous budget gap that is growing daily as a result of the disparity between taxes due and taxes actually collected.

A. Enforce Current Laws

The Main Street Fairness Act would grant federal authority to states, thus allowing states to enforce sales and use tax laws that are currently in place but are often not obeyed. Sales or use taxes are legally due on internet sales if the item is otherwise taxable under state law. Generally, retailers collect taxes from customers on behalf of states for convenience. However, when a customer purchases a taxable item and the retailer fails to collect a sales tax, that customer is obligated to pay a use tax and file a use tax return with the state.

People often do not pay use taxes on internet purchases for two reasons. First and most commonly, the average consumer is unaware that a tax is due when she purchases a product from an online retailer such as Amazon or Overstock. In other cases, the consumer may be aware that a tax is due but fails to pay sales or use taxes because he believes the law is not enforced and he will not be caught. This is the more dangerous scenario because in knowingly failing to pay a tax that is legally due, the consumer crosses the line of intentional disregard and is more likely to violate that law again.

In an effort to both inform residents of their obligation to pay use taxes and to actually collect those taxes, many states have started to include a line on their income tax returns where taxpayers are supposed to calculate and declare unpaid taxes. For example, Michigan includes the following line on its individual income tax return: “Use Tax: Use tax due on internet, mail order or other out-of-state purchases,” then references a separate worksheet that is provided to help the taxpayer calculate use tax due.29

Some states have begun to enforce use tax compliance on an individual level, sending tax bills to consumers that had made taxable purchases but failed to pay a tax. Nebraska recently cracked down on a local March of Dimes chapter after the chapter purchased 4,000 t-shirts from an online vendor in Florida. Nebraska tracked purchases for the preceding five years and could collect an estimated $215,000 from the charity, or approximately thirteen percent of the donations. Other states are less stringent, allowing a de minimis exemption for individuals.30

Some states have attempted to enforce sales and use tax compliance by leveraging customers to act as whistleblowers when companies knowingly fail to collect those taxes.31 Under these false claim statutes, individual consumers may bring suits on behalf of the state against parties that knowingly violated sales tax laws. If successful, the whistleblower would be entitled to a portion of the state taxes collected.

While states have had some success tackling the noncompliance issue on their own through enacting Amazon laws or similar statutes, the federal government is the sole body that is constitutionally charged with regulating interstate commerce and therefore should provide states with a tool to help them enforce their laws and uniformly tax interstate commerce. If passed, the Main Street Fairness Act could effectively serve as that tool.

B.  Level the Playing Field

Perhaps the strongest policy reason for implementing a federal law to delegate Commerce power to states is the inherent unfairness that results from forcing some companies to charge their customers sales taxes while others do not have to charge any sales tax.

Two groups are hurt by current disparities in sales tax enforcement: local retailers and large companies with physical presence in many states. Small local retailers (mom and pop shops) are at a distinct disadvantage when their online competitors do not have to charge customers sales tax. Recent studies indicate that many consumers are beginning to follow a “just looking” trend whereby they test products in local stores by seeing, touching, and feeling them, then rush home to order the same products online where they can avoid paying sales taxes.32 According to one consumer behavior report, seventy-five percent of online consumers sought to purchase from merchants that did not charge sales tax and offered free shipping.33 The savings are even greater when buying in bulk, thus enticing large organizations to shift their purchasing patterns away from small local retailers to reduce costs in a bad economy.

Ironically, opponents of internet sales tax regulation argue that enforcing sales tax laws would do greater harm than good to small retailers.34 Such opponents reason that the last decade has provided an unprecedented opportunity for individuals to start small companies that leverage the Internet to grow quickly, thus spurring the economy and creating jobs.Less than one month after the Main Street Fairness Act was introduced, a group of U.S. Representatives introduced the “Supporting the Preservation of Internet Entrepreneurs and Small Businesses” resolution.35 The Preservation bill focuses on avoiding “any legislation that would grant State governments the authority to impose any new burdensome or unfair tax collecting requirements on small online businesses and entrepreneurs.” Representative Dan Lungren, sponsor of the Preservation bill, commented:

The most effective thing we can do to help our economy recover is to remove the roadblocks standing in the way of our nation’s job creators. At a time when we are trying to foster a sustained economic recovery, it doesn’t make sense to saddle entrepreneurs with tax requirements that stifle growth. The possibility of new taxes being levied on online retailers will have a negative impact on the online marketplace. We should send a clear message that Congress should not burden small businesses with unfair tax schemes.

The Preservation bill is constructed on two false premises. First, it presupposes that federal legislation granting states Congressional authority to collect sales taxes would impose a new tax. As discussed in the previous section of this article, sales and use taxes are already due in nearly every state on online purchases. A federal grant of authority would therefore not impose a new tax, but loosen the handcuffs Quill placed on states to enforce their own laws. Second, the Preservation bill is aimed at protecting small businesses and entrepreneurs. While noble in its purpose, the Preservation bill is simply unnecessary; the Main Street Fairness Act’s small seller exception would exempt from sales tax collection the very businesses the Preservation bill aspires to protect.

Another group that is damaged by the current system is large online retailers that have a physical presence in many states, such as Wal-Mart or Target. Most, if not all, online sales from these stores are subject to sales taxes because they have a physical presence in nearly every state. These companies put appropriate resources into ensuring that the taxes are properly collected and remitted. The inconsistency arises when comparing a company like Wal-Mart to a company like Amazon. Both are large companies that sell products to residents in every U.S. state and territory. However, Wal-Mart has stores in every state, while Amazon only has physical presence in a handful of states, thus creating a real disparity that needs to be addressed.

C.  Bridge the Budget Gap

It is no secret that states are struggling to find revenue sources while tax collections are down nationwide. Advocates of internet sales taxation correctly promote the Main Street Fairness Act as a way for states to raise revenue without imposing additional taxes. While allowing states to enforce sales tax collection on all of its residents’ purchases would not solve the current budget crisis, it would allow states to take a healthy step in the right direction.

IV,  Conclusion

Regardless of which political party is in the majority, the Main Street Fairness Act should be given consideration as a viable solution to the problems discussed above. Its passage would comport with the constitutional grant of authority over interstate commerce to Congress, while allowing states the freedom to choose whether to voluntarily join the Agreement. This system is ideal because states can preserve their independence by joining or leaving the Agreement at any time, while providing substantial benefits to out-of-state retailers by simplifying and unifying their reporting requirements. The Main Street Fairness Act is the bandwagon heading toward uniformity and fairness in sales tax collection. States just need to jump on.


[1] Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local Government Sales Tax Revenue Losses from Electronic Commerce, U. Tenn. Center Bus. Econ. Res., Apr. 13, 2009, available at http://cber.utk.edu/ecomm/ecom0409.pdf.

[2] Main Street Fairness Act, H.R. 5660, 111th Cong. (2010).

[3] Five states do not currently impose a sales tax: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Richard Stim, Sales Tax on the Internet, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/sales-tax-internet-29919.html.

[4] See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), National Bella Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967), Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).

[5] National Bella Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967) at 756.

[6] National Bella Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967) at 758–60. (internal citations omitted).

[7] Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).

[8] Quill at 305 (internal citations omitted).

[9] U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3.

[10] The dormant Commerce Clause is a judicially-created doctrine that “rests entirely on the negative implications of the Commerce Clause of Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.” See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 174 (Thomson West 2007).

[11] Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, Registration Frequently Asked Questions, [hereinafter FAQs], http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=faq.         …

[12] Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act, S. 1736, H.R. 3184, 108th Cong. (2003); Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act, S. 2152, 109th Cong. (2005); Streamlined Sales Tax Simplification Act, S. 2153, 109th Cong. (2005); Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act, S. 34, H.R. 3396, 110th Cong. (2007).

[13] Borders Online v. State Board of Equalization, 129 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1189–92 (Cal. App. 2005).

[14] Id. at 664–666, (listing some of the factors courts have examined in searching for substantial nexus: business ownership structure, common logos and names, common merchandise, use of private or branded credit cards, links between affiliates’ websites, credit card reward programs, gift certificates and gift cards, trademarks, goodwill, and return policies).

[15] Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).

[16] Id.; NYaffiliates.com, Merchants Removing NY Affiliates, http://www.abestweb.com/forums/showthread.php?t=105869 (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).

[17] R.I. Gen. Laws -§ 44-18-15 (2009); see also State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations Department of Revenue, Important Notice: Definition of Sales Tax “Retailer” Amended, available at http://www.tax.state.ri.us/notice/Retailer_definition_NoticeC.pdf.

[18] N.C Gen. Stat. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (2009).

[19] North Carolina Department of Revenue, Sales Tax Law Changes, Form E-505 (8-09), Part II: Other Legislative Changes, available at http://www.dornc.com/downloads/e505_8-09.pdf.

[20] N.C Gen. Stat. § 105-164.3(33c) (2009).

[21] Jennifer Heidt White, Safe Haven No More: How Online Affiliate Marketing Programs Can Minimize New State Sales Tax Liability, 5 Shidler J. L. Com. & Tech. 21 (2009), (listing the following states as having introduced versions of the affiliate tax: Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, California, Hawaii, Mississippi, New Mexico, Vermont, Virginia, and Illinois).

[22] H.B. 10-1193, 67th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010), available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2010a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/B30F5741….

[23] Id.                                                       

[24] Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Huber, Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 2011 WL 250556, Civil No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS, (D.Colo. 2011).

[25] 2009 OK H.B. 2359, (Feb. 1, 2010) available at http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/textofmeasures/textofmeasures.aspx.

[26] Edward A. Zelinsky, The Paradoxes of Oklahoma’s Amazon Statute: Weak Duties, Expansive Coverage, Often Superfluous, Constitutionally Infirm, Cardozo Sch. L., Inst. Advanced L. Stud., Working Paper No. 315, at 17 (Oct. 2010).

[27] Michael Mazerov, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, New York’s “Amazon Law”: An Important Tool for Collecting Taxes Owed on Internet Purchases, 1, July 23, 2009, http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-23-09sfp.pdf.

[28] H.R. 5660 at 1.

[29] 2009 Michigan Individual Income Tax Return MI-1040, line 25, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/taxes/MI-1040_305378_7.pdf.

[30] Minnesota, for example, exempts individuals with total purchased under $770 from paying the use tax, which is equivalent to $50 of use tax liability. Four other states have similar exemptions for individuals. See Nina Manzi, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns in Other States, Research Department, Minnesota House of Representatives, *2, June 2010, available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf.

[31] Leslie J. Carter, Blowing the Whistle on Avoiding Use Taxes in Online Purchases, 2008 U. Chi. Legal F. 453–54 (2008).

[32] Google Retail Advertising Blog, Trend to Watch: Research & Purchase Process is Multi-Channel, (March 3, 2010), http://googleretail.blogspot.com/2010/03/trend-to-watch-research-purchas….

[33] Sara Rodriguez, Economic Climate Shifts Consumers Online, PriceGrabber.com (March 25, 2009), https://mr.pricegrabber.com/Economic_Climate_Shifts_Consumers_Online_Mar….

[34] Congressman Daniel Lungren, Lundgren Introduces Resolution to Protect Small Businesses and Entrepreneurs from New Sales Taxes, Feb. 16, 2011, http://lungren.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=39&sectiontree=6,39&itemid=759.

[35] H.R. 1570, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills….

© Copyright 2011 Michael J. Payne, CPA

Florida Minimum Wage To Increase Tomorrow

An important FYI posted today by Jay P. Lechner of Greenberg Traurig, LLP about the impending increase in minimum wage in Florida:

 

Florida’s minimum wage increases tomorrow to $7.31 per hour — a 6 cent increase. The minimum wage for tipped workers also goes up 6 cents, to $4.29 per hour. These increases are the result of a recent circuit court decision in Leon County ruling that the state’s method of calculating minimum wage was incorrect under the Florida Constitution.

The Florida Constitution and the Florida Minimum Wage Act require the state to annually “calculate an adjusted state Minimum Wage rate by increasing the state Minimum Wage by the rate of inflation for the twelve months prior to each September 1st using the consumer price index (CPI) for urban wage earners and clerical workers….” Neither the Constitution nor the Act specifically addresses deflation in the computation of the minimum wage. Yet, due to a slight cost of living decrease during the 12-month period preceding September 1, 2009, the state lowered the state minimum wage rate in 2010 from $7.21 to $7.06, dropping it below the federal minimum wage. Then, in determining the 2011 rate, the state calculated an increase to $7.16 (still below the federal rate) based on a 1.4 percent cost of living increase during the 12-month period preceding September 1, 2010.

The court found that the state’s method for calculating the state minimum wage rate was incorrect because, based on the constitutional language, the minimum wage cannot be decreased. Soon after the ruling, a Florida Senate bill intended to amend the Act consistent with the state’s approach was withdrawn from consideration.

When the federal and Florida minimum wage rates differ, Florida employers are required to pay the higher rate. Tomorrow’s increase raises the Florida minimum wage above the $7.25 federal minimum wage rate. Thus, employers currently paying federal minimum wage to eligible workers in Florida must adjust their pay practices accordingly.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

 

Illinois Civil Union Law Requires Employer Action

Posted yesterday at the National Law Review by Thomas G. Hancuch and Jessica L. Winski of Vedder Price P.C. a great overview of the implications for employers in Illinois of the law recognizing civil unions which will be in effect June 1st:

The recently enacted Illinois law recognizing civil unions has implications for all Illinois employers.  The law becomes effective June 1, 2011.  Before that date, employers should review and update their policies and employee benefit programs that may be affected by the law.  This is true for both employers that provide domestic partner benefits and those that do not.

The Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act ( the “Civil Union Act”) allows same-sex and opposite-sex couples to enter into a new form of legal relationship called a “civil union.”  Under the Act, persons entering into a civil union are entitled to the same legal protections, benefits, obligations and responsibilities as spouses under Illinois law.  The law provides a process for establishing a civil union and for dissolving one.

The Civil Union Act also contains a reciprocity provision under which Illinois will recognize as a civil union any same-sex marriage, civil union or other substantially similar legal relationship (other than a common law marriage) that was legally entered into in another jurisdiction.  Currently, five states (Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont) and the District of Columbia, as well as a number of foreign countries (including Canada) permit same-sex couples to marry.  Other states (including Oregon, Nevada, New Jersey and Washington) have laws similar to the new Illinois Civil Union Act recognizing civil unions or domestic partnerships.  Still other states (including Colorado, Maine, Maryland and Wisconsin) accord more limited legal recognition to such relationships.

Complicating matters, the federal Defense of Marriage Act provides that, for purposes of federal law,  “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”  So, while civil union partners generally are to be treated the same as spouses under Illinois law once the Civil Union Act becomes effective later this year, it appears that they will not have the same rights or status as spouses under federal law.

Of course, employers operating in Illinois are subject to both Illinois and federal law.  Certain programs maintained by private-sector employers, such as bereavement leave, are governed exclusively by state law; others, such as retirement plans and flexible spending accounts, exclusively by federal law; and still others, such as insured health benefits plans (but not self-insured plans), by both federal and state law.  Unfortunately, this creates significant complexity for employers.

Illinois employers that currently offer domestic partner benefits should review their domestic partner benefit program in light of the Civil Union Act.  For example, the definition of “domestic partner” in the domestic partner benefits policy and the applicable benefit program documents and leave of absence and other policies may need to be revised to specifically encompass civil union partners.  In addition, consideration should be given to whether an affidavit attesting to the existence of a domestic partnership will continue to be regarded as sufficient, or if Illinois employees should be required to formalize the relationship as a civil union in order to receive domestic partner benefits.

Illinois employers that do not offer domestic partner benefits will need to review their benefit plans and leave of absence and other human resources policies that involve spouses of employees to determine the impact of the Civil Union Act.  For example, an employer with medical or dental insurance funded through a group insurance policy issued in Illinois will find that civil union partners will be eligible for coverage on the same terms as spouses beginning June 1, 2011, even though the employer may not want to provide such benefits.

© 2011 Vedder Price P.C.

EPA and Corps Issue Draft Guidance on Waterways and Wetlands That Fall Under Federal Jurisdiction as Part of Obama Administration’s Just Released Clean Water Framework

Recently posted by Linda H. Bochert of  Michael Best & Friedrich LLP – details about the recent draft guidance issued about when a wetland is subject to federal jurisdiction: 

Five years after the US Supreme Court issued the decision that was supposed to – but didn’t – clarify when a wetland is subject to federal jurisdiction, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) are seeking public comment on draft guidance intended to explain how such decisions are to be made.

The Draft Guidance on Federal Jurisdiction

On April 27, 2011, EPA and the Corps issued Draft Guidance on Identifying Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act(“Draft Guidance”). The Draft Guidance interprets two key Supreme Court decisions, often referred to as Rapanos and SWANCCRapanos is the 2006 Supreme Court decision in the consolidated cases of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 547 UW 715 (2006); SWANCC is the 2001 Supreme Court decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The Draft Guidance addresses both wetlands and waterbodies and is limited to whether the federal Clean Water Act applies; it does not determine what state laws or regulations might apply.

After years of confusion, the 2006 decision in Rapanos was widely anticipated to provide a clear test for when a wetland is subject to federal jurisdiction. It failed to do so. The court split three ways, with no point of view supported by a majority of the justices. The prevailing view since Rapanos has been that a wetland is subject to federal jurisdiction if it satisfies either of two tests:  1) the wetland must be immediately adjacent to a navigable body of water that has a relatively permanent flow; or 2) there is a “significant nexus” between the wetland and a body of water that was, is, or could be made navigable. But stating the tests and applying them are two different things – and application of that two-part test has been anything but clear-cut.  For more on Rapanos andSWANCC, see our June 29, 2006 Client Alert: Wetlands and Water Bodies Must Have “Significant Nexus” with a Navigable Water to Fall Under the Jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act.

The EPA and the Corps are taking another run at it. The Draft Guidance is carefully described as “consistent with Supreme Court decisions and existing agency regulations” – presumably to combat anticipated criticism that it either overreaches or underreaches the current state of the law, although the critics have already begun to weigh in. 

Under the Draft Guidance, federal jurisdiction would apply to wetlands that:

  • are adjacent to either traditional navigable waters or interstate waters
  • directly abut relatively permanent waters
  • are adjacent to jurisdictional tributaries to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters if there is a “significant nexus”

    And federal jurisdiction would apply to waterbodies that are:

  • traditional navigable waterbodies
  • interstate waterbodies
  • non-navigable tributaries to traditional navigable waters that are relatively permanent (contain water at least seasonally)
  • tributaries to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters if there is a “significant nexus”
  • in the category of “other waters” – including some that are physically proximate to other jurisdictional waters and some that are not, based on fact specific circumstancesFollowing the 60-day public comment period, EPA and the Corps intend to finalize the Guidance and then initiate formal rulemaking.  The message of that process is that the agencies want to identify as much of the anticipated controversy about their interpretation as possible before drafting a federal regulation implementing that interpretation.

    Effect in Wisconsin

    Implementation of the Draft Guidance is not likely to have a significant impact in Wisconsin  As far as waterbodies are concerned, Wisconsin has historically taken a broad view of navigability for purposes of state jurisdiction.  With respect to wetlands, as explained in our June 2006 Client Alert following the SWANCC decision the Wisconsin Legislature extended the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (“WDNR”) to include “nonfederal wetlands”.  Wis. Stat. §. 281.36(1m). Thus, a nonfederal wetland may still be subject to state water quality standards and permit requirements implemented by WDNR, even if it does not come within federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. 

    The Clean Water Framework

    The Draft Guidance is part of the Obama Administration’s national Clean Water Framework also released on April 27, 2011. The Clean Water Framework “recognizes the importance of clean water and healthy watersheds to our economy, environment and communities” and is composed of the following initiatives:

    • promoting innovative partnerships
    • enhancing communities and economies by restoring important water bodies
    • innovating for more water-efficient communities
    • ensuring clean water to protect public health
    • enhancing use and enjoyment of our waters
    • updating the nation’s water policies – this initiative includes the Draft Guidance
    • supporting science to solve water problems

     

    © MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

ABA Recent Developments in State and Local Government Law – Live Webinar Teleconference Series May 19th

The National Law Review wanted to bring your attention to the upcoming Live Webinar and Teleconference Series on Recent Developments in State and Local Government Law

Program Information:    

Thursday, May 19, 2011—11:00 AM – 12:30 PM Eastern 
Sex, Drugs and Government?
Program Description Individual Online Registration | Group Online Registration 
Event Code: cet1sdg

Thursday, May 19, 2011—1:00 PM – 2:00 PM Eastern 
Cyberbullying
Program Description Individual Online Registration | Group Online Registration 
Event Code: cet1cbb

Thursday, May 19, 2011—2:30 PM – 3:30 PM Eastern 
Ethics of Social Networking (Ethics Credit)
Program Description Individual Online Registration | Group Online Registration 
Event Code: cet1esn

Register for the entire series or alternatively view additional information and register for individual programs by clicking here.   CLE credit available.