Category: Securities Law

OFAC Settles Alleged Sanctions Violations for $88.3 million

Posted in the National Law Review an article by Thaddeus Rogers McBride and Mark L. Jensen of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP regarding OFAC’s settlements with financial institutions:

 

On August 25, 2011, a major U.S. financial institution agreed to pay the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) $88.3 million to settle claims of violations of several U.S. economic sanctions programs. While OFAC settlements with financial institutions in recent years have involved larger penalty amounts, this August 2011 settlement is notable because of OFAC’s harsh—and subjective—view of the bank’s compliance program.

Background. OFAC has primary responsibility for implementing U.S. economic sanctions against specifically designated countries, governments, entities, and individuals. OFAC currently maintains approximately 20 different sanctions programs. Each of those programs bars varying types of conduct with the targeted parties including, in certain cases, transfers of funds through U.S. bank accounts.

As reported by OFAC, the alleged violations in this case involved, among other conduct, loans, transfers of gold bullion, and wire transfers that violated the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515, the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560, the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 538, the Former Liberian Regime of Charles Taylor Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 593, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544, the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, and the Reporting, Procedures, and Penalties Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 501.

Key Points of Settlement. As summarized below, the settlement provides insight into OFAC’s compliance expectations in several ways:

1. “Egregious” conduct. In OFAC’s view, three categories of violations – involving Cuba, in support of a blocked Iranian vessel, and incomplete compliance with an administrative subpoena – were egregious under the agency’s Enforcement Guidelines. To quote the agency’s press release, these violations “were egregious because of reckless acts or omissions” by the bank. This, coupled with the large amount and value of purportedly impermissibly wire transfers involving Cuba, is likely a primary basis for the large $88.3 million penalty.

OFAC’s Enforcement Guidelines indicate that, when determining whether conduct is “egregious,” OFAC gives “substantial” weight to (i) whether the conduct is “willful or reckless,” and (ii) the party’s “awareness of the conduct at issue.” 31 C.F.R. Part 501, App. A. at V(B)(1). We suspect that OFAC viewed the conduct here as “egregious” and “reckless” because, according to OFAC, the bank apparently failed to address compliance issues fully: as an example, OFAC claims that the bank determined that transfers in which Cuba or a Cuban national had interest were made through a correspondent account, but did not take “adequate steps” to prevent further transfers. OFAC’s emphasis on reckless or willful conduct, and the agency’s assertion that the bank was aware of the underlying conduct, underscore the importance of a compliance program that both has the resources to act, and is able to act reasonably promptly when potential compliance issues are identified.

2. Ramifications of disclosure. In this matter, the bank voluntarily disclosed many potential violations. Yet the tone in OFAC’s press release is generally critical of the bank for violations that were not voluntarily disclosed. Moreover, OFAC specifically criticizes the bank for a tardy (though still voluntary) disclosure. According to OFAC, that disclosure was decided upon in December 2009 but not submitted until March 2010, just prior to the bank receiving repayment of the loan that was the subject of the disclosure. Although OFAC ultimately credited the bank for this voluntary disclosure, the timing of that disclosure may have contributed negatively to OFAC’s overall view of the bank’s conduct.

This serves as a reminder that there often is a benefit of making an initial notification to the agency in advance of the full disclosure. This also serves as reminder of OFAC’s very substantial discretion as to what is a timely filing of a disclosure: as noted in OFAC’s Enforcement Guidelines, a voluntary self-disclosure “must include, or be followed within a reasonable period of time by, a report of sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding of an apparent violation’s circumstances.” (emphasis added). In this regard, OFAC maintains specific discretion under the regulations to minimize credit for a voluntary disclosure made (at least in the agency’s view) in an inappropriate or untimely fashion.

3. Size of the penalty. The penalty amount—$88.3 million—is substantial. Yet the penalty is only a small percentage of the much larger penalties paid by Lloyds TSB ($350 million), Credit Suisse ($536 million), and Barclays ($298 million) over the past few years. In those cases, although the jurisdictional nexus between those banks and the United States was less clear than in the present case, the conduct was apparently more egregious because it involved what OFAC characterized as intentional misconduct in the form of stripping wire instructions. The difference in the size of the penalties is at least partly attributable to the amount of money involved in each matter. It also appears, however, that OFAC is distinguishing between “reckless” conduct and intentional misconduct.

4. Sources of information. As noted, many of the violations in this matter were voluntarily disclosed to OFAC. The press release also indicates that certain disclosures were based on information about the Cuba sanctions issues that was received from another U.S. financial institution (it is not clear whether OFAC received information from that other financial institution). The press release also states that, with respect to an administrative subpoena OFAC issued in this matter, the agency’s inquiries were at least in part “based on communications with a third-party financial institution.”

It may not be the case here that another financial institution (or institutions) blew the proverbial whistle, but it appears that at least one other financial institution did provide information that OFAC used to pursue this matter. Such information sharing is a reminder that, particularly given the interconnectivity of the financial system, even routine reporting by financial institutions may help OFAC identify other enforcement targets.

5. Compliance oversight. As part of the settlement agreement, the bank agreed to provide ongoing information about its internal compliance policies and procedures. In particular, the bank agreed to provide the following: “any and all updates” to internal compliance procedures and policies; results of internal and external audits of compliance with OFAC sanctions programs; and explanation of remedial measures taken in response to such audits.

Prior OFAC settlements, such as those with Barclays and Lloyds, have stipulated compliance program reporting obligations for the settling parties. While prior agreements, such as Barclay’s, required a periodic or annual review, the ongoing monitoring obligation in this settlement appears to be unusual, and could be a requirement that OFAC imposes more often in the future. (Although involving a different legal regime, requirements with similarly augmented government oversight have been imposed in recent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act settlements, most notably the April 2011 settlement between the Justice Department and Johnson & Johnson. See Getting Specific About FCPA Compliance, Law360, at:http://www.sheppardmullin.com/assets/attachments/973.pdf).

Conclusions. We think this settlement is particularly notable for the aggression with which OFAC pursued this matter. Based on the breadth of the settlement, OFAC seems to have engaged in a relatively comprehensive review of sanctions implications of the bank’s operations, going beyond those allegations that were voluntarily self-disclosed to use information from a third party. Moreover, as detailed above, OFAC adopted specific, negative views about the bank’s compliance program and approach and seems to have relied on those views to impose a very substantial penalty. The settlement is a valuable reminder that OFAC can and will enforce the U.S. sanctions laws aggressively, and all parties—especially financial institutions—need to be prepared.

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

 

Justice Department Investigation of S&P

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Jared Wade of Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS) regarding the Justice Department investigating S&P:

The Justice Department is investigating Standard & Poor’s for improperly rating the garbage mortgage-backed securities that tanked the economy once the world caught on that they were toxic assets.

The anonymous folks who leaked this info to the press claim that the inquiry began prior to S&P’s downgrade of U.S. debt, but many have speculated that the fervor and depth of the probe has ratcheted up since the nation lost its AAA-status.

Either way, the law dogs are — finally — poking around in the ratings world.

The Justice Department has been asking about instances in which the company’s analysts wanted to award lower ratings on mortgage bonds but may have been overruled by other S.& P. business managers, according to the people with knowledge of the interviews. If the government finds enough evidence to support such a case, which is likely to be a civil case, it could undercut S.& P.’s longstanding claim that its analysts act independently from business concerns.

It is unclear if the Justice Department investigation involves the other two ratings agencies, Moody’s and Fitch, or only S.& P.

Any inquiry should of course involve looking at all three. Each overrated the used diaper mortgage-backed securities to a baffling degree. Whether or not it was incompetence or something more insidious is really the only question, I have. I presume they are capable of both.

But if this investigation focuses solely on S&P then it falls even more into how one talking head on MSNBC’s The Daily Rundown described it: more of a Washington story than a Wall Street one.

Honestly, the only weird thing about hearing today about an investigation going on right now is that it was something I expected to hear in 2008.

In related news, and not just to toot our own horn, but I would feel remiss not to mention that our Risk Management magazine cover story this month was titled “The Future of Ratings” and examines “how rating agencies gained so much power, helped tank the economy and figure into the future of risk assessment.”

I’m not going to pretend that I knew just how much play rating agencies would be getting in August when I commissioned the piece a few months ago. I’m many things, but clairvoyant is not one of them. But the piece speaks to many of the questionable issues surrounding the ratings world that have been curiously dormant in the mainstream media for years until recently.

A wonderful writer, Lori Widmer, did a fine job so please do give it a read.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor. Copyright 2011 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

Unclaimed Property Audits: No Laughing Matter

Posted on August 8, 2011 in the  National Law Review an article about several  states’ increased focus on unclaimed property and companies needing to be proactive in monitoring and improving their unclaimed property compliance practices.   This article was written by Marc J. Musyl, Micah Schwalb and Sarah Niemiec Seedig of Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Failure to Comply with Unclaimed Property Laws Can Cost a Company Millions in Interest and Penalties Alone

Many states continue to turn to unclaimed property as a source of revenue in the face of budget shortfalls. During the last two years, some state regulators have pursued non-traditional types of unclaimed property and state legislatures have revised their unclaimed property statutes to reduce dormancy periods, effectively causing companies to remit more unclaimed property in a shorter time frame. In New York, for example, the legislature lowered dormancy periods from five to three years for a number of different asset classes typically held by financial institutions.

Acting upon provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC recently proposed to expand rules that would require brokers and dealers to escheat sums payable to security holders. Failure to comply with these laws can mean millions of dollars in interest and penalties for a company, which can negatively impact a company’s bottom line. For example, a growing number of life insurers are being audited by multiple states to assess their compliance with unclaimed property laws. One state regulator estimated that these life insurer audits could transfer “north of $1 billion” from the audited life insurers into the pockets of consumers, in the form of benefit payments, and revenue to the states, in the form of unclaimed property, interest and fines.

Unclaimed Property and State Audits

Unclaimed property laws require the remittance of certain types of property to the state for safekeeping if a business is unable to contact the owner of that property after a specified period, known as the dormancy period. Each state has its own set of laws that set forth the types of property subject to escheat, the dormancy period for each category of property, and reporting rules. Examples of items that can constitute unclaimed property include unused gift cards, uncashed payroll checks, uncashed stock dividend checks, abandoned corporate stock, and abandoned trust funds.

States have the ability to audit companies to determine their compliance with the unclaimed property laws. If an audit reveals improperly held or abandoned assets, states can seize the property, hold it in trust for a rightful owner, and impose costs, fines, and interest against the offending entity. In severe cases, the interest and fines can exceed the amount of unclaimed property at issue. These audits are often conducted by third-party auditors paid on a contingency basis, thus creating an incentive for them to maximize the unclaimed property uncovered. What’s more, the lack of a statute of limitations on escheat in most jurisdictions can lead to decades of accumulated unclaimed property liabilities.

35 States: How Does an Audit Get So Large?

Typically, an audit begins when a state engages a third-party auditor and provides a company with notice that it is under audit. The third-party auditor, being paid on a contingency basis, can expand its compensation by adding additional states to the audit. If only one state has authorized an unclaimed property audit, the thirdparty auditor only receives a percentage of the unclaimed property that was required to be reported to that state. However, if 20 states have authorized the audit, the third-party auditor now receives a percentage of the unclaimed property that should have been reported to 20 states, significantly increasing the auditor’s overall compensation.

This snowball effect is exactly what happened to some life insurers, and what could happen to any company. For example, the State of California initiated anaudit of John Hancock in 2008. This audit was undertaken by Verus Financial L.L.C. Fast forward three years to 2011, and Verus has now been authorized by 35 states and the District of Columbia to investigate and audit numerous insurance companies. These audits center around life insurers’ claims handling processes. The Social Security Administration publishes a Death Master File, updated weekly, which can be used to verify deaths. Insurers have been using the Death Master File to find dead annuity holders in order to stop payments. On the flip side, the insurers have not been using the Death Master File to find deceased policy insureds in order to pay the policy beneficiaries. The states and Verus have seized upon this disparate use of the Death Master File in their investigation of whether the funds should have been paid out to beneficiaries, in the form of benefit payments, or the states, in the form of unclaimed property.

Why Should I Be Concerned?: John Hancock as an Example

As a result of the Verus audit discussed above, John Hancock reportedly negotiated a global resolution agreement with 29 states which took effect June 1. As part of John Hancock’s settlement with the State of Florida, John Hancock will pay over $2.4 million in investigative costs and legal fees to Florida, and will establish a $10 million fund to pay death benefits and interest owed to beneficiaries. The amounts owed to beneficiaries that cannot be located will be turned over to Florida’s unclaimed property division. In addition, John Hancock has agreed to change its claims-handling procedures. Throughout the process, John Hancock has maintained that it has not violated the law. Given the number of insurance companies currently under audit, news of further settlements should be expected in the future.

In light of success with life insurers, recent legislative changes and continued state budget crunches, it is reasonable to expect an expansion of audits to other industries. It is widely estimated that a significant percentage of companies are not in full compliance with unclaimed property laws. There is no statute of limitations in most jurisdictions, as mentioned above, so the look-back period can be fairly lengthy and cover periods for which the company no longer has adequate records. The auditor may estimate the unclaimed property liability for such periods, which can lead to a company paying more than it would have otherwise owed. Further, interest and penalties can be severe. For example, in California interest is calculated by state statute at 12% per annum from the date the property should have been reported.

Taking Control of Unclaimed Property Compliance

As a result of the states’ increased focus on unclaimed property, companies need to be proactive in monitoring and, if necessary, improving their unclaimed property compliance practices. As a preliminary step, companies should determine whether or not they are currently in compliance with the unclaimed property laws. Many states have voluntary compliance programs for companies that are out of compliance. Oftentimes, by entering into a voluntary disclosure agreement with the appropriate authorities, a company can retain control of the process, limit the look-back period (remember, there is often no statute of limitations!), and limit the penalties and/or interest that may be owed for non-compliance. Typically, these voluntary programs are not available to companies once they have been selected for audit. Analyzing a target’s unclaimed property liability exposure should also be part of the due diligence process in a potential acquisition. Attention to unclaimed property compliance now can save valuable company resources later.

 

D.C. Circuit Invalidates SEC's Proxy Access Rules

Posted on Sunday, July 24, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by John D. Tishler  and Evan Mendelsohn of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP regarding the  United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision invalidating the SEC’s proxy access rules adopted in August 2010:

July 22, in Business Roundtable v. Securities & Exchange Commission, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued its decision invalidating the SEC’s proxy access rules adopted in August 2010 with the intention that they be effective for the 2011 proxy season (see our blog here). The Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed the lawsuit in September 2010 challenging the SEC’s adoption of proxy access rules and separately requesting for the SEC to stay implementation of the rules pending the outcome of the lawsuit. The SEC granted the request for stay in October 2010 and issuers were relieved of the burdens of proxy access for the 2011 proxy season. (See our blog posts here and here.)

The Court found that the Commission “neglected its statutory responsibility to determine the likely economic consequences of Rule 14a-11 and to connect those consequences to efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” The Court also criticized the SEC’s reliance on empirical data that purported to demonstrate that proxy access would improve board performance and increase shareholder value by facilitating the election of dissident nominees, pointing out numerous studies submitted in the rule comment process that reached the opposite result.

The SEC’s proxy access rules also included an amendment to Rule 14a-8 that would authorize stockholder proposals to establish a procedure for stockholders to nominate directors. The SEC stayed implementation of the changes to Rule 14a-8 at the same time it stayed implementation of Rule 14a-11; however, the changes to Rule 14a-8 were not affected by the Court’s decision.

The SEC will now need to decide whether to propose new regulations for proxy access and whether to permit Rule 14a-8 to go effective.  However the SEC decides to proceed, it seems unlikely that public companies will face mandatory proxy access for the 2012 proxy season. 

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Payments by Enron are "Settlement Payments" under the Bankruptcy Code's Safe Harbor Provisions

An interesting article recently published in the National Law Review  by David A. Zdunkewicz of  Andrews Kurth LLP  regarding the Second Circuit Court of Appeals protecting  payments made by Enron to redeem commercial paper prior to maturity as “Settlement Payments” under the Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbor Provisions.

In a matter of first impression in In Re: Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., v. ALFA, S.A.B. DE C.V., et al., No. 09-5122-bk(L) the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sided with two holders of Enron’s commercial paper who received prepetition payments redeeming the paper prior to its stated maturity. The price paid by Enron to redeem the debt was considerably higher than the market value of the debt.

Enron argued that the payments were either preferential or constructively fraudulent transfers and were not “settlement payments” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code because (i) the payments were not “commonly used in the securities trade,” (ii) the definition of “settlement payment” includes only transactions in which title to the securities changes hands and, therefore, because the redemption was made to retire debt and not to acquire title to the commercial paper, no title changed hands and the redemption payments are not settlement payments, and (iii) the redemption payments are not settlement payments because they did not involve a financial intermediary that took title to the transacted securities and thus did not implicate the risks that prompted Congress to enact the safe harbor.

The Second Circuit rejected each of Enron’s arguments, holding that the payments qualified as “settlement payments” under the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.

As to Enron’s first argument, the Court disagreed that the payments must have been common in the securities trade to qualify as a settlement payment under the Bankruptcy Code. Section 741(8) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “settlement payment” as “a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the securities trade.” Enron argued that the phrase “commonly used in the securities trade” modified each of the preceding terms in section 741(8), not only the immediately preceding term. The Second Circuit disagreed and held that the phrase “commonly used in the securities trade” only modified the immediately preceding term in Section 741(8), i.e. it only modified “similar payment.” Thus there is no requirement that the payments made to the holders be common in the securities trade.

As to Enron’s second argument, the Second Circuit found nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or the relevant caselaw to exclude the redemption of debt securities from the definition of a settlement payment. Accordingly, there is no requirement, as Enron argued, that title to the securities change hands for the payment to be considered a settlement payment under the Bankruptcy Code.

Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the third argument advanced by Enron. Enron argued that the redemption of debt did not constitute a settlement payment because it did not involve a financial intermediary that took a beneficial interest in the securities during the course of the transaction. Thus, the argument goes, the redemption would not implicate the systemic risks that motivated Congress to enact the safe harbor provision for settlement payments.

The Second Circuit rejected the argument and held that the fact that a financial intermediary did not take title to the securities during the course of the transaction is a proper basis to deny safe-harbor protection, joining the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits in rejecting similar arguments. The Court stressed that § 546(e) applies to settlement payments made “by or to (or for the benefit of)” a number of participants in the financial markets and it would be inconsistent with this language to restrict the definition of “settlement payment” to require that a financial intermediary take title to the securities during the course of the transaction.

While each case must be determined on a case-by-base analysis, the Second Circuit’s ruling in Enron reflects a continued trend among the Court of Appeals to broadly interpret the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and protect covered transactions.

© 2011 Andrews Kurth LLP

 

 

 

 

 

IRS Defends Discretion to Withhold Section 1256 Exchange Designation for ISOs

Recently posted at the National Law Review by William R. Pomierski of  McDermott Will & Emery an article about the IRS defending its decision not to designate independent system operators as qualified board or exchange:

The IRS defended its decision not to designate independent system operators asqualified board or exchange (QBE) principally on the grounds that, as a matter of law, it is not required to designate any exchanges as QBEs under Category 3 of Section 1256 Contracts.

In Sesco Enterprises, LLC (Civ. No. 10-1470, D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2010), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defended its discretion to refrain from extending qualified board or exchange status under Code Section 1256 to U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-regulated independent system operators.  The district court dismissed the taxpayer’s claim that the IRS acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it refused to classify electricity derivatives that traded on independent system operators as “Section 1256 Contracts.

Section 1256 Contracts in General

For federal income tax purposes, a limited number of derivative contracts are classified as Section 1256 Contracts.   Absent an exception, Section 1256 Contracts are subject to mark-to-market tax accounting and the 60/40 rule.  The 60/40 rule characterizes 60 percent of the net gain or loss from a Section 1256 Contract as long-term and 40 percent as short-term capital gain or loss.  Corporate taxpayers often view Section 1256 Contracts as tax disadvantageous, relative to economically similar derivatives that are not taxed as Section 1256 Contracts, such as swaps, unless the business hedging or some other exception is available.

Section 1256 Contract classification is limited to regulated futures contracts, foreign currency contracts, nonequity options, dealer equity options and dealer securities futures contracts, as each is defined in the Internal Revenue Code.   Unless a derivative falls within one of these categories, it is not a Section 1256 Contract, regardless of its economic similarity to a Section 1256 Contract.

Except for foreign currency contracts, Section 1256 Contracts are limited to derivative positions that trade on or are subject to the rules of a qualified board or exchange (or QBE).  QBE status is extended only to national securities exchanges registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (a Category 1 Exchange); domestic boards of trade designated as contract markets by the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) (a Category 2 Exchange); orany other exchange, board of trade or other market that the Secretary of the Treasury Department determines has rules adequate to carry out the purposes of Code Section 1256 (a Category 3 Exchange).

Category 1 and Category 2 Exchange status is automatic.   Category 3 Exchange status, however, requires a determination by the IRS.  In recent years, Category 3 Exchange designation has been extended to four non-U.S. futures exchanges offering products in the United States: ICE Futures (UK), Dubai Mercantile Exchange, ICE Futures (Canada) and LIFFE (UK).

Sesco Challenges IRS Discretion to Withhold Category 3 Exchange Designation

According to its website, the taxpayer in Sesco (Taxpayer) is an electricity and natural gas trading company. The facts of the case indicate that it traded electricity derivatives (presumably INCs, DECs, Virtuals and/or FTRs) on various independent system operators or regional transmission organizations regulated by the FERC (collectively, ISOs).  Because ISOs are not regulated by the SEC or the CFTC, they cannot be considered Category 1 or Category 2 Exchanges for purposes of Code Section 1256.  To date, no ISO has been designated as a Category 3 Exchange by the IRS.

According to the facts in Sesco, the Taxpayer took the position on its return that derivatives trading on ISOs were Section 1256 Contracts eligible for 60/40 capital treatment.  The IRS denied Section 1256 Contract status on audit.  Somewhat surprisingly, a footnote in Sesco suggests, without any further discussion, that the IRS agreed with the Taxpayer’s position that these electricity derivatives qualified as “regulated futures contracts” under Code Section 1256 except for satisfying the QBE requirement.

During the examination process, the Taxpayer apparently requested a private letter ruling from the IRS that the relevant ISOs were Category 3 Exchanges.   According to the district court, “The IRS refused, asserting that the request for a QBE determination must be made by the exchange itself.”  The Taxpayer then asked one of the ISOs to request Category 3 Exchange status, but the ISO declined to do so.  Taxpayer then filed suit challenging the IRS’s adjustments and asserted that the IRS “acted arbitrarily and capriciously and abused its discretion when it refused to make a QBE determination except upon request from the ISO.”  In essence, the Taxpayer was attempting to force the IRS to designate the ISOs at issue as QBEs.

The IRS defended its decision not to designate the ISOs as QBEs principally on the grounds that, as a matter of law, it is not required to designate any exchanges as QBEs under Category 3.   After briefly considering the wording of Code Section 1256 and the relevant legislative history, the court agreed with the IRS position and dismissed the case on procedural grounds (lack of jurisdiction).

Observations

Although the District Court’s decision in Sesco may be of little or no precedential value due to the procedural aspects of the case, the decision nevertheless is important in that it reflects what has long been understood to be the IRS’ position regarding Category 3 Exchange status, which is that Category 3 Exchange status is not automatic and requires a formal determination by the IRS.  Sesco also confirms that the IRS believes QBE classification can only be requested by the exchange at issue, not by exchange participants.

Unfortunately, Sesco does not address the separate question of whether the IRS could have unilaterally designated the ISOs at issue as QBEs without the participation of the exchanges.  Sesco also raises, but does not address, the issue of whether derivatives traded on exchanges that are not “futures” exchange can be considered “regulated futures contracts” for purposes of Code Section 1256.  These are critical questions that will become more relevant in the near future as the exchange-trading and exchange-clearing requirements imposed by the Dodd-Frank derivatives reform legislation begin to take effect.

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

Collision Occurs Between Copyrights and Misappropriation in Electronic News Media Space

Posted this week at the National Law Review by Bracewell & Giuliani LLP  and interesting article about copyrightable aspects of Wall Street research—the published models, insights, and facts:   

Despite winning in court to protect valuable copyrights, Wall Street firms are unable to protect their valuable trading recommendations as federal and state laws collide in Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc.1 (pending any potential review on appeal). The electronic news media continues to lead the charge, and now the walls of exclusivity are beginning to crumble for these respected recommendations.

Wall Street firms have for long provided detailed research reports and trading recommendations—exclusively to firm customers—to drive order flow with the recommending firm, thereby generating commission revenue. Storming the walls, however, are those in the electronic news media blasting the once-exclusive information to all corners of the Internet, immediately upon its release by Wall Street. But for Wall Street, this widespread, uncontrolled dissemination has cut into profitability and has wreaked havoc on traditional business models for market research.

Although the electronic news media scored a fresh victory, Wall Street has not suffered a devastating loss. The copyrightable aspects of Wall Street research—the published models, insights, and facts, for example, are often more valuable to institutional customers than the basic recommendation itself (e.g., Buy, Sell, or Hold). These copyrightable aspects, of course, remain protected by federal copyright law.2 Outside the realm of finance, however, this case may signal much broader implications for any business with both feet in the Information Age.

The appeals court received this case after the District Court for the Southern District of New York granted injunctive relief to plaintiffs Barclays Capital Inc.; Merrill Lynch; Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.; and Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc. (“the Firms”), which prohibited Theflyonthewall.com, Inc. (“Fly”) from publishing information about the Firms’ recommendations, within certain parameters.3 The issue presented on appeal was whether Fly could be enjoined from publishing “news,” i.e., bare facts, that the Firms [had] made certain recommendations.4 The appeals court vacated the injunction, paving the way for the electronic news media to publish Wall Street recommendations far and wide, and of course, to direct profits to publishers and sponsors, away from the recommending firm. In the wake of this decision, Wall Street firms must now reconsider business models built upon the value of their proprietary information.

Without further recourse from federal copyright law, which does not protect bare “facts” alone, the Firms sought relief under New York tort law through the doctrine of “hot news” misappropriation of information. The appeals court was bound to consider, however, whether federal copyright law preempted the applicability of state law in these circumstances. To survive preemption, Firms were required to prove that Fly’s use of the information constitutes “free riding” on the Firms’ efforts.5 By concluding that there was no “free riding,” the appeals court significantly narrowed the circumstances in which similar state law misappropriation claims can survive preemption by federal copyright law. Accordingly, this case signals a broader victory for electronic publishers hoping to widely distribute, and to profit from, factual information created by others.

In determining whether Fly engaged in “free riding,” the court looked to precedent in National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.6 (“the NBA Case”). In the NBA Case, the NBA collected and broadcast information, based on live sports games, over a communication network; and likewise, a competitor collected and broadcast its own information, based on live sports games, over a competing communication network. The appeals court noted that, in the NBA Case, there was no free riding, in part, because Motorola was bearing its own costs of collecting factual information.

In the present case, the appeals court’s ultimate inquiry was whether any of the Firms’ products enabled Fly “to produce a directly competitive product for less money because it has lower costs.”7 Extending the reasoning from the NBA Case to cover Fly’s actions, the appeals court concluded that that there was no “free riding” because approximately half of Fly’s twenty-eight employees were involved in the collection and distribution of Firms’ recommendations.8 According to the appeals court, Fly “is reporting financial news—factual information on Firm Recommendations—through a substantial organizational effort.”9

The appeals court, however, did not consider it important that the Firms had incurred substantial costs in research and analysis (i.e., acquiring and creating information) as the basis for their recommendations, whereas Fly’s only costs were in collecting and reporting the recommendations. The appeals court discarded the relevance of these basis costs—even though they provide an arguable distinction over the NBA Case—stating that although the Firms “may be ‘acquiring material’ in the course of preparing their reports . . . that is not the focus of this lawsuit. In pressing a ‘hot news’ claim against [Fly], [Firms] seek only to protect their Recommendations, something they create using their expertise and experience rather than acquire through efforts akin to reporting.”10 The appeals court concluded that there was no meaningful difference between “taking material that a Firm has created . . . as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money . . . and selling it by ascribing the material to its creator” and the “unexceptional and easily recognized behavior by members of the traditional news media [reporting on] winners of Tony Awards . . . with proper attribution of the material to its creator.”11 We expect that the contours of these differences to be a key issue if this case [is] heard on appeal, either at the Second Circuit en banc or at the United States Supreme Court.

Absent any legal recourse to ensure the exclusivity of their recommendations, Wall Street firms must now scramble to implement even greater security and counter-intelligence measures. After all, publishers such as Fly rely on information leaks and intelligence to timely obtain the recommendations in the first place. More likely, however, is that Wall Street firms will soon refine their business models to otherwise adequately monetize, or else reduce expenditures in, their intensive research and analysis efforts.

The broader implications of this case—that the “ability to make news . . . does not give rise to a right for it to control who breaks that news and how”12—will bear critically on the development, funding, and overall power of rapidly-advancing electronic information sources. In particular, businesses providing information aggregation services of all stripes—including, for example, those provided by Google, Inc. and Twitter, Inc.—will rejoice in the ability to gather and publish information from multiple sources across the entire nation with a lower risk of encountering divergent legal standards for misappropriation, on a state-by-state basis.

____________________

1 Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., No. 10-1372-cv (2d Cir. June 20, 2011).
2 The District Court for the Southern District of New York awarded monetary relief for copyright infringement by Fly’s unauthorized distribution of the Firm’s actual reports. Issues concerning copyright infringement were not addressed on appeal.
3 The injunction allowed the Firms’ customers to trade on the Firms’ recommendations prior to the broader market. The injunction prohibited Fly from reporting a recommendation until (a) the later of one half-hour after the opening of the New York Stock Exchange or 10:00 am for those recommendations first distributed prior to 9:30 am, or (b) two hours after the recommendation is first distributed by one of the Firms to its clients, for those recommendations first distributed at or after 9:30 am on a given day. See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., slip op. at 29, n.20.
4 For example, a headline covering one of the Firms’ recommendations may state: “EQIX initiated with a Buy at BofA/Merrill. Target $110.”
5 “Free riding” was but one factor in a five-pronged test, the remainder of which were not the basis of the decision. The appeals court speculated, however, that proving certain other factors may be troublesome, such as “direct competition” between Fly and the Firms.
6 105 17 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
7 Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., slip op. at 67.
8Fly previously relied on employees at investment firms (without the firms’ authorization) to e-mail the research reports to Fly as they were released. Fly’s staff would summarize a recommendation as a headline, and sometimes, Fly would include in a published item an extended passage taken verbatim from the underlying report.  Fly maintains that it no longer obtains recommendations directly from such investment firms and, instead, that it gathers them using a combination of other news outlets, chat rooms, “blast IMs” sent by people in the investment community to hundreds of recipients, and conversations with traders, money managers, and its other contacts involved in the securities markets. Id. at 16-17.
9 Id. at 67.
10 Id. at 62.
11 Id. at 63-64.
12 Id. at 71.

© 2011 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

7th Securities Litigation and Enforcement Summit April 26-27 New York, NY

The National Law Review is proud to be a media partner for the upcoming IQPC’s 7th Securities Litigation and Enforcement Summit –  April 26-27 in New York, NY.   This two day event will feature panel discussions, case studies, contemporary insights and practical advice vital to the successful management of securities litigation. 

The second half of 2010 the securities industry witnessed a rise in class action suits mainly due to an increase of undisclosed product and operational defects, breaches of fiduciary duties and accounting improprieties. Securities litigation and associated risk is thus once again front and center in the legal landscape.

ATTEND AND LEARN ABOUT:

  • SEC, DOJ and State Attorneys General enforcement initiatives and actions
  • New enforcement initiatives under the Frank Dodd Act – what will be the impact for securities litigation cases?
  • Developing effective strategies to respond to and resolve government enforcement actions
  • Aligning litigation strategy with macro economic considerations
  • International trends impacting US based securities litigation
  • Recent trends in Insider Trading and Fraud investigations

Register By Friday March 25th and Save:

Please click here for more information and to register:


Developments in Securities Law – February 2011

Recent posting including Security Law Updates for February at the National Law Review by Geoffrey R. Morgan, Michael H. Altman, and Jeffrey M. Barrett of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP:  

Final Rules

Say-on-Pay Voting Rules

On January 25, 2011, the SEC adopted final rules requiring public companies to conduct separate shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation and “golden parachute” compensation arrangements.  These rules were adopted substantially as proposed on October 18, 2010.  One notable difference from the proposed rules is a temporary exemption for smaller reporting companies so that these issuers will not be required to conduct either a say-on-pay or say-on-frequency vote until the first annual or other meeting of shareholders occurring on or after January 21, 2013.  This temporary exemption does not apply to shareholder advisory votes regarding golden parachute compensation of smaller reporting companies.  Because companies that have received TARP funds are required by U.S. Treasury regulations to have an annual say-on-pay vote, which is effectively the same as the say-on-pay vote under these rules, TARP recipients are exempt from the requirement to include an additional say-on-pay vote and a say-on-frequency proposal until their first meeting at which directors are elected after the company is no longer subject to the TARP restrictions.

The Dodd-Frank Act requires public companies to conduct say-on-pay and say-on-frequency votes for their first annual or other such meeting of shareholders occurring on or after January 21, 2011, regardless of whether final rules had been adopted by the SEC.  The final rules do not become effective until 60 days following publication in the Federal Register.  Companies must comply with the new rules concerning the golden parachute vote and disclosure with respect to any merger proxy statement (and certain other similar filings) filed on or after April 25, 2011.

Michael Best Comments

Say on Pay Could Make for a Rocky 2011 Proxy Season

While the say-on-pay rules just went into effect and the 2011 proxy season has just begun, we are seeing some interesting results that may signal a rocky season.  Two of the first 55 say-on-pay votes failed to gain majority approval.  While these votes are only advisory, companies whose annual meetings are later this year should take note that proxy advisory firms are playing a significant role in the process, especially for those companies whose say-on-pay proposals failed.  Also, given the prohibition on counting broker discretionary votes in say-on-pay and say-on-pay frequency proposals, a major source of votes upon which companies have historically relied, management recommendations on voting have less significance than in the past.

Companies are also required to put to a shareholder vote the frequency with which the say-on-pay vote should occur.  Shareholders must be given the choice of annual, biennial or triennial.  Shareholders are showing a distinct preference for more frequent review of executive compensation, with the early yet distinct trend towards annual referendums, rather than a biennial or triennial schedule that is favored by most companies.  Annual say on pay votes will likely require additional time and cost for companies to design and disclose executive pay programs.  There is a discrepancy between management’s recommendation and shareholder’s response to this item.  Nearly 60% of companies recommended a triennial vote, while a majority of shareholders at nearly 70% of companies have supported an annual vote.  This divergence was more significant for the largest U.S. companies.  Most of those companies that were successful in a biennial or triennial vote were controlled by insiders.

Proposed Rules & Final Rules

Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors

On January 25, 2011, the SEC proposed amendments to its rules to conform the definition of “accredited investor” to the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Section 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the definitions of “accredited investor” in the SEC’s rules to exclude the value of a person’s primary residence for purposes of determining whether the person qualifies as an “accredited investor” on the basis of having a net worth in excess of $1.0 million.  This change to the net worth standard was effective upon enactment by operation of the Dodd-Frank Act on July 21, 2010, but Section 413(a) also requires the SEC to revise its rules under the Securities Act of 1933 to reflect the new standard.

The change to the accredited investor definition is of significant importance for securities issuers as various exemptions for private or other limited offerings of securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and state “blue sky” laws depend on whether participants are “accredited investors.”  One of the bases on which individuals may qualify as accredited is having a net worth of at least $1.0 million, either alone or together with their spouse. Non-accredited investors who participate in private offerings under Rule 505 or Rule 506 of Regulation D must receive financial and other information that is not required to be given to accredited investors, and in offerings relying on Rule 506 there is a limit of 35 non-accredited investors.

Removal of Credit Rating References

On February 9, 2011, the SEC, pursuant to Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act, proposed rule amendments that would remove references to credit ratings in rules and forms promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The focus of the proposal is to eliminate the use of credit ratings as a condition of “short-form” eligibility, which enables issuers to register securities “on the shelf” on a Form S-3 or F-3.  Currently, an issuer can use a Form S-3 or F-3 if it meets certain registrant requirements, including a requirement that, for at least one year, it has been a reporting company and has been filing its periodic reports in a timely manner, in addition to at least one of the applicable form’s transaction requirements.  One such transaction requirement allows an issuer to use a short-form registration statement for an offering of non-convertible securities, such as debt securities, provided that such securities be rated “investment grade” by at least one credit rating agency that is a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.  Under the proposed rules, the transaction eligibility requirement relating to the offering of non-convertible securities would be replaced with a new requirement, which would permit use of a short-form registration statement for primary offerings of non-convertible securities if the issuer has issued (as of a date within 60 days prior to the filing of the registration statement), for cash, more than $1 billion in non-convertible securities, other than common equity, through registered primary offerings over the last three years and otherwise meets the registrant requirements.  The proposed standard is modeled on the standard for determining whether an issuer is a “well-known seasoned issuer” based on its debt issuances, where it does not meet the public equity float requirement.

New Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations

Smaller Reporting Companies – On February 11, 2011, the SEC released new Q&A interpretations addressing how to determine whether an issuer is a smaller reporting company as of January 21, 2011.  If an issuer is a smaller reporting company as of that date, the issuer will be entitled to rely on the delayed phase-in period for holding say-on-pay and say-on-frequency votes.  An issuer’s status as a smaller reporting company is based on such issuer’s public float or annual revenues at the end of the second fiscal quarter of 2010. A change in status, if any, based on the issuer’s second fiscal quarter of 2010 results is effective on the first day of such issuer’s first quarter of 2011, regardless of whether such issuer has filed a report with the SEC indicating its new status.

Sec Releases & Policy Statements

No relevant Releases or Policy Statements.

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

Time to Retire the ESOP from the 401k: Assessing the Liabilities of KSOP Structures in Light of ERISA Fiduciary Duties and Modern Alternatives

The National Law Review would like to congratulate Adam Dominic Kielich of  Texas Wesleyan University School of Law as one of our 2010 Fall Student Legal Writing Contest Winners !!! 

I. Introduction

401k plans represent the most common employer-sponsored retirement plans for employees of private employers. They have replaced defined benefit pension plans, as well as less flexible vehicles (such as ESOPs) as the primary retirement plan.1 However; some of these plan models have continued their legacy through 401ks through structures that tie the two together or place one inside the other. A very common and notable example is the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). ESOPs are frequently offered by companies as an investment vehicle within 401ks that allow participants to invest in the employer’s stock as an alternative to the standard fund offerings that are pooled investments (e.g. mutual funds or institutional funds). Participants may be unaware that the company stock option in their 401k is a plan within a plan. These combination plans are sometimes referred to as KSOPs.2

Although this investment vehicle seems innocuous, KSOPs generate considerable risk to both participants and sponsors that warrants serious consideration in favor of abandoning the ESOP option. Participants face additional exposure in their retirement savings when they invest in a single company, rather than diversified investment vehicles that spread risk across many underlying investments. They may lack the necessary resources to determine the quality of this investment and invest beyond an appropriate risk level. Moreover, sponsors face substantial financial (and legal) risk by converting their plan participants into stockholders within the strict protections of ERISA.3 The risk is magnified by participant litigation driven by the two market downturns of the last decade. Given the growing risk, sponsors may best find themselves avoiding the risks of KSOPs by adopting a brokerage window feature (sometimes labeled self-directed brokerage accounts) following the decision in Hecker.4

II.  Overview and History of ESOPs

A.  ESOP Overview

ESOPs are employer-sponsored retirement plans that allow the employee to invest in company stock, often unitized, on a tax-deferred basis. They are qualified defined contribution plans under ERISA. As a standalone plan, ESOPs take tax deferred payroll contributions from employees to purchase shares in the ESOP, which in turn owns shares of the employer’s stock. That indirect ownership through the ESOP coverts participants into shareholders, which gives them shareholder rights and creates liabilities to the participants both as shareholders and as participants in an ERISA-protected plan. They may receive dividends, may have the option to reinvest dividends into the plan, and may be able to receive distributions of vested assets in cash or in-kind, dependent upon plan rules.5

ESOPs offer employers financial benefits: they create a way to add to employee benefit packages in a manner that is tax-advantaged while providing a vehicle to keep company stock in friendly hands – employees – and away from the hands of parties that may seek to take over the company or influence it through voting. Additionally, ESOPs create a consistent flow of stock periodically drawn out of the market, reducing supply and cushioning prices. Moreover, with those shares in the hands of employees, who tend to support their employer, there are fewer shares likely to vote against the company’s decision-makers or engage in shareholder activism.6

B.  Brief Relevant History of ESOPs

ESOPs are generally less flexible and less advantageous to employees than 401ks. ESOPs lack loan options, offer a single investment option, typically lack a hardship or in-service distribution scheme and most importantly, lack diversification opportunities. Individual plans may adopt more restrictive rules to maintain funds within the plan as long as possible, as long as it is ERISA-compliant. Perhaps the most important consequence of that lack of diversity is that it necessarily ties retirement savings to the value of the company. If the company becomes insolvent or the share price declines without recovery, employees lose their retirement savings in the plan, and likely at least some of the pension benefits funded by the employer. The uneven distribution of benefits to employees helped pave the way for ERISA in 1974.7

C.  Current State of Law on ESOPs

1.  ESOPs Within 401k Plans

After the ERISA regulatory regime paved the way for 401k plans, employers began folding their ESOPs and other company stock offerings into the 401ks. For decades employers could mandate at least some plan assets had to be held in company stock. When corporate scandals and the dot com bubble burst in 2001, it evaporated significant retirement savings of participants heavily invested in their employer’s stock, often without their choice. Congress responded by including in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) by eliminating or severely restricting several permissible plan rules that require 401k assets in any company stock investment within 401k plans.8

2. ERISA Litigation of the 2000s

Participants who saw their 401k assets in company stock vehicles disappear with the stock price had difficulty recovering under ERISA until recent litigation changed how ERISA is construed for 401k plans. ERISA was largely written with defined benefit plans in mind. Defined benefit plans hold assets collectively in trust for the entire plan. Participants may have hypothetical individual accounts in some plan models, but they do not have actual individual accounts. ERISA required that suits brought by participants against the plan (or the sponsor, trust, or other agent of the plan) for negligence or malfeasance would represent claims for losses to the plan collectively for all participants, so any monetary damages would be awarded to the plan to benefit the participants collectively, similar to the shareholder derivative suit model. Damages were not paid to participants or used to increase the benefits payable under the plan.

Defined contribution plans with individual participant accounts, such as 401k plans and ESOPs, were grafted onto those rules. Therefore, any suit arising from an issue with the company stock in one of these plans meant participants could not be credited in their individual accounts relative to injuries sustained. It rendered participant suits meaningless in most cases because the likelihood of recovery was suspect at best.9

The Supreme Court affirmed this view in 1985 in Russell, and courts have consistently held that individual participants could not individually benefit from participant suits. Participants owning company stock through the plan could take part separately in suits as shareholders against the company, but these are distinguished from suits under ERISA. In 2008, the Supreme Court revisedRussell in LaRue and held that Russell only applied to defined benefit plans. Defined contribution plan participants could now bring claims individually or as a class and receive individual awards as participants. This shift represented new risks to sponsors that immediately arose with the market crash in 2007.10

III.  Risks to Employees

The primary risk to employees is financial; a significant component of employee financial risk is the investment risk. 401k sponsors are required to select investments that are prudent for participant retirement accounts. This is why 401k plans typically include pooled investments; diversified investment options spread risk. ESOPs are accepted investments within 401k plans, although they are not diversified.11 This increases the risk, and profit potential, participants can expose themselves to within their accounts. While added risk can be exponentially profitable to participants when the employer has rising stock prices or a bull market is present, the downside can also be significantly disastrous when the company fails to meet analyst expectations or the bears take over the markets.

Moreover, employees may be more inclined to invest in the employer’s stock than an independent investor would. Employees tend to be bullish about their employer for two reasons.12 First, employees are inundated with positive comments from management while typically negative information is not disclosed or is given a positive spin. This commentary arises in an area not covered by ERISA, SEC, or FINRA regulations. This commentary is not treated as statements to shareholders; they arise strictly from the employment relationship. This removes much of the accountability and standards that otherwise are related to comments from the company to participants and shareholders. Management can, and should, seek to motivate its employees to perform as well as possible. While the merit of misleading employees about the quality of operations may be debatable, the ability to be positive to such an end is not.

Second, employees tend to believe in the quality of their employer, even if they espouse otherwise. They tend to believe the company is run by experienced professionals who are leading the company to long term success. Going to work each day, seeing the company operating and producing for its customers encourages belief that the company must be doing well. It can even develop into a belief that the employee has the inside edge on knowing how great the company is, although this belief is likely formed with little or no knowledge of the financial health of the company. The product of the internal and external pressures is a strong likelihood employees will invest in an ESOP over other investment options for ephemeral, rather than financial, reasons.13

Additionally, participants may have greater exposure to the volatility of company stock over other shareholders due to 401k plan restrictions. While some plans are liberally constructed to give participants more freedom and choice, some plans conversely allow participants few options. This is particularly relevant to the investment activity within participant accounts. Participants may be limited to a certain number of investment transfers per period (e.g. quarterly or annually), may be subject to excessive trade restrictions, or may even find themselves exposed to company stock through repayment of a loan that originated in whole or in part from assets in the ESOP. Additionally, the ESOP may have periodic windows that restrict when purchases or redemptions can occur. While a regular shareholder can trade in and out of a stock in seconds in an after-tax brokerage account, ESOP shareholders may find themselves hung out to dry by either the ESOP or 401k plan rules. These restrictions are not penal; they represent administrative decisions on behalf of the sponsor to avoid the added expense generally associated with more liberal rules.

Although employees take notable risk to their retirement savings portfolio by investing in ESOPs within their 401k plans, it can add up to a tremendous financial risk when viewed in the bigger picture of an employee’s overall financial picture. Employees absorb the biggest source of financial risk by nature of employment through the company because it is the major, if not sole, income stream during an employee’s working years. This risk increases if the employer is also the primary source of retirement assets or provides health insurance. The employee’s present and future financial well being is inherently tied directly to the employer’s financial well being. This risk is compounded if the employee also has stock grants, stock options, or other stock plans that keep assets solely tied to the value of the company stock. If the employee is fortunate enough to have a defined benefit plan (not withstanding PBGC coverage) or retirement health benefits through the company, then that will further tie the long term success of the company to the financial well being of the employee. Adding diversification in the retirement portfolio may be a worthwhile venture when those other factors are considered in a holistic fashion.

IV.  Risks to the Sponsor

ERISA litigation is a serious risk and concern to sponsors. Although there is exposure in other areas related to participants as stockholders, ERISA establishes higher standards towards participants than companies otherwise have towards shareholders. Sponsors once were able to protect themselves under ERISA but since LaRue participants have an open door to reach the sponsor to recover losses related to the administration of the plan.14 ERISA requires sponsors to make available investment options that are prudent for 401k plans. The dormant side of that rule requires sponsors to remove investment options that have fallen below the prudent standard. Company stock is not excluded from this requirement.15

Any time the market value of the stock declines, the sponsor is at risk for participant losses for failure to remove the ESOP (or other company stock investment option) as an imprudent investment within the plan. Participants are enticed to indemnify losses through the sponsor. Such a suit is unlikely to succeed when the loss is short term and negligible, or the value declined in a market-wide downturn. However, as prior market downturns indicate, investors look to all possible avenues to indemnify their losses by bringing suits against brokers, advisors, fund companies, and issuers of their devalued assets. There is no reason to believe that participants would not be enticed to try this route; LaRuewas born out of the downturn in the early 2000s.16

The exposure for sponsors runs from additional costs to mount a defense to massive monetary awards to indemnify participants for losses. In cases where participants are unlikely to recover, sponsors still must finance the defense against what often turns into expensive, class action litigation or a long serious of suits. However, there is a serious risk of sponsors having to pay damages, or settle, cases where events have led to a unique loss in share value. Participants have filed suit under the theory that the sponsor failed to remove imprudent investment options in a timely fashion. BP 401k participants filed suit following the gulf oil leak under a similar theory that the sponsor failed to remove the company stock investment option from the plan, knowing that it would have to pay clean up costs and settlements. While it remains to be seen if these participants will be successful, they surely will not the last to try.17

Sponsors should take a good, long look at the ESOP to determine whether the sponsor receives more reward than risk – particularly future risk – from its inclusion. The risk to a company does not have as severe as the situation BP faced this year. Even bankruptcy or mismanagement that results in serious stock decline can merit suit when the sponsor fails to immediately withdraw the ESOP, since it has prior knowledge of the bankruptcy or mismanagement prior to any public release.

To hedge these risks, sponsors can adopt several options. First, sponsors may limit the percentage of any account that may be held in company stock. This is easily justified as the sponsor taking a position in favor of diversification and responsible execution of fiduciary duties. While this may not completely absolve the sponsor of the duty to remove imprudent investment options, it does act as a limit on liability. Although it does provide some protection against risk, it is an imperfect solution.

Second, ESOP plans can adopt pricing structures to discourage holding large positions of company stock for the purpose of day trading. Some 401k plans allow participants to trade between company stock and cash equivalents without restraint. When the ESOP determines share pricing based on the closing price of the underlying stock, it creates a window where participants can play the company stock very differently than the constraints of most 401k investment options.

It is a very alluring reason to take advantage of the plan structure by taking an oversized position in company stock. Add the possibility to indemnify losses in court and it becomes even more desirable. The process is simple: participants can check the trading price minutes before the market closes. If the stock price is higher than the basis, they sell and net profit. If it is below, they hold the stock and try against each day until the sale is profitable. They will then buy back into the ESOP on a dip and repeat the process. This is distinguishable from the standard diversified fund options in 401k plans, where ignorance of the underlying investments preempts the ability to game closing prices. Funds generally discourage day trading – and may even carry redemption fees to penalize it – and encourage long term investing strategies more consistent with the objective of retirement accounts.

Available solutions are directly tied to the cause of the problem; changing the ESOP pricing scheme can eliminate gaming closing prices. ESOPs can adopt other pricing schemes such as average weighted pricing and next day order fulfillment. Average weighted pricing gives participants the average weighted prices of all transactions in the stock, executed that day, by a given entity. For example, if the ESOP is held with Broker X as the trustee, it may rely upon Broker X to provide the prices and volumes of all of its executed orders that day in the stock, which is used to determine the average weighted price participants will receive that day. Alternately, participants could be required to place orders on one day and have the order fulfilled on the following day’s closing with that day’s closing price. Both of these pricing schemes introduce some mystery into the price that diminishes gaming the closing price. This is also an imperfect solution, even if combined with the first option, because it maintains the risks of the ESOP.

Sponsors may also take advantage of brokerage windows to expand employee investment options, including company stock, without the risks afforded to ESOPs. Brokerage windows create brokerage accounts within 401k plans. The brokerage window is not an investment in itself; it is a shell that allows employees to reach through the window to access other investments. Sponsors found good reason to be suspicious of brokerage windows, seeing it as liability for all the available investments that could be deemed imprudent for retirement accounts. A minute minority of participants saw it as a way to have their cake and eat it too during the last rise and fall of the markets; they could invest more aggressively within their 401ks and then demand sponsors indemnify their losses when the markets gave up years of gains on the basis of sponsor failure to review the available contents of the window under the prudence standard.

However, in Deere the court handed down a critcal decision: sponsors could not be responsible for the choices made by participants within brokerage windows. InDeere, several Deere & Co. (John Deere) employees sued the company for making available investments that were imprudent for 401k accounts that caused substantial losses in the 2007 market downturn. John Deere had not reviewed the thousands of available options under the ERISA prudence standard. Although the plaintiffs’ theory was a compelling interpretation of ERISA duties, the court rejected the theory on two grounds. First, it would be impossible for any sponsor to review every investment available through the window. Second, participants had taken ownership of the responsibility to review their investment decisions by choosing to invest through the window.18

Following the court’s decision in Deere, brokerage windows gained new life as a means for sponsors to expand investment availability at less risk. Rather than having to review a menu of funds and company stock for prudence under ERISA, sponsors can justifiably limit the fund selection directly offered through the plan and leave the rest of the options to the brokerage window. Importantly, this includes offering company stock in the window. By utilizing the brokerage window, sponsors allow access to the company stock without the liabilities of offering an ESOP through the plan. The sponsor will likely lose out on any benefits received from the ESOP, although for most established employers ESOPs are likely more of a convenience factor and a legacy offering rooted in the history of employer-sponsored plans.

Although Deere foreclosed participant abuse of brokerage windows, this option is not without its own negative aspects. Future litigation may reestablish some liability upon the sponsor for the brokerage link. Sponsors may face alternate liability under ERISA for selecting a brokerage window with excessive commissions or fees, similar to requirements for funds under ERISA.19 Given the flurry of awareness brought to 401k management fees and revenue sharing agreements between sponsors and fund providers following the market crash in 2007, it is likely that brokerage windows will be the hot ticket for participants in the next market crash. Therefore, sponsors should preemptively guard against future litigation by reviewing available brokerage window options to make sure any fees or commissions are reasonable and the categories of investment options are reasonable (even if specific investments in those categories are not).

Perhaps a lesser concern, sponsors need to consider overall plan operation and any negative impacts that may arise from shifting to a brokerage window-based investment offering. These concerns may be less of a legal risk issue than a risk of participant discontent and dealing with those effects. There are primarily two areas that brokerage windows can create discontent. First, when participants want to move from a fund to the brokerage window, they must wait for the sale to settle from the fund and transfer to the window, which generally makes the money available in the window the day after the fund processes the order. Conversely, selling investments in the window may delay transferring money into plan funds because of settlement periods and the added delay of settlement with the fund once the funds are available to move out of the window. Additionally, the settlement periods within the window may frustrate participants, although the plan has no control over those timeframes. Those natural delays in processing the movement of money may create discontent, especially for those participants trying to invest based upon short term market conditions.

Second, those same processes and delays can negatively affect plan distributions. Many plans offer loans and withdrawal schemes, and while sponsors may have their own reasons for making those options available, participants often use those offerings to finance emergency financial needs. Brokerage windows can complicate and delay releasing money to participants. Settlement periods will create delays; if money has to be transferred out of the window to another investment to make those funds available for a distribution that will add at least one more day before money can be released. If participants find themselves in illiquid investments, the money may not be able to move for a distribution at all. Although these issues may not be of legal significance but they will be significant to the people responsible for absorbing participant complaints and there may be additional expenses created in handling those issues.

An additional concern is that the Department of Labor (DOL) is still fleshing out several requirements surrounding brokerage windows and how they relate to ERISA requirements. For example, the DOL October 2010 modification of 401k disclosure rules affects plans as a whole, but it leaves open several areas of ambiguity around the specific effects on brokerage windows. Sponsors may face continuing financial costs complying and determining how to comply with DOL requirements. Future changes in the regulations may negatively affect plans that rely heavily on brokerage windows to provide access to a greater range of investment options.20

These considerations are not exhaustive to the benefits or risks of either ESOPs or brokerage windows, they merely highlight some of the more salient points as they relate generally to the legal and significant financial benefits and risks to sponsors. There may be additional concerns equally salient to sponsors given their particular situation, such as participant suspicion of the removal of the ESOP or unwillingness at the executive level to retire the ESOP.

V.  Conclusion

Although brokerage windows may open the door to some new liabilities, it closes the door to the risks of ESOPs, for both participants and sponsors. Sponsor diligence in administering retirement plans will always be the most successful method of checking liability; however, as discussed ESOPs risk putting sponsors in an unwinnable position. Removing the company stock option may not be the most beneficial option in all cases but it may be time for sponsors to consider retiring the ESOP from the 401k in light of the current regulatory regime. A brokerage window option is well suited to take advantage of participant ownership of the employer’s stock, as well as other investment opportunities, while limiting the risk that normally accompanies that ownership. Ultimately, sponsors must consider what is best for the plan and its participants over both the short term and the long term.

Endnotes.

1. Chris Farrell, The 401(k) Turns Thirty Years Old, Bloomberg Businessweek Special Report, Mar. 15, 2010,http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/mar2010/pi20100312_874138.htm.

2. National Center for Employee Ownership401(k) Plans as Employee Ownership Vehicles, Alone and in Combination with ESOPs, (no date provided),http://www.nceo.org/main/article.php/id/15/.

3. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2010); the term “sponsor” can be used interchangeably with “employer” for purposes of this discussion, however there are some situations where the employer is not the sponsor, such as union plans, or the employer is not the sole sponsor in the case of multi-employer plans. This discussion relates to KSOPs where the sponsor is the employer. Different rules and different liability may apply to other plan structures.

4. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 590 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).

5. Todd S. Snyder, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs): Legislative History, Congressional Research Service, May 20, 2003.

6. William N. Pugh et al. The Effect of ESOP Adoptions on Corporate Performance: Are There Really Performance Changes?, 21Managerial & Decision Econ., 167, 167-180 (2000).

7. Supra note 5.

8. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 901, 29 U.S.C. 401 (2010).

9. LaRue v. DeWitt, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 254-55 (2008).

10. Id. at 255-56.

11. Shlomo Benartzi et al., The Law and Economic of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 50 J.L. & Econ. 45, 45-79 (2007).

12. Id.

13. Id.

14. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 254-55.

15.  § 1104.

16. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51.

17. E.g., In Re: BP P.L.C. Securities Litigation, MDL No. 2185, 2010 WL 3238321 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010).

18. Hecker, 556 F.3dat 590.

19. §1104.

20. 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (2010).

© Copyright 2010 Adam Dominic Kielich