Category: Securities Law

What ERISA Plans Should Know about Money Market Reform

Drinker Biddle Law Firm

Most U.S. money market funds will begin restructuring their operations beginning in 2014 and throughout 2015 and 2016 as a result of the SEC’s adoption of wide ranging changes to the rules regulating these funds.  Since many plan participants invest in money market funds, ERISA plan sponsors, recordkeepers and investment consultants and other advisers will need to plan for operational, contractual, disclosure and other changes in connection with these new rules.

Floating and Stable NAV Funds

One of the biggest rule changes involves how money market funds will be allowed to value their shares.  Currently, money market funds generally offer shares at a stable net asset value (“NAV’) of $1.00.  Under the SEC’s new money market rules, only government and “retail” money market funds can offer their shares at a stable NAV.  Government money market funds are those funds that hold at least 99.5% of their investments in government securities, cash or repurchase agreements collateralized by government securities.  Money market funds that don’t qualify to offer shares at a stable NAV because of the nature of their shareholder base (i.e., institutional money market funds) will have to float their NAVs, meaning the share price will fluctuate from day to day.

Retail money market funds are funds that restrict investors only to beneficial owners that are natural persons.  A beneficial owner is any person who has direct or indirect, sole or shared voting and/or investment power.  Under the new rules, retail money market funds will be required to reasonably conclude that beneficial owners of intermediaries are natural persons.  The SEC stated that tax-advantaged savings accounts and trusts, such as (i) participant-directed defined contribution plans; (ii) individual retirement accounts; (iii) simplified employee pension arrangements, and other similar types of arrangements, would qualify for the natural person test.  On the other hand, defined benefit plans, endowments and small businesses are not considered “natural persons” and would not be eligible to invest in a retail money market fund.

It is widely expected that the SEC’s new money market rules will result in many changes in fund offerings.  For example:

  • Money market funds that currently have both institutional and natural persons as holders may spin off the institutional holders into separate floating NAV funds;

  • Some institutional funds may decide to liquidate or merge with other funds;

  • Some advisers may begin offering new money fund-“like” products that only hold short term securities (60 days or less maturity) and therefore value fund holdings at amortized cost; and

  • Some prime money market funds may change their investment strategies to operate as a government money market fund in order to steer clear of the floating NAV and liquidity fee and gate rules (discussed below).

Effect on ERISA Plans.  The SEC provided examples of how funds could satisfy the natural person definition with intermediaries, including through: contractual arrangements, periodic certifications and representations or other verification methods.  Accordingly, ERISA service providers who hold fund shares in omnibus accounts may expect to be contacted by retail money market funds to provide these certifications or representations and/or to enter into new agreements with funds for this purpose.

ERISA plan sponsors and investment consultants and advisers will also need to be alert to potential changes to existing money market funds currently offered in plans to which they provide services and/or new fund offerings that may be appealing to and/or better serve the best interests of participants.

Liquidity Fees and Redemption Gates

All money market funds, except government money market funds, will be subject to the SEC’s new rules with respect to the imposition of liquidity (or redemption) fees and redemption gates during periods when a money market fund’s weekly liquid assets dip below certain thresholds.  Under these new rules a fund board may impose up to a 2% liquidity fee and a gate on fund redemptions if weekly liquid assets fall below 30% of total assets.  The fund board must impose a 1% liquidity fee if weekly liquid assets fall below 10% of total assets, unless the board decides otherwise.  Of course, if 10% of a money market fund’s assets are below 10% of a fund’s total assets, it would be unlikely that a board would not impose liquidity fees and redemption gates.  The redemption gates can last no longer than 10 days and cannot be imposed more than once in a 90-day period.

Effect on ERISA Plans.  The liquidity fee and gate requirements will usually only be triggered in times of extreme market stress.  But they are features that many ERISA participants and ERISA service providers will not find appealing.  For that reason, there may be more demand from participants for government money market funds, which may, but are not required to, comply with the fee and gate rules.  It is not expected that government money market funds will opt to become subject to these fee and gate rules.

The liquidity fee and redemption gate rules will require recordkeepers to make technical changes in their operations.  These operational changes could be expensive and time consuming to implement especially for smaller plans.  In particular, it should be noted that liquidity fees may vary in amount depending on a fund board’s determination and redemption gates may vary in the amount of days and will need to be removed quickly upon notice by a fund board.  Additionally, there may be contractual impediments to implementation of liquidity fees and gates, which are discussed below.

Many commenters on the proposed money market rules raised questions with the SEC regarding possible conflicts caused by the application of the fee and gate rules to funds in ERISA and other tax-exempt plans.  Specifically, commenters mentioned the following issues with the fee and/or gate rules:

  • possible violations of certain minimum distribution rules that could be interfered with by the gate rule;

  • potential taxation as a result of the inability to process certain mandatory refunds on a timely basis;

  • delays in plan conversions or rollovers;

  • possible conflicts with the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) qualified default investment (“QDIA”) rules; and

  • conflicts with plan fiduciaries’ duties regarding maintenance of adequate liquidity in their plans.

The SEC’s response generally was that these concerns either were unlikely to materialize or could be mitigated by ERISA plan sponsors or service providers.  For example, with respect to QDIAs, the SEC suggested that a plan sponsor or service provider could (i) loan funds to a plan for operating expenses to avoid the effects of a gate, or (ii) pay a liquidity fee on behalf of a redeeming participant.  In connection with rollovers or conversions, the SEC likewise pointed out that if the liquidity fee caused a hardship on a participant, then the ERISA fiduciary or its affiliate could simply pay the liquidity fee; failing that, the SEC suggested that the fiduciary consider a government money market fund for investment purposes, which is not required to comply with the fee and gate rules.

The SEC continues to work with the DOL on these and other ERISA-and tax exempt specific issues but thus far has not provided any relief from its fee and gate rules for these types of plans and accounts.  Thus, ERISA fiduciaries and plan sponsors may need to consider money market fund offerings in their plans in light of these issues.

Contractual Issues

As noted above, the “natural person” requirements for retail money market funds will require these funds to ascertain information regarding beneficial ownership of fund shares from ERISA intermediaries.  Retail money market funds may ask ERISA intermediaries to make representations about their customers through revised service agreements containing representations about the nature of the intermediaries’ customers.  These funds may also use periodic certifications or questionnaires to obtain this information.

In addition, many existing contracts between money market funds and intermediaries have restrictions in them regarding the imposition of redemption fees and may restrict a fund’s right to delay effecting redemptions thereby putting them in conflict with the new liquidity fee and redemption gate rules.  Recordkeepers who contract with retail or institutional money market funds may therefore be asked by these funds to amend or otherwise revise their servicing agreements with the funds to provide for liquidity fees and redemption gates.

Pricing Changes

The new money market rules will require all floating NAV money market funds to price their shares to four decimal places (e.g., $1.0000).  Recordkeepers will need to adjust their systems to accommodate the four-decimal place pricing system.

Disclosure and Education/Training

ERISA service providers will need to train and educate their personnel on the new money market rules and fund options so that they can answer participants’ questions.  ERISA service providers will need to develop disclosure for ERISA participants that clearly describes the risks and differences in money market funds and new fund options.

Compliance Dates

The new money market rules take effect in various stages over the next two years.  Importantly, the floating NAV, decimal pricing, and liquidity fee and gate rules become effective on October 14, 2016.  That said, the mutual fund industry appears to be moving quickly to prepare to comply, and it is probable that investment advisers to money market funds will begin to make some changes, for example, creating new funds and separating retail and institutional shareholders into different funds well ahead of the 2016 compliance date.  Therefore, ERISA service providers will need to be alert to the possibility that their operations may need to be adjusted as these changes occur.

The SEC’s new money market rules will usher in many changes to money market funds over the next 18-24 months that will affect ERISA and tax-exempt participants who invest in these vehicles and ERISA service providers.  ERISA service providers should begin preparing for these changes by assessing their systems, as applicable, to evaluate whether they can comply with the new rules and, if not, what other investment options might be available to address participants’ short-term investment needs.  ERISA service providers may also want to consider whether non-government money market funds or other short-term liquidity vehicles should be offered to ERISA participants in light of the new fee and gate rules.

ARTICLE BY

Diana E. McCarthy
OF
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Join the ABA for their Securities Fraud Conference in New Orleans – November 13-14

SFR14_250x250

When

Thursday November 13 – Friday November 14, 2014

Where

The Westing New Orleans

Each year this National Institute draws elite officials from both the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for an exclusive educational and professional forum to examine current legal and ethical issues relating to securities fraud.

  • Program highlights include:
  • Creative Discovery Tactics in Defending Securities Fraud Allegations
  • Compliance Chiefs: The Role of the Internal Watchdog
  • Future of Private Plan Securities (including the recent Stanford Supreme Court decision)
  • Too Big to Fail: If All Else Fails, Do Guilty Pleas Matter?
  • Sez Who? SEC Targeting Attorneys Who Allegedly Obstruct Enforcement Investigations (ETHICS)

Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Litigation Heating Up

Barnes Thornburg

The past few months have been busy for courts and the SEC dealing with securities whistleblowers. The Supreme Court’s potentially landmark decision in Lawson v. FMR LLC back in March already seems like almost ancient history.  In that decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection provision (18 U.S.C. §1514A) protected not simply employees of public companies but also employees of private contractors and subcontractors, like law firms, accounting firms, and the like, who worked for public companies. (And according to Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, it might even extend to housekeepers and gardeners of employees of public companies).

Since then, a lot has happened in the world of whistleblowers. Much of the activity has focused on Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions, rather than Sarbanes-Oxley. This may be because Dodd-Frank has greater financial incentives for plaintiffs, or because some courts have concluded that it does not require an employee to report first to an enforcement agency. The following are some interesting developments:

What is a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank?

This seemingly straightforward question has generated a number of opinions from courts and the SEC. The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower-protection provision, enacted in 2010, focuses on a potentially different “whistleblower” population than Sarbanes-Oxley does. Sarbanes-Oxley’s provision focuses particularly on whistleblower disclosures regarding certain enumerated activities (securities fraud, bank fraud, mail or wire fraud, or any violation of an SEC rule or regulation), and it protects those who disclose to a person with supervisory authority over the employee, or to the SEC, or to Congress.

On the other hand, Dodd-Frank’s provision (15 U.S.C. §78u-6 or Section 21F) defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(a)(6).  It then prohibits, and provides a private cause of action for, adverse employment actions against a whistleblower for acts done by him or her in “provid[ing] information to the Commission,” “initiat[ing], testif[ing] in, or assist[ing] in” any investigation or action of the Commission, or in making disclosures required or protected under Sarbanes-Oxley, the Exchange Act or the Commission’s rules.  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(h)(1). A textual reading of these provisions suggests that a “whistleblower” has to provide information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC.  If the whistleblower does so, an employer cannot discriminate against the whistleblower for engaging in those protected actions.

However, after the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC promulgated rules explicating its interpretation of Section 21F. Some of these rules might require providing information to the SEC, but others could be construed more broadly to encompass those who simply report internally or report to some other entity.  Compare Rule 21F-2(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(3), 17 C.F.R. §240.21F-2(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(3). The SEC’s comments to these rules also said that they apply to “individuals who report to persons or governmental authorities other than the Commission.”

Therefore, one issue beginning to percolate up to the appellate courts is whether Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions consider someone who reports alleged misconduct to their employers or other entities, but not the SEC, to be a “whistleblower.” The only circuit court to have squarely addressed the issue (the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC) concluded that Dodd-Frank’s provision only applies to those who actually provide information to the SEC.

In doing so, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the “plain language and structure” of the statutory text, concluding that it unambiguously required the employee to provide information to the SEC.  Several district courts, including in Colorado, Florida and the Northern District of California, have concurred with this analysis.

More, however, have concluded that Dodd-Frank is ambiguous on this point and therefore have given Chevrondeference to the SEC’s interpretation as set forth in its own regulations. District courts, including in the Southern District of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Tennessee and Connecticut, have adopted this view. The SEC has also weighed in, arguing (in an amicus brief to the Second Circuit) that whistleblowers should be entitled to protection regardless of whether they disclose to their employers or the SEC.  The agency said that Asadi was wrongly decided and, under its view, employees that report internally should get the same protections that those who report to the SEC receive. The Second Circuit’s decision in that case (Liu v. Siemens AG) did not address this issue at all.

Finally, last week, the Eighth Circuit also decided not to take on this question. It opted not to hear an interlocutory appeal, in Bussing v. COR Securities Holdings Inc., in which an employee at a securities clearing firm provided information about possible FINRA violations to her employer and to FINRA, rather than the SEC, and was allegedly fired for it. The district court concluded that the fact that she failed to report to the SEC did not exclude her from the whistleblower protections under Dodd-Frank. It reasoned that Congress did not intend, in enacting Dodd-Frank, to encourage employees to circumvent internal reporting channels in order to obtain the protections of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection.  In doing so, however, the district court did not conclude that the statute was ambiguous and rely on the SEC’s interpretation.

A related question is what must an employee report to be a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank. Thus far, if a whistleblower reports something other than a violation of the securities laws, that is not protected. So, for example, an alleged TILA violation or an alleged violation of certain banking laws have been found to be not protected.

These issues will take time to shake out. While more courts thus far have adopted, or ruled consistently with, the SEC’s interpretation, as the Florida district court stated, “[t]he fact that numerous courts have interpreted the same statutory language differently does not render the statute ambiguous.”

Does Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection apply extraterritorially?

In August, the Second Circuit decided Liu. Rather than focus on who can be a whistleblower, the Court concluded that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions do not apply to conduct occurring exclusively extraterritorially. In Liu, a former Siemens employee alleged that he was terminated for reporting alleged violations of the FCPA at a Siemens subsidiary in China.  The Second Circuit relied extensively on the Supreme Court’s Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank case in reaching its decision. In Morrison, the Court reaffirmed the presumption that federal statutes do not apply extraterritorially absent clear direction from Congress.

The Second Circuit in Liu, despite Liu’s argument that other Dodd-Frank provisions applied extraterritorially and SEC regulations interpreting the whistleblower provisions at least suggested that the bounty provisions applied extraterritorially, disag
reed. The court concluded that it need not defer to the SEC’s interpretation of who can be a whistleblower because it believed that Section 21F was not ambiguous.  It also concluded that the anti-retaliation provisions would be more burdensome if applied outside the country than the bounty provisions, so it did not feel the need to construe the two different aspects of the whistleblower provisions identically.  And finally, the SEC , in its amicus brief, did not address either the extraterritorial reach of the provisions or Morrison, so the Second Circuit apparently felt no need to defer to the agency’s view on extraterritoriality.

Liu involved facts that occurred entirely extraterritorially. He was a foreign worker employed abroad by a foreign corporation, where the alleged wrongdoing, the alleged disclosures, and the alleged discrimination all occurred abroad. Whether adding some domestic connection changes this result remains for future courts to consider.

The SEC’s Use Of The Anti-Retaliation Provision In An Enforcement Action

In June, the SEC filed, and settled, its first Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation enforcement action. The Commission filed an action against Paradigm Capital Management, Inc., and its principal Candace Weir, asserting that they retaliated against a Paradigm employee who reported certain principal transactions, prohibited under the Investment Advisers Act, to the SEC. Notably, that alleged retaliation did not include terminating the whistleblower’s employment or diminishing his compensation; it did, however, include removing him as the firm’s head trader, reconfiguring his job responsibilities and stripping him of supervisory responsibility. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, both respondents agreed to cease and desist from committing any future Exchange Act violations, retain an independent compliance consultant, and pay $2.2 million in fines and penalties.  This matter marks the first time the Commission has asserted Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions in an enforcement action, rather than a private party doing so in civil litigation.

The SEC Announces Several Interesting Dodd-Frank Bounties

Under Dodd-Frank, whistleblowers who provide the SEC with “high-quality,” “original” information that leads to an enforcement action netting over $1 million in sanctions can receive an award of 10-30 percent of the amount collected. The SEC recently awarded bounties to whistleblowers in circumstances suggesting the agency wants to encourage a broad range of whistleblowers with credible, inside information.

In July, the agency awarded more than $400,000 to a whistleblower who appears not to have provided his information to the SEC voluntarily.  Instead, the whistleblower had attempted to encourage his employer to correct various compliance issues internally. Those efforts apparently resulted in a third-party apprising an SRO of the employer’s issues and the whistleblower’s efforts to correct them. The SEC’s subsequent follow-up on the SRO’s inquiry resulted in the enforcement action. Even though the “whistleblower” did not initiate communication with the SEC about these compliance issues, for his efforts, the agency nonetheless awarded him a bounty.

Then, just recently, the SEC announced its first whistleblower award to a company employee who performed audit and compliance functions. The agency awarded the compliance staffer more than $300,000 after the employee first reported wrongdoing internally, and then, when the company failed to take remedial action after 120 days, reported the activity to the SEC. Compliance personnel, unlike most employees, generally have a waiting period before they can report out, unless they have a reasonable basis to believe investors or the company have a substantial risk of harm.

With a statute as sprawling as Dodd-Frank, and potentially significant bounty awards at stake, opinions interpreting Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions are bound to proliferate. Check back soon for further developments.

 
ARTICLE BY

Brian E. Casey
 
OF 
Barnes & Thornburg LLP

North Carolina General Assembly Fails to Jump Start Our Businesses with Crowdfunding Legislation

Poyner Spruill Law firm

Crowdfunding is a relatively new capital raising tool, which was generally used in the past as a financing method for such ventures as films and music recordings.  To date, crowdfunding has not been a popular method for offering and selling securities because offering a share of financial returns or profits from business activities would subject the transaction to federal and state securities laws, requiring certain registrations with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and state securities regulators. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfunding (October 23, 2013).

In 2012, Congress passed the JOBS Act (Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act).  The JOBS Act, among other things, added a new section, 4(a)(6), to the Securities Act of 1933, creating a new exemption for certain crowdfunding offerings from SEC and state law registration requirements.  However, before the law can become effective the SEC must promulgate and implement rules regulating the exemption.  For further information on the JOBS Act, please see The JOBS Act—An Overview and Some Recent Developments, written by Michael E. Slipsky and David R. Krosner.

As of this summer, the SEC has proposed rules for crowdfunding, but those rules are not final. A dozen states are making an effort to join Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Alabama, Maine, Washington, Wisconsin, and Indiana by developing their own regulations allowing crowdfunding within the states. States are growing frustrated and tired of waiting for the SEC to adopt federal regulations.  See Posting of Bill Meagher to TheDeal.com, States make own crowdfunding rules, rather than wait for SEC (May 5, 2014, 15:03 EST).

In response to the federal delay, Representative Tom Murry of Wake County sponsored state legislation attempting to allow and regulate crowdfunding in North Carolina, filing House Bill 680, the JOBS Act, on April 9, 2013.  House Bill 680 did not pass the Senate and was not eligible for consideration in the 2014 short session.  For that reason, in June the House added the crowdfunding provisions, titled, “Jump-Start Our Business Start-Ups Act,” to the 32 page fifth edition of Senate Bill 734, Regulatory Reform Act of 2014. 

When compromise discussions between the House and Senate on Senate Bill 734 stalled, the Senate added to House Bill 1224 various provisions regarding modifications to the local government sales and use tax rate as well as other provisions including the crowdfunding provisions.  House Bill 1224 had been filed at the beginning of the short session as a bill modifying the Job Maintenance and Capital Development Fund.  The House rejected the Senate’s modifications of House Bill 1224.  As a result, the House and Senate appointed a conference committee, and the committee made its report on July 31, 2014.  The Proposed Conference Committee Substitute was passed by the Senate, however it failed in the House. 

The final version of House Bill 1224, the Proposed Conference Committee Substitute, would have allowed North Carolina residents to invest up to only $2,000 per purchaser – unless the purchaser is an accredited investor as defined by rule 501 of SEC regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 – in new in-state ventures through the crowdfunding mechanism.  It would have allowed most companies to raise up to $1 million in capital through unregistered securities without a financial audit and up to $2 million in capital if the issuer has undergone and made available to each prospective investor and the Secretary of State the documentation resulting from a financial audit.  Essentially companies would have been able to sell securities directly to the North Carolina public without having to incur the expense of conducting a registered securities offering.  The NC Secretary of State would have been tasked with the regulation of these types of transactions and would have collected quarterly reports.  See Posting of Mark Binker to WRAL TechWire, Crowdfunding bill clears N.C. Senate Committee,  (July 16, 2014 14:08 EST).

The General Assembly has adjourned sine die.  Although crowdfunding provision had an opportunity to become law during the 2014 short session in either Senate Bill 734 or the Proposed Conference Committee Substitute of House Bill 1224, the General Assembly did not pass the crowdfunding provision.  House Bill 1224 failed in the House and the compromise finally reached for Senate Bill 734 in the ratified bill excluded the crowdfunding provision.  There is a possibility the crowdfunding provision could again be considered before the 2015 session, scheduled for late January, if three-fifths of all members of the Senate and three-fifths of all members of the House vote to do so, as provided in Section 11(2) of Article II of the North Carolina Constitution.  However, the more likely scenario for the General Assembly to return would be for a “special session” by call of the Governor.  As provided in Section 5(7) of Article 3 of North Carolina Constitution, “[t]he Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, by and with the advice of the Council of State, convene the General Assembly in extra session by his proclamation, stating therein the purpose or purposes for which they are thus convened.”

ARTICLE BY

Jillian DeCamp
 
OF 
Poyner Spruill LLP

Quarterly Whistleblower Award Update – August 21, 2014

Drinker Biddle Law Firm

Since our last quarterly update, the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower (“OWB”) has issued four denial orders and three award orders. Here are some lessons learned from this activity:

  • The SEC Will Not Award Whistleblowers Who Provide Frivolous Information. The SEC determined that a claimant (who submitted “tips” relating to almost every single Notice of Covered Action”) was ineligible for awards because he/she “has knowingly and willfully made false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements and representations to the Commission over a course of years and continues to do so.” Under Rule 21F-8, persons are not eligible for an award if they “knowingly and willfully make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, or use any false writing or document knowing that it contains any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry with intent to mislead or otherwise hinder the Commission or another authority.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c)(7). The OWB found that a number of passages submitted by the claimant were patently false or fictitious and that the person had the requisite intent because of the (1) incredible nature of the statements, (2) continued submissions that lack any factual nexus to the overall actions, and (3) refusal to withdraw unsupported claims at the request of the OWB. (May 12, 2104.)

  • The SEC Will Enforce the Time Frames Set Forth in the Statue. The OWB denied two awards because the claimants did not submit an award claim within the 90-day period established by Rule 21F-10(b). The claimants argued that OWB should waive the 90-day period due to extraordinary circumstances. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(a). The OWB determined that neither a lack of awareness that the information that the whistleblower had shared would lead to a successful enforcement action nor the lack of awareness that the Commission posted Notices of Covered Actions on its website constitutes an extraordinary circumstance to waive the timing requirement. See SEC Release No. 72178 (May 16, 2014) and SEC Release No. 72659 (July 23, 2014).

  • Whistleblowers are Not Eligible for an Award Unless the Information Leads to a Successful Enforcement Action. The OWB denied an award to a claimant because the provided information did not lead to a “successful enforcement by the Commission of a federal court or administrative action, as required by Rules 21F-3(a)(3) and 21F-4(c) of the Exchange Act.” OWB also noted that the claimant did not submit information in the form and manner required by Rules 21F-2(a)(2), 21F-8(a), and 21F-9(a) & (b) of the Exchange Act. See In the Matter of Harbinger Capital Partners, LLC, File No. 3-14928 (July 4, 2014).

The OWB Can Be Persuaded to Change Its Preliminary Determination. Although the OWB initially denied the whistleblower’s award claim on the basis that the information did not appear to have been voluntarily submitted within Rule 21F-4(a)(ii) because it was submitted in response to a prior inquiry conducted bya self-regulatory organization (“SRO”). In a Final Determination issued on July 31, 2014, however, the OWB determined that claimant was entitled to more than $400,000. OWB noted that a submission is voluntary if it is provided before a request, inquiry, or demand for information by the SEC in connection with an investigation by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, any self-regulatory organization, Congress, the federal government, or any state Attorney General.

On the basis of the unique circumstances of this case, the OWB decided to waive the voluntary requirement of Rule 21F-4(a) for this claimant. The SEC noted that the claimant “worked aggressively … to bring the securities law violations to the attention of appropriate personnel,” the SRO inquiry originated from information that in part described claimant’s role, claimant believed that the company had provided the SRO with all the materials that claimant developed during his/her own internal efforts, and claimant promptly reporting to the SEC that the company’s internal efforts as a result of the SRO inquiry would not protect investors from future harm. Sean McKessy, chief of the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, remarked that “[t]he whistleblower did everything feasible to correct the issue internally. When it became apparent that the company would not address the issue, the whistleblower came to the SEC in a final effort to correct the fraud and prevent investors from being harmed. This award recognizes the significance of the information that the whistleblower provided us and the balanced efforts made by the whistleblower to protect investors and report the violation internally.”See SEC Release No. 72727 (July 31, 2014); SEC Press Release, “SEC Announces Award for Whistleblower Who Reported Fraud to SEC After Company Failed to Address Issue Internally,” (July 31, 2014).

  • SEC Continues to Make Awards to Qualified Claimants. On June 3, 2014, the SEC awarded two claimants 15% each for a total of 30% percent of the monetary sanctions collected in the covered action. See SEC Release No. 72301 (June 3, 2014). On July 22, 2014, the SEC awarded three claimants 15%, 10%, and 5% respectively (for a total of 30%) of the monetary sanctions collected in the Covered Action. See SEC Release No. 72652 (July 22, 2014).

ARTICLE BY

William L. Carr
Daniel E. Brewer
 
OF
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

SEC Brings Fraud Charges Against Oil and Gas Company and Its CEO

Katten Muchin Law Firm

On August 4, the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Houston American Energy Corp., an oil and gas exploration and production company, and John F. Terwilliger, its CEO, for making fraudulent claims about the company’s oil reserves. According to the SEC, during late 2009 and early 2010, Houston American raised approximately $13 million in a public offering and saw its stock price increase from less than $5 to more than $20 per share after fraudulently claiming that a Colombian exploration concession, in which Houston American owned a fractional interest, held between one billion and four billion barrels of oil reserves that would be worth the equivalent of $100 per share to investors. The SEC alleged that those estimates lacked any reasonable basis and were falsely attributed to the concession’s operator, who actually had much lower estimates. The SEC order charged Houston American and Mr. Terwilliger with violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act); Rule 10b-5, Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act; and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. The SEC seeks a civil penalty and disgorgement from Houston American, and to prohibit Mr. Terwilliger from acting as an officer and director of the company.

Matter of Houston American Energy Corp. et al, Admin. Proceeding No. 3-16000 (Aug. 4, 2014).

ARTICLE BY

Michael S. Gordon
Ashley H. Jones
Of
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

SEC Commissioner Highlights Need for Cyber-Risk Management in Speech at New York Stock Exchange

Proskauer Law firm

Cyber risks are an increasingly common risk facing businesses of all kinds.  In a recent speech given at the New York Stock Exchange, SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar emphasized that cybersecurity has grown to be a “top concern” of businesses and regulators alike and admonished companies, and more specifically their directors, to “take seriously their obligation to make sure that companies are appropriately addressing those risks.”

Commissioner Aguilar, in the speech delivered as part of the Cyber Risks and the Boardroom Conference hosted by the New York Stock Exchange’s Governance Services department on June 10, 2014, emphasized the responsibility of corporate directors to consider and address the risk of cyber-attacks.  The commissioner focused heavily on the obligation of companies to implement cybersecurity measures to prevent attacks.  He lauded companies for establishing board committees dedicated to risk management, noting that since 2008, the number of corporations with board-level risk committees responsible for security and privacy risks had increased from 8% to 48%.  Commissioner Aguilar nevertheless lamented what he referred to as the “gap” between the magnitude of cyber-risk exposure faced by companies today and the steps companies are currently taking to address those risks.  The commissioner referred companies to a federal framework for improving cybersecurity published earlier this year by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which he noted may become a “baseline of best practices” to be used for legal, regulatory, or insurance purposes in assessing a company’s approach to cybersecurity.

Cyber-attack prevention is only half the battle, however.  Commissioner Aguilar cautioned that, despite their efforts to prevent a cyber-attack, companies must prepare “for the inevitable cyber-attack and the resulting fallout.”  An important part of any company’s cyber-risk management strategy is ensuring the company has adequate insurance coverage to respond to the costs of such an attack, including litigation and business disruption costs.

The insurance industry has responded to the increasing threat of cyber-attacks, such as data breaches, by issuing specific cyber insurance policies, while attempting to exclude coverage of these risks from their standard CGL policies.  Commissioner Aguilar observed that the U.S. Department of Commerce has suggested that companies include cyber insurance as part of their cyber-risk management plan, but that many companies still choose to forego this coverage.  While businesses without cyber insurance may have coverage under existing policies, insurers have relentlessly fought to cabin their responsibility for claims arising out of cyber-attacks.  Additionally, Commissioner Aguilar’s speech emphasizes that cyber-risk management is a board-level obligation, which may subject directors and officers of companies to the threat of litigation after a cyber-attack, underscoring the importance of adequate D&O coverage.

The Commissioner’s speech offers yet another reminder that companies should seek professional advice in determining whether they are adequately covered for losses and D&O liability arising out of a cyber-attack, both in prospectively evaluating insurance needs and in reacting to a cyber-attack when the risk materializes.

Read Commissioner Aguilar’s full speech here.

ARTICLE BY

Shawn Ledingham
OF
Proskauer Rose LLP

SEC Settles Charges Against Hedge Fund Adviser for Conducting Prohibited Transactions and Retaliating Against Whistleblower

Vedder Price Law Firm

On June 16, 2014, the SEC settled charges against a hedge fund advisory firm,Paradigm Capital Management, Inc., for engaging in principal transactions with an affiliated broker-dealer without providing effective disclosure to, or obtaining effective consent from, a hedge fund client. The SEC also settled charges against the firm’s owner, Candace Weir, for causing the improper principal transactions.

According to the SEC’s order, Paradigm’s former head trader made a whistleblower submission to the SEC that revealed the principal transactions between Paradigm and the affiliated broker-dealer. The SEC found that, after learning that its head trader had reported potential violations to the SEC, Paradigm engaged in a series of retaliatory actions that ultimately resulted in the head trader’s resignation. This is the first time the SEC has filed a case under its new authority to bring anti-retaliation enforcement actions. According to the SEC, Ms. Weir conducted transactions between Paradigm and an affiliated broker-dealer while trading on behalf of a hedge fund client. The SEC’s order also found that Paradigm failed to provide effective written disclosure to the hedge fund and did not obtain its consent as required prior to the completion of each principal transaction. The SEC’s order stated that Paradigm attempted to satisfy the written disclosure and consent requirements by establishing a conflicts committee to review and approve each of the principal transactions on behalf of the hedge fund. The SEC’s order found that the conflicts committee itself, however, was conflicted, because its two members, Paradigm’s chief financial officer and chief compliance officer, each reported to Ms. Weir and Paradigm’s CFO also served as CFO of the affiliated broker-dealer. The SEC also found that Paradigm’s Form ADV was materially misleading for failing to disclose its CFO’s conflict as a member of the conflicts committee.

The SEC’s order found that Paradigm violated, among other things, Sections 206(3) and 207 of the Advisers Act. The SEC’s order also found that Ms. Weir caused Paradigm’s violations of Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act. Paradigm and Ms. Weir agreed to jointly and severally pay disgorgement of $1.7 million for distribution to current and former investors in the hedge fund, and pay prejudgment interest of $181,771 and a penalty of $300,000. Paradigm also agreed to retain an independent compliance consultant.

Article By:

Investment Services Group
Of:
Vedder Price

SEC Settles Civil Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Action Against Two Former Oil Services Executives

Katten Muchin

On the eve of a trial which was scheduled to begin this week, the Securities and Exchange Commission settled a civil Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) case it brought against two former oil services executives. The case was an outgrowth of anindustry-wide investigation the SEC had initially commenced beginning in 2010.

In February 2012, the SEC filed a complaint against Mark A. Jackson, who was the former CEO and CFO of Noble Corporation, and James J. Ruehlen, former Director and Division Manager of Noble’s Nigerian subsidiary, alleging that they authorized the payment of bribes to customs officials to process false paperwork that purported to show the export and re-import of oil rigs, which was necessary under the requirements of Nigerian law. In fact, the rigs had never been moved. The SEC alleged that the scheme was part of a design to save Noble from losing business and incurring costs associated with exporting rigs from Nigeria and re-importing them under new permits. The complaint asserted violations of the anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA. The complaint also detailed the fact that Jackson had refused to cooperate during Noble’s internal investigation of the matter and had asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify during the SEC investigation.

The settlement with Jackson and Ruehlen was the last in a lengthy saga of FCPA actions against Noble and its former employees. Noble was initially charged with FCPA violations in a civil action in 2010. The company settled, agreeing to pay more than $8 million in fees. The SEC filed charges against Jackson and Ruehlen in 2012 following the corporate settlement and also filed charges against Thomas F. O’Rourke, the former controller and head of internal audit at Noble. O’Rourke quickly settled and agreed to pay a penalty.

Despite pursuing the action for more than two years and alleging serious wrongdoing by the defendants, including responsibility for an extensive bribery scheme, the SEC agreed to settle with Jackson and Ruehlen just two days before their trial was to commence with an injunction against violating the books and records provision of the FCPA. Although Noble had settled its own case for a hefty penalty, neither Jackson nor Ruehlen were required to pay a fine, concede a violation of the bribery provisions of the FCPA nor agree to restrictions on employment.

SEC v. Jackson et al., No. 4:12-c-00563 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2014).  

Article By:

Emily Stern
Ashley H. Jones
Of:
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

Halliburton II: Supreme Court Upholds Basic Presumption

Morgan Lewis logo

On June 23, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its long-anticipated decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II).[1] Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Scalia and Alito joined.

The Halliburton II case generated significant publicity because it presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to reexamine the fraud-on-the-market presumption created in Basic v. Levinson.[2] The Court in Basic held that, in a securities fraud class action, the plaintiff is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reliance and, therefore, does not have to prove that each investor in the class relied on any alleged material misrepresentation. The foundation for the fraud-on-the market theory is the efficient-market theory, which presumes that, in an efficient market, all material, public information about a company is absorbed by the marketplace and reflected in the price of the security. The efficient-market theory has been under increasing attack in recent years, leading many to believe that the time may have come to overturn Basic.

In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court addressed whether to continue the fraud-on-the-market presumption unchanged, to cease the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption altogether, or to alter the presumption. In the Court’s opinion, the majority declined to overrule or modify Basic’s presumption of classwide reliance, but it did hold that defendants may rebut the presumption at the class certification stage by introducing evidence that the alleged misrepresentation did not impact the market price. The majority determined that Halliburton had not demonstrated the “special justification” necessary to overturn “a long-settled precedent.”[3] The majority also rejected Halliburton’s request that the plaintiffs be required to show a price impact to invoke the presumption because “this proposal would radically alter the required showing for the reliance element.”[4] The majority did hold that defendants can rebut the presumption by showing lack of price impact at the class certification stage because “[t]his restriction makes no sense, and can readily lead to bizarre results.”[5] The majority therefore vacated the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, noted that, although the decision would “broaden the scope of discovery available at certification,” the increased burden would be on defendants to show the absence of price impact, not on plaintiffs whose burden to raise the presumption of reliance had not changed.[6]

In a separate opinion concurring only in the judgment, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, argued that Basic should be overturned for three reasons. First, the fraud-on-the–market theory has “lost its luster”[7] in light of recent developments in economic theory.[8] Second, the presumption permits plaintiffs to bypass the requirement—as set forth in some of the Court’s most recent decisions on class certification—that plaintiffs affirmatively demonstrate compliance with Rule 23. Third, the Basic presumption of reliance is “largely irrebuttable” because “[a]fter class certification, courts have refused to allow defendants to challenge any plaintiff’s reliance on the integrity of the market price prior to a determination on classwide liability,”[9] therefore effectively eliminating the reliance requirement.

The Supreme Court’s decision has significant implications for securities fraud litigation, particularly at the class certification stage. Although plaintiffs need not prove direct price impact and may instead still raise the presumption of reliance by showing an efficient market and that the information was material and public, defendants may now rebut this presumption before class certification by showing a lack of price impact. We believe that defendants’ ability to rebut the presumption by showing no price impact effectively swallows the rule that plaintiffs need not prove a price impact. This will undoubtedly lead to a battle of the experts at the class certification stage. Although the Court’s decision does not explicitly affect other proceedings, such as a motion to dismiss, the scope of the decision will certainly be tested in the coming months and years.

Article By:

John M. Vassos
Karen Pieslak Pohlmann
Laura E. Hughes
Of:
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

[1]. No. 13-317 (U.S. June 23, 2014), available here.

[2]. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).

[3]. Halliburton II, No. 13-317, slip op. at 4; see generally id. at 4–16.

[4]. Id. at 17.

[5]. Id. at 19.

[6]. Id. at 1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

[7]. Id. at 7 (Thomas, J., concurring).

[8]. Id. at 8–9.

[9]. Id. at 13.