Category: Regulatory

New UK IDTA and Addendum Come Into Force

The new UK International Data Transfer Agreement (“IDTA”) and Addendum to the new 2021 EU Standard Contract Clauses (“New EU SCCs”) are now in force (as of the 21 March 2022), providing much needed certainty for UK organisations transferring personal data to service providers and group companies based outside of the UK/EEA.

The IDTA and Addendum replace the old EU Standard Contractual Clauses  (“Old EU SCCs”) for use as a UK GDPR-compliant transfer tool for restricted transfers from the UK, which also enables UK data exporters to comply with the European Court of Justice’s ‘Schrems II’ judgement.

For new UK data transfer arrangements or where UK organisations are in the process of reviewing their existing arrangements, use of the new ITDA or Addendum would be the best option to seek to future proof against the need to replace them in 2 years’ time.

Where the data flows involve transfers of personal data from both the UK and the EU, the use of the Addendum alongside the New EU SCCs, will enable organisations to implement a more harmonised solution.

To view copies of the documents please follow the links below:

To read our previous blog post on this topic, click here.

Article By Francesca Fellowes of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP. Hannah-Mei Grisley also contributed to this article.

For more data privacy legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

The Gensler SEC: What to Expect in 2022

Since Gary Gensler became chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in April 2021, his agency has signaled an active agenda that many expect will be aggressively enforced. Cornerstone Research recently brought together distinguished experts with SEC experience to share what they expect the SEC will focus on in 2022. The expert forum, “The Gensler SEC: Policy, Progress, and Problems,” featured Joseph Grundfest, a former commissioner of the SEC and currently serving as the W. A. Franke Professor of Law and Business at Stanford Law School; and Mary Jo White, senior chair, litigation partner, and leader of Debevoise & Plimpton’s Strategic Crisis Response and Solutions Group who previously served as chair of the SEC and as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Moderated by Jennifer Marietta-Westberg of Cornerstone Research, the forum was held before an audience of attorneys and economists and explored the major regulatory and enforcement themes expected to take center stage in the coming year.

ESG Disclosures and Materiality

In its Unified Regulatory Agenda first released in June of last year, the SEC indicated that it will propose disclosure requirements in the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) space, particularly on climate-related risks and human capital management. However, as documented by the numerous comments received as a result of the SEC’s March 15, 2021, request for input on climate change disclosures, there is substantial debate as to whether these disclosures must, or should, require disclosure only of material information. During the expert forum, Grundfest and White agreed that ESG disclosures should call for material information only. However, they have different predictions on whether ESG disclosures actually will be qualified by a materiality requirement.

White emphasized that materiality is a legal touchstone in securities laws. “If the SEC strays far from materiality, the risk is that a rule gets overturned,” she said. “Not every single rule needs to satisfy the materiality requirement, but it would be a mistake for the SEC not to explain what its basis for materiality is in this space.”

Grundfest added, “There is a spectrum of ESG issues, and while some are within the SEC’s traditional purview, others are new and further away from it. For example, to better ensure robust greenhouse emissions disclosure, the Environmental Protection Agency should be the one to require disclosure rules that would not be overturned.”

Gensler has indicated that investors want ESG disclosures in order to make investment and voting decisions. For instance, in his remarks before the Principles for Responsible Investment in July 2021, Gensler stated that “[i]nvestors are looking for consistent, comparable, and decision-useful disclosures so they can put their money in companies that fit their needs.” White predicts that some but not all ESG disclosure requirements in the proposed rules the SEC is working on will call for material information.

Grundfest, however, believes that the rules the SEC eventually adopts will require disclosure only of material information. “The SEC’s proposal on ESG disclosures will ask for everything, from the moon to the stars,” he said. “But public comments will sober the rules. The SEC staff will take into account the Supreme Court standard and the Chevron risk. It will settle on adopting materiality-based disclosure rules.”

There is also debate over the potential definition of materiality in the context of any proposed ESG disclosures. The panelists were asked whether the fact that large institutional investors assert various forms of ESG information are important to their investment decisions is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the information is material. Neither White nor Grundfest believes the Supreme Court as currently composed would accept this argument, but they differ on the reasons.

Grundfest believes the Supreme Court will stick with its approach of a hypothetical reasonable investor. “The fact that these institutional investors ask for this information doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s material,” he said. “If the SEC wants to have something done in this space, it has to work within the law.”

White said an important aspect of the rule will be the economic analysis, though she, too, does not think materiality can be “decided by an opinion poll among institutional investors.” For example, a shareholder proposal requesting certain information that has not received support does not necessarily make the information immaterial. “The Supreme Court will be tough on the survey approach,” she said.

Digital Assets and Crypto Exchanges

In several statements and testimonies, Gensler has declared the need for robust enforcement and better investor protection in the markets for digital currencies. He has publicly called the cryptocurrency space “a Wild West.” In addition to bringing enforcement actions against token issuers and other market participants on the theory that the tokens constitute securities, the SEC under his leadership has brought enforcement actions against at least one unregistered digital asset exchange on the theory that the exchange traded securities and should therefore register as securities exchange.

“The crypto space is the SEC’s most problematic area,” Grundfest said. “Franz Kafka’s most famous novel is The Trial. It’s about a person arrested and prosecuted for a crime that is never explained based on evidence that he never sees. Some recent SEC enforcement proceedings make me wonder whether Kafka is actually still alive and well, and working deep in the bowels of the SEC’s Enforcement Division.” In support of this literary reference, Professor Grundfest  noted that, in bringing enforcement actions against crypto exchanges alleging that they traded tokens that were unregistered securities, the SEC never specified which tokens traded on these exchanges were securities. “This is almost beyond regulation by enforcement. It’s regulation by FUD—fear, uncertainty, and doubt,” Grundfest said.

White predicted that, of the 311 active crypto exchanges listed by CoinMarketCap as of December 1, 2021, the SEC will bring cases against at least four in the coming year.

Gensler has publicly argued for bringing the cryptocurrency-related industry under his agency’s oversight. “We need additional congressional authorities to prevent transactions, products, and platforms from falling between regulatory cracks,” he said in August at the Aspen Security Forum. But neither White nor Grundfest believes the current Congress will enact legislation giving the SEC authority to regulate crypto transactions that do not meet the definition of an investment contract under the Howey test.

In November 2021, a federal jury in Audet v. Fraser at the District Court of Connecticut decided that certain cryptocurrency products that investors purchased were not securities under Howey. Neither Grundfest nor White believes this finding will cause the SEC to become more cautious about asserting that some forms of crypto are securities.

“One jury verdict is hardly a precedent,” White said. “The facts of the case didn’t have many of the nuances under Howey that other cases have. It will not deter the SEC.”

The panelists agreed that SEC enforcement activity will be aggressive in the crypto space. A report by Cornerstone Research, titled SEC Cryptocurrency Enforcement: 2021 Update, found that, under the new administration, the SEC has continued its role as one of the main regulators in the cryptocurrency space. In 2021, the SEC brought 20 enforcement actions against digital asset market participants, including first-of-their-kind actions against a crypto lending platform, an unregistered digital asset exchange, and a decentralized finance (DeFi) lender.

Proxy Voting

With the 2022 proxy season on the horizon, people will be watching the SEC closely, as Gensler’s Commission recently adopted new rules for universal proxy cards, and it has revisited amendments adopted under the former chair of the SEC, Jay Clayton.

Last November, the SEC adopted universal proxy rules that now allow shareholders to vote for their preferred mix of board candidates in contested elections, similar to voting in person.  These rules would put investors voting in person and by proxy on equal footing. “Universal proxy was proposed at the time when I was the chair of the SEC, and the logic for the rule is overpowering,” White said. “In adoption, some commissioners had reservations on the thresholds of voting power a dissident would be required to solicit, but voted in favor anyway based on its logic. It was a 4 to 1 vote.”

Grundfest and White expect the number of proxy contests that proceed to a vote will go up as a result. From 2019 to 2020, the incidence of proxy contests increased from 6 to 13. Looking ahead to the coming year, Grundfest predicts the rule change will increase the incidence of proxy contests by somewhere between 50% and 100%. White predicts a more modest increase of about 50%.

Regarding rules on proxy voting advice, the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L (CF) last November to address Rule 14a-8(i)(7), which permits exclusion of a shareholder proposal that “deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.”

The bulletin puts forth a new Staff position that now denies no-action relief to registrants seeking to exclude shareholder proposals that transcend the company’s day-to-day business matters. “This exception is essential for preserving shareholders’ right to bring important issues before other shareholders by means of the company’s proxy statement, while also recognizing the board’s authority over most day-to-day business matters,” the bulletin said.

Both White and Grundfest believe a modest number of issuers will go to court in the 2022 proxy season seeking to exclude Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals as “transcending” day-to-day operations. “I think companies will challenge shareholder proposals in court but not a lot,” White said. “It depends on the shareholder proposal.”

Grundfest believes any such cases would be driven as much by CEOs as by any other factor. “Companies may challenge a shareholder proposal in court if they have a CEO who is offended by a certain proposal or for First Amendment reasons,” he said. Grundfest cited a hypothetical example of a software company in Texas with a shareholder proposal on gun rights or abortion rights, which have nothing to do with the cybersecurity software the company produces. “It would be hard to force a company to put forth a politically charged proposal that is not related to that company’s business,” he said. “If it’s a First Amendment right, the company will go to court.”

Article By Jennifer Marietta-Westberg and Simona Mola of Cornerstone Research

For more SEC and securities legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright ©2022 Cornerstone Research

Europol: More Than Half of Counterfeits Originate in China

On March 7, 2022, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) jointly released the Intellectual Property Crime Threat Assessment 2022. Per the Assessment, China (including Hong Kong) was the main source of counterfeits based on number of counterfeits and by value of the counterfeits seized at the EU external borders.  Almost 76% of the fake goods detained were for trademark infringement; design infringement was the second most reported at 23% while copyright was third with 15%.

China and Turkey remain the main countries of origins for counterfeit clothing, shoes, bags, watches, and jewelry seized at the EU’s border. These goods are mostly ordered online and discovered as part of postal shipments or on passengers entering the EU.

Similarly, China is the country of origin for most of the seized counterfeit electrical/electronic and computer equipment, mobile phones and accessories. With respect to mobile phones, the Assessment states,

…the visual appearance of the counterfeit devices is very convincing, closely mimicking the external characteristics of the original phones. However, typically some features and software characteristics are missing and the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) is often fake.  The use of cheap and substandard electric components, which can be found in fake batteries, headphones or chargers, pose safety risks.

“China and Turkey were among the most frequently reported non-EU countries of origin for counterfeit food and drink seized at the EU’s external border.” Similarly, counterfeit perfumes and cosmetic products often originate from China and Turkey.

In addition to ready-to-use IPR-infringing goods, product components, such as aroma compounds, fixatives and solvents, are increasingly being seized. These components are used to create the final counterfeit products in the EU.

More worrisome, China and Turkey were the main origin of counterfeit pharmaceutical products.

Toys round out the top 10 counterfeits with China also being main point of origin.

The full Assessment is available here: IP_Crime_Threat_Assessment_2022_FullR_en.

Article By Aaron Wininger of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Sugar Association Files Supplemental Petition Urging Regulatory Changes for Artificially Sweetened Foods

  • This week the Sugar Association submitted a Supplemental petition (“Supplement”) to FDA to further support the Association’s June 2020 petition Misleading Labeling Sweeteners and Request for Enforcement Action (“Petition”).  As noted in a previous post, the Association’s petition asks FDA to promulgate regulations requiring additional labeling disclosures for artificially sweetened products, which it believes are necessary to avoid consumer deception. Other than acknowledging accepting the petition for filing on Nov. 30, 2020, (see Regulations.gov), the agency has not responded.
  • The Supplement provides new data and information that the Association believes supports its original Petition, alleging that misleading labeling is “getting more prolific in the absence of FDA action.”  According to the Association, the number of new food product launches containing non-sugar sweeteners has increased by 832% since 2000, with 300% growth in just the last five years.  To further support its position, the Association references consumer research that it commissioned, suggesting that consumers think it is important to know if their foods contain sugar alternatives.
  • The Association is urging FDA to mandate significant additional disclosures on labels of artificially sweetened food products, including the following requirements to —
    • Clearly identify the presence of alternative sweeteners in the ingredient list;
    • Indicate the type and quantity of alternative sweeteners, in milligrams per serving, on the front of package of food and beverage products consumed by children;
    • Disclose the sweetener used on the front of package for products making a sugar content claim, such as “Sweetened with [name of Sweetener(s)]” beneath the claim;
    • Disclose gastrointestinal effects of various sweeteners at minimum thresholds of  effect;
    • Require that no/low/reduced sugars claims be accompanied by the disclosure “not lower in calories” unless such products have 25% fewer calories than the comparison food.

Article By The Food and Drug Law Practice Group at Keller and Heckman LLP

For more biotech, food, and drug legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Keller and Heckman LLP

GDPR Privacy Rules: The Other Shoe Drops

Four years after GDPR was implemented, we are seeing the pillars of the internet business destroyed. Given two new EU decisions affecting the practical management of data, all companies collecting consumer data in the EU are re-evaluating their business models and will soon be considering wholesale changes.

On one hand, the GDPR is creating the world its drafters intended – a world where personal data is less of a commodity exploited and traded by business. On the other hand, GDPR enforcement has taken the form of a wrecking ball, leading to data localization in Europe and substitution of government meddling for consumer choice.

For years we have watched the EU courts and enforcement agencies apply GDPR text to real-life cases, wondering if the legal application would be more of a nip and tuck operation on ecommerce or something more bloody and brutal. In 2022, we received our answer, and the bodies are dropping.

In January Austrian courts decided that companies can’t use Google Analytics to study their own site’s web traffic. The same conclusion was reached last week by French regulators. While Google doesn’t announce statistics about product usage, website tracker BuiltWith published that 29.3 million websites use Google Analytics, including 69.5 percent of Quantcast’s Top 10,000 sites, and that is more than ten times the next most popular option. So vast numbers of companies operating in Europe will need to change their platform analytics provider – if the Euro-crats will allow them to use site analytics at all.

But these decisions were not based on the functionality of Google Analytics, a tool that does not even capture personally identifiable information – no names, no home or office address, no phone numbers. Instead, these decisions that will harm thousands of businesses were a result of the Schrems II decision, finding fault in the transfer of this non-identifiable data to a company based in the United States. The problem here for European decision-makers is that US law enforcement may have access to this data if courts allow them. I have written before about this illogical conclusion and won’t restate the many arguments here, other than to say that EU law enforcement behaves the same way.

The effects of this decision will be felt far beyond the huge customer base of Google Analytics.  The logic of this decision effectively means that companies collecting data from EU citizens can no longer use US-based cloud services like Amazon Web Services, IBM, Google, Oracle or Microsoft. I would anticipate that huge cloud player Alibaba Cloud could suffer the same proscription if Europe’s privacy panjandrums decide that China’s privacy protection is as threatening as the US.

The Austrians held that all the sophisticated measures taken by Google to encrypt analytic data meant nothing, because if Google could decrypt it, so could the US government. By this logic, no US cloud provider – the world’s primary business data support network – could “safely” hold EU data. Which means that the Euro-crats are preparing to fine any EU company that uses a US cloud provider. Max Schrems saw this decision in stark terms, stating, “The bottom line is: Companies can’t use US cloud services in Europe anymore.”

This decision will ultimately support the Euro-crats’ goal of data localization as companies try to organize local storage/processing solutions to avoid fines. Readers of this blog have seen coverage of the EU’s tilt toward data localization (for example, here and here) and away from the open internet that European politicians once held as the ideal. The Euro-crats are taking serious steps toward forcing localized data processing and cutting US businesses out of the ecommerce business ecosystem. The Google Analytics decision is likely to be seen as a tipping point in years to come.

In a second major practical online privacy decision, earlier this month the Belgian Data Protection Authority ruled that the Interactive Advertising Bureau Europe’s Transparency and Consent Framework (TCF), a widely-used technical standard built for publishers, advertisers, and technology vendors to obtain user consent for data processing, does not comply with the GDPR. The TCF allows users to accept or reject cookie-based advertising, relieving websites of the need to create their own expensive technical solutions, and creating a consistent experience for consumers. Now the TCF is considered per-se illegal under EU privacy rules, casting thousands of businesses to search for or design their own alternatives, and removing online choices for European residents.

The Belgian privacy authority reached this conclusion by holding that the Interactive Advertising Bureau was a “controller” of all the data managed under its proposed framework. As stated by the Center for Data Innovation, this decision implies “that any good-faith effort to implement a common data protection protocol by an umbrella organization that wants to uphold GDPR makes said organization liable for the data processing that takes place under this protocol.” No industry group will want to put itself in this position, leaving businesses to their own devices and making ecommerce data collection much less consistent and much more expensive – even if that data collection is necessary to fulfill the requests of consumers.

For years companies thought that informed consumer consent would be a way to personalize messaging and keep consumer costs low online, but the EU has thrown all online consent regimes into question. EU regulators have effectively decided that people can’t make their own decisions about allowing data to be collected. If TCF – the consent system used by 80% of the European internet and a system designed specifically to meet the demands of the GDPR – is now illegal, then, for a second time in a month, all online consumer commerce is thrown into confusion. Thousands were operating websites with TCF and Google Analytics, believing they were following the letter of the law.  That confidence has been smashed.

We are finally seeing the practical effects of the GDPR beyond its simple utility for fining US tech companies.  Those effects are leading to a closed-border internet around Europe and a costlier, less customizable internet for EU citizens. The EU is clearly harming businesses around the world and making its internet a more cramped place. I have trouble seeing the logic and benefit of these decisions, but the GDPR was written to shake the system, and privacy benefits may emerge.

Copyright © 2022 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about international privacy, visit the NLR Cybersecurity, Media & FCC section.

Agriculture Groups Sue FDA on Chlorpyrifos Ban

  • As previously reported, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a final rule on August 30, 2021 that revoked all tolerances for the pesticide chemical chlorpyrifos on raw agricultural commodities; the rulemaking was driven by toxicity concerns, primarily concerning exposure in children. The tolerances are set to expire on February 28, 2022, effectively banning the use of chlorpyrifos on food crops. In light of the expiration, FDA published a guidance document to assist food producers and processors that handle foods which may contain chlorpyrifos restudies.
  • In October of 2021, agriculture stakeholders submitted formal written objections and a request to stay the tolerance revocations to EPA. More than 80 stakeholders signed the document, arguing that significant harms would result from banning chlorpyrifos and urging the agency to stay implementation of the rule until objections were formally addressed by EPA.
  • Agriculture stakeholder groups are now seeking a court injunction against EPA’s ban on chlorpyrifos. On February 10, 2022, agricultural trade groups representing thousands of members filed a lawsuit against EPA before the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, alleging that the agency ignored its own scientific findings regarding 11 high-benefit and low-risk crop uses for chlorpyrifos and that the revocation will cause irreparable damage. It remains to be seen how EPA will respond to the lawsuit.

Article By Food and Drug Law Practice Group at Keller and Heckman LLP

For more food and drug legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Keller and Heckman LLP

Ongoing Canadian Protests Shine Spotlight on Ripple Effect of Supply Chain Disruptions

Although the last two years have seen a nearly never-ending line of supply chain impacts for manufacturers, the latest disruption is also serving to shine a spotlight on the broader impact that relatively small disruptions in the supply chain can have on the global economy.  We all know that trucking is a critical component of the economy.  The U.S. estimates seventy two percent of goods in the U.S. travel by truck.  Trucking has become even more important in this era of increased deliveries and backlogs at ports and other logistics hubs.

In Canada, what began as protests by truckers regarding certain pandemic-related restrictions and mandates have snowballed into broader protests and blockages of roads, bridges, and border crossings.

Protesters have been blocking various bridges and roads in Canada in protest of certain pandemic-related restrictions and mandates.  On Tuesday, the bridge connecting Windsor, Ontario to Detroit (a critical linkage for cross-border travel) was largely blocked, with traffic stopped going into Canada and slowed to a trickle going into the United States. The blockades are now leading U.S. automakers to begin trimming shifts and pausing certain operations in their Michigan and Canadian plants. The bridge protests and automakers’ reduction in capacity continued on Thursday without an end in sight.

The ongoing protests in Canada have also served as a reminder of how seemingly local trucking disruptions in one country can cascade through the supply chain.  This is not the first time that trucking strikes and blockages have rippled through the supply chain and economy.  In 1996, a truckers’ strike in France lasted 12 days, barricading major highways and ultimately leading to concessions from the French government over certain worker benefits and hours.  The resulting agreement led to heightened tensions with Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain due to the impact felt across borders.  In 2008, truckers went on strike in Spain and blocked roads and border crossings, protesting fuel prices.  In 2018, truckers in Brazil staged a large strike and protest that lasted for 10 days, blocking roads, disrupting food and fuel distribution, canceling flights, and causing certain part shortages for automakers.

The ongoing protests in Canada have similarly expanded from Ottawa to the current blockage of border crossings, further raising their profile internationally as they begin to impact global trade.  It remains to be seen how the blockades and protests will resolve, as leaders call for de-escalation and re-opening of roads and crossings.  However, the ripple effects of what started as a localized protest will continue to be felt far beyond Canada’s borders.

Article By Lauren M. Loew of Foley & Lardner LLP

For more COVID-19 and supply chain legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

Federal Cannabis Reform – Is 2022 the Year?

Hope soared with the possibility of federal cannabis reform in 2021.  And for good reason –  the induction of a new, more liberal administration, rapid state-level legalization, broad support by Americans,[1] and growing bipartisan backing led many to believe that 2021 was going to be the year where federal decriminalization of cannabis would become a reality.  But, as 2021 continued on, optimism dwindled as any advancement in federal cannabis reform was hobbled by the inability of Congress to agree on the appropriate level of reform  and the proper mechanics for passage.  Specifically, tension rose amongst the elected Democrats on whether to support incremental reform (like access to banks or removal of cannabis from the list of Schedule 1 drugs) or comprehensive legalization with provisions to address social inequities stemming from the legacy of the War on Drugs.  And so 2021 came to an end, and the cannabis industry saw yet another year of failed meaningful change on the federal level.

Still, momentum for reform has not been lost.  If anything, last year saw more bills introduced into Congress (including two new federal legalization proposals) than ever before – clearly indicating its import to our nation’s leaders.  Justice Clarence Thomas from the Supreme Court even subtly advised Congress to address legalization, noting that the Federal Government’s current “half in, half out regime” on cannabis strained the principles of federalism.

And so, as we move forward in 2022 with hope, we review the bills before Congress and their progresses to assess which of these may have some traction for passage during this upcoming year.

Secure and Fair Enforcement (“SAFE”) Banking Act of 2021[2]

Considered modest reform, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 mainly focused on granting cannabis-related businesses access to federally-backed financial institutions.  The bill was introduced early in 2021,[3] and passed in the U.S. House of Representatives on April 20, 2021 by a vote of 321 to 101.  At the time of the House’s passage, many believed the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 would easily move its way through the Senate, due – in part – to its demonstrated bipartisan appeal with 106 Republican votes in the House.  Congressman Ed Pearlman, one of its drafters, even remarked:

After years of bringing up this issue, I’m thrilled to see overwhelming support for this bipartisan, commonsense legislation in the U.S. House once again. I feel optimistic about the path forward for the SAFE Banking Act and, more broadly, reforms to our federal cannabis laws.[4]

However, after its passage in the House, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 languished in the Senate’s Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.  Momentum for the bill slowed, with those opposing it campaigning for more comprehensive legalization.  In late September 2021, fervor for the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 arose again when the House passed, by voice vote, an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (“NDAA”) to add the SAFE Banking Act of 2021.  Many hoped that by couching the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 in the NDAA, it would make it easier to pass through the Senate.  On November 23, 2021, 4 Senators[5] penned a letter to the Senate’s Armed Services Committee urging them to retain the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 in the NDAA.  Despite these efforts, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 was stripped from the NDAA on December 10, 2021 – stalling its progress once more.

The Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment & Expungement (“MORE”) Act

The MORE Act is the oldest comprehensive legislative proposal.  It was passed in the House in December 2020, during a lame-duck session, but never made any headway in the Senate.[6]  On May 28, 2021, Representative Jerrold Nadler reintroduced the MORE Act into the House and much of its substance provided the legislative stepping stones for the Cannabis Administrative and Opportunity Act (“CAO”).

The MORE Act aimed to end criminalization of cannabis by removing it from the list of controlled  substances, eliminate related past criminal penalties and convictions, and provide essential criminal justice reform, social justice and economic development for those affected by the War on Drugs.  The MORE Act also would tax cannabis products starting at 5% to 8% (increasing by 1% over 5 years) to help fund social reform projects, make Small Business Administration loans and services available to cannabis-related businesses, and prohibit denial of federal public benefits (like housing) and protections under immigration law on the basis of cannabis-related conduct or conviction.

After sitting in the House Judiciary Committee, the bill was finally approved in the Committee on September 30, 2021, with 2 Republican Representatives voting yes.  This act sent the measure to the House floor for another vote before it could make its way to the Senate.

The Cannabis Administrative and Opportunity Act

Embracing the MORE Act’s goals for comprehensive reform, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (along with Senators Cory Booker  and Ron Wyden) introduced the long awaited draft of the CAO into the Senate on July 14, 2021.  Considered a historic and ambitious bill, the CAO aimed to implement a full-scale federal scheme for cannabis reform that reaches beyond just decriminalization.  It hopes to provide restorative measures “to lift up people and communities who were unfairly targeted in the War on Drugs.”[7] Specifically, the CAO seeks to do the following:

  • Decriminalize cannabis by removing it from the Controlled Substances Act and automatically expunge any arrests and convictions for non-violent federal cannabis offenses;
  • Transfer primary agency jurisdiction over cannabis to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (“TTB”), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) so that cannabis can be federally regulated similar to alcohol and tobacco;
  • Establish a Center for Cannabis Products responsible for regulating the “cannabis aspect of all products containing cannabis,” and implementing requirements related to cannabis products (g., good manufacturing practice, product standards, product labeling, product distribution and recall, etc.) within the FDA;
  • Mandate federal research and studies regarding the impact of cannabis (including any benefits and/or impairments) on the human brain and health conditions and its impact on drivers under its influence;
  • Permit movement of cannabis products through channels of interstate commerce;
  • Establish Opportunity Trust Fund Programs funded by federal cannabis tax revenue to restore and reinvest in communities greatly impacted by the War on Drugs (including funds for job training, reentry services, legal aid, and youth recreation/mentoring programs) and to help level the playing field by granting entrepreneurs of color access to the cannabis industry through small business loans;
  • Prohibit denial of federal benefits or immigration protection due to a past cannabis-related offense; and
  • Impose federal excise tax on sale of cannabis products, starting at 10% and increasing up to 25% in a span of 5 years, with certain favorable tax credit for cannabis producers with less than $20 million sales.

Though the CAO has lofty goals, it does not force states to legalize cannabis, emphasizing the integrity of state-specific cannabis law.

As a draft bill, the CAO was subject to a review period in which its authors requested public comments by September 1, 2021.  At the expiration of this review period, the drafters of the bill received numerous comments from both supporters and those criticizing the CAO as overly ambitious and a big-government approach.  In particular, many critics take issue with the bill’s tax structure, calling the imposition of an ultimate 25% federal excise tax burdensome.  Indeed, the CAO – as it stands – implements the highest tax structure for cannabis products of all the bills proposed in 2021.  Many allege that the high federal tax in addition to any state-imposed tax could promote the illicit cannabis market rather than encourage business owners to engage legally.  Additionally, the high federal tax could force states to reduce their own tax requirements, negatively affecting their own ability to fund state-run social equity and education initiatives.

For now, the public comments have been taken under advisement as the cannabis industry waits to see what the drafters decide to incorporate.  Once formally filed, the CAO will be sent to a committee for continued discussions and revisions before it can be advanced to the Senate floor for a vote.

The States Reform Act

The States Reform Act (“SRA”) is the latest comprehensive reform bill led by Republican Representative Nancy Mace and introduced in the House in November 15, 2021.  Like the MORE Act and the CAO, the SRA also seeks to decriminalize cannabis and provides retroactive expungement for non-violent federal cannabis offense, except for any person involved in a drug cartel.  However, the SRA differentiates itself by limiting federal social equity reform programs.  Instead, the SRA vests the authority  to determine what level of cannabis reform, including outright prohibition, in the individual states.  States will also retain authority to regulate the use, distribution, sale and manufacturing of cannabis, with some general federal oversight by the FDA, TTB, ATF and the Department of Agriculture.  Specifically, the SRA aims to regulate cannabis like alcohol (and alcohol alone) – another substantial difference from the CAO.  The SRA permits each state to determine the appropriate age limit for purchase of cannabis products, but incentivizes states to implement a 21+ limit by eliminating funding for highways for any state with an age limit of under 21 years of age and prohibiting advertisements directed at any person under the age of 21.  The bill also seeks to provide veterans with access to medical cannabis without fear of discrimination or denial of Veteran Affairs benefits.  The SRA also generally requires that medical cannabis be permitted for treatment of arthritis, cancer and chronic pain.  Similar to the CAO, the SRA will also allow the interstate cannabis transportation.

Notably, the SRA provides the lowest tax structure for cannabis products in comparison to other reform proposals, with the proposed imposition of a single tax rate of 3% that cannot be increased for at least 10 years.  Revenues from the tax would be used to support SBA programs for cannabis businesses, law enforcement initiatives including reentry programs, and veteran mental health programs.

Given its recency, little is known about the bill’s reception in the House and any progress that has been made.  However, the SRA does carry potential bipartisan appeal, particularly because it is sponsored by 4 Republican Representatives.  Additionally, it is anticipated that the Congressional Republicans will appreciate the SRA’s straight forward tax structure capped at a low rate for at least 10 years and its stance on states’ sovereignty regarding cannabis reform.  The real issue for the SRA is its lack of restorative justice and social equity efforts, which may be its death knell in the current Democrat-controlled House.

Implications for 2022

There are now 4 bills (3 with comprehensive legislation) circulating Capitol Hill that could provide much needed cannabis reform in 2022.  Congress will likely continue debating, revising and attempting to compromise on the terms in the MORE Act, the CAO and the SRA.  Potentially, if the 3 comprehensive bills remain on the discussion table, they will compete with one another, potentially dividing the Legislators’ support.  Congress should thus focus on forging a compromise or middle ground on these reforms to increase bipartisan support and avoid competing and inconsistent bills floating around, resulting in another year of unwanted (and unnecessary) deadlock.  Indeed, the CAO could be an example of such needed compromise – especially if the drafters seriously heed the criticisms and comments provided during the bill’s review period and consider incorporating certain bipartisan elements of the SRA, like a more stream-lined and lower rate tax structure.  With that said, the status of these cannabis reform bills, particularly the CAO and the MORE Act, face potential change should this year’s mid-term elections change the makeup of who controls the Senate, House or both.

Regardless, until Congress can iron out the kinks on comprehensive cannabis reform, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 remains a practical law to pass in the interim.  The SAFE Banking Act of 2021 is currently the least controversial of all the cannabis-reform bills, has substantial bipartisan appeal, and will provide immediate financial resources and relief to the largely cash-based cannabis industry.  Though a small reform, it is still a necessary one that is long overdue.  The SAFE Banking Act of 2021 (and its predecessors) has already made its way through the House 6 times, proving that federal lawmakers believe it will help cannabis businessmen.  It may not resolve the issue of prohibition on cannabis, but its passage will likely be a great victory for the cannabis industry, signal federal de-stigmatization of cannabis, promote public safety by discouraging participation in the illicit cannabis market, and help cannabis-related businesses comply with tax laws.

Footnotes

[1] https://news.gallup.com/poll/356939/support-legal-marijuana-holds-record…

[2] On February 4, 2022, the SAFE Banking Act passed again in the House – this time, as an included amendment to the America COMPLETES Act.

[3] The bill is the successor to the previously introduced SAFE Banking Act of 2019.  See https://www.cannabislawblog.com/2021/09/safe-banking-act-2021/

[4] https://perlmutter.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=5486

[5] Gary Peters, Angus King, Kevin Cramer, and Mark Kelly

[6] https://www.cannabislawblog.com/2020/12/house-representatives-passes-bil…

[7] https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CAOA%20Detailed%20Summary

 

Article By Jennifer N. Le of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more cannabis legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Mississippi Enacts Medical Marijuana Law

Mississippi Governor Tate Reeves signed legislation legalizing medical cannabis on February 2, 2022. Known as the “Mississippi Medical Cannabis Act”, the law permits the use of medical cannabis to treat certain debilitating medical conditions including cancer, Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease, muscular dystrophy, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, ALS, Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, sickle-cell anemia, Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism,  cachexia or wasting syndrome, chronic pain, severe or intractable nausea, seizures, severe and persistent muscle spasms, among others.  The law was effective immediately upon signing by the Governor, although medical cannabis will not become available for months.

Medical cannabis products will include cannabis flower, cannabis extracts, edible cannabis products, beverages, topical products, ointments, oils, tinctures and suppositories.

The medical cannabis law contains many favorable provisions for employers.  Specifically:

  1. Employers are not required to permit or accommodate the medical use of medical cannabis, or to modify any job or working conditions or any employee who engages in the medical use of cannabis, or seeks to engage in the medical use of cannabis;
  2. Employers are not prohibited from refusing to hire, discharging, disciplining, or otherwise taking adverse employment action against an individual with respect to hiring, discharging, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment as a result, in whole or in part, of that individual’s medical use of medical cannabis, regardless of the individual’s impairment or lack of impairment resulting from the medical use of medical cannabis;
  3. Employers are not prohibited from establishing or enforcing a drug testing policy;
  4. Employers may discipline employees who use medical cannabis in the workplace or who work while under the influence of medical cannabis.
  5. The law does not interfere with, impair or impede any federal requirements or regulations such as the U.S. Department of Transportation’s drug and alcohol testing regulations;
  6. The law does not permit, authorize or establish an individual’s right to commence or undertake any legal action against an employer for refusing to hire, discharging, disciplining or otherwise taking an adverse employment action against an individual with respect to hiring, discharging, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges or employment due to the individual’s medical use of medical cannabis;
  7. Employers and their workers’ compensation carriers are not required to pay for or to reimburse an individual for the costs associated with the medical use of cannabis;
  8. The law does not affect, alter or otherwise impact the workers’ compensation premium discount available to employers who establish a drug-free workplace program in accordance with Miss. Code Section 71-3-201 et seq.;
  9. The law does not affect, alter or otherwise impact an employer’s right to deny or establish legal defenses to the payment of workers’ compensation benefits to an employee on the basis of a positive drug test or refusal to submit to or cooperate with a drug test, as provided under Miss. Code Sections 71-3-7 and 71-3-121;
  10. The law does not authorize an individual to act with negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, in breach of any applicable professional or occupational standard of care, or to effect an intentional wrong, as a result, in whole or in part, of that individual’s medical use of medical cannabis;
  11. The law prohibits smoking and vaping medical cannabis in a public place or in a motor vehicle;
  12. The law prohibits operating, navigating, or being in actual physical control of any motor vehicle, aircraft, train, motor boat or other conveyance in a manner that would violate state or federal law as a result, in whole or in part, of that individual’s medical use of medical cannabis; and,
  13. The law does not create a private right of action by an employee against an employer.

Mississippi employers should review the law to determine whether any revisions to drug and alcohol testing policies or other workplace policies will be necessary.

Article By Kathryn J. Russo of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more cannabis legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022