Regulatory Archives - Page 19 of 30 - The National Law Forum

Considerations For International Clients Who Intend to Buy A Home In the U.S.

International buyers invested $82.5 billion in U.S. residential real estate (4.8% of total U.S. sales) according to the most recent survey conducted by the National Association of Realtors for the 12 month period ending with March 2012. According to that survey, the top states in the U.S. for international buyers were Florida, California, Arizona and Texas. That survey also finds that the top-five international buyers were from Canada, China, Mexico, India, and the United Kingdom and that Brazil also remains a major source of purchasers. Homes are bought in the U.S. for investment, vacation-use, temporary use for professional, educational (which could include providing a home to a child who is pursuing his or her education in the U.S.), and a myriad of other reasons.

U.S. home buying and ownership, without proper planning, can have unexpected and unintended consequences. Many international clients are not aware that ownership of a U.S. home triggers U.S. estate tax on death and a gift of the property during lifetime triggers U.S. gift tax. U.S. estate and gift tax is imposed at a rate of 40%. An individual who is neither a U.S. citizen nor domiciled in the U.S. can shelter only $60,000 of U.S. situs assets on death (i.e. assets located or deemed to be located within the U.S.). In terms of gifting, an individual who is neither a U.S. citizen nor domiciled in the U.S. can make annual exclusion gifts of $14,000 per year to anyone and can currently pass $143,000 per year to a spouse who is not a U.S. citizen free of gift tax. That is in contrast to the $5,250,000 that a U.S. citizen or domiciliary can pass free of estate tax on death or by gift during lifetime as well as unlimited transfers to a U.S. citizen spouse.

To avoid triggering U.S. estate tax on death, many international clients are counseled to take title to the home in a foreign “blocker” corporation which, if respected, is not subject to U.S. estate tax on death. This form of title has the added advantage of providing anonymity and liability protector to the shareholder . Owning a home in a foreign corporation triggers other more immediate tax concerns such as application of the corporate tax rate (up to 35%) in lieu of the preferential long-term capital gains rates on sale (up to 20%), possible imputed rental income for use of corporate property by the shareholder, loss of step-up in the income basis of the home on the death of the owner (the basis of the stock in the corporation would be adjusted but the inside basis—the home itself would not be entitled to a basis adjustment), and loss of the ability to avoid the home being reassessed for California real property tax purposes on transfer from parent to a child. In addition, a U.S. person who will inherit shares in a corporation that will either become a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) or a passive foreign investment company (PFIC) faces numerous special compliance obligations and substantive tax issues as a result of the ownership of those shares. There are many other ways to take title, such as through a LLC or a trust and each option should be explored in depth to achieve the client’s objectives to the maximum extent possible. Consideration should also be given to planning aimed at avoiding a public court proceeding that would be necessary to convey title to the beneficiaries of an international client who dies holding title directly to a U.S. home.

Article By:

Amy L. McEvoy

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

Protect Your CEO’s Tweets and Posts from U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Enforcement Action

Mark F. Foley with von Briesen & Roper, S.C. had an article, Protect Your CEO’s Tweets and Posts from U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Enforcement Action, recently featured in The National Law Review:

The U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Enforcement Division altered the jet stream of blogosphere commentary last December by, for the first time, recommending legal action against a CEO on account of a Facebook post. Immediately after the announcement, a blizzard of articles, tweets, and blogs buried the mediascape with opinions about the critical role of CEO social media use in the new economy, the wisdom or foolishness of allowing CEO’s to Tweet or post, and whether the SEC should be time warped back to the Stone Age it seems to prefer.

Sweeping away the accumulated hyperbole reveals two important takeaways from the SEC’s announcement, applicable to both public and private companies: i) the more things change, the more they remain the same, and ii) this latest “grave threat” to the modern world is not a crisis, but an opportunity. Social media can be a valid, legal, and effective way to communicate with investors, if it’s done right.

About Regulation FD

The SEC’s action responded to a July 2012 Facebook post by CEO Reed Hastings stating that members watched over 1 billion hours on Netflix in June. Netflix estimated that Hastings had reached 200,000 people through his Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn accounts. The SEC felt this was material information for investors and that by announcing it through social media, rather than more traditional outlets, Netflix had violated Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD).

The SEC adopted Reg. FD in 2000 to fix a perceived lack of fairness in the public securities markets. Before Reg. FD, public companies could share material information with analysts who participated in conference calls or meetings not open to smaller investors. Well-connected investors got trading advantages over the general public. Reg. FD prohibits public companies from providing material information to limited groups of investors without simultaneously making the information available to the entire marketplace.

Under Reg. FD, public disclosures must be made by “filing or furnishing a Form 8-K, or by another method or combination of methods that is reasonably designed to effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.” The “other method” most often employed is a press release to an array of media outlets likely to disseminate the information broadly and quickly. Individuals and companies violating Reg. FD risk injunctions and monetary penalties.

Use of Social Media Growing, Creating Risks

Social media channels first became critical communication tools for companies after adoption of Reg. FD. A 2010 study of the 100 largest companies in the Fortune 500 found that 79% were using at least one of the four most popular social media platforms. See Burson-Marsteller Fortune Global 100 Social Media Study, Feb. 23, 2010, available at http://www.burson-marsteller.com/Innovation_and_insights/blogs_and_podcasts/BM_Blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=160

A 2012 Forbes article cited an IBM study saying 57% of surveyed CEO’s likely would be using social media by 2017. Mark Fidelman, IBM Study: If you Don’t Have a Social CEO, YourGoing to be Less Competitive, FORBES, May 22, 2012.

The SEC itself uses social media to disclose important information such as speeches, trading suspensions, litigation releases, and administrative proceedings.

While some CEOs see social media as “part of their job description,” others try to minimize risk by having employees write or review tweets before posting, and some CEOs have already tried social media and moved on. See Leslie Kwoh and Melissa Korn, 140 Characters of Risk: Some CEO’s Fear Twitter, WALL STREET JOURNAL, September 26, 2012.

Not everyone does, or should, use all forms of social media. The point of Twitter, for example, is to provide information contemporaneously with the occurrence of a thought or an event. This promptness is both the differentiating touchstone of the medium and its source of danger. Quick, unconsidered, unscripted communications by senior executives of public companies pose risks in the form of leaked intellectual property, disclosed business plans, angered customers, litigious investors, and frothy regulators. The SEC Netflix announcement demonstrates the potential for liability arising from disclosures of information requiring consideration through social media focused solely on promptness. A Facebook post subjected to prior review might have been a better choice.

Even where the SEC does not act, executives may be at risk. In May 2012, retailer Francesca’s Holdings Corporation fired its CFO, Gene Morphis after he tweeted: “Board meeting. Good numbers = Happy Board.” Mr. Morphis, who was also active on other social media outlets, had a history of postings about earnings calls, road shows, and other work related matters. Morphis lost his job even though the SEC took no action. Rachel Emma Silverman, Facebook and Twitter Postings Cost CFO His Job, WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 14, 2012.

Social Media Without Big Risk

The SEC has never issued guidance about the use of social media, but it has issued guidance that websites could be deemed sufficiently “public” to satisfy Reg. FD when: (1) it is a recognized channel of distribution, (2) posting on the web site disseminates the information in a manner making it available to the securities marketplace in general, and (3) there has been a reasonable waiting period for investors and the market to react to the posted information. Indeed, “for some companies in certain circumstances, posting … information on the company’s web site, in and of itself, may be a sufficient method of public disclosure,” SEC Release No. 34-58288 (Aug. 7, 2008) at 18, 25.

This is an example of how “the more things change, the more they stay the same” when it comes to the intersection of law and technology. The purpose of Reg. FD is to make sure that all investors have access to the same information roughly simultaneously. The specific communications method is not important so long as the principle of public disclosure to the general market, not subsets of investors, is served. Because 8-K filings and press releases were the most common ways to quickly and broadly disseminate information in the past, investors knew where to look for them and could monitor those information outlets. Now, when companies establish their websites as well-known places to find press releases, SEC filings, and supplemental information, they, too, have become acceptable means for Reg. FD disclosures.

The same analysis applies to social media, as well as any new communications technology that may exist in the future. The critical question is: has the company sufficiently alerted the market to its disclosure practices based on the regularity, prominence, accuracy, accessibility, and media coverage of its disclosure methods? If so, social media should be just as acceptable as any other communication tool.

One company seems to have found the right balance. Alan Meckler, CEO of WebMediaBrands Inc. drew the SEC’s attention after a pattern of regularly disclosing company information through social media back in December 2010. The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance questioned whether Mr. Meckler’s Tweets “conveyed information in compliance with Regulation FD.”SEC letter dated December 9, 2010. Despite, the investigation, the SEC brought no enforcement action.

To use social media with minimum SEC risk, the company must educate investors so that they know such communications will always occur at a particular place and at least simultaneously with other outlets. This is done by a regular pattern of social media disclosure and links to other sources, such as SEC filings, showing the way. A company should not force investors to win a shell game, finding the nut of important information in Twitter this time, on Facebook the next time, and Instagram after that. Consistency, predictability, and transparency are key. Used this way, social media present an opportunity to communicate with investors in new ways, not a source of legal problems.

SEC Approves NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ Compensation Committee Listing Standards

The National Law Review recently published an article by Jeff C. Dodd and Scott L. Olson with Andrews Kurth LLP regarding, SEC regulations:

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently approved amendments to the compensation committee listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),¹ the NYSE MKT² and the NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ)³ that were initially proposed in September 2012 to comply with Rule 10C-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.⁴ In approving the listing standards, the SEC did not require any changes to the exchanges’ proposals, as amended.

The new listing standards will impact the authority and responsibilities of compensation committees with respect to their advisers and the independence analysis for compensation committee members. Although the SEC has approved the new compensation committee listing standards, issuers with listed equity securities subject to the new standards will have time to comply as follows.

NYSE- and NYSE MKT-listed issuers have until:

the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014, to comply with the enhanced compensation committee independence standards; and
July 1, 2013 to comply with the remaining standards (e.g., the authority to retain and fund advisers to the committee and the responsibility to consider specified independence factors before selecting or receiving advice from advisers).

NASDAQ-listed issuers have until:

July 1, 2013 to establish in the compensation committee charter, board resolutions or other board action the compensation committee’s new responsibilities and authority (i.e., the authority to retain and fund advisers to the committee and the responsibility to consider specified independence factors before selecting or receiving advice from advisers); and
the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014, to comply with the remaining standards (e.g., have a formal compensation committee of at least two independent directors, have a compensation committee charter and satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standards).

Current compensation committee listing standards will apply pending the transition to the new standards.

Click here to read about key aspects of the NYSE’s new compensation committee listing standards.

Click here to read about key aspects of the NYSE MKT’s new compensation committee listing standards.

Click here to read about key aspects of NASDAQ’s new compensation committee listing standards.

Click here to read about practical considerations for NYSE-, NYSE MKT- and NASDAQ-listed issuers to consider in response to the new compensation committee listing standards.

NYSE Compensation Committee Listing Standards

Committee charter requirements for compensation committee authority and responsibilities regarding its advisers. In addition to current NYSE charter requirements, compensation committee charters must specify the following:

the committee’s authority, in its sole discretion, to retain or obtain the advice of a compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser (collectively referred to throughout the discussion of the NYSE’s new listing standards as advisers);
the committee’s direct responsibility for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the work of any adviser retained by the committee;
the issuer’s responsibility to provide for appropriate funding (as determined by the committee) for the payment of reasonable compensation to any adviser retained by the committee; and
the committee’s responsibility to conduct an independence assessment before selecting or receiving advice from an adviser to the committee (as discussed in more detail below under “Assessment of adviser independence”).

The new authority and responsibilities regarding advisers do not:

require the compensation committee to implement or follow its advisers’ advice or recommendations; or
affect the ability or obligation of the compensation committee to exercise its own judgment in fulfilling its duties.

Assessment of adviser independence. As noted above and subject to limited exceptions discussed below, before selecting or receiving advice from an adviser (for compensation or non-compensation matters and regardless of who retained the adviser), the compensation committee must consider all factors relevant to that adviser’s independence from management, including:

the provision of other services to the issuer by the adviser’s employer;
the amount of fees received from the issuer by the adviser’s employer, as a percentage of the employer’s total revenue;
the policies and procedures of the adviser’s employer that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest;
any business or personal relationship between the adviser and a compensation committee member;
any issuer stock owned by the adviser (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, it interprets this to include stock owned by the adviser’s immediate family members); and
any business or personal relationship between either the adviser or the adviser’s employer and an issuer’s executive officer (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, this would include, for example, situations where an issuer’s CEO and the adviser have a familial relationship or where the CEO and the adviser or the adviser’s employer are business partners).

These factors are considerations for the compensation committee rather than bright-line standards. Although compensation committees must consider the specified factors, they are also responsible for identifying and considering all additional factors relevant to an adviser’s independence from management. After conducting the required independence assessment, compensation committees may select or receive advice from any adviser they prefer, even those that are not independent.⁵ In response to comments that compensation committees should be specifically required to also consider whether an adviser requires a contractual agreement to indemnify the adviser or limit the adviser’s liability, the NYSE noted that it is not apparent that the existence of such indemnification agreements or contractual limitations on liability is relevant to an independence analysis.⁶

Compensation committees must conduct the independence assessment for any adviser that the committee selects or receives advice from, other than:

in-house legal counsel; and
any adviser whose role is limited to:
- consulting on any broad-based plan that does not discriminate in scope, terms, or operation, in favor of executive officers or directors of the issuer, and that is available generally to all salaried employees; or
- providing information that either is not customized for a particular issuer or that is customized based on parameters that are not developed by the adviser and about which the adviser does not provide advice.

In response to comments, the NYSE made it clear that the independence assessment requirement applies to any outside legal counsel consulted by the compensation committee, including any regular outside counsel to the issuer consulted on matters such as SEC filing requirements or federal tax issues associated with equity compensation plans.

In response to a comment expressing concern about the possible need to conduct a new independence assessment before every compensation committee meeting for those advisers that regularly provide advice to the compensation committee, the NYSE indicated that the frequency of the assessment will be a facts and circumstances determination. Specifically, the NYSE noted that “[w]hile an annual assessment may be sufficient in some cases, in other circumstances a more frequent review may be warranted.” In approving the new standards, the SEC noted its expectation that the assessment would be conducted at least annually.

Compensation committee independence. Current listing standards require that a compensation committee be comprised solely of independent directors, and the board must affirmatively determine that a compensation committee member is independent under the general board independence standards set forth in Section 303A.02 of the Manual.

Under the new standards, in making an affirmative independence determination regarding a compensation committee member the board must also consider all factors specifically relevant to determining whether a director has a relationship to the issuer that is material to that director’s ability to be independent from management in connection with the duties of a compensation committee member, including:

the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the issuer to the director; and
whether the director is affiliated with the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the issuer.

These factors do not include any specific numerical or materiality tests, and are considerations for the board rather than bright-line standards. For example, the NYSE did not adopt an absolute prohibition on a board making an affirmative independence finding for a compensation committee member solely because the member or any of his or her affiliates are significant stockholders. Although the board must consider the specified factors, it must also identify and consider all additional factors that would be relevant to a compensation committee member’s independence from management. In response to comments, the NYSE confirmed that a single factor or relationship considered in the independence analysis may be sufficiently material to render a director non-independent.

When considering the source of a director’s compensation, the board should consider whether the director receives compensation from any person or entity that would impair his or her ability to make independent judgments about the issuer’s executive compensation. Likewise, when considering any affiliate relationship, the board should consider whether the relationship places the director under the direct or indirect control of the issuer or its senior management, or creates a direct relationship between the director and senior management, in each case of a nature that would impair the director’s ability to make independent judgments about the issuer’s executive compensation.

In response to comments that director fees should be an explicit factor to be considered in compensation committee independence determinations, the NYSE noted that it does not believe that it is likely that director fees would be a relevant consideration for the independence analysis. However, if “excessive” board compensation might affect a director’s independence, the NYSE noted that the listing standards would require the board to consider that factor in its independence determination, as the standards require the board to consider all relevant factors. The NYSE did not indicate what constitutes “excessive” board compensation.

If a compensation committee member ceases to be independent for reasons outside that member’s reasonable control, the member may, with prompt notice by the issuer to the NYSE, remain a compensation committee member until the earlier of (1) the next annual stockholder meeting or (2) one year from the event that caused the member to cease to be independent. This cure provision is limited to situations where the compensation committee continues to have a majority of independent directors.

Exemptions. The new compensation committee listing standards will not apply to the following issuers that are exempt from the NYSE’s current compensation committee listing standards:

controlled companies (i.e., issuers where more than 50% of the voting power for the election of directors is held by an individual, a group or another company);
limited partnerships (for example, master limited partnerships (MLPs));
companies in bankruptcy;
closed-end and open-end funds registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act);
passive business organizations in the form of trusts (for example, royalty trusts);
derivatives and special purpose securities; and
issuers whose only listed equity security is preferred stock.

Smaller reporting companies (generally issuers with less than $75 million of public equity float) are exempt from the new enhanced compensation committee independence and consideration of adviser independence standards. As a result, their compensation committee charters will not have to reflect these matters. However, these issuers are subject to the other new standards. An issuer that ceases to qualify as a smaller reporting company will have:

six months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to comply with the consideration of adviser independence standard;
six months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have one member of its compensation committee satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard;
nine months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have a majority of its compensation committee members satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard; and
12 months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have a compensation committee consisting entirely of members that satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard.⁷

Foreign private issuers that elect to follow home country practice are exempt from the new compensation committee listing standards provided that they comply with the disclosure requirements of Section 303A.11 of the Manual.

Transition periods for newly-listed and other issuers. The current transition periods available to newly-listed issuers and certain other categories of issuers (e.g., issuers listing in connection with a carve-out or spin-off transaction) apply to the new compensation committee listing standards. For example, an issuer listing in connection with its initial public offering (IPO) must have one independent compensation committee member by the earlier of the IPO closing date or five business days from the listing date, a majority of independent members within 90 days of the listing date, and a fully independent committee within one year of the listing date.

Click here to read about practical considerations to consider in response to the new compensation committee listing standards.

NYSE MKT Compensation Committee Listing Standards

Compensation committee authority and responsibilities regarding its advisers. A compensation committee⁸ must have the following authority and responsibilities:

the authority, in its sole discretion, to retain or obtain the advice of a compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser (collectively referred to throughout the discussion of the NYSE MKT’s new listing standards as advisers);
the direct responsibility for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the work of any adviser retained by the committee;
the issuer must provide for appropriate funding (as determined by the committee) for the payment of reasonable compensation to any adviser retained by the committee; and
the responsibility to conduct an independence assessment before selecting or receiving advice from an adviser to the committee (as discussed in more detail below under “Assessment of adviser independence”).

The new authority and responsibilities regarding advisers do not:

require the compensation committee to implement or follow its advisers’ advice or recommendations; or
affect the ability or obligation of the compensation committee to exercise its own judgment in fulfilling its duties.

the provision of other services to the issuer by the adviser’s employer;
the amount of fees received from the issuer by the adviser’s employer, as a percentage of the employer’s total revenue;
the policies and procedures of the adviser’s employer that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest;
any business or personal relationship between the adviser and a compensation committee member;
any issuer stock owned by the adviser (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, it interprets this to include stock owned by the adviser’s immediate family members); and
any business or personal relationship between either the adviser or the adviser’s employer and an issuer’s executive officer (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, this would include, for example, situations where an issuer’s CEO and the adviser have a familial relationship or where the CEO and the adviser or the adviser’s employer are business partners).

These factors are considerations for the compensation committee rather than bright-line standards. Although compensation committees must consider the specified factors, they are also responsible for identifying and considering all additional factors relevant to an adviser’s independence from management. After conducting the required independence assessment, compensation committees may select or receive advice from any adviser they prefer, even those that are not independent.⁹ In response to comments that compensation committees should be specifically required to also consider whether an adviser requires a contractual agreement to indemnify the adviser or limit the adviser’s liability, the NYSE MKT noted that it is not apparent that the existence of such indemnification agreements or contractual limitations on liability is relevant to an independence analysis.¹⁰

Compensation committees must conduct the independence assessment for any adviser that the committee selects or receives advice from, other than:

in-house legal counsel; and
any adviser whose role is limited to:
- consulting on any broad-based plan that does not discriminate in scope, terms, or operation, in favor of executive officers or directors of the issuer, and that is available generally to all salaried employees; or
- providing information that either is not customized for a particular issuer or that is customized based on parameters that are not developed by the adviser and about which the adviser does not provide advice.

In response to comments, the NYSE MKT made it clear that the independence assessment requirement applies to any outside legal counsel consulted by the compensation committee, including any regular outside counsel to the issuer consulted on matters such as SEC filing requirements or federal tax issues associated with equity compensation plans.

In response to a comment expressing concern about the possible need to conduct a new independence assessment before every compensation committee meeting for those advisers that regularly provide advice to the compensation committee, the NYSE MKT indicated that the frequency of the assessment will be a facts and circumstances determination. Specifically, the NYSE MKT noted that “[w]hile an annual assessment may be sufficient in some cases, in other circumstances a more frequent review may be warranted.” In approving the new standards, the SEC noted its expectation that the assessment would be conducted at least annually.

Compensation committee independence. Current listing standards require that executive officer compensation be determined, or recommended to the board for determination, either by a compensation committee comprised solely of independent directors or by a majority of the independent directors. Moreover, the board must affirmatively determine that a compensation committee member is independent under the general board independence standards set forth in Section 803A(2) of the Guide.

Under the new standards, the board must also affirmatively determine that all of the compensation committee members (or all of the independent directors if an issuer does not have a compensation committee) are independent for compensation committee purposes. To make this determination, the board must consider all factors specifically relevant to determining whether a director has a relationship to the issuer that is material to that director’s ability to be independent from management in connection with the duties of a compensation committee member, including:

the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the issuer to the director; and
whether the director is affiliated with the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the issuer.

These factors do not include any specific numerical or materiality tests, and are considerations for the board rather than bright-line standards. For example, the NYSE MKT did not adopt an absolute prohibition on a board making an affirmative independence finding for a compensation committee member solely because the member or any of his or her affiliates are significant stockholders. Although the board must consider the specified factors, it must also identify and consider all additional factors that would be relevant to a compensation committee member’s independence from management. In response to comments, the NYSE MKT confirmed that a single factor or relationship considered in the independence analysis may be sufficiently material to render a director non-independent.

In response to comments that director fees should be an explicit factor to be considered in compensation committee independence determinations, the NYSE MKT noted that it does not believe that it is likely that director fees would be a relevant consideration for the independence analysis. However, if “excessive” board compensation might affect a director’s independence, the NYSE MKT noted that the listing standards would require the board to consider that factor in its independence determination, as the standards require the board to consider all relevant factors. The NYSE MKT did not indicate what constitutes “excessive” board compensation.

If a compensation committee member ceases to be independent for reasons outside that member’s reasonable control, the member may, with prompt notice by the issuer to the NYSE MKT, remain a compensation committee member until the earlier of (1) the next annual stockholders meeting or (2) one year from the event that caused the member to cease to be independent. This cure provision is limited to situations where the compensation committee continues to have a majority of independent directors.

The NYSE MKT amended its listing standards so that only smaller reporting companies (generally issuers with less than $75 million of public equity float) may rely on the current exception that allows one non-independent director to serve on the compensation committee under exceptional and limited circumstances, even for a director who fails the enhanced compensation committee independence standards. Under the exception, one non-independent director may be appointed to the compensation committee if:

the committee consists of at least three members;
the non-independent director is not currently an executive officer, employee, or an immediate family member of an executive officer or employee;
the board, under exceptional and limited circumstances, determines that the individual’s membership is required by the best interests of the issuer and its stockholders; and
the non-independent director serves for no longer than two years.

A smaller reporting company relying on the exception must provide certain disclosures required by NYSE MKT listing standards in the proxy statement for the next annual meeting following the determination (or annual report on Form 10-K if a proxy statement is not required), and any disclosure required by Instruction 1 to Item 407(a) of Regulation S-K regarding reliance on the exception.

Exemptions. The new compensation committee listing standards will not apply to the following issuers that are exempt from the NYSE MKT’s current compensation committee listing standards:

controlled companies (i.e., issuers where more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group or another issuer);
limited partnerships (for example, MLPs);
companies in bankruptcy;
closed-end and open-end funds registered under the 1940 Act;
asset-backed issuers and other passive business organizations (for example, royalty trusts);
derivatives and special purpose securities; and
issuers whose only listed equity security is preferred stock.

Smaller reporting companies are exempt from the new enhanced compensation committee independence and consideration of adviser independence standards. However, these issuers are subject to the other new standards. An issuer that ceases to qualify as a smaller reporting company will have:

six months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to comply with the consideration of adviser independence standard;
six months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have one member of its compensation committee satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard;
nine months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have a majority of its compensation committee members satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard; and
12 months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have a compensation committee consisting entirely of members that satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard.¹¹

Foreign private issuers may seek an exemption on the basis that they follow home country practice if they comply with the requirements of Section 110 of the Guide.

Transition periods for newly-listed issuers. The current transition periods available to newly-listed issuers apply to the new compensation committee listing standards. Thus, an issuer listing in connection with its IPO must have one independent compensation committee member at the time of listing, a majority of independent members within 90 days of listing, and a fully independent compensation committee within one year of listing.

Click here to read about practical considerations to consider in response to the new compensation committee listing standards.

NASDAQ Compensation Committee Listing Rules

Compensation committee authority and responsibilities regarding its advisers. A compensation committee must have the following authority and responsibilities:

the authority, in its sole discretion, to retain or obtain the advice of a compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser (collectively referred to throughout the discussion of NASDAQ’s new listing standards as advisers);
the direct responsibility for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the work of any adviser retained by the committee;
the issuer must provide for appropriate funding (as determined by the committee) for the payment of reasonable compensation to any adviser retained by the committee; and
the responsibility to conduct an independence assessment before selecting or receiving advice from an adviser to the committee (as discussed in more detail below under “Assessment of adviser independence”).

For those issuers without a standing compensation committee, until the requirement to have a standing compensation committee is effective (as discussed in more detail below under “Compensation committee composition and independence”) these requirements will apply to the independent directors who determine, or recommend to the board to determine, the compensation of executive officers.

Issuers will need to consider under the corporate law of the state of their incorporation whether to grant by July 1, 2013 the authority and responsibilities discussed above through a charter, board resolution or other board action.

The new authority and responsibilities regarding advisers do not:

require the compensation committee to implement or follow its advisers’ advice or recommendations; or
affect the ability or obligation of the compensation committee to exercise its own judgment in fulfilling its duties.

the provision of other services to the issuer by the adviser’s employer;
the amount of fees received from the issuer by the adviser’s employer, as a percentage of the employer’s total revenue;
the policies and procedures of the adviser’s employer that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest;
any business or personal relationship between the adviser and a compensation committee member;
any issuer stock owned by the adviser (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, it interprets this to include stock owned by the adviser’s immediate family members); and
any business or personal relationship between either the adviser or the adviser’s employer and an issuer’s executive officer (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, this would include, for example, situations where an issuer’s CEO and the adviser have a familial relationship or where the CEO and the adviser or the adviser’s employer are business partners).

These factors are considerations for the compensation committee rather than bright-line standards. After considering the six independence factors, compensation committees may select or receive advice from any adviser they prefer, even those that are not independent.¹²

Compensation committees must conduct the independence assessment for any adviser (including outside legal counsel) that the committee selects or receives advice from, other than:

in-house legal counsel; and
any adviser whose role is limited to:
- consulting on any broad-based plan that does not discriminate in scope, terms, or operation, in favor of executive officers or directors of the issuer, and that is available generally to all salaried employees; or
- providing information that either is not customized for a particular issuer or that is customized based on parameters that are not developed by the adviser and about which the adviser does not provide advice.

In approving the new listing rules, the SEC noted its expectation that the independence assessment would be conducted at least annually.

Compensation committee composition and independence. NASDAQ’s current listing rules require that an issuer’s executive officer compensation must be determined, or recommended to the board for determination, either by:

a compensation committee comprised solely of independent directors; or
independent directors constituting a majority of the board’s independent directors in a vote in which only independent directors participate.

NASDAQ eliminated the second alternative and by the relevant 2014 compliance date issuers, including smaller reporting companies (generally issuers with less than $75 million of public equity float), must have a standing compensation committee comprised of at least two members. Each compensation committee member must be an independent director (as defined in current Listing Rule 5605(a)(2)), and boards are required to make an affirmative determination that no independent director has a relationship that, in the board’s opinion, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.

In addition to satisfying the requirement that each compensation committee member be an independent director, the new rules provide that:

each member is prohibited from accepting directly or indirectly any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee from the issuer or any of its subsidiaries; and
the board must consider whether a compensation committee member is affiliated with the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the issuer to determine whether any affiliation would impair the member’s judgment as a member of the compensation committee.

These independence factors do not include any specific numerical or materiality tests. In approving the listing rules, the SEC confirmed that, despite any explicit statement by NASDAQ on the matter, a single factor could disqualify a director from being independent under the enhanced compensation committee independence rules.

Although director fees are not an explicit factor to be considered in compensation committee independence determinations, NASDAQ noted that as boards must make an affirmative independence determination that each independent director has no relationship that would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director the board could, if appropriate, consider director fees in that context.¹³

The enhanced independence rules adopt the same bright-line prohibition against compensatory fees applicable to audit committees. The prohibition does not include a “look-back” period and, therefore, would apply only during a director’s service on the compensation committee. “Compensatory fees” do not include:

fees received for board or board committee service; or
the receipt of fixed amounts of compensation under a retirement plan, including deferred compensation, for prior service with the issuer (provided that the compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service).

Unlike the prohibition regarding compensatory fees, the rules do not impose a bright-line prohibition on affiliation, but rather impose a requirement to consider such affiliations when making a compensation committee independence determination. Although a board may conclude differently based on the specific facts and circumstances, NASDAQ does not believe ownership of issuer stock by itself, or possession of a controlling interest through ownership of issuer stock by itself, precludes a board from finding that it is appropriate for a director (for example, as a representative of a significant stockholder) to serve on the compensation committee. The board will not be required to apply a “look-back” period and, therefore, need consider affiliation only with respect to relationships that occur during a director’s service on the compensation committee.

Issuers, including smaller reporting companies, may rely on the current exception that allows one non-independent director to serve on the compensation committee under exceptional and limited circumstances, even for a director who fails the new enhanced compensation committee independence rules. Under this exception, one non-independent director may be appointed to the compensation committee if:

the committee consists of at least three members;
the non-independent director is not currently an executive officer, employee, or a family member of an executive officer;
the board, under exceptional and limited circumstances, determines that the individual’s membership is required by the best interests of the issuer and its stockholders;
the non-independent director serves for no longer than two years; and
the issuer provides certain disclosures required by the listing rules either on its website or in the proxy statement for the next annual meeting following the determination (or annual report if a proxy statement is not required), and the disclosures required by Instruction 1 to Item 407(a) of Regulation S-K regarding reliance on the exception.

If an issuer, including a smaller reporting company, fails to comply with the compensation committee composition requirements due to one vacancy, or one compensation committee member ceases to be independent for reasons beyond that member’s reasonable control, the issuer must regain compliance by the earlier of (1) its next annual stockholder meeting or (2) one year from the event that caused the non-compliance. If the annual stockholder meeting occurs within 180 days after the event causing the non-compliance, the issuer would instead have 180 days from the event to regain compliance. An issuer relying on the cure period must provide notice to NASDAQ immediately upon learning of the event or circumstances that caused the non-compliance.

Committee charter requirements. Issuers must certify that they have adopted a formal written compensation committee charter and that the compensation committee will review and reassess the adequacy of the charter on an annual basis.¹⁴ The charter must specify:

the scope of the committee’s responsibilities and how it carries out those responsibilities, including structure, processes and membership requirements;
the committee’s responsibility for determining, or recommending to the board for determination, the compensation of the issuer’s executive officers;
that the CEO may not be present during voting or deliberations by the committee on his or her compensation; and
the specific committee authority and responsibilities discussed above under “Compensation committee authority and responsibilities regarding its advisers.”

Smaller reporting companies must adopt either a formal written compensation committee charter or a board resolution that specifies only the matters in the first three bullets above. These issuers are not required to specify the compensation committee authority and responsibilities set forth in the fourth bullet above or to certify that they will review and reassess the adequacy of the charter or board resolution on an annual basis.

Exemptions. The new listing rules do not apply to the following issuers that are exempt from NASDAQ’s current compensation-related listing rules:

asset-backed issuers and other passive issuers;
cooperatives;
limited partnerships (for example, MLPs);
management investment companies registered under the 1940 Act; and
controlled companies (i.e., issuers where more than 50% of the voting power for the election of directors is held by an individual, a group or another company).

Smaller reporting companies are exempt from the new compensation committee listing rules, except as follows:

they must have (and certify that they have and will continue to have) a formal compensation committee comprised of at least two independent members based on the current independent director definition in Listing Rule 5605(a)(2), but not the enhanced compensation committee independence standards; and
they must certify that they have adopted a formal written compensation committee charter or board resolution as discussed above under “Committee charter requirements.”

An issuer that ceases to qualify as a smaller reporting company will have six months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to:

comply with the committee authority and responsibilities standards; and
certify to NASDAQ that it (1) has adopted a formal written compensation committee charter, including all of the matters specified above under “Committee charter requirements,” and (2) has, or will within the required phase-in schedule,¹⁵ comply with the enhanced compensation committee independence standards.

Foreign private issuers that follow their home country practice are exempt from the new listing rules provided that they comply with the disclosure requirements in current Listing Rule 5615(a)(3). In addition, foreign private issuers that follow their home country practice in lieu of having an independent compensation committee as required by NASDAQ listing rules must disclose in their annual reports filed with the SEC the reasons why they do not have an independent compensation committee.

Certification. Issuers must certify to NASDAQ within 30 days after the final implementation deadline applicable to them, on a form to be provided by NASDAQ, that they have complied with the new compensation committee listing rules. Although smaller reporting companies, foreign private issuers and controlled companies are exempt from some or all of the compensation committee listing standards, based on a sample certification form provided by NASDAQ in one of its rule filings these issuers would need to complete and file the required certification form.¹⁶

Transition periods for IPO issuers. Although issuers listing in connection with their IPO are subject to the new rules, they can phase-in compliance with the compensation committee composition requirements in accordance with current phase-in schedules. Thus, these issuers must have one independent compensation committee member at listing, a majority of independent members within 90 days of listing and a fully independent committee within one year of listing.

Practical Considerations

NYSE-, NYSE MKT- and NASDAQ-listed issuers and their boards and compensation committees that are subject to the listing standards should consider the following matters. In addition to the following, issuers should not forget to conduct a review of “conflicts of interest” with compensation consultants who had any role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director compensation (subject to certain exceptions). A new SEC rule requires any such conflicts of interest to be disclosed in proxy statements for meetings involving the election of directors held on or after January 1, 2013.¹⁷ As part of this process, issuers should update their director and officer questionnaire to solicit information about the existence of business or personal relationships with compensation consultants and the consultants’ employers and establish policies and procedures for collecting and analyzing information about compensation consultants to determine whether a conflict of interest exists.

By July 1, 2013:

Grant required compensation committee authority and responsibilities regarding advisers.
- NASDAQ- and NYSE MKT-listed issuers should consider under the corporate law of the state of their incorporation whether to grant the new authority and responsibilities to the compensation committee (or, in lieu of such a committee, the independent directors who determine or recommend executive compensation) through a committee charter amendment, board resolution or other board action. Although the authority and responsibilities must be granted by July 1, 2013, NASDAQ-listed issuers are not required to include these matters in their compensation committee charter until 2014 (as discussed below). NYSE MKT-listed issuers are not required to have a compensation committee charter, but must determine how best to grant the required authority and responsibilities by July 1, 2013. Although not required until 2014, NASDAQ-listed issuers with existing compensation committee charters may determine it is best to amend their charters by July 1, 2013 to grant the required authority and responsibilities instead of relying on a board resolution or other board action.
- NYSE-listed issuers should review their compensation committee charters and amend as necessary to grant the new authority and responsibilities.
Conduct adviser independence assessment.
- Discuss the new listing standards with each existing and potential adviser to the compensation committee, even those advisers retained by management or the issuer, to determine whether an independence assessment is required.
- As specifically noted by the SEC in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, establish policies and procedures for collecting and analyzing information about advisers before the compensation committee can select or receive advice from those advisers. Steps issuers could take include (1) collecting information internally on the services provided by advisers, including identifying the individual advisers that perform services for the issuer and such advisers’ employers, and the fees paid for such services, (2) having the advisers complete a questionnaire or requesting specific representations and covenants in the adviser engagement letter to solicit the information necessary for the compensation committee to consider the enumerated factors set forth in the listing standards and any other factors deemed relevant to the compensation committee, and (3) updating the director and officer questionnaire to determine the existence of any business or personal relationship with any adviser to the compensation committee or such adviser’s employer. Ensure that any policies and procedures developed are consistent with the compensation committee charter and other issuer procedures, and that they provide that the required independence assessment is conducted prior to selecting or receiving advice from new advisers and at least annually for existing advisers.
- For existing advisers to the compensation committee where an independence assessment is required, assess their independence and then schedule the next assessment for that adviser at least annually thereafter. As part of this exercise, boards of NYSE- and NYSE MKT-listed issuers should identify and consider any factors in addition to the six specified factors that would be relevant to an adviser’s independence from management. The listing standards are clear that advisers are not required to be independent if the independence assessment is conducted before selecting or receiving advice from an adviser. However, compensation committees may want to consider whether to adopt a policy that guides their actions if an adviser is not independent.

By the earlier of the first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014:

Evaluate compliance with enhanced compensation committee independence standards.
- Update the director and officer questionnaire to address the enhanced compensation committee independence standards.
- Evaluate the independence of compensation committee members to ensure they satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standards. Except for NASDAQ’s absolute prohibition on compensatory fees from the issuer or its subsidiaries, the enhanced independence standards do not impose a prohibition on committee membership if the enumerated independence factors are not satisfied. However, as stockholders and proxy advisory firms may be concerned if any factor is not satisfied boards should carefully consider how they will respond if a member does not satisfy the enumerated independence factors. Issuers may choose to conduct such an evaluation in 2013, and develop contingency plans in the event one or more of the existing compensation committee members would not be deemed independent under the enhanced independence standards (for example, in the case of a NASDAQ-listed issuer if a member receives any compensatory fees from the issuer or its subsidiaries). In such case, issuers should consider updating their 2013 director and officer questionnaire to include, for compensation committee members, questions that solicit the information that will enable the board to conduct an evaluation under the enhanced independence standards.
Establish a compensation committee. For NASDAQ-listed issuers without a formal compensation committee, establish a committee in accordance with the new listing rules.
Adopt a compensation committee charter. For NASDAQ-listed issuers, adopt a compensation committee charter that complies with the new charter standards or ensure that the existing compensation committee charter complies with the new charter standards.

Provide compliance certification. NASDAQ-listed issuers must certify to NASDAQ within 30 days after the final implementation deadline applicable to them, on a form to be provided by NASDAQ, that they have complied with the new compensation committee listing rules.

_{1. New York Stock Exchange LLC, Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 3, and Order Granting Accelerated Approval for Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment Nos. 1 and 3, to Amend the Listing Rules for Compensation Committees to Comply with Securities Exchange Act Rule 10C-1 and Make Other Related Changes, Release No. 34-68639 (Jan. 11, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 4570 (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-22/pdf/2013-01106.pdf. The amendments impact Sections 303A.00, 303A.02(a) and 303A.05 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual (Manual). The text of the amended listing standards is included in Exhibit 5 to this NYSE rule filing.}

_{2. NYSE MKT LLC, Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 3, and Order Granting Accelerated Approval for Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment Nos. 1 and 3, to Amend the Listing Rules for Compensation Committees to Comply with Securities Exchange Act Rule 10C-1 and Make Other Related Changes, Release No. 34-68637 (Jan. 11, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 4537 (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-22/pdf/2013-01104.pdf. The amendments impact Sections 110, 801(h), 803A and 805 of the NYSE MKT Company Guide (Guide). The text of the amended listing standards is included in Exhibit 5 to this NYSE MKT rule filing.}

_{3. The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, Notice of Filing of Amendment Nos. 1 and 2, and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change as Modified by Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 to Amend the Listing Rules for Compensation Committees to Comply with Rule 10C-1 under the Act and Make Other Related Changes, Release No. 34-68640 (Jan. 11, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 4554 (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-22/pdf/2013-01107.pdf. The amendments impact compensation committee- and corporate governance-related Listing Rules 5605(d) and 5615, and add new Listing Rule 5605A. The amendments also include conforming amendments to audit and nominations committee-related Listing Rules 5605(c) and 5605(e)(3) and corrections of typographical errors in other listing rules. The text of the amended listing rules is included in Exhibit 5 to this NASDAQ rule filing.}

_{4. Please see our client alert dated October 22, 2012 for a discussion of the listing standard amendments as originally proposed, NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ Propose Amendments to Compensation Committee Listing Standards.}

_{5. Issuers should remember that pursuant to new Item 407(e)(3)(iv) of Regulation S-K their proxy statements for meetings involving the election of directors held on or after January 1, 2013 must include disclosure of any “conflict of interest” involving compensation consultants (but not other advisers such as lawyers) who had any role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director compensation (subject to certain exceptions). “Conflict of interest” is not defined, but to determine whether a conflict of interest exists, issuers should use the factors set out in Exchange Act Rule 10C-1(b)(4) relating to adviser independence, which are the same six factors identified in the new NYSE standards.}

_{6. See Letter from Janet McGinness, Exec. Vice Pres., Corp. Sec’y & Gen. Counsel, NYSE Markets, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 10, 2013), availableat http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2012-49/nyse201249-8.pdf.}

_{7. These issuers would also need to update their compensation committee charters to reflect these matters.}

_{8. For the remainder of the discussion of the NYSE MKT’s new listing standards, references to compensation committee are meant to refer to an issuer’s independent directors as a group where the issuer does not have a compensation committee, but instead relies on its independent directors to determine, or recommend to the board for determination, executive officer compensation.}

_{9. Issuers should remember that pursuant to new Item 407(e)(3)(iv) of Regulation S-K their proxy statements for meetings involving the election of directors held on or after January 1, 2013 must include disclosure of any “conflict of interest” involving compensation consultants (but not other advisers such as lawyers) who had any role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director compensation (subject to certain exceptions). “Conflict of interest” is not defined, but to determine whether a conflict of interest exists, issuers should use the factors set out in Exchange Act Rule 10C-1(b)(4) relating to adviser independence, which are the same six factors identified in the new NYSE MKT standards.}

_{10. See Letter from Janet McGinness, Exec. Vice Pres., Corp. Sec’y & Gen. Counsel, NYSE Markets, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 10, 2013), availableat http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2012-49/nyse201249-8.pdf. Although no comments were submitted on the NYSE MKT’s proposed listing standards, comments were submitted on the NYSE’s and NYSE Arca’s proposed listing standards. In response to these comments, NYSE Euronext (the parent company of NYSE, NYSE MKT and NYSE Arca) issued one response letter that addressed the comments on behalf of all NYSE exchanges, including NYSE MKT, as the comments raised are in substance applicable to all three proposals.}

_{11. Any such issuer that does not have a compensation committee must comply with this transition requirement with respect to all of its independent directors as a group.}

_{12. Issuers should remember that pursuant to new Item 407(e)(3)(iv) of Regulation S-K their proxy statements for meetings involving the election of directors held on or after January 1, 2013 must include disclosure of any “conflict of interest” involving compensation consultants (but not other advisers such as lawyers) who had any role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director compensation (subject to certain exceptions). “Conflict of interest” is not defined, but to determine whether a conflict of interest exists, issuers should use the factors set out in Exchange Act Rule 10C-1(b)(4) relating to adviser independence, which are the same six factors identified in the new NASDAQ rules.}

_{13. See Letter from Erika J. Moore, Assoc. Gen. Counsel., NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-NASDAQ-2012-109/NASDAQ2012109-9.pdf.}

_{14. NASDAQ also proposed, and the SEC approved, amendments to NASDAQ’s audit committee listing rules that require listed issuers to proactively certify that the audit committee “will review and reassess” the adequacy of the audit committee charter on an annual basis. Current listing rules require the certification to provide that the audit committee “has reviewed and reassessed” the adequacy of the audit committee’s charter on an annual basis. NASDAQ noted that this change is consistent with its current interpretation of the audit committee charter requirements and will harmonize the audit committee charter requirements with the new compensation committee charter requirements.}

_{15. A smaller reporting company that loses that status must comply with the enhanced compensation committee independence requirements as follows: (1) one member in compliance within six months from the date smaller reporting company status is lost, (2) a majority in compliance within nine months from the date smaller reporting company status is lost and (3) all members in compliance within one year from the date smaller reporting company status is lost.}

_{16. See Exhibit 3 to this NASDAQ rule filing for the form of compensation committee certification NASDAQ intends to use.}

_{17. For more information on this SEC disclosure requirement, please see our client alert dated July 9, 2012, SEC Adopts Rules Implementing Dodd-Frank Requirements for Compensation Committees and Compensation Advisers.}

Sequestration: Responding to Government Contract Delays and Changes

The National Law Review recently published an article regarding Sequestration written by Jonathan T. Cain of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.:

Recent hardening of the rhetoric between Congressional Republicans and the White House is leading to growing acknowledgment that across-the-board reductions in federal agency budgets are likely to be imposed, at least temporarily, beginning March 1st. Government contractors serving nearly every federal agency can expect to be affected by delays, stop-work orders, and/or contract changes to postpone or reduce the government’s cost of contract performance.

Federal contracts give the government the right to impose schedule delays in contractor performance, direct work stoppages, and order changes in the delivery schedule, but the government does not have the right to impose the costs of those actions on contractors – provided the contractors take timely action to preserve their rights to compensation for those increased costs.

The clause most likely to be employed is the stop-work order. This clause is included in federal contracts for supplies, services, and R&D, and in both fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts. It permits the contracting officer to issue a written order to the contractor to stop all or any part of the contract work for up to 90 days. Within that 90-day period, or any additional extension of the 90-day period to which the contractor has agreed, the contracting officer must either revoke the stop-work order or terminate the contract for the government’s convenience. If the stop-work order is lifted, the contractor has 30 days after the end of the work stoppage to submit a written claim for increased costs. The contracting officer must allow all timely submitted, reasonable costs incurred by the contractor for the stoppage. If the agency terminates the contract for convenience, the contractor is entitled to recovery of all reasonable costs of termination plus profit on all work completed.

Fixed-price supply and service contracts for non-commercial items also will include a Government delay of work clause. Under this clause, the contractor is entitled to recover for increased costs resulting from delays or interruptions in the performance of the work caused by any overt act of the contracting officer or the failure of the contracting officer to take a contractually required action in a timely manner. Recovery of costs for government delay of work do not require a written order by the contracting officer. A delay caused, for example, by a decision of the customer agency to send government employees home on furlough may cause a contractor serving that agency to incur a costly delay. Such costs are recoverable under the delay of work clause. In the case of a delay of work, the contractor may only recover costs incurred within the 20 days before the contractor gives written notice of the cause of the delay to the contracting officer. If a contractor suffers a government-caused delay, it should immediately calendar its notice deadlines and file written notices to preserve its right to recover delay costs.

Contracts that are not for commercial items and services also will contain a changes clause that gives the government the unilateral right to change certain terms of the contract, including in the case of services, the time of performance. The contractor is entitled to an equitable adjustment to the contract price, schedule, or both to compensate for the change. Changes may occur as a result of an express contract modification or constructively as a result of other government actions. In either case, the contractor is entitled to an equitable adjustment to the contract for all changes, provided that it has given written notice to the contracting officer within 30 days after the change is imposed. If a contractor does experience an express or constructive change to the contract, it also must immediately begin to separately account for all its incurred, segregable costs that are allocable to the change. Failure to do so will make recovery of those costs more difficult, if not impossible.

Commercial item contracts for goods and services are not required to contain a delay or stop-work clause, though many do. The standard changes clause in a commercial item contract requires mutual agreement of the government and the contractor to any modification, though it is not uncommon for that clause to be replaced with a non-commercial changes clause. Each contract should be reviewed to determine the steps required of the contractor to preserve its right to recover for government delays and changes resulting from even a short period of sequestration.

Key Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Regulatory Focus of 2013: Retail Sales of Complex Products, According to Annual Letter [VIDEO]

The National Law Review recently published an article, Key Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Regulatory Focus of 2013: Retail Sales of Complex Products, According to Annual Letter [VIDEO], written by Mark T. Carberry with Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP:

In January, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) published its annual letter identifying its regulatory and examination priorities for 2013, a document intended to “represent [FINRA’s] current assessment of the key investor protection and market integrity issues on which [FINRA] will focus in the coming year.”

Although numerous such issues were identified by FINRA in its letter, including issues relating to the sale of private placement securities, anti-money laundering compliance, insider trading, margin lending practices, and algorithmic trading, a substantial focus for 2013 relates to suitability concerns and the sale of complex products to retail investors.

Economic Environment Sharpens FINRA’s Concern

FINRA specified in its letter a number of current general economic factors giving rise to concerns about retail investors purchasing complex products:

FINRA believes the “slow growth, low-interest rate environment…” has challenged retail customers to seek returns outside their stated risk tolerance;
“[A]n unprecedented compression of credit risk premiums and yields…;”
The fact that retail investors are, therefore, increasingly transferring funds from equity to debt markets;
Retail investor “appetite for yield…” has increased prices on investment-grade and high-yield debt issues, limiting substantially upside growth while exacerbating risk of loss.

In light of the above factors, FINRA expressed its particular concern “about sales practice abuses, yield-chasing behaviors and the potential impact of any market correction, external stress event or market dislocation on market prices.”

3 Complex Products Earn Particular FINRA Scrutiny

While FINRA’s assessment again identifies numerous complex products in previous annual reviews, including non-traded REITs and leveraged and inverse ETFs, FINRA singled-out the following three “recently surfaced…” products as potentially unsuitable for retail investors in the current economic environment, given their underlying market, credit and liquidity risk factors:

Business Development Companies (BDCs): BDCs, typically closed-end investment companies, are highlighted due to, among other things, their investment in the corporate debt and equity of private companies;
Leveraged Loan Products: These adjustable-rate loans are extended by financial institutions to companies with low credit quality;
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities: FINRA is concerned retail investors are not being advised by their registered representatives of the “considerable risks given today’s low-interest-rate, low-yield environment.”

FINRA’s Recommended Supervisory Points of Emphasis

Supervisory policies and procedures regarding the sale of complex products to retail investors will be subject to particular scrutiny in 2013. FINRA’s Regulatory Notice 12-03 (“Complex Products-Heightened Supervision of Complex Products”), offers substantial guidance regarding heightened supervisory procedures that may be appropriate. In brief, some of these supervisory procedures may include:

Suitability: Is there a process to ensure the mandatory suitability analyses have been undertaken, particularly in light of FINRA’s revised suitability rule (FINRA Rule 2111)?
Post-Approval Review: Is there a supervisory process in place to reassess – post-sale – the performance and risk profile of existing complex products? Does this process also capture any complaints received from customers relating to a particular complex product?
Training: Registered representatives who recommend complex products must have a thorough understanding of all features and risks of a given product to enable them to articulate such features and risks to retail clients. Have sufficient resources been allocated to such training, and is there a process in place to ensure this training was utilized and effective?
Financial Sophistication of Clients: FINRA recommends that firms adopt the approach mandated for options trading accounts – that financial advisors must have a reasonable basis to believe that a retail client is sufficiently knowledgeable in financial matters, that he or she is capable of evaluating the risks of a recommended transaction and that the client can bear the associated financial risks.
Discussions with the Client: In recommending a complex product, a registered representative should thoroughly discuss all features of the product, how the product is expected to perform under different market conditions, the risks of the product and potential returns and the costs of the product. Fundamentally this should be undertaken in a manner most likely to facilitate the client’s understanding of the product.

In sum, as advised in its letter, FINRA is “particularly concerned about firms’ and registered representatives’ full understanding of complex or high-yield products, potential failures to adequately explain the risk-versus-return profile of certain products, as well as a disconnect between customer expectations and risk tolerances.”

For these reasons, supervisory procedures regarding sales of complex products to retail investors in large part must be designed – and enforced – with the intent to give financial advisors the ability to provide credible, substantive responses to the regulatory inquiry, “How did you educate yourself regarding the particular features and risk factors of this product?” and “How did you effectively communicate that information to your (suitable) client?”

Private Equity Beware: Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Official Predicts Increased Scrutiny, Enforcement Action in 2013

The National Law Review recently published an article, Private Equity Beware: Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Official Predicts Increased Scrutiny, Enforcement Action in 2013, written by Mark T. Carberry with Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP:

In late January, the SEC published remarks from a high-ranking SEC official that included projections that the private equity industry would see more scrutiny and enforcement in 2013. “It’s not unreasonable to think that the number of [enforcement] cases involving private equity will increase,” said Bruce Karpati, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit.* In his comments, Karpati rooted his prediction in private equity’s “significant growth spurt” preceding the financial crisis, the substantial increase in assets under management, and the fact that only recently have many private equity managers become registered investment advisers.

VALUATION & CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CROSSHAIRS

The misconduct that the SEC is most likely to target falls under two broad categories: valuation and conflicts of interest, according to Karpati.

As to valuation, Karpati described one form of manager misconduct that occurs when assets are “written up” during a fund raising period, only to be immediately written down after the fund raising period closes.

Karpati further identified the following common conflicts of interest that require control and disclosure:

Conflicts between the profitability of the private equity management firm and the best interests of investors, particularly where the firm is publicly traded;
Conflicts that arise when expenses are shifted from the management firm to the funds;
Conflicts that arise in charging additional fees to the portfolio companies where allowable fees are poorly defined in the partnership agreement;
Conflicts relating to the challenges of managing different clients, different investors and different products “under the same umbrella …,” with the potential that “preferred clients” will be favored at the expense of others;
Conflicts generated by a manager’s other business interests, including the possibility of diverting investment opportunities.

COOS/CFOS ‘CRITICAL’ IN MEETING FIDUCIARY DUTIES

Karpati deemed the roles of chief operating officer and chief financial officer “critical” in ensuring a firm satisfies its fiduciary duties to clients. This is true due to the unique, broad perspective they enjoy in running the business of the manager.

Karpati specified a number of “best practices” that private equity firms should consider:

Compliance risk explicitly should be integrated in overall, enterprise risk management;
COOs, CFOs and compliance personnel should proactively identify and resolve practices giving rise to conflicts of interest;
Firms should implement a set of compliance procedures appropriate for the particular business model in place;
COOs and CFOs should act as investor advocates, and be sufficiently empowered in the firm by, for example, securing membership on important, decision-making firm committees.

Karpati concluded his remarks by encouraging collaboration with legal and compliance resources whenever potential conflict of interest issues are identified.

Note: The Asset Management Unit is one of five specialized units within the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, each designed to address specific areas of the financial markets. The other units are the Market Abuse Unit, the Structured and New Products Unit, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit, and the Municipal Securities and Public Pension Unit.

NLRB Now Permits Front Pay in Lieu of Reinstatement in Board Settlements

The National Law Review recently published an article by John T.L. Koenig of Barnes & Thornburg LLP regarding A Recent NLRB Ruling:

The National Labor Relations Board “NLRB” has traditionally refused to include the concept of front pay in lieu of reinstatement in formal Board settlements. As such, if an employer was interested in resolving an NLRB case that involved employee terminations, but not interested in bringing those terminated employees back to work, the only avenue was a non-Board settlement. That may change based on a new guidance memo the Acting General Counsel issued Jan. 9, 2013.

Noting that most agreements involving waivers of reinstatement in exchange for payment of front pay “are entirely non-Board” settlements, and that Agency policy should favor Board settlements, not discourage them, the AGC “decided to modify existing policy to permit Agency settlements to include front pay.” The Board’s Case Handling Manual will be revised to reflect this change. The updated manual instructs that offers of front pay in lieu of reinstatement be communicated to alleged discriminatees, but without pressuring them to waive reinstatement. The Region is “serving only as a conduit for the proposal” pursuant to the updated language in the Manual.

The memo also requires that waiver of reinstatement be in writing, unless otherwise authorized by Operations-Management in a particular case. The full memo with updated language in the Case Handling Manual can be found here.

The Debate Rages On Regarding Whether Default Fiduciary Duties Apply to LLC Managers Under Delaware Law

Michael C. Hefter and Ryan M. Philp of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP recently had an article, The Debate Rages On Regarding Whether Default Fiduciary Duties Apply to LLC Managers Under Delaware Law, featured in The National Law Review:

Earlier this year, we reported on the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, LLC, wherein Chancellor Strine held that traditional fiduciary principles apply to LLC managers or members by default. See Delaware Chancery Court Clarifies that Default Fiduciary Duties Apply to LLC Managers, March 15, 2012 available here (discussing Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, LLC, No. C.A. 4390-CS, 2012 WL 361677 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2012)). We emphasized that “until the Delaware Supreme Court or General Assembly state otherwise, Chancellor Strine has definitively established that LLC managers are governed by the same well-established fiduciary duties applicable to corporate fiduciaries, unless explicitly stated otherwise in the LLC Agreement.”

On November 7, 2012, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its decision on appeal. In an en banc opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery decision, but declined to reach the issue whether default fiduciary duties exist for LLC managers. See Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., No. 148, 2012 (Nov. 7, 2012). The Supreme Court instead affirmed on the ground that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties arising from an express contractual provision in the operating agreement of the LLC. The Supreme Court’s analysis focused on Section 15 of the LLC Agreement. Section 15 provided, in pertinent part, that no member or manager was permitted to cause the company to “enter into any additional agreements with affiliates on terms and conditions which [were] less favorable to the Company than the terms and conditions of similar agreements which could then be entered into with arms-length third parties . . . .” Emphasizing that “there is no requirement in Delaware that an LLC agreement use magic words, such as ‘entire fairness’ or ‘fiduciary duties[,]'” the Supreme Court construed Section 15 as an explicit contractual assumption by the contracting parties of a fiduciary duty to obtain a fair price for the LLC in transactions between the LLC and affiliated persons. Viewing Section 15 functionally, the Supreme Court treated it as the contractual equivalent of the entire fairness standard of conduct and judicial review. Thus, because there was no approving vote by the majority of the Company’s minority members, the Supreme Court held that the defendant – the LLC’s manager – had the burden of establishing the entire fairness of the transaction. Referencing the defendant’s trial testimony and the evidentiary record, the Supreme Court held that he failed to meet this burden, and thus affirmed the Court of Chancery’s holding that he had breached his contractually adopted fiduciary duties.¹

While the Supreme Court’s contractual analysis is instructive, the decision has garnered far more attention based on the Supreme Court’s analysis of Chancellor Strine’s holding that default fiduciary duties apply to LLC managers, which it characterized as “dictum without any precedential value.” The Supreme Court reasoned that “[w]here, as here, the dispute over whether fiduciary standards apply could be decided solely by reference to the LLC Agreement, it was improvident and unnecessary for the trial court to reach out and decide, sua sponte, the default fiduciary duty issue as a matter of statutory construction.” The Supreme Court thus intentionally left unresolved the question whether default fiduciary duties apply to managers of an LLC.

However, the debate regarding default fiduciary duties did not end there. Just a few weeks later, Vice Chancellor Laster revisited the issue in Feeley v. NJAOCG, C.A. No. 7304-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 28, 2012), a case that, unlike Auriga, put the question of default fiduciary duties squarely before the court. Though he acknowledged that the Auriga decision could not be relied upon as precedent, Vice Chancellor Laster nonetheless adopted Chancellor Strine’s analysis, “afford[ing] his views the same weight as a law review article, a form of authority the Delaware Supreme Court often cites.” Based on Chancellor Strine’s reasoning and “the long line of Chancery precedents holding that default fiduciary duties apply to the managers of an LLC[,]” the Court held that default fiduciary duties apply to LLC managers. Vice Chancellor Laster recognized, however, that “[t]he Delaware Supreme Court is of course the final arbiter on matters of Delaware law.”

Thus, in many ways these two decisions bring things full circle. Until the Delaware Supreme Court or General Assembly address the question whether default fiduciary duties exist for managers of Delaware LLCs, Delaware Chancery precedent provides that they do. However, while this may suggest extra caution be used when drafting an LLC agreement, the Supreme Court’s contractual analysis in the Auriga decision suggests that the question of default fiduciary duties may often be beside the point. Even in the absence of magic language regarding “fiduciary duties” or “entire fairness,” imprecise language in an LLC agreement may be construed as a contractual assumption by the LLC manager to abide by traditional fiduciary duties. Thus, while we do not expect that Chancellor Strine’s Feeley decision represents the last word in the default fiduciary duty debate, the lesson is the same: LLC agreements should be drafted to expressly address the nature and scope of the LLC managers’ fiduciary duties, or to specifically eliminate fiduciary duties altogether.

_{1 The Supreme Court also affirmed the Court of Chancery’s determination that the LLC Agreement did not exculpate or indemnify the LLC’s manager due to his bad faith and willful misrepresentations, as well as its awards of damages and attorneys’ fees.}

The Fiscal Cliff Deal’s Impact on Clean Energy

Bryan M. Stockton with Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. recently had an article, The Fiscal Cliff Deal’s Impact on Clean Energy, in The National Law Review:

Contains key tax provisions for renewable energy but funding for USDA energy programs is left out

Capping weeks of intense negotiations between the Obama Administration and Congressional leaders to avert the fiscal cliff, the House of Representatives late on the night of Jan. 1 passed HR 8, the American Taxpayer Relief Act, on vote of 257-167. The Act was passed by the Senate, 89-8, in a similar late night vote on Dec. 31, so it now goes to President Obama for his signature.

The Act is not a “grand bargain” or a comprehensive solution: sequestration—the automatic spending cuts Congress imposed on itself–has been postponed for only two months to give time for further negotiations. The Act allows federal tax rates to rise on those making over $400,000 ($450,000 for married couples) but also limits the impact of the Alternative Minimum Tax on 4 million taxpayers. The Act also includes a one-year extension of emergency unemployment benefits and a one-year extension of provisions to prevent doctors’ payments from Medicare from being cut.

The Act is a mixed bag for the clean energy industry but contains some significant wins on tax policy. The Act extends $46 billion in tax cuts for individuals and businesses—the so called tax extenders.Many of these tax extenders target the renewable energy and energy efficiency industries. For example, a tweak to the Section 45 production tax credit will allow projects that begin construction before Jan. 1, 2014 to take advantage of the credit. However, the Act is a disappointment for those depending on USDA Energy Title Programs as no mandatory funding was contained in the ninemonth reauthorization of Farm Bill programs included as part of the package.

Below is a summary of key clean energy provisions in the American Taxpayer Relief Act.

Tax extenders

Extension and modification of incentives for Sec. 45 renewable electricity property production tax credit. Under current law, taxpayers can claim either a 1.1 or 2.2 cent per kilowatt hour tax credit for electricity produced for a 10-year period from eligible facilities placed-in-service by the end of 2012 (wind) or 2013 (closed-loop biomass, open-loop biomass, landfill gas, or municipal solid waste facilities). The provision modifies section 45 to allow eligible renewable energy facilities that begin construction before the end of 2013 to claim the 10-year credit.
Extension of investment tax credit in lieu of production tax credit. The Act would allow facilities qualifying for the section 45 production tax credit to elect to take a 30% investment tax credit in lieu of the production tax credit for facilities that begin construction by the end of 2013.
Extension of alternative fuel vehicle refueling property credit (non-hydrogen refueling property). The Act extends for two years, through 2013, the 30% investment tax credit for alternative vehicle refueling property.
Extension of incentives for alternative fuel and alternative fuel mixtures (other than liquefied hydrogen). The Act extends through 2013 the $0.50 per gallon alternative fuel tax credit and alternative fuel mixture tax credit. This credit can be claimed as a nonrefundable excise tax credit or a refundable income tax credit. Due to claims of abuse in the alternative mixture tax credit, taxpayers can no longer claim the refundable portion of the alternative fuel mixture tax credit.
25C Credit for certain nonbusiness energy property. The Section 25C credit for energyefficient improvements to existing homes is extended for two years, through 2013. This reinstates the credit as it existed before passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
Plug-in electric motorcycles and highway vehicles. The Act reforms and extends for two years, through 2013, the individual income tax credit for highway-capable plug-in motorcycles and 3-wheeled vehicles. It also makes golf carts and other low-speed vehicles ineligible for the credit.
Cellulosic biofuels producer tax credit. The Act extends the $1.01 per gallon production tax credit on cellulosic biofuel produced before the end of 2013. The definition of qualified cellulosic biofuel production is expanded to include algae-based fuel.
Biodiesel and renewable diesel credits. The Act extends through 2013 the $1.00 per gallon tax credit for biodiesel, as well as the $.10 per gallon small agri-biodiesel producer credit. The Act also renews through 2013 the $1.00 per gallon tax credit for diesel fuel created from biomass.
Credit for construction of new energy efficient homes. The tax credit for the construction of energy-efficient new homes that achieve a 30% or 50% reduction in heating and cooling energy consumption is extended for two years, through 2013.
Energy efficient appliance credit. The Act extends for two years, through 2013, a tax credit to US-based companies that manufacture energy-efficient clothes washers, dishwashers and refrigerators.
Cellulosic biofuels bonus depreciation. The 2008 Farm Bill allowed cellulosic biofuel facilities placed-in-service before the end of 2012 to expense half of their eligible capital costs in the first year of operation. The Act extends this bonus depreciation for one additional year for facilities placed-in-service before the end of 2013 and allows algae-based fuel to qualify for bonus depreciation.
Special rule for sales of transmission property. The Act extends the present law deferral of gain on sales of transmission property by vertically integrated electric utilities to FERC approved independent transmission companies. The Act allows gain on such sales prior to January 1, 2014 to be recognized ratably over an eight-year period.
Extension of New Markets Tax Credit. The federal government leverages New Markets Tax Credits (NMTCs) to encourage significant private investment in businesses in low-income communities. The program provides a 39 percent tax credit spread over 7 years. The Act extends NMTCs for two years, permitting a maximum annual amount of qualified equity investments of $3.5 billion each year.
Extension of bonus depreciation. Businesses are allowed to recover the cost of capital expenditures over time according to a depreciation schedule. Starting in 2008, Congress allowed businesses to take an additional depreciation deduction allowance in the first year. The Act extends the 50 percent accelerated expensing provision for qualifying property purchased and placed in service before January 1, 2014 (before January 1, 2015 for certain longer-lived and transportation assets).

Bioenergy funding

The Act also extends the 2008 Farm Act for nine-months (until the end of fiscal year 2013). A short term extension was necessary after the House refused to vote on a five-year reauthorization. The Act reauthorizes funding for US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Energy Title programs but does not provide mandatory funding. Despite hopeful signals that mandatory funding was included in an agreement between the Agriculture Committees’ leadership, it was not included in the final deal between Senate Minority Leader McConnell and the Obama Administration.

By comparison, the Senate Farm Bill passed last year contained approximately $800 billion over 10 years for USDA energy programs. It also would have expanded eligibility under certain programs to renewable chemicals. These USDA programs provide grants, loans, and loan guarantees to renewable energy and advanced biofuel projects; promote cultivation of cellulosic feedstocks; and provide research funding. Work on a new five-year Farm Act will now have to start again, though much of the groundwork has already been done by the committees.

Congress Passes Bill Fixing Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

The National Law Review recently published an article, Congress Passes Bill Fixing Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, written by Phillip L. Stern and Michael C. Diedrich with Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP:

The U.S. Senate has passed H.R. 4014, a House bill that adds the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) to the list of federal banking agencies with whom supervised entities may share information without effecting a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to third-parties. President Obama is expected to sign the bill into law.

The bill, sponsored by Rep. Bill Huizenga of Michigan (R), is intended to address a perceived shortcoming in the original Dodd-Frank Act, which created the Bureau. Under Dodd-Frank, the new Bureau was given broad supervisory and enforcement powers over large swaths of the financial and credit services industries. The Act, however, did not provide – as is the case with other Prudential Regulators, including the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (see12 U.S.C. 1828(x)) – that the attorney-client privilege would not be waived when otherwise privileged information is shared by a supervised entity with the Bureau except with respect to its dealings with the Bureau.

The bill fixes this omission and adds the Bureau to the list of Prudential Regulators for whom the privilege is not waived as to material submitted in the course of any supervisory or regulatory process. Moreover, the Bureau can share the supervised entity’s privileged information with other Prudential Regulators without triggering a waiver of the supervised entity’s privilege except with respect to that Prudential Regulator. The law thus closes what many commentators and members of Congress felt was a loophole that would impede cooperation among supervised entities and the Bureau.

The Bureau had tried to address the omission through a bulletin it issued on January 4, 2012 (CFPB Bulletin 12-01) in which it stated that because its supervisory powers were equivalent to those of the Prudential Regulators, it had the power “to receive privileged information from supervised entities without effecting a waiver of privilege.” Due to the omission in the Act that created the Bureau, most commentators feared that the Bureau’s unilateral decree was insufficient to protect the privilege. Similarly, Congress expressed a preference for a statutory scheme to address inter-agency sharing of privileged material over any agency pronouncement or rule-making. SeeCongressional questioning of Raj Date, Deputy Director of the CFPB, on 7/19/12 before House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit.

In addition to adding the Bureau to the list of Prudential Regulators for the purpose of maintaining attorney-client privilege, the bill also adds the Bureau to a different statutory list (12 U.S.C. 1821(t)(2)(A)) of credit agencies among whom sharing of privileged information will not result in a waiver as to third-parties including the Farm Credit Administration, the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

Though H.R. 4014 does close the gap as to sharing of information obtained through supervisory examinations and among government regulators, the law does not address a major concern of supervised entities – that material obtained through the course of an examination will be shared with the Bureau’s enforcement division and form the basis of an action. According to the Congressional summary of the bill, the provision prohibiting information gathered by the CFPB in its supervisory or regulatory capacity will not be construed as a waiver of privilege as to “any person or entity other than the CFPB…” (emphasis added). The concern as to the Bureau itself, and its two divisions, remains.

Category: Regulatory

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Practical Considerations

By July 1, 2013:

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Contains key tax provisions for renewable energy but funding for USDA energy programs is left out

Tax extenders

Bioenergy funding

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