Category: Regulatory

Michigan Supreme Court Won’t Give Advisory Opinion on Right-to-Work

barnes

Saying simply that “we are not persuaded that granting the request would be an appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion,” the Michigan Supreme Court on Friday denied Gov. Rick Snyder’s request that the high court render an advisory opinion about the constitutionality of Michigan’s new right-to-work law.

Relying upon the provision in the state’s constitution’s that allows the governor to request the “opinion of the supreme court on important questions of law upon solemn occasions as to the constitutionality of legislation after it has been enacted into law but before its effective date,” the Governor had asked the Court for a ruling largely because the state’s public workers’ collective agreements are set to expire at the end of 2013. In a brief filed in support of the request for an advisory opinion, Michigan Solicitor General John Bursch said that an advisory opinion would prevent an “impasse at the negotiating table.”

Notwithstanding the Court’s decision, six lawsuits continue challenging the Act. Two of them are brought by unions or labor coalitions. Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Callaghan has been brought in federal court and challenges the constitutionality of the Act as to private sector workers. UAW v. Green, currently pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals, challenges the constitutionality as it applies to public sector workers. Here’s a helpful link to a chart describing the pending litigation.

SG Bursch also said in his filing with the Supreme Court that barring Supreme Court action, the state would consider filing a motion seeking an expedited ruling in the Green case.

The Detroit Free Press coverage on the court’s decision can be found here.

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Impact of Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) Rulings in Court Decisions

Katten Muchin

The US Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) provides, among other things, a forum for trademark owners to oppose the issuance of a certificate of registration for a mark filed by a third party which it believes is confusingly similar to its registered mark. Although the TTAB can issue a decision as to whether two marks are confusingly similar such that one of them should not be entitled to registration, the issue of whether one mark infringes another is beyond the scope of a TTAB proceeding and is instead left to the courts.

Therefore, when a trade mark owner is formulating its enforcement strategy, a common question that arises is whether a TTAB decision holding that two marks are confusingly similar would be dispositive when the same two marks are the subject of a trademark infringement claim before the courts. This issue was recently addressed by the Eighth Circuit in the case of B&B Hardware, Inc v Hargis Industries, Inc and the conclusion reached in this case can be helpful to brand owners contemplating their approach to brand enforcement.

B&B Hardware, the owner of a trade mark registration for the mark Sealtight covering a fastener product that is used predominantly in the aerospace industry, had successfully opposed a trade mark application filed by Hargis for the mark Sealtite covering a line of self-drilling and self-taping screws that are commonly used in the construction of metal buildings. Subsequently, B&B Hardware sued Hargis, making claims of trade mark infringement and unfair competition. The District Court rejected B&B Hardware’s claims and in doing so decided not give preclusive effect to the TTAB decision (that is, the Court did not allow the decision to preclude the issue from being re-litigated) which held that there was a likelihood of confusion between the two marks.

B&B Hardware appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit arguing that the TTAB’s determination that there is a likelihood of confusion between the two marks should have been given preclusive effect by the District Court on the claim of trade mark infringement which, in turn, would have necessitated a finding by the District Court in B&B Hardware’s favour. The Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that regardless of whether the TTAB is an agency whose decisions are entitled to preclusive effect, the decision rendered in the opposition proceedings was not so entitled. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit ruled that preclusive effect should not be given to the TTAB decision at issue because the likelihood of confusion test applied by the TTAB when considering B&B Hardware’s opposition to Hargis’ attempt to register the Sealtite mark did not equate to a determination of likelihood of confusion for purposes of analysing a claim for trade mark infringement.

The decision issued by the Eighth Circuit was not without dissent, however. The dissent took the position that when an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact which the parties had the opportunity to litigate, the courts should give the decision issued preclusive effect. In short, the dissent believed that Hargis should not have had the opportunity to re-litigate the dispute at the District Court level after already having done so before the TTAB.

This case, therefore, stands for the proposition that a ruling by the TTAB may not be serve as the final decision on the existence of a likelihood of confusion between two marks. However, as indicated by the dissent, the holding in this case may not be universally applied so careful consideration should be given by a trade mark owner when pursuing a claim of trade mark infringement when the marks at issue were already the subject of a TTAB decision.

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Recent Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Developments

Rules Creating Exemptions to the ATR Rule Finalized

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) recently finalized rules that modified and created specific exemptions to the CFPB’s Ability-to-Repay Rule. The rules have three main effects.

  1. They exempt certain community development lenders and nonprofits—specifically those that lend only to low- and moderate-income consumers, and make 200 or fewer such loans per year—from the ATR Rule.
  2. They facilitate lending by community banks and credit unions that have less than $2 billion in assets, and make 500 or fewer first lien mortgages per year.
  3. They no longer require that compensation paid by a broker or lender to a loan originator counts towards the Dodd-Frank points and fees limits.

These changes to the ATR Rule will take effect on January 10, 2014.

Effective Date of Prohibitions on Financing Credit Insurance Premiums Delayed

The CFPB has delayed the effective date of a regulation prohibiting creditors from financing credit insurance premiums secured by a dwelling. The regulation, previously effective June 1, 2013, has been delayed until January 10, 2014. The CFPB wanted to clarify how the rule applied to transactions other than those where a lump-sum premium was added to the loan amount at closing.

CFBP Seeking Comments on Possible Revisions to the Civil Penalty Rule

The CFPB is seeking comments on possible revisions to the Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule. The CFBP uses this fund, established by the Dodd-Frank Act, to deposit civil penalties obtained in judicial or administrative actions under federal consumer financial laws. The fund can be used to pay victims of violations of federal consumer financial laws, or, if victims cannot be found, to educate consumers and provide financial literacy programs. The rule articulates the CFPB’s interpretations of what kind of victim payments are appropriate and how to otherwise allocate the funds. Comments are due on July 8, 2013.

White Paper Concerning Overdraft Practice Concerns Published

The CFPB published a white paper concerning overdraft practice concerns and institutional practices. The paper finds that a large portion of consumer checking account revenue continues to come from overdraft fees. Furthermore, those consumers who choose, let alone use, overdraft coverage have higher costs and a higher chance of having their checking accounts involuntary closed. No action, other than further research, is currently planned.

CFPB Launches New Mortgage Rule Implementation Page

The new mortgage rule implementation page is part of an effort to help lenders comply with the Dodd-Frank Act reforms and CFPB rules. Debtors and potential debtors can find potentially useful information, including quick reference charts, video guides, manuals, etc.—related to the new 2013 mortgage rules. While the CFPB’s intention for the site is to help understand the rules, the materials are not a substitute for the rules themselves.

Ryan C. Fairchild, summer law clerk at Poyner Spruill, co-authored this article.

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Defense of Marriage Act’s Demise (DOMA) – What it Means for Canadian Residents with U.S. Ties

Altro Levy LogoLast week, the US Supreme Court issued an historic and landmark ruling in the case of US v. Windsor. It has been hailed in the media as the demise of the Defense Of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), and celebrated as an extension of more than 1,000 federal benefits to same-sex couples.

In US v. Windsor, Edith Windsor brought suit against the US government after she was ordered to pay $363,000 in US estate tax upon the death of her wife Thea Spyer. Edith and Thea were legally married in Canada in 2007, but the US federal government did not recognize their marriage when Thea passed away in 2009. Under DOMA gay marriage was not recognized, even if it was legal in the jurisdiction where it was performed. This lack of recognition meant that Edith could not take advantage of the marital deduction that would have allowed her to inherit from her wife without paying US estate tax.

In its ruling on June 26th, the US Supreme Court ruled that the US federal government could not discriminate against same-sex married couples in the administration of its federal laws and benefits as previously dictated by DOMA. Same-sex couples, who are legally married in one of the 13 states that recognize gay marriage, or a country like Canada, now have access to the same federal protections and benefits as a heterosexual married couple.

Tax Benefits

The demise of DOMA will bring with it a multitude of changes under US tax law. We will not attempt to enumerate all of them here, though we will provide a brief overview of key changes for our Canadian and American clients.

i. US Estate Tax

The case of US v. Windsor was based on the US estate tax, which is imposed by the US federal government on both US citizens and residents, as well as non-residents who own US assets worth more than $60,000 USD. Currently US citizens and residents with less than $5.25 Million USD in worldwide assets do not owe US estate tax on death. Canadians with worldwide assets of $5.25 Million USD or less receive a unified credit under the Canada-US Tax Treaty that works to eliminate any US estate tax owed on their US property.

Under federal law a US citizen may pass his entire estate to his US citizen spouse tax-free upon death. Up until last week this rollover was unavailable to same-sex couples.

Canadian same-sex couples should now benefit from the Canada-US Tax Treaty provisions that provide a marital credit to the surviving spouse. This allows for a doubling up of credit against any potential US estate tax due on US property. Now a Canadian same-sex spouse can inherit a worldwide estate worth up to $10.5 Million USD and should see little to no tax on US assets due upon the death of the first spouse.

ii. Gift Tax

The US imposes a tax on gifts if they exceed $14,000 USD per recipient per year. There is an exemption for gifts between spouses, which are generally not taxable.

Gifts made in the US between non-US citizen non-resident spouses are taxable, but the annual exemption is $139,000 USD instead of $14,000 USD. Canadian spouses who gift each other US property, US corporate stocks, etc. may gift up to $139,000 USD per year without incurring US gift tax.

These exemptions have now been extended to same-sex couples, expanding their ability to use gifting for tax and estate planning.

iii. US Income Tax

Many Canadians move to the US each year, in part because of the lower personal tax rates. In the US spouses are allowed to engage in a form of income splitting by filing a joint income tax return. By filing jointly, married couples are also generally able to take advantage of further credits and deductions not afforded to individual or single filers. Being able to file jointly can be highly tax advantageous.

Previously, same-sex couples had to file either separately or as head of household. Now they have the option of filing jointly as spouses, and gaining access to the aforementioned income splitting, credits and deductions.

Couples may file up to three years of amended US Income Tax returns if they believe that they would have been entitled to a larger tax return by filing jointly in those years.

iv. Other Tax Benefits

In the US most individuals receive health insurance through their employer at least up until they qualify for US Medicare at age 65. Previously, if the employer sponsored health insurance plan covered the same-sex spouse as well, then it was considered a taxable benefit. Such coverage will now also be tax-free for same-sex couples.

Retirement Benefits

Among the many benefits now extended to same-sex couples are a variety of “Retirement Benefits.”

i. Social Security and Medicare Benefits

With the end of DOMA, same-sex couples may now qualify for retirement, death, and disability Social Security benefits based on their spouse’s qualifying US employment history. For example, same-sex couples that do not have the required US employment history to qualify for US Social Security benefits on their own may now qualify for spousal Social Security benefits based on their spouse’s qualifying employment history. These spousal Social Security benefits are typically equal to 50% of the Social Security benefits received by the spouse with the qualifying employment history.

Additionally, spouses can qualify for US Medicare based on only one spouse’s qualifying US employment. This allows access to premium-free, or reduced-premium, health coverage in retirement.

Previously these important retirement benefits were not available to same-sex spouses.

ii. Individual Retirement Accounts

Important changes to the rights and recognition of spouses under US retirement savings plans result from the end of DOMA. Same-sex couples will now be recognized under 401(k), 403(b), IRA, Roth IRA, and similar plans. Spouses will be required to give their consent for any non-spouse beneficiary designations for these accounts. They will be treated as spouses for purposes of determining required distributions. For example, an inheriting same-sex spouse will not have to begin IRA distributions until age 70 ½, whereas previously he would have had to begin required distributions immediately as would any non-spouse beneficiary.

Immigration

One of the biggest questions after the US Supreme Court’s ruling on DOMA was whether there would be immediate changes to US immigration policy. Previously the US government did not recognize same-sex couples for immigration purposes. This meant that a US citizen spouse could not sponsor his husband for immigration to the US as a permanent resident (a.k.a. green card holder).

Last week, shortly after the ruling on DOMA, Alejandro Mayorkas, the director of US Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) announced at the American Immigration Lawyers Association annual conference that the USCIS would begin issuing green cards to qualifying same-sex couples.

As of Friday, June 29, 2013, USCIS began issuing green cards to same-sex spouses. USCIS has stated that it has been keeping a record of spousal green card petitions denied only due to a same-sex marriage for the past two years. It is expected to reopen and reconsider these spousal sponsorship petitions that were previously denied due to same-sex marriage.

Conclusion

The demise of DOMA is exciting news for Americans, and Canadians with US ties. It provides same sex couples a wealth of new tax and estate planning opportunities, not to mention new opportunities for retirement and immigration planning. It is not too early to review your current planning, and take advantage of these changes.

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Obama Administration Delays Until 2015 Large Employer Shared Responsibility Requirements, Reporting and Tax Penalties

Dickinson Wright LogoOn July 2, 2013, the Department of Treasury announced a one-year delay in the employer shared responsibility mandate under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and related information reporting.

Complexity Leads to Delayed Reporting Implementation

The Department said that over the past several months, the Administration engaged in dialogue with businesses about the new employer and insurer reporting requirements under ACA. It took into account employer concerns about the complexity of the requirements and their need for more time to implement them effectively. Based on this, the Administration announced that it will provide an additional year, to January 1, 2015, before the ACA mandatory employer and insurer reporting requirements begin. It said the delay is designed to meet two goals. First, it will allow the Department to consider ways to simplify the new reporting requirements consistent with the law. Second, it will provide time to adapt health coverage and reporting systems while employers are moving toward making health coverage affordable and accessible for their employees. The Department said that within the next week, it will publish formal guidance describing the transition. In doing so, it said it is working hard to adapt and be flexible about reporting requirements as it implements the law.

More specifically, the Department said that the ACA includes information reporting (under Code Section 6055) by insurers, self-insured employers, and other parties that provide health coverage. It also requires information reporting (under Code Section 6056) by certain employers with respect to the health coverage offered to their full-time employees. The Department expects to publish proposed rules implementing these provisions this summer, after a dialogue with stakeholders – including responsible employers that already provide their full-time work force with coverage that exceeds the minimum employer shared responsibility requirements – in an effort to minimize the reporting, consistent with effective implementation of the law.

Once these rules have been issued, the Administration will work with employers, insurers, and other reporting entities to strongly encourage them to voluntarily implement this information reporting in 2014, in preparation for the full application of the provisions in 2015. It said that real-world testing of reporting systems in 2014 will contribute to a smoother transition to full implementation in 2015.

Delayed Implementation of Shared Responsibility and Tax Penalties

The Department said it recognizes that this transition relief will make it impractical to determine which applicable large employers owe the shared responsibility tax payment for not providing minimum essential coverage that is affordable and provides minimum value (under Code Section 4980H) for 2014. Accordingly, the Department is extending transition relief on the employer shared responsibility payments. Under the transition relief, applicable large employers will not owe either the $2,000 tax or the $3,000 tax for 2014. Any employer shared responsibility tax payments will not apply until 2015. During the 2014 transition period, the Department strongly encourages employers to maintain or expand the health coverage they provide to their employees.

Importantly, the Department said its actions do not affect employees’ access to the premium tax credits available under the ACA, although without employers reporting on who they provide coverage to, it is hard to see how the government will know which individuals qualify for a tax credit. Without more, this suggests that the Department intends that marketplaces for individuals will still be available January 1, 2014. It also suggests that most Americans will still have to obtain health benefits coverage or pay the individual tax. It is not clear if the notice employers are required to send to all employees by October 1, 2013 advising them of the marketplaces will still be required. The upcoming guidance should address this and other requirements. The Department also said that this delay does not change the compliance requirements under any other provision of the ACA. This suggests that the PCORI fee payable by July 31, 2013 is still due, the 90-day maximum waiting period for benefits eligibility in 2014 still applies, etc.

Hopefully, the upcoming guidance will provide more detail on on-going employer responsibilities. Until then, it appears that, presuming there are no additional delays or relief:

  • Employers will not have to count full-time employees and full-time equivalents in 2013 to determine if they are applicable large employers beginning January 1, 2014.
  • Applicable large employers will not have to determine their full-time employees for purposes of providing minimum essential coverage in 2014.
  • Applicable large employers who do not provide minimum essential coverage to all full-time employees in 2014 will not owe the $2,000 tax times all full-time employees (minus 30) if one full-time employee purchases coverage through a marketplace and obtains a tax credit or subsidy.
  • Applicable large employers that provide minimum essential coverage that is not affordable or does not provide minimum value in 2014 will not owe the $3,000 tax times all full-time employees who purchase coverage through a marketplace and receive a tax credit or subsidy.
  • Employers will not have to report to the government on their full-time employees and health plan coverage in 2014, although the government will urge voluntary reporting.
  • Employers that have been considering adjusting the structure of their workforces to minimize the number of their full-time employees appear to have additional time in which to analyze and implement workforce changes.
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What Windsor Means for Same-Sex Married Couples Seeking U.S. Immigration Benefits

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On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Windsor that Section 3 of the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) is unconstitutional. This Section of DOMA prohibited the U.S. government from conferring any federal benefits to same-sex couples who were married in any jurisdiction in the world.

horshoe ring

What does the Windsor decision mean for same-sex couples seeking immigration benefits?

On the immigration front, DOMA has been the main obstacle prohibiting married same-sex couples from accessing any immigration benefits that would otherwise flow to a spouse. For example, a U.S. citizen may sponsor a spouse who is a foreign national for permanent residence, and that foreign national spouse is considered an “immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen and exempt from annual numerical limitations on immigrants. Before Windsor, this option of “immediate relative” sponsorship did not exist for same-sex couples. Same-sex spouses also were not able to qualify for derivative nonimmigrant visas, or to qualify as dependents in an employment-based immigrant visa or adjustment of status process. Windsor has permanently shifted this landscape, with same-sex married couples being recognized as married and therefore able to access immigration benefits, provided they can demonstrate eligibility under the law for the specific benefits sought.

What marriages are valid under Windsor?

Generally, if a couple’s marriage is valid where it is performed, it is valid for purposes of immigration law. If you and your foreign national spouse were married in one of the 12 U.S. states that recognize same-sex marriage or in a foreign country that recognizes same-sex marriage, such as Canada, your green card sponsorship and application process should be treated exactly like the application of a different-sex couple. In fact, Edie Windsor, the plaintiff in Windsor, married her wife in Canada. To determine the validity of the marriage, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) focuses on the place where the marriage took place, not the location where one or both spouses live. This same principle is applied by other agencies within the Department of Homeland Security as well as at U.S. Embassies and Consulates.

Recent Guidance from the Federal Government

We expect government agencies to implement the Windsor decision swiftly. This means that immediately we will see changes at the various federal agencies that process applications for immigration benefits and visas. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued a statement following the Court’s decision. She directed USCIS “to review immigration visa petitions filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same manner as those filed on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse.” Recent Department of Homeland Security guidance is now clear that family-based immigrant visas will no longer “be automatically denied as a result of the same-sex nature of your marriage.” Following the Court’s decision, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the Department of State (DOS) will work with the Department of Justice and other agencies “to review all relevant statues as well as benefits administered” by DOS. We expect to see guidance from U.S. Consulates in the coming weeks.

Conclusion

Same-sex couples who are married now have equal access to immigration benefits. The scope of the Windsor decision extends to same-sex spouses of individuals pursuing employment-based immigration benefits, such as green card and nonimmigrant visa sponsorship. We will continue to monitor developments in the law and provide guidance on immigration options for LGBT families.

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SAP Joins Patent and Trade Office against Versata in Eastern District of Virginia

Schwegman Lundberg Woessner

You may recall that Versata sued the Patent Office in the Eastern District of Virginia to challenge the PTAB’s decision to institute a CBM review of Versata’s U.S. 6,553,350 patent.  Versata Development Group, Inc. v. Rea, 1:13-cv-00328-GBL-IDD (E.D. VA).  It turns out that SAP America, Inc. and SAP AG (collectively “SAP”) filed a Motion to Intervene in that suit.  On June 24, 2013, Judge Gerald Bruce Lee granted SAP’s Motion to Intervene over Versata’s objections (the PTO did not oppose the motion).  The motion was granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).  SAP is now an intervenor in the lawsuit.

SAP also filed a motion to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), alleging a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  That motion has not yet been decided; however, this is a very important case for all post-grant practitioners because it will likely give guidance as to which types of PTAB decisions may be appealed.   First, SAP argues that the decision is not appealable under the AIA, in particular 35 U.S.C. § 324(e).  Second, SAP contends that a decision to institute trial is not appealable because it is not a final decision by the PTAB; it is the very beginning of the PTAB trial.  In its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, SAP stated:

First, Versata invokes the APA to challenge a decision by the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) made on her behalf by the newly-created Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”). 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.2, 42.4. Specifically, Versata challenges the Board’s initial decision to institute a post-grant review proceeding. But under the America Invents Act (“AIA”), Congress expressly precluded judicial review of the exact decision that Versata seeks to challenge: “The determination by the Director whether to institute a post-grant review . . . shall be final and nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(e). Simply put, the APA does not apply—and this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction—where, as here, a “statute precludes judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).

SAP’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, page 1 (italics in original).

This is certainly an interesting development.  We will stay tuned into the future events of this matter.

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In a Pro-Employee World, U.S. Supreme Court Rulings Offer Employers Hope

GT Law

In a pair of important opinions released last week, both of which are helpful to employers, the U.S. Supreme Court raised the bar for employees asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. _, No. 12-484 (2013), the Court ruled that an employee claiming retaliation must do more than show that retaliatory animus was a “motivating factor” for discipline – it must be the “but-for” cause.  In Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. _, No. 11-556 (2013), the Court ruled that for employers to be held vicariously liable for the actions of a “supervisor,” the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “supervisor” had power to take a “tangible employment action,” such as transferring or terminating the employee. Authority merely to direct aspects of the employee’s work will not suffice.

Nassar and Vance represent significant victories for employers faced with Title VII retaliation and discrimination claims. The heightened requirements that charging employees now face should enhance an employer’s prospects for obtaining summary judgment and, failing that, impose a more rigorous hurdle for plaintiffs at trial.

Nassar Imposes More Stringent “But-For” Causation Test for Title VII Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff in Nassar was a physician of Middle Eastern descent. The defendant university hired him as a member of its medical faculty, and under the terms of the university’s affiliation agreement with a local hospital, the plaintiff also worked at the hospital as a staff physician. The plaintiff alleged that the University’s Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine harassed him because of her discriminatory “bias against Arabs and Muslims.” The plaintiff ultimately resigned from the university faculty, and accused his superior of discriminatory bias in his letter of resignation, which he sent to the university’s chair of Internal Medicine and other faculty members. The chair was allegedly dismayed by the public accusations of discrimination, and said that the chief must “be publicly exonerated” of the charges against her. When he learned that plaintiff had been offered a staff physician position at the hospital, the chair objected that the affiliation agreement required all staff physicians to also be faculty members, and the hospital therefore withdrew its offer to plaintiff.

Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, alleging that he had been constructively discharged by reason of the chief’s discriminatory harassment, and that the chair subsequently allegedly retaliated against him for complaining of that harassment. A jury found for plaintiff on both claims, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed only as to the retaliation claim, holding that retaliation claims under Title VII required a showing merely that retaliation was a “motivating factor” for an adverse employment action rather than its “but-for” cause.

The Supreme Court vacated that decision, concluding that “the text, structure and history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation claim … must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” The Court reasoned that because Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision appears in a different section from the status-based discrimination ban, which utilizes the lesser “motivating factor” causation test, the “but-for” standard applies to Title VII retaliation claims. Accordingly, “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” To establish a retaliation claim, employees must now show that their employer would not have taken the challenged employment action but for the employee’s protected activity.

Vance Limits “Supervisors” to Those with Power to Take a Tangible Employment Action

In a second critical decision for employers, plaintiff in Vance, an African-American woman, worked in the university’s Banquet and Catering Division of Dining Services. Plaintiff alleged that a fellow employee, a white woman named Davis, harassed and intimidated her because of her race.  Plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging that her white co-worker created a racially hostile work environment. “The parties vigorously dispute[d] the precise nature and scope of Davis’ duties, but they agree[d] that Davis did not have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance.”

The District Court granted defendant summary judgment, holding the university was notvicariously liable for Davis’s alleged actions because she could not take tangible employment actions against the plaintiff and therefore was not a “supervisor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “who qualifies as a ‘supervisor’” under Title VII. The Court held that “an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII [only] if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim” and affirmed.

In analyzing when an employer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees, the Court defined “tangible employment actions” to include effecting “‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” The Court specifically rejected the EEOC’s definition of “supervisor,” which tied “supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over another’s daily work[,]” as “a study in ambiguity.” Hence, under Title VII, if an employee is not authorized to impose tangible employment actions against another, the employer cannot be vicariously liable for the subject employee’s alleged harassment.

Vance enhances an employer’s ability to limit the company’s responsibility for harassment. Employers should remain mindful of the duties of their employees, ensuring that only key management and supervisory personnel possess the power to effect a “significant change in employment status”. Clear definitions of an employee’s responsibilities should greatly limit any future claims of vicarious liability against employers. This more precise definition of “supervisor” should, like Nassar, increase the likelihood of dismissal at the summary judgment stage and help obtain favorable in limine and trial rulings.

Conclusion

Nassar and Vance afford significant advantages to employers defending against discrimination and retaliation claims.  Importantly, although the decisions themselves were concerned with claims arising under federal anti-discrimination (not just Title VII) laws, the Court’s reasoning may well find acceptance among state courts, which frequently apply the Title VII analysis to claims asserted under analogous state laws. Nassar and Vance are likely to prove valuable tools to employers defending against claims of discrimination and/or retaliation, increasing both the prospects of obtaining summary judgment and, if necessary, the odds of success at trial.

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No Implied Duty to Develop Particular Strata in Pennsylvania (e.g. Marcellus Shale)

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On June 21, 2013, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (the “Court”) held that a lessee does not owe a duty to a lessor to develop each and every “economically exploitable strata” under an oil as gas lease in Pennsylvania.

In early 2012, Terry L. Caldwell and Carol A. Caldwell, husband and wife (“Plaintiffs”) sued Kriebel Resources Co., Range Resources—Appalachia, LLC and others (“Defendants”) regarding an oil and gas lease executed between the Plaintiffs and Defendants on January 19, 2001 (the “Lease”). The Lease provided for a primary term of twenty four (24) months and so long thereafter as oil or gas was being produced. The Defendants drilled a number of shallow wells on the property that Defendants alleged held the entire property under the terms of the Lease. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Defendants in early 2012 alleging that, among other things, Defendants breached the implied duty to develop the property by not drilling deeper wells to exploit the valuable Marcellus Shale and, based on such potential unexploited value, the current production did not amount to production in paying quantities. The trial court sustained certain preliminary objections raised by the Defendants that resulted in a dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims. In Terry L. Caldwell et al. v. Kriebel Resources Co. et al. (1305 WDA 2012), the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case.

Regarding the duty to develop, Plaintiffs argued that without direct Pennsylvania case law on topic the Court should follow a Louisiana case, Goodrich v. Exxon Co., 608 So.2d 1019 (La. App. 1992), which held that Exxon’s duty to develop as a reasonably prudent operator included the obligation to develop valuable oil-producing sands underlying the leased premises. Based on this rationale, Plaintiffs alleged there is an implied duty to “develop all strata, not simply to extract shallow gas . . .” The Court rejected the application of the Goodrich rationale and held that the specific terms of the Lease were to control. Therefore, because the Lease provides for the continued validity of the Lease upon production of gas and allows for the guarantee of delay rentals if no gas is produced, the Court found that it was “not compelled to follow Louisiana law.” The production from various shallow wells was found to be sufficient to hold the entirety of the leased estate.

The Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the concept of “paying quantities” should be based on all potential gas strata underlying the Lease and should impose some obligation relating to good faith. The Court quickly dismissed this claim and made clear that “paying quantities” in Pennsylvania merely requires the well to “consistently pay[] a profit, however small.” It is of no legal effect that the extent of the profit produced from these shallow wells is “not to the extent appellants desire.” Due to the continued production in paying quantities and the Court’s failure to impose a duty on Defendants to develop all potentially economic strata, the Court chose not to terminate Defendants’ Lease.

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America Invents Act – Practical Considerations for Portfolio Companies

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Private equity funds should familiarize themselves with recent changes to U.S. patent law that affect patent protection strategies for their portfolio companies.  In September 2011, the U.S. Congress enacted the America Invents Act (AIA) patent reform bill, which significantly overhauled U.S. patent law.  This article summarizes practical considerations that private equity funds should bear in mind when evaluating and managing the patent portfolio of their investments.

First Inventor to File 

In the broadest sense, the AIA converts U.S. patent law into a “first-inventor-to-file” system from a “first-to-invent” system.  This conversion harmonizes U.S. patent law with the rest of the world’s patent laws.  In practice, it means that businesses should not delay filing patent applications, as they can no longer antedate patent-defeating prior art with an earlier invention date.

Challenges to Patent Rights 

Effective September 12, 2012, the AIA provided businesses new post-issuance patent validity challenge options that may be exercised before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  The new post-issuance challenges provide businesses new and predictable avenues to test the validity of a competitor’s patent that is, or may in the future be, an impediment to commercialization.  These post-issuance challenges include post-grant review, inter partes review and the Transitional Program for Covered Business Methods.  Each of the three post-issuance challenges is defined briefly here.

Post-Grant Review

Someone other than the patent owner may file a petition for post-grant review challenging the validity of a patent within nine months of the patent’s date of issue or reissue on any statutory grounds for invalidity.  Thus, even if a patent has been grated to a portfolio company, it may be subject to challenge by third parties in the time period immediately following issuance.  Similarly, a portfolio company could elect to challenge a competitor’s rights, even after a patent has been issued.

Inter Partes Review 

Someone other than the patent owner may file a petition for inter partes review challenging the validity of the patent nine months after the date of issue or reissue on limited invalidity grounds.  Inter partes review may only be instituted after the time period for post-grant review has expired and offers only a subset of the challenges available in post-grant review.  This means that throughout the entire life of an issued patent, generally 20 years from the filing date of the earliest priority document, it may be subject to challenge and invalidation.  Private equity funds should closely consider any potential challenges that could be lodged against a portfolio company and should evaluate potential risk before investing.

Transitional Program for Covered Business Methods

With regard to business method patents, someone other than the patent owner may file a petition for covered business method review challenging the validity of a patent if (1) the petitioner has been sued for infringement or threatened with an infringement suit, and (2) the patent claims a financial product or service.  Practically speaking, this scope is broader than mere financial products or services, such that any patent claiming anything related to money may potentially be challenged using a covered business method review.  Versata Development Group Inc. recently filed suit against the USPTO in the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that such a scope is impermissibly broad.  Until the result of that case or guidance is issued by the USPTO, private equity funds should proceed under the broad definition of “financial product or service” when evaluating a portfolio company with patents that may be challenged under the covered business method review.

Conclusion

Whether used against competitors’ patents or in defense of a business’ own interests, the new post-issuance challenges available under the AIA are powerful new tools in a portfolio company’s strategic toolbox.

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