“Damaged Goods” Not Enough to Sway Third Circuit Court of Appeals

In early February, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the “damaged goods” approach to valuing property crossed by a pipeline. In UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement For 1.7575 Acres et al., the appeals court vacated the trial court’s property valuation that was based on an expert’s opinion that the stigma of a natural gas pipeline decreased the value of the property crossed by the pipeline.

The expert largely based his opinion on anecdotes from his past employment in an appliance shop where he noticed customers valued undamaged property more than damaged property. Under his “damaged goods” theory, the expert opined that property under which a pipeline crosses has a lower value because people perceive it as damaged. The panel held that the expert’s methodology was incapable of testing, had not been peer reviewed, was not generally accepted, and did not provide for a rate of error. While an expert’s opinion does not have to meet all, or even most, of those factors, the fact that this expert’s opinion met none left his opinion unreliable.

The panel noted that parts of the expert’s opinion compared the value of properties impacted by oil spills or the radiation emitted from the Three-Mile Island nuclear disaster. Those properties were figurative oranges to the apples and thus incapable of assisting the trier of fact in concluding the impact to the value of property under which a natural gas pipeline crosses.

Finally, the Third Circuit held that the district court must act as “gatekeeper” and ensure that expert opinions are based on reliable science.


© Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. All Rights Reserved.

For more on property valuation, see the National Law Review Real Estate law section.

I Have an Easement for Lake Access. Am I a Riparian?

The Michigan Court of Appeals recently said no. In Wenners v Chisholm, the plaintiffs owned property on Portage Lake in Washtenaw County. The defendant owned a back lot, but she and the previous owners of her property had accessed the lake using a strip of land located between the plaintiffs’ properties for more than 30 years.

The trial court found that the defendant had established a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress to the lake. However, the easement did not include riparian rights, and the defendant was barred from installing a dock or mooring any watercraft in the lake.

The defendant argued that the trial court could not grant her a prescriptive easement for lake access without also giving her riparian rights. The Court of Appeals rejected her arguments. It concluded that since the defendant could not show that she and the previous owners of her property had exercised riparian rights for a 15-year period, the prescriptive easement did not include riparian rights.

Had the defendant presented evidence showing that she and the previous owners of her property had installed a dock and moored a boat in the lake for at least 15 years, perhaps the outcome might have been different. But without that, the defendant’s easement to access the lake did not include riparian rights.


© 2020 Varnum LLP

For more easement access issues, see the National Law Review Real Estate law page.

Swap New Year’s Resolutions for Real Property with a 1031 Tax-Deferred Exchange

A 1031 Tax-Deferred Exchange (“§ 1031 Exchange”) is an extremely useful tax strategy for taxpayers that maintain real property for productive use in trade, business or for investment. It allows a taxpayer to defer payment of capital gains tax on investment properties that are sold.

A taxpayer continues to qualify for a § 1031 Exchange if the following rules are met: (1) the properties being exchanged must be “like-kind”; (2) the taxpayer must transfer property held for productive use in a trade, business or for investment (the “Relinquished Property”) and subsequently receives property to be held either for productive use in a trade, business or for investment (the “Replacement Property”)”; (3) the Replacement Property value must be greater than or equal to the Relinquished Property value; (4) the taxpayer must not receive “boot” in order for the exchange to remain tax-free; (5) the name on title of the Relinquished Property must mirror the name on the title of the Replacement Property; (6) the taxpayer must identify a replacement property within 45 days after the taxpayer transfers the Relinquished Property; and (7) the taxpayer must receive the Replacement Property within 180 days of the transfer of the Relinquished Property, or on the date the taxpayer’s tax return is due, whichever is earlier.

Section 1031 Exchanges, while an excellent tax deferral tool, are not without complications. Section 1031 Exchanges must be used exclusively for the exchange of real property held for investment or business purposes. Section 1031 Exchange rules also require the title of the Replacement Property to be under the same name as the title of the Relinquished Property. Any real property interests owned by a limited liability company or a partnership must be reinvested by the entity in real property of “like-kind” nature for investment or business purposes in order for it to qualify under § 1031. This is a problem if an individual member or partner of the entity wishes to “cash out” or reinvest in something other than “like-kind” real property. To remedy this problem, many transactions are structured as a “drop and swap” where the interests in the real property are transferred to the individuals as tenants in common and those tenants in common, as individuals, deed the Relinquished Property to the buyer. Because the taxpayers, as individuals, sold the Relinquished Property, it is the individuals that must reinvest in the Replacement Property to utilize the tax deferrals under § 1031. Because the individuals are tenants in common, each is able to choose independently whether to reinvest in a Replacement Property and defer tax under § 1031 or cash out and pay the tax on their individual earnings from the sale of the property.

However, this “drop and swap” technique is increasingly disfavored by the IRS and may create tax implications for the taxpayers if the real property is acquired by the individual taxpayers immediately prior to the sale. Since real property must be for investment or business purposes to be eligible under a § 1031 Exchange, it is best practice to distribute the interests in the property to the individuals well in advance of the date of the relinquishment so each individual holds the property long enough to constitute an investment. While the IRS has not provided guidelines on the length of the holding period, it is recommended that such transfer, or “drop” to the individuals occur at least a year in advance before the closing on the Relinquished Property and that records be kept of the transfer and the intent of the taxpayers to hold the real property for business or investment. Moreover, taxpayers need to take care when transferring (“dropping”) the interest in the real property from the entity to individual tenancy-in-common interests to ensure the taxpayers aren’t viewed as operating as a partnership and thus, subject to ownership constraints of a partnership (this would likely negate the drop and swap technique and require the individuals, as tenants-in-common but operating as a partnership, to all invest in the Replacement Property for some to benefit from tax deferral under a §1031 Exchange).

There does not appear to be any limitation on how an individual taxpayer uses their proceeds if they are cashing out, and have no intent to defer tax under a § 1031 Exchange. However, for a taxpayer to defer tax under a § 1031 Exchange the above requirements must be met, and there can be no actual or constructive receipt of money or other property before the taxpayer actually receives the Replacement Property. Even if the taxpayer may ultimately receive the like-kind Replacement Property, any receipt of cash or other property, including an interest in an additional entity or personal property, prior to that Replacement Property will make the transaction a sale rather than a deferred exchange and prevent the taxpayer from gaining the tax deferral under a § 1031 Exchange.


© 2020 Davis|Kuelthau, s.c. All Rights Reserved

See more on the topic via the National Law Review Tax Law page.

Real Estate Developer Rights When Cities Demand Too Much [PODCAST]

ANTHONY DE YURRE

Welcome to Land Development in the 305, a podcast featuring news, observations, and analysis on the redeveloping and reshaping of the Miami skyline. My name is Anthony De Yurre, I’m a partner in Bilzin Sumberg’s Land Development and Government Relations Practice Group, and I have with me today, my partner and chair of our department, Stanley B. Price. On my side, I focus most of my day on transit-oriented development, large scale mixed-use projects, and P3 development with government infrastructure. Stan, why don’t you tell us a little bit about yourself and your practice?

STANLEY B. PRICE

Thank you, Anthony. I have practiced for 45 years as a zoning attorney, and I had the privilege of being an assistant county attorney for ten years in charge of zoning in Miami-Dade County. I’ve been in private practice since 1981, and as you indicated, my practice is almost exclusive land development regulations, planning, and governmental law.

ANTHONY DE YURRE

So today, Stan, we’re very glad to have you here with us. We’re going to talk about a very important case in Florida. The decision of Koontz v. Saint Johns River Water Management District is a 2013 case that essentially requires municipalities to follow the constitutional rule of law and reigns in some aggressive requirements that were made on behalf of property owners in order to try to move forward with a particular project they had. Tell us a little bit about your view on the significance of the Koontz case.

STANLEY B. PRICE

The Koontz case is a seminal case in that it provides protection to property owners and the bane of every zoning attorney is standing in front of a public hearing and asking the local government to respond to exaction requests, money for a park, money for a school program, and the like. That practice used to be legalized extortion, but the Koontz case has changed that procedure, and the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional condition — a principle which applies to Koontz. I think it’s important to understand the background of Koontz and it goes back to the taking jurisprudence of Penn Central Railroad in the 1970s where the Supreme Court indicated that as long as government takes property and gives you an equal compensation in that case in terms of transferred development rights, there is no governmental taking. We fast forward many years later to the Nollan case out of California. The Nollan case was a situation where a property owner was remodeling a house along the ocean in California, and the California Coastal Commission required him, as a condition of getting the permit to remodel his home, to grant a public easement through his property to the beach for the use of the general public. The Supreme Court rejected that concept. They said this is nothing more than an appropriation of private property and found that to be a regulatory taking. A few years later, in the Dolan case, the Dolan case involves the construction of a store, and as part of the condition of approval, the local government required the property owner to build a bike path and other improvements which bore no reasonable relationship to the project. The Court held and has become the framework of the Koontz case that before a government can impose a burden on a property owner, there has to be a rational nexus between what is being asked for and the request must be in conformity with the impact caused by the property. Fast forward to 2013 and the Koontz case, which was authored by Justice Alito. Justice Alito seemed to get in the head of every zoning attorney who practiced in the United States, and he recognized that a zoning hearing is nothing but authorized extortion. And he used those terms in the case and indicated that it is inappropriate for a government, exact donations from a private property owner, which have no conceptual reality to what is the impact is. The property owner owned a 13-acre parcel of property. It was designated wetlands under the local plan. The property owner came forward with a plan to development uplands three-and-a-half acres which were not wetlands by definition and the state agency said well if you want to develop that, we only want you to develop one acre, or if you develop the three-and-a-half acres we want you to give us $150,000, so we can nourish wetlands several miles from the property.

ANTHONY DE YURRE

Stan, that is literally the definition of extortion. Which is why I think the court uses such strong language, and we’re all thankful they did. And what is also interesting is that you know when you talk about constitutional rights what we see in the news nowadays, we will talk about you know First Amendment rights, religious freedom rights, things of that nature. But people just seem to gloss over the fact that this country was founded on property rights, and that is really one of the biggest issues that we deal with on a daily basis, upholding constitutional property rights. I guess it just does not get the same headline attention that the other constitutional protections do, but without that and particularly the Koontz case, you know, it really goes to the heart and fabric of what ownership in the United States is all about.

STANLEY B. PRICE

When the Koontz case was decided, I was going through a zoning process in a town in Northeast Dade to build a religious facility, and the city manager came to me and said: “I want you to donate $100,000 for town beautification and I want you to pave a roadway several blocks from your synagogue.” And my client was obviously very upset. I was very upset. We waited. The Koontz case came out. I brought the Koontz case to a meeting, and I said, do you want to be the picture in the dictionary for the Koontz case. They dropped their demands immediately, and we were able to develop the property.

ANTHONY DE YURRE

And you know what is interesting about that is that really is a great anecdote about the importance of constantly staying on top of all the latest case law that comes out. Whether it is our local jurisdiction here in Miami-Dade County, at the State of Florida level, at a federal level, and even at the Supreme Court level, you know? I think that of the almost 20 members of our department each mention an anecdote about a matter we had at hand that was pressing and because we specifically monitored case laws that came out, just like you did in this instance with the Koontz case, we were able to win the day and really,  you have to practice this type of law, you have to do land development, you have to do zoning, it has to be focused, and you cannot be a jack-of-all-trades, so to speak. You really have to be focused in that particular field and stay at the cutting-edge and the tip of the spear with the case law.

STANLEY B. PRICE

What has occurred as a result of Koontz is that generally United States Supreme Court cases, while they are important on a national basis, usually don’t filter down to local governments. But in this instance, the Koontz case formed the foundation of the state legislature in Florida forming and creating section 70.45 of the Florida statutes which basically provides a cause of action for a property owner who feels that they have been aggrieved by an illegal exaction, which is defined as an exaction which has no correlation to the impact caused by the development. The statute is a very clean statute. It puts the burden of proof on the government, not on the property owner.

ANTHONY DE YURRE

Incredibly important.

STANLEY B. PRICE

Yes.

STANLEY B. PRICE

To show that there is a reasonable proportionality. The statute awards attorney’s fees for the prevailing party, which is very important. And what it does, it creates a cause of action that basically provides that you have rights that you did not have before. Generally, zoning decisions are handled by a petition for a certiorari. This creates a de novo action you can take if you are at a hearing, and you are concerned that these conditions will be egregious to your client. You could wait until after the hearing. You do not have to object at the hearing. And then you avail yourself by this statute. Now, what is important about this statute is that…

ANTHONY DE YURRE

Before you continue, I just want to jump in on something you noted, which is the fact that you get statutory attorney’s fees for this. And in the State of Florida, unless you have a contractual right to attorney’s fees or a statutory right to attorney’s fees, you are not awarded attorney’s fees for causes of action in the State of Florida. But even more so, it is important in the case where you are dealing with litigation with a government entity because remember, the government entity really has an unlimited resource of attorneys at their disposal. They really have very deep pockets with tax dollars, and so ultimately that is something that I think both of us have had experience with, and when a client looks at that and says, you know when I go up against the government, the problem is I have a finite amount of dollars, am I ever going to get that back because the expense might be significant in this case.

STANLEY B. PRICE

— and the way to developers, of course, by unnecessary litigation. What is interesting about section 70.45 is that there is – the government has tried to wave their liability by having applicants sign a waiver beforehand that they will not seek damages.

ANTHONY DE YURRE

Yeah, sure, of course.

STANLEY B. PRICE

This specifically indicates in the statute it cannot be waived. You can sign every contact you want, but it can’t be waived. Number two it requires you to file an action no earlier than 60 days but no later than 180 days, to make your claim. The government has the ability to respond, they must respond, and what they say cannot be used against them at a later time except as to attorney’s fees. And the government has the burden of showing that the unconstitutional condition basically is in proportion to the impact of the development.

ANTHONY DE YURRE

So we have 2013 Koontz comes out. Then we have the Florida statue. Where are we right now in more recent case law? Because obviously, this goes back again, as you mentioned, in Penn Central, Nollan, Dolan, then we have Koontz. Now we have the Florida statues. Tell us where we are today. In particular, I think it would be helpful to talk about the city of Venice and mandarin development as well.

STANLEY B. PRICE

The City of Venice case is an interesting case in that the cause of action accrued prior to the effective date of the Florida statute 70.45. So the rules of procedure were somewhat different, and a clever municipal attorney had the applicants sign a waiver of liability to say that this was an annexation case. This was not a zoning case. And he said if you want to be in next to our jurisdiction, you have to make a list of 15 things. One of which was to make what they call an extraordinary monetary contribution to the local government. The Court struck down that extraordinary contribution as an unconstitutional condition, and in addition, the Court held that you could not waive — a party cannot waive a constitutional right in writing and must — and it cannot be foreclosed from bringing such an action. A somewhat similar case was decided shortly thereafter in Manatee County. It really wasn’t a decision, but the property owner was asked to dedicate property far in excess of what the impact of his project would be, and the property owner filed an action, once again a pre 70.45 action — and many land-use cases take several years to go through the court system — and the county — the judge in the Manatee County case refused to grant summary judgment to the local government. And in fact, wrote in his order what the county was doing here was an unconstitutional condition because the proportionality test of Nollan and Dolan was not met. The parties subsequently settled this case, and the settlement is interesting in that Judge Hall, who was the judge in this case, wrote a 45-page opinion indicating that the property rights were trampled in a good way. What does this mean to our practice and the like? Number one, applicants for zoning hearings no longer have to be a punching bag and get up and play Let’s Make a Deal. You want door number one, door number two, or door number three? Those days are over. However, you still see the local government attempting to do this on a regular basis. Sophisticated local attorneys, municipal attorneys know the Koontz case and know about 70.45. Unfortunately, several jurisdictions do not know that. I had a case earlier today, which I had been on a conference call.

ANTHONY DE YURRE

I heard you through the wall, by the way.

STANLEY B. PRICE

Right.

ANTHONY DE YURRE

It was an interesting conversation.

STANLEY B. PRICE

I talk loud. This indicates that this government is going to be sued under the Civil Rights Act and under the equitable estoppel principles were withdrawing a building permit for no basis whatsoever. Koontz is a tremendous weapon for a municipal attorney, a zoning attorney to know how far your client can be pushed and when you can push back. And I urge everyone to look at the statute and the decision of the Supreme Court, and it will make you feel good that Justice Alito may have been one time a zoning attorney.

ANTHONY DE YURRE

Well, Stan, I really appreciate your insight and walking us through the importance of Koontz and the pertinent Florida statutes. I think that we can’t forget that the constitutional right to this country was founded on really are those that pertain to property and it applies to everyone in this country from the largest developer on down to the apartment complex owner or the owner of the smallest condo unit and a micro-unit perhaps. It really defends people equally. Thank you all again for joining us on our podcast. Stan Price, again, chair of our department, thank you very much for your time in this podcast. Thank you for listening to us, and if you want more on this and other land development related topics, you can visit us at Bilzin.com and also subscribe to our new Miami blog at Newmiamiblog.com. We publish all the latest case law and other decisions that are pertinent to land use, zoning, and development in Miami-Dade County and as well as the State of Florida. Thank you.

STANLEY B. PRICE

Thank you, Anthony.

ANTHONY DE YURRE

Thank you, Stan.


© 2020 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

More on zoning laws & development on the National Law Review Real Estate law page.

Five Suggestions for Elder Care If You or Your Elderly Parents Have “One Foot on the Banana Peel”

Shana and I recently had a new client, “Jane,” that came to see us because she was concerned about her elderly parents. Both are in their 90s and although they are still living independently, she is noticing both a physical and cognitive decline in both.  She described them as having “one foot on the banana peel,” recognizing that they are one fall or illness away from no longer being able to maintain their current lifestyle.

As with many of our clients, they are resistant to making any changes and she is worried about what will happen. Jane lives a distance from her parents, works full time, and has her own teenage children. She came to us for assistance in understanding what she can do to help them. Here are five suggestions we made for her:

1. Changes to Powers of Attorney and Health Care Proxy

Jane’s parents’ existing legal documents have each other as primary agents and neither is able to act in that capacity. Jane is handling their bill paying and taking them to MD appointments and it will be easier for her to continue this role with the appropriate legal documents naming her as the primary agent.

2. Financial Planning

Jane’s parents have limited liquid assets and own their home. Their monthly income does not cover their expenses, so they are drawing from those assets every month. This plan will not work long term if either needs to hire a caregiver to help them at home due to the high cost. We helped Jane to understand the realities of paying for care and the limited coverage of Medicare. We also explained the criteria for Medicaid eligibility, the application process and the problem with using Medicaid to pay for home care. We stressed the importance of Jane and her parents exploring alternative living situations that may better meet their needs while they still had funds and ensuring that they found a facility that would allow them to spend down to Medicaid when their funds are exhausted.

3. Home Evaluation

Jane’s parents live in a bi-level home with stairs to enter and Jane is very concerned about their safety. We recommended a home evaluation to determine what modifications can be done to the home to make it safer. These modifications can be simple such as a tub bench, so they don’t have to step over the tub to get into the shower or more complex such as a stairlift or emergency alert system.

4. Medication Management

Jane’s parents have multiple medical conditions and each takes many medications. They often forget to take their medications or take them incorrectly. This is a very serious issue and often leads to unnecessary hospitalization which can precipitate a downward spiral. We discussed a variety of options, including a visiting nurse and an automatic medication dispenser.

5. Take a Deep Breath

As with all our clients, Jane loves her parents and wants what is best for them. However, her vision of what is best for them doesn’t necessarily coincide with their vision. As a caregiver-child myself, I can very much relate to her frustration of having a clear idea of what will improve an elderly parent’s quality and/or quantity of life and having that parent refuse to make a change. Sometimes small changes are acceptable and they can make a difference and prolong stability. But very often the best we can do is to plan for the emergency and know we have done the best we can.


©2020, Norris McLaughlin & Marcus, P.A., All Rights Reserved

For more on caring for elderly relations, see the National Law Review Family Law, Divorce & Custody type-of-law section.

Appellate Court Tells CitiMortgage It Can’t Force “Repurchase” Of What No Longer Exists

A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit offers some vindication for mortgage companies still facing “repurchase” demands made by the banks to which they sold residential mortgages in the years leading up to the financial crisis that began in 2007 and accelerated in 2008.  In CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Equity Bank, N.A., No. 18-1312 (8th Cir. 2019), the Eighth Circuit (which has appellate jurisdiction over the federal district courts of Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, and the Dakotas) reached the common-sense conclusion that a plaintiff cannot require a defendant loan originator/seller to “repurchase” a loan extinguished by foreclosure.  In such a circumstance, the court reasoned, there simply is nothing left to repurchase.  In so holding, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri  — a court that, despite being CitiMortgage’s consistently chosen forum for repurchase and contractual indemnification claims against loan sellers, had granted summary judgment to the defendant, Equity Bank, on this issue.

The relevant factual background is as follows. CitiMortgage filed suit against Equity, demanding that Equity repurchase 12 residential mortgage loans. CitiMortgage had notified Equity that it needed to take action under the cure-or-purchase provision in the parties’ Agreement.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Equity’s duty to repurchase was limited to the six loans that had not gone through foreclosure. For the loans that had not gone through foreclosure, the court affirmed the district court’s holding that Equity breached the Agreement. The court rejected Equity’s claims that CitiMortgage’s letters lacked the necessary detail to trigger its duty to perform, and that CitiMortgage waited too long to exercise its rights. But, as to the six loans that had gone through foreclosure, the court affirmed the district court’s holding that Equity owed nothing to CitiMortgage.

As part of its analysis detailing the reasons that Equity could not be required to repurchase loans already foreclosed upon, the Eighth Circuit faulted CitiMortgage for never explaining what, exactly, Equity was supposed to repurchase. We have regularly made that argument when defending clients against repurchase claims and likewise, have never gotten a satisfactory response as to what our client could repurchase.   Typically, in tacit acknowledgment of the merit of that argument, plaintiffs make sure to do something that the appellate court intimated CitiMortgage should have done in this case.  That is to seek instead what is usually an alternative contractual remedy, indemnification.   Perhaps because it considered the repurchase provision in its contract with Equity more likely to generate a significant damages award (this contract’s repurchase provision established a “repurchase price formula” favorable to CitiMortgage), CitiMortgage opted in this case to seek only the remedy of “repurchase.”

To be sure, a plaintiff’s decision to seek an “indemnification” remedy also creates obstacles to recovery in most cases of this type.  Among those obstacles are many of the same statute of limitations problems that parties asking for repurchase face, as well as substantial questions about the circumstances under which the party seeking indemnification incurred the liability for which it is seeking payment.  Relatedly, whether a particular alleged loan defect can fairly be said to have caused the plaintiff’s monetary loss is typically very much in question when a plaintiff aggregator seeks indemnification from a defendant loan seller. Many battles over such issues remain to be fought, but, in the meantime, the Eighth Circuit’s recognition that a party cannot repurchase what no longer exists is a welcome development for residential mortgage loan originators.


© 2019 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

Washington’s Model Toxics Control Act: Transforming Contaminated Sites into Community and Environmental Assets

The Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA) has been cleaning up contaminated sites in Washington State for 30 years. On December 10, 2019, Beveridge & Diamond and the Environmental Law Institute will be hosting a seminar (MTCA 30) to celebrate the success and examine the future of the state’s cleanup statute with an all-star program featuring some of the state’s leading experts. In advance of the seminar, B&D is publishing a series of articles focused on MTCA.

MTCA’s Many Triumphs

MTCA has been spurring the cleanup of contaminated sites in Washington for 30 years. Since MTCA went into effect, over 7,000 sites have been cleaned up. While the workhorse statute is not going to take a rest anytime soon, with more than 6,000 sites requiring further action before closure and over 200 new sites identified each year, the citizen’s initiative already has amassed an impressive legacy. Below are just a few of the many examples where MTCA has been instrumental in turning contaminated properties into productive community and environmental assets – on both large and small scales and in urban and rural areas of Washington.

  • Mount Baker Housing Association – Restoring Brownfields to Provide Affordable Housing in Seattle’s Rainier Valley. In 2016, the Mount Baker Housing Association (MBHA) entered into a prospective purchaser consent decree with the State of Washington to investigate and ultimately clean up chlorinated solvent contamination from a former dry cleaner and petroleum contamination from a former gas station and auto repair facility. The innovative use of MTCA’s prospective purchaser provisions allowed the nonprofit affordable housing developer to take on the risks of investing in properties with known contamination while gaining liability protections and expanding housing options for lower-income earners in an expensive real estate market. Importantly, the settlement also has provided a vehicle for MBHA to receive public funds to cover at least some of the remedial action costs. Just the other week, MBHA released a draft remedial investigation / feasibility study and a draft cleanup action plan for public comment.

  • Puget Sound Initiative – Ensuring Healthy Habitats in Padilla and Fidalgo Bays. In 2007, the Department of Ecology (Ecology) identified seven bays around Puget Sound where it would prioritize cleaning up contaminated sites and habitat restoration. In Padilla and Fidalgo Bays in northern Puget Sound, six industrial waterfront sites have been cleaned up while work on five other sites is in progress. The bays are home to valuable marine habitat, including extensive eelgrass beds, which serve as groundfish nurseries. The sites that have been cleaned up in the last 15 years include a former oil tank farm, a former lumber mill and pulp mill, a boatyard, and former milling, shipbuilding, and marina operations, among others.

  • Kittitas Valley Fire and Rescue – Building a New Fire Station in Ellensburg. When the Kittitas Valley Fire and Rescue was looking for a new fire station location, it purchased a property that had been used for hay scales, as well as truck repair and fueling, with associated soil and groundwater contamination. During property redevelopment, the contamination was investigated and remediated, with assistance from Ecology. With effective planning and use of the building design as a protective cap, cleanup was completed for under $250,000 and in under three months.

  • Kendall Yards – Transforming an Old Railyard in Spokane. In 2005, River Front Properties, LLC entered Ecology’s Voluntary Cleanup Program to address contamination at a 78-acre site to the northwest of Spokane’s downtown area. The site had been used extensively for locomotive repair and servicing and had served as a location for plating and storage operations. Over a single year, 200,000 tons of soil contaminated with petroleum, PAHs, and metals were removed from the site. Now, Kendall Yards has turned into a vibrant community with a growing collection of houses, apartment buildings, offices, and restaurants.

  • Gas Stations, Dry Cleaners, and Underground Storage Tanks Around the State. Contaminated sites are not caused only by heavy industrial operations. Many of the most common sources of contamination are gas stations, dry cleaners, and other businesses with underground storage tanks. Ecology has identified over 7,000 leaking tanks in the state. But significant progress is being made. Contamination from over 4,000 tanks has been remediated, and cleanup has started for over 2,000 more tanks. For gas stations, Ecology has entered into multi-site agreements to facilitate and coordinate cleanups for parties with larger portfolios of sites. Collectively, efforts to address contamination at service stations and dry cleaners have resulted in about a thousand NFA determinations under MTCA.

  • Substantial Public Funding for Cleanups and Related Projects. The 1988 citizens’ initiative resulted in a tax on the “first possession” of hazardous substances in Washington, in addition to MTCA’s cleanup framework. Although the tax revenue has fluctuated due to volatility in oil prices, it generated around $2.2 billion between 1988 and 2017 to support Ecology programs and to fund cleanups and related environmental projects around the state. This funding is critical to remediating sites where sufficient private dollars are not available. For instance, between 2015 and 2017, Ecology provided $1.2 million to remediate American Legion Park in Everett. The park was impacted by the nearby former Asarco smelter. The area-wide cleanup has exceeded the dollars collected in a 2009 bankruptcy settlement with Asarco. This year, the state legislature converted the tax on petroleum products from a price-based tax to a volumetric tax with the goal of making funding more predictable. The Department of Revenue also has estimated that revenues under the new tax will be higher.


© 2019 Beveridge & Diamond PC

For more environmental site developments, see the National Law Review Environmental, Energy & Resources law page.

California’s New Statewide Rent Control – What You Need to Know

Summary:

As expected, California’s legislature passed AB 1482 this month, which imposes statewide rent control, restricting the ability of landlords to terminate certain tenancies without just cause, and further restricting the ability of landlords to increase rent on an annual basis. For those properties already subject to rent control, the new law is unlikely to change much if anything, but owners of other residential rental properties should be aware of the new restrictions.

Below is a summary of the key points of the new law.

When does it apply? 

AB 1482 applies to tenants that have occupied a dwelling unit for more than 12 consecutive months. If additional adult tenants are added during the lease term, it applies once the new tenant has occupied for 12 months, or one of the existing tenants has occupied the unit for 24 or more consecutive months.

What properties are exempt? 

AB 1482 applies to all residential properties in California, excluding the following:

  • Housing that has been issued a certificate of occupancy within the previous 15 years.
  • Transient and tourist hotel occupancy.
  • Housing accommodations in a nonprofit hospital, religious facility, extended care facility, licensed residential care facility for the elderly or an adult residential facility.
  • Dormitories owned and operated by colleges or schools.
  • Housing accommodations in which the tenant shares bathroom or kitchen facilities with the owner who maintains their principal residence at the residential real property.
  • Single-family owner-occupied residences, as long as the owner does not lease more than 2 units (including ADUs).
  • A duplex in which the owner occupied one of the units as the owner’s principal place of residence at the beginning of the tenancy, so long as the owner continues in occupancy.
  • Residential real property that is alienable separate from the title to any other dwelling unit, provided the owner is not a REIT, corporation or limited liability company in which at least one member is a corporation, and further subject to certain tenant notice requirements.

What are the limitations on increasing rent?

The bill restricts the owner of residential real property from increasing rent during any 12-month period by more than the lesser of (i) 5% plus a cost of living adjustment based on the California CPI, or (ii) 10%. The percentage increase in any 12-month period is based on the lowest applicable rate during the preceding 12-month period, but the value of any rent discounts, incentives or other concessions made by the landlord are not taken into account when determining the lowest rate in effect during such period.

When can a landlord terminate a lease? 

A landlord can terminate the lease for at-fault just cause for (i) defaults in the payment of rent, (ii) a material breach of the lease, (iii) nuisance uses, (iv) illegal or criminal activities, (v) committing waste, (vi) refusal by the tenant to sign a lease extension, (vii) refusal by the tenant to allow owner entry as required by law, (viii) assignment or subletting in violation of the lease, (ix) failure to vacate after signing a vacation agreement, or (x) failure to vacate upon termination of employment.

A landlord can also terminate for no-fault just cause if (i) the owner or certain family members intend to occupy the property (for leases entered into after July 1, 2020 other requirements must be satisfied), (ii) the property is withdrawn from the rental market, (iii) the owner is required by law to vacate the property (and if the tenant was the cause, the tenant will not be entitled to relocation assistance), or (iv) the owner intends to demolish or substantially remodel the property.

For any no-fault just cause termination, the landlord must provide the tenant with relocation assistance by either paying the tenant an amount equal to one month’s rent or waiving in writing the final month’s rent before the same is due. A landlord’s failure to strictly comply with the provisions relating to a no fault just cause termination renders the termination void.


© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

For more on rental laws, see the National Law Review Real Estate law page.

California’s “Housing Crisis Act of 2019” May Boost Housing Production or Just Boost Housing-Related Litigation

On October 9, 2019, Governor Newsom signed into law Senate Bill (SB) 330, or the “Housing Crisis Act of 2019” in an effort to combat California’s current housing shortage, which has resulted in the highest rents and lowest homeownership rates in the nation. In a nutshell, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 seeks to boost homebuilding throughout the State for at least the next 5 years, particularly in urbanized zones, by expediting the approval process for housing development. To accomplish this, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 removes some local discretionary land use controls currently in place and requires municipalities to approve all developments that comply with current zoning codes and general plans. If not extended, SB 330 will only be effective from January 1, 2020 through January 1, 2025.

Governor Newsom signed SB 330 over the objections of local governments to help meet his ambitious goal of 3.5 million new housing units by 2025. One study by UCLA found that localities have already approved zoning for 2.8 million new housing units – 80% of Governor Newsom’s goal. However, if zoning alone was enough to increase housing production, California’s rate of housing production would be increasing. Instead, in the first half of 2019, there was a 20% reduction in the issuance of residential building permits compared to the same time period in 2018. California believes the reduction was due, in part, to excessive hearings and local approval procedures, mid-application spikes in development impact fees, and mid-application changes to development regulations, all of which can render a residential development project infeasible.

Only time will tell if SB 330 will actually increase the rate of housing production or merely fill the courts with more housing-related litigation prior to SB 330’s sunset in 5 years. However, one thing is for sure – local governments must tread carefully before denying the next housing project.

Major Provisions:

The Housing Crisis Act of 2019 applies to all housing developments consistent with objective general plan, zoning and subdivision standards in affect at the time an application is deemed complete, and affects all cities and counties in California – including charter cities. A “housing development” is defined as a project that is (1) all residential; (2) a mixed use project with at least two-thirds of the square-footage residential; or (3) for transitional or supportive housing.

SB 330 also places extra restrictions on certain “affected” cities and counties with housing statistics below national averages. As defined by the legislation, today there are nearly 450 cities and unincorporated parts of counties that qualify as “affected.”

For all cities and counties, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019’s major impacts include:

  • Retroactive prevention of zoning codes or design standards alterations that reduce residential density or intensity of use from that which was in place on January 1, 2018;
  • Authorization of proposed housing developments to override the local zoning codes that are inconsistent with the general plan, if the project is consistent with the general plan or land-use element of a specific plan;
  • Prevention of non-scheduled impact fees increases after a project applicant has submitted all preliminary required information;
  • Limitation of the number of public hearings on a development to 5; and
  • Specification that applications must be reviewed for completeness within 30 days of submission, provision of a written notice to the applicant if the agency believes the project is inconsistent with objective local development plans, policies and standards within 30 days if a housing project is under 150 units (and 60 days if the housing project is over 150 units).

Additional controls on “affected”[1] cities include:

  • Prevention of municipalities from enacting moratoriums on residential and mixed use projects;
  • Prevention of municipalities from establishing caps on the number of people who can live in the municipality, the number of housing units allowed, or the number of housing units to be constructed; and
  • Prevention of any density reductions or changes to design standards that downzone or limit housing development.

In addition to the above-mentioned controls on a local government’s ability to restrict development, there are also special limitations on reductions to affordable housing in a community. As to cities and counties, a local agency may not disapprove, or condition approval in a manner that renders infeasible a housing project for very low, low-, or moderate-income households or emergency shelters without specific written findings based on a preponderance of evidence in the record. This only applies to projects with 20% of the total units set-aside for affordable housing at 60% area median income (AMI) or 100% of the total units set-aside for affordable housing at 100% AMI.

As for developers, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 bans any demolition of affordable or rent-controlled units unless the developer replaces all such units, allows tenants to stay in their homes until 6 months before construction begins, provides relocation assistance to tenants, and offers tenants a first right of return at an affordable rent.

SB 330 also implements penalties for violation of Housing Accountability Act (Govt. Code § 65589.5) (HAA) rules. Specifically, a court may require an agency make appropriate findings of denial or pay a $10,000 per unit fine into affordable housing funds. In the case of a local agency’s bad faith and failure to comply with a court order within 60 days, fines can increase to $50,000 per unit and the court can overturn a project denial and approve the project itself. Bad faith includes decisions that are frivolous or entirely without merit.


[1] SB 330 sets out criteria for identifying “affected” cities based on incorporation, size, and the average rent and vacancy rate compared to the national average.


Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

ARTICLE BY Jeffrey W. Forrest and Kelsey Clayton, Law Clerk at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP.
For more on housing development, see the National Law Review Real Estate law page.

Beware of the Barter: A Cautionary Tale

A recent ruling by Tennessee’s top court sends a strong message: be leery of waiving traditional forms of payment in favor of accepting goods or services. In TWB Architects, Inc. v. The Braxton, LLC, et al., an architecture firm and a cash-strapped developer executed an agreement for the architect to receive a penthouse condominium instead of his design fee. When the developer could not deliver a deed for the condominium, the architecture firm sued the developer for its fees.

So far, the ensuing litigation has lasted over 10 years and, most recently, resulted in an opinion by the Supreme Court of Tennessee that reversed summary judgment in favor of the architect and remanded the matter back to the trial court for still more proceedings.

The parties originally entered in a standard Architect Agreement, whereby the plaintiff, TWB Architects, was to be paid for its design services based on two percent of the construction costs for the project. After failing to obtain sufficient financing for the project, the defendant, The Braxton, informed TWB that it could not pay the design fees and suggested TWB accept a condominium in the project as payment instead. TWB agreed, and the parties executed the Condominium Agreement.

Thereafter, TWB’s owner acted as though he owned the condominium contemplated in the deal, which just so happened to be a penthouse. He invested nearly $40,000 in upgrades and repeatedly referred to the penthouse as “his penthouse.” In December 2008, he moved into the penthouse and represented himself as its owner.

However, shortly thereafter, issues arose with Braxton’s ability to deed the condominium to TWB’s owner. At that point, TWB decided to change course. It claimed that it was still entitled to the original design fee under the Architect Agreement and filed a mechanic’s lien for the unpaid fees. Braxton claimed the Condominium Agreement had acted as a novation, nullifying the Architect Agreement and, accordingly, TWB’s ability to collect its fee thereunder.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of TWB, holding it could still recover its design fees because there was insufficient evidence that the parties intended a novation by substituting the Architect Agreement for the Condominium Agreement. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that summary judgment was improperly granted because disputed questions of material fact existed about whether TWB and Braxton intended a novation when they executed the condominium agreement.

Unless the parties can settle the matter, the case will now require a trial to determine whether TWB can recover its fees. It’s unknown whether TWB’s owner is still living in the penthouse.

This case is a great example of how a tempting barter – like accepting a penthouse from a cash-strapped developer – may sound like a nice solution at the time, but can lead to further headaches and protracted litigation.


© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

For more developer-architect concerns, see the National Law Review Real Estate law or Construction Law pages.