Category: Real Estate

Mortgage Industry to Face Centralized Repository for State Regulatory Enforcement Actions – Deadline for Comments is September 20, 2011

Posted in the National Law Review an article by attorney  Thomas J. McKee, Jr., Gil Rudolph and Michael R. Sklaire of Greenberg Traurig, LLP regarding State Regulatory Registry LLC (SRR);

 

 

Deadline for Comments is September 20, 2011

On July 22, 2011, the State Regulatory Registry LLC (SRR) issued a Request for Public Comments on a proposal to collect, centralize and publish all state regulatory enforcement information concerning mortgage loan originators. By creating a central source of investigation information, the SRR aims to provide a repository of background information for both consumers and other state and federal regulators. Before implementing, the SRR has asked for public comments to be submitted by September 20, 2011.

In 2008, the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System & Registry (NMLS) was created under the federal Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act (“SAFE Act”), with the purpose of “provid[ing] consumers with accessible information . . . regarding the employment history of, and publicly adjudicated disciplinary and enforcement actions against loan originators.” 12 U.S.C.A. § 5101(7). As part of implementing this purpose, the NMLS intended to use the SRR as the vehicle through which to include all regulatory actions taken by state regulators against companies and individuals that could be gathered and published. Previously, actions by state regulators could only be found, if at all, through a search of the individual state regulators’ websites.

The proposal to incorporate state regulatory reporting into the NMLS, which would take effect in Spring of 2012, consists of twelve major policies and processes, which include, among others:

  1. The state agency that took the action will be responsible for inputting such information into the NMLS. The SRR will not verify, validate, or amend any of the enforcement actions, as such information can only be changed by the inputting agency.
  2. Whether an action will actually be included in the NMLS can vary from state to state, depending on state-specific statutes and regulations. Further, each state will determine which actions will be shared only with other regulators, and those that will be made available to the general public.
  3. Reported actions will not be limited to those actions that are public. Instead, a regulator will have the ability, at their discretion, to include information that is to be shared only among regulators or among agency employees.
  4. A recommendation that any postings be made within five (5) days of receipt of a state agency’s final order.
  5. Provide a standardized set of information to be posted, including, for example, (a) the enforcing agency, (b) a description of the Order, and (c) the amount of any fine or other penalty.
  6. The SRR recommends that actions taken against companies should be posted on a prospective basis, while actions taken against loan originators should be posted as of the date each state’s SAFE Act became effective.
  7. All respondents named in an action will be included in any reporting, and the action will be tied to the records of both the named company and/or individuals.
  8. A company or individual will be notified of any posting in the system and will be able to view any publicly posted actions against it in the NMLS. The SRR proposal does not, however, contain a mechanism for a company or individual to learn of the non-public postings against it.
  9. State regulators will have the ability to post multi-state actions through NMLS. Each state involved in such an action is responsible for posting the action pursuant to its own reporting policies.

At first glance, the proposed registry presents a number of benefits to companies. For example, by having a central repository for all state regulatory actions, companies will have easy, up-to-date, access to the types of enforcement actions being pursued across the country, including the resulting fines and penalties assessed. Such information can be invaluable when defending an enforcement action and evaluating settlement proposals with state agencies. Companies will be able to see enforcement trends and use such information to modify their practices. The new system will greatly simplify a company’s ability to learn from the conduct of others.

Such benefits, however, do not come without a host of potential drawbacks. Specifically, while the system seeks to compile standard information regarding enforcement actions, it does not set forth a standard for reporting. Instead, its reliance upon individual state standards for reporting could lead to competitive disadvantages where, despite identical conduct, one company is tagged with a report while another is not solely due to a difference in state reporting standards.

The discretion given to regulators under the system could have similar effects. Giving regulators the discretion to input information (including non-adjudicated information) that will only be shared among regulators or agency employees could result in information being shared without verification, accountability, or opportunity to cure. Successfully defending an enforcement action would not necessarily preclude the sharing of negative comments about a company on the system. Companies will not be privy to such secret, albeit formalized, statements that could be prejudicial to how such entities are viewed and/or treated by other regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, the repository could be a potential treasure trove of information for future plaintiffs and will certainly be a frequent target of discovery in lawsuits.

Companies should carefully examine the potential ramifications each of the proposed policies may have on their business.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

The Truth about Clean Energy Jobs

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by U.S. Department of Energy in response to The Washington Post’s assertions  about the Department of Energy’s loan programs:

The Washington Post’s assertions today about the Department of Energy’s loan programs are both incomplete and inaccurate.

Here are the facts: over the past two years, the Department of Energy’s Loan Program has supported a robust, diverse portfolio of more than 40 projects that are investing in pioneering companies as we work to regain American leadership in the global race for clean energy jobs. These projects include major advances for our renewable power industry including the world’s largest wind farm, several of the world’s largest solar generation facilities, and one of the country’s first commercial-scale cellulosic ethanol plants. Collectively, the projects plan to employ more than 60,000 Americans, create tens of thousands more indirect jobs, provide clean electricity to power three million homes, and save more than 300 million gallons of gasoline a year, all while investing in American competitiveness. What matters to the men and women who have those jobs is that the investments that this Administration is making are helping to keep factories open and running.

When the Washington Post claims that the program has created 3,500 jobs, here is what the reporters are excluding:

  • 33,000 American auto jobs saved at Ford. The Post article does acknowledge that the program enabled Ford to modernize its factories to produce more fuel efficient vehicles, which a Ford spokeswoman credits for “helping retain the 33,000 jobs by ensuring our employees can build the fuel-efficient cars people want to drive.”
  • More than 7,300 construction jobs. Many of the projects funded by the program are wind and solar power plants, which create significant numbers of construction jobs but once built can be operated inexpensively without a large workforce. But the Washington Post chose to ignore all of those jobs. If a community built a new highway or a bridge that employed 200 workers directly during construction – and many more in the supply chain — and that also strengthened the local economy by making it faster to transport goods, would anyone say that the project created zero jobs?
  • Supply chain jobs. While these jobs aren’t reflected in official government estimates because of the difficulty in obtaining a precisely accurate count, that doesn’t mean they don’t exist. When a company spends $100 million or $200 million building a wind farm or a solar power plant, most of that economic value actually goes into the supply chain – creating huge manufacturing opportunities for the United States.

In fact, when you look at the Washington Post’s graphic, you can see that the program has already created or saved roughly 44,000 jobs.  Many of the projects it has funded are just getting going, and many of the loans won’t even go out the door until the next few weeks. Others have not ramped fully up to scale. But we are on pace to achieve more than 60,000 direct jobs – and many more in the supply chain.

Here’s a simple example:

Last year, the Department awarded a loan guarantee to build the Kahuku wind farm in Hawaii. It employed 200 workers during construction. Those wind turbines were built in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The project also features a state of the art energy storage system supplied by a company in Texas. The supply chain reached 104 U.S. businesses in 21 states. But by the Washington Post’s count, none of those jobs – not even the 200 direct construction jobs – should count.

What’s critically important and completely ignored by the Washington Post, is that the value of this program can’t be measured in operating jobs alone. The investments are helping to build a new clean energy industry here in America. We are now on pace to double renewable energy generation from wind and solar from the time the President took office. Yet we are still in danger of falling behind China and other nations that are competing aggressively for leadership in these technologies. This is a race we can and will win, but only if we make these investments today. These investments will pay dividends not just in today’s jobs but in entire industries and supply chains – and in cleaner air and water for our children and grandchildren.

One of the goals of the program is to create projects that will encourage the private sector to take the financing risk on other, similar projects on its own. If we can show, for example, that a commercial scale cellulosic biofuel plant in Iowa can succeed, the private sector will likely finance many more of them around the country.

America’s economic strength has been built on technological leadership. The next great technological revolution is the clean energy revolution, and this Administration is committed to making sure that America will continue to lead the world.

Department of Energy – © Copyright 2011

NYC Condo Refinance Collapses Because There Was No "Meeting of the Minds"

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Eric S. O’Connor of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP wherein  plaintiffs sought damages arising out of their attempt to refinance a mortgage loan with the defendant bank:

In Trief v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Index No. 105280/09, — N.Y.S.2d — (Sup Ct, NY County, Apr. 4, 2011) (“Trief”), the plaintiffs sought damages arising out of their attempt to refinance a mortgage loan with the defendant bank (the “Bank”), for breach of contract and violation of New York’s Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act, N.Y. General Business Law (“NYGBL”) § 349. Justice Charles Edward Ramos granted the Bank’s motion for summary judgment on both counts. The parties actually proceeded to closing when plaintiff walked away from the refinancing of a luxury midtown condominium located at 15 West 53rd Street, New York, NY – seemingly over a $518.75 dispute.

The main lesson is that all parties, especially when communicating via more informal modes of communications like email, must clarify and confirm an “agreement on all essential terms” or else a valid contract will not be formed.

The facts – negotiation, informal communications, the exchange of standard loan forms, etc… – follow a seemingly common pattern. A mortgage consultant from the Bank filled out the refinance application on the Triefs’ behalf by telephone and then sent an e-mail attaching a Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Charges (the “GFE”). The GFE proposed a 5.125% interest rate and a standard provision indicating that the “fees listed are estimated – the actual charges may be more or less.” The cover email asked to “let me know if you would like me to lock you in for 60 days”, which Mr. Trief responded “sure.” After a small dispute about the rate, the Bank faxed a Conventional Commitment Letter (the “Letter”) to the Triefs confirming the rate and other details. Despite language in the Letter that “You must sign and return this commitment letter within that period to ensure receiving the terms specified”, neither party signed the Letter. At the scheduled closing, the Triefs refused to proceed because the Bank sought to charge them a rate lock extension fee of $518.75, which the Triefs claim was never negotiated or agreed to.

The main issue was whether a contract was formed. The Court explained the classic rules that a plaintiff must establish an offer, acceptance of the offer, consideration, mutual assent, and an intent to be bound. Kowalchuk v. Stroup, 61 A.D.3d 118, 121 (1st Dept 2009).  Mutual assent means a “meeting of the minds” and must include agreement on all essential terms. Id. The Court held that there was not a meeting of the minds on all of the essential terms of a final contract for refinancing. The two key pieces of evidence – the email from the Bank asking to “let me know if you would like me to lock you in for 60 days” and the standard GFE language that terms were subject to change – were only seeking an acceptance to lock in the rate for a fixed period of time, rather than a final agreement to refinance. Further, the Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act(“RESPA”) shows that the legislature did not intend for the GFE to bind a lender to a final loan agreement. See 24 CFR § 3500.7 [a], [g] (the “GFE is not a loan commitment. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require a loan originator to make a loan to a particular borrower.”).

Finally, the Court also rejected the Triefs claim under NYGBL § 349. A claim for violation of GBL § 349 is based upon consumer-oriented conduct that is materially misleading, causing a plaintiff injury. The Court held that the Triefs failed to even identify consumer-oriented conduct on the part of the Bank because private contract disputes, unique to the parties, generally do not fall within the scope of the statute. The Triefs failed to demonstrate injury because they refused to close on the loan refinancing and did not pay any fees to the Bank.
Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Avoid Unnecessary Real Property Taxes

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Richard B. Tranter and Sarah Sparks Herron of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP regarding valuation pitfalls involved with the purchase of an on-going business that owns real estate.

When Buying an On-Going Business that Includes Real Estate in Ohio

Beware the valuation pitfalls involved with the purchase of an on-going business that owns real estate. A buyer can accidentally cause its real property taxes on the newly purchased property to increase dramatically if it fails to allocate values properly between personal property and real property. Fortunately, a few preventative measures can be taken at the closing to prevent an unnecessary real property tax increase and litigation.

Imagine the following scenario: Company ABC decides to buy a hotel. The purchase includes the real estate on which the hotel is located, the personal property, including the furniture, fixtures and equipment (“FF&E”) within the hotel, and the goodwill associated with the hotel franchise. The purchase price for everything is $3,600,000. Neither the purchase agreement nor the settlement statement allocates this purchase price between the real estate, FF&E and goodwill. After the closing, a title agent goes to record the deed for the real estate at the local recorder’s office. The agent is asked to fill out a “Real Property Conveyance Fee Statement of Value and Receipt” (a/k/a “Conveyance Fee Statement”). The agent fills-in the purchase price as the consideration for the real property. Shortly thereafter, Company ABC receives a notice that the County Auditor will be increasing the value of the real property to reflect the $3.6 million purchase price, and the real property taxes will be going up to reflect this new, higher value. Company ABC objects because the $3.6 million price reflects the combined value of the real property, FF&E and goodwill. Now, to challenge the property valuation, Company ABC must file a complaint with the county board of revision and prove that the purchase price, as stated on the Conveyance Fee Statement, does not reflect the fair market value of the real property.

This is exactly what happened in a recent Ohio Supreme Court case, Hilliard City Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Rev., 128 Ohio St.3d 565, 2011-Ohio-2258, 949 N.E.2d 1. The buyer in that case, K.D.M. and Associates, L.L.C. (“KDM”), purchased an 80-room, fully operating hotel for $3,600,000. Shortly thereafter, the Franklin County Auditor increased the value of the real property from $2,240,000 to $3,550,000. KDM filed a complaint, and the Franklin County Board of Revision reduced the real property value by $800,000 for FF&E, $60,000 for inventory, and $500,000 for goodwill for a final real property valuation of $2,240,000. The local school board appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), which disallowed the $500,000 allocation to goodwill and the $60,000 allocated to inventory. Thus, the BTA concluded that the value of the real estate was $2,750,000. On appeals by both KDM and the school board, the Supreme Court valued the real estate even higher. The Court decreased the deduction for FF&E from $800,000 to $280,000. In addition, the Court refused to permit the deduction of $500,000 for goodwill. Thus, approximately six years after the plaintiff purchased an operating hotel for $3,600,000, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the value of the real estate involved was $3,320,000.

What could KDM have done to avoid years of litigation and an additional $1.1 million in real property tax value? First, KDM could have completely filled out the Conveyance Fee Statement. Section 8(E) of this form asks what portion, if any, of the total consideration paid was for items other than real property. After every sale, the auditor will evaluate whether to increase or decrease the property’s valuation. This determination is made, in part, based on the Conveyance Fee Statement. If the new property owner allocates the purchase price on the Conveyance Fee Statement and the auditor accepts the allocation at this stage, then the new property owner does not have to challenge the auditor’s valuation. Further, if the local school board challenges the property valuation, the school board has the burden of proving a higher valuation. Thus, a fully completed Conveyance Fee Statement can head-off potential valuation disputes.

Second, KDM could have documented the allocation between real property, FF&E and goodwill in the closing documents. Notably, the settlement statement for the hotel purchase did not provide an allocation to personal property. In addition, the bill of sale for personal property was incomplete. The bill included “inventory, equipment, fixtures, assets used by seller in the business in the attached ‘Exhibit A’”, but there was no Exhibit A, nor any value assigned to that property. Thus, KDM had little evidence from the closing to support its conclusion that $800,000 of the purchase price was for FF&E, $60,000 was for inventory, and $500,000 was for goodwill.

The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the FF&E was worth $280,000 based on a financing appraisal conducted in anticipation of the purchase. The Court pragmatically concluded that an operating hotel clearly included personal property, and this personal property clearly had value to be allocated as part of the purchase price. Thus, the Court rejected the school board’s argument that the sale price, as set forth in the Conveyance Fee Statement, reflected the fair market value of the real property. The Court, however, rejected KDM’s representatives’ testimony about the value of the FF&E and rejected an unauthenticated, 2005 year-end financial statement showing FF&E of $800,000. With no allocation on the Conveyance Fee Statement or in the closing documents, the best evidence available to the Court was the financing appraisal which presented an estimation of value relied upon by KDM’s lender at the time of the sale. The Court utilized such appraisal evidence.

In conclusion, the purchase of an on-going business can have multiple moving parts. If you are contemplating a purchase that includes real estate, remember to document the purchase price allocation between real and personal property in both the Conveyance Fee Statement and closing documents. These simple steps can avoid unnecessary real property taxes and litigation.

© 2011 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

Wisconsin Supreme Court Delivers Win for Hospital Systems with Offsite Facilities

Posted on August 10, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by Craig J. Johnson, Kate L. Bechen, David J. Hanson and Robert L. Gordon   of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP regarding  a major victory for hospital systems with offsite outpatient facilities in Wisconsin.

Last month the Wisconsin Supreme Court provided a major victory for hospital systems with offsite outpatient facilities. Its decision in Covenant Health Care, Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa (2011 WI 80) reversed a Court of Appeals decision and held that an outpatient clinic owned by St. Joseph Hospital (the “Clinic”) constituted property used for the purposes of a hospital under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4m)(a). As a result, Covenant Healthcare System, Inc., the sole member of St. Joseph Hospital and the owner of the real property on which the Clinic stands, was entitled to a refund of real property taxes paid on the Clinic’s property.

Background

Wisconsin. Stat. § 70.11(4m)(a) excludes from taxation real property used exclusively for the purposes of any nonprofit hospital. The statute specifies that the exemption does not extend to property that is used for commercial purposes or as a doctor’s office, or the earnings from which inure to the benefit of a member.

The Clinic is a five-story building located approximately five miles from St. Joseph Hospital.  Two of the Clinic’s floors are leased to medical providers as office space. The remaining three floors are used to provide outpatient services and include an Urgent Care Center that is open 24 hours a day, seven days a week and is capable of treating all levels of emergency room care, which generally limits its treatment of serious cases to the extent of stabilizing a patient for transport to a different medical facility.

The City of Wauwatosa took the position that the Clinic was in fact a doctor’s office and, therefore, assessed real property taxes on the Clinic. Covenant challenged this assessment as it applied to the Clinic’s three floors that were not used as office space for medical providers.  The Circuit Court ruled in favor of Covenant but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Clinic was a doctor’s office. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, ruling in favor of Covenant.

Ruling

The City of Wauwatosa maintained its position that the Clinic was a doctor’s office. The City also took the alternative positions that the Clinic was used for commercial purposes and that the property’s earnings inure to the benefit of Covenant. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Covenant had satisfied its burden of proving that each of the City’s assertions was incorrect.

Doctor’s Office

The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered seven factors that were previously laid out by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in 1997 in St. Clare Hospital v. City of Monroe, which also considered whether a health care facility constituted a doctor’s office. The Supreme Court concluded that five of those factors weighed against the Clinic being considered a doctor’s office, and the remaining two were not determinative.

The five factors which persuaded the Supreme Court that the Clinic was not a doctor’s office were: (1) physicians practicing at the Clinic do not receive variable compensation related to the extent of their services; (2) Clinic physicians do not receive extra compensation for overseeing non-physician staff; (3) the Clinic’s bills are generated on the same software system as those of St. Joseph Hospital; (4) Clinic physicians do not have their own offices at the Clinic but instead have access to communal cubicle space; and (5) Clinic physicians do not own or lease the building or any equipment at the Clinic.

The two remaining St. Clare factors that weighed in favor of the Clinic being a doctor’s office were (1) the Clinic does not provide inpatient services and (2) most patients are seen at the Clinic by appointment and during regular business hours. However, the Court pointed out that advances in technology have allowed for more procedures to be performed on an outpatient basis than when St. Clare was decided. In addition, St. Joseph Hospital (as well as several other large area hospitals) has an outpatient clinic on its hospital grounds.  This hospital-based outpatient center has never jeopardized the tax exemption of St. Joseph Hospital despite only seeing patients by appointment during regular business hours. Therefore, the Court did not weigh either of these factors as significant in reaching its conclusion that the Clinic is not a doctor’s office.

Commercial Purposes

The Court interpreted the statutory prohibition against commercial purposes as being a prohibition against a facility having profit as its primary aim. In determining that the Clinic did not have profit as its primary aim, the Court cited the Clinic’s business plan as listing several goals beyond increasing profit margin, including promoting a greater faith-based health care presence. Further, the Court found that the Clinic serves a greater portion of Medicare and Medicaid patients than other Milwaukee and Wisconsin hospitals, indicating to the Court a focus other than profit.

Private Inurement

Finally, the Court determined that the language of the statutory prohibition against private inurement to any member does not contemplate a not-for-profit member of a nonprofit corporation. According to the Court, interpreting the statute to penalize Covenant’s corporate structure would be an unreasonable construction, and would end up requiring a nonprofit corporation to distribute its assets upon dissolution to unrelated nonprofit entities, rather than its actual member(s), in order to qualify for property tax exemption.

Conclusion

The earlier Court of Appeals decision in this case called into question the property tax exemptions of nonprofit hospital systems with offsite facilities. The reversal by the Wisconsin Supreme Court has provided some reassurance to Wisconsin’s hospital systems. Although the decision was based on facts unique to the Clinic and did not set bright line standards going forward, the Court confirmed that offsite hospital facilities can qualify as exempt under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4m)(a), and provided guidance on what types of facts and organizational structures will be considered to qualify an offsite facility for exemption.

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

The New Wave of Insurance Construction Defects? Four States Enact Statutes Favoring Coverage for Faulty Workmanship

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Clifford J. Shapiro and Kenneth M. Gorenberg of Barnes & Thornburg LLP about whether construction defects are covered by commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policies and briefly discuss four new statutes in various states.

 

 

Courts across the country remain split on the issue of whether claims alleging construction defects are covered by commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policies. The primary battle ground has been whether such claims involve an accidental “occurrence” within the meaning of the CGL policy coverage grant. Now this issue is getting substantial attention from state legislatures. Four states recently enacted new legislation addressing insurance coverage for construction defect claims, and each statute favors coverage,albeit in different ways and to varying degrees. These statutes signal that the battle over whether construction defects constitute an “occurrence” may have shifted from the courts to state legislatures. The four new statutes are discussed briefly below.

Colorado

Section 13-20-808 of the Colorado Code, effective May 21, 2010, creates a presumption that a construction defect is an accident, and therefore an “occurrence” within the meaning of the standard CGL insurance policy. To rebut this statutory presumption, an insurer must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property damage at issue was intended and expected by the insured. The statute expressly does not require coverage for damage to an insured’s own work unless otherwise provided in the policy, leaving that potentially to be decided by Colorado’s courts. In addition, the act does not address or change any policy exclusions, the scope of which will also remain an issue possibly to be determined in court. Thus, it appears that the Colorado statute resolves in favor of coverage that construction defect claims give rise to an accidental “occurrence” under the CGL policy coverage grant, but leaves most other insurance issues affecting coverage in the construction defect context subject to further attention by the courts.

Hawaii

Chapter 431, Article 1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes provides that “the term ‘occurrence’ shall be construed in accordance with the law as it existed at the time that the insurance policy was issued.” The statute does not declare what the “the law” is now or what “the law” was at any time in the past. However, the preamble explains that the appellate court decision in Group Builders, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 231 P.3d 67 (Hawaii 2010) “invalidates insurance coverage that was understood to exist and that was already paid for by construction professionals,” and that the purpose of the statute is to restore the coverage that was denied. While not necessarily clear from the appellate court decision, coverage arguably was denied for both defects in the insured’s own work and also consequential property damage caused by faulty workmanship.

Thus, it appears that the legislature’s intent was to allow insurers to deny coverage under policies issued after May 19, 2010 to the extent permitted by the courts based on Group Builders and whatever further judicial decisions may follow, but to require application of the more favorable judicial interpretations of coverage for construction defects that the Hawaii legislature believes existed before that time. In other words, the Hawaii statute appears to be an attempt to preserve more favorable treatment of coverage for construction defect claims for projects currently underway which were insured under policies issued before Group Builders was decided.

This approach, of course, still leaves it to the courts to interpret the applicable law with respect to any particular claim (i.e., the law that existed at the time the policy was issued). But we cannot help but think that the Hawaii courts may be influenced going forward to find more readily in favor of coverage due, at least in part, to the part of the preamble to the legislation that states: “Prior to the Group Builders decision … construction professionals entered into and paid for insurance contracts under the reasonable, good-faith understanding that bodily injury and property damage resulting from construction defects would be covered under the insurance policy. It was on that premise that general liability insurance was purchased.”

Arkansas

Arkansas Code Section 23-79-155 (enacted on March 23, 2011) requires CGL policies offered for sale in Arkansas to contain a definition of occurrence that includes “property damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship.”It is unclear whether this requirement applies to policies previously issued. The act also states that it does not limit the nature or types of exclusions that an insurer may include in a CGL policy. Thus, the numerous exclusions related to construction defect claims contained in the typical CGL insurance policy are not affected by the Arkansas statute, and the judicial decisions that have interpreted those exclusions presumably remain good law.

South Carolina

Enacted on May 17, 2011, South Carolina Code Section 38-61-70 provides that CGL policies shall contain or be deemed to contain a definition of occurrence that includes property damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship, exclusive of the faulty workmanship itself. However, whether the South Carolina statute will change the law in South Carolina is unclear because the statute was immediately challenged in court. On May 23, 2011, Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company filed a complaint in the South Carolina Supreme Court seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that the new statute violates several provisions of the U.S. and South Carolina constitutions, particularly with respect to existing insurance policies at issue in pending litigation.

Conclusion

The new state statutes are intended to overrule, at least to some extent, judicial decisions that denied insurance coverage for construction defect claims. The thrust of these statues is to require construction defects to be treated as an accidental “occurrence” within the meaning of the CGL insurance policy. As such, the legislation generally should make it easier for policyholders in the affected states to establish at least the existence of potential coverage for a construction defect claim, and thereby more easily trigger the insurance company’s duty to provide a defense. Whether these statutes will also result in increased indemnity coverage for construction defect claims, however, remains to be seen. Among other things, the statutes generally do not alter the exclusions that already apply to construction defect claims, and they leave the interpretation of the meaning of these exclusions to the courts.

In short, while this new wave of statutes increases the complexity and divergence among the states of this already fractured area of the law, they also appear to increase the likelihood of insurance coverage for construction defect claims in Colorado, Hawaii, Arkansas and South Carolina.

© 2011 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Federal Authorities Warn of Terrorism: Three Steps Toward Comprehensive Risk Management for the Hotel Industry

Recently posted at the National Law Review by Richard J. Fildes of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. – news about a recent federal government terror alert involving hotels and resort properties: 

Quality service, prime amenities, ideal locations and excellent accommodations are the repertoire of successful hotels. In light of a recent warning issued by federal authorities to the U.S. hotel industry, that checklist may need to expand, according to the American Hotel & Lodging Educational Institute. Though Mumbai-style attacks have thankfully not come to fruition on American soil in recent years, the need for vigilance is ever-present. Based on intelligence reports gathered by the U.S. government, terror plots on the hotel industry are a looming threat;however, a panic-free plan for potentially devastating crises can easily be developed.

Attacks of terrorism and natural disasters can often share the same elements of surprise, chaos, structural destruction and health-related concerns. Just as hotels should plan for before, during, and after a storm (more details), there should be a similarly structured program for staff and guests when dealing with terrorist attacks. Combining the consideration of both events can streamline the process of training employees and increasing familiarity with risk management in the aftermath of such events. Some considerations are as follows:

• Lobbies tend to be the most dangerous part of hotels because they are typically unsecured open areas where guests congregate. If finances permit, have plain clothed security personnel in the lobby. The presence of uniformed security guards can create a perception of safety; however, non-uniformed guards can be more attuned as the eyes and ears of hotel security.

• Staff should be trained to spot potentially dangerous activities. All employees who may have contact with guests, including housekeeping, maintenance, front desk, guest services, food and beverage, transportation, and parking should be given detailed instructions on what types of activity should be reported to hotel security.

• Staff should also have equally detailed instructions on panic control and ways to manage the turmoil of natural disasters.

• Record keeping is also vital, especially with health related issues. Knowing which employees have medical ailments or potential concerns will help reduce health risks stemming from natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Though some guests may not want to disclose such information, consider asking guests whether they have any heart conditions, diabetes or other issues that would be necessary for the staff to know in case of an emergency. Such inquiries should be phrased “as non-intrusive” inquiries geared toward providing the best possible customer care and service in the rare chance that something may happen.

• Keeping both paper and electronic copies of records, including which guests are checked into the hotel at any given time, is also key to minimizing confusion and chaos when responding to an emergency.

• Develop specific evacuation plans. The standard “in-case-of-a-fire” evacuation route may not be helpful during a chemical weapon attack, bombing or hurricane.

• Have designated evacuation areas equipped (or readily able to be equipped) with vital supplies. Back up energy sources, medical supplies and non-perishable foods, and bottled waters are all necessary to keep guests safe and calm.

• Make the evacuation routes easy to follow, and ensure that the staff knows exactly where guests should be located during the different emergencies.

Being vigilant, heightening security efforts, and ensuring staff preparedness will help reduce the stress, commotion and devastating aftermath of natural disasters and terrorist related incidents.

* Tara L. Tedrow is co-author of this article. She is a rising third year law student and has not been admitted to the Florida Bar.

To read the press release issued by the American Hotel & Lodging Association, please click on the following : AHLEI PR_TerrorWarningReinforcesNeedVigilanceTraining.pdf

© Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, PA, 2011. All rights reserved.

EPA and Corps Issue Draft Guidance on Waterways and Wetlands That Fall Under Federal Jurisdiction as Part of Obama Administration’s Just Released Clean Water Framework

Recently posted by Linda H. Bochert of  Michael Best & Friedrich LLP – details about the recent draft guidance issued about when a wetland is subject to federal jurisdiction: 

Five years after the US Supreme Court issued the decision that was supposed to – but didn’t – clarify when a wetland is subject to federal jurisdiction, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) are seeking public comment on draft guidance intended to explain how such decisions are to be made.

The Draft Guidance on Federal Jurisdiction

On April 27, 2011, EPA and the Corps issued “Draft Guidance on Identifying Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act” (“Draft Guidance”). The Draft Guidance interprets two key Supreme Court decisions, often referred to as Rapanos and SWANCC. Rapanos is the 2006 Supreme Court decision in the consolidated cases of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 547 UW 715 (2006); SWANCC is the 2001 Supreme Court decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The Draft Guidance addresses both wetlands and waterbodies and is limited to whether the federal Clean Water Act applies; it does not determine what state laws or regulations might apply.

After years of confusion, the 2006 decision in Rapanos was widely anticipated to provide a clear test for when a wetland is subject to federal jurisdiction. It failed to do so. The court split three ways, with no point of view supported by a majority of the justices. The prevailing view since Rapanos has been that a wetland is subject to federal jurisdiction if it satisfies either of two tests:  1) the wetland must be immediately adjacent to a navigable body of water that has a relatively permanent flow; or 2) there is a “significant nexus” between the wetland and a body of water that was, is, or could be made navigable. But stating the tests and applying them are two different things – and application of that two-part test has been anything but clear-cut.  For more on Rapanos andSWANCC, see our June 29, 2006 Client Alert: Wetlands and Water Bodies Must Have “Significant Nexus” with a Navigable Water to Fall Under the Jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act.

The EPA and the Corps are taking another run at it. The Draft Guidance is carefully described as “consistent with Supreme Court decisions and existing agency regulations” – presumably to combat anticipated criticism that it either overreaches or underreaches the current state of the law, although the critics have already begun to weigh in. 

Under the Draft Guidance, federal jurisdiction would apply to wetlands that:

  • are adjacent to either traditional navigable waters or interstate waters
  • directly abut relatively permanent waters
  • are adjacent to jurisdictional tributaries to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters if there is a “significant nexus”

    And federal jurisdiction would apply to waterbodies that are:

  • traditional navigable waterbodies
  • interstate waterbodies
  • non-navigable tributaries to traditional navigable waters that are relatively permanent (contain water at least seasonally)
  • tributaries to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters if there is a “significant nexus”
  • in the category of “other waters” – including some that are physically proximate to other jurisdictional waters and some that are not, based on fact specific circumstancesFollowing the 60-day public comment period, EPA and the Corps intend to finalize the Guidance and then initiate formal rulemaking.  The message of that process is that the agencies want to identify as much of the anticipated controversy about their interpretation as possible before drafting a federal regulation implementing that interpretation.

    Effect in Wisconsin

    Implementation of the Draft Guidance is not likely to have a significant impact in Wisconsin.   As far as waterbodies are concerned, Wisconsin has historically taken a broad view of navigability for purposes of state jurisdiction.  With respect to wetlands, as explained in our June 2006 Client Alert following the SWANCC decision the Wisconsin Legislature extended the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (“WDNR”) to include “nonfederal wetlands”.  Wis. Stat. §. 281.36(1m). Thus, a nonfederal wetland may still be subject to state water quality standards and permit requirements implemented by WDNR, even if it does not come within federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. 

    The Clean Water Framework

    The Draft Guidance is part of the Obama Administration’s national Clean Water Framework also released on April 27, 2011. The Clean Water Framework “recognizes the importance of clean water and healthy watersheds to our economy, environment and communities” and is composed of the following initiatives:

    • promoting innovative partnerships
    • enhancing communities and economies by restoring important water bodies
    • innovating for more water-efficient communities
    • ensuring clean water to protect public health
    • enhancing use and enjoyment of our waters
    • updating the nation’s water policies – this initiative includes the Draft Guidance
    • supporting science to solve water problems

     

    © MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

Residential Foreclosures: Lenders Become Landlords

Featured Guest blogger at the National Law Review, W. Alexander Burnett of Williams Mullen provides great insight on the evolving role of certain lenders becoming landlords after foreclosures:  

 

Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Public Law 111-22

Introduction

On May 20, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (the “PTFA” or the “Act”). The PTFA was part of the larger “Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009.” The Act provides new protections to bona fide tenants in any federally-related mortgage loans or any residential real property. Before enactment of PTFA, a new owner of a foreclosed property could take immediate action to evict an existing tenant. The PTFA requires the foreclosing party to allow the tenant to remain in the premises through the end of the lease term, and it requires the foreclosing party to provide a bona fide tenant with at least 90 days notice to vacate. As a result, lenders and other parties who foreclose on residential rental property occupied by a tenant have no choice but to play the role of landlord until the expiration of the tenant’s lease. This article explains who is affected by the Act, the requirements under the Act, and the respective rights, remedies and obligations for both foreclosing parties and tenants who occupy the foreclosed properties.

The Basics

Who Is Affected by the PTFA?

The PTFA applies to any residential real property or any “federally-related mortgage loan” acquired through foreclosure. The only properties not covered by the Act are non-residential properties that were not foreclosed in connection with a federally-related mortgage loan. Note that one court in New York has held that the PTFA can only be enforced where “federally-related mortgage loans” are involved and that the enforcement of the PTFA in all residential loan situations “would extend federal control to arguably every area of human endeavor and vitiate the constitutional framers’ requirement that ‘federalism’ involves a limited universe of power and that the states retained all but expressly ceded powers.” Collado v. Boklari, 892 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2009). It is important to note, however, that this case has been distinguished by at least one other court, and that other courts have held that the PTFA applies in connection with non-federally-related mortgage loans.

The PTFA protects the rights of a “bona fide tenant,” which is defined by the Act as a person in possession of the property with or without a lease, provided that:

i. the tenant is not the mortgagor or the child, spouse, or parent of the mortgagor;

ii. the lease or tenancy was the result of an arms-length transaction; and

iii. the lease or tenancy requires the receipt of rent that is not substantially less than fair market rent for the property, or the rent is reduced or subsidized due to a federal, state, or local subsidy.

All three elements must be satisfied for a tenant to be a bona fide tenant.

The new restrictions in the PTFA are binding on any “immediate successor in interest” in the property. While the Act does not define “immediate successor in interest,” the term generally means the first party to take title to the property following the foreclosure. Note that the PTFA does not specifically address the situation involving a deed in lieu of foreclosure.

What Are the Effective Dates of the Act?

The PTFA became effective immediately upon enactment on May 20, 2009 and applies to all foreclosures that occur after enactment; pending foreclosures included. The provisions of the Act expire on December 31, 2012.

What Requirements Are Imposed on an Immediate Successor in Interest?

First, a successor must allow any existing tenants to remain in the premises until the end of the lease term. If, however, the property is sold to a purchaser who will occupy the property as a primary residence, then the new owner can give 90 days notice of the early termination of the lease. Second, if the lease has expired, is month-to-month or is terminable at will, the successor must give the tenant at least 90 days notice before requiring the tenant to vacate the property. The PTFA, therefore, places drastic new burdens on lenders and other foreclosing parties, especially when there is a significant amount of time remaining under a residential lease, because the lender must serve as a landlord throughout the duration of that lease.

The notice to vacate must be given to the tenant by the successor. Therefore, the successor can’t give notice prior to acquiring title to the property at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, the notice of foreclosure sale cannot also serve as the 90-day notice to vacate. It is good practice to send the notice to vacate and any other notices to the tenant by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, and to keep the receipts in case they are needed to prove to a court that proper notice was given.

Unfortunately, the PTFA does not give any details or set forth the rights or remedies of the successor during the time that the tenant is allowed to remain in the property. The Act merely states that successor assumes an interest in the property “subject to the rights of any bona fide tenant.” That likely means that the successor steps into the shoes of the former landlord and assumes both the rights and responsibilities of the landlord under the lease. This, of course, raises many questions which the Act does not answer.

Reading Between the Lines: The Details Behind the PTFA

What Responsibilities Do Tenants Owe to their New Landlords?

Presumably, a tenant must abide by all of the provisions in the lease. If the tenant defaults under the lease, the Act does not preempt a landlord from evicting the tenant without giving the 90 day notice under the Act. If a tenant has stopped paying rent, for example, the new landlord should follow applicable provisions under the lease and in the Landlord Tenant Act (Va. Code § 55-217, et seq.) or the Virginia Residential Landlord Tenant Act (Va. Code § 55-248.2, et seq.) to give proper notice of the default to the tenant and then to file an Unlawful Detainer suit to evict the tenant.

The Successor Has the Burden of Proving that an Occupant Is Not a Bona Fide Tenant.

In Bank of America v. Owens, the successor issued a 90 day notice to vacate immediately after foreclosure. 2010 NY Slip Op 20164, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 954 (N.Y. City Ct. May 5, 2010). Along with the notice to vacate, the successor also issued a questionnaire to determine if the occupant was a bona fide tenant. The questionnaire stated that, if it was not returned to the successor within five days, the successor would commence eviction proceedings. When the questionnaire was not returned, the successor filed an eviction suit immediately and well before the expiration of the 90 day period. The court held that the new burden imposed by the questionnaire was impermissible and was not authorized by the PTFA. The court also held that the burden is on the successor to show that an occupant is not a bona fide tenant.

Can Tenants File Suit Against Successors For Violating the PTFA?

No. The PTFA does not create a private right of action. In Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., the Bank foreclosed on property and evicted the tenants one month later without giving 90 days notice. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51697 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2010). The tenants’ personal property was placed on the street where it was damaged or stolen. The tenants filed suit against the Bank seeking money damages for, among other causes of action, violations of the PTFA. The court held that the PTFA does not create a private cause of action and dismissed the PTFA count. See also, Fannie Mae v. Lemere, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67005 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2010) (“[F]ederal courts have held that the [PTFA] does not create a federal private right of action, but indeed provides directives to state courts.”) It is important to note, however, that these tenants may have had other valid causes of action against the bank, such as conversion or unlawful ouster. In addition, it is clear from the Bank of America v. Owens case that a tenant may use a violation of the PTFA as a defense in an eviction proceeding, even though it cannot be used as the basis for an affirmative claim for damages against a successor.

Is the New Landlord Responsible for the old Security Deposit?

This question is simply not answered by the Act, and there are no cases from the Virginia state or federal courts that interpret the Act. Generally speaking, however, under Virginia law a foreclosure wipes out the lease, which suggests that the new landlord is not responsible for the security deposit. In addition, the old landlord holds the security deposit in trust for the tenant. If the old landlord fails to transfer the security deposit to the new landlord, pursuant to Va. Code § 55-507, then the tenant would have a direct claim against the old landlord. The new landlord may not have any recourse against the old landlord. Furthermore, under the PTFA the new landlord steps into the shoes of the old landlord only with respect to the real property itself and not with respect to incidentals such as the security deposit. Nevertheless, it is possible that a court making a generous interpretation of the PTFA could find that the new landlord stepped into the same shoes of the old landlord and, therefore, is responsible for the old security deposit.

Can a Successor Terminate a Lease Early Using “Cash for Keys”?

Yes. “Cash for keys” is a program offered by many mortgage lenders where the tenant agrees to turn over the property in good condition and/or before the expiration of the tenant’s lease in exchange for a cash payment from the lender. It is no different than an agreement between a landlord and tenant to modify or terminate a lease early. There is no magic to it, and there is nothing in the PTFA that prevents a successor and a tenant from reaching such an agreement. It is important, however, to ensure that the transaction is arms-length, that it is agreed to voluntarily by both the successor and the tenant, and that the parties put the agreement in writing and sign it.

© 2011 WILLIAMS MULLEN ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

 

Foreclosure or Deed in Lieu: What’s Right for You?

This week’s featured bloggers at the National Law Review are from Williams Mullen.  Jamie Watkins Bruno details two options available in Virgina for defaulted loans secured by deeds:  

In Virginia, a lender holding a defaulted loan secured by a deed of trust has two primary means to enforce its remedies under that deed of trust: foreclosure by a trustee’s sale and conveyance by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. We’ve put together a brief primer summarizing the key strengths, weaknesses and procedural guidelines for each alternative to help you determine which option works best for your needs, timeline and budgetary constraints.

I. Trustee’s Sale.

The most common procedure for foreclosure is the sale of the property by a trustee, a non-judicial action. A trustee can act only in a manner authorized by the express or implied terms of the trust instrument or as authorized by statute. If the deed of trust does not provide otherwise, the provisions of the Virginia Code control as to the authority of the trustee. Foreclosure by a trustee’s sale can usually be completed within thirty (30) to forty-five (45) days after the expiration of any cure period provided by the loan documents for the default giving rise to the foreclosure, if the lender acts promptly.

A. The Trustee.

1. Duties and Obligations. A trustee is a fiduciary for both the debtor and the creditor. The trustee must not place himself in a position where the trustee’s personal interests conflict with the interests of the parties to whom he owes a fiduciary duty. A trustee who is counsel to or an employee of the noteholder must be sensitive to the obligation to discharge his fiduciary duties in an impartial manner. The mere fact that a trustee in a deed of trust securing a debt due to a corporation is a stockholder, member, employee, officer or director of, or counsel to, the corporation, however, does not disqualify him from exercising the powers conferred by the trust instrument. Trustees cannot act as purchasers, directly or indirectly, at their own sales; when a trustee buys directly or indirectly at his own sale, that constitutes constructive fraud, and the transaction is voidable. This rule also applies to a trustee who is named in a deed of trust but does not act.

2. Substitution of Trustee. If the person who is to conduct the foreclosure is not named in the deed of trust as trustee, a substitution of trustee is needed. When an instrument appointing a substitute trustee has been executed by the holders of more than fifty percent (50%) of the secured obligations, the substitute trustee can immediately execute all powers granted to the prior trustee.

    B. Initial Procedures.

    1. Documentation. A trustee should secure the proper documentation from the noteholder, which includes the deed of trust, the original note, title evidence (including title policies and surveys), copies of any correspondence between the noteholder and the debtor, copies of mortgage insurance or guaranty agreements, appraisal, written direction to proceed with the foreclosure and engagement letter. The trustee should verify that the noteholder has complied with all notice requirements set forth in the deed of trust.

    2. Diligence. A trustee should contact the local commissioner of accounts regarding fees charged for approving and examining accounts as well as any local requirements, including proper advertisement procedures. Though the trustee is only charged with selling the property encumbered by the deed of trust, the noteholder should consider any relevant diligence issues affecting the property prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings, including environmental matters, permits, insurance, utilities, leases, appraisal, physical condition and rights in fixtures. In addition, though there is no statutory right of redemption in Virginia, the debtor does have the right to pay off the secured indebtedness before the sale; some deeds of trust provide for reinstatement of the debt if the debtor cures all defaults and pays all expenses in the manner and time provided in such deeds of trust.

    3. Title. While the doctrine of caveat emptor applies in a foreclosure sale, a trustee must be aware of all liens and encumbrances affecting the property. A trustee cannot sell a greater interest in the property than the deed of trust gives him authority to sell, and any sale by the trustee will be subject to encumbrances having precedence over the deed of trust. A trustee must be aware of all encumbrances on the property, including federal tax liens, in order to properly notify all interested parties, to exercise proper discretion as to whether a fair sale can be had, and to make a lawful distribution of the proceeds of the sale. A trustee should order a title rundown of the property from the date of the original title policy, which can be obtained for approximately $100-$250.

      C. Notice.

      The trustee has no authority to exercise the power of sale or to obtain possession of the property until such time as the debtor defaults under the terms of the note and the trust instrument. The trustee must satisfy himself that the note and the deed of trust are actually in default before initiating foreclosure proceedings, including providing any pre-acceleration notice required by either document.

      1. Requirements; Timing. The present owner of the property must be given written notice of sale at his last known address as such address and owner’s name appear in the records of the secured party, which must be personally delivered or sent by registered or certified mail at least fourteen (14) days before the date of the foreclosure sale. It is a good idea to send a separate notice to each owner by regular mail. Each such must provide the date, time, and place of sale and is sufficient if it contains the same information set forth in the public advertisement of the sale. ‘Inadvertent’ failure to give notice imposes no liability on either the trustee or the secured party, and failure to comply with the notice requirements will not affect the validity of the sale. A purchaser for value will have no duty to ascertain whether proper notice was given. Actual receipt by the owner of the foreclosure notice is not required, and a defective statutory notice does not affect the validity of a foreclosure sale.

      2. Other Parties. Notice should also be given to any guarantors of the indebtedness, subordinate lienholders, private mortgage insurers, the United States (if a federal tax lien affects the property) and any government agencies that are involved with the secured loan. If a federal tax lien affects the property and has been filed for at least thirty (30) days before the date of the proposed sale, notice should be given to the United States at least twenty-five (25) days prior to such sale.

        D. Advertisement.

        A trustee must conform the advertising to the terms of the deed of trust, and any material departure will invalidate the sale. Substantial compliance, however, is sufficient as long as the rights of the parties are not materially affected. Section 55-62 of the Virginia Code provides a permissible form of notice that must include the time, place, and terms of sale, including the amount of any deposit required. The advertising provisions are mandatory and override the discretion of the trustee, regardless of the contractual agreement of the parties.

        1. Requirements; Timing. The advertisement must briefly describe the property to be sold by street address, if any, and, if there is no street address, the general location of the property with reference to routes, streets, and known landmarks. The tax map identification number of the property may be used but is not required. The advertisement must also include the name, address, and telephone number of the trustee and the secured party, or the secured party’s agent or attorney, to respond to inquiries from the public about the sale. Advertisement of the foreclosure must be made in a newspaper having a general circulation in the city or county where the property being sold or any portion thereof lies. The sale can be held no earlier than eight (8) days after the first advertisement and no later than thirty (30) days after the last advertisement.

        2. Number of Publications. If the deed of trust provides for the number of publications by using language such as “advertisement required,” then the direction of the deed of trust must be followed. In any event, if the newspaper advertisement is published on a weekly basis, it must be published not less than once a week for two weeks before the sale; and if published on a daily basis, it must be published not less than once a day for three days, which may be consecutive days. If the deed of trust does not provide for the number of publications, the Virginia Code requires that “the trustee shall advertise once a week for four successive weeks; provided, however, that if the property or some portion thereof is located in a city or in a county immediately contiguous to a city, publication of the advertisement five different days, which may be consecutive days, shall be deemed adequate.”

          E. The Sale.

          There are virtually no rules regarding bidding at a foreclosure sale, other than that the purchase price of the property must not be so low as to ‘shock the conscience’. The sale may take place “at the premises or at such other place in the city or county in which the property or the greater portion thereof lies, or in the corporate limits of any city surrounded by or contiguous to such county.” Most sales take place on the front steps of the city or county circuit court building. In the absence of specific direction in the trust instrument, the trustee is authorized to sell “upon such terms and conditions as the trustee may deem best.” This language has been interpreted to include the power to sell either for cash or on credit. The trustee must be present and either conduct or supervise the sale. In the absence of specific authority in the deed of trust, a trustee cannot, even with the consent of the lender, delegate the power to sell and be absent from the sale; the trustee may employ an auctioneer to cry out the sale. Prior to bidding, the trustee should announce the terms of sale and answer any general questions from the public. The trustee should disclose fully any known liens or encumbrances. A contract of sale between a trustee and a purchaser is complete when the trustee knocks down the property to the highest bidder and makes and signs a memorandum of the sale and its terms. The trustee may require a deposit, and a closing will be scheduled for approximately ten (10) to thirty (30) days after the sale, all as set forth in the advertisement. In the event that there was a federal tax lien on the property, the government has a right of redemption for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days, meaning that the government may take the property and reimburse the purchaser for the amount paid within this time frame. The trustee may request the waiver of such right upon the delivery of the notice of sale.

            F. Settlement and Accounting.

            A purchaser can only require a deed with special warranty of title from the trustee. The trustee is not responsible for conveying good title, because a trustee can sell only the interest conveyed to him under the deed of trust. Recordation tax to be paid upon recordation of the deed is the greater of the amount bid at the sale or the assessed value of the property. The trustee must receipt for the proceeds. Any proceeds from the sale must be applied in the following order: to discharge the expenses of executing the trust, including the trustee’s commission; to discharge all taxes, levies, and assessments, with costs and interest, including the due pro rata thereof for the current year; and to discharge in the order of their priority, if any, the remaining debts and obligations secured by the trust instrument, and any liens of record inferior to the trust instrument under which sale is made, with lawful interest. Any residual proceeds shall be paid to the debtor or his assigns. Within six months of the sale, the trustee must file an accounting of sale, including the original note, and all vouchers for his expenses with the local commissioner of accounts. The secured party may sue the debtor or any guarantor for any deficiency between the amount of the proceeds of the sale applied to the note and the amount of indebtedness outstanding thereunder.

              G. Advantages and Disadvantages.

              In Virginia, a trustee’s sale is a relatively quick and efficient means of foreclosing on real property. Once the sale has been completed, the purchaser will own the property free and clear of other junior encumbrances (provided that the junior lienholders were properly notified). However, the lender must be cognizant of the procedural and timing requirements in order to properly coordinate the trustee’s sale, and the foreclosure process can be more expensive than acquir4ing the property by a deed in lieu.

                II. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure.

                With a deed in lieu of foreclosure, the grantor transfers the fee simple title to the property encumbered by the deed of trust to the lender under the deed of trust. The lender contemporaneously releases the lien of the deed of trust and forgives or stipulates the liability of the obligors under the obligations secured by the deed of trust.

                A. Advantages. Acquisition by a deed in lieu can be advantageous to a debtor, as the process minimizes damage to the debtor’s reputation and credit rating by avoiding a formal foreclosure and creates substantial savings in costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees and trustee’s fees. The lender may find significant benefits as well, such as efficiency and the ability to obtain quick control of the property to effect its completion, rental or sale to a third party.

                  B. Disadvantages. A lender should be aware of the potential disadvantages to obtaining property by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. The lender will own the property subject to junior encumbrances (which are normally extinguished by a foreclosure sale) and all obligations of the former owner (including building code violations and environmental responsibilities). The debtor’s creditors may attack the sale as a fraudulent or voluntary conveyance if the value of the property greatly exceeds the value of the loan forgiven; and any guarantor that did not consent to the transaction may assert that the guarantors and debtor are released from any deficiency claim.

                    © 2011 WILLIAMS MULLEN ALL RIGHTS RESERVED