Fourth Circuit Reverses $1 Billion Award for Vicarious Liability Claim for More than 10,000 Works

On January 12, 2021, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia awarded a group of music recording companies (the plaintiffs) a $1 billion verdict against Cox Communications (Cox). The Virginia court’s ruling found that Cox, an internet service provider (ISP), was contributorily and vicariously liable for copyright infringement committed by certain subscribers on its networks. The plaintiffs alleged that the ISP allowed the unauthorized downloading and distribution of more than 10,000 copyrighted works by Cox subscribers who had already received three or more notices of infringement. The district court in Virginia established that the “takedown” notices sent by the plaintiffs provided Cox with the requisite knowledge of its subscribers’ repeated infringement to substantiate their claim that Cox was contributorily liable, suggesting that Cox had sufficient specific knowledge of infringement to have done something about it.

The plaintiffs’ notice to Cox identified the IP address of the subscriber, as well as the time of infringement and the identification of the infringed work, which the plaintiffs argued was sufficiently specific knowledge for Cox to be able to identify the subscriber and to exercise its policy by suspending or terminating the infringing subscriber. This case proceeded to trial on two theories of secondary liability – vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The plaintiffs argued that Cox failed to act on these known repeat infringers, and the jury found Cox liable for willful contributory infringement and vicarious infringement, ordering Cox to pay more than $99,000 for each of the infringed-upon works. Cox appealed the jury verdict.

On appeal, before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Cox raised several questions of law concerning the secondary liability for copyright infringement, as well as what constitutes a derivative work in the Internet Age.

Vicarious Infringement
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis first considered whether the district court erred in denying plaintiffs’ vicarious infringement claim. “A defendant may be held vicariously liable for a third party’s copyright infringement [if the defendant] (1) profits directly from the infringement and (2) has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer.” See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n.9 (2005) (internal citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs failed to establish the first element as a matter of law and thus found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that Cox was vicariously liable.

In reaching this decision, the Fourth Circuit turned to the landmark decision in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963), a case on vicarious liability for infringing copyrighted music recordings. In Shapiro, a department store was sued for the selling of “bootleg” records by a concessionaire operating in its stores. The store had the right to supervise the concessionaire and employees, demonstrating its control over the infringement. There, the store received a certain percentage of every record sale, “whether ‘bootleg’ or legitimate,” giving it “a more definite financial interest” in the infringing sales.” Thus, the Shapiro court found that the financial gains were clearly spelled out from the bootleg sales and acts of infringement in Shapiro.

Next, the Fourth Circuit recognized that courts have found that a defendant may possess a financial interest in a third party’s infringement of copyrighted music, even absent a strict correlation between each act of infringement and an added penny of profits. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). In Fonovisa, the operator of a swap meet allowed vendors to sell infringing goods, and the operator collected “admission fees, concession stand sales, and parking fees” but no sales commission “from customers who want[ed] to buy the counterfeit recordings at bargain-basement prices.” The Fonovisa court found that the plaintiffs adequately showed a financial benefit from the swap meet owner and the sales of pirated recordings at the swap meet, which was a draw for customers. Thus, the infringing sales “enhance[d] the attractiveness of the venue of the potential customers, finding the swap meet operator had a financial interest in the infringement sufficient to state a claim for vicarious liability.”

The Fourth Circuit established that Shapiro and Fonovisa provided the steppingstones of the principles of copyright infringement to the internet and cyberspace and that Congress agreed that “receiving a one-time setup fee and flat periodic payment for service” from infringing and non-infringing users alike ordinarily “would not constitute a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.” Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F. 3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). The Court also reviewed other court precedents, including A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), to show that increased pirated music drew in users as a direct financial interest for vicarious liability., but also notes that courts have found no evidence of a direct financial benefit between subscribers of American Online (AOL) and the availability of infringing content.’’ Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079.

Against this backdrop, the Fourth Circuit held that to prove Cox was vicariously liable, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate that Cox profited from its subscribers’ infringing download and distribution of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted songs, which – given the evidence at trial – it did not. While the district court found it was enough that Cox repeatedly declined to cancel an ISP subscriber’s monthly subscription fee, the Fourth Circuit found this evidence to be insufficient. Instead, the Fourth Circuit found that the continued monthly payment fees for internet service, even by repeat infringers, was not a financial benefit flowing directly from the copyright infringement. Cox established that subscribers paid a flat fee even if all of its subscribers stopped infringing. Recognizing that an internet provider would necessarily lose money if it canceled subscriptions only demonstrates that service providers have a direct financial interest in providing subscribers with access to the internet only. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that vicarious liability demands proof that the defendant profits directly from the acts of infringement for which it is being held accountable.

To rebut this, the plaintiffs claimed that the jury could infer that subscribers paid monthly membership fees based on the high volume of infringing content. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument and found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that customers were drawn to Cox’s internet service or that they continued the service because they were specifically drawn to the opportunity to infringe the plaintiffs’ copyrights. The plaintiffs further asserted that subscribers were willing to pay more for the opportunity to infringe based on Cox’s tiered structure for internet access – but the plaintiffs fell short in proving this claim because no reasonable inference could be drawn that Cox subscribers paid more for faster internet to infringe on the copyrighted works. Ultimately, the Court found that the plaintiffs could not establish a causal connection between subscribers’ copyright infringement and Cox’s revenue for monthly subscriptions. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that Cox was not liable for its subscribers’ copyright infringement and reversed the district court’s ruling on this theory. The court vacated the $1 billion damages award and remanded the case for a new trial on damages, holding that the jury’s finding of vicarious liability could have influenced its assessment of statutory damages.

Contributory Infringement
The Fourth Circuit then examined the remaining issue of contributory infringement. Under this theory, “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another is liable for the infringement, too.” Cox argued that the district court erred by taking away the factual determination from the jury that notices of past infringement established Cox’s knowledge that subscribers were substantially certain to infringe in the future. Cox had contracted with a third party to provide copyright violation notices to users and asserted that it used these notices as their safe harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to alert violators and to terminate access to users who were repeat infringers. Despite this, the Fourth Circuit ultimately agreed with the jury’s finding that Cox materially contributed to copyright infringement occurring on its network and that its conduct was culpable.

Therefore, a three-judge panel found that Cox was liable for willful copyright infringement but reversed the vicarious liability verdict and remanded a new trial on damages. The Fourth Circuit held that because Cox did not profit from its subscribers’ acts of infringement, a legal prerequisite for vicarious liability, Cox was not liable for damages under the vicarious liability theory.

The Impact
The Fourth Circuit’s decision recognizes a new dawn breaking in copyright law, one that requires a causal connection between profit and/or financial gain and a defendant’s acts of infringement to prove vicarious liability in a copyright infringement claim under the Copyright Act. The plaintiffs attempted to bridge the financial gap between acknowledging access to infringing content through a monthly internet subscription and high-volume infringing acts. However, the Fourth Circuit found that this leap in logic was a step too far and reversed the award for vicarious liability for lack of evidence to find this missing connection between Cox subscribers and infringing plaintiffs’ content.

While this may be one route the courts may consider to reduce music piracy damages, it remains to be seen whether other courts will take this approach to determining that profit is the key element supporting other vicarious liability claims in cyberspace.

AI Got It Wrong, Doesn’t Mean We Are Right: Practical Considerations for the Use of Generative AI for Commercial Litigators

Picture this: You’ve just been retained by a new client who has been named as a defendant in a complex commercial litigation. While the client has solid grounds to be dismissed from the case at an early stage via a dispositive motion, the client is also facing cost constraints. This forces you to get creative when crafting a budget for your client’s defense. You remember the shiny new toy that is generative Artificial Intelligence (“AI”). You plan to use AI to help save costs on the initial research, and even potentially assist with brief writing. It seems you’ve found a practical solution to resolve all your client’s problems. Not so fast.

Seemingly overnight, the use of AI platforms has become the hottest thing going, including (potentially) for commercial litigators. However, like most rapidly rising technological trends, the associated pitfalls don’t fully bubble to the surface until after the public has an opportunity (or several) to put the technology to the test. Indeed, the use of AI platforms to streamline legal research and writing has already begun to show its warts. Of course, just last year, prime examples of the danger of relying too heavily on AI were exposed in highly publicized cases venued in the Southern District of New York. See e.g. Benajmin Weiser, Michael D. Cohen’s Lawyer Cited Cases That May Not Exist, Judge Says, NY Times (December 12, 2023); Sara Merken, New York Lawyers Sanctioned For Using Fake Chat GPT Case In Legal Brief, Reuters (June 26, 2023).

In order to ensure litigators are striking the appropriate balance between using technological assistance in producing legal work product, while continuing to adhere to the ethical duties and professional responsibility mandated by the legal profession, below are some immediate considerations any complex commercial litigator should abide by when venturing into the world of AI.

Confidentiality

As any experienced litigator will know, involving a third-party in the process of crafting of a client’s strategy and case theory—whether it be an expert, accountant, or investigator—inevitably raises the issue of protecting the client’s privileged, proprietary and confidential information. The same principle applies to the use of an AI platform. Indeed, when stripped of its bells and whistles, an AI platform could potentially be viewed as another consultant employed to provide work product that will assist in the overall representation of your client. Given this reality, it is imperative that any litigator who plans to use AI, also have a complete grasp of the security of that AI system to ensure the safety of their client’s privileged, proprietary and confidential information. A failure to do so may not only result in your client’s sensitive information being exposed to an unsecure, and potentially harmful, online network, but it can also result in a violation of the duty to make reasonable efforts to prevent the disclosure of or unauthorized access to your client’s sensitive information. Such a duty is routinely set forth in the applicable rules of professional conduct across the country.

Oversight

It goes without saying that a lawyer has a responsibility to ensure that he or she adheres to the duty of candor when making representations to the Court. As mentioned, violations of that duty have arisen based on statements that were included in legal briefs produced using AI platforms. While many lawyers would immediately rebuff the notion that they would fail to double-check the accuracy of a brief’s contents—even if generated using AI—before submitting it to the Court, this concept gets trickier when working on larger litigation teams. As a result, it is not only incumbent on those preparing the briefs to ensure that any information included in a submission that was created with the assistance of an AI platform is accurate, but also that the lawyers responsible for oversight of a litigation team are diligent in understanding when and to what extent AI is being used to aid the work of that lawyer’s subordinates. Similar to confidentiality considerations, many courts’ rules of professional conduct include rules related to senior lawyer responsibilities and oversight of subordinate lawyers. To appropriately abide by those rules, litigation team leaders should make it a point to discuss with their teams the appropriate use of AI at the outset of any matter, as well as to put in place any law firm, court, or client-specific safeguards or guidelines to avoid potential missteps.

Judicial Preferences

Finally, as the old saying goes: a good lawyer knows the law; a great lawyer knows the judge. Any savvy litigator knows that the first thing one should understand prior to litigating a case is whether the Court and the presiding Judge have put in place any standing orders or judicial preferences that may impact litigation strategy. As a result of the rise of use of AI in litigation, many Courts across the country have responded in turn by developing either standing orders, local rules, or related guidelines concerning the appropriate use of AI. See e.g., Standing Order Re: Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) in Cases Assigned to Judge Baylson (June 6, 2023 E.D.P.A.), Preliminary Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence by New Jersey Lawyers (January 25, 2024, N.J. Supreme Court). Litigators should follow suit and ensure they understand the full scope of how their Court, and more importantly, their assigned Judge, treat the issue of using AI to assist litigation strategy and development of work product.

How to Succeed in Environmental Marketing Claims

Environmental marketing claims often present something of a Catch-22—companies that are doing actual good for the environment deserve to reap the benefits of their efforts, and consumers deserve to know, while at the same time, heightened scrutiny from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the National Advertising Division (NAD), state regulators and the plaintiffs’ bar have made such claims increasingly risky.

In 2012, the FTC issued the Green Guides for the use of environmental marketing claims to protect consumers and to help advertisers avoid deceptive environmental marketing. Compliance with the Green Guides may provide a safe harbor from FTC enforcement, and from liability under state laws, such as California’s Environmental Marketing Claims Act, that incorporate the Green Guides. The FTC has started a process to revise the Green Guides, including a request for comments about the meaning of “sustainable.” In the meantime, any business considering touting the environmental attributes of its products should consider the following essential takeaways from the Green Guides in their current form:

    • Substantiation: Substantiation is key! Advertisers should have a reasonable basis for their environmental claims. Substantiation is the support for a claim, which helps ensure that the claim is truthful and not misleading or deceptive. Among other things, substantiation requires documentation sufficient to verify environmental claims.
    • General benefit claims: Advertisers should avoid making unqualified claims of general benefit because substantiation is required for each reasonable interpretation of the claim. The more narrowly tailored the claim, the easier it is to substantiate.
    • Comparative claims: Advertisers should be careful and specific when making comparative claims. For example, a claim that states “20% more recycled content” begs the question: “compared to what?” A prior version of the same product? A competing product? Without further detail, the advertiser would be responsible for the reasonable interpretation that the product has 20% more recycled content than other brands, as well as the interpretation that the product has 20% more recycled content than the advertiser’s older products.
    • General greenwashing terms: Advertisers should be very cautious when using general environmental benefit terms such as “eco-friendly,” “sustainable,” “green,” and “planet-friendly.” Those kinds of claims feature prominently in many complaints alleging greenwashing, and they should only be used where the advertiser knows and explains what the term means, and can substantiate every reasonable interpretation of the claim.

Putting it into Practice: Given the scrutiny that environmental claims tend to attract, advertisers should exercise care when making environmental benefit claims about their products and services. They should narrowly tailor their claims to the specific environmental attributes they want to promote, and perhaps most important, they should ensure they have adequate backup to substantiate their claims. While the FTC Green Guides are due for a refresh (which we will surely report on), for the time being, they will continue to serve as important guidance for advertisers seeking to inform consumers without exposing their business to FTC scrutiny or class action litigation.

To AI or Not to AI: U.S. Copyright Office Clarifies Options

The U.S. Copyright Office has weighed in with formal guidance on the copyrightability of works whose generation included the use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools. The good news for technology-oriented human creative types: using AI doesn’t automatically disqualify your work from copyright protection. The bad news for independent-minded AI’s: you still don’t qualify for copyright protection in the United States.

On March 16, 2023, the Copyright Office issued a statement of policy (“Policy”) to clarify its practices for examining and registering works that contain material generated by the use of AI and how copyright law’s human authorship requirements will be applied when AI was used. This Policy is not itself legally binding or a guarantee of a particular outcome, but many copyright applicants may breathe a sigh of relief that the Copyright Office has formally embraced AI-assisted human creativity.

The Policy is just the latest step in an ongoing debate over the copyrightability of machine-assisted products of human creativity. Nearly 150 years ago, the Supreme Court ruled at photographs are copyrightable. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). The case involved a photographer’s claim against a lithographer for 85,000 unauthorized copies of a photograph of Oscar Wilde. The photo, Sarony’s “Oscar Wilde No. 18,” is shown below:

Sarony’s “Oscar Wilde No. 18"

The argument against copyright protection was that a photograph is “a reproduction, on paper, of the exact features of some natural object or of some person” and is therefore not a product of human creativity. Id. at 56. The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that there was sufficient human creativity involved in making the photo, including posing the subject, evoking the desired expression, arranging the clothing and setting, and managing the lighting.

In the mid-1960’s, the Copyright Office rejected a musical composition, Push Button Bertha, that was created by a computer, reasoning that it lacked the “traditional elements of authorship” as they were not created by a human.

In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Naruto, a crested macaque (represented by a group of friendly humans), lacked standing under the Copyright Act to hold a copyright in the “monkey selfie” case. See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). The “monkey selfie” is below:

Monkey Selfie

In February 2022, the Copyright Office rejected a registration (filed by interested humans) for a visual image titled “A Recent Entrance to Paradise,” generated by DABUS, the AI whose claimed fractal-based inventions are the subject of patent applications around the world. DABUS’ image is below:

“A Recent Entrance to Paradise”

Litigation over this rejected application remains pending.

And last month, the Copyright Office ruled that a graphic novel consisting of human-authored text and images generated using the AI tool Midjourney could, as a whole, be copyrighted, but that the images, standing alone, could not. See U.S. Copyright Office, Cancellation Decision re: Zarya of the Dawn (VAu001480196) at 2 (Feb. 21, 2023).

The Copyright Office’s issuing the Policy was necessitated by the rapid and remarkable improvements in generative AI tools over even the past several months. In December 2022, generative AI tool Dall-E generated the following images in response to nothing more than the prompt, “portrait of a musician with a hat in the style of Rembrandt”:

Four portraits generated by AI tool Dall-E from the prompt, "portrait of a musician with a hat in the style of Rembrandt."

If these were human-generated paintings, or even photographs, there is no doubt that they would be copyrightable. But given that all four images were generated in mere seconds, with a single, general prompt from a human user, do they meet the Copyright Office’s criteria for copyrightability? The answer, now, is a clear “no” under the Policy.

However, the Policy opens the door to registering AI-assisted human creativity. The toggle points will be:

“…whether the ‘work’ is basically one of human authorship, with the computer [or other device] merely being an assisting instrument, or whether the traditional elements of authorship in the work (literary, artistic, or musical expression or elements of selection, arrangement, etc.) were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine.” 

In the case of works containing AI-generated material, the Office will consider whether the AI contributions are the result of “mechanical reproduction” or instead of an author’s “own original mental conception, to which [the author] gave visible form.” 

The answer will depend on the circumstances, particularly how the AI tool operates and how it was used to create the final work. This will necessarily be a case-by-case inquiry.” 

See Policy (citations omitted).

Machine-produced authorship alone will continue not to be registerable in the United States, but human selection and arrangement of AI-produced content could lead to a different result according to the Policy. The Policy provides select examples to help guide registrants, who are encouraged to study them carefully. The Policy, combined with near future determinations by the Copyright Office, will be critical to watch in terms of increasing likelihood a registration application will be granted as the Copyright Office continues to assess the impacts of new technology on the creative process. AI tools should not all be viewed as the “same” or fungible. The type of AI and how it is used will be specifically considered by the Copyright Office.

In the short term, the Policy provides some practical guidance to applicants on how to describe the role of AI in a new copyright application, as well as how to amend a prior application in that regard if needed. While some may view the Policy as “new” ground for the Copyright Office, it is consistent with the Copyright Office’s long-standing efforts to protect the fruits of human creativity even if the backdrop (AI technologies) may be “new.”

As a closing note, it bears observing that copyright law in the United Kingdom does permit limited copyright protection for computer-generated works – and has done so since 1988. Even under the U.K. law, substantial questions remain; the author of a computer-generated work is considered to be “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.” See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (1988) §§ 9(3), 12(7) and 178. In the case of images generated by a consumer’s interaction with a generative AI tool, would that be the consumer or the generative AI provider?

Copyright © 2023 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

Lawyer Bot Short-Circuited by Class Action Alleging Unauthorized Practice of Law

Many of us are wondering how long it will take for ChatGPT, the revolutionary chatbot by OpenAI, to take our jobs. The answer: perhaps, not as soon as we fear!

On March 3, 2023, Chicago law firm Edelson P.C. filed a complaint against DoNotPay, self-described as “the world’s first robot lawyer.” Edelson may have short-circuited the automated barrister’s circuits by filing a lawsuit alleging the unauthorized practice of law.

DoNotPay is marketed as an AI program intended to assist users in need of legal services, but who do not wish to hire a lawyer. The organization was founded in 2015 to assist users in disputing parking tickets. Since then, DoNotPay’s services have expanded significantly. The company’s website offers to help users fight corporations, overcome bureaucratic obstacles, locate cash and “sue anyone.”

In spite of those lofty promises, Edelson’s complaint counters by pointing out certain deficiencies, stating, “[u]nfortunately for its customers, DoNotPay is not actually a robot, a lawyer, or a law firm. DoNotPay does not have a law degree, is not barred in any jurisdiction and is not supervised by any lawyer.”

The suit was brought by plaintiff Jonathan Faridian, who claims to have used DoNotPay for legal drafting projects, demand letters, one small claims court filing and drafting an employment discrimination complaint. Faridian’s complaint explains he was under the impression that he was purchasing legal documents from an attorney, only to later discover that the “substandard” outcomes generated did not comport with his expectations.

When asked for comment, DoNotPay’s representative denied Faridian’s allegations, explaining the organization intends to defend itself “vigorously.”

© 2023 Wilson Elser

8 Best Lawyer Forums Online

Though unorthodox for a traditional profession like the law, remote work is becoming a more realistic option for lawyers all over the country. With the help of tools like legal practice management software and options to practice law in multiple states, lawyers everywhere are tackling the challenges of remote work.

But one obstacle that remains is networking. Remote lawyers need to put extra work into maintaining professional connections and building an online presence, both of which are made easier with online forums designed specifically for legal professionals.

What Is an Online Forum?

An online forum is an internet space dedicated to conversation using questions, answers, responses, and prompts. Typically, online forums are asynchronous — users post a question, then other users respond at their leisure.

Posts in forums are archived and arranged into categories like post date, popularity, and more. Discussions can last for hours, days, months, or possibly years, as long as users continue to contribute.

Why Should Lawyers Use Online Forums?

After the rapid shift to remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic, plenty of industries saw the value of allowing employees to work from home – including law firms. More and more lawyers are working remotely, but that could come at the cost of networking.

Networking doesn’t have to mean interactions that take place over coffee, lunch, cocktails, golf excursions, or big events. In the strictest sense, networking is any meeting between people, whether in a group or one on one, online or in-person, which can be done using online forums.

Online forums dedicated to lawyers and the legal industry are an effective way to facilitate networking opportunities when in-person meetings aren’t an option. Getting involved in online forums help lawyers discuss industry topics with experts and thought leaders, stay current on trends and technology, and learn valuable tips from other lawyers.

Top 8 Online Forums for Lawyers

Curious about online forums? Here are the best options for lawyers and legal professionals to engage with other legal professionals and build a network as a remote attorney:

1. Quora

Quora is a broad forum that covers a variety of topics in question-and-answer formats, including the legal industry. You can easily search for questions or topics that are trending in the legal industry and contribute expert answers to boost your credibility. The more answers you provide, and the more other users engage with you, the closer you can get to becoming a thought leader in the space.

2. Bar Association Forums

Bar association forums are always a benefit to lawyers, remote or otherwise. There are plenty of options to choose from, including local bar associations or forums dedicated to your practice area. Best of all, you’ll be engaging with other knowledgeable legal professionals to connect and network.

3. Social Media Groups

Social media channels like Facebook and LinkedIn have dedicated groups that bring together users based on interests or industries, such as the legal industry. These two platforms are among the best for getting into a private or public group and enhancing your online presence. Keep in mind that you are representing yourself as a lawyer in these groups, so use a professional social media account, not your personal one.

The Thomson Reuters Legal Community is an exclusive option for customers of Thomson Reuters that brings together a virtual community of lawyers to network and engage in group settings. You can connect with lawyers from all different practice areas, both locally and nationally, and gain valuable insights from industry experts.

5. The Lawyerist Community

The Lawyerist is an online community dedicated to small firm lawyers to provide coaching, podcasts, books, guides, and other insights. The company has its own online lawyer forum – The Lawyerist Community – on Facebook to discuss law firm best practices, trends, and ideas.

6. Reddit

Reddit has some of the best online forums for a range of different topics, from broad subjects like sports to niche communities dedicated to obscure literature. There’s also a legal forum, r/LawFirm, that’s an informal community for lawyers to discuss running a law firm and the legal industry as a whole. There’s also a lawyer subreddit that you can join if you’re licensed.

7. Slack

Slack is a top-rated collaboration platform that offers individual channels for groups of users. There are several communities dedicated to the law, including LawyerSmack, which is comprised of private attorneys.

8. Law School Alumni Forums

Some law schools have online forums for alumni to stay connected with faculty and colleagues. While not every school offers an online forum for networking, if yours does, you can build vital industry contacts and further your practice. You’ll also get updates on news, trends, and in-person network events by participating in the forum.

Outlook on Online Forums

Remote and hybrid working models are the “new normal,” even for lawyers. Now that law firms and lawyers have seen the benefits in productivity, work-life balance, and enhanced communication afforded by remote work, there’s no going back.

Still, lawyer networking is essential for lawyers to grow their practice, no matter if it’s online or in-person. Along with joining forums to engage in discussions with other industry professionals, you can enhance your remote work with law practice management software. The right law firm software empowers lawyers to manage their practice from anywhere.

Start Networking Remotely

Networking is a big part of successful client acquisition for lawyers. Though it takes a little more work to keep up with networking as a lawyer working remotely, online lawyer forums can keep you connected to other industry professionals. And because you can engage with lawyers all over the country, you can find even more opportunities online than in person at networking events.

© Copyright 2023 PracticePanther

Another Lesson for Higher Education Institutions about the Importance of Cybersecurity Investment

Key Takeaway

A Massachusetts class action claim underscores that institutions of higher education will continue to be targets for cybercriminals – and class action plaintiffs know it.

Background

On January 4, 2023, in Jackson v. Suffolk University, No. 23-cv-10019, Jackson (Plaintiff) filed a proposed class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against her alma matter, Suffolk University (Suffolk), arising from a data breach affecting thousands of current and former Suffolk students.

The complaint alleges that an unauthorized party gained access to Suffolk’s computer network on or about July 9, 2022.  After learning of the unauthorized access, Suffolk engaged cybersecurity experts to assist in an investigation. Suffolk completed the investigation on November 14, 2022.  The investigation concluded that an unauthorized third party gained access to and/or exfiltrated files containing personally identifiable information (PII) for students who enrolled after 2002.

The complaint further alleges that the PII exposed in the data breach included students’ full names, Social Security Numbers, Driver License numbers, state identification numbers, financial account information, and Protected Health Information.  While Suffolk did not release the total number of students affected by the data breach, the complaint alleges that approximately 36,000 Massachusetts residents were affected.  No information was provided about affected out-of-state residents.

Colleges and Universities are Prime Targets for Cybercriminals

Unfortunately, Suffolk’s data breach is not an outlier.  Colleges and universities present a wealth of opportunities for cyber criminals because they house massive amounts of sensitive data, including employee and student personal and financial information, medical records, and confidential and proprietary data.  Given how stolen data can be sold through open and anonymous forums on the Dark Web, colleges and universities will continue to remain prime targets for cybercriminals.

Recognizing this, the FBI issued a warning for higher education institutions in March 2021, informing them that cybercriminals have been targeting institutions of higher education with ransomware attacks.  In May 2022, the FBI issued a second alert, warning that cyber bad actors continue to conduct attacks against colleges and universities.

Suffolk Allegedly Breached Data Protection Duty

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Suffolk did not follow industry and government guidelines to protect student PII.  In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Suffolk’s failure to protect student PII is prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 and that Suffolk failed to comply with the Financial Privacy Rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),  15 U.S.C.A. § 6801.  Further, the suit alleges that Suffolk violated the Massachusetts Right to Privacy Law, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 214, § 1B, as well as its common law duties.

How Much Cybersecurity is Enough?

To mitigate cyber risk, colleges and university must not only follow applicable government guidelines but also  consider following industry best practices to protect student PII.

In particular, GLBA requires a covered organization to designate a qualified individual to oversee its information security program and conduct risk assessments that continually assess internal and external risks to the security, confidentiality and integrity of personal information.  After the risk assessment, the organization must address the identified risks and document the specific safeguards intended to address those risks.  See 16 CFR § 314.4.  

Suffolk, as well as other colleges and universities, may also want to look to Massachusetts law for guidance about how to further invest in its cybersecurity program.  Massachusetts was an early leader among U.S. states when, in 2007, it enacted the “Regulations to safeguard personal information of commonwealth residents” (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93H § 2) (Data Security Law).  The Data Security Law – still among the most prescriptive general data security state law – sets forth a list of minimum requirements that, while not specific to colleges and universities, serves as a good cybersecurity checklist for all organizations:

  1. Designation of one or more employees responsible for the WISP.
  2. Assessments of risks to the security, confidentiality and/or integrity of organizational Information and the effectiveness of the current safeguards for limiting those risks, including ongoing employee and independent contractor training, compliance with the WISP and tools for detecting and preventing security system failures.
  3. Employee security policies relating to protection of organizational Information outside of business premises.
  4. Disciplinary measures for violations of the WISP and related policies.
  5. Access control measures that prevent terminated employees from accessing organizational Information.
  6. Management of service providers that access organizational Information as part of providing services directly to the organization, including retaining service providers capable of protecting organizational Information consistent with the Data Security Regulations and other applicable laws and requiring service providers by contract to implement and maintain appropriate measures to protect organizational Information.
  7. Physical access restrictions for records containing organizational Information and storage of those records in locked facilities, storage areas or containers.
  8. Regular monitoring of the WISP to ensure that it is preventing unauthorized access to or use of organizational Information and upgrading the WISP as necessary to limit risks.
  9. Review the WISP at least annually or more often if business practices that relate to the protection of organizational Information materially change.
  10. Documentation of responsive actions taken in connection with any “breach of security” and mandatory post-incident review of those actions to evaluate the need for changes to business practices relating to protection of organizational Information.

An organization not implementing any of these controls should consider documenting the decision-making process as a defensive measure.  In implementing these requirements and recommendations, colleges and universities can best position themselves to thwart cybercriminals and plaintiffs alike.

© Copyright 2023 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

B.S.ing with Bob Major [PODCAST]

When Bob Major founded Major, Lindsey & Africa in 1982, he could not have envisioned what the organization would become and the impact it would have on the legal profession. In this episode of B.S.: Beyond Stereotypes, Bob shares his journey with Merle Vaughn, including his childhood in Texas and Oklahoma, his Stanford education, and how both influenced his outlook on life personally and professionally.

Bob Major, founder and Partner at Major, Lindsey & Africa, grew up in Texas and Oklahoma. He received his undergraduate degree from Stanford University and attended The University of Texas at Austin where he received a J.D. degree. Bob spent five years at the Washington, D.C., firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (now WilmerHale) practicing in its federal administrative practice. Prior to founding his own legal recruiting firm, he spent a year in-house as securities counsel at Saga Corporation (Menlo Park, California).

©2023 Major, Lindsey & Africa, an Allegis Group Company. All rights reserved.

IP Rights in Virtual Fashion: Lessons Learned in 2022 and Unanswered Questions

There was a lot of talk and much hype about the “metaverse” in 2022. While some were skeptical and stayed on the sidelines to watch, many companies began offering virtual counterparts to their real-world products for use by avatars in the metaverse, including virtual clothing and accessories. For example, Tommy Hilfiger live-streamed a virtual fashion show on Roblox as part of the New York Fashion Week, and Decentraland hosted a Metaverse Fashion Week. Many companies also introduced NFTs into fashion product lines, such as Alo’s NFT offering.

The emergence of virtual goods has generated novel questions about how to protect and enforce IP rights in virtual fashion, and how those strategies might differ from IRL (meaning “in real life”) fashion. Although many questions remain unanswered, this article sets out important considerations for how companies might use various IP laws to protect virtual fashion goods in the United States.

I. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN VIRTUAL FASHION AND IRL FASHION

Before diving into the IP discussion, it’s worth highlighting some distinctions between virtual fashion and IRL fashion outside the legal context, beyond the obvious fact that virtual fashion is worn by avatars. IRL clothing and accessories are worn primarily for protection against the elements, to conform to societal standards, to conform with a specific event’s dress requirements, to communicate via express messages on clothing or accessories, or to express oneself through the style or design of the clothing.

Virtual fashion can also serve each of those purposes for an avatar, and in some cases the person behind the avatar. But, because it is comprised of software code, the possibilities for virtual fashion utility are endless. For example, a particular piece of virtual clothing can also grant access to certain virtual spaces or events or give the avatar special powers within virtual worlds. If tied to an NFT (non-fungible token), virtual clothing can also provide benefits on and off virtual platforms, including exclusive access to sales promotions and IRL events.

Unlike IRL clothing, however, virtual fashion items currently face compatibility limitations, as the ability to use any virtual fashion item across all virtual platforms is unlikely.

To muddy the waters, as virtual and augmented reality technologies are becoming more popular, they can blur the lines between IRL and virtual fashion. For example, an IRL sweatshirt, when viewed through an appropriate lens, could feature virtual components.

II. IP PROTECTION FOR VIRTUAL FASHION

Because there are no IP laws specific to virtual fashion items, we must seek protection from laws that have traditionally applied to real-life clothing, namely, trademark, trade dress, copyright, and design patent. But the application of these laws can sometimes differ in the virtual context. Each is addressed below.

A. TRADEMARK

Trademark law protects source identifiers such as words, names, logos, and slogans. Obtaining trademark rights specifically in virtual goods, whether acquired through use in commerce or federal registration, is generally straightforward and similar to marks covering IRL fashion. This is evidenced by many marks that were registered in 2022 and specifically cover virtual goods.

That said, even if a company does not have trademark coverage specifically for its virtual goods, the owner of a trademark covering IRL fashion items should have strong arguments that such trademark rights extend to their virtual counterparts. To that point, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) has refused registration of marks covering virtual goods and services based on prior registrations for the identical marks covering the corresponding IRL goods and services. See, e.g., the refusals of Application No. 97112038 for the mark GUCCI and Application No. 97112054 for the mark PRADA, each of which were filed by parties unrelated to the famous brands.

However, for purposes of enforcement outside of the USPTO context, if a defendant’s goods are virtual, it would have a stronger argument that such goods are not commercial products, but rather expressive works protected by the First Amendment. If a court accepts such an argument, it must then weigh the plaintiff’s trademark rights against the defendant’s First Amendment right of free expression, meaning it would be more challenging for a brand owner to enforce its trademark rights.

In this regard, please see our earlier alert regarding the Hermès v. Rothschild case, in which the court deemed NFTs tied to images of bags called “MetaBirkins” subject to First Amendment protection. [1] In denying Rothschild’s motion to dismiss, the court acknowledged in a footnote that virtually wearable bags (i.e., as opposed to virtual fashion that is displayable but not wearable) might not be afforded First Amendment protection. But we suspect defendants will argue even virtually wearable items should be afforded First Amendment protection, especially given that video games have received such protection. [2]

On balance, companies should consider seeking federal trademark registration specifically for virtual goods and services, for a few reasons:

More direct coverage could help a company in an enforcement action against infringing virtual goods, even if the defendant successfully argues it should be entitled to First Amendment protection. For instance, if the plaintiff has direct coverage for virtual goods, it may be easier to prove the defendant’s use of the mark was “explicitly misleading” under the Rogers test. [3]

Certain platforms featuring virtual fashion items may only honor a takedown request if the complainant company has a federal registration covering goods that are the same or nearly identical to the allegedly infringing virtual goods.

The registration will provide a presumption of valid trademark rights nationwide, and it may serve as a deterrent to third parties wishing to use confusingly similar marks in virtual worlds.

B. TRADE DRESS

U.S. trademark law also protects certain source-identifying elements of a product’s aesthetic design, configuration/shape, and packaging, often referred to as “trade dress.” To obtain trade dress protection, such elements must be (1) non-functional and (2) distinctive (either inherently or acquired through use). There are a couple of interesting nuances with respect to acquiring trade dress protection in the virtual context.

First, although we have not yet seen any case law specifically addressing this, companies will likely have stronger arguments that virtual shape or design elements (as opposed to IRL elements) are non-functional. Specifically, the non-functionality requirement means the relevant elements must not be essential to the use or purpose or affect the cost or quality of the article. For real-life fashion items, this can be difficult to meet due to the inherently functional nature of many aspects of clothing or accessories. However, because virtual fashion items are essentially software code with endless possibilities, in many instances the fashion item will not require any particular design or shape to function.

Second, some virtual fashion items could receive more favorable treatment from a distinctiveness perspective. The distinctiveness requirement has historically been a difficult barrier for protecting IRL fashion. Specifically, case law prior to 2022 established that, while packaging can sometimes be inherently distinctive, product design and configuration/shape can never be, meaning companies must prove such elements have acquired distinctiveness. Proving acquired distinctiveness is burdensome because the company must have used the elements extensively, substantially exclusively, and continuously for a period of time. Often, by the time a company can acquire distinctiveness in the design, the design is no longer in style. Or, if a design is popular and copied by third parties, it can be difficult for the company to claim it used the design substantially exclusively.

If, however, a virtual fashion item provides the user with benefits that go beyond merely outfitting the avatar, such as by providing access to other products or services, one might argue that those items should be construed as packaging, or some new category of trade dress, for such other products or services, in which case the elements could possibly be deemed inherently distinctive with respect to those other products or services.

That said, if a company already has trade dress protection for IRL fashion goods, it should have good arguments that the protection extends to any virtual counterpart. On the flipside, given the difficulties companies typically face in seeking trade dress protection in IRL fashion, to the extent they can obtain trade dress protection in a virtual counterpart more easily, perhaps it can argue the rights in any virtual goods should also extend to the physical counterpart. Or, if a company introduces a physical design and virtual design simultaneously, it could possibly acquire distinctiveness in both sooner, as the simultaneous use would presumably create greater exposure to more customers and reinforce the source-identifying significance of the alleged elements.

With respect to enforcement, like traditional marks, defendants are more likely to raise a successful First Amendment defense for any virtual products allegedly infringing trade dress. The Hermès case is again an example of this, as Hermès alleged infringement of both its BIRKIN word mark and the trade dress rights in the design of its handbags, and the court held that the defendant’s MetaBirkin NFTs were entitled to the First Amendment protection.

Finally, although obtaining trade dress protection is typically more difficult than obtaining trademark protection for traditional marks such as words and logos, companies should also consider seeking registration for trade dress in virtual goods, particularly for important designs that are likely to carry over from season to season, for the same reasons discussed in the trademark section above.

C. COPYRIGHT

Copyright protects original works of authorship that contain at least a modicum of creativity, which is a relatively low bar. However, copyright does not protect useful articles. In effect, for IRL fashion items, copyright generally extends only to those designs that would be entitled to copyright protection if they were extracted or removed from the clothing or viewed on a different medium, and not to the shape of the fashion item itself.

Like trade dress protection, copyright protection should provide companies with greater protection for virtual fashion items than would be available for IRL items, particularly because the software behind the virtual fashion can theoretically create an infinite number of clothing shapes that are creative and not necessarily “useful.” Nonetheless, if a virtual clothing item is merely shaped like its IRL counterpart that lacks originality (e.g., a virtual t-shirt shaped like a basic real-life t-shirt), it may also fail to qualify for copyright protection based on a lack of creativity.

Unlike trade dress protection, however, copyright protection arises immediately upon creation of the work and its fixation in a tangible medium of expression, so it can be a useful tool for protecting virtual fashion without having to spend the time and resources required to seek registration as trade dress and establish acquired distinctiveness.

In addition, unlike IRL fashion, a separate copyright protects the underlying source code for virtual clothing items, which could provide owners with an additional, though likely limited, claim against unauthorized source code copycats.

A copyright registration will provide owners with the ability to sue for copyright infringement, but companies should balance:

  • the benefits of seeking potentially broader copyright protection in virtual fashion items (apart from the code) than it would for IRL items with the risks of conceding that virtual fashion items are works of art entitled to First Amendment protection, which would make trademark and trade dress enforcement more difficult; and
  • the benefits of obtaining any copyright registration for source code with the benefits of keeping the source code secret (although the Copyright Office permits some redactions, significant portions are required to be deposited into the public record).

We are unaware of any 2022 case law specifically addressing copyright in virtual fashion. However, the following cases are worth watching:

  • Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith[4]: In October 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments regarding whether Andy Warhol’s “Prince Series” silk screen prints and pencil drawings based on a photograph infringed the photographer’s copyright, or whether they were sufficiently “transformative” to constitute fair use. The outcome of this case could affect a copyright owner’s ability to enforce copyrights against unauthorized digital reproductions of its work, especially if the original work is fixed in a physical medium (e.g., enforcing copyright in a physical clothing item against a third party’s digital reproduction).
  • Thaler v. Perlmutter[5]: Filed in June 2022, the plaintiff is suing the U.S. Copyright Office for refusing registration of an AI-created image because there was no human author. The outcome of this case will necessarily implicate virtual fashion incorporating any AI-generated work.

D. DESIGN PATENT

Design patents protect the ornamental appearance or look of a unique product. Specifically, they protect any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture. Traditionally, this law was interpreted to require that the article of manufacture is a physical or tangible product. Thus, in the fashion industry for example, one can file a design patent application directed to a unique shoe, handbag, or jewelry design. Historically, an image or picture would not qualify for design patent protection.

However, the USPTO is currently assessing design patents with respect to new technologies such as projections, holograms, and virtual and augmented reality. In December 2020, the USPTO issued a request for public comment regarding a potential rule change to the “article of manufacture” requirement and whether U.S. law should be revised to protect digital designs. Public opinion was mixed, and in April 2022, the USPTO issued a summary of this requested information.

Although the USPTO has not yet formally revised the rules, it has issued guidelines over the years that provide examples of non-physical products that could be protected by a design patent, suggesting changes may ultimately be coming to U.S. design patent law. For example, in 1995, the USPTO released guidelines for design patent applications claiming computer-generated icons. In general, to be eligible for protection, the computer-generated icon must be embodied in a computer screen monitor, or other display monitor. The USPTO has also issued guidance allowing type font to be protectable by design patents. However, it is still unclear whether the USPTO will set forth design patent guidance specific to digital designs or virtual fashion.

Notwithstanding the possibility of obtaining a design patent specifically on such virtual goods, courts have been reluctant to find that a virtual product infringes the design patent for an IRL product. For example, in 2014, in P.S. Products, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.,[6] P.S. Products accused Activision of infringing its design patent directed to a stun gun by depicting a virtual weapon in its video game that P.S. Products claimed resembled its patent-protected IRL product.

The court found there was no infringement because “no ordinary observer would be deceived into purchasing a video game believing it to be plaintiffs’ patented stun gun.” This case may have come out differently if the virtual gun was sold separately from the video game and could be used across various platforms rather than being one component of a particular video game. Although there are still software compatibility restrictions for virtual goods, portability of virtual goods is likely to grow as technology evolves and companies respond to consumer demands.

While we wait for further USPTO guidance that ultimately may have application to virtual fashion, parties seeking design patent protection may consider simultaneously filing one application to protect the work as a digital design on a display screen, like a patentable computer-generated icon, and a second, traditional design patent application to protect the design as a tangible product. That said, companies should consider other options for protecting any designs created by AI, as the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held in 2022 that AI cannot qualify as an inventor for purposes of obtaining a patent.[7]

III. Virtual Fashion in Practice

Contracts relating to virtual fashion are analogous to contracts for IRL fashion and should be structured accordingly. For instance, companies should ensure that contracts with IP contributors include an assignment of all IP rights, or at least a sufficiently broad license. In the virtual context, this includes rights to the software code itself. Likewise, downstream licensing should generally address ownership, licensee rights, and if applicable, confidentiality for any trade secrets in the source code. In addition, for both IP contributors and licensees, if AI software is used in any part of the creative process, companies should give thought to allocation of ownership.

In addition, some designers or marketing teams may prefer to encourage a brand’s customer base to copy its designs or create derivative works. Although this seems counterintuitive (especially to an IP lawyer), many players in the Web3 space encourage others to build off their own designs. For example, the Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC), known for issuing NFTs tied to images of apes, grants owners of its NFTs the rights to use the images of apes, including for commercial purposes.[8] For example, one purchaser of a Bored Apt NFT created a Bored Ape-themed restaurant.

In the virtual fashion context, if a marketing team wants customers to build off the brand’s virtual designs but wants to retain ownership of its own designs (and perhaps derivatives), it should implement standard licensing terms relating to ownership, customer licensee rights, and other provisions. However, it’s important to consider how the terms are presented and how customers indicate assent to maximize the prospects of enforceability.

From a business perspective, companies can also now use NFTs and smart contracts to receive automatic royalties in any downstream sales or licenses. And because NFTs use blockchain technology, which provides an immutable chain of title, third parties will be able to trace such designs to the original source. This means companies can encourage the sharing of designs and receive royalties in connection with the downstream licensing of designs tied to NFTs, and third parties can confirm that the designs are legitimate by reviewing the relevant blockchain ledger. Accordingly, although encouraging customers to use the brand’s designs may not be a model for every brand, there are some steps brands can take to protect the IP rights associated with them and reap financial benefits.

As virtual fashion items become more popular, companies are faced with uncertainties and novel questions regarding how to protect and enforce their IP rights. In 2022, some questions were answered, but many more remain open. Therefore, it is important to discuss strategies for protecting innovative virtual fashion with IP counsel.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Notably, on December 30, 2022, the Hermès court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, with an opinion to follow by January 20. A jury trial is scheduled to begin on January 30, 2023. Hermès International, et al. v. Mason Rothschild, 1:22-cv-00384-JSR (S.D.N.Y.).

[2] See, e.g., AM Gen. LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

[3] If a defendant’s unauthorized use of a mark is protected by the First Amendment, many courts use the Rogers test to balance the plaintiff’s trademark rights with the defendant’s First Amendment right of expression. This test looks at whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark was artistically relevant and, if so, whether it was explicitly misleading. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).

[4] 11 F.4th 26 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1412 (2022).

[5] Case No. 1:22-cv-01564 (D.D.C.).

[6] 140 F. Supp. 3d 795, 802 (E.D. Ark. 2014).

[7] Thaler v. Vidal, 43 F.4th 1207, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

[8] We will save for another day a discussion of the recent lawsuit against BAYC and many celebrities for failing to disclose financial incentives when promoting the BAYC NFT collection, and instead focus here on IP protection. Adonis Real, et al., v. Yuga Labs, Inc., et al., 2:22-cv-08909 (C.D. Cal.). But companies should also ensure that influencers properly disclose any incentives and other material connections.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2023 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.

Bouncing Back with Shaun Sethna [PODCAST]

Finding the right home for your career can do wonders to change your perspective. For Shaun Sethna, the move in-house was exactly what he needed to go from feeling like work as something he had to do to work being something he enjoyed. In this episode of Bouncing Back, he talks to Rebecca Glatzer about his career journey, the bumps along the way and his growth mindset.

Shaun Sethna is Deputy General Counsel at Altisource, a FinTech and services provider to the mortgage and real estate industries.  Shaun has been at Altisource for almost 10 years, where his practice focuses on technology transactions and M&A.  He also developed and helps to manage a team focused on contracts, compliance, and general legal support to Altisource’s technology, mortgage cooperative and insurance businesses. Previously Shaun was at Schlumberger in Houston, and he got his start in the IP practice group at King & Spalding LLP in Atlanta. Shaun received his undergraduate degree in Industrial Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology and his J.D. from Columbia Law School.  Shaun’s favorite aspect of his job is managing and developing teams.

©2022 Major, Lindsey & Africa, an Allegis Group Company. All rights reserved.