Category: Litigation

Federal Court Prohibits Union From Striking To Prevent Sale Of Business To Non-Union Employer

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Last week a New York federal district court granted a preliminary injunction against the Teamsters union after it threatened to go on strike against Will Poultry, Inc. if the company proceeded to sell its business to a non-union purchaser who had no plans of assuming the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The parties’ CBA did not have a “successor clause” or any other language obligating a purchaser to assume or otherwise recognize the Teamsters union upon a sale. When the Teamsters demanded that Will Poultry modify the CBA to include a “successor clause” in advance of the sale or face a strike, the company filed for an injunction in federal court.

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While the CBA did not contain an express “no strike clause,” it did have a grievance/arbitration provision, and the court held that constituted an “implied” no strike clause. Accordingly, the court issued an order prohibiting the union from striking in violation of the implied no strike clause, which almost certainly would have killed the pending sale.

While the New York federal court correctly found an implied no strike clause in this case, this case should serve as a reminder that you should always review your CBA in advance of successor contract negotiations to make sure any language issues (like the lack of a no strike clause) can be addressed.

The Teamsters have filed for an appeal of the decision, but a copy of the district court’s order can be found here.

Article by:

David J. Pryzbylski

Of:

Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Center Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), Office of Inspector General (OIG) Extend Electronic Health Records (EHR) Stark Law Exception, Anti-Kickback Safe Harbor Through 2021

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On December 27, 2013, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will publish final rules that extend through December 31, 2021 the existing Stark Law Exception (42 CFR 411.357(w)) and Anti-Kickback Statute Safe Harbor (42 CFR 1001.952(y)) applicable to the donation of electronic health records (EHR) items and services.   December 31, 2021 is the last year of the Medicaid Meaningful Use incentive payments.

In the Final Rule, CMS and OIG also:

  • Update the provisions under which EHR software is deemed interoperable;
  • Remove the requirement relating to e-prescribing from the Exception and Safe Harbor
  • Limit the scope of protected donors to exclude laboratory companies; and
  • Clarify the condition that prohibits a donor from limiting or restricting the use, compatibility or interoperability of donated EMR items and services.

Interoperability

The final rules require the donated EHR technology to be “interoperable” as of the date it is donated.  Such technology will be deemed to be interoperable if it has been certified by a certification body authorized by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) to an edition of the EHR certification criteria identified in the then-applicable 45 CFR part 170 (i.e., the HITECH Act’s definition of “Certified EHR”).  This will require donated software to be “as interoperable as feasible given the prevailing state of technology at the time they are provided to the recipient.”  For example, in 2013, the HITECH Act’s definition of “Certified EHR” permits certification pursuant to either the 2011 or 2014 editions of the EHR certification requirements; in 2014, the HITECH Act requires certification pursuant to the 2014 edition only.

E-prescribing

CMS and OIG have concluded that there are sufficient alternative policies driving the adoption of electronic prescribing such that it need not be included in the Exception and Safe Harbor.  Thus, under the final rules, an EHR is no longer required to have electronic prescribing capability in order to be subsidized.

Permissible Donors

In the proposed rules, CMS and OIG identified concerns of potentially abusive practices stemming from the donation of EHR software that seemed to provide for the interoperable exchange of information, but instead led to data and referral “lock-in” between the donor and the referral source.  OIG and CMS specifically referred to EHR items and services donated by ancillary service providers and suppliers, i.e., those do not have a direct primary patient care relationship, as subject to this concern. In the proposed rules, CMS and OIG sought comments on whether to limit the list of permissible donors of EHR items and services to hospitals, group practices, Prescription Drug Plan sponsors and Medicare Advantage organizations – or others with front-line patient care responsibilities.  In light of the comments received, in the final rules, CMS and OIG specifically exclude laboratories from the list of permissible donors.  Otherwise, the universe of protected donors remains the same.

Restrictions

In the proposed rules, CMS and OIG also requested comments on “new and modified conditions” that would prevent EHR donations from becoming a method for locking-in referrals (generally, to the donor), and instead encourage the free exchange of data.  CMS and OIG do not adopt any such additional conditions in the final rules, but clarify that neither a donor “nor any person on the donor’s behalf may take any action to limit or restrict the use, compatibility or interoperability of the donated items or services with other electronic prescribing or other EHR systems, including but not limited to health information technology applications, products or services.”  This expanded language is meant to clarify that neither donors nor recipients may limit interoperability and that donated EHRs must be interoperable both with other EHRs and with health information exchanges and other forms of technology.

To view the CMS final rule, click here. To view the OIG final rule, click here.

Article by:

Jennifer R. Breuer

Of:

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Keeping Third Party Communications Protected by the Attorney-Client Privileged

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A recent Pennsylvania federal court decision highlights the difficulty in keeping third party communications privileged.  (King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-CV-1797, 2013 WL 4836752 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2013)).  In Cephalon, the court found third party communications privileged because the third party performed a role for Cephalon substantially identical to that of Cephalon employees.  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had sought an order requiring Cephalon to produce documents shared with or created by its third party consultants in connection with work the consultants performed for Cephalon that Cephalon withheld or redacted based upon theattorney-client privilege.

In keeping the documents protected, the court followed other courts and adopted the broader “functional equivalent” approach to third party communications.  According to the court, this approach “reflects the reality that corporations increasingly conduct their business not merely through regular employees but also through a variety of independent contractors retained for specific purposes.” Cephalon, 2013 WL 4836752, at *7.  The broader “functional equivalent” analysis looks at the following factors.  First, third party consultants must perform a role substantially identical to that of an employee.  For example, in Cephalon, the consultants worked closely with employees by providing managerial support, strategic advice, and participating in making preservations to senior management.  The consultants also had dedicated office space and were subject to confidentiality agreements.  Second, the documents or communications must be kept confidential.  And, third, the documents or communications must be made for the purpose of providing or obtaining legal advice.

However, not all courts agree with this broader approach.  Other courts have adopted a narrower “functional equivalent” test.  The main differences with the narrower approach are that consultants must be incorporated into the staff to perform a corporate function that is necessary in the content of actual or anticipated litigation, and possess information needed by attorneys in rendering legal advice.  See In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., No. 00-1990, 2003 WL 25962198, at *4 (D.N.J. June 25, 2003).

The varying scope of the functional equivalent test highlights that the most important factor in keeping third party communications privileged is to know your jurisdiction’s viewpoint.  Other considerations include making certain that consultants are the functional equivalent of employees, and that the communications are kept confidential and created for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.

Article by:

Karne O. Newburn

Of:

McDermott Will & Emery

Top Ten Intellectual Property Stories from 2013

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I admit it, I like lists, even completely subjective ones like this one, that is tilted toward patent law and prep/pros. So in no particular order, except for number one, here we go:

top 10 2013 intellectual property patent

  1.  Myriad [Add your pun title here!]. No story can top a unanimous Supreme Court opinion (Thomas writing even!) holding that a discrete chemical molecule is really a data storage device made for us all by Mother Nature, and so is a “natural product”. More troubling, I fear, are Judge Lourie’s two opinions below, holding that the broadly-claimed diagnostic methods were patent-ineligible as “abstract ideas.” Combine this with Mayo and PerkinElmer v. Intema and you get caught in a perfect storm that can sink almost any claim to a diagnostic method.
  2. CLS Bank v. Alice. A big story indeed, as commentators tried, with little success, to unravel the threads in multiple opinions issued by the Fed. Cir. judges. Now the Supreme Court will try to define an abstract idea. Is C =pi(D) carved into a brick concrete enough for you?
  3. Inequitable Conduct goes into IP hospice. While we still have a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the PTO, Rule 1.56(b) is gone. A simple failure to submit even “material” information will seldom, if ever, lead to an IC holding. In 1st Media v Electronic Arts, Sony, a defendant in the suit, petitioned for cert., playing the “rigid test” card, but the Supreme Court stood pat and denied the petition. In Network Signatures v. State Farm, Judge Newman suggested that facially false petitions would not amount to “egregious misconduct” unless they involved statutory standards of patentability, as opposed to formal PTO filings. However, the Supreme Court also denied cert.  in Apotex v. Cephalon, in which the Cephalon attorney and scientist obtained a patent on an invention made by their supplier – both the D.C. and the Fed. Cir found IC. And where are the final PTO rules?
  4. The rise of the Written Description Requirement as a patent-killer. I predicted this trend post-Ariad and the Fed. Cir. has ruled accordingly. It is much easier to invalidate a claim by finding that the specification does not demonstrate enough “possession” of the claimed invention that it is to have to sort through all those messy Wands factors for enablement. Even with a lot of structural data, Novozymes’ patent on its improved enzyme sank like a stone. And the Fed. Cir. has pretty much ignored patentee’s attempts to argue that a thin disclosure can be supplemented by information available to the art. See Wyeth v. Abbott Labs. Even “Gentry Gallery” –based decisions seem to be in vogue again (no support in specification for later claim amendment) – see Synthes v. Spinal Kinetics. However, possession did “rule” in Sanofi-Aventis v. Pfizer, so perhaps it is possible to turn this ocean liner around.
  5. Section 112(b) Indefiniteness. Supreme Court may grant cert to resolve the question: “Does the Federal Circuit’s acceptance of ambiguous patent claims with multiple reasonable interpretations—so long as the ambiguity is not ‘insoluble’ by a court—defeat the statutory requirement of particular and distinct patent claiming.” Nautilus v Biosig Instruments. This is one of the few lines of Fed. Cir. decisions that favor patentees.
  6. Who induced infringement, or did they? In Limelight Networks v. Akami Techs., the Supreme Court may well grant cert. to decide the question: “Whether the Fed. Cir. erred in holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing patent infringement under [271(b)] even though no one has committed direct infringement under [271(a)]?” This somewhat muddled question could be clearer if “no one” was defined more completely, but the Solicitor General has recommended that the Court take this one up, so watch out.
  7. The Rise of Secondary Considerations. In the wake of KSR’s termination of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test, the Fed. Cir. and the Board are increasingly looking for, and giving weight to, the oft neglected bag of secondary considerations. The court has noted that unexpected results are a secondary consideration (I don’t think that John Deere said that), and has put increased emphasis on long-felt need, failure of others, commercial success and the like. This does not mean that applicants or patentees will always “win”, but it significantly increases the number of patentability “chips” they have to play. For example, see Galderma v Tolmar, Appeal No. 2013-1034 ( Fed. Cir., December 11, 2013)in which a split panel of the Fed. Cir. found Galderma’s add-on patent for adapalene obvious, but spent a lot of space evaluating unexpected results and defining “teaching away.”
  8. Has Cybor’s Time Finally Come? The Fed. Cir. en banc will soon decide whether or not Fed. Cir. panels should overrule its practice of reviewing claim construction de novo, as a matter of law. Cybor has been much reviled in recent years, but there are voices that feel Cybor comports with the mission of the Fed. Cir. to bring uniformity to patent law. If the court takes this step, some commentators think that the Supreme Court will be the final arbiter.
  9. Stem Cell Research to Continue. The suit seeking to ban Federal funding for embryonic stem cell research was finally dismissed.
  10. The Battle Against “Patent Trolls” continues. And continues to threaten a system that has worked to advance innovation for over 200 years. The biggest threat posed by attempts to limit suits by NPE’s against – mostly – high tech communications companies is that they tar patent holders as a group, particularly universities and individual inventors and start-ups, by making it more difficult/costly for them to enforce their patent rights against deep pocket infringers. H.R. 3309 is just one of the latest shotgun blasts fired at the patent system. Now the Office may have a new “Director” who believes that the patent system is broken and needs to be fixed. I don’t like legislative and administrative bodies cooperating to fix a problem that almost no one has clearly defined. The last time this happened, there was a bill passed to reduce the backlog by severely limiting application filing and prosecution in general.

Merry holidays (or year-end rushes) to us all and many happy allowances!

Article by:

Warren Woessner

Of:

Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

Supreme Court To Consider Employers’ Arguments Regarding Contraceptive Mandate

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The United States Supreme Court will revisit the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)requirement that most employers provide contraceptive coverage in employee health insurance plans. On November 26, 2013, the Court accepted two cases which center on the issue, each of which resulted in a different outcome. The ACA currently provides an exemption to certain non-profit religious organizations, but there is no such exemption for private employers.

The Supreme Court will now consider whether private companies should be able to refuse to provide employees with contraception coverage under their health plans on the basis of religion. Further, the Supreme Court may consider whether for-profit corporations may validly claim protection under freedom of religion.

In Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.[1], the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit ruled that a requirement which forced Hobby Lobby to comply with the contraception coverage mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which protects religious freedom. Hobby Lobby is owned by David and Barbara Green, who have stated that they strive to run their company in accordance with their Christian beliefs. The Greens have no objection to preventive contraception, but only medication which may prevent human embryos from being implanted in the womb (i.e., “the morning-after pill”).

The 10th Circuit Appeals Court ruled in favor of Hobby Lobby based upon its  decision in a previous case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission[2], which held that corporations hold political speech rights akin to individuals. Taking this reasoning further, if a corporation can have political speech rights, then it should also have protection for its religious expression, according to the Court.

In Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sebelius[3], the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit viewed the issue differently. The Court upheld the contraception coverage mandate based upon what it perceived as a “total absence of case law” to support any argument that corporations are guaranteed religious protection.

According to the ACA, contraceptive coverage provided by employers’ group health insurance plans is “lawful and essential” to women’s health; however, certain businesses assert that their religious liberty is more important. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court will cast the deciding vote.

[1] Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).

[2] Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

[3] Conestoga Woods Specialties v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).

 

Article by:

Brittany Blackburn Koch

Of:

McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie and Kirkland, PLLC

 

Holiday Warning Update: Cut Sexual Harassment From Your Holiday Party Invitation List (seriously)

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OK, we admit it is somewhat cliché for employment lawyers to circulate client alerts every December warning about the dangers lurking at company holiday parties. But when real-life examples show just how expensive claims arising from these events can be, we would be remiss not to issue yet another such alert.

Last December, we issued an alert concerning a federal district court’s refusal to dismiss a holiday party related sexual harassment lawsuit filed against an employer,Shiner v. State University of New York at Buffalo (Case No. 11-CV-01024).

The case finally settled in August 2013, with the employer paying the plaintiff a whopping $255,000.

The plaintiff, Leslie Shiner, was a clerk at the University at Buffalo Dental School. She alleged that she had not wanted to attend the school’s annual holiday party because the conduct at previous events made her uncomfortable. However, a supervisor encouraged her to attend the party, which was held at a local bar. During the party, an associate dean, with supervisory authority over the plaintiff, allegedly made sexual advances toward her that included fondling her, putting his tongue in her ear and pulling her onto his lap. Another department official with supervisory authority allegedly cheered him on.

In early 2012, the plaintiff filed claims of sexual harassment under state and federal anti-discrimination laws, as well common law claims of assault and battery. In November 2012, as we wrote last year, the judge denied the defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss and allowed the case to proceed. After months of discovery and over a year and a half after the plaintiff filed her lawsuit, her employer ultimately agreed to pay her $255,000 to settle her claims. That amount obviously does not include the attorneys’ fees expended by the employer during a protracted time period of motion practice and discovery. Not including the inconveniences to the employer, the total out-of-pocket cost of the case to the employer likely exceeded $350,000 or $400,000.

The lesson for all employers is that the lighthearted, and sometimes drunken, atmosphere at office holiday parties does not equate to a free pass for unwanted touching, lewd comments and other types of inappropriate behavior that otherwise would not be tolerated. As the University of Buffalo Dental School eventually had to recognize when it agreed to settlement, employers who fail to protect themselves can be held liable for workers’ conduct that might easily get out of hand at festive events particularly when there is drinking.

The following are examples of ways employers can reduce the threat of dangerous misbehavior:

  • Remind employees prior to the event that the company’s code of conduct remains in effect during the event
  • Establish procedures in advance to handle any inappropriate behavior that might occur
  • Limit the amount of drinking and provide taxis or other safe transportation home to employees who may be intoxicated

If an employee does come to you with a sexual harassment complaint, please consider it seriously and take prompt action as necessary to investigate and stop the harassment.

 

Article by:

Michael B. Kass

Of:

Armstrong Teasdale

Supreme Court Declines Review of Intern Compensability Issue

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While the compensability of time spent in internship programs continues to be an hotly contested litigation issue, the United States Supreme Court has declined an opportunity to provide clarity in this area, denying certiorari to a Florida medical billing intern whose claim was rejected last year by the Eleventh Circuit.  Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 2013 U.S. LEXIS 8046 (U.S. 2013).

Perhaps multiple requests for high court review of an appellate decision will be necessary before the Supreme Court addresses the status of interns under the FLSA, as was required before the Court accepted review of the exempt status of pharmaceutical sales representatives.

Article by:

Noel P. Tripp

Of:

Jackson Lewis P.C.

Supreme Court to Consider Case on Patent Eligibility of Computer-Implemented Inventions

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On December 6, 2013, the Supreme Court agreed to consider Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, a case concerning the patent eligibility of computer-implemented inventions. The Court will review a split decision issued by the en banc Federal Circuit in May 2013. In that decision, seven of 10 judges concluded Alice Corporation’s claims to computer-based methods for minimizing settlement risk in financial transactions, as well as claims to computer-readable media containing program code for performing such methods, constituted patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101. The judges split evenly, however, regarding the patent eligibility of Alice’s remaining claims to computerized systems for performing such transactions. Given the stark differences of opinion expressed by members of the Federal Circuit, it was widely predicted that the Supreme Court would step in to settle the dispute. The Court’s decision could have significant implications for the computer hardware and software industries, as well as for patent eligibility standards in general.

The Supreme Court is expected to hear arguments in early 2014, and a decision is expected by the end of the term in June 2014. The case number is 13-298.

Article by:

Of:

Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

 

It's Official—The Supreme Court Announces That It Will Review The Contraceptive Mandate

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On Nov. 26, 2013, U.S. Supreme Court announced that it will review two cases in which for-profit employers challenged the application of the contraceptive mandate under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The cases are Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialites Corp. v. Sebelius.

Both employers say that their religious beliefs bar them from providing employees with drugs or other items that they consider abortifacients. These employers argue that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act protects their religious beliefs and therefore bars the application of the contraceptive mandate. In contrast, the government argues that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion and therefore have no protection from the mandate.

Supreme Court

At present, the federal courts of appeal are deeply divided on this issue. Three circuits—the Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits—have upheld challenges to the mandate, while two circuits—the Third and the Sixth—have rejected these challenges. The most recent decision came from the Seventh Circuit in Korte v. Sebelius, Case No. 12-3841, and Grote v. Sebelius, Case No. 13-1077.  The court’s ruling, issued Nov. 8, 2013, held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act barred the application of the mandate to closely held, for-profit corporations when the mandate substantially burdened the religious-exercise rights of the business owners and their companies.

The Supreme Court will likely hear oral argument in the consolidated Hobby Lobby andConestoga case in March 2014. The decision is expected to decide whether—and to what extent—for-profit corporations have a right to exercise religion. Many commentators see parallels between this case and the Citizens United case in which the Court held that corporations had a First Amendment right to make certain political expenditures. If the Court finds that corporations also have religious rights, it could have significant impact on the application of other laws—including the Title VII, the ADA, the FMLA, etc. For example, could a religious employer object to providing FMLA leave for an employee to care for a same-sex spouse, even in a state that recognizes same-sex unions? Keep an eye on this case—it could have far-reaching consequences.

Article by:

Mark D. Scudder

Of:

Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Rite Aid to Pay $12.3 Million for Failing to Properly Manage Waste Products from its California Stores

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Rite Aid Corporation has agreed to pay more than $12.3 million to settle a civil lawsuit alleging that Rite Aid improperly managed, transported, and disposed of hazardous waste at hundreds of its California stores and distribution centers.  The hazardous wastes at issue include: pharmaceuticals and over-the-counter medications, bleaches, photo processing chemicals, pool chlorine and acids, pesticides, fertilizers, batteries, electronic devices, mercury containing lamps, paints, lamp oils and other ignitable liquids, aerosol products, oven cleaners and various other cleaning agents, automotive products, and other flammable, reactive, toxic and corrosive materials.

Background

The case against Rite Aid began in 2009 when local environmental health agencies began to investigate Rite Aid facilities’ management of hazardous wastes. Prosecutors, investigators, and environmental regulators statewide conducted a series of waste inspections at Rite Aid stores and local landfills. The inspections revealed that over a six-and-a-half year period, Rite Aid had improperly managed certain hazardous wastes at its facilities, transported hazardous waste without meeting regulatory requirements, and in some cases illegally disposed of hazardous waste in landfills not authorized to accept such waste. On September 17, 2013, fifty-three California district attorneys and two city attorneys filed a joint environmental protection lawsuit against Rite Aid. Pursuant to California Health and Safety Code sections 25516 and 25516.1, the prosecutors brought a civil action in the name of the People of the State of California and sought to enjoin violations of California’s hazardous waste, medical waste, hazardous waste transportation and hazardous materials release response laws and implementing regulations.

The Allegations

The prosecutors asserted that Rite Aid stores engaged in numerous violations of California’s hazardous waste laws and regulations, including:

  • Disposal of hazardous waste at unauthorized points, such a trash compactors, dumpsters, drains, sinks, toilets, Rite Aid facilities, and landfills or transfer stations not authorized to receive hazardous waste, in violation of Health and Safety Code sections 25189 and 25189.2;
  • Failure to determine whether each waste generated at each facility in question as a result of a spill, container break, or other means of rending the product not useable for its intended purpose was a hazardous waste, as required under the California Code of Regulations (“CCR”), Title 22, sections 66262.11 and 66260.200;
  • Transporting or transferring custody of hazardous wastes without a properly licensed and registered transporter, as required by Health and Safety Code section 25163;
  • Failure to dispose of accumulated hazardous wastes from facilities at least once during every 90 day period, as required by CCR Title 22, section 66262.34;
  • Failure to timely file with the Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) a hazardous waste manifest for all hazardous waste transported for offsite handling, treatment, storage, disposal or combination thereof, as required by Health and Safety Code section 25160(b)(3) and CCR Title 22, section 66262.23;
  • Failure to contact the transporter or owner/operator of the designated receiving facility to determine the status of hazardous waste in the event of non-receipt of a copy of a manifest with the signature of the owner/operator within 35 days of the date the waste was accepted by the transporter, as required by CCR Title 22, section 66262.42;
  • Treatment, storage, disposal, and transport of hazardous waste without receiving and using a proper EPA or DTSC identification number for the originating facility, as required by CCR Title 22, section 66262.12(a);
  • Failure to maintain a program for the lawful storage, handling and accumulation of hazardous waste, as required by Health and Safety Code section 25123.3 and CCR Title 22, sections 66262.34, 66265.173 and 662165.177;
  • Failure to properly designate hazardous waste storage areas, segregate hazardous wastes, and failure to conduct inspections, as required by CCR Title 22, sections 66262.34 and 66265.174;
  • Failure to comply with employee training obligations for the management of hazardous waste, as required by CCR Title 22, section 66262.34;
  • Failure to have in place at all times a hazardous waste contingency plan and emergency procedures for each facility, as required by CCR Title 22, section 66262.34;
  • Failure to continuously implement, maintain, and submit a complete hazardous materials business plan, as required by Health and Safety Code sections 25503(a), 25504, 25505 and CCR Title 19, sections 2729 et seq.;
  • Failure to immediately report any release or threatened release of a reportable quantity of any hazardous material from any facility into the environment, as required by Health and Safety Code sections 25501 and 25507;
  • Failure to properly manage, mark, and store universal waste in compliance with management standards in CCR Title 22, sections 66273.1 et seq.;
  • Failure to comply with the California Medical Waste Management Act (Health and Safety Code sections 117600 et seq.); and
  • Causing to deposit, without permission of the owner, hazardous substances upon the land of another, in violation of California Penal Code section 374.8(b).

The prosecutors sought civil penalties for each violation and reimbursement of the costs of investigation, enforcement, prosecution, and attorneys’ fees.

The Consent Judgment

On September 24, 2013, Judge Linda L. Lofthus issued an order approving the consent judgment negotiated by the parties. Under the agreement, Rite Aid agreed to fully comply with the Code sections and regulations at issue in the Complaint. Moving forward, stores will be required to retain their hazardous waste in segregated, labeled containers so as to minimize the risk of exposure to employees and to ensure that incompatible wastes do not combine to cause dangerous chemical reactions. The company will continue to designate four full-time employees responsible for environmental, health, regulatory and safety compliance assurance in California. California Rite Aid stores will work with state-registered haulers to document, collect and properly dispose of hazardous waste produced through damage, spills and returns. Moreover, Rite Aid has implemented a computerized scanning system and other environmental training to manage its waste.

Rite Aid agreed to pay $9,500,000.00 in civil penalties pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 25189 and 25514 and Business and Professions Code section 17206, to the prosecuting and regulatory agencies. Rite Aid also agreed to pay $1,974,000 for certain supplemental environmental projects. Finally, Rite Aid will pay $950,000 for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees, costs of investigation, and other costs of enforcement.

According to the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, Rite Aid was cooperative with prosecutors and investigators throughout the case.

Conclusion

The Rite Aid case reflects continued active enforcement by California’s prosecutors and regulators of the state’s environmental protection laws against retailers related to alleged mismanagement of hazardous wastes. Since 2011, California regulators have secured more than seven multi-million dollar settlements in hazardous waste enforcement actions against large retailers.

Article By:

Of:

Beveridge & Diamond PC