Category: Litigation

Misrepresentation of Source Claims Re: Foreign Trademark Registration

Katten Muchin

Owners of marks that are well- known outside the United States may find that an American company has attempted to take advantage of the renown of the foreign mark by obtaining a trade mark registration for such mark in the United States. While Article 6(bis) of the Paris Convention provides the owner of a famous foreign trade mark with a basis for asserting and sustaining a claim of priority in the US over a US registrant, this provision does not provide a basis for cancelling a US registration absent use of the mark in the US.

In April, however, the US Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) issued a precedential decision which extends the ability of the owner of a mark that is famous internationally but not used in the US to enforce rights in their marks. In Bayer Consumer Care AG v Belmora LLC, the TTAB granted Bayer’s petition to cancel Belmora’s Registration for the Flanax mark based upon a misrepresen- tation of source in accordance with Section 14(3) of the Trademark Act even though Bayer was not using, nor had any intention to use, the Flanax mark in the US.

The evidence in Bayer showed that Bayer’s Mexican affiliate had been dis- tributing a naproxen sodium-based analgesic under the Flanax mark in Mexico since 1976 and that Flanax is the top selling pain reliever in Mexico. However, Bayer does not use the Flanax mark in the US and, instead, markets its naproxen sodium-based analgesic in the US under the Aleve mark.

The respondent, Belmora, adopted the Flanax mark in connection with a naproxen sodium-based analgesic that it sold and marketed towards the Hispanic community. The evidence fur- ther established that the initial packag- ing used by Belmora copied the logo and colour scheme used by Bayer for its Flanax product in Mexico and repeat- edly invoked the reputation of Bayer’s Flanax mark when marketing its prod- ucts in the US.

Belmora attacked Bayer’s standing to bring the cancellation proceedings, arguing that Bayer does not own a US registration for the Flanax mark, has not used the Flanax mark in the US and had no plans to use the mark in the US. The TTAB rejected these arguments, stating that “if respondent is using the FLANAX mark in the US to misrepre- sent to US consumers the source of respondent’s products as petitioner’s Mexican products, it is petitioner who loses the ability to control its reputation and thus suffers damage”. Integral to this analysis was the TTAB’s finding that given the size of the Mexican pop- ulation in the US, the “reputation of the Mexican FLANAX mark does not stop at the Mexican border”.

Having held that Bayer had standing to pursue the cancellation, the TTAB turned to its analysis of Section 14(3) which provides that a party may cancel a registration for a mark if the mark “is being used by, or with the permission of, the respondent so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used”. In doing so, the TTAB held that the evidence established blatant misuse of the Flanax mark by Belmora in a manner calculated to trade on the goodwill and reputation of Bayer. Therefore, the TTAB ordered the can- cellation of Belmora’s Registration for the mark Flanax.

Although typically the ability to claim rights in a trade mark in the US requires that the mark actually be in use in the US, the TTAB’s decision in Bayer indicates that there may be an alternate basis that can be pursued when a foreign trade mark owner that does not use its mark in the US seeks to assert rights in its mark. On the other hand, the standard to satisfy a claim of misrepresentation of source is fairly dif- ficult, as it requires that the petitioner show that the respondent took steps to deliberately pass off its goods as those of petitioner. Therefore, a successful claim of misrepresentation of source will be very fact dependent.

Article By:

Karen Artz Ash
Bret J. Danow
Of:
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

The Supreme Court Decides Bay Mills Case, Leaves Tribal Sovereign Immunity Intact

Godfrey Kahn

In its long-awaited decision in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, the U.S. Supreme Court today re-affirmed its 1998 holding in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. 523 U.S. 751 (1998) that tribal sovereign immunity extends to tribes’ governmental and commercial activities, both on reservation and off. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act waiver of tribal sovereign immunity for suits to enjoin gaming on Indian lands in violation of a tribe’s gaming compact with a state did not apply to tribal gaming on non-Indian lands and that the State was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suing the Tribe directly for damages.

The Court rejected Michigan’s arguments that Kiowa was wrongly decided and that tribes should enjoy no immunity with respect to their commercial, off-reservation activities. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer and Sotomayor, emphasized the doctrine that the court should not overrule its previous decisions without special justification (stare decisis), pointing out that (1) the Court had explicitly invited Congress to consider limitations on tribal sovereign immunity its Kiowa decision, (2) Congress had, in fact, considered several bills that would have imposed broad limits but had not enacted any of them (“Having held in Kiowa that this issue is up to Congress, we cannot reverse ourselves because some may think its conclusion wrong” Slip. Op. 20), and (3) Michigan had other means of enforcing state law against Bay Mills, including denial of required licenses, suits against employees and officials of the tribe to enjoin violations of state law and criminal prosecution of tribal officials and employees and for violations of state criminal laws.

The Court concluded:

As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian tribes exercise sovereignty subject to the will of the Federal Government. …Sovereignty implies immunity from lawsuits. Subjection means (among much else) that Congress can abrogate that immunity as and to the extent it wishes. If Congress had authorized this suit, Bay Mills would have no valid grounds to object. But Congress has not done so: The abrogation of immunity in IGRA applies to gaming on, but not off, Indian lands. We will not rewrite Congress’s handiwork. Nor will we create a freestanding exception to tribal immunity for all off reservation commercial conduct. This Court has declined that course once before. To choose it now would entail both overthrowing our precedent and usurping Congress’s current policy judgment.

In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor asserted that the historical basis for tribal sovereign immunity is stronger than the dissent recognized and that the result reached by the majority is consistent with comity in view of the fact that State sovereign immunity prevents states from being sued by tribes. Justice Sotomayor also pointed out the special challenges that tribes face with respect to raising revenue and the role that their commercial enterprises play in funding government.

The unmistakable premise of the dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Alito, is that sovereign immunity as currently exercised by tribes under the rule of Kiowa has led to widespread, grave and intolerable injustices. These injustices, according to the dissenters, warrant departing from the rule of stare decisis to correct the Court’s “mistake” in the Kiowa decision:

In Kiowa, this Court adopted a rule without a reason: a sweeping immunity from suit untethered from commercial realities and the usual justifications for immunity, premised on the misguided notion that only Congress can place sensible limits on a doctrine we created. The decision was mistaken then, and the Court’s decision to reaffirm it in the face of the unfairness and conflict it has engendered is doubly so.

Dissent, slip Op. 18.

Justice Thomas’ opinion highlights areas, including taxation, tobacco commerce, payday lending and campaign finance, in which tribes have “exploited” immunity to avoid state regulation. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg expressed her view that the Court had gone too far not only in expanding the scope of tribal sovereign immunity in Kiowabut also in expanding state sovereign immunity from suits by tribes to enforce federal laws in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Justice Ginsburg would impose greater limits on the immunity of both sovereigns.

The Court’s decision leaves unclear two areas of tribal sovereign immunity jurisprudence. First, the Court expressly acknowledged that it has never “specifically addressed” whether immunity “should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim, or other plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe, has no alternative way to obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct. The argument that such cases would present a ‘special justification’ for abandoning precedent is not before us” Slip. Op. 16, n.8. The Court’s comment will be viewed as an invitation for a plaintiff to make the argument that this situation does indeed present a “special justification” for an exception to immunity.

The Court’s opinion also leaves unaddressed the extent to which tribal sovereign immunity applies to subsidiary entities. In a footnote, the dissent observed, without comment, that “[l]ower courts have held that tribal immunity shields not only Indian tribes themselves, but also entities deemed ‘arms of the tribe.’ … In addition, tribal immunity has been interpreted to cover tribal employees and officials acting within the scope of their employment.”

The consequences of the Court’s decision are likely to be (1) arguments by state lobbyists that Congress should take action to limit tribal immunity for the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion and (2) suits based on the assertion that there should be an exception to tribal sovereign immunity for a “tort victim or other plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe” who has “no alternative way to obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct.”

Article By:

Brian L. Pierson
Of:
Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

New York Federal Court Rejects Preemption and Primary Jurisdiction Arguments in “All Natural” Case

GT Law

In our February 12, 2014 post, entitled “Consumer Class Actions Trending From Attacking ‘All Natural’ to ‘Raw,’” we addressed whether claims challenging consumer product advertising as “all natural” were preempted in the absence of specific guidance from the FDA and the mixed results the argument has produced.  In Ault v. J.M. Smucker Co. et al., 2014 WL 1998235 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2014), the Court denied a motion to dismiss based on preemption and primary jurisdiction where the plaintiff alleged that it was deceived into purchasing Smucker’s Crisco oil by “all natural” advertising where the product contained genetically modified organisms, or GMOs, because the FDA has not addressed the use of the term “all natural” in this context.

All Natural

Smuckers argued that FDA policies regarding the use of the term “natural” preempt state law false advertising claims based on this language, even if those policies are informal.  However, the Court found, “no federal specifications exist here.”  Id. at *3.  And “[e]ven if an informal FDA definition does exist, the term ‘natural’ ‘may be used in numerous contexts and may convey different meanings depending on that context[]” [citation,] [and] “that is one of the reasons the FDA has never adopted a formal definition.”  Id. (citing Pelayo v. Nestle USA, Inc.,<“> No. CV 13–5213, 2013 WL 5764644, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 25, 2013)).  In addition, “the FDA has declined to consider the specific issue here:  whether and under what circumstances food products containing ingredients produced using genetically engineered ingredients may or may not be labeled ‘natural.’”  Id. (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted).  “As a result,” the Court found, “any general, informal FDA guidance is not controlling.”  Id. (citing In re Frito–Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litig., No. 12–md–2413,2013 WL 4647512, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013)).

The Court also rejected Smucker’s argument that the FDA’s decision not to impose a labeling requirement for foods with GMOs supports preemption, stating, “[i]n effect, Defendant interprets the FDA’s lack of action as approval for Defendant’s use of the phrase ‘All Natural’ to describe foods containing GMO [but] [i]n reality, the FDA has stayed silent because it ‘operates in a world of limited resources’ where it ‘must prioritize which issues to address.’”  Id. (citation omitted.)

In addition, the Court found Smucker’s primary jurisdiction argument unavailing:  “three federal district judges previously referred the question of whether foods containing GMOs may be labeled ‘natural’ to the FDA under the primary jurisdiction doctrine [and on] January 6, 2014, the FDA responded and explicitly declined to make such a determination.”  Id. at *4 (citing January 6, 2014 FDA Letter).  “The FDA’s refusal to consider the question demonstrates that ‘resort to the agency at this time would be unavailing,’ [citation] and therefore weighs against applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine.”  Id.

This case signals that, until the FDA acts, preemption and primary jurisdiction arguments against “all natural” advertising of products with GMOs may be more and more challenging.

Article By:

Jordan D. Grotzinger
Of:
Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Tax Court Holds that a Trust can Qualify for the "Real Estate Professional Exception" of Section 469(c)(7)

Proskauer

The Tax Court recently handed down its decision in Frank Aragona Trust v. Commissioner, ruling that a trust can qualify for the real estate professional exception of Section 469(c)(7). By taking into account the actions of the trustees, a trust can be considered to be materially participating in real estate activities. This means that losses from real estate activities can be treated as nonpassive and therefore deductible in determining the trust’s taxable income. This decision is especially relevant to trusts that own business as it affects the application of the passive activity loss rules in Section 469 and whether income from those activities is subject to the new 3.8% net investment income Medicare surtax under Section 1411.

The Frank Aragona Trust (the “Trust”) was a Michigan trust that owned several pieces of real property and was also involved in the business aspects of developing and maintaining the property. The Trust had six trustees, three of whom were also employees of Holiday Enterprises, LLC (the “LLC”). The LLC was owned 100% by the Trust. The LLC also employed other professionals.

The Trust had losses in 2005 and 2006 from its real estate activities and deducted those losses(on the basis that they resulted from nonpassive activities) on its income tax returns. In issuing a notice of deficiency for those tax years, the Service determined that the real estate activities were passive under Section 469 and therefore any related losses were not deductible.

In general, real estate rental activity is considered passive regardless of whether the taxpayer materially participates in the real estate business. However, there is an exception for “real estate professionals” under Section 469(c)(7). Before the Tax Court, the Trustees argued that the Trust was a “real estate professional” as defined in Section 469(c)(7) so that the losses were considered to be from nonpassive activities and therefore deductible. To qualify for the real estate professional exception, a taxpayer must pass two tests. First, more than one-half of the personal services performed in a taxable year must be performed in real property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially participates. Second, the taxpayer must perform more than 750 hours or services during the taxable year in real property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially participates. The Service argued that the regulations to Section 469(c)(7) define “personal services” as “work performed by an individual in connection with a trade or business [emphasis added].” Because the trust was not an individual, it could not perform personal services and therefore did not fall under the Section 469(c)(7) exception.

The Tax Court rejected the Service’s argument that the trust could not be considered an individual under Section 469(c)(7) and the associated regulations. Further, the Court found that the Trustees’ participation in the real estate activities met the material participation requirements of Section 469(c)(7) because they were regular, continuous and substantial. The Court determined that the participation of the Trustees should be considered in determining whether the taxpayer (the Trust) materially participated in the real estate activities. The Service argued that the activities of the Trustee should only apply if they are performed in their capacity as Trustees (as opposed to employees of the LLC). Here, the Court looked to Michigan law, under which trustees are required to administer trusts solely for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. The Court explained that the Trustees could not simply stop acting as Trustees because they were also employees of the LLC, so that their activities in other capacities could be considered in whether the Trust was a material participant in the real estate activities.

In summary, a trust may be able to qualify for the real estate professional exception of Section 469(c)(7). If the trust qualifies for the exception, losses from the associated real estate activities may be deductible on the trust’s income tax return. This distinction has increased importance with the application of the new 3.8% net investment income Medicare surtax under Section 1411.

Article By:

Albert W Gortz
George D Karibjanian
David Pratt
Mitchell M Gaswirth
Andrew M Katzenstein
Henry J Leibowitz
Of:
Proskauer Rose LLP

 

Conflict Minerals Rule Update: D.C. Circuit Court Denies Request for Stay

Andrews Kurth

As most readers are likely aware, on April 14, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) dismissed a variety of challenges to the SEC’s conflict minerals rule, but found unconstitutional the rule’s requirement that issuers report, in a conflict minerals report to be filed with the SEC and posted on the issuer’s publicly available website, that any of their products have “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’” Following the SEC’s partial stay of the aspects of the conflict minerals rule the court found to be unconstitutional,1 the appellants in the litigation as to the rule’s validity petitioned the D.C. Circuit for an emergency stay of the entire rule. On May 14, 2014, the D.C. Circuit denied the emergency motion without explanation.2

As a result of this development, issuers subject to reporting obligations under the rule should be working on finalizing their Form SDs and any necessary conflict minerals reports. Issuers must file these forms and reports with the SEC by the June 2, 2014 filing deadline. Issuers should prepare their reports in accordance with the guidance provided in the recent statement (Statement) of the Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance (CorpFin)3 that indicated that the CorpFin staff expects that filed Form SDs and conflict minerals reports will comply with and address those portions of the rule that the D.C. Circuit upheld and that provided guidance on the disclosure to be provided in Form SDs and conflict minerals reports in light of the D.C. Circuit’s April decision.

As the D.C. Circuit’s April decision created many interpretive questions that the Statement did not fully answer, issuers should stay tuned to see if CorpFin issues further disclosure guidance as the filing deadline nears.

1. See SEC, Order Issuing Stay In the Matter of Exchange Act Rule 13p-1 and Form SD, Rel. No. 34-72079 (May 2, 2014), available at http:// www .sec.gov/rules/other/2014/34-72079.pdf. Only the requirement that issuers report in a conflict minerals report to be filed with the SEC and posted on the issuer’s publicly available website that any of their products have “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’” is stayed. Please see our client alert dated May 2, 2014, SEC Issues Partial Stay of Conflict Minerals Rule.

2. nchorOrder, Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-5252 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 2014).

3. nchorSee Keith F. Higgins, Director, SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., Statement on the Effect of the Recent Court of Appeals Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule (Apr. 29, 2014), available at www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541681994. Please see our client alert dated May 2, 2014, The Conflict Minerals Rule: Important Recent Developments, for a discussion of the guidance provided in the Statement.

Article By:

Dudley W. Murrey
G. Michael O’Leary
Eric R. Markus
Of:
Andrews Kurth

Sixth Circuit Appeals Court Upholds $6.1 Million Fraud Judgment Against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan

Varnum LLP

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has affirmed a $6.1 million fraud judgment against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan. The Appeals Court agreed that “BCBSM committed fraud by knowingly misrepresenting and omitting information about the Disputed Fees in contract documents.”  Its misleading information “helped sustain the illusion that BCBSM was more cost-competitive” than its competitors.

The ruling confirms last year’s judgment by a federal court in Detroit, which found that BCBSM collected millions of dollars in hidden fees over a 20-year period from Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. and Hi-Lex America, Inc., along with their self-insured employee health plan. Varnum attorneys representing Hi-Lex showed that BCBSM marked up employee hospital claims by as much as 22 percent and kept the markup. Reports provided to Hi-Lex did not disclose the hidden fees. Internal company e-mails showed that BCBSM’s managers knew customers were unaware of the markups, and that employees were trained to “downplay” the hidden fees if any customers discovered them.

“We are very happy that the judgment was affirmed,” said Varnum attorney Perrin Rynders, whose team has battled the issue for more than three years. “It’s been a long time coming, but we never doubted that this would be the ultimate outcome. We applaud our client who had the courage to stand up for what’s right and persevere through this lengthy legal process. Litigation was not our client’s preferred approach, but BCBSM refused at every turn to accept responsibility for its actions.”

The Hi-Lex matter was the first to reach judgment out of more than 35 similar ERISA cases that Varnum has filed against BCBSM on behalf of companies and their self-insured health plans.

Rynders noted that the ultimate result is a win for more than just those clients who have filed suit. BCBSM apparently discontinued its practice of rolling fees and surcharges into “hospital claims” for its self-insured clients in 2012, shortly after Varnum filed its first group of lawsuits.

“Employers work hard to manage their health care costs. It is upsetting that an organization trusted to help keep costs in line would violate that trust and take advantage of its customers,” Rynders said.  “The cases we are handling are good for companies and workers all across Michigan, because more money will be available for vital health care.”

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision on May 14, 2014.

The original judgment was issued in May 2013 by U.S. District Court Judge Victoria A. Roberts. It concluded that BCBSM violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) through its practice of collecting additional compensation without customers’ knowledge. The Court held that BCBSM engaged in illegal self-dealing and breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA.

Judge Roberts entered judgment in favor of Hi-Lex for $6.1 million, including a return of all hidden fees taken from Hi-Lex since 1994 plus interest.

Article By:

Stephen F. MacGuidwin
Perrin Rynders
Aaron M. Phelps
Of:
Varnum LLP

In This “Unreliable” Opinion, California Court Requires Privity For Action Against Unlicensed Broker-Dealer

AllenM logo with tagline

Since California Corporations Code Section 25501.5 was enacted ten years ago, I’ve been repeatedly asked “What do it mean?“.  The statute provides that a person who purchases a security from, or sells a security to, an unlicensed broker-dealer may bring an action for rescission of the sale or purchase or, if the plaintiff or the defendant no longer owns the security, for damages.  The question has always been whether the statute requires privity of contract.

Now, there is a judicial answer; just not one that can be relied upon (more about that below).  In Alpinieri v. Tgg Mgmt. Co., 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3177 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. May 5, 2014), the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded:

The Legislature’s use of the commonplace phrases “purchases a security from” and “sells a security to” demonstrates it intended a civil action for rescission or damages under section 25501.5 be available only to a person who transacts directly with an unlicensed broker-dealer, that is, who is in privity with that unlicensed broker-dealer.  We see no indication in section 25501.5′s language any intent other than to restrict a claim for rescission or damages against one who is directly responsible for violating the statute by virtue of selling the security.  Because no contrary legislative intent appears in the statute, there is no basis to disregard literal construction.

(citation omitted).  The Court distinguished two other decisions involving the privity requirement under the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, Moss v. Kroner, 197 Cal. App. 4th 860 (2011) and Viterbi v. Wasserman, 191 Cal. App. 4th 927 (2011), on the basis that those cases did not involve Section 25501.5.

Why is this an “unreliable” holding?  The opinion, which was penned by Associate Justice Terry B. O’Rourke, was not certified for publication.  Under Rule 8.115(a) of the California Rules of Court, an unpublished opinion, with certain exceptions ”must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action”.

Article By:

Keith Paul Bishop
Of: 
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Wind Farms and Eagle “Take” Permits – Litigation is Coming Over the New “30-Year” Permit Rule

McDermottLogo_2c_rgb

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) recently changed its eagle “take” permitting rules to allow wind developers to apply for 30-year take permits; previously, such permits, which allow the incidental killing of eagles, were available for a maximum of just five years.  Wind developers had lobbied for the rule change based on concerns that shorter permitting periods inhibit their ability to obtain financing.  But now, a bird conservation group, the American Bird Conservancy (ABC), is threatening litigation to overturn the “30-Year” rule.

 

How strong are ABC’s claims?

Not especially strong, because the FWS has powerful responses to each of ABC’s contentions.  The FWS will also be protected by the deferential standard of review that typically applies in this type of lawsuit.  And even if ABC were to prevail on its claims, the end result is less likely to be wholesale revocation of the rule than some delays in implementing it.  That is because ABC’s claims are largely procedural in nature, not substantive.

ABC’s claims are summarized in an April 30 letter to the U.S. Department of the Interior and the FWSannouncing the group’s intention to file suit over the 30-Year rule.  The letter contends that the FWS committed three legal errors when it extended the maximum take permitting period from five years to 30 years.  According to ABC, the FWS violated:  (1) the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment for the 30-Year rule; (2) the Endangered Species Act (ESA), by allegedly failing to ensure that the rule is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species; and (3) the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA), which is the statute that authorizes take permits, by prioritizing the concerns of wind developers over those of the eagles the statute is designed to protect.

The problem for ABC – and the good news for wind developers – is that FWS has strong defenses to ABC’s assertions.  First, the NEPA claim will almost certainly turn on whether the FWS correctly concluded that the 30-Year rule falls within a “categorical exclusion” from NEPA’s requirements.  In its letter, ABC quibbles with the FWS’s conclusion, but courts generally review such conclusions under a highly deferential standard of review.  Indeed, agencies often prevail on such claims simply by offering a facially plausible explanation of why NEPA does not apply.  Here, the FWS has done that.  The agency’s NEPA implementation regulations permit the FWS to forego NEPA analysis for rules that have broad or speculative impacts, provided that those impacts will be analyzed on a case-by-case basis in the future.  The FWS contends that is the situation here – it will conduct a NEPA analysis on a permit-by-permit basis in the future.  Courts have rejected NEPA claims under similar circumstances in the past.

The FWS has a similar defense to ABC’s ESA claim.  That claim turns on whether the FWS had a duty to engage in internal consultation about the potential impact of the 30-Year rule on endangered species or critical habitat.  ABC’s letter insists that the FWS was subject to that duty and failed to comply with it.  But the FWS previously concluded, in 2009, that the eagle take permitting rule as a whole would not have any impact on endangered species.  That leaves the FWS in a strong position now, because the 30-Year rule does little more than change the maximum available permitting period under the existing permitting rule.  The FWS will also likely argue that, contrary to ABC’s assertions, the 30-Year rule does not affect endangered species because all it does is authorize the issuance of permits, it does not itself grant any developer permission to undertake any activity.  In sum, the FWS will likely argue that the proper time for ESA consultation is in the context of specific permit applications in the future, not in the context of this more general rulemaking that is not project-specific.

Finally, although ABC insists that the FWS should not have privileged the interests of wind developers over the protection of eagles, that is probably not enough to establish that the 30-Year rule violates the BGEPA.  The BGEPA expressly allows the FWS to permit eagle takes “for the protection of . . . other interests in any particular locality.”

ABC will likely wait 60 days before actually commencing litigation, so as to comply with the ESA’s citizen suit provision.  In the interim, the FWS will surely be evaluating the merits of ABC’s contentions and considering what options it has for addressing them.  Wind developers may want to make their voices heard during that 60 day period, and may want to consider intervening to defend the 30-Year rule in the event this matter does in fact proceed to litigation.

Article By:

Jacob Hollinger
Of:
McDermott Will & Emery

West Virginia Chemical Spill Prompts Wave of Lawsuits

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The January 9th, 2014 chemical release at a Freedom Industries, Inc. facility in West Virginia has shown, yet again, that major environmental releases are likely to prompt major environmental lawsuits. As a result of the spill of 7,500 gallons of 4-MCHM, a chemical foam used to wash coal, 300,000 residents of nine counties were told not to use tap water for anything other than toilet-flushing or firefighting, area businesses were forced to close, and hospitals took emergency measures to conserve water.

More than 60 lawsuits were filed in state court by residents and business owners in eight counties against West Virginia-American Water Company and Freedom Industries. The suits assert personal injury claims ranging from emotional distress and requests for medical monitoring to property-related claims such as trespass. Freedom Industries and the water supply company promptly removed the 62 actions to federal court, which Plaintiffs moved to remand. On April 18th, U.S. District Court Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. issued an order consolidating the cases for the limited purposes of adjudicating a motion to remand the actions to state court. See Desimone Hospitality Servs. LLC v. West Virginia-American Water Co., No.  2:14-CV-14845 (S.D. W. Va., Apr. 18, 2014). Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), Judge Copenhaver explained that consolidation was particularly appropriate here because “[t]he risk of inconsistent adjudications, substantial expense to the parties, and inefficient use of court resources markedly increases here if the court declines consolidation to some extent.”  See Desimone Hospitality Services LLC, slip op. at 23-24.

In addition to these suits, non-profit groups also have filed an emergency petition with the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals accusing the state’s Department of Environmental Protection and the Department of Health and Human Resources of failing to perform their legal duties to protect the public’s health in response to the spill. See Covenant House v. Huffman, No. 14-0112 (W. Va. February 7, 2014).

Article By:

Daniel M. Krainin
Gayatri M. Patel
Mackenzie S. Schoonmaker
Of:
Beveridge & Diamond PC

Legal Updates for Government Entities Covering March and April 2014

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Arizona Court of Appeals

Immunity under A.R.S. § 12-820.05

Tucson Unified School District v. Gallagher, –P.3d–, 2014 WL949114 (March 11, 2014)

The Gallaghers sued TUSD and a TUSD school employee, Michael Corum, alleging that Corum sexually abused and/or exploited their developmentally challenged daughter at a TUSD school. The Gallaghers claimed that TUSD was vicariously liable for Corum’s conduct and was negligent in hiring and supervising Corum. The Gallaghers alleged that if TUSD had properly investigated Corum’s employment history they would have discovered that a prior employer recommended that he not be employed in a position that involved disabled children. TUSD filed for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune under A.R.S. § 12-820.05 because Corum had committed a felony and it had no actual knowledge of Corum’s purported propensity for such conduct. The trial court denied summary judgment, concluding that TUSD should have known of the circumstances of Corum’s previous conduct and thus the immunity statute did not apply. TUSD appealed.

A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) provides that a public entity is not liable for losses that arise out of and are directly attributable to a public employee’s act or omission that is determined by a court to be a felony, unless the public entity knew of the public employee’s propensity for that action. The Court of Appeals held that immunity under A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) applies unless the entity has actual, not constructive, knowledge. The Court based its decision on the plain language of the statute. When the legislature intends a standard of actual or constructive knowledge, it expressly states so. The use of the word “knew” in the immunity statute unambiguously shows the legislature’s intent to require actual knowledge rather than constructive knowledge. A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) means exactly what it says—that immunity applies unless the public entity actually knew of the “employee’s propensity.”

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Qualified immunity for warrantless entry

Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2014)

Sheehan suffered from a mental illness and was residing in a group home.  Her assigned social worker was concerned about her deteriorating condition, deemed her gravely disabled, and called the police to transport her to a mental health facility for a 72-hour involuntary commitment. When officers Reynolds and Holder arrived at the home, they entered Sheehan’s room, without a warrant, to confirm her mental condition and take her into custody. Sheehan reacted violently, grabbed a knife, threatened to kill the officers, and told them that she did not wish to be detained in a mental health facility. The officers retreated to the hallway for their safety and called for backup. But rather than waiting for backup to arrive, the officers drew their weapons and forced their way back into Sheehan’s room. Sheehan again threatened them with a knife. The officers shot her six times. Sheehan survived and filed a § 1983 action, claiming the officers’ entry into her room violated the Fourth Amendment and they used excessive force. The district court found the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment. Sheehan appealed.

Generally, a warrantless search or seizure in a person’s home is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. But there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the emergency aid exception. The emergency aid exception applies when, under the totality of the circumstances, (1) law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm, and (2) the search’s scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need. Under this exception, the Ninth Circuit held that the officers’ first entry into Sheehan’s room did not violate the Fourth Amendment because they had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an urgent need to protect Sheehan from serious harm. The officers knew she was off of her medication, was not taking care of herself, had threatened her social worker, and was gravely disabled and in need of involuntary hospitalization.  Indeed, the court noted that the officers reasonably took a cautious approach to the situation and that “erring on the side of caution is exactly what we expect of conscientious police officers.”  And they carried out the search in a reasonable manner. They knocked and announced and used a pass key to gain entry. They did not draw their weapons and had no reason to believe that their entry would trigger a violent confrontation.

The court found that the emergency aid exception also justified the second warrantless entry into Sheehan’s room. The officers continued to have an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an urgent need to protect Sheehan from serious harm. And because the two entries were part of a single, continuous search or seizure, the officers were not required to separately justify the continuing emergency with respect to the second entry. But the court found that fact issues as to whether the entry was conducted in a reasonable manner precluded summary judgment, and noted that Ninth Circuit case law would put any reasonable, competent officer on notice that it is unreasonable to forcibly enter the home of an armed, mentally ill subject who is acting irrationally and threatening anyone who entered, when there was no objective need for immediate entry.

Lack of resources defense/ jury instruction in § 1983 cases

Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014)

Peralta, a prison inmate, sued a prison dentist claiming deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. At trial, the court instructed the jury that “whether a dentist or doctor met his duties to Peralta under the Eighth Amendment must be considered in the context of the personnel, financial, and other resources available to him or her or which he or she could reasonably obtain.” Peralta challenged this jury instruction on appeal.

The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has not said whether juries and judges may consider a lack of resources as a defense in § 1983 cases. But the Supreme Court has held that prison officials are not deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs unless they act wantonly, and whether an official’s conduct can be characterized as wanton depends on the constraints facing him. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). The Court has also held that even if an official knows of a substantial risk, he’s not liable if he responded reasonably. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994). This framework makes clear that what is reasonable depends on the circumstances that constrain what actions an official can take.

Several constraints impacted and delayed provision of care for Peralta. Security concerns dictate that only one prisoner at a time can be in the exam room, and the prisoner cannot be left alone in the room because dental tools can be used as weapons. During lockdown, only emergency cases can be seen. Dentists can’t accept prisoners’ complaints at face value, as inmates often try to jump the line by exaggerating symptoms.

The Ninth Circuit noted that lack of resources is not a proper defense to a claim for prospective relief. But a claim for damages is different. Damages provide redress for something an official could have done but did not. So with respect to a claim for damages, the nature of the available resources is highly relevant to show the scope of choices that the individual defendant had. A prison medical official who fails to provide needed treatment because he lacks the necessary resources can hardly be said to have intended to punish the inmate. The court held that the challenged jury instruction properly advised the jury to consider the resources the dentist had available in determining whether he was deliberately indifferent.

United States Supreme Court

Scope of Fourth Amendment consent to search

Fernandez v. California, 132 S.Ct. 1126 (2014)

Officers responding to an assault call saw a man running through an alley and into a building.  A minute or two later, they heard sounds of screaming and fighting coming from the building. They knocked on the apartment unit from which the screams were coming. A crying woman, Rojas, answered the door. Her face was red, she had a large bump on her nose, and fresh blood was on her shirt and hand. Officers asked her to step outside so they could do a protective sweep of the apartment.  The plaintiff, Fernandez, stepped forward and told the officers that they could not enter. Believing that Fernandez had assaulted Rojas, the officer removed him from the apartment and arrested him. About an hour later, a detective returned to the apartment and requested and received oral consent from Rojas to search the premises. Police found evidence incriminating Fernandez, which Fernandez moved to suppress in his criminal case. Fernandez argued that the search was unconstitutional because his denial of consent trumped the later consent Rojas gave. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, and the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Consent searches are recognized as an exception to the requirement for a search warrant. In 1974, the Supreme Court held that police officers may search jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants consents. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).  Years later, the Court recognized a narrow exception to this rule, holding that the consent of one occupant is insufficient when another occupant is present and objects to the search. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). Here, the Court declined to expand the current rule. They rejected Rodriguez’s argument that his objection to the search should have barred a later search since he was absent from the premises only because the police arrested and removed him.  The Court held that an occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other reason. The Court also rejected the idea that once an occupant objects to a search, the objection remains effective until withdrawn.

Article By:

Lisa S. Wahlin
Of:
Ryley Carlock & Applewhite, A Professional Corporation