Category: Litigation

Supreme Court Will not Disturb Ruling that a False Rumor about “Sleeping Your Way to a Promotion” can be a Hostile Work Environment

The U.S. Supreme Court decided not to review an appellate court decision that held a false rumor about a woman “sleeping” her way to a promotion can give rise to a hostile work environment claim.  This means that the February 2019 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Parker v. Reema Consulting Services, Inc. will stand.  In Parker, the Fourth Circuit held that, where an employer participates in circulating false rumors that a female employee slept with her male boss to obtain a promotion, this constitutes Title VII gender discrimination.

Parker’s Discrimination Claim

Evangeline Parker started worked for Reema Consulting Services, Inc., (“RCSI”) at its warehouse facility as a low-level clerk.  She was promoted six times, ultimately rising to Assistant Operations Manager.  About two weeks after she was promoted to a manager position, she learned that some male employees were circulating “an unfounded, sexually-explicit rumor about her” that “falsely and maliciously portrayed her as having [had] a sexual relationship” with a higher-ranking manager to obtain her management position.

The rumor originated with another RCSI employee who was jealous of Parker’s achievement, and the highest-ranking manager at the warehouse facility participated in spreading the rumor.  Parker’s complaint alleged that as the rumor spread, she “was treated with open resentment and disrespect” from many coworkers, including employees she was responsible for supervising.

At an all-staff meeting at which the rumor was discussed, the warehouse manager slammed the door in Parker’s face and excluded her from the meeting.  The following day, the warehouse manager screamed at Parker and blamed her for “bringing the situation to the workplace.” He also stated that “he could no longer recommend her for promotions or higher-level tasks because of the rumor” and that he “would not allow her to advance any further within the company.”  A few days later, the warehouse manager “lost his temper and began screaming” at Parker, and Parker then filed an internal sexual harassment complaint with RCSI Human Resources.  Shortly thereafter, RCSI gave Parker two warnings and terminated her employment.

Lawyer pointingParker brought a discrimination claim, alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment.  The district court dismissed her claim on the grounds that 1) the harassment was not based upon gender and instead based upon false allegations of conduct by her, and 2) the conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered the conditions of Parker’s employment because the rumor was circulated for just a few weeks.  Judge Titus found, “Clearly, this woman is entitled to the dignity of her merit-based promotion and not to have it sullied by somebody suggesting that it was because she had sexual relations with a supervisor who promoted her.”  However, he continued “that is not a harassment based upon gender.  It’s based upon false allegations of conduct by her.  And this same type of a rumor could be made in a variety of other context[s] involving people of the same gender or different genders alleged to have had some kind of sexual activity leading to a promotion.”  Ultimately, Judge Titus held that “the rumor and the spreading of that kind of a rumor is based upon conduct, not gender.

Gender-Based Rumors Can Constitute Sex Harassment

Taking into account all of the allegations of the complaint, including the sex-based nature of the rumor and its effects, the Fourth Circuit held that the rumor that Parker had sex with her male superior to obtain a promotion was gender-based in that it implied that she “used her womanhood, rather than her merit, to obtain from a man, so seduced, a promotion.”  The court found that the rumor invoked “a deeply rooted perception — one that unfortunately still persists — that generally women, not men, use sex to achieve success.”  This double standard precipitated by negative stereotypes regarding the relationship between the advancement of women in the workplace and their sexual behavior can cause superiors and coworkers to treat women in the workplace differently from men.  Thus, the rumor about Parker sleeping her way to a promotion constituted a form of sexual harassment.

The Fourth Circuit also held that Parker sufficiently alleged severe or pervasive harassment:

[T]he harassment was continuous, preoccupying not only Parker, but also management and the employees at the Sterling facility for the entire time of Parker’s employment after her final promotion.  The harassment began with the fabrication of the rumor by a jealous male workplace competitor and was then circulated by male employees.  Management too contributed to the continuing circulation of the rumor.  The highest-ranking manager asked another manager, who was rumored to be having the relationship with Parker, whether his wife was divorcing him because he was “f–king” Parker.  The same manager called an all-staff meeting, at which the rumor was discussed, and excluded Parker.  In another meeting, the manager blamed Parker for bringing the rumor into the workplace. And in yet another meeting, the manager harangued Parker about the rumor, stating he should have fired her when she began “huffing and puffing” about it.

Implications

Parker correctly recognizes that gender-based stereotypes can prevent women from advancing in the workplace and that Title VII bars employers from using negative gender stereotypes to harass employees.

© 2019 Zuckerman Law

ARTICLE BY Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
More on workplace harassment via the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

SCOTUS Case Watch 2019-2020: Welcome to the New Term

The Supreme Court of the United States kicked off its 2019-2010 term on October 7, 2019, with several noteworthy cases on its docket. This term, some of the issues before the Court will likely have great historical significance for the LGBTQ community. Among these controversies are whether the prohibition against discrimination because of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses discrimination because of sexual orientation. In addition, the Court is slated to consider Title VII’s protections of transgender individuals, if any. Here’s a rundown of the employment law related cases that Supreme Court watchers can expect this term.

Title VII and Sexual Orientation

In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618 and Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 the Court will consider whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII. Oral argument for these consolidated cases is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Transgender Employees

In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 18-107, the Court agreed to decide whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Oral argument for this case is scheduled for October 8, 2019.

Age Discrimination

In Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 the Court will consider a provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 regarding federal-sector coverage. The provision at issue requires employers taking personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or older to free from “discrimination based on age.” The issue is whether the federal-sector provision requires a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of a challenged personnel action. A date has not yet been set for oral arguments in this case.

Employee Benefits

In Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, No. 18-1116 the Supreme Court agreed to settle an issue concerning the statute of limitation in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The three-year limitations period runs from “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The question for the Court is whether this limitations period bars suit when the defendants in a case had disclosed all relevant information to the plaintiff more than three years before the plaintiff filed a complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information. Oral arguments, in this case, are scheduled for December 4, 2019.

We will report in further details on these cases once the Supreme Court issues its rulings.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

DOJ Policy Review of SEPs May Have Big Implications for Company Environmental Settlements

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is in the midst of a comprehensive policy review regarding the use of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) in settlements of environmental enforcement actions. This review could potentially have far-reaching implications for companies that seek to settle such actions brought by either the federal government, or in the case of a citizen suit, a non-governmental organization (NGO). It remains to be seen if the ongoing SEP policy review will result in additional limits on the use of SEPs in settlement, thus limiting the flexibility in achieving penalty mitigation that has been a hallmark of environmental enforcement case resolutions for nearly three decades.

SEPs have been popular among both governmental and non-governmental defendants in enforcement cases for nearly thirty years. SEPs allow settling parties to mitigate a portion of a civil penalty in exchange for performance of environmentally beneficial projects. Under long standing SEP policy, settling parties can receive up to a maximum of 80 percent credit towards mitigation of a portion of a civil penalty for funds expended in performance of SEPs. This policy has proven popular in local communities that benefit from the projects, and these benefits are something that is beyond what is required to achieve compliance with the law. In the early 1990s, SEPs tended to be the exception to the norm of environmental enforcement settlements. But during the later 1990s, SEPs became quite common – even typical.

It is possible that the current ongoing review of SEP policy could result in greater scrutiny of use of SEPs in settlements with companies. Further restrictions on the use of SEPs could take many forms, including limitations on the funds expended, greater scrutiny of the nexus of the SEP to the underlying violations, and even potential elimination of the use of SEPs altogether. Typically, settling parties would much prefer including a SEP as part of a settlement, rather than simply paying all of its out-of-pocket costs as a civil penalty, so further restrictions or elimination of SEPs altogether would not be a positive development for the regulated community.

It is clear that the current administration takes a much more skeptical view of the appropriateness of SEPs than any prior administration. This past August, Assistant Attorney General for the Environment and Natural Resources Division (ENRD) Jeffrey Clark issued a memorandum to all ENRD Section Chiefs outlining new limits on the use of SEPs. Under the new policy, the use of SEPs is prohibited in settlements involving state and local governments, which gives less flexibility to both state and local governments as well as DOJ enforcement attorneys in determining appropriate resolution of enforcement cases.

This latest SEP policy memorandum builds on last November’s memorandum from the Attorney General outlining policies and procedure for civil consent decrees and settlements with state and local governments. This November memorandum included a directive that consent decrees “must not be used to achieve general policy goals or to extract greater or different relief from than could be obtained through agency enforcement authority or by litigation the matter to judgment.” Part of the intent of the outlined policy was to ensure accountability of state and local governments as to their policy goals.

Building on this in reference to SEPs, Clark stated “A clearer example of a form of relief that falls within the prohibition in the November 2018 Policy is difficult to imagine.” Clark left open the possibility of limited case-by-case exceptions to the broader policy of the prohibition, under certain limited conditions, pending his further overall review of SEP policies. But Clark further stated that even if certain limitations are satisfied, “there is no guarantee that I will recommend approval . . . “of including a SEP as part of a settlement with a state or local government.”

© 2019 Schiff Hardin LLP

For more Supplemental Environmental Project issues, see the National Law Review Environmental, Energy & Resources law page.

Food for Thought: Outcomes of Food Labeling Cases Prove Difficult to Predict

The past year has seen a proliferation of lawsuits alleging that food product labels mislead consumers about the product’s ingredients. The trend continued last month, with decisions from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and one of its district courts reaching different results on motions to dismiss complaints alleging deceptive food labels.

Last month, the First Circuit reinstated a class action lawsuit against New England Coffee for violation of Massachusetts’ consumer protection laws related to the coffee brand’s label for “Hazelnut Crème” coffee. Dumont v. Reily Foods, 18-2055 (1st Cir. Aug. 8, 2019). Plaintiff alleged that the product name was deceptive because the product did not contain hazelnuts. A Massachusetts federal district court judge dismissed the suit because the complaint lacked sufficient particularized facts to satisfy the heightened pleading standard for fraud allegations.

The First Circuit reversed in a 2-1 decision. The majority noted that although the ingredient list on the product package’s back label read “100% Arabica Coffee Naturally and Artificially Flavored,” reasonable consumers might take different approaches in determining whether the coffee actually contained real hazelnuts. One might check the list of ingredients to ensure the coffee contained hazelnut while others may not, instead relying on the name of the product, without searching the ingredient list, “much like one might easily buy a hazelnut cake without studying the ingredients list to confirm that the cake actually contains some hazelnut.” The majority accordingly concluded that whether the product name implied that the product contained hazelnuts was better suited for resolution “from six jurors, rather than three judges.” In dissent, Circuit Judge Lynch argued that “a reasonable consumer plainly could not view the phrase ‘Hazelnut Crème’ as announcing the presence of actual hazelnut in a bag of coffee which also proclaims it is “100% Arabica Coffee.”

Neither opinion is especially persuasive. As for the dissent, hazelnuts are not coffee, and the fact that a coffee product called “Hazelnut Crème” is said to contain 100% Arabica Coffee does not reasonably rule out the possibility that the product contains hazelnuts. By the same token, however, other courts have concluded that reasonable consumers do not ignore a product’s prominently displayed ingredient list when information on the front label may be viewed as ambiguous concerning whether an ingredient is or is not contained in the product. See, e.g., Jessani et al. v. Monini North America, which one of the authors litigated and which this blog covered. To the extent the Dumont majority suggests otherwise, the opinion would be misguided. That said, whereas the olive oil product in Monini was labeled as “truffle flavored,” here, there was no modifier to suggest that the coffee in question simply tasted, or smelled, like hazelnuts. In such cases, perhaps, one could conclude that the front label lacked ambiguity, and thus would not compel prospective purchasers to search the label further.

Less than a week after the First Circuit’s Dumont decision, Judge Alison Burroughs of the District of Massachusetts tossed a putative class action suit alleging that the advertising and packaging of the cereal “Honey Bunches of Oats” falsely suggested it was sweetened only or primarily with honey, when in fact the main sweeteners are sugar, brown sugar, and corn syrup. Lima v. Post Consumer Brands, 18-12100 (D. Mass. Aug. 13, 2019).The plaintiffs pointed to images of a sun, bee, and honey dipper as representing that honey was the principal sweetener in the cereal. They also cited surveys showing that most consumers believe honey is “better for you than sugar” and that approximately half of consumers are willing to pay more for foods that are primarily sweetened with honey.

In concluding that the consumers failed to state a claim, Judge Burroughs found that plaintiffs had offered no reasonable basis for their alleged belief that the honey references on the packaging implied that honey was the primary sweetener in the cereal rather than simply one of its primary flavors. In addition, even assuming the packaging could be viewed as portraying honey to be an ingredient instead of or as well as a flavor, Judge Burroughs found that plaintiffs still failed to state a claim. She noted that, unlike the “Hazelnut Crème” product in Dumont that did not contain any hazelnut, Honey Bunches of Oats did, in fact, contain honey. She also distinguished the case from Mantikas v. Kellogg, in which the Second Circuit found that a “made with whole grain” claim could imply that the product contained more whole wheat flour than white flour. Here, according to Judge Burroughs, the mere references to honey on the package carried no implication that honey was the primary sweetener, and a reasonable consumer concerned about how the cereal was sweetened would have consulted the cereal’s list of ingredients.

If nothing else, these cases underscore the fact-specific nature of the inquiry as to what product labels imply about their ingredients.

 

© 2019 Proskauer Rose LLP.

For more on class action lawsuits, see the National Law Review Litigation & Trial Practice page.

New York Times v. Sullivan Supreme Court Decision and its Impact on Libel Law: the Case, the Context and the Consequences

Aimee Edmondson, Ph.D. and Associate Professor and Director for Graduate Studies at Ohio University, has recently published a new book, In Sullivan’s Shadow on the landmark libel US Supreme Court case New York Times v. Sullivan. In the current contentious climate where even the weather has become a political topic, and with President Trump courting a combative relationship with the news media, this case from the Civil Rights Era (1964) has a new resonance. It seems appropriate to re-examine the case, the historical context surrounding it, and why it still matters today.

The following are the facts of this case. In the early ’60s, the New York Times (NYT) published a full-page advertisement by the supporters of Martin Luther King, Jr, criticizing the Montgomery Alabama police, and specifically L.B. Sullivan, the Montgomery Police commissioner, for the department’s mistreatment of Civil Rights protesters. Sullivan sued the paper for defamation, and the trial court ruled in his favor. The NYT appealed to the Supreme Court in Alabama, which affirmed, and then the NYT appealed to the U.S Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case and returned a unanimous decision 9-0, that the underlying decisions violated the First Amendment. This 1964 Supreme Court landmark decision is foundational in support of the First Amendment’s right of freedom of the press and ultimately demonstrates that the freedom of speech protections in the First Amendment restrict the ability of public officials to sue for defamation. This decision also created the “actual malice” standard, which required that the publication of false or erroneous information had to be done with actual intent to harm the public figure.

Libel litigation has really kicked up in recent years. While the “actual malice” standard is still firmly in place, a few high-profile libel actions have pressed forward. A few examples are the following: Sarah Palin suing the NYT; the Covington Catholic students, specifically Nicholas Sandmann and his ultimately dismissed lawsuit against the Washington Post (WP); and former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s lawsuit against the NYT and editorial writer Michelle Cottle which was also dismissed. Additionally, Trump frequently uses his Twitter feed to proclaim that libel suits “are out of reach” but continues to threaten libel action when unflattering press is published. To be clear, his threats have remained threats; to this date, he has not filed lawsuits regarding libel.

With this history and cultural context in mind, I am very grateful that Professor Edmondson took the time to speak with me regarding the state of libel litigation in the United States.

The NLR: The Sullivan case dates back to the ’60s and came out of the Civil Rights Movement when the NYT was sued by the Montgomery, Alabama police commissioner, L.B. Sullivan. Why is this precedent especially relevant now?

Sullivan is relevant for at least these three reasons.

First, journalism faces tough challenges. Local print journalism is withering. The president of the United States has launched an assault on news media. And manipulators, some of them foreign, are abusing technology with fakery and confusion. As the free press struggles, our Republic is well served by existing protection again libel abuse.

Second, we as a nation go to great lengths to protect free speech, even unpopular and hateful expression. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the government could not deny vulgar trademarks citing the First Amendment (Iancu v. Brunetti, decided June 24, 2019). Citizens who chant “send her back” at a Trump rally are protected. Journalists who cover controversy likewise should be protected from libel abuse.

When the nation’s Founders gathered to amend the Constitution through the Bill of Rights, they positioned freedom of speech and the free press side-by-side, as complementary. As we protect free speech, we also should protect the free press.

Third, the abuse of libel is an instinctive default position of authority facing criticism. When authority is irritated by the message, it can seek ways to injure or chill the messenger. America should guard against abuse of libel. Justice William Brennan wrote in the 1964 landmark Sullivan case that, left unchecked, abuse of libel can “threaten the very existence of an American press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold enough to criticize the conduct of public officials.”

In this era of divided citizenry, profound technological changes, and nervousness about the future, Sullivan is perhaps more relevant because it checks the misuse of libel.

The NLR:  Based on your research of libel prior to Sullivan, what can you tell us about the use and abuse of libel before Sullivan?

In the Jim Crow South, libel was weaponized against the press and individuals who challenged the racial status quo. The Sullivan case was the culmination of an onslaught of libel claims designed to brake progress, silence criticism, and bankrupt agents of change as the civil rights movement was gaining momentum.

The intersection of libel, race, and journalism can be tracked to the early years of our nation. In 1830, abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison was indicted in Baltimore for publishing a newspaper report of 75 enslaved people shipped from Baltimore to New Orleans. He was locked up for 49 days in part for criticizing the institution of slavery. Garrison’s lawyer, Charles Mitchell of Baltimore, described libel abuse as an “engine of tyranny.”

My book primarily focuses on civil rights-era libel litigation, mainly, but not exclusively, in the South. Chapter One is set in Los Angeles. The local Klan sued the African American editor-publisher of the California Eagle in 1925 after the newspaper published a Klan strategy memo on how to manipulate black voters in Watts. The judge ruled in favor of the paper, concluding that the Klan document, which had been handed over to police and then to journalists, was privileged. (In court, the Klan said the paper was fake.)

The win-loss record of libel cases was mixed before Sullivan was taken up by the nation’s high court. Defendants settled some cases to avoid expense and exposure. Some judges ruled that truth was a defense against libel claims.

Regardless of the legal outcomes, the pile-on of libel lawsuits against the press and civil rights leaders was draining financially. For example, Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth was a named defendant in the Sullivan case, even though he didn’t know that his name appeared in the full-page ad in NYT that prompted Sullivan’s lawsuit. Alabama courts awarded Commissioner Sullivan $500,000, a record-high judgment at the time. While the case was on appeal, authorities seized Reverend Shuttlesworth’s Plymouth, which brought $400 at auction to help pay the judgment. Land owned by three other ministers who also were defendants was sold at auction for $4,350.

By the time the U.S. Supreme Court heard the Sullivan case, there was plenty of evidence in multiple jurisdictions showing that libel abuse was weighing on the First Amendment.

The NLR: After the Sullivan ruling in 1964, the press went on to break some fairly fantastic stories. I am thinking about Watergate, in the early ’70s, specifically. What were the implications of Sullivan regarding press coverage of civil rights, Vietnam, Watergate, and other contentious news?

Yes. My colleague Christopher B. Daly at Boston University (author of “Covering America”) makes the profound point that Americans need a free and robust press in wartime and peacetime. He cites coverage of the Pentagon Papers, the My Lai Massacre, and the Abu Ghraib torture scandal.

I close my book by pointing out that Sullivan freed the press to ramp up its watchdog reporting on a wide range of issues. The press’ scrutiny must continue as a cornerstone of our democratic tradition.

Balancing police authority/public safety with respect for individual freedoms and free expression was at the core of much of the libel litigation before and after Sullivan. The Sullivan case at its heart was about criticism of police brutality against civil rights protesters in Montgomery, Alabama, which was a cradle of the Confederacy during the Civil War. As a result of Sullivan, today’s public criticism of law enforcement, such as press coverage of  “Hands up, don’t shoot,” and “I can’t breathe” are not actionable libel claims.

The NLR: Earlier this year, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that the Supreme Court should take a look at Sullivan, after 55 years, to modify the standard on actual malice. The rest of the Court did not voice similar sentiments. What point is Justice Thomas making/what is on his mind, and do you think the Court will revisit libel anytime soon?

Justice Thomas often treads his own path in the area of First Amendment law. He is a noted defender of advertising (commercial speech), questioning why it should be more heavily regulated than other types of speech, even political speech. He has questioned laws that regulate political contributions, and strongly supported less government regulation of street and lawn signs. However, he has opposed free speech protections for high school students and prisoners.

I see Sullivan as a civil rights case as well as a libel case. How ironic that Justice Thomas, the only African-American on the Supreme Court, is calling for a retreat on civil rights-era protections in Sullivan. He made this remark in a concurring opinion released early this year when the court turned down an appeal from Kathrine McKee, who accused Bill Cosby of sexual assault. She sued Cosby for libel after his lawyers called her dishonest (McKee v. Cosby). As Justice Thomas says:

New York Times and the Court’s decisions extending it were policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law. Instead of simply applying the First Amendment as it was understood by the people who ratified it, the Court fashioned its own “‘federal rule[s]’” by balancing the “competing values at stake in defamation suits.” (quoting Gertz v. Welch and Sullivan). We should not continue to reflexively apply this policy-driven approach to the Constitution. Instead, we should carefully examine the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If the Constitution does not require public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits, then neither should we.

As you noted in your question, Thomas’ colleagues on the Supreme Court have not publicly joined his push to roll back Sullivan. I do not expect that Court will revisit Sullivan immediately. But predicting what the Court will do is virtually impossible. Sometimes, the seeds planted by a single justice, like Thomas’ remarks about Sullivan, yield results later.

Generally, critics say Sullivan stacks the deck against the plaintiff, that actual malice is an impossible standard, and the press should not have license to run amuck.

The NLR: Sullivan set the standard pretty high for public officials seeking to win libel claims, they have to show “actual malice.” Does this, and other existing protections of the press, make it virtually impossible to win a libel claim?

Journalists are not totally protected from libel suits, nor should they be. Truth is the ultimate defense in a libel suit. If reporters get it wrong, certainly there can be ramifications.

If reporters get it wrong and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the reporters may lose a libel case if actual malice is proven in court. Actual malice is publishing content that is knowingly wrong, or journalists should have known it was incorrect.

After a 15-day trial, a jury in New York awarded $75,000 in damages to Barry Goldwater, the Republican nominee for president in 1964 (Goldwater v. Ginzburg). A federal appeals court affirmed the outcome in 1969, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. Ralph Ginzburg, publisher of Fact magazine, ran an article that said Goldwater was paranoid, unfit for office, and troubled by “intense anxiety about his manhood.” This unflattering claim was based on a survey mailed to psychiatrists. Some of the respondents had warned that psychological evaluations must take place in clinical settings, but Ginzburg published anyway. He cited the Sullivan case when Goldwater took him to court, to no avail.

Rolling Stone settled multiple libel claims after retracting its 2014 story of gang rape at a University of Virginia fraternity. The flawed 9,000-word article portrayed an associate dean as “chief villain” of the incident. She won a $3 million verdict in court and then settled. Rolling Stone settled with the fraternity for $1.65 million, and also settled with members of the fraternity.

In June, a jury in Ohio awarded $44.4 million in punitive and compensatory damages to family-owned Gibson’s Bakery to be paid by Oberlin College (Gibson’s Bakery v. Oberlin College). Bakery owners said the college defamed and harmed their business after a shoplifting incident. “Even a college as influential as Oberlin,” noted conservative blogger Cornell Law Professor William Jacobson, “may be held accountable for its actions in a court of law.”

The NLR: What has candidate Donald Trump/President Trump said about libel?

In 2016 in Fort Worth, Texas, then-candidate Trump took aim at libel laws directly: “One of the things I’m going to do if I win, and I hope we do and we’re certainly leading. I’m going to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money. We’re going to open up those libel laws. So when The New York Times and Washington Post . . . writes a hit piece, we can sue them and win money instead of having no chance of winning because they are totally protected.”

President Trump lamented in 2018 that “totally false” reports are out of reach of libel law:

Trump Tweet

Trump has threatened libel action against both the media and individuals. For example, candidate Trump threatened to sue NYT in 2016 after NYT’S publication containing claims by women of his alleged inappropriate touching. In response, a NYT attorney said if Trump thinks “the law of this land forces us and those who would dare to criticize him to stand silent or be punished, we welcome the opportunity to have a court set him straight.”

Trump did not sue.

Threatening libel action is part of Trump’s broader effort, aimed at his voter base and the electorate, to de-legitimize the press.

The NLR: Defamation-libel litigation is very active lately. What are today’s courts saying about libel?

Legal outcomes vary because circumstances vary. There is significant activity on libel, in state and federal courts, showcasing the durability of the legal standard set more than a half-century ago in Sullivan.

The Sullivan standard resonates throughout the 11-page opinion dismissing former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s lawsuit against NYT and editorial writer Michelle Cottle. “Because plaintiff has failed to plead actual malice, his false light claim must fail as well,” wrote US District Court Judge Amit P. Mehta (District of Columbia) in a decision issued August 9, 2019. Arpaio was longtime sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, before running for Congress in 2018. After Arpaio lost in the primary, NYT published an opinion piece by Cottle criticizing the sheriff’s treatment of immigrants (“he was so much more than a run-of-the-mill immigrant basher”). Arpaio, a public figure, claimed the column harmed his reputation and his chances to run for the U.S. Senate in 2020. The judge said Arpaio’s complaint “comes nowhere close to pleading sufficient facts that plausible establish ‘actual malice.’” (Arpaio v Cottle, August 9, 2019). This case is remarkably similar to the multiple libel suits filed by legendary southern lawman Lawrence Rainey, a former Neshoba County, Mississippi sheriff who sued multiple journalists and even Orion Pictures for his depiction in the film, Mississippi Burning, in 1989.

Current libel claims highlight the inflation in the amount of damages sought by plaintiffs. In the early 1960s, Sullivan (as well as then Alabama Governor John Patterson) sued NYT for $500,000. In 1982, General William Westmoreland sued CBS for $120 million regarding a Vietnam documentary (Westmoreland settled during the trial, ending the case without payment, retraction, or apology from CBS).

This year, a high school student from Kentucky sued WP for $250 million, the purchase price of the newspaper when Amazon founder Jeff Bezos bought it in 2013. On July 26, U.S. District Court Judge William O. Bertelsman (Eastern District of Kentucky) dismissed the case (Nicholas Sandmann v. The Washington Post). Publication of opinion is not actionable libel, the judge concluded. This case involved coverage of Sandmann’s encounter with Native American activist Nathan Phillips on the National Mall on January 19, 2019.

“The Court accepts Sandmann’s statement that, when he was standing motionless in the confrontation with Phillips, his intent was to calm the situation and to not impede or block anyone”, the judge said. “However, Phillips did not see it that way. He concluded that he was being ‘blocked’ and not allowed to ‘retreat.’ He passed these conclusions on to The Post. They may have been erroneous, but . . . they are opinion protected by the First Amendment. The Post is not liable for publishing these opinions.”

Days after the Sandmann case was dismissed in federal court, eight of Sandmann’s classmates (“John Does 1 through 8”) from Covington Catholic High School in Park Hills, Kentucky, filed a defamation suit in state court against 12 individuals. Defendants include two members of Congress, comic Kathy Griffin, and a batch of commentators and journalists.

Also, in August, a federal appeals court reinstated Sarah Palin’s defamation suit against NYT. Therefore, a court will consider whether a NYT editorial on gun violence exhibited “actual malice” against Palin, a former vice presidential candidate.

The NLR: You’ve raised some excellent points. How does all of this fit together?  What are we to make of this landscape in today’s contentious and media-saturated environment?

Truth-seeking is a primary mission of journalism. News reporting inspires debate. Reporting controversy does not constitute libel. Publication of malicious, reckless, falsehood is actionable libel.

Newsgathering is an ongoing process, as events evolve. Courts appear to understand this dynamic, with the media’s constant deadlines, and do not view updating as a story evolves as actual malice. It’s quite the opposite. We write what we know to be the truth as we know it.

It’s important to note that Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Sullivan protected even false information, as long as that information was published by accident (without actual malice). Later libel cases built on Sullivan with the U.S. Supreme Court declaring that “pure opinion” is also constitutionally protected speech (Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Company). The First Amendment, then, ensures that free speech isn’t “chilled” and thus clears the way for journalists to write about fast-moving and-or controversial issues without fear of costly libel litigation.

As we ponder the big picture, let’s remember Justice Louis Brandeis’ time-honored advice: “the answer to bad speech is more speech, not ‘enforced silence.’”

The NLR: Many thanks to Dr. Edmondson for her insights and useful examples on this important and timely matter.

Copyright ©2019 National Law Forum, LLC

For more freedom of speech issues, see the Constitutional Law page on the National Law Review.

Qui Tam Defendants’ Presentations to Government During Investigation Unprotected from Discovery in Other Lawsuits, Federal District Court Ruled

In a recent decision, a federal district court judge ruled that a defendant’s presentations to the Department of Justice, made during the course of the Department’s investigation of a pending False Claims Act qui tam lawsuit, are not protected from discovery by the whistleblower who brought that lawsuit. The case is the United States and State of California ex rel. Higgins v. Boston Scientific Corp., 11-cv-2453 (D. Minn. Aug. 28, 2019), and was decided by Judge Joan Ericksen.

The relator (the term for the whistleblower in a False Claims Act lawsuit), Higgins, alleged that Boston Scientific made certain false certifications relating to the company’s defibrillators, thereby causing physicians to submit false claims for payment relating to the use of those devices. As is usual in qui tam cases, after filing the lawsuit, the Department of Justice opened an investigation and requested documents (known as a “civil investigative demand” under the False Claims Act) to Boston Scientific. The company turned over documents to the Department, but then also created and made “presentations” to the government. While the court’s decision does not describe those “presentations,” presumably they were slideshows or other materials, put together by Boston Scientific’s lawyers, to try to convince the Department of Justice to shut down the investigation or to decline intervention in the lawsuit.

Unscrupulous companies have found many different ways to take advantage of vital government programs. The False Claims Act is an essential weapon in the fight against government programs fraud since it was first enacted during the Civil War to combat war profiteering. The system often depends on whistleblowers telling their story with the help of an experienced False Claims Act attorney.

These private citizens bring qui tam (whistleblower) lawsuits under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), which allows them to act on behalf of the U.S. government in exposing government programs fraud committed by companies serving the federal government. Under the FCA, relators (fraud whistleblowers) receive a portion of the money that has been recovered by the government, known as the relator’s share.

After the government declined intervention in the case, Higgins decided to pursue the case on his own (which a relator is permitted to do), and he served a document request on Boston Scientific demanding production of any such presentations. Boston Scientific did not want to turn over the materials and therefore raised four separate legal objections. It was those objections that Judge Ericksen addressed in her opinion.

First, Boston Scientific objected to turning over the presentations because they were akin to “settlement negotiations” with the government, and thus not “relevant” to relator’s lawsuit. The court, however, ruled that although settlement negotiations might not be admissible at trial, they were still subject to discovery by Higgins because “they were related to his claims about the medical devices at issue.”

Second, Boston Scientific objected because “public policy” required protection of the presentations, arguing that “the government will not be able to settle False Claims Act cases if a defendant’s presentations to the government could later be revealed to relators.” Judge Erickson, however, found nothing in the False Claims Act that supported this position. While the government might not be able to turn over such presentations under certain circumstances, nothing in the statute prevented Boston Scientific from turning them over to relator.

Third, Boston Scientific claimed an “expectation of confidentiality” in the presentations, citing a 1977 decision by the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Erickson rejected that contention, finding that the earlier Circuit Court decision related to attorney-client privilege, but not to the work product doctrine. Because the materials that Boston Scientific had provided to the Department of Justice were not covered by attorney-client privilege, the company’s only argument was “work product,” and that argument was not sufficient to support its claimed “expectation of confidentiality.”

Finally, Boston Scientific argued that the work product doctrine itself protected the presentations from disclosure. Judge Erickson easily disposed of that argument, noting that work product protection “is waived by intentional disclosure to an adversary,” and that the government was indeed Boston Scientific’s “adversary,” even though the Department of Justice later declined to intervene in the case.

The court’s decision was correct. Although Boston Scientific’s attorneys came up with several creative arguments in an attempt to protect the “presentations” from discovery, none of them had any merit. Although a defendant in a False Claims Act case is free to communicate with the Department of Justice, the defendant cannot assume that those communications will remain secret, particularly from the relator who has brought the very lawsuit under investigation by the Department. The relator is entitled to know about those communications, especially if they are relevant to the merits of the relator’s case (which they almost always will be). Accordingly, Judge Erickson reached the correct result and established useful precedent on this recurring issue.

© 2019 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP

For more on qui tam cases, see the National Law Review Litigation / Trial Practice page.

What are Consumers Claiming in Juul Lawsuits?

Within the past decade, regular tobacco users have turned to electronic cigarettes in an effort to wean off of traditional cigarettes, believing them to be a safer option for human health. E-cigarettes, also known as nicotine vaporizers, vaporizer cigarettes, or simply vape pens, have grown in popularity over the past several years, partially driven by the debut of Juul’s e-cig devices in 2015. Now, Juul Labs is a leading manufacturer of e-cigarette devices and e-liquid flavors nationwide. Despite its growing popularity, especially among teens and young adults, Juul has been at the center of several consumer legal battles, most of which allege that Juul’s e-cig devices are extremely detrimental to users’ health. Several suits have been filed by parents or guardians on behalf of teenage children.

Several consumers have accused Juul Labs of deliberately marketing its products to appeal to the younger generation. A lawsuit recently filed by the father of a Carmel, Indiana teen in the U.S. District Court in Indianapolis alleged that his son was enticed by the rainbow colors and fruity flavors of Juul’s e-cigarette products, which contained excessive levels of nicotine. The teen later developed an intense nicotine addiction and fears that his addiction may lead to health problems throughout his life.

Other suits have similarly claimed that Juul specifically targets underage markets with its presence on several social media platforms and use of online influencers to attract teen users.

This is not the first attack against Juul’s advertising practices. Stanford University researchers evaluated Juul’s marketing campaigns over its first three years on the market, and the resulting impact on teens and young adults, in a January 2019 study.

By analyzing Juul’s website, social media platforms, hashtags, and customer campaign emails, the researchers concluded that, “Juul’s advertising imagery in its first [six] months on the market was patently youth oriented.” Though Juul representatives have repeatedly denied that the company intentionally targets a younger generation in its marketing, the study revealed how Juul, “continued to engage in advertising either targeted to youth…or by placing its promotional material preferentially in youth consumed media channels…”

Juul lawsuits have also been filed in response to defective vape batteries and device explosions. Juul’s e-cigarette products are operated by lithium-ion batteries, which can allegedly overheat and explode. In several instances, vape explosions have damaged users’ mouths, hands, and other body parts, causing burns, broken jaws, and even deaths. Treacy Gangi, for example, filed a lawsuit in November 2017 on behalf of her husband who was killed by an exploding e-cigarette, similar to a Juul device.

Another lawsuit recently filed by an Ohio mother on behalf of her two teen daughters claimed that Juul failed to warn its customers of the high levels of nicotine in its devices. The complaint stated that the two twin daughters, who are now 16 years old, began vaping in 2016 and initially purchased the devices in a store that “knowingly sold e-cigarettes to underage customers.” The teens quickly became addicted to their e-cigarettes and were eventually vaping two Juul pods a day. According to the lawsuit, one Juul pod contains the same amount of nicotine as two packs of cigarettes.

Similar lawsuits have claimed that in addition to containing excessive levels of nicotine, Juul products are advertised as being a healthier alternative to traditional cigarettes. Recent cases, however, have shown that vaping Juul e-cigarettes is linked to a number of health conditions, including heart disease, lung damage, and seizures. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is inspecting the recent hospitalizations of more than 149 individuals whose health problems are linked to vaping. The patients, who are predominantly teens and young adults, reportedly developed severe lung illnesses that have been associated with vaping.

According to recent cases, vaping also puts users at risk of experiencing seizures, which is a known symptom of nicotine poisoning. The FDA has received about 127 reports of seizures linked to vaping since 2010, and issued a warning about the potential correlation between vaping and seizures (convulsions) in April 2019.

Amid a lack of research and information on the health risks of using e-cigarettes, an Illinois patient was reportedly the first to die of a lung illness that was associated with vaping. Health experts say that more research needs to be done in order to understand the health implications of vaping, before other users face a similar fate.

Copyright © 2019 Katy Moncivais, Ph.D.

For more on vaping related litigation see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

Claim Construction Disputes Must Be Decided Before Applying Alice

On August 16, 2019, the Federal Circuit issued a 2-1 decision holding that a lower court erred by adjudicating patent eligibility without resolving the parties’ claim construction dispute. See MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, LLC et al., Nos. 2018-1758, 2018-1759 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2019).

The patents at issue in MyMail cover methods for modifying toolbars displayed on Internet-connected devices. In response to defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings that the patents claim ineligible subject matter, MyMail raised a legal dispute over the proper construction of “toolbar.” The district court granted defendants’ motions without addressing the parties’ claim construction dispute, and without construing “toolbar.” The Court found in a split decision that the district court erred.

The majority held that “[d]etermining patent eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter.”  Accordingly, “if the parties raise a claim construction dispute at the Rule 12(c) stage, the district court must either adopt the non-moving party’s constructions or resolve the dispute to whatever extent is needed to conduct the § 101 analysis.”  Because the district court never addressed the parties’ claim construction dispute, or otherwise construed “toolbar,” the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

In his dissent, Judge Lourie argued that the facts of the case demonstrate that the parties’ claim construction dispute is “little more than a mirage,” and the claims at issue are “clearly abstract, regardless of claim construction.”

Implications

This decision provides patentees with another tool to help delay early patent eligibility decisions by raising legal issues over the proper scope of the claims. It is important to note, however, that this decision does not mean that judges must always construe the claims before ruling on patent eligibility—only when the parties raise a dispute. Further, patentees should weigh the relative pros and cons of raising claim construction issues early in a case, as this may come with some risks including putting a stake in the ground without sufficient discovery concerning the accused products.

© 2019 Brinks Gilson Lione. All Rights Reserved.

For more on patent law see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

Corporate Closedown Does Not Shield Boss From Potential TCPA Culpability

So, your corporation is sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). One defense strategy if you are the founder and sole owner: cease operations, terminate your employees, close your offices, formally dissolve the corporation and live in British Columbia. No potential individual exposure for TCPA violations in Alabama – right?

Not so fast, said the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in Eric K. Williams v. John G. Schanck. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151778, Case No.:5-15-cv-01434-MHH, decided September 6, 2019. Mr. Williams originally sued Stellar Recovery, Inc., a company founded and solely owned by Schanck, for collection calls made to the plaintiff’s cellphone in Alabama. Mr. Schanck then told the Court in a telephone conference call that “Stellar Recovery had dissolved and did not intend to participate in this lawsuit.” Mr. Williams moved to amend his complaint to add Mr. Schanck individually and Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala granted his motion.

But, wait a minute, countered Mr. Schanck. Service of the amended complaint on me in Vancouver, British Columbia does not afford the Court personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, Mr. Williams is too late because he added me as a defendant after the four-year TCPA statute of limitations had passed. So, Mr. Schanck moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), respectively.

The Court was unconvinced on both counts.

First, on the jurisdictional issue, the Court examined whether Mr. Schanck’s alleged contacts with the State of Alabama were sufficient to satisfy specific jurisdiction (i.e., “contacts within the forum state give rise to the action before the court”). Mr. Williams asserted that Mr. Schanck “guide[d], over[saw], and ratifie[d] all operations of…Stellar” and knew of the “‘violations of the TCPA alleged’ in the complaint and ‘agreed to and ratified such actions of his company.’” Indeed, throughout the complaint, Mr. Williams contended that “Stellar acted on behalf of Defendant Schanck.”

Mr. Schanck did “not challenge the factual allegations concerning his ownership interest in Stellar or his managerial control over the company.” Rather, he contended that the “corporate shield doctrine” precluded the Court from exercising jurisdiction over him. However, Judge Haikala noted that the “express language of the TCPA allows actions against corporate officers who authorize TCPA violations” and Mr. Williams “has alleged just that – that Mr. Schanck directed and authorized the alleged TCPA violations that purportedly occurred in this District.” Motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(2) denied.

Second, the Court also dispensed with the statute of limitations issue. The Court concluded that the claim against Mr. Schanck as an individual arose out of the “conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Under such circumstances, the claims in the amended complaint could relate back to Mr. Williams original complaint.

But, Mr. Schanck argued, Mr. Williams knew about him and his status in Stellar yet chose only to sue the latter. Therefore, there could have been no mistake on his part about the “identity” of the proper party (i.e., Mr. Schanck) to sue and the FRCP 15(c) requirements regarding the timing of serving Mr. Schanck as a new defendant were not met.

Correcting Mr. Schanck’s application of that requirement, the Court noted that the issue was not about Mr. Williams knowledge, but “whether Mr. Schanck himself knew or should have known that he would be named as a defendant ‘but for an error’” by Mr. Williams. And at this stage, “if Mr. Williams contentions about Mr. Schanck’s involvement with Stellar prove correct,” then Mr. Schanck “reasonably should have known that he would be named as a defendant but for an error.” Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6) denied.

So some TCPAWorld lessons learned about the solidity of the “corporate” shield when one person allegedly runs the company show.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Jurisdictional Lessons from Mt. Gox Cryptocurrency Litigation

Last week, on the heels of a significant decline in Bitcoin prices, Forbes reported that China’s Central Bank is set to launch the world’s first state-backed cryptocurrency. The cryptocurrency will be made available initially to seven of China’s largest financial institutions, including three banks and two financial technology companies (including Alibaba).  It is planned to eventually reach the virtual wallets of U.S. consumers, through relationships with Western correspondent banks.

Meanwhile, in the United States, litigation rages on against Mark Karpeles, the President and CEO of Mt. Gox. Formerly the world’s leading bitcoin exchange platform, Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan in 2014 amidst reports of rampant security breaches and refusal by its Japanese banking partner, Mizuho Bank, to process withdrawals for Mt. Gox users. Before its bankruptcy, Mt. Gox announced that 850,000 bitcoins valued at more than $450 million had gone “missing,” likely due to cyber theft.

In the aftermath, Mt. Gox account holders filed putative class actions against Karpeles and Mizuho in the Central District of California, the Northern District of Illinois, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting causes of action for negligence, fraud, and tortious interference. In each action, both defendants filed motions to dismiss, claiming lack of personal jurisdiction due to their residences in France and Japan, respectively.

Earlier this year, all three courts dismissed Mizuho from the litigation, agreeing that the bank did not purposefully direct any activity at the forum states. Mt. Gox’s bank accounts with Mizuho were located in Japan, the decisions not to process withdrawals from those accounts were made by Mizuho employees located in Japan, and all wire transfers were initiated or received in Japan.

However, all three courts denied Mr. Karpeles’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Mr. Karpeles,  a French citizen, argued that his contacts with the forum states were merely the incidental result of where some Mt. Gox users lived. The courts unanimously disagreed.

In the most recent of these three decisions, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, relying on the previous decisions by the courts in California and Illinois, held that it has specific jurisdiction over Karpeles “because he availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in Pennsylvania through soliciting business from [a named plaintiff] and thousands of other Pennsylvania residents through the Mt. Gox website.” Pearce v. Karpeles, No. CV 18-306, 2019 WL 3409495, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2019).

The Court applied the “sliding scale” test established by Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997), which has been characterized as “a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an internet website,” to determine that Karpeles’ internet presence sufficiently gave rise to personal jurisdiction over him. Karpeles, 2019 WL 3409495, at *4-5. The Zippo scale “ranges from situations where a defendant uses an interactive commercial website to actively transact business with residents of a forum state (personal jurisdiction exists) to situations where a passive website merely provides information that is accessible to users in the forum state (personal jurisdiction does not exist).” Id. at *4. Under that Pennsylvania precedent, a defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the state if its website “repeatedly attracts business from a forum or knowingly conducts business with forum state residents via the site.” Id. at *5.

The Court held that Mt. Gox’s internet activity fell at the “interactive end of the Zippo spectrum.” Id. Mt. Gox’s website was interactive, allowing users to open and manage accounts, make purchases and trades, and transfer and deposit cash. Id. Further, Mt. Gox had knowledge of the residences of its users because at the time they opened accounts, they had to provide Mt. Gox with their addresses and other personal information. Id. Users could also purchase “Yubikeys” (a hardware authentication device that allows users to securely log into their accounts) to be sent to their physical addresses. Id. Approximately 4% of all Mt. Gox users (over 19,000 individuals) who registered with addresses were Pennsylvania citizens, making Karpeles’ interactions with the forum state neither random, isolated, nor fortuitous. Id. at *6.

The Court also rejected Karpeles’ assertion that it would be unfair to force him to defend in the United States since he is on probation in Japan and prohibited from leaving the country, holding that the interests of the plaintiffs and the forum state justified any burden of defending in Pennsylvania. Karpeles, 2019 WL 3409495, at *8-9.

The increased use of cryptocurrency looks inevitable, with Facebook’s cryptocurrency, Libra, poised to launch in 2020, and some economists proposing that a cryptocurrency backed by central banks throughout the world will email one day replace the U.S. dollar as the world’s global reserve currency. As cryptocurrency proliferates, it is likely that so too will cryptocurrency litigation, bringing with it a host of jurisdictional challenges for litigants. The Mt. Gox-related orders provide valuable insight into how some such challenges may be resolved in the future.

© 2019 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

ARTICLE BY Shalia Sakona and Philip R. Stein of Bilzin Sumberg.