Category: Litigation

SCOTUS Shelves Request to Review 11th Circuit Dark Tower Decision, Ending Copyright Saga

The Supreme Court’s refusal to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in DuBay v. King marks an end to a 4-year copyright battle concerning the lead character of Stephen King’s acclaimed series, The Dark Tower.  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirmed that the King’s anti-hero, Roland Deschain, is not substantially similar to William DuBay’s The Rook comic book character, Restin Dane. The decision illustrates the complexity of literary copyright infringement disputes, where a claim is brought based on a mix of original and stock character elements.

In 2017 William DuBay’s heir, Benjamin DuBay, sued novelist Stephen King, Marvel Entertainment, Sony Entertainment, and others for various counts of copyright infringement, alleging that King copied DuBay’s artistic expression based on purported similarity between lead characters of The Rook (Restin Dane) and The Dark Tower (Roland Deschain). The district court granted summary judgment to King, determining (1) that any similarities between the characters comprise unprotectable general ideas and scènes à faire elements; and (2) that the protectable original character elements in dispute are different, such that “no reasonable jury…could find the works substantially similar.” DuBay appealed.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in assessing substantial similarity.  DuBay argued that the characters were substantially similar based on several shared characteristics, including: (1) similar names; (2) interaction with time-travel related towers; (3) having a bird as a companion; (4) having knightly characteristics; (5) wearing Western-style clothing; (6) surviving a fictionalized interpretation of The Alamo; (7) the use of knives; and (8) traveling back in time to save a young boy who becomes a gunslinger. DuBay also argued that the unique combination of these elements made Dane a distinctive character, and that Deschain is a copy of DuBay’s artistic expression in that character.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed DuBay’s contentions in two parts.

First, the court assessed whether each of the claimed character elements merit copyright protection. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that “character names do not merit copyright protection,” since mere words and short phrases cannot be protected under copyright law.  The court reiterated that only original elements of a copyrighted work can be afforded protection, and that certain claimed elements (i.e., “knightly heritage,” time travel to “different times and parallel worlds,” “western attire,” “fictionalized Alamo histories,” and “knife wielding”) are merely general ideas or scènes à faire that are “too general to merit copyright protection.”  The court then reviewed the remaining elements to determine whether the shared characteristics rendered the characters substantially similar.  Although both characters may be broadly similar in having bird companions, a relationship to towers and tower imagery, and past time travel experiences involving the rescue of a young boy, the court found that the depiction of these elements was different in each work.  For example, whereas Dane lives in and travels via tower shaped structures shaped like the namesake chess piece, Deschain embarks on an endless mission to find an elusive Gothic tower that connects parallel worlds and time periods.  Because the portrayals of each original element are distinguishable, the court determined that no reasonable jury could have concluded that the works were similar.

Second, the court examined whether the characters are substantially similar based on each character’s combination of the claimed elements (or the “look and feel” of the characters).  The Court recognized of the potential dangers of comparing works based on individual similarities alone because an original combination of unoriginal elements can potentially sustain a claim of copyright infringement.  However, the court found that any similarities of combined elements were “superficial” at best, and that the “look and feel” analysis actually hurt, rather than helped, DuBay’s case by highlighting differences in expression of shared original character elements.

Takeaway:

The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Dubay reinforces the basic tenet of copyright law that general ideas or scènes à faire cannot be protected by copyright.  It also reminds litigants that although a combination of original and non-original elements can be protected under copyright law, broad similarities are usually insufficient to sustain a copyright infringement claim.

The case is DuBay v. King, 844 Fed. Appx. 257 (11thCir. 2019), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 490 (2021).

Article By Spencer K. Beall and Margaret A. Esquenet of Finnegan

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2021 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP

EPA’s Stormwater General Permit is Safe. Does it Matter?

A Colorado-based NGO has dropped its 9th Circuit lawsuit challenging EPA’s Multi-Sector General Permit for stormwater discharges associated with industrial facilities.

On one hand, this is a victory for EPA which apparently offered nothing to settle the case before the NGO threw up its hands.

On the other hand, the General Permit is only applicable in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New Mexico, the three states that have not been delegated the authority to issue such a permit (as well as tribal lands and other lands not subject to state jurisdiction).

Why did the NGO bring this suit to begin with?  Did it hope that the Biden Administration EPA would, when push came to shove, do something dramatically different than the Trump Administration EPA?

Whatever the reason, the NGO has apparently concluded that the current law and permit give it plenty of grounds to bring suits over stormwater discharges in the 9th Circuit and elsewhere.  There are already several such imaginative suits pending on the west coast.

Are the regulators in Massachusetts less able to issue and enforce stormwater permits than than their colleagues in 47 other states?  The answer is of course not.  They are completely able and more able than most.  And they already have authority under state laws and regulations that are broader in their reach than the federal law.

But the Massachusetts legislature has stood in the way, apparently because it doesn’t want to bear the costs of regulating in this area borne by 47 other states.  Uncertainty and the threat, if not the actuality, of litigation has been the unfortunate result of this dereliction for the regulated community, including the municipalities in which we live.

We deserve better.

“The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) is dropping its legal challenge to EPA’s industrial stormwater general permit that sought stricter regulation of plastics pollution after settlement discussions were unfruitful, according to an attorney familiar with the litigation.“

Article By Jeffrey R. Porter of Mintz

For more environmental legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©1994-2021 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Stay of OSHA Emergency Temporary Standard Lifted By Sixth Circuit – “All Systems Go,” For Now…

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit lifted the stay on the Occupational Safety and Health Association’s Emergency Temporary Standard (“OSHA ETS”) late Friday night (December 17, 2021). The Sixth Circuit had previously been selected at random to hear the consolidated OSHA ETS litigation.

As a result of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, OSHA announced that it would exercise enforcement discretion with respect to the compliance dates of the OSHA ETS.  To provide employers with sufficient time to come into compliance:

  • OSHA will not issue citations for noncompliance with any requirements of the OSHA ETS before January 10, 2022; and

  • OSHA will not issue citations for noncompliance with testing requirements before February 9, 2022.

These “extensions” are conditioned on an employer exercising reasonable, good faith efforts to come into compliance with the OSHA ETS.

Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit found that the petitioners (Republican-led states, businesses, religious groups, and individuals) were unable to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit considered and analyzed a myriad of statutory and constitutional arguments. Two out of the three judges on the panel determined that the petitioners would be unlikely to be successful on their constitutional arguments that OSHA violated the commerce clause or the non-delegation doctrine.

Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, OSHA is required to show that health effects may constitute a “grave danger” in order to warrant an emergency temporary standard. The Sixth Circuit held that the determination as to what constitutes “grave danger” should be left, in the first instance, to the agency. The Sixth Circuit expressly disagreed with, and in effect overruled, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by holding that OSHA was not required to make findings of exposure in all covered workplaces. The Sixth Circuit held that to require so would mean that no hazard could ever rise to the level of “grave danger.” Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit found that OSHA had shown that COVID-19 is a danger and relied on proper science in issuing the ETS. The Sixth Circuit further held that simply because OSHA did not issue the ETS at the beginning of the pandemic did not mean the agency did not consider COVID-19 an emergency worth addressing.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision was appealed this morning to the Supreme Court; however, this appeal does not alter the decision unless and until the Supreme Court rules.  In the meantime, employers should resume (or continue) preparations to comply with the ETS requirements. For a summary of the OSHA ETS and its requirements, visit here.

Article By Lilian Doan Davis and Isaac T. Caverly of Polsinelli PC

For more coronavirus legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

5th Circuit Rejects Request from United Airlines Employees to Block Company’s COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate

In a decision from the New Orleans-based Fifth Circuit, in a bid to block the company’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, a divided court rejected an emergency request for an injunction from United Airlines employees. The request came in the wake of a November ruling by a federal judge in Fort Worth, Texas, which also ruled in favor of United Airlines.

United Airlines was the first major air carrier to implement a vaccine mandate and has so far granted about 2,000 exemptions. Its policy would place on unpaid leave any employees who fail to get the COVID-19 vaccine (and who fail to qualify for an exemption). The key question, in this case, is the extent to which United Airlines has accommodated employees’ religious or medical exemptions. The six plaintiffs claim that United Airlines’ policy is a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, among other things, requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for all aspects of an employee’s religious beliefs, absent “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”

While the Fifth Circuit did not rule on the merits, two of the three judges denied the motion for an injunction citing previous decisions but did not offer any additional reasoning. Judge James C. Ho dissented asserting that the mandate placed a substantial burden on one’s religion and calling the harm a “quintessentially irreparable injury, warranting preliminary injunctive relief.” The Fifth Circuit did, however, grant a request from the plaintiffs for an expedited appeal. That hearing and the court’s decision should provide some guidance on the legal constraints and guidelines for COVID-19 vaccine mandates.

This article was written by Nelson Mullins attorneys Mitch Boyarsky and Benjamin Lichtman. For more articles regarding vaccine mandate challenges, please click here.

9th Cir. Upholds Antitrust Jury Verdict Against Chinese Telescope Company [PODCAST]

Court affirms evidentiary rulings on market definition and overcharges. Agrees evidence supported verdict for collusion and attempted monopolization.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals this month upheld judgment in favor of Optronic Technologies, Inc., finding there was sufficient evidence that Chinese telescope manufacturer, Ningbo Sunny Electronic (“Sunny”), conspired with a competitor in the U.S. consumer telescope market to allocate customers, fix prices, and monopolize the telescope market in violation of federal antitrust laws (Optronic Technologies, Inc., v. Ningbo Sunny Electronic Co., Ltd., No. 20-15837, 9th Cir. 2021). Ninth Circuit Judge Ronald M. Gould wrote the opinion.

California-based Optronic, known commercially as Orion Telescopes & Binoculars, sued Sunny in November 2014. Orion alleged Sunny violated Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2 by conspiring to allocate customers in the telescope market and conspiring to fix prices or credit terms for Optronics in collusion with Suzhou Synta Optical Technology. Orion further alleged Sunny’s 2014 acquisition of independent manufacturer, Meade, violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Orion alleged that Sunny engaged in these anticompetitive acts to force Orion out and further monopolize the telescope market.

A California jury found in favor of Orion on all counts and awarded the company $16.8 million in damages, which the district court trebled to $50.4 million. The district court also ordered injunctive relief, directing Sunny to supply Orion and Synta’s Meade on non-discriminatory terms for five years, and not to communicate with Synta about competitively sensitive information.

Rulings on key elements of plaintiff’s economic evidence affirmed.

Sunny appealed on several grounds, including two that challenged key elements of the plaintiff’s expert economic evidence. The jury had found Sunny liable for attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Section 2, which makes it unlawful for any person to monopolize or attempt or conspire to monopolize any relevant market. Sunny argued on appeal that the evidence could not support a Section 2 verdict because Orion’s economist failed to define a relevant market. In particular, Sunny claimed the expert did not examine the cross-elasticity between substitute products in the market or perform a SSNIP test, the standard analysis used to delineate the outer boundaries of a relevant market.

The appeals court found these contentions lacked merit. The plaintiff’s economist had testified that the relevant product market was the market for telescope manufacturing services. The purpose of the SSNIP test is to determine whether the relevant market is drawn too narrowly and should be expanded to include potential substitutes. But because no other manufacturing capacity can substitute for telescope manufacturing services, wholesale purchasers of telescopes cannot turn to other manufacturers to fulfill orders. Without substitutable manufacturers, a SSNIP test boils down to whether new manufacturers would enter the market fast enough to make an increase in price unprofitable for a hypothetical monopolist, which they could not. As a result, the court held that the economist reasonably could forgo performing a SSNIP analysis.

Sunny also challenged the economist’s estimate of anticompetitive overcharges that could not directly be observed. Neither the “benchmark” nor “before-and-after” estimation methods were available. Therefore, to develop a measure of damages, the plaintiff’s expert presented two different methods of estimating the overcharges. In the first method, the expert collected data on cartel overcharges from the economic literature on markets with structures and conditions similar to telescope manufacturing. The average of those overcharges was then used as an estimate of the overcharge resulting from defendants’ collusion. As a check on this estimate, the economist also submitted a theoretical Cournot equilibrium model of market prices based on assumptions drawn from the record in the case. The two methods yielded similar and consistent results. Affirming the admissibility of the expert’s damages estimates, the appellate court found the expert’s report and testimony “were sufficiently tied to the facts of this case such that the district court properly admitted this evidence.”

In rebuttal, the defendant’s economist testified to the high sensitivity of the assumptions used in the plaintiff’s theoretical model. Interestingly, defendants were not permitted to submit their own estimate of damages for the first time on rebuttal, so the defendants’ expert had to limit her testimony to the sensitivity of the model without the ability to show the jury any resulting alternative estimate of the anticompetitive overcharge. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s limitation on the defendants’ rebuttal expert.

Price fixing and a larger scheme.

Sunny also argued that Orion failed to present sufficient evidence to support Orion’s Section 1 claims. Section 1 prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. Horizontal price fixing and market allocation are per se unreasonable and support Section 1 liability without regard to any purported justification or defense. The Ninth Circuit noted that Orion offered evidence that Synta executives encouraged Sunny’s purchase of Meade, an acquisition that was part of a larger scheme by Sunny and Synta to jointly control the telescope manufacturing market, even though federal regulators had already prohibited such a combination. The court also declined to upset the jury’s finding that Sunny conspired with a Synta subsidiary to fix prices and credit terms to Orion, a per se violation of Section 1.

“If you break it, you buy it.”

Finally, it is notable that the appellate court affirmed the award of damages accruing after September 2016, when the defendant and Synta took their last steps to eliminate Meade, and Synta entered a Settlement and Supply Agreement with Orion. The court held that, even if the conspiratorial acts of Sunny and Synta ended in 2016, Orion could still recover post-2016 damages “because it continued to suffer economic harm from the harm to competition caused by the illegal concerted activity.” Thus, where collusion causes a durable change in market structure or sets the pattern of a continuing collusive practice, it is no defense that the conspirators may have ceased engaging in concerted action.

The rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Optronics is clear: “[W]here an antitrust plaintiff suffers continuing antitrust injuries from anticompetitive changes to market structure that arose from a proven antitrust violation, we hold that the violation may be a material cause of that injury, and so recovery of damages is permitted, even after the last proven date of the violative conduct. This rule accords with the common-sense principle that ‘if you break it, you buy it.’”

Welcomed clarity.

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion brings welcomed clarity on several points. It demonstrated that plaintiffs need not perform a SSNIP test where market-specific circumstances define a market’s outer boundary. For claimants facing the need to estimate unobservable anticompetitive overcharges, it affirms an ingenious method for arriving at a reasonable and reliable estimate. And, for past conspiracies with continuing anticompetitive effects, the decision announces the common-sense principle that a defendant “remains liable for the continuing injuries suffered by plaintiffs from the structural harm to competition that its unlawful scheme brought about.” Put simply, this is a well-articulated decision by a capable panel that adds precision and certainty to antitrust.

Edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin LLP

© MoginRubin LLP

For more articles on 9th Circuit decisions, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Disclaiming Patent Claims Leads PTAB to Grant a Request for Adverse Judgment

In Arsus, LLC v. Unified Patents, LLC, (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2021), the Federal Circuit affirmed, through a Rule 36 judgment, the PTAB’s ruling granting a Request for Adverse Judgment After Institution of Trial.

Arsus initially sued Tesla Motors, Inc. for patent infringement in the Northern District of California asserting U.S. Patent No. 10,259,494. The ’494 patent is directed to a “rollover prevention apparatus.” The patent describes an “adaptive steering range limiting device,” which “prevents the steering wheel of the vehicle from being turned beyond the threshold of vehicle rollover, but otherwise does not restrict the rotational range of motion of the steering wheel of the vehicle.”

Unified Patents filed for inter partes review, challenging Arsus’ claims as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Arsus then filed for statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims with the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. 1.321(a), and subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss with the Board. In doing so, Arsus argued that because all of the claims at issue were disclaimed, there was no longer any case or controversy, and thus the Board had no jurisdiction to do anything other than to dismiss the IPR. However, the Board construed Arsus’s disclaimer as a Request for Adverse Judgment under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), and terminated the IPR in favor of Unified Patents.

Arsus responded by filing a Motion to Vacate Judgment and, relying on Federal Circuit precedent from Sanofi-Aventis U.S. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Inc., 933 F.3d 1367, 1373-75 (Fed. Cir. 2019), argued that the Board did not have jurisdiction to enter the Judgment because the disclaimer mooted the IPR petition and “deprived the Board of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Unified Patents, LLC v. Arsus, LLC, IPR2020-00948, Paper 19, 3 (PTAB Jan. 29, 2021). The Board, however, pointed out that Sanofi-Aventis concerned a district court’s jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution, and determined that Arsus failed to show that the same requirements applied to administrative proceedings.

Arsus subsequently appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed without opinion by issuing a Rule 36 judgment.

© 2021 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP

Article By Andrew N. Schneider, Shannon M. Patrick and Amanda K. Murphy, Ph.D. of Finnegan

For more articles on the PTAB, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

Before the Supreme Court…December 9, 2021

The Supreme Court placed two Indian law cases on its docket for the October 2021 term.

In Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas (20-493), the Supreme Court will determine whether legislation that restored federal recognition to two Tribes permits the State of Texas to regulate gaming activities on the Tribes’ land.  The restoration legislation contained a provision stating that “[a]ll gaming activities which are prohibited by [Texas] are hereby prohibited on the reservation[.]”  Because Texas regulates bingo but does not prohibit it, the Tribe asserts that it therefore retains full authority to set the terms of its bingo games and need not comply with Texas’ regulations.  Texas argues that the Tribe must submit to Texas’ regulations.  The Fifth Circuit sided with Texas, holding that Texas’ regulations became surrogate federal law under the restoration legislation.  The federal government filed a brief supporting the Tribe and urging the Supreme Court to take the case.  The case will directly affect the two Tribes subject to the restoration legislation, but there may be broader implications depending on whether the Supreme Court accepts or rejects the idea that state regulations may, under certain circumstances, become surrogate federal law that Tribes must follow.

In Denezpi v. United States (20-7622), the Supreme Court will decide whether a Tribal member convicted for assaulting another Tribal member on trust land in a “CFR Court” can later be tried for the same conduct in U.S. District Court.  The defendant was charged with serious offenses in the Court of Indian Offenses of the Ute Mountain Ute Agency.  Unlike a Tribal court, Courts of Indian Offenses (or “CFR Courts”—so called because they are authorized by the Code of Federal Regulations) are created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to administer criminal justice for Tribes lacking their own courts.  The CFR Courts may prosecute violations of Tribal ordinances and other offenses listed in the regulations.  The defendant was charged with three offenses in the CFR Court and ultimately pled guilty to one count and received a 140-day sentence.  Six months later, the defendant was indicted in U.S. District Court.  The defendant asserted his prosecution was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution.  The lower federal courts, however, concluded that the CFR Court was not exercising the sovereignty of the United States, but was instead exercising the sovereign powers of the Ute Mountain Tribe.  Under the long-established “dual sovereignty” doctrine, the federal government may prosecute an American Indian after a Tribal prosecution for the same act.  The same rule generally permits the federal government to charge an individual with a federal crime even after that person has been tried for the same conduct in state court.  The key question for the Supreme Court to decide is: whose sovereignty is the CFR Court exercising?  The answer will affect the five existing CFR Courts that serve more than a dozen Tribes.

The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether it will hear an appeal in Haaland v. Brackeen.  In that case the Fifth Circuit held several provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) to be unconstitutional.  If the Supreme Court agrees to hear the case it will likely become the most significant Indian law case of the term.

This article was written by Patrick Daugherty of Van Ness Feldman law firm. For more articles on tribal law, please click here.

China’s Supreme People’s Court Rules No Accounting for Profit for Joint Patent Ownership

In decision no. （2020）最高法知民终954号 dated November 25, 2021, China’s Supreme People’s Court ruled that if the co-owners of a patent or patent application right do not make an agreement on the exercise of the right and one of the co-owners independently practices the patent,  the other co-owner cannot claim the distribution of the proceeds from the separate practicing of the patent on the grounds of co-ownership of the patent right.

 

 

 

 

 

The appellant, the First Affiliated Hospital of Wenzhou Medical University 温州医科大学附属第一医院 (hereinafter referred to as Wenzhou Hospital) and the appellee Shenzhen Huilistong Information Technology Co., Ltd. 深圳市汇利斯通信息技术有限公司 (hereinafter referred to as Huilistong Company) were involved in a patent infringement litigation for CN Patent No. ZL 201210235924.0 entitled “a self-service terminal used in the lobby of a hospital.”

Wenzhou Hospital asserted that it co-owns the involved patent with Huilistong. Without its permission, Huilistong Company violated the rights of Wenzhou Hospital by practicing the patent involved in the case, and requested an order for Huilistong Company to stop the infringement and destroy inventory of infringing products and compensate Wenzhou Hospital for economic losses of 2.5098 million RMB and reasonable expenses for rights protection of 116,400 RMB.

The Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court of Guangdong Province held that Huilistong Company could independently practice the patent involved in the case in accordance with the law, which does not constitute an infringement of the patent right of Wenzhou Hospital.

Wenzhou Hospital appealed to the Supreme People’s Court. The Supreme People’s Court made a determination on the issue of “allocation of royalties,” and on September 24, 2020, it rejected the appeal and upheld the original judgment.

The Supreme People’s Court explained that Article 15 of the Patent Law stipulates that if the co-owners of the patent right have an agreement on the exercise of the right, such agreement shall prevail. If there is no agreement, the co-owners may practice the patent alone or permit others to implement the patent by way of ordinary licensing; if the patent is permitted to be practiced by others, the royalties collected shall be distributed among the co-owners.

Except for the circumstances specified in the preceding paragraph, the exercise of joint patent application rights or patent rights shall obtain the consent of all co-owners.

Therefore, without the consent of the co-owner of the patent, the co-owner of a patent may directly obtain economic benefits through the co-owned patent in two ways: first, to separately practice the co-owned patent, and second, to license others to exploit the patent in the way of ordinary license, and only in the latter circumstance may there be a requirement for distributing the profits to the co-owners, but under the circumstance of independent exploitation, there is no such requirement.

In this case, Wenzhou Hospital claimed that some of the self-service registration integrated machines involved in this case were marked with such words as the joint research and development by Huilistong Company and the hospital involved in this case. However, this does not prove that Huilistong Company licensed the hospital involved in this case to use the patent involved, and there was no evidence in this case that the hospital involved in this case paid any patent licensing fee to Huilistong Company.

Therefore, the claim of Wenzhou Hospital for sharing the economic proceeds obtained by Huilistong Company from the exploitation of the patent at issue was not valid.

Wenzhou Hospital separately claimed that, according to the provisions of the civil law on the sharing of proceeds by the co-owners with respect to the co-owned property, Wenzhou Hospital also had the right to share the economic proceeds obtained by Huillistong Company from the implementation of the patent in question.

In response, the Supreme People’s Court held that, although Article 78 (2) of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China provides that “a co-owner enjoys the rights and assumes the obligations over the co-owned property,” this provision is a general provision on the co-owned property, and the aforesaid provision of the Patent Law falls under the special provisions on the distribution mechanism of the rights and interests of all co-owners under the circumstance of co-ownership of patents, and the special provisions of the Patent Law shall prevail.

Therefore, the Supreme People’s Court ruled for Huilistong Company.

The full text of the decision is available here (Chinese only).

© 2021 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

In the Coming ‘Metaverse’, There May Be Excitement but There Certainly Will Be Legal Issues

The concept of the “metaverse” has garnered much press coverage of late, addressing such topics as the new appetite for metaverse investment opportunities, a recent virtual land boom, or just the promise of it all, where “crypto, gaming and capitalism collide.”  The term “metaverse,” which comes from Neal Stephenson’s 1992 science fiction novel “Snow Crash,” is generally used to refer to the development of virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) technologies, featuring a mashup of massive multiplayer gaming, virtual worlds, virtual workspaces, and remote education to create a decentralized wonderland and collaborative space. The grand concept is that the metaverse will be the next iteration of the mobile internet and a major part of both digital and real life.

Don’t feel like going out tonight in the real world? Why not stay “in” and catch a show or meet people/avatars/smart bots in the metaverse?

As currently conceived, the metaverse, “Web 3.0,” would feature a synchronous environment giving users a seamless experience across different realms, even if such discrete areas of the virtual world are operated by different developers. It would boast its own economy where users and their avatars interact socially and use digital assets based in both virtual and actual reality, a place where commerce would presumably be heavily based in decentralized finance, DeFi. No single company or platform would operate the metaverse, but rather, it would be administered by many entities in a decentralized manner (presumably on some open source metaverse OS) and work across multiple computing platforms. At the outset, the metaverse would look like a virtual world featuring enhanced experiences interfaced via VR headsets, mobile devices, gaming consoles and haptic gear that makes you “feel” virtual things. Later, the contours of the metaverse would be shaped by user preferences, monetary opportunities and incremental innovations by developers building on what came before.

In short, the vision is that multiple companies, developers and creators will come together to create one metaverse (as opposed to proprietary, closed platforms) and have it evolve into an embodied mobile internet, one that is open and interoperable and would include many facets of life (i.e., work, social interactions, entertainment) in one hybrid space.

In order for the metaverse to become a reality, that is, successfully link current gaming and communications platforms with other new technologies into a massive new online destination – many obstacles will have to be overcome, even beyond the hardware, software and integration issues. The legal issues stand out, front and center. Indeed, the concept of the metaverse presents a law school final exam’s worth of legal questions to sort out.  Meanwhile, we are still trying to resolve the myriad of legal issues presented by “Web 2.0,” the Internet we know it today. Adding the metaverse to the picture will certainly make things even more complicated.

At the heart of it is the question of what legal underpinnings we need for the metaverse infrastructure – an infrastructure that will allow disparate developers and studios, e-commerce marketplaces, platforms and service providers to all coexist within one virtual world.  To make it even more interesting, it is envisioned to be an interoperable, seamless experience for shoppers, gamers, social media users or just curious internet-goers armed with wallets full of crypto to spend and virtual assets to flaunt.  Currently, we have some well-established web platforms that are closed digital communities and some emerging ones that are open, each with varying business models that will have to be adapted, in some way, to the metaverse. Simply put, the greater the immersive experience and features and interactions, the more complex the related legal issues will be.

Contemplating the metaverse, these are just a few of the legal issues that come to mind:

  • Personal Data, Privacy and Cybersecurity – Privacy and data security lawyers are already challenged with addressing the global concerns presented by varying international approaches to privacy and growing threats to data security. If the metaverse fulfills the hype and develops into a 3D web-based hub for our day-to-day lives, the volume of data that will be collected will be exponentially greater than the reams of data already collected, and the threats to that data will expand as well. Questions to consider will include:
    • Data and privacy – What’s collected? How sensitive is it? Who owns or controls it? The sharing of data will be the cornerstone of a seamless, interoperable environment where users and their digital personas and assets will be usable and tradeable across the different arenas of the metaverse.  How will the collection, sharing and use of such data be regulated?  What laws will govern the collection of data across the metaverse? The laws of a particular state?  Applicable federal privacy laws? The GDPR or other international regulations? Will there be a single overarching “privacy policy” governing the metaverse under a user and merchant agreement, or will there be varying policies depending on which realm of the metaverse you are in? Could some developers create a more “privacy-focused” experience or would the personal data of avatars necessarily flow freely in every realm? How will children’s privacy be handled and will there be “roped off,” adults-only spaces that require further authentication to enter? Will the concepts that we talk about today – “personal information” or “personally identifiable information” – carry over to a world where the scope of available information expands exponentially as activities are tracked across the metaverse?
    • Cybersecurity: How will cybersecurity be managed in the metaverse? What requirements will apply with respect to keeping data secure? How will regulation or site policies evolve to address deep fakes, avatar impersonation, trolling, stolen biometric data, digital wallet hacks and all of the other cyberthreats that we already face today and are likely to be exacerbated in the metaverse? What laws will apply and how will the various players collaborate in addressing this issue?
  • Technology Infrastructure: The metaverse will be a robust computing-intensive experience, highlighting the importance of strong contractual agreements concerning cloud computing, IoT, web hosting, and APIs, as well as software licenses and hardware agreements, and technology service agreements with developers, providers and platform operators involved in the metaverse stack. Performance commitments and service levels will take on heightened importance in light of the real-time interactions that users will expect. What is a meaningful remedy for a service level failure when the metaverse (or a part of the metaverse) freezes? A credit or other traditional remedy?  Lawyers and technologists will have to think creatively to find appropriate and practical approaches to this issue.  And while SaaS and other “as a service” arrangements will grow in importance, perhaps the entire process will spawn MaaS, or “Metaverse as a Service.”
  • Open Source – Open source, already ubiquitous, promises to play a huge role in metaverse development by allowing developers to improve on what has come before. Whether or not the obligations of common open source licenses will be triggered will depend on the technical details of implementation. It is also possible that new open source licenses will be created to contemplate development for the metaverse.
  • Quantum Computing – Quantum computing has dramatically increased the capabilities of computers and is likely to continue to do over the coming years. It will certainly be one of the technologies deployed to provide the computing speed to allow the metaverse to function. However, with the awesome power of quantum computing comes threats to certain legacy protections we use today. Passwords and traditional security protocols may be meaningless (requiring the development of post-quantum cryptography that is secure against both quantum and traditional computers). With raw, unchecked quantum computing power, the metaverse may be subject to manipulation and misuse. Regulation of quantum computing, as applied to the metaverse and elsewhere, may be needed.
  • Antitrust: Collaboration is a key to the success of the metaverse, as it is, by definition, a multi-tenant environment. Of course collaboration amongst competitors may invoke antitrust concerns. Also, to the extent that larger technology companies may be perceived as leveraging their position to assert unfair control in any virtual world, there may be additional concerns.
  • Intellectual Property Issues: A host of IP issues will certainly arise, including infringement, licensing (and breaches thereof), IP protection and anti-piracy efforts, patent issues, joint ownership concerns, safe harbors, potential formation of patent cross-licensing organizations (which also may invoke antitrust concerns), trademark and advertising issues, and entertaining new brand licensing opportunities. The scope of content and technology licenses will have to be delicately negotiated with forethought to the potential breadth of the metaverse (e.g., it’s easy to limit a licensee’s rights based on territory, for example, but what about for a virtual world with no borders or some borders that haven’t been drawn yet?). Rightsholders must also determine their particular tolerance level for unauthorized digital goods or creations. One can envision a need for a DMCA-like safe harbor and takedown process for the metaverse. Also, akin to the litigation that sprouted from the use of athletes’ or celebrities’ likenesses (and their tattoos) in videogames, it’s likely that IP issues and rights of publicity disputes will go way up as people’s virtual avatars take on commercial value in ways that their real human selves never did.
  • Content Moderation. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) has been the target of bipartisan criticism for several years now, yet it remains in effect despite its application in some distasteful ways. How will the CDA be applied to the metaverse, where the exchange of third party content is likely to be even more robust than what we see today on social media?  How will “bad actors” be treated, and what does an account termination look like in the metaverse? Much like the legal issues surrounding offensive content present on today’s social media platforms, and barring a change in the law, the same kinds of issues surrounding user-generated content will persist and the same defenses under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act will be raised.
  • Blockchain, DAOs, Smart Contract and Digital Assets: Since the metaverse is planned as a single forum with disparate operators and users, the use of a blockchain (or blockchains) would seem to be one solution to act as a trusted, immutable ledger of virtual goods, in-world currencies and identity authentication, particularly when interactions may be somewhat anonymous or between individuals who may or may not trust each other and in the absence of a centralized clearinghouse or administrator for transactions. The use of smart contracts may be pervasive in the metaverse.  Investors or developers may also decide that DAOs (decentralized autonomous organizations) can be useful to crowdsource and fund opportunities within that environment as well.  Overall, a decentralized metaverse with its own discrete economy would feature the creation, sale and holding of sovereign digital assets (and their free use, display and exchange using blockchain-based payment networks within the metaverse). This would presumably give NFTs a role beyond mere digital collectibles and investment opportunities as well as a role for other forms of digital currency (e.g., cryptocurrency, utility tokens, stablecoins, e-money, virtual “in game” money as found in some videogames, or a system of micropayments for virtual goods, services or experiences).  How else will our avatars be able to build a new virtual wardrobe for what is to come?

With this shift to blockchain-based economic structures comes the potential regulatory issues behind digital currencies. How will securities laws view digital assets that retain and form value in the metaverse?  Also, as in life today, visitors to the metaverse must be wary of digital currency schemes and meme coin scams, with regulators not too far behind policing the fraudsters and unlawful actors that will seek opportunities in the metaverse. While regulators and lawmakers are struggling to keep up with the current crop of issues, and despite any progress they may make in that regard, many open issues will remain and new issues will be of concern as digital tokens and currency (and the contracts underlying them) take on new relevance in a virtual world.

Big ideas are always exciting. Watching the metaverse come together is no different, particularly as it all is happening alongside additional innovations surrounding the web, blockchain and cryptocurrency (and, more than likely, updated laws and regulations). However, it’s still early. And we’ll have to see if the current vision of the metaverse will translate into long-term, concrete commercial and civic-minded opportunities for businesses, service providers, developers and individual artists and creators.  Ultimately, these parties will need to sort through many legal issues, both novel and commonplace, before creating and participating in a new virtual world concept that goes beyond the massive multi-user videogame platforms and virtual worlds we have today.

Article By Jeffrey D. Neuburger of Proskauer Rose LLP. Co-authored by  Jonathan Mollod.

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© 2021 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Sixth Circuit Deals Blow to OSHA’s Proposed Expedited Briefing Schedule, Says it Will Keep ETS Case

In what is getting to be habit in the OSHA ETS litigation with courts issuing orders late Friday afternoons, the Sixth Circuit on December 3, 2021 tersely denied a petition to transfer the case back to the Fifth Circuit.  In the same order, the Sixth Circuit also denied, without explanation, the union petitioners’ bid to transfer the case to the D.C. Circuit where there is pending litigation of the OSHA Healthcare ETS issued in June 2020.

The order perfunctorily addressed several pending motions on the docket, including OSHA’s motion for an expedited briefing schedule, which would have set the close of briefing on the merits for December 29, 2021 with oral argument held as soon as practicable thereafter.  In denying the motion, the Sixth Circuit stated little more than it was reserving judgment on setting a merits briefing schedule.  Obviously, there are a tremendous number of parties with varied interests and a multitude of legal arguments both statutory and Constitutional, which the court clearly recognizes are at play and likely require a schedule that is not rushed.

The next big issue for the court to tackle will be OSHA’s motion to dissolve the stay with the close of briefing just a week away on December 10, 2021.  Whether the court will dole out more good news for employers, states, and other challengers to the ETS for the holiday season is anybody’s guess, but a decision before the holidays seems imminent.

Article By Melanie L. Paul of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more coronavirus legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2021