2024 Title IX Regulations Vacated Nationwide

On January 9, 2025, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case of Tennessee v. Cardona, vacating the 2024 Title IX regulations nationwide. The court ruled that the issuance of the 2024 regulations exceeded the Department of Education’s authority and was unconstitutional on multiple grounds.

The ruling may be appealed, but for now, institutions covered by Title IX should revert to compliance with their policies in effect under the 2020 Title IX regulations.

The 2024 Title IX regulations, which took effect on August 1, 2024, had faced several challenges that led to injunctions with varying geographic scopes. As a result, prior to the Cardona decision, the Title IX regulations were only effective in about half of the states across the U.S.

Property Insurance Coverage Pitfalls for Cannabis Businesses and Landlords

Nearly all Americans now live in a state where some form of cannabis is legal. Given that the cannabis industry is now valued in billions of dollars and has created hundreds of thousands of jobs across 39 of the 50 states, it requires the same range of insurance products that protect businesses in other sectors. This includes insurance for property owners that lease to tenants engaged in cannabis-related activities. Fortunately, common fact patterns have emerged that are instructive to cannabis businesses and property owners that wish to ensure they have effective coverage.

Where Liability Lies

It is not uncommon for a landlord to lease a property for a non-cannabis purpose, only to purportedly later learn that the tenant is using the property for an unpermitted cannabis operation. In such a case, the primary question is whether the landlord knew what the property was being used for and when. Mosley v. Pacific Specialty Ins. Co., 49 Cal. App. 5th 417 (2020) is instructive on this issue.

Mosley involved an action under a homeowners’ insurance policy, wherein the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer on the basis that coverage was excluded for a fire that occurred after a tenant rerouted the property’s electrical system to steal power from a main utility line for a marijuana growing operation, causing a fuse to blow. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, finding that there was a triable issue as to whether the tenant’s actions were within the owners’ control (for purposes of determining whether the plant-growing exclusion applied). It was undisputed that the owners did not know about the operation or the alteration, and there was no evidence as to whether they could have discovered the operation by exercising ordinary care or diligence. The court explained in relevant part that “an insured increases a hazard ‘within its control’ only if the insured is aware of the hazard or reasonably could have discovered it through exercising ordinary care or diligence.”

A landlord’s knowledge of the operations is therefore relevant for several reasons. It may be relevant to a provision for increasing a particular hazard, as noted above. Equally important, it may be relevant to a provision in the policy for fraud or misrepresentation in the application or claims process. Many homeowners and commercial general liability policies contain a provision that the policy may be void or rescinded for fraud or a misrepresentation perpetrated in the application or claims process. Thus, if the insured property owner knew of the intended use, but misrepresented the nature of the property’s intended use, there may be no coverage for an insured’s loss.

Misrepresentation

Another common scenario involves the landlord or tenant misrepresenting the nature of the business at the insured location to obtain a better rate, to avoid mandatory inspections, or for other reasons. For example, an insured may state on the insurance application that it is a retail dispensary when in fact it manufactures cannabis using extraction machines and volatile solvents. Because the nature of the risk is substantially different for a retail dispensary than for a manufacturing operation, higher premiums and routine inspections may be required. A dispensary’s primary risk is theft whereas the use of solvents during extraction poses a risk of explosion.

Security Compliance

Failure to properly comply with security safeguard warranties and exclusions that are commonly found in cannabis commercial property policies has precluded coverage for many cannabis-related property claims, particularly those that involve theft and fires. For example, a common question is whether the storage of on-site harvested cannabis or finished stock complies with the Locked Safe Warranty provision that is required in most cannabis policies. Policy language varies, but most require harvested plant material or stock to be stored in a secured cage, a safe, or a vault room.

Definitions also vary between policies and it is important for the insured to pay close attention to the policy language to ensure that their business practice aligns with what is required under the warranty. It is common to hear an insured complain that it “complied with state regulations” with respect to the storage of cannabis, only to learn that the policy requires security that is more strict than applicable regulations.

The definitions and terms used within security safeguard warranties and exclusions in cannabis commercial property policies have evolved over the past few years to better align with the insured’s business operations, and to avoid ambiguity and unnecessary coverage disputes and litigation.

Examples of precise requirements for a compliant vault include:

  • Being located in an enclosed area constructed of steel and concrete with a single point of entry
  • A minimum steel door thickness of one inch
  • Continuous monitoring by a central station alarm, motion sensors, and video surveillance
  • A minimum of one-hour fire rating for all walls, floors, and ceilings
  • Procedures that limit access only to authorized personnel.

Similar coverage issues frequently arise regarding whether the insured has complied with other common security safeguards required by the policy, including specific requirements for what qualifies as a central station burglar alarm and the location of motion sensors and video surveillance equipment. Again, the cannabis business owner or landlord are often tripped up by the assumption that so long as they are “compliant” with state cannabis regulations, all will be well and they will be covered by their insurance policy.

This is frequently an incorrect, and ultimately expensive, assumption that may be avoided by closely reading the requirements of the policy to ensure that they align with actual business practices.

Conclusion

Cannabis businesses and property owners currently have a good selection of insurance options across multiple lines of coverage with reputable insurance companies. To avoid unnecessary coverage problems and expensive mistakes, however, it is important that the company or landlord work with an insurance broker who is familiar with the available cannabis-specific insurance forms and the common problematic factual scenarios, some of which are identified above.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Vacates Its Own Stay Rendering the Corporate Transparency Act Unenforceable . . . Again

On December 26, 2024, in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. v. Garland, No. 24-40792, 2024 WL 5224138 (5th Cir. Dec. 26, 2024), a merits panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an order vacating the Court’s own stay of the preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”), that was originally entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on December 3, 2024, No. 4:24-CV-478, 2024 WL 5049220 (E.D. Tex. Dec 5, 2024).

A Timeline of Events:

  • December 3, 2024 – The District Court orders a nationwide preliminary injunction on enforcement of the CTA.
  • December 5, 2024 – The Government appeals the District Court’s ruling to the Fifth Circuit.
  • December 6, 2024 – The U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issues a statement making filing of beneficial ownership information reports (“BOIRs”) voluntary.
  • December 23, 2024 – A motions panel of the Fifth Circuit grants the Government’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal and FinCEN issues a statement requiring filing of BOIRs again with extended deadlines.
  • December 26, 2024 – A merits panel of the Fifth Circuit vacates its own stay, thereby enjoining enforcement of the CTA.
  • December 27, 2024 – FinCEN issues a statement again making filing of BOIRs voluntary.
  • December 31, 2024 – FinCEN files an application for a stay of the December 3, 2024 injunction with the Supreme Court of the United States.

This most recent order from the Fifth Circuit has effectively paused the requirement to file BOIRs under the CTA once again. In its most recent statement, FinCEN confirmed that “[i]n light of a recent federal court order, reporting companies are not currently required to file beneficial ownership information with FinCEN and are not subject to liability if they fail to do so while the order remains in force. However, reporting companies may continue to voluntarily submit beneficial ownership information reports.”

Although reporting requirements are not currently being enforced, we note that this litigation is ongoing, and if the Supreme Court decides to grant FinCEN’s December 31, 2024 application, reporting companies could once again be required to file. Given the high degree of unpredictability, reporting companies and others affected by the CTA should continue to monitor the situation closely and be prepared to file BOIRs with FinCEN in the event that enforcement is again resumed. If enforcement is resumed, the current reporting deadline for most reporting companies will be January 13, 2025, and while FinCEN may again adjust deadlines, this outcome is not assured.

For more information on the CTA and reporting requirements generally, please reference the linked Client Alert, dated November 24, 2024.

Client Alert Update: Developments in the Corporate Transparency Act Injunction

As we previously reported, a nationwide preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) was issued on December 3, 2024. Since our last update, there have been significant developments:

  1. Fifth Circuit Stay and Revival of CTA Enforcement: On December 23, 2024, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the lower court’s preliminary injunction, temporarily reviving the immediate enforceability of the CTA.
  2. Extension of Filing Deadline: Following the Fifth Circuit’s stay, FinCEN announced an extension of the filing deadline for Beneficial Ownership Information Reports (BOIRs) to January 13, 2025, applicable to entities formed before January 1, 2024.
  3. Injunction Reinstated: On December 26, 2024, the Fifth Circuit vacated the three-judge panel’s decision to stay the preliminary injunction. As a result, enforcement of the CTA is once again enjoined, and reporting companies are not currently required to file BOIRs with FinCEN.

Litigation challenging the CTA continues, and further developments are likely as the legal landscape evolves. At this time, we reaffirm our prior guidance:

  • Reporting companies are not currently required to file BOIRs while the injunction remains in effect and will not face penalties for failing to do so.
  • FinCEN continues to accept voluntary submissions for entities that wish to proactively comply with potential future obligations.

Businesses that have already begun preparing beneficial ownership information may wish to complete the process to ensure readiness if the injunction is lifted. We will continue to provide updates on this matter.

Federal Appeals Court Reinstates Injunction Against the CTA, Pending Appeal

At approximately 8:15 p.m. Eastern Time on December 26, 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) reversed course from its prior ruling in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., v. Garland to allow a lower court’s nationwide preliminary injunction stand against the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), pending the Government’s appeal. This means that, once again, the Government, including the United States Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), is barred from enforcing any aspect of the CTA’s disclosure requirements against reporting companies, including those formed before January 1, 2024. This decision prevents FinCEN from enforcing its recently announced deadline extension that would have deferred the compliance deadline for such existing entities from January 1, 2025, to January 13, 2025.

This abrupt about-face appears to be the result of a reassignment of Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., v. Garland from one three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit to another. The Fifth Circuit’s prior decision was issued by a “motions panel,” which decided only the Government’s motion to stay the lower court’s injunction. The motions panel also ordered that the case be expedited and assigned to the next available “merits panel” of the Fifth Circuit, which would be charged with deciding the merits of the Government’s appeal. Once the case was assigned to the merits panel, however, the judges on that panel (whose identities have not yet been publicized) appear to have disagreed with their colleagues. The new panel vacated the motions panel’s stay “in order to preserve the constitutional status quo while the merits panel considers the parties’ weighty substantive arguments.” The Government must now decide whether to seek relief from the United States Supreme Court, which may ultimately determine the fate of the CTA.

“Don’t You Have to Look at What the Statute Says?” – IMC’s Oral Arguments

As we noted earlier on TCPAWorld, the IMC odds against the FCC might be better than initially thought due to the panel of judges from the Eleventh Circuit hearing the oral arguments. Oral argument recordings are available online.

And the panel did not disappoint in pushing back on the FCC.

The conversation hinged on the FCC’s power to implement regulations in furtherance of the TCPA’s statutory language. This is important because the FCC is limited to implementation, and they are do not have the authority “to rewrite the statute” as was mentioned in the oral arguments.

Judge Luck (HERE) had some concerns with the FCC’s limitations on the consumer’s ability to consent. The statute, according to Luck, intends to allow consumers to agree to receive calls. If that is the case, then a limitation of the consumer’s ability to exercise their rights is an attempt to rewrite the statute.

Luck agreed that implementing the statute is fine, but limiting the right of consumers to receive calls they consent to receive is over reach. Luck continued “Just because you [the FCC] are ineffective at enforcing the authority doesn’t mean you have the right to limit one’s right, a statutory right, or rewrite those rights to limit what it means.”

The FCC attempted to argue that implementation of statute by their very nature is going to lead to restriction, but Judge Luck pushed back on that. According to Luck, there are ways to implement statutes that don’t restrict a consumer’s statutory rights. This exchange was also telling:

LUCK: Without the regulation do you agree with me that the statute would allow it?

FCC: Yes.

LUCK: If so, then it’s not an implementation. It’s a restriction.

Luck was not the only Judge who pushed back on the FCC. Judge Branch (I believe because she was not identified) also strongly pushed back on the FCC’s restriction on topically and logically associated as an element of consent. Branch stated that the FCC was looking at consumer behavior and essentially stated too many consumers didn’t know what they were doing in giving consent. The FCC stated “I think we have to look at how the industry was operating…” only to be interrupted by Branch who questioned that statement by asking “Don’t you have to look at what the statute says?”

YIKES.

Finally, the FCC’s turn in oral argument ended with this exchange:

JUDGE: Perhaps the question should be “We have a problem here. We should talk to Congress about it.”

FCC: Congress did task the agency to implement here.

JUDGE: It’s given you power to implement, not carte blanche.

DOUBLE YIKES.

There was also a conversation around whether or not the panel should issue a stay in this case. The IMC argued that yes – a stay was appropriate due to the uncertainty in the market.

It’s pretty clear that the judges questioned the statutory authority of the FCC to implement the 1:1 consent and the topically and logically related portions of the definition of prior express written consent.

While we don’t have a definitive answer yet on this issue, we do know this is going to be a lot more interesting than everyone thought before the oral arguments.

We will keep you up to date on this and we will have more information soon.

Litigants Beware: Unjust Enrichment v. Quantum Meruit

The distinction between unjust enrichment claims and quantum meruit claims have long bedeviled courts and practitioners. In Core Finance Team Affiliates v. Maine Medical Center, the Law Court provided important guidance regarding the differences between these claims while leaving open a difficult question relating to the implications of pursuing one claim but not the other.

Core Finance involved a suit by a contractor against hospitals relating to the provision of services for reimbursement submittals. The contractor asserted claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. After a jury concluded that the contractor failed to prove the existence of a contract, the court held a bench trial and awarded damages to the contractor for unjust enrichment.

The Law Court reversed the judgment on narrow grounds—namely, that the contractor failed to “prove the damages recoverable under either a quantum meruit theory or an unjust enrichment theory.” The Court concluded that, absent proof of conscious wrongdoing, “the appropriate measure of damages” for an unjust enrichment claim is the same as for a quantum meruit claim: “the market value of [defendant’s] uncompensated contractual performance.” The contractor had not presented evidence of the value of its services; rather, its evidence focused on the increase in reimbursement to the hospitals (i.e., the value to the defendants of the services). Thus, the record did not contain a sufficient basis for correctly determining damages.

Although this holding is of note in its own right, it was preceded by a particularly notable discussion of the differences between a quantum meruit claim and an unjust enrichment claim. The parties had disputed whether the trial court should have considered the unjust enrichment claim at all, absent any quantum meruit claim. The hospitals argued that the contractor had to exhaust its legal remedies by pursuing a quantum meruit claim before pursuing an unjust enrichment claim.

Discussing this issue, the Court emphasized that a quantum meruit claim involves “recovery for services or materials provided under an implied contract.” It thus involves enforcement of a promise, and is a legal remedy. An unjust enrichment claim, by contrast, does not involve an implied contract, but rather involves compelled performance “of a legal and moral duty to pay.” Unjust enrichment does not involve any express or implied promise, and is an equitable remedy.

The Court went on to observe that it had “never stated that an unjust enrichment claim involving the rendition of services cannot be adjudicated until after the court has rejected a quantum meruit claim involving the same services.” Importantly, it then acknowledged that this “premise can readily be inferred” for two reasons: (1) the limitation on the availability of equitable remedies if there is an adequate legal remedy, and (2) the primacy over contract over unjust enrichment in the remedial scheme, which requires determining whether an express contract exists before considering quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims. The Court noted that equitable remedies should be granted “only when there is not an adequate legal remedy,” and that “the court need not consider unjust enrichment if quantum meruit is an adequate remedy.” Having said all that, however, the Court declined “to explore the dilemma further,” instead resolving the case on the damages issue.

The Court’s lengthy discussion is dicta, but it is important nevertheless. Although the Court did not hold that the failure to bring a quantum meruit claim barred an unjust enrichment claim, the Court walked right up to that line. Its language certainly is suggestive that it would so hold if it had to resolve the issue. As such, Core Finance is an important guidepost for litigants considering which claims to bring in the alternative to a breach of contract claim.

Trial Tactics: It Starts in Discovery

Trial preparation starts in discovery.

Yes, that statement seems a bit ridiculous – especially considering the fact that the majority of civil matters will never see a courtroom – but working a case backwards with trial prep as a starting point is truly the only way to ensure you are truly doing everything in your power to zealously protect your client’s interests and fully develop your client’s defenses in each case. This is especially important if the majority of your practice is within the same subset of law, such as toxic torts.

Embracing the “work backwards” approach has a few key benefits:

  1. It ensures that nothing will be missed or overlooked in discovery.
  2. It prepares you for the unexpected.
  3. It will ultimately save you time and effort down the line.

Thorough Discovery

The eve of trial is not the time to realize you still have questions about the allegations or facts in a case. Hindsight is always 20/20, and by working backwards you can ensure your path forward in a case is clear.

Preparing a trial cross of the witnesses offered for deposition forces you to conduct a more thorough examination during their deposition, which ensures that no questions are left unanswered – or worse, never even asked. You will also have to look at potential exhibits you would want to use at trial which will ensure discovery is fully developed with all the avenues explored.

If an expert deposition is coming up, drafting potential Daubert motions or motions in limine can help you to fully develop what you need to obtain from their deposition prior to same.

The Unexpected

During settlement negotiations, Plaintiff’s Counsel unexpectedly demands double what the case is worth, in an attempt to catch you off guard and force your hand as trial is approaching. However, since you have worked backwards for this case, you are ready to call their bluff or, better yet, go forward with trial on your client’s behalf.

By embracing this approach, you have already developed potential Daubert motions, motions in limine, and cross examinations of Plaintiff’s expected witnesses, which you used to draft your cross outlines for each deposition. Further, you also identified all the key documents you plan to use as exhibits and have already incorporated those in discovery or witness depositions.

Time Saved

It is true that some trial prep is best saved for right before trial – such as the final draft of your opening statement, cross examinations, etc. However, by taking the work backwards approach, the large portion of the substance – or the most time-consuming part – should already be completed for each trial task.

Arguably, it is an injustice to your client if you are not adequately preparing for all potential outcomes – no matter how unlikely or distant trial may be – but also just as important is it allows you to think outside the box and continue to develop your skills as a trial attorney.

Federal District Court Issues Nationwide Preliminary Injunction Barring Enforcement of Corporate Transparency Act

In Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al., a federal district court judge issued a nationwide preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”), finding that the CTA likely exceeds Congress’s powers. Therefore, at present, a reporting company is not obligated to comply with the CTA and the government is enjoined from enforcing the CTA’s reporting requirements. As expected, on December 5, 2024, the government entered a notice of appeal of the preliminary injunction and may still seek a stay of the preliminary injunction pending the appeal. If a stay is granted by the Court of Appeals, the reporting obligations would once again be in effect. The Court of Appeals could also decide to keep the preliminary injunction in place while an appeal is pending.

At this time, companies are not required to file Beneficial Ownership Information (“BOI”) reports, although they are free to do so should they choose. Indeed, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued guidance after the entry of the notice of appeal, stating as much: “In light of a recent federal court order, reporting companies are not currently required to file beneficial ownership information with FinCEN and are not subject to liability if they fail to do so while the order remains in force. However, reporting companies may continue to voluntarily submit beneficial ownership information reports.” (available at https://www.fincen.gov/boi.)

At present, it is unknown how long companies would be given to file if the preliminary injunction is stayed, modified or the law is ultimately upheld. However, FinCEN’s statement suggests that a reasonable extension of time for filing can be expected, though that is not a certainty. Of course, if the CTA is ultimately struck down, no filing would be required.

FCA Enforcement & Compliance Digest — Fall 2024 False Claims Act Newsletter

Welcome to the Fall 2024 issue of “FCA Enforcement & Compliance Digest,” our quarterly newsletter in which we compile essential updates on False Claims Act (FCA) enforcement trends, litigation, agency guidance, and compliance tips. We bring you the most recent and significant insights in an accessible format, concluding with our main takeaways — aka “And the Fox Says…” — on what you need to know.

In this Fall 2024 edition, we cover:

  1. Enforcement Trends: Manufacturers challenge AKS intent requirement as reflected in recent denials of OIG Advisory Opinion requests.
  2. Litigation Developments: Implications of Florida judge’s ruling that the FCA qui tam provision is unconstitutional.
  3. Compliance Corner: What health care companies need to know about AI.
  4. ICYMI: Federal Court Permits Investors to Resume Kickback Suit Against Teva

1. Enforcement Trends

Do Violations of the AKS Require a ‘Corrupt’ Intent? Manufacturers Challenge the OIG’s Interpretation of the Statute

In a series of recent lawsuits filed by the pharmaceutical industry against the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), manufactures are challenging the OIG’s interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Statue (AKS), arguing that violations of the statute require a corrupt intent. While courts have so far ruled in OIG’s favor, should a court accept this argument, the AKS regulatory landscape could be upended, providing health care providers and suppliers the opportunity to develop and implement arrangements that have historically been prohibited by the OIG.

The challenges to OIG’s interpretation of the AKS come in the context of OIG Advisory Opinion requests submitted by the manufacturers (or a related charity) proposing various forms of patient assistance programs under which the manufacturers or their related charities offer financial assistance to patients on the manufacturers’ products. The OIG denied each of the Advisory Opinion requests, finding that the proposed forms of patient assistance would constitute remuneration intended to induce patients to purchase the manufacturers’ drugs in violation of the AKS.

The OIG has consistently reiterated its opposition to manufacturer-operated patient assistance programs, with both the OIG’s 2005 Special Advisory Bulletin: Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees and the 2014 Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient Assistance Programs noting that manufacturers cannot provide co-pay assistance to federal health care program beneficiaries, as doing so would constitute a kickback. However, the guidance also described the parameters under which independent charities can provide co-pay assistance, including assistance to federal health care program beneficiaries (i.e., Medicare beneficiaries). One of the key factors with respect to the operation of charitable patient assistance programs, is the independence of the charities operating the programs. While the independent charities are primarily funded by manufacturers, to be considered independent for OIG’s purposes, the charities must retain independence from donors. This means the donors cannot influence the design or operation of the patient assistance programs, and the programs cannot favor patients on the donor’s drug (e.g., assistance cannot be contingent upon the patient being prescribed a donor’s drug).

In three separate litigations, Pfizer Inc. v. United States Department of Health and Human ServicesVertex Pharmaceuticals Incorporated v. United States Department of Health and Human Services et al., and Pharmaceutical Coalition for Patient Access v. United States of America et al., manufacturers are challenging OIG’s long-held position that manufacturers cannot provide patient assistance, including co-pay assistance, to federal health care program beneficiaries. In doing so, the goal of the manufacturers is to provide assistance to patients, including co-pay support, either directly or through a charity that is not considered independent by OIG’s standards due to the relationship of the proposed charities to the manufactures and the level of influence by the manufacturers over the proposed charities. In each litigation, the manufacturer or, in the case of the Pharmaceutical Coalition for Patient Access (PCPA), the charity controlled by the manufacturers, is challenging an unfavorable Advisory Opinion issued by OIG concluding that the proposed patient assistance programs would constitute remuneration intended to induce patients to use a particular manufacturer’s products.

Under the arrangements proposed by Pfizer and PCPA, the proposed charities would be funded exclusively by manufacturers and would only provide support to patients on those funders’ drugs. In Pfizer’s Advisory Opinion request, the company proposed two potential co-pay assistance programs: (1) a direct co-pay assistance program and (2) a Pfizer-supported charity co-pay assistance program. Similar to the proposed Pfizer-supported charity co-pay assistance program, PCPA, an organization funded by manufacturers of Part-D-covered oncology drugs, proposed to create its own patient assistance program that would provide co-pay assistance to patients who meet certain qualifying criteria and then invoice each participating manufacturer for “the total amount of cost-sharing subsidies provided to eligible Part D enrollees.”

Vertex’s Advisory Opinion request focused on a proposed “Fertility Preservation Program” under which Vertex would pay fertility providers through a third-party vendor for the treatments provided to patients enrolled in the program. While this proposed program involved coverage of related treatment costs (i.e., the costs of the fertility treatments) rather than coverage of the co-pay costs associated with the Vertex drug itself, OIG nonetheless applied the same reasoning as in the Pfizer and PCPA opinions, concluding that the program would constitute remuneration to the patients in violation of the AKS.

In each litigation, the manufacturer (or, in the case of PCPA, the manufacturer-related charity) is challenging OIG’s position that the manufacturer’s subsidies constitute “remuneration” meant “to induce” patients to purchase manufactures’ products. The manufacturers argue that the AKS criminalizes conduct that “leads or tempts to the commission of crime” through “remuneration” that corrupts medical decision-making, as part of a quid pro quo transaction. In other words, according to the manufacturers, “to induce” requires a corrupt intent. Therefore, because the manufactures’ efforts to assist patients with meeting Medicare co-pay obligations or gaining access to Medicare-covered treatments (or treatments otherwise covered by the federal health care programs) are not done with malice or corrupt intent, such programs would not violate the AKS.

To date, no court has agreed with the manufacturers’ position. While Vertex is still pending trial in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled against Pfizer, noting that “the law is clear that absent an express carve-out, the Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits any remuneration intended to induce someone to purchase or receive a drug or medical service.” Similarly, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled against PCPA, concluding that HHS OIG’s “interpretation of the AKS adheres faithfully [to] the statute’s plain text, comports with its context, and does not offend its history.” On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision in Pfizer, finding that an AKS violation does not require “corrupt intent.” Pfizer then appealed to the US Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. PCPA’s case is currently on appeal with the Fourth Circuit.

Should the Vertex court or a court of appeals agree that the statutory terms “induce” and “remuneration” should be construed more narrowly and require a corrupt intent to violate the AKS, AKS regulatory interpretation and much of OIG’s guidance could be called into question. Arrangements that have historically been viewed as suspect by the OIG could be considered compliant to the extent the parties lacked a corrupt intent to violate the law.

And the Fox Says… Ongoing efforts challenging OIG’s statutory interpretation of the AKS demonstrate manufacturers’ interests in narrowing the scope of prohibited activities under the law. Providers and suppliers should continue monitoring the ongoing litigation and any future efforts to challenge OIG’s interpretation of the AKS, as any judicial narrowing of the interpretation could provide opportunities to develop innovative arrangements that may be beneficial to patients. Regardless, developing compliant arrangements to benefit patients can be complicated, and legal counsel can help to ensure you remain apprised of all relevant developments and assist in structuring compliant arrangements.

2. Litigation Developments

What Is the FCA Without Its Qui Player? A Look Into Zafirov’s Future Implications and the Enforceability of the FCA Without a Qui Tam Device

As we previously discussed, a Florida federal district court recently held in Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates LLC that the FCA qui tam provision is unconstitutional. The court reasoned that a relator who litigates an FCA lawsuit on behalf of the United States is not a properly appointed “officer” under Article II of the US Constitution and, thus, does not have the authority to serve in that position. This article examines several questions: What does FCA enforcement look like without a qui tam device? What questions did Zafirov leave unresolved? And what should one expect in the coming years as this issue is litigated on appeal and among other courts?

Can the government successfully enforce the FCA without a qui tam device? If, in the end, the qui tam provision is voided, that does not spell doom for the FCA. This is because the government still has the authority to file FCA actions itself and could hire many more attorneys to investigate and prosecute them. The government also has other mechanisms to entice whistleblowers to come out of the woodwork and inform it of wrongdoing. For example, recently, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the “Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program.” This enforcement program compensates whistleblowers who inform the DOJ of original and truthful information concerning corporate misconduct. If the information leads to a successful forfeiture of over $1 million, the whistleblower is compensated. Currently, however, the program does not cover FCA claims. But the DOJ or US Congress could theoretically expand this program, or create a new one, to attract whistleblowers who have information concerning FCA violations. Under such a program, the government’s litigation of FCA claims would not be all that different from what happens currently. Rather than intervene in a meritorious FCA case brought by a relator, the government would file its own case based on information provided by a whistleblower. This would avoid the constitutional pitfalls identified in Zafirov. A post-qui tam landscape will certainly see fewer FCA claims being filed overall, but the government would likely file more FCA claims than it does now.

Still, many questions remain unresolved under Zafirov concerning the extent to which relator suits are constitutionally permissible. In Zafirov, the relator was litigating an FCA suit in which the United States declined to intervene. But what happens if the United States does intervene and takes over the case? Are those suits permissible? Does the relator act as an “officer” if her role is just limited to filing a lawsuit? Could the government get around Zafirov by intervening in more cases? Or are all FCA lawsuits filed by a relator invalid ab initio even if the government intervenes? If so, would Congress have to create a mechanism to appoint a relator as an officer for FCA purposes? In short, it is unclear how broadly Zafirov will be read. On one hand, it could be read to only apply to non-intervened cases. On the other hand, the very act of filing a complaint on behalf of the United States may require a constitutional appointment, and the government’s intervention would not cure that taint. These questions will remain unresolved until they are addressed by the Supreme Court.

Only time will tell what will happen as this issue percolates in the courts. Already, several circuit courts have upheld the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions. In the district courts located in circuits that have not yet addressed this issue, defendants are filing dispositive motions arguing that the relator’s appointment is unconstitutional. Though the decision in Zafirov is currently an outlier, it soon may not be as more courts consider arguments that rely on Zafirov’s reasoning.

And the Fox Says… Zafirov is significant because it may be the first blow to a significant enforcement mechanism on which the government heavily relies. But the qui tam provision’s fate is not set in stone. The relator in Zafirov will almost certainly appeal the decision to the Atlanta-based Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. That court’s decision may then be appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeals process for Zafirov may take years before the Supreme Court grants certiorari on the issue (if it does at all). In the meantime, the issue is not going away, and Zafirov is unlikely to be a one-off case. Those who are in the throes of an FCA investigation or litigation should raise this issue as a possible litigation risk or as an affirmative defense. The best possible time to raise this issue amid litigation is on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Even if a case is past this point, Zafirov supports the position that such an argument is not waived, given that the issue goes to the relator’s very authority to bring the suit. So, defendants litigating a case brought by a relator should raise this issue as soon as possible. We at ArentFox Schiff will continue to monitor developments to help our clients navigate this ever-changing legal landscape.

3. Compliance Corner

AI Under the DOJ Microscope: How Health Care Companies Should Respond

Many companies, including health care companies, have incorporated artificial intelligence (AI) into their business practices. While historically, AI has largely been unregulated, that is starting to change. Recently, state governments have begun regulating the use of AI in the health care setting, as our colleagues summarized here regarding recently passed California legislation requiring health care facilities, clinics, and physician practices in the state to disclose the use of AI in communications regarding patient clinical information. Now, AI has the attention of the DOJ.

This past March, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco indicated the DOJ’s interest in AI, stating at the American Bar Association’s 39th National Institute on White Collar Crime that “fraud using AI is still fraud.” Following Monaco’s statement, in September, the Criminal Division of the DOJ updated its Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) guidelines to require DOJ prosecutors to consider whether a company’s compliance program safeguards against misuse of AI or other emerging technologies. As a brief primer, the ECCP is a DOJ document that prosecutors use to evaluate the effectiveness of a corporate compliance program in determining whether to criminally charge a company. The document is published publicly and provides helpful insight into the DOJ’s expectations for companies as they build and implement their corporate compliance programs.

Under the updated guidance, the DOJ emphasizes that companies need to assess AI-related risks as part of their overall enterprise risk management systems. Specifically, a corporate compliance program must consider whether it has specific policies and procedures to prevent “any potential negative or unintended consequences” resulting from the use of AI in its business practices and compliance program. Additionally, a company should proactively conduct risk analyses of its use of AI and mitigate the potential for “deliberate or reckless misuse of technologies” by company insiders. Other key considerations are whether the company trains its employees on the use of AI, whether there is a baseline of human decision-making used to assess AI-generated content, and how the company implements accountability over the use of AI.

In its September update, the DOJ also revised a section of the ECCP, asking whether compliance personnel have access to relevant data sources to allow for “timely and effective monitoring and/or testing” of policies, controls, and transactions. A key consideration is whether the assets, resources, and technology available to compliance programs are comparable to those available elsewhere in the company. An imbalance in access to technology and resources may indicate a compliance program’s inability to detect and mitigate risks, particularly if a business unit is given unfettered access to AI tools while compliance lags behind.

Compliance officers at health care companies should take steps now to ensure that the implementation and use of AI within their organizations do not raise any compliance red flags. Consider the recent Texas Attorney General settlement with Pieces Technologies, a company that markets generative AI products, which resolved allegations that the company made misleading statements regarding the accuracy of its products. As part of the settlement, Pieces agreed to provide more explicit disclosures to customers related to how the company’s products should be used and the potential harm that could result from the products.

Providers using such technologies may encounter data privacy and security risks, including cybersecurity risks such as ransomware and malware attacks, bias and fairness concerns with respect to the training of the AI systems that may result in preference for a particular drug or treatment, and reliability and accountability concerns affecting a health care professional’s ability to provide patient care. With that being said, the DOJ could conduct investigations similar to the Pieces investigation against health care providers that use AI without considering these risks.

To help mitigate the risks associated with AI, including in the event of a DOJ investigation, compliance officers should be involved during all stages of discussions around AI initiatives, including through implementation and use. Compliance officers should ensure their companies have appropriate policies and procedures governing the use of AI once it is introduced to their organizations and provide training to employees both on the AI technology and on the policies governing its use. Finally, compliance officers should ensure they have the necessary access to AI systems to conduct compliance oversight measures. Such oversight measures may include assessing AI-related risks as part of their organization’s annual risk assessment, conducting AI-related auditing, and monitoring to help identify potential issues with the technology as they arise.

And the Fox Says… The DOJ’s AI-focused compliance guidance is a call to action for companies to proactively address the legal and regulatory implications of AI technologies, reminding them that the age of AI requires more than just innovation — it demands robust compliance strategies. Companies that conduct regular risk assessments of their practices must consider the use of AI, update policies and procedures to address its use, provide compliance teams with equal data access, and regularly update training on the lawful use of these technologies. Empowering compliance personnel and working with outside compliance experts to make these regular updates will put a company in a good position to meet these new standards. By embracing these guidelines, companies can mitigate legal and regulatory risks while leveraging the capabilities of AI technologies.

4. In Case You Missed It

Our most popular blog post from the last quarter: Federal Court Permits Investors to Resume Kickback Suit Against Teva.