Category: Litigation

Holy Hemp: New Jersey Court Partially Invalidates Hemp Law

On Oct. 10, 2024, a New Jersey Federal District Court made a big decision on hemp. The Court largely invalidated New Jersey’s recent attempt to tighten controls on “intoxicating hemp products” like Delta-8 and Delta-10, which were previously sold in gas stations, smoke shops, and convenience stores without much oversight. The state had put forward amendments aimed at restricting these products to those over 21 and regulating them like cannabis. New Jersey argued that it was time to clamp down on these sales, citing public health concerns and the rising number of minors getting their hands on these potent, unregulated products.

NJ Gov. Phil Murphy had signed off on these amendments despite admitting the law wasn’t perfect. For him, protecting minors was the priority. And today, the Court shared that sentiment—partially. It kept in place only the part that prevents the sale of these products to minors.

As for the rest of the amendment? The Court struck it down. The reason? It found that New Jersey’s approach violated federal law, essentially treating hemp products from out-of-state differently from those produced locally under the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory Commission’s new process. This selective control crossed the line, according to the Dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution and provisions in the Federal Farm Act, which stops states from blocking the transport of hemp products.

The Court’s decision made it clear that New Jersey does have the power to regulate these sales, but the amendments need legislative fine-tuning to meet federal standards. So, while New Jersey’s push to regulate intoxicating hemp is on pause, this is far from over.

Here’s where the decision makes things complicated for sellers: By Oct. 12, shops were supposed to pull these hemp products from the shelves, including Delta-8 drinks and THC-A gummies. That means, until New Jersey’s Cannabis Regulatory Commission issues new rules, those products are off-limits.

For anyone in the hemp or cannabis business in New Jersey, it’s a loud reminder—stay compliant, stay updated, and be ready to adapt quickly to changes.

by: Benjamin Sheppard of Norris McLaughlin P.A.
©2024 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

For more news on Hemp Legality, visit the NLR Biotech, Food, & Drug section.

The Power of Incorporation Compels You: Surety Succeeds in Compelling Contractor to Arbitrate Bond Claims Pursuant to Arbitration Clause in Subcontract

In Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Argonaut Insurance Co., Swinerton Builders, a contractor, sued a surety on bond claims arising from defaults by its subcontractor on a series of work orders. The owner of Swinerton’s mechanical subcontractor on three projects passed away unexpectedly, and the subcontractor was unable to complete its remaining work on the projects.

Swinerton filed a complaint in August 2023 against Argonaut, the subcontractor’s surety, seeking to recover on the payment and performance bonds issued by Argonaut. The complaint also included claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fraud. Argonaut responded by moving to dismiss based on the arbitration clause in Swinerton’s subcontract. The bonds at issue incorporated by reference the subcontract, including the arbitration provision. The federal district court converted the motion to dismiss to a motion to stay and compel arbitration based on the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act.

To compel arbitration, the court noted that Argonaut must show that there was an agreement to arbitrate with Swinerton and that the disputes at issue fell under that agreement. Swinerton argued that it only agreed to arbitrate disputes between Swinerton and the subcontractor and that the arbitration provision did not apply to Argonaut, a non-signatory to the subcontract agreement.

The court disagreed with Swinerton and granted Argonaut’s motion. Relying on precedent holding that a surety may be bound by an arbitration provision where the bond incorporates the underlying contract containing the arbitration clause, the court ruled that the same rationale supported the surety’s motion to compel in this instance. The court also did not find persuasive Swinerton’s argument that it should not be compelled to arbitrate where the bonded subcontractor’s default was not disputed. The court determined the alleged breaches of the subcontract would have to be arbitrated.

It is not clear why Argonaut elected to pursue arbitration as opposed to litigating the bond claims. The surety may have been concerned with the bad faith and fraud claims asserted by Swinerton and concluded that arbitrating such disputes would be preferable to a jury trial on those issues. However, the court did note that the arbitrator would retain authority to determine which of Swinerton’s claims were arbitrable under the arbitration agreement, so there remains a risk that some of the claims will be referred back to the court by the arbitrator. Regardless, for parties choosing whether to arbitrate or litigate under their construction contracts, the expansive application of the arbitration provision by the court in Swinerton Builders is another factor to be considered, especially where performance is secured by third-party bonds, guarantees, and other instruments.

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© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on Contractors, visit the NLR Construction Law section

The Power of Incorporation Compels You: Surety Succeeds in Compelling Contractor to Arbitrate Bond Claims Pursuant to Arbitration Clause in Subcontract

In Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Argonaut Insurance Co., Swinerton Builders, a contractor, sued a surety on bond claims arising from defaults by its subcontractor on a series of work orders. The owner of Swinerton’s mechanical subcontractor on three projects passed away unexpectedly, and the subcontractor was unable to complete its remaining work on the projects.

Swinerton filed a complaint in August 2023 against Argonaut, the subcontractor’s surety, seeking to recover on the payment and performance bonds issued by Argonaut. The complaint also included claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fraud. Argonaut responded by moving to dismiss based on the arbitration clause in Swinerton’s subcontract. The bonds at issue incorporated by reference the subcontract, including the arbitration provision. The federal district court converted the motion to dismiss to a motion to stay and compel arbitration based on the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act.

To compel arbitration, the court noted that Argonaut must show that there was an agreement to arbitrate with Swinerton and that the disputes at issue fell under that agreement. Swinerton argued that it only agreed to arbitrate disputes between Swinerton and the subcontractor and that the arbitration provision did not apply to Argonaut, a non-signatory to the subcontract agreement.

The court disagreed with Swinerton and granted Argonaut’s motion. Relying on precedent holding that a surety may be bound by an arbitration provision where the bond incorporates the underlying contract containing the arbitration clause, the court ruled that the same rationale supported the surety’s motion to compel in this instance. The court also did not find persuasive Swinerton’s argument that it should not be compelled to arbitrate where the bonded subcontractor’s default was not disputed. The court determined the alleged breaches of the subcontract would have to be arbitrated.

It is not clear why Argonaut elected to pursue arbitration as opposed to litigating the bond claims. The surety may have been concerned with the bad faith and fraud claims asserted by Swinerton and concluded that arbitrating such disputes would be preferable to a jury trial on those issues. However, the court did note that the arbitrator would retain authority to determine which of Swinerton’s claims were arbitrable under the arbitration agreement, so there remains a risk that some of the claims will be referred back to the court by the arbitrator. Regardless, for parties choosing whether to arbitrate or litigate under their construction contracts, the expansive application of the arbitration provision by the court in Swinerton Builders is another factor to be considered, especially where performance is secured by third-party bonds, guarantees, and other instruments.

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© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on Contractors, visit the NLR Construction Law section

Artificial Intelligence and the Rise of Product Liability Tort Litigation: Novel Action Alleges AI Chatbot Caused Minor’s Suicide

As we predicted a year ago, the Plaintiffs’ Bar continues to test new legal theories attacking the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology in courtrooms across the country. Many of the complaints filed to date have included the proverbial kitchen sink: copyright infringement; privacy law violations; unfair competition; deceptive and acts and practices; negligence; right of publicity, invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion; unjust enrichment; larceny; receipt of stolen property; and failure to warn (typically, a strict liability tort).

A case recently filed in Florida federal court, Garcia v. Character Techs., Inc., No. 6:24-CV-01903 (M.D. Fla. filed Oct. 22, 2024) (Character Tech) is one to watch. Character Tech pulls from the product liability tort playbook in an effort to hold a business liable for its AI technology. While product liability is governed by statute, case law or both, the tort playbook generally involves a defective, unreasonably dangerous “product” that is sold and causes physical harm to a person or property. In Character Tech, the complaint alleges (among other claims discussed below) that the Character.AI software was designed in a way that was not reasonably safe for minors, parents were not warned of the foreseeable harms arising from their children’s use of the Character.AI software, and as a result a minor committed suicide. Whether and how Character Tech evolves past a motion to dismiss will offer valuable insights for developers AI technologies.

The Complaint

On October 22nd, 2024, Ms. Garcia, the mother of the deceased minor (Sewell), filed a complaint in the Middle District of Florida against Google LLC, Character Technologies Inc. and the creators of Character.AI—Noam Shazeer and Daniel De Frietas Adiwarsana. Shazeer and De Frietas formed Character Technologies Inc. after they left their prior jobs at Google LLC and subsequently developed and marketed Character.AI.

Character.AI allows users to communicate with existing Character.AI characters – such as Interviewer or Trip Planner – or to create new AI characters using Character.AI’s tools. A user can then engage with the Character.AI character – whether for human-like conversations, such as to answer questions, write a story, translate or write code – based on Character Tech’s large language model chatbot. According to the Complaint, Character.AI was rated as suitable for children until July 2024.

The Complaint alleges that Character.AI’s chatbot led Sewell to commit suicide. The Plaintiff claims her son became instantly addicted to Character.AI, leading to drastic behavioral changes such as sleep deprivation, school-related issues and low self-esteem. Her son primarily engaged with Character.AI characters from the HBO series Game of Thrones. The conversations with Game of Thrones’ female characters (such as Rhaenyra Targaryen and Daenerys Targaryen) involved sexualized content. Sewell also expressed his own dark thoughts such as “[t]he world I’m in now is such a cruel one. One where I’m meaningless. But, I’ll keep living and trying to get back to you so we can be together again, my love.” According to the Complaint, after Ms. Garcia took her son’s phone away, Sewell would use extraordinary measures to engage with Character.AI characters.

In his last conversation with a Character.AI character, Sewell told the character that he wanted to “come home” and the character replied, “[please] come home to me as soon as possible, my love,” to which he responded, “[w]hat if I told you I could come home right now?” The character answered, “…please do, my sweet king.” Seconds later, Sewell took his own life.

The Claims

The Complaint asserts a host of claims centered around an alleged lack of safeguards for Character.AI and the exploitation of minors. The most significant claims are noted below:

  • The Product Liability Torts

The Plaintiff alleges both strict liability and negligence claims for a failure to warn and defective design. The first hurdle under these product liability claims is whether Character.AI is a product. She argues that Character.AI is a product because it has a definite appearance and location on a user’s phone, it is personal and movable, it is a “good” rather than an idea, copies of Character.AI are uniform and not customized, there are an unlimited number of copies that can be obtained and it can be accessed on the internet without an account. This first step may, however, prove difficult for the Plaintiff because Character.AI is not a traditional tangible good and courts have wrestled over whether similar technologies are services—existing outside the realm of product liability. See In re Social Media Adolescent Addiction, 702 F. Supp. 3d 809, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (rejecting both parties’ simplistic approaches to the services or products inquiry because “cases exist on both sides of the questions posed by this litigation precisely because it is the functionalities of the alleged products that must be analyzed”).

The failure to warn claims allege that the Defendants had knowledge of the inherent dangers of the Character.AI chatbots, as shown by public statements of industry experts, regulatory bodies and the Defendants themselves. These alleged dangers include knowledge that the software utilizes data sets that are highly toxic and sexual to train itself, common industry knowledge that using tactics to convince users that it is human manipulates users’ emotions and vulnerability, and that minors are most susceptible to these negative effects. The Defendants allegedly had a duty to warn users of these risks and breached that duty by failing to warn users and intentionally allowing minors to use Character.AI.

The defective design claims argue the software is defectively designed based on a “Garbage In, Garbage Out” theory. Specifically, Character.AI was allegedly trained based on poor quality data sets “widely known for toxic conversations, sexually explicit material, copyrighted data, and even possible child sexual abuse material that produced flawed outputs.” Some of these alleged dangers include the unlicensed practice of psychotherapy, sexual exploitation and solicitation of minors, chatbots tricking users into thinking they are human, and in this instance, encouraging suicide. Further, the Complaint alleges that Character.AI is unreasonably and inherently dangerous for the general public—particularly minors—and numerous safer alternative designs are available.

  • Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices

The Plaintiff asserts a deceptive and unfair trade practices claim under Florida state law. The Complaint alleges the Defendants represented that Character.AI characters mimic human interaction, which contradicts Character Tech’s disclaimer that Character.AI characters are “not real.” These representations constitute dark patterns that manipulate consumers into using Character.AI, buying subscriptions and providing personal data.

The Plaintiff also alleges that certain characters claim to be licensed or trained mental health professionals and operate as such. The Defendants allegedly failed to conduct testing to determine whether the accuracy of these claims. The Plaintiff argues that by portraying certain chatbots to be therapists—yet not requiring them to adhere to any standards—the Defendants engaged in deceptive trade practices. The Complaint compares this claim to the FTC’s recent action against DONOTPAY, Inc. for its AI-generated legal services that allegedly claimed to operate like a human lawyer without adequate testing.

The Defendants are also alleged to employ AI voice call features intended to mislead and confuse younger users into thinking the chatbots are human. For example, a Character.AI chatbot titled “Mental Health Helper” allegedly identified itself as a “real person” and “not a bot” in communications with a user. The Plaintiff asserts that these deceptive and unfair trade practices resulted in damages, including the Character.AI subscription costs, Sewell’s therapy sessions and hospitalization allegedly caused by his use of Character.AI.

  • Wrongful Death

Ms. Garcia asserts a wrongful death claim arguing the Defendants’ wrongful acts and neglect proximately caused the death of her son. She supports this claim by showing her son’s immediate mental health decline after he began using Character.AI, his therapist’s evaluation that he was addicted to Character.AI characters and his disturbing sexualized conversations with those characters.

  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Ms. Garcia also asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Defendants allegedly engaged in intentional and reckless conduct by introducing AI technology to the public and (at least initially) targeting it to minors without appropriate safety features. Further, the conduct was allegedly outrageous because it took advantage of minor users’ vulnerabilities and collected their data to continuously train the AI technology. Lastly, the Defendants’ conduct caused severe emotional distress to Plaintiff, i.e., the loss of her son.

  • Other Claims

The Plaintiff also asserts claims of negligence per se, unjust enrichment, survivor action and loss of consortium and society.

Lawsuits like Character Tech will surely continue to sprout up as AI technology becomes increasingly popular and intertwined with media consumption – at least until the U.S. AI legal framework catches up with the technology. Currently, the Colorado AI Act (covered here) will become the broadest AI law in the U.S. when it enters into force in 2026.

The Colorado AI Act regulates a “High-Risk Artificial Intelligence System” and is focused on preventing “algorithmic discrimination, for Colorado residents”, i.e., “an unlawful differential treatment or impact that disfavors an individual or group of individuals on the basis of their actual or perceived age, color, disability, ethnicity, genetic information, limited proficiency in the English language, national origin, race, religion, reproductive health, sex, veteran status, or other classification protected under the laws of [Colorado] or federal law.” (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-1701(1).) Whether the Character.AI technology would constitute a High-Risk Artificial Intelligence System is still unclear but may be clarified by the anticipated regulations from the Colorado Attorney General. Other U.S. AI laws also are focused on detecting and preventing bias, discrimination and civil rights in hiring and employment, as well as transparency about sources and ownership of training data for generative AI systems. The California legislature passed a law focused on large AI systems that prohibited a developer from making an AI system available if it presented an “unreasonable risk” of causing or materially enabling “a critical harm.” This law was subsequently vetoed by California Governor Newsome as “well-intentioned” but nonetheless flawed.

While the U.S. AI legal framework – whether in the states or under the new administration – an organization using AI technology must consider how novel issues like the ones raised in Character Tech present new risks.

Daniel Stephen, Naija Perry, and Aden Hochrun contributed to this article

© Copyright 2024 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more on AI, visit the NLR Communications Media Internet section

8 Things to Know About AFFF Lawsuits

Thousands of individual lawsuits have been consolidated into multidistrict litigation (MDL) against the corporations that make aqueous film forming foam (AFFF), a type of firefighting foam that was filled with per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), synthetic chemicals that are now known to be dangerous to human health.

Here are 8 things that you should know about the AFFF firefighting foam lawsuits, according to mass tort lawyer Dr. Nick Oberheiden.

1. AFFF Caused Lots of Chemical Contamination

AFFF is one of the types of foam that firefighters use to put out flames. There are two classes of AFFF firefighting foam:

  1. Class A, which is used for combustible fires, like for wood or paper
  2. Class B, which is used for ignitable liquids like oil, gas, or jet fuel

Class A firefighting foams rely primarily on the water in the foam to put out the flames, though they are still substantially more effective than just using straight water. They have far fewer chemicals in them and are used more often than Class B foams.

Of Class B foams, there are two types:

  1. Foams that have fluorine in them
  2. Foams that do not have fluorine in them

Both foams work the same basic way: By blanketing flammable liquids, they prevent the fuel from catching fire and extinguish any lit fuels by suffocating the flames of the oxygen that they need in order to keep burning. This works far better than water for these types of fires, as the flaming liquids are lighter than water and would float on its surface and continue to burn.

AFFF, however, is a fluorinated type of foam. That fluorine comes in the form of a PFAS compound. There are hundreds of types of these compounds, but they are all based on one of the strongest chemical bonds in organic chemistry; the one between fluorine and carbon.

2. PFAS Chemicals are Everywhere

While PFAS chemicals have been used in firefighting foam since the 1970s, when the U.S. Navy worked in collaboration with the giant chemical corporation 3M to produce a foam that could quickly put out fires on vessels, PFAS compounds have been used in a wide variety of other capacities since the 1940s. A very versatile chemical compound, PFAS chemicals were used to:

  • Prevent or remove stains
  • Suppress or resist heat
  • Waterproof materials or make them water resistant
  • Contain grease or oil

As a result, PFAS chemicals have been added to a huge array of consumer products that span nearly every industry, including:

  • Food packaging and wrapping
  • Pizza boxes
  • Raincoats
  • Water resistant clothing and shoes
  • Non-stick cookware
  • Carpeting
  • Paint
  • Wood stain, varnish, and lacquer

In recent decades, though, researchers have noticed that the sheer ubiquity of these chemicals could pose a threat: The carbon-fluorine bond that these synthetic compounds are based on does not break down naturally, leading to PFAS being dubbed “forever chemicals.” Every piece of PFAS that is produced will continue to be a PFAS until something is done to break it down artificially, like putting the chemical into water and then superheating the water well past its boiling point.

3. PFAS Chemicals are Dangerous

It was not until relatively recently that the public learned two things about these PFAS chemicals:

  1. They had contaminated soil and groundwater across the country, and
  2. They were connected to numerous different medical conditions, including several types of cancers.

The strong chemical bond between carbon and fluorine that was fundamental to PFAS meant that, as it was used or disposed of, it would not break down. Instead, PFAS chemicals would just build up in the soil where they were dumped or would contaminate the groundwater in that soil. Eventually, PFAS chemicals found their way into drinking water and water for crops and animals. From there, it got into the food system.

It was not until the 2000s that this became apparent to the public. By then, there had been nearly 60 years of PFAS buildup.

Around this time, medical researchers also discovered that exposure to PFAS chemicals could lead to PFAS contamination in the bloodstream, which could cause a host of serious medical conditions. While research is still being done to find out what, exactly, PFAS chemicals does in the human body and which medical conditions it can cause, PFAS contamination has been linked to increased risks for:

  • Pregnancy issues, including:
    • Fetal death
    • Birth deformities
    • Hypertension
    • Preeclampsia
    • Low birth weight
    • Developmental delays in young children
  • Liver damage
  • Liver cancer
  • Testicular cancer
  • Thyroid cancer
  • Kidney cancer
  • Prostate cancer
  • Fertility problems
  • A dysfunctional immune system, including decreased effectiveness of vaccines
  • Hormonal imbalances
  • Obesity
  • High cholesterol

These are some serious medical conditions that could end up being fatal. Anyone who was exposed to PFAS chemicals, including those in AFFF, are at risk of developing them and can talk to an AFFF lawyer about filing an AFFF firefighting foam lawsuit.

4. These Cases Involve Yet Another Corporate Cover-Up

As lawsuits over PFAS exposure started to get filed in the 2000s, it quickly became clear that the large corporations who had filled our world with PFAS-heavy products had long known the risks associated with them.

PFAS manufacturer DuPont, one of the largest chemical producers on the planet, instructed its workers to only handle PFAS chemicals with extreme care as early as 1961. PFAS manufacturer 3M had discovered that the company’s PFAS chemicals were inside fish that swam in the water near one of its plants in the 1970s. In the 1980s, DuPont suddenly moved all of its female employees out of the production facility that handled PFAS chemicals – several female DuPont employees in the facility had given birth to children with serious deformities.

In spite of these warning signs, these major corporations continued to dispose of PFAS materials however they wanted to – whether that meant dumping it into the water, burying it in the ground, or burning it into the air. They also continued making new products with PFAS chemicals in them, including AFFF firefighting foam in the 1970s, which was then used by military and civilian firefighters both to put out real fuel fires and to train in putting them out. This continued for three decades, with firefighters pumping PFAS-heavy foam onto airport tarmacs and training areas on military bases across the country, deeply contaminating the soil and nearby waterways and exposing the firefighters to dangerous amounts of PFAS chemicals.

The corporate cover-up would have continued, if it were not for two things. First, in 1998, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) learning of an internal study at one of the major PFAS manufacturers that had found that the offspring of pregnant lab rats who had been exposed to PFAS chemicals were almost guaranteed to die within days. Second, the first class action against the PFAS manufacturer Chemours reached a temporary settlement for $71 million and funding for the C8 Science Panel to research the dangers posed by PFAS chemicals. When the Panel started to publish its findings, Chemours quickly settled the case permanently for $671 million.

5. Other PFAS Lawsuits Have Recovered Billions, and That is Just for Clean Up 

Since that first class action settled, many, many more lawsuits have been filed over PFAS contamination. These lawsuits have targeted the major corporations that have manufactured PFAS products, including:

  • 3M
  • DuPont
  • Chemours
  • BAFS

All told, these MDLs and class actions have settled for over $11 billion. There are two things about these PFAS lawsuits are important to know:

  1. They are confined to compensating for cleanup and decontamination costs, and
  2. They apply to general PFAS products, not specifically to AFFF.

This first point is crucial. The plaintiffs in these huge lawsuits have been water districts that have demanded compensation for the costs of upgrading their filtration equipment and the decontamination of their water and soil. None of the $11 billion is earmarked for the inevitable medical conditions that all of that prior PFAS contamination will cause.

6. AFFF Firefighting Foam: Class Action or MDL? AFFF Lawsuits the First to Allege Personal Injuries and Losses

Now, though, an AFFF firefighting foam MDL includes personal injury claims for medical and financial losses by victims of AFFF exposure for the first time. So you have time to file an AFFF lawsuit and join the MDL.

MDL No. 2873 consolidated hundreds of these AFFF firefighting foam cases in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina in January, 2019. This MDL covers individual victims who have suffered from one of the medical conditions associated with PFAS exposure, who need medical monitoring after being exposed to the chemicals, or who have suffered a financial loss for the diminution in the value of their property due to PFAS contamination. The cases are limited to PFAS exposure from contaminated groundwater near military bases, airports, and other industrial sites due to the use of AFFF that contain either of the two main types of PFAS chemicals used in AFFF:

  1. Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA)
  2. Perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)

When it was first consolidated into an MDL, there were around 500 cases. Since then, it has exploded to over 9,000 claims by July, 2024, with much of the growth coming in recent months.

7. Status and Future of the AFFF MDL

MDLs like this one have become the preferred way to handle mass tort situations: Cases where the misconduct of one or a small handful of companies have led to hundreds or thousands of people suffering in similar or identical ways. By consolidating all of the cases together for pre-trial procedures, like the gathering of evidence and summary judgment motions, the cases can move forward far more efficiently than if they were all on their own.

Even though the MDL was formed over two years ago now, the AFFF litigation is still in its early stages. The defendant corporations, all of whom manufactured and sold AFFF firefighting foams, will advance numerous legal defenses to avoid accountability for their conduct or to at least mitigate the damage of a judgment or the amount of a settlement. Some of the defenses that we will likely hear are:

  • The medical condition a particular person suffered was caused by something else
  • Some other AFFF manufacturer was responsible for a particular area of contamination
  • Plaintiffs waited too long to file their claims and the statute of limitations has expired
  • The company’s version of AFFF has less PFAS chemicals in it than others

In the meantime, a growing body of medical literature is connecting PFAS exposure and contamination to serious medical issues. We may even see new medical conditions getting linked to AFFF and the toxic chemicals in it.

As evidence is gathered, settlement talks will begin. If these prove to be fruitless, the court will schedule bellwether trials. These are individual cases that are representative of the rest of the cases in the MDL that are brought through a jury trial. The outcome of those trials are then used to inform further settlement discussions, which nearly always resolve the MDL outside of the courtroom.

8. How This Will Likely End

PFAS lawsuits have been equated to the Big Tobacco Settlement, when cigarette companies settled a class action against them for huge sums. In both cases, the large corporations knew that the products that they were selling were likely to cause life-threatening medical conditions, but continued to sell them and took affirmative actions to cover up evidence that there was any risk.

In the end, though, the most important factor will be the solvency of the defendant corporations that make AFFF. Some of them are substantially larger than others and will be better able to pay the huge settlements that we are likely to see. According to mass tort lawyer Dr. Nick Oberheiden, founding partner of the national law firm Oberheiden P.C. and leading attorney on AFFF cases, “As evidence is gathered, it will become more and more clear what the defendant corporations owe. If they are not able to pay it, they are more likely to extend this MDL to the bellwether trial stage in a risky attempt to avoid settling and try to beat it, altogether. Another option that they would have in this situation is to file for bankruptcy and create a victim’s trust fund, much like asbestos companies did in order to resolve the class action against them for causing mesothelioma.”

Oberheiden P.C. © 2024
For more news on Aqueous Film Forming Foam Litigation, visit the NLR Health Law & Managed Care  section.

PRIVACY ON ICE: A Chilling Look at Third-Party Data Risks for Companies

An intelligent lawyer could tackle a problem and figure out a solution. But a brilliant lawyer would figure out how to prevent the problem to begin with. That’s precisely what we do here at Troutman Amin. So here is the latest scoop to keep you cool. A recent case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Smith v. Yeti Coolers, L.L.C., No. 24-cv-01703-RFL, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194481 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024), addresses complex issues surrounding online privacy and the liability of companies who enable third parties to collect and use consumer data without proper disclosures or consent.

Here, Plaintiff alleged that Yeti Coolers (“Yeti”) used a third-party payment processor, Adyen, that collected customers’ personal and financial information during transactions on Yeti’s website. Plaintiff claimed Adyen then stored this data and used it for its own commercial purposes, like marketing fraud prevention services to merchants, without customers’ knowledge or consent. Alarm bells should be sounding off in your head—this could signal a concerning trend in data practices.

Plaintiff sued Yeti under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”) for violating California Penal Code Sections 631(a) (wiretapping) and 632 (recording confidential communications). Plaintiff also brought a claim under the California Constitution for invasion of privacy. The key question here was whether Yeti could be held derivatively liable for Adyen’s alleged wrongful conduct.

So, let’s break this down step by step.

Under the alleged CIPA Section 631(a) violation, the court found that Plaintiff plausibly alleged Adyen violated this Section by collecting customer data as a third-party eavesdropper without proper consent. In analyzing whether Yeti’s Privacy Policy and Terms of Use constituted enforceable agreements, it applied the legal frameworks for “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” agreements.

Luckily, my Contracts professor during law school here in Florida was remarkable, Todd J. Clark, now the Dean of Widner University Delaware Law School. For those who snoozed out during Contracts class during law school, here is a refresher:

Clickwrap agreements present the website’s terms to the user and require the user to affirmatively click an “I agree” button to proceed. Browsewrap agreements simply post the terms via a hyperlink at the bottom of the webpage. For either type of agreement to be enforceable, the Court explained that a website must provide 1) reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms and 2) require some action unambiguously manifesting assent. See Oberstein v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., 60 F.4th 505, 515 (9th Cir. 2023).

The Court held that while Yeti’s pop-up banner and policy links were conspicuous, they did not create an enforceable clickwrap agreement because “Defendant’s pop-up banner does not require individuals to click an “I agree” button, nor does it include any language to imply that by proceeding to use the website, users reasonably consent to Defendant’s terms and conditions of use.” See Smith, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194481, at *8. The Court also found no enforceable browsewrap agreement was formed because although the policies were conspicuously available, “Defendant’s website does not require additional action by users to demonstrate assent and does not conspicuously notify them that continuing to use to website constitutes assent to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.” Id. at *9.

What is more, the Court relied on Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014), which held that “where a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice.” Here, the Court found the pop-up banner and link on Yeti’s homepage presented the same situation as in Nguyen and thus did not create an enforceable browsewrap agreement.

Thus, the Court dismissed the Section 631(a) claim due to insufficient allegations that Yeti was aware of Adyen’s alleged violations.

However, the Court held that to establish Yeti’s derivative liability for “aiding” Adyen under Section 631(a), Plaintiff had to allege facts showing Yeti acted with both knowledge of Adyen’s unlawful conduct and the intent or purpose to assist it. It found Plaintiff’s allegations that Yeti was “aware of the purposes for which Adyen collects consumers’ sensitive information because Defendant is knowledgeable of and benefitting from Adyen’s fraud prevention services” and “assists Adyen in intercepting and indefinitely storing this sensitive information” were too conclusory. Smith, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194481, at *13. It reasoned: “Without further information, the Court cannot plausibly infer from Defendant’s use of Adyen’s fraud prevention services alone that Defendant knew that Adyen’s services were based on its allegedly illegal interception and storing of financial information, collected during Adyen’s online processing of customers’ purchases.” Id.

Next, the Court similarly found that Plaintiff plausibly alleged Adyen recorded a confidential communication without consent in violation of CIPA Section 632. A communication is confidential under this section if a party “has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded.” Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal. 4th 766, 776-77 (2002). It explained that “[w]hether a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a context-specific inquiry that should not be adjudicated as a matter of law unless the undisputed material facts show no reasonable expectation of privacy.” Smith, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194481, at *18-19. At the pleading stage, the Court found Plaintiff’s allegation that she reasonably expected her sensitive financial information would remain private was sufficient.

However, as with the Section 631(a) claim, the Court held that Plaintiff did not plead facts establishing Yeti’s derivative liability under the standard for aiding and abetting liability. Under Saunders v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 846 (1994), the Court explained a defendant is liable if they a) know the other’s conduct is wrongful and substantially assist them or b) substantially assist the other in accomplishing a tortious result and the defendant’s own conduct separately breached a duty to the plaintiff. The Court found that the Complaint lacked sufficient non-conclusory allegations that Yeti knew or intended to assist Adyen’s alleged violation. See Smith, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194481, at *16.

Lastly, the Court analyzed Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim under the California Constitution using the framework from Hill v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35-37 (1994). For a valid invasion of privacy claim, Plaintiff had to show 1) a legally protected privacy interest, 2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and 3) a serious invasion of privacy constituting “an egregious breach of the social norms.” Id.

The Court found Plaintiff had a protected informational privacy interest in her personal and financial data, as “individual[s] ha[ve] a legally protected privacy interest in ‘precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information.”‘ Smith, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194481, at *17. It also found Plaintiff plausibly alleged a reasonable expectation of privacy at this stage given the sensitivity of financial data, even if “voluntarily disclosed during the course of ordinary online commercial activity,” as this presents “precisely the type of fact-specific inquiry that cannot be decided on the pleadings.” Id. at *19-20.

Conversely, the Court found Plaintiff did not allege facts showing Yeti’s conduct was “an egregious breach of the social norms” rising to the level of a serious invasion of privacy, which requires more than “routine commercial behavior.” Id. at *21. The Court explained that while Yeti’s simple use of Adyen for payment processing cannot amount to a serious invasion of privacy, “if Defendant was aware of Adyen’s usage of the personal information for additional purposes, this may present a plausible allegation that Defendant’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to survive a Motion to Dismiss.” Id. However, absent such allegations about Yeti’s knowledge, this claim failed.

In the end, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint but granted leave to amend to correct the deficiencies, so this case may not be over. The Court’s grant of “leave to amend” signals that if Plaintiff can sufficiently allege Yeti’s knowledge of or intent to facilitate Adyen’s use of customer data, these claims could proceed. As companies increasingly rely on third parties to handle customer data, we will likely see more litigation in this area, testing the boundaries of corporate liability for data privacy violations.

So, what is the takeaway? As a brilliant lawyer, your company’s goal should be to prevent privacy pitfalls before they snowball into costly litigation. Key things to keep in mind are 1) ensure your privacy policies and terms of use are properly structured as enforceable clickwrap or browsewrap agreements, with conspicuous notice and clear assent mechanisms; 2) conduct thorough due diligence on third-party service providers’ data practices and contractual protections; 3) implement transparent data collection and sharing disclosures for informed customer consent; and 4) stay abreast of evolving privacy laws.

In essence, taking these proactive steps can help mitigate the risks of derivative liability for third-party misconduct and, most importantly, foster trust with your customers.

© 2024 Troutman Amin, LLP
For more news on Companies’ Consumer Data Risks, visit the NLR Consumer Protection section.

Lawsuit Challenges CFPB’s ‘Buy Now, Pay Later’ Rule

On Oct. 18, 2024, fintech trade group Financial Technology Association (FTA) filed a lawsuit challenging the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) final interpretative rule on “Buy Now, Pay Later” (BNPL) products. Released in May 2024, the CFPB’s interpretative rule classifies BNPL products as “credit cards” and their providers as “card issuers” and “creditors” for purposes of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Regulation Z.

The FTA filed its lawsuit challenging the CFPB’s interpretative rule in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The FTA alleges that the CFPB violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment requirements by imposing new obligations on BNPL providers under the label of an “interpretive rule.” The FTA also alleges that the CFPB violated the APA’s requirement that agencies act within their statutory authority by ignoring TILA’s effective-date requirement for new disclosure requirements and imposing obligations beyond those permitted by TILA. The FTA also contends that the CFPB’s interpretive rule is arbitrary and capricious because it is “a poor fit for BNPL products,” grants “insufficient time for BNPL providers to come into compliance with the new obligations” imposed by the rule, and neglects “the serious reliance interests that [the CFPB’s] prior policy on BNPL products engendered.”

In a press release announcing its lawsuit, the FTA said the BNPL industry would welcome regulations that fit the unique characteristics of BNPL products, but that the CFPB’s interpretive rule is a poor fit that risks creating confusion for consumers. “Unfortunately, the CFPB’s rushed interpretive rule falls short on multiple counts, oversteps legal bounds, and risks creating confusion for consumers,” FTA President and CEO Penny Lee said. “The CFPB is seeking to fundamentally change the regulatory treatment of pay-in-four BNPL products without adhering to required rulemaking procedures, in excess of its statutory authority, and in an unreasonable manner.”

The FTA’s pending lawsuit notwithstanding, BNPL providers may wish to consult with legal counsel regarding compliance with the CFPB’s interpretive rule. Retailers marketing BNPL products should also consider working with legal counsel to implement third-party vendor oversight policies to enhance BNPL-partner compliance with the rule.

©2024 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.
For more on the CFPB, visit the NLR Financial Institutions Banking section.

Social Media’s Legal Dilemma: Curated Harmful Content

Walking the Line Between Immunity and Liability: How Social Media Platforms May Be Liable for Harmful Content Specifically Curated for Users

As proliferation of harmful content online has increasingly become easier and more accessible through social media, review websites and other online public forums, businesses and politicians have pushed to reform and limit the sweeping protections afforded by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which is said to have created the Internet. Congress enacted Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 “for two basic policy reasons: to promote the free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene material.” Congress intended for internet to flourish and the goal of Section 230 was to promote the unhindered development of internet businesses, services, and platforms.

To that end Section 230 immunizes online services providers and interactive computer services from liability for posting, re-publishing, or allowing public access to offensive, damaging, or defamatory information or statements created by a third party. Specifically, Section 230(c)(1) provides,

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.

[47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)]

Section 230 has been widely interpreted to protect online platforms from being held liable for user-generated content, thereby promoting the free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet. See, e.g., Hassell v. Bird, 5 Cal. 5th 522 (2018) (Yelp not liable for defamatory reviews posted on its platform and cannot be forced to remove them); Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App.4th 561, 567–575 (2009) (§ 230 immunity applies to tort claims against a social networking website, brought by minors who claimed that they had been assaulted by adults they met on that website]; Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., 145 Cal. App.4th 790, 804–808 (2006) (§ 230 immunity applies to tort claims against an employer that operated an internal computer network used by an employee to allegedly communicate threats against the plaintiff]; Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 826-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (§ 230 immunity applies to tort and statutory claims against an auction website, brought by plaintiffs who allegedly purchased forgeries from third party sellers on the website).

Thus, under § 230, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred. Under the statutory scheme, an “interactive computer service” qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also function as an “information content provider” for the portion of the statement or publication at issue. Even users or platforms that “re-post” or “publish” allegedly defamatory or damaging content created by a third-party are exempted from liability. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 62 (2006). Additionally, merely compiling false and/or misleading content created by others or otherwise providing a structured forum for dissemination and use of that information is not enough to confer liability. See, e.g. eBay, Inc. 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (the critical issue is whether eBay acted as an information content provider with respect to the information claimed to be false or misleading); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122-1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (Matchmaker.com not liable for fake dating profile of celebrity who started receiving sexual and threatening emails and voicemails).

Recently, however, the Third Circuit appellate court found that Section 230 did not immunize and protect popular social media platform TikTok from suit arising from a ten-year old’s death following her attempting a “Blackout Challenge” based on videos she watched on her TikTok “For You Page.” See Anderson v. TikTok, Inc., 116 F.4th 180 (3rd Cir. 2024). TikTok is a social media platform where users can create, post, and view videos. Users can search for specific content or watch videos recommended by TikTok’s algorithm on their “For You Page” (FYP). This algorithm customizes video suggestions based on a range of factors, including a user’s age, demographics, interactions, and other metadata—not solely on direct user inputs. Some videos on TikTok’s FYP are “challenges” that encourage users to replicate the actions shown. One such video, the “Blackout Challenge,” urged users to choke themselves until passing out. TikTok’s algorithm recommended this video to a ten-year old girl who attempted it and tragically died from asphyxiation.

The deciding question was whether TikTok’s algorithm, and the inclusion of the “Blackout Challenge” video on a user’s FYP, crosses the threshold between an immune publisher and a liable creator. Plaintiff argued that TikTok’s algorithm “amalgamat[es] [] third-party videos,” which results in “an expressive product” that “communicates to users . . . that the curated stream of videos will be interesting to them.” The Third Circuit agreed finding that a platform’s algorithm reflecting “editorial judgments” about “compiling the third-party speech it wants in the way it wants” is the platform’s own “expressive product,” and therefore, TikTok’s algorithm, which recommended the Blackout Challenge on decedent’s FYP, was TikTok’s own “expressive activity.” As such, Section 230 did not bar claims against TikTok arising from TikTok’s recommendations via its FYP algorithm because Section 230 immunizes only information “provided by another,” and here, the claims concerned TikTok’s own expressive activity.

The Court was careful to note its conclusion was reached specifically due to TikTok’s promotion of the Blackout Challenge video on decedent’s FYP was not contingent on any specific user input, i.e. decedent did not search for and view the Blackout Video through TikTok’s search function. TikTok has certainly taken issue with the Court’s ruling contending that if websites lose § 230 protection whenever they exercise “editorial judgment” over the third-party content on their services, then the exception would swallow the rule. Perhaps websites seeking to avoid liability will refuse to sort, filter, categorize, curate, or take down any content, which may result in unfiltered and randomly placed objectionable material on the Internet. On the other hand, some websites may err on the side of removing any potentially harmful third-party speech, which would chill the proliferation of free expression on the web.

The aftermath of the ruling remains to be seen but for now social media platforms and interactive websites should take note and re-evaluate the purpose, scope, and mechanics of their user-engagement algorithms.

COPYRIGHT © 2024, STARK & STARK
For more on Social Media, visit the NLR Communications Media Internet section.

Unitary Executive Theory Surfaces in Court: District Court Rules Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act Unconstitutional

On September 30, 2024, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ruled that filing claims on behalf of the government under qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA) is unconstitutional in United States of America ex rel. Clarissa Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC, et al. The ruling, made by Judge Kathryn Mizelle, a 33-year-old Trump-appointee, declares that False Claims Act whistleblowers undermine executive power by filing qui tam lawsuits.

The Zafirov decision follows a recent dissent by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas in which he questioned the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions. It also follows a political movement pushing the Unitary Executive Theory in the United States judicial courts.

This controversial decision mischaracterizes the qui tam provisions of the FCA and will likely be appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Should the ruling stand, however, it and other similar challenges to the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions will cripple what has been America’s number 1 anti-fraud law. Since the False Claims Act was modernized in 1986, qui tam whistleblower cases have allowed the government to recover more than $52 billion from fraudsters, over $5 billion of which came in cases where the government chose not to intervene.

Applying the ‘Unitary Executive’ Theory to Paint Whistleblowers as ‘Self-Selected Private Bounty Hunters’

Originally passed during the Civil War, the False Claims Act contains qui tam provisions enabling whistleblowers, also known as ‘relators’, to report government contracting fraud and work directly with government investigators. Once the whistleblower brings forward the suit, the government may intervene and continue to prosecute the litigation as the plaintiff. However, in the interest of accountability, the qui tam provision of the FCA permits the whistleblower to pursue a case even if the United States declines prosecution. Whistleblowers who file successful qui tam lawsuits are eligible to receive up to 30% of recovered damages.

The question of the constitutionality of the False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions was notably raised in a dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas in the 2023 Supreme Court case U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources. While Polansky discussed the issue of a relator pursuing a lawsuit after the government declines to intervene, Thomas raised a separate issue of constitutionality in his dissent. He stated that “there are substantial arguments that the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II and that private relators may not represent the interests of the United States in litigation.” In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, invited challenges to the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions, writing that “In my view, the Court should consider the competing arguments on the Article II issue in an appropriate case.”

Judge Mizelle, a former clerk of Justice Thomas, drew heavily upon Justice Thomas’ dissent in her decision. Echoing Thomas’ dissent in Polansky, JudgeMizelle concluded that the qui tam provision “directly defies the Appointments Clause by permitting unaccountable, unsworn, private actors to exercise core executive power [litigating on behalf of the government] with substantial consequences to members of the public.” The District Court thus agreed with the defendants that the FCA’s qui tam provisions indeed violates the Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution.

The Zafirov ruling relies upon the ‘unitary executive theory,’ a constitutional law theory that states the President of the United States has sole authority over the executive branch and that power cannot be limited by Congress.

According to then-Assistant Attorney General William Barr’s 1989 Memo Constitutionality of the Qui TamProvision of the False Claims Act, which repeatedly cited by both the judgment and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce amicus brief, the move to enable private citizens to file on behalf of the government represents a breach of the separation of powers allowing “Congress to circumvent the Executive’s check.” Barr rebrands whistleblowers as “private bounty hunters” and claims that the 1986 amendments which reincorporated the FCA’s qui tam provisions was a tactic by Congress to override presidential powers. Barr maintains that “only a unitary executive” that is, “only the President” can “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

In a dissent in the 1988 Supreme Court case Morrison v Olsen, Justice Antonin Scalia interpreted the ‘Unitary Executive’ to have unchecked authority to appoint and remove executive officials, claiming that the firing of an independent counsel without cause falls within the limitless power of the President over the executive.

The Middle District of Florida ruling draws on Scalia’s rationale arguing that the right to pursue a qui tam case denies the President the executive authority of appointment of the relator. Under the FCA, however, whistleblowers are granted certain rights. For example, the executive must guarantee a whistleblower the “right to continue as a party” with or without the United States intervening and wait for the relator’s approval before settling the action.

The court agrees with the defendants’ argument that the FCA therefore “den[ies] the President necessary removal authority and sufficient supervisory control over [the relator].”

The court contends that the physician-turned-whistleblower Zafirov was “an improperly appointed officer” in violation of the Appointments Clause and the Take Care and Vest Clause of the Article. According to the ruling, by filing a qui tam against Medicare fraud, Zafirov was granted “core executive power” without any “proper appointment under the Constitution.”

A Mischaracterization of Qui Tam Whistleblowing

Judge Mizelle’s decision in United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Fla. Med. Assocs. first mischaracterizes the FCA’s qui tam as a breach of presidential power instead of as a provision that strengthens checks and balances. Second, the court ignores case law outlining government prerogatives over relators such that they are not menacing to the core Executive powers.

The revived qui tam provision of 1986 was a legislative move to improve government accountability over fraud—neither expanding Congressional oversight nor the size of government—by mobilizing private citizens rather than public agents. The Florida court wrongfully elevates the status of a relator to an ‘officer’ responsible to the government. A citizen pursuing a claim on behalf of the government is not and does not pretend to be an extension of the Executive Office and, therefore not subject to administrative appointment procedure. Rather the relator is a private person, and the government is a third party to the case. The Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens majority opinion also written by Justice Scalia discussing whether relators have judicial standing under Article III, qualifies that the relator is on “partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” A ‘partial assignee’—to which only some rights are transferred—may “assert the injury suffered by the assignor” (the U.S.) so long as the harm done is sufficient. Scalia reiterates the ‘representational standing’ of relators and makes no remarks on its challenge to the Unitary Executive. Judge Mizelle’s reliance on Morrison v Olsen to claim that like an independent counsel, a relator should also qualify as an officer ignores the Stevens Supreme Court ruling distinguishing relators as a type of assignee.

Mizelle also raises that relators seem to enjoy unbridled authority over the Executive by initiating a qui tam suit without government intervention. While Mizelle points to 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c) to demonstrate the unchecked power of the relator, she neglects the numerous limitations specified in § 3730 (c)(2), including the broad power of the government to dismiss the qui tam action after intervening notwithstanding any objections from the relator. She frames the government intervention as “the government’s ability to pursue a parallel action and to exert limited control [which] does not lessen a relator’s unchecked civil enforcement authority to initiate.” In truth, the statute and years of judicial history maintain the government’s absolute discretion over whether to intervene in or completely stop the case by dismissing the action.

Contrary to Judge Mizelle’s belief, relators are not free from potential government intervention even when independently pursuing the case. On the contrary, relators are not able to independently pursue any binding action on the government unimpeded by the government. While Zafirov independently pursued the claim for five years, the government could have intervened and then dismissed the claim at any time. If the government intervenes, underlined in 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(2), the government is empowered to settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding any objections from the relator and to restrict their participation in the course of the litigation. The fact that the government may choose not to intervene at one point does not divest them of their ability to intervene later and exercise significant authority over the relator.

Implications: Crippling the False Claims Act

Judge Mizelle’s decision seeks to end the historic success of the qui tam provision of the FCA by declaring the government’s most effective mechanism of detecting fraud as unconstitutional. While the decision does not invalidate the FCA nationally, this case could be the first step in a series of appeals that may elevate the issue to the Supreme Court.

The government’s largest obstacle to fighting white-collar crime such as fraud is detection. The diffuse and indirect nature of fraud requires those with insider knowledge to assist the government in pursuing corruption. In terms of the effectiveness of the qui tam provision, between 1987 and 2022, the Department of Justice Civil Fraud Division recovered $22.1 billion without the help of whistleblowers versus $50.3 billion with the help of whistleblower lawsuits. Since the 1986 amendments to the FCA, whistleblowers have been the direct source of approximately 70% of civil fraud recoveries by the federal government. From the Medicare billing fraud committed in Florida Medical Associates to Russian money laundering, the United States may lose its most effective tool to fight fraud fraud if the qui tam provisions of the FCA are ruled unconstitutional.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section.

Federal District Court in Florida Holds FCA’s Qui Tam Provisions Unconstitutional

In the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., three justices expressed concern that the False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions violate Article II of the Constitution and called for a case presenting that question. Justice Clarence Thomas penned a dissent explaining that private relators wield significant executive authority yet are not appointed as “Officers of the United States” under Article II. Justice Brett Kavanaugh and Justice Amy Coney Barrett, concurring in the main opinion, agreed with Justice Thomas that this constitutional issue should be considered in an appropriate case.

Earlier this year, several defendants in a non-intervened qui tam lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida took up the challenge. The qui tam, styled United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC et al., involves allegations of Medicare Advantage coding fraud. After several years of litigation, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the relator’s qui tam action was unconstitutional, citing Justice Thomas’s dissent in Polansky.

The defendants’ motion prompted a statement of interest from the United States and participation as amici by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Anti-Fraud Coalition. The Court also asked for supplemental briefs on Founding-era historical evidence regarding federal qui tam enforcement.

On September 30, 2024, Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle granted the defendants’ motion, agreeing the relator was unconstitutionally appointed and dismissing her complaint. Judge Mizelle, who clerked for Justice Thomas, held a private FCA relator exercises significant authority that is constitutionally reserved to the executive branch, including the right to bring an enforcement action on behalf of the United States and recover money for the U.S. Treasury. In doing so, a relator chooses which claims to prosecute, which theories to raise, which defendants to sue, and which arguments to make on appeal, resulting in precedent that binds the United States. Yet, a relator is not appointed by the president, a department head, or a court of law under Article II, making the qui tam device unconstitutional.

Judge Mizelle distinguished historical qui tam statutes, which were largely abandoned early in our nation’s history, on the ground that few gave a relator the level of authority the FCA does. And while the FCA itself dates back to the Civil War, the statute largely remained dormant (aside from a flurry of use in the 1930s and 40s) until the 1986 amendments set off a new wave of qui tam litigation.

The ruling is significant for the future of the FCA. As Judge Mizelle’s opinion explains, most FCA actions are brought by relators as opposed to the government itself. If the decision is upheld on appeal, a number of outcomes are possible. If the FCA is to continue as a significant source of revenue generation for the government, the DOJ must devote more resources to bringing FCA actions directly. Congress may also consider amending the FCA’s qui tam provisions to limit relators’ authority to conduct FCA litigation, thereby maintaining the statute as a viable avenue for whistleblowing.

One thing is almost certain, however. FCA defendants across the country will likely raise similar arguments in light of Judge Mizelle’s ruling. Whether in Zafirov or another case, it appears the Supreme Court will get to decide the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions sooner rather than later.

© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on Qui Tam Provisions, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section.