Labor & Employment Archives - Page 69 of 155

Haitian TPS Program Will End in July 2019

Six months after then-Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly announced the extension of Haitian Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for only six months (until January 2018, when he would reevaluate the determination), Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke announced her decision to terminate the designation with a delayed effective date of 18 months. She said this would allow for an orderly transition before the designation terminates on July 22, 2019.

Haitians with TPS will be required to reapply for Employment Authorization Documents in order to legally work in the United States until the end of the period. Further details about this termination for TPS will appear in a Federal Register notice. Termination of TPS will affect not only some 50,000-60,000 Haitians who are in the U.S. on TPS, but also their families, including approximately 30,000 U.S.-citizen children born in the U.S. to Haitians in TPS status since 2010 (when TPS was conferred after the earthquake that killed thousands on the island).

A number of advocacy groups, members of Congress, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce had been urging a further extension based on ongoing problems from the devastating 2010 earthquake and Haiti’s limited capacity to reabsorb these nationals and family members. They also highlighted that termination will create labor dislocations in certain construction, food processing, hospitality, and healthcare industries that have relied on Haitian TPS workers since 2010. Florida and Texas may be particularly hard hit as they continue to recover from Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.

For more Immigration legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Yoga and Massage Therapist Fired for Being “Too Cute” Sees Gender Discrimination Revived on Grounds of Unjustified Spousal Jealousy

A New York appeals court recently ruled in Edwards v. Nicolai (153 A.D.3d 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2017)) that an employment termination motivated by the sexual jealousy of an employer’s spouse may support a claim for gender discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”).

Defendants Charles Nicolai and his wife Stephanie Adams – a former Playboy model – were co-owners of a chiropractic center located in New York City. In 2011, Nicolai hired plaintiff Dilek Edwards, a female yoga and massage therapist, and was her direct supervisor. Edwards’s complaint alleged that during the course of her employment, her relationship with Nicolai was “purely professional” and that Nicolai “regularly praised [her] work performance.”

However, in June 2013, Nicolai purportedly told Edwards “that his wife might become jealous of [her], because [Edwards] was too cute.” Several months later, Adams sent plaintiff a text message saying, “You are NOT welcome any longer at Wall Street Chiropractic, DO NOT ever step foot in there again, and stay the [expletive] away from my husband and family!!!!!!! And remember I warned you.” A few hours later, Edwards allegedly received an email from Nicolai stating, “You are fired and no longer welcome in our office. If you call or try to come back, we will call the police.” One day later, Adams filed an allegedly false complaint with the New York City Police Department claiming that Edwards placed “threatening” phone calls to Adams which caused Adams to change the locks at her home and business. Edwards’s complaint alleges that she has “no idea what sparked . . . Adams’ [sic] suspicions.”

Edwards’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL gender discrimination claims were dismissed at the trial court level. However, that decision was overturned on appeal, with the court holding that “adverse employment actions motivated by sexual attraction are gender-based, and therefore, constitute unlawful gender discrimination.” The court explained that while Edwards does not allege that she was subjected to sexual harassment, it can be inferred that Nicolai was motivated to terminate Edwards “by his desire to appease his wife’s unjustified jealousy.” Further, it can also be inferred that Adams was motivated to terminate Edwards based on Adams’s own jealousy. Accordingly, the court found it plausible that each defendant’s motivation to terminate Adams was sexual in nature and therefore unlawful.

In reaching its decision the court observed that, “while it is not necessarily unlawful for an employer to terminate an at-will employee at the urging of the employer’s spouse,” a plaintiff may find relief for such a discharge if the spouse requested the termination for unlawful, gender-related reasons. Here, assuming Edwards’s allegations are true, her termination was unlawful not because Adams asked Nicolai to fire Edwards, but because she did so for no other reason than her belief that Nicolai was sexually attracted to Edwards.

Laura Doyle contributed to this post.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Survey Says: Employees Still Value Validation Over Compensation

For decades, survey after survey has shown that recognition, respect, etc., are far more important to employees than compensation. A new survey from Globoforce’s WorkHuman Research Institute confirms that the trend continues. One of the best things about this, in my opinion, is that every manager can impact things like recognition in the workplace in a positive way. In short, there are small things managers can do every day to improve their workplaces, employee morale and engagement.

On the union avoidance front this is key. In many cases, the catalyst for unionization of a workforce is mistreatment of employees by management (including lack of recognition on the job). This latest survey confirms the importance of maintaining positive employee relations. Accordingly, companies should consider ensuring union-free plans contain a strong component of positive employee relations training/planning.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Maryland’s Montgomery County Joins Jurisdictions Increasing Minimum Wage to $15.00

Montgomery County, Maryland, where the minimum wage already is $11.50, is set to join two states (California and New York), the neighboring District of Columbia and at least six local jurisdictions (Flagstaff (Arizona), Los Angeles, Minneapolis, San Francisco, San Jose, SeaTac and Seattle) that have enacted legislation increasing the minimum wage for some or all private sector employees to $15 over the next several years.

On November 7, 2017 the Montgomery County Council unanimously passed Bill 28-17, which increases the minimum wage for “large employers” — those with 51 or more employees in the county — to $15.00 by July 1, 2021, with intermediate increases to $12.25 on July 1, 2018, $13.00 on July 1, 2019, and $14.00 on July 1, 2020.

The bill also increases the minimum wage to $15.00 by July 1, 2023 for “mid-sized employers,” those who (1) employ 11 to 50 employees; (2) have tax exempt status under IRC Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code; or (3) provide “home health services” or “home or community based services,” as defined under federal Medicaid regulations and receive at least 75% of gross revenues through state and federal medical programs.

The bill additionally increases the minimum wage to $15.00 by July 1, 2024 for “small employers” — those with 10 or fewer employee (including non-profits and Medicaid funded home health and home or community based service providers of that size) — with intermediate increases to $12.00 on July 1, 2018, $12.50 on July 1, 2019, $13.00 on July 1, 2020, $13.50 on July 1, 2020, $14.00 on July 1, 2022 and $14.50 on July 1, 2023.

Notably, the rates of increases is considerably slower than in the neighboring District of Columbia, which is already at $12.50 and will reach $15.00 on July 1, 2020 for all private sector employers.

In addition, the bill includes an “opportunity wage” that allows payment of a wage equal to 85% of the County minimum wage to an employee under the age of 20 for the first six months of employment.

The bill further adopts provisions to automatically adjust the minimum wage rate (1) for large employers annually starting July 1, 2022 to reflect average increases in the CPI-W for Washington-Baltimore for the previous year, and (2) for mid-sized and small employers starting July 1, 2024 and 2025, respectively, to reflect the same CPI-W increase for the previous year, plus one percent of the previous year’s required minimum wage, up to a total increase of $0.50, until the rate is equal to the amount for large employers. An employer’s size is calculated as of the time it first becomes subject to the law, and it remains subject to the applicable schedule regardless of the number of employees employed in subsequent years.

In addition, the Director of Finance must make certifications by January 31 of each year from 2018 through 2022 regarding certain reductions in county private employment, negative growth in the gross domestic product, or whether the U.S. economy is in recession. If certain targets are for that year, for no more than two times.

The bill specifically addresses concerns the County Executive expressed in vetoing a prior version of the bill that passed by a narrow majority in January 2017, by postponing the prior effective dates for large and small employers by one and two years, respectively; increasing from 26 to 51 the number of employees required to be a larger employer; creating a new mid-size employer category of 11 to 50 employees and defining a small employer as one with ten or fewer employees; and adding non-profits and Medicaid funded home health and home health services providers with more than ten employees to the extended schedule for mid-size employers. The County Executive has stated that he will sign the bill.

Notably, it is likely that an effort will be made in the upcoming state legislative session to further increase the state minimum wage, already at $9.25 and set to go to $10.10 on July 1, 2018.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Time to Think About Holiday Bonuses

Halloween has passed and we are now squarely approaching the holiday season. While this time of year brings many good things, it can also bring unwanted headaches for employers wanting to spread some “holiday cheer,” especially those who forget how bonuses may affect payment of overtime. So, while we recently discussed bonuses in general, now is a good time for a refresher on bonuses and overtime pay in the context of holiday payments.

First, don’t forget the general rule for non-exempt employees is that all compensation is to be included in the calculation of the “regular rate.” Bonuses must be included within the regular rate unless specifically excluded by law or regulation. Bonuses which do not qualify for exclusion from the regular rate must be totaled in with other earnings to determine the regular rate on which overtime is based. However, certain things are excluded from compensation used to calculate the regular rate.

The first of these is the traditional “Christmas bonus,” or more precisely, “sums paid as gifts; payment in the nature of gifts made at Christmas time or other special occasions, as a reward for service, the amounts of which are not measured by or dependent on hours worked, production or efficiency.” To not be included as compensation used for calculating the regular rate, the “bonus must actually be a gift or be in the nature of a gift.” The bonus cannot be measured by the hours worked, production or efficiency. Nor can it be so substantial that it can be assumed that employees consider it as part of wages for which they work. The bonus may, however, vary between employees based on length of service. Finally, it cannot be paid pursuant to some contract. Bottom line – true Christmas gifts or holiday bonuses do not have to be included in the regular rate for purposes of computing the regular rate.

The second, and more challenging, scenario is a bonus that while paid at year-end is not necessarily a true holiday gift. As we recently addressed, the question is whether such bonuses truly are discretionary. Again, the exclusion is narrow. To be excluded from computation of the regular rate, the “sum paid in recognition of services performed in a given period” (i.e. bonus) must fall in one of two categories. One, the fact that the payment is to be made and the amount to be paid must be in the sole discretion of the employer. Further, the decision must be made at or near the end of the period in which payment is to be made and not be based on any promise, contract or agreement which causes the employee to regularly expect such payments. Or two, the compensation may be excluded from the regular rate if the payments are made pursuant to a bona fide profit-sharing plan or trust or bona fide thrift or savings plan.

Employers looking to spread holiday cheer in the form of end-of-the-year bonuses must therefore address the primary question of whether the bonus truly is discretionary. In making this determination, consider the following facts that may destroy the discretionary aspect of a bonus:

(1) If the employer promises in advance to pay a bonus

(2) If the amount of the bonus is conditioned on allocating a percentage of sales to the “bonus pool”

(3) If the bonus is promised at the time of hire

(4) If the bonus is to induce employees to work more efficiently or to remain with the employer

As examples, attendance bonuses, individual or group production bonuses, bonuses for quantity or quality of work, or retention bonuses are not discretionary and must be included in the regular rate.

So, celebrate the holidays and reward your employees, but be careful to consider whether bonuses must be included in computing the regular rate for non-exempt employees.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

The Law of Unintended Consequences: BIPA and the Effects of the Illinois Class Action Epidemic on Employers

Has your company recently beefed up its employee identification and access security and added biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retina scans? Have you implemented new timekeeping technology utilizing biometric identifiers like fingerprints or palm prints in lieu of punch clocks? All of these developments provide an extra measure of security control beyond key cards which can be lost or stolen, and can help to control a time-keeping fraud practice known as “buddy punching.” If you have operations and employees in Illinois (or if you utilize biometrics such as voice scans to authenticate customers located in Illinois), your risk and liability could have increased with the adoption of such biometric technology, so read on ….

What’s the Issue in Illinois?

The collection of biometric identifiers is not generally regulated either by the federal government or the states. There are some exceptions, however. Back in 2008, Illinois passed the first biometric privacy law in the United States. The Biometric Information Privacy Act, known as “BIPA,” makes it unlawful for private entities to collect, store, or use biometric information, such as retina/iris scans, voice scans, face scans, or fingerprints, without first obtaining individual consent for such activities. BIPA also requires that covered entities take specific precautions to secure the information. BIPA also carries statutory penalties for every individual violation that can multiply quickly … and the lawsuits against employers have been coming by the dozens over the past few months.

The Requirements of BIPA

Among other requirements, under BIPA, any “private entity” — including employers — collecting, storing, or using the biometric information of any individual in Illinois – no matter how it is collected, stored or used, or for what reason – must:

Provide each individual with written notice that his/her biometric information will be collected and stored, including an explanation of the purpose for collecting the information as well as the length of time it will be stored and/or used.
Obtain the subject’s express written authorization to collect and store his/her biometric information, prior to that information being collected.
Develop and make available to the public a written policy establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for destroying the biometric information, which shall include destruction of the information when the reason for collection has been satisfied or three years after the company’s last interaction with the individual, whichever occurs first.

Also, any such information collected may not be disclosed to or shared with third parties without the prior consent of the individual.The Money Issue

Under the law, plaintiffs may recover statutory damages of $1,000 for eachnegligent violation and $5,000 per intentional or reckless violation, plus attorneys’ fees and other relief deemed appropriate by the court. Moreover, if actual damages exceed liquidated damages, then a plaintiff is entitled under the Act to pursue actual damages in lieu of liquidated damages.

These damage calculations are made and awarded under BIPA on an individual basis. Do the math: If an employer has 100 employees in Illinois and has allegedly been negligent in obtaining required BIPA consent from employees, this can be a potential exposure of an employer to $500,000 in penalties, before you add in the ability to recover attorneys’ fees.

Who is Getting Sued?

The list of companies sued under BIPA spans industries. The initial groups of defendants included companies such as Facebook, Shutterfly, Google, Six Flags, and Snapchat. Also, a chain of tanning salons and a chain of fitness centers were each sued for using biometric technology to identify members. Between July and October, nearly 26 class-action lawsuits were filed in Illinois state court by current and former employees alleging their employers had violated the BIPA. Companies range from supermarket chains, a gas station and convenience store chain, a chain of senior living facilities, several restaurant groups, and a chain of daycare facilities.

Facts vary from case to case, but nearly all of the recent employee BIPA cases implicate fingerprint or palm-print time-keeping technologies that collect biometric data to to clock employees’ work hours. The plaintiffs allege their employers failed to inform employees about the companies’ policies for use, storage and ultimate destruction of the fingerprint data or obtain the employees’ written consent before collecting, using or storing the individual biometric information.

In at least one case, the employee has also alleged fingerprint data was improperly shared with the supplier of the time-tracking machines, and has named that supplier as a defendant as well (Howe v. Speedway LLC, No. 2017-CH-11992 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 1, 2017)).

What Do I Do Now?

In order to avoid becoming the next target, employers with operations and employees in Illinois should ask some basic questions and review processes and procedures:

First question to ask: are we collecting, storing or using individual biometric data for any purpose?
If the answer is yes, has your company issued the required notice and received signed releases/consents from all affected individuals? This release/consent should be obtained at the commencement of employment before any collection of individual biometric data begins. Do you have a publicaly available written policy to cover the collection, storage, use and destruction of the data? The employee handbook is the most logical place for this policy.
Review your processes: (a) make sure that any collected data is not being sold or disclosed to third parties, outside of the limited exceptions permitted by the Act, and this includes vendors and third party suppliers of biometric technology who process and store the information in a cloud-based service, and (b) make sure that you evaluate your internal data privacy protocols and processes for protecting this new data set, and be prepared to prove that you have “reasonably sufficient” security measures in place for the individual biometric data.
Review your vendor processes: If a vendor has access to the individual biometric data (such as a software-as-a-service provider), make sure the vendor has sufficient data privacy protocols and processes in place and that you have representations regarding this protection from the vendor.
Review insurance coverage for this type of exposure with your broker.
Remember the data breach issues: Make sure your data breach policies recognize that individual biometric data is considered personal information under Illinois laws addressing data breach notification requirements.

This post was authored by Cynthia J. Larose of © Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Right-to-Work Battle in Illinois Enters Cease Fire – For Now

Illinois is completely surrounded by right-to-work states that have laws making it unlawful for companies to require union dues as a condition of employment. Notwithstanding the recent trend of states enacting such laws, the Illinois legislature tried its best this year to block right-to-work legislation within its borders.

Earlier this year, the Illinois legislature passed a law that would prohibit local governments from enacting their own right-to-work laws after one Illinois municipality attempted to enact a right-to-work ordinance in 2015. Illinois Gov. Bruce Rauner vetoed the legislation – based on his belief that right-to-work laws promote business growth – and this week the legislature fell one vote short of overriding his veto. There are signals legislators may attempt to revive the legislation next year. Thus, this remains an issue for Illinois employers to watch.

This issue is not unique to Illinois; local governments in Kentucky enjoyed some success with their own right-to-work ordinances several years ago before the state enacted its own right-to-work law.

Right-to-work laws are permitted under Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act and make it unlawful for companies to require union dues as a condition of employment. In states where right-to-work laws are not enacted, most unionized employers have clauses in their labor agreements that require dues payments as a condition of employment – the clauses generally are known as “union seniority clauses.” At present, 28 states have right-to-work laws on the books. The National Right to Work Foundation maintains a current list.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

The Politics of Tragedy – New Employment Rights Proposed for Bereaved Parents

You know it’s time to re-issue your employment legislation when the nearest available section number for the insertion of an amendment into the Employment Rights Act is Section 171ZZ. Though it might sound like a bottom-rank Star Wars droid, that little fellow is actually the proposed product of a new Bill on time off work for parents who lose children, the Parental Bereavement (Leave and Pay) Bill.

No one can question the lasting devastation of the death of a child, but what evidence is there that we really need still more employment legislation to ensure that the parent has some time to mourn? So far as is apparent from recent speeches on the matter (go to www.theyworkforyou.com to see who has said what in Parliament on the point), the sponsoring MP has no direct evidence of time off not being granted by an employer in those circumstances. Instead he relies on an unattributed story from another MP about someone in Scotland who was told on the death of his new baby that as he would therefore no longer need the balance of his paternity leave, he was expected to return to work. If true, this is obviously grim beyond words, but no Employment Tribunal on earth would support a dismissal on those grounds and so it seems scant grounds indeed for this new legislation. Any employer which would say such a thing at that time is hardly likely to pay attention to some obscure Westminster regulation anyway.

All that said, what about the proposal itself? Running to 18 pages, a full third of them consequential amendments to other statutory provisions, the Bill sets out a scheme with distressing parallels in terms of complexity and rank over-engineering with the Shared Parental Leave rules, including the frankly appalling proposition, that the employer should be entitled to ask for proof of the child’s death as a condition of granting the leave.

Key points so far, bearing in mind that the Bill is merely an enabling framework, not the detailed regulations due to be made under it:

“Child” is anyone under 18 and likely to include stillbirths after 24 weeks of pregnancy. “Parent” may include step-parents and others with established caring relationships above and beyond the biological parents.
The minimum period of leave will be two weeks, to be taken in whole weeks (but not necessarily consecutively) within eight weeks from the passing of the child.
Like maternity absence, you keep all your terms and conditions (and obligations) of employment over the absence period except in relation to remuneration.
There is a hint that the employer’s ability to dismiss the employee during the absence period may be limited and/or there may be an obligation on the employer to offer alternative employment. I imagine that this may end up looking like the Regulation 10 rules in the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations around redundancy and priority for redeployment during maternity leave. A dismissal in breach of those rules in likely to be automatically unfair.
The right to time off has no prior service condition but Statutory Parental Bereavement Pay will by a new Section 171ZZ6(2)(b) – I am not making this up, I promise – only be available to those with six months’ prior continuous service.
Eligibility for SPBP may also be conditional on appropriate prior written notices being given to the employer of the week or weeks for which it is to be paid. I would take the view that giving an express form of notice to my employer would be the last thing on my mind if my world had just fallen apart through the loss of a child, so you would at least hope that any such notice could be retrospective.
SPBP will be deemed included in any continuation of the employee’s salary over the absence period and by Section 171ZZ10 you will not be able to contract out of paying it or make the employee contribute to it.

Losing a child is a horrible thing but this fairly overt attempt to turn grief into political capital is neither necessary nor fit for purpose. We must hope, for the benefit of both employers and the very people it is designed to protect, that if the Bill makes law at all, the implementing measures greatly declutter the provisions which it currently proposes.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Citing Failure to Cooperate, Court Orders Use of Specific Keyword Search Terms

United States v. New Mexico State Univ., No. 1:16-cv-00911-JAP-LF, 2017 WL 4386358 (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2017)

In this pay discrimination case, the Court addressed Defendants’ motion for a protective order precluding further searching for responsive documents. Citing defense counsel’s failure to “adequately confer” before performing the initial searches, “which resulted in searches that were inadequate to reveal all responsive documents,” the Court concluded that “which searches will be conducted is left to the Court” and went on to order Defendants to conduct additional searches with specific terms, many of which were proposed by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants payed a female employee less than they were paying her male counterparts, despite similar responsibilities in the track and field program, and sought, broadly speaking, production of documents reflecting communications regarding her compensation; production of documents regarding her complaints concerning pay; and production of documents regarding any other complaints of pay discrimination made by other coaches, trainers, etc. Without adequately cooperating with the plaintiff, Defendants performed “more than 20” keyword searches and produced “more than 14,000 pages of documents.” When Plaintiff indicated concern regarding the adequacy of Defendants’ searching, the parties were unable to resolve their dispute and Defendants ultimately moved for a protective order. Defendants argued that the discovery sought was not proportional to the needs of the case, noting the efforts already undertaken. Plaintiff disagreed.

Indicating that this case presented “the question of how parties should search and produce [ESI] in response to discovery requests,” the Court reminded the parties that “[t]he best solution in the entire area of electronic discovery is cooperation among counsel” and that “[c]ooperation prevents lawyers designing keyword searches ‘in the dark, by the seat of the pants,’ without adequate discussion with each other to determine which words would yield the most responsive results.” In the present case, the Court concluded that the failure to confer resulted in inadequate searches and, acknowledging Plaintiff’s argument that “[Defendant] alone is responsible for its illogical choices in constructing searches” indicated that, “which searches will be conducted is left to the Court.”

As promised, the Court went on to discuss the three disputed discovery requests and identified specific search terms and custodians to be searched, many of which were proposed by the plaintiff. The Court also instructed the parties to work together to the extent necessary, if the non-responsive documents returned were too voluminous, for example.

The Court ended the opinion by returning to the topic of cooperation:

Electronic discovery requires cooperation between opposing counsel and transparency in all aspects of preservation and production of ESI. Moreover, where counsel are using keyword searches for retrieval of ESI, they at a minimum must carefully craft the appropriate keywords, with input from the ESI’s custodians as to the words and abbreviations they use, and the proposed methodology must be quality control tested to assure accuracy in retrieval and elimination of “false positives.” It is time that the Bar—even those lawyers who did not come of age in the computer era—understand this.

[Citation omitted.]

A copy of the Court’s order is available here.

For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Employers Helping Employees—Are Disaster Relief Payments and Loans Exempt From Puerto Rico Income Tax?

With the havoc wrought by Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, employers are exploring options to provide emergency relief to those employees who have encountered financial hardship to meet their necessities and repair their homes in the wake of the disaster. Occasionally, aid from employers to employees comes in the form of disaster-relief monetary payments and interest-free loans. In light of the state of emergency in Puerto Rico declared by local authorities, on October 4, 2017, the Puerto Rico Department of Treasury released Administrative Determination No. 17-21 (AD 17-21), which provides necessary and well-timed guidance on the taxation of this type of assistance.

Qualified Disaster Assistance Payments

Disaster assistance payments, which meet the requirements of AD 17-21, are not includable in an employee’s taxable income and, thus, are exempt from Puerto Rico income tax. Under AD 17-21, any payment made by an employer to an employee, or directly to a provider of goods and/or services, will be considered “qualified” and not treated as taxable compensation provided that:

payments are made in lieu of wages lost by the employee while he or she is not able to work due to the disaster;
payments are made to (a) cover necessary and reasonable expenditures of the employee or the employee’s relatives for food, medications, gas, lodging, medical expenses, the care of children or dependents, power generators, funeral services, and/or the repair of destruction to the employee’s principal residence incurred as a result of Hurricane Maria, as long as the payment is made directly to the provider of goods and/or services; (b) to the employee himself or herself and to mitigate damages or losses resulting from Hurricane Maria, subject to a monthly cap of 1,000; and/or (c) for other purposes, as recognized by AD 17-21;
payments are received by the employee (or the provider of goods and/or services, as appropriate) at any time between September 21, 2017, and December 31, 2017; and
payments are in no way attributable or related to the level of the employee’s position or salary.

Employers that make qualified disaster assistance payments must report such payments no later than January 31, 2018, by submitting a sworn statement to the Puerto Rico treasury stating the names and social security numbers of the employees who received qualified payments and the total amount of the payments. Qualified disaster assistance payments made in compliance with AD 17-21 are tax-deductible for the employer.

Interest-Free Loans

Interest-free loans of up to $20,000 (either individually or in the aggregate) granted by an employer to an employee, from September 21, 2017, through June 30, 2018, to cover necessary and reasonable expenses of the employee or the employee’s family and expenditures for the construction or repair of the employee’s principal residence due to damage from Hurricane Maria are exempt from Puerto Rico income tax.

Employers may grant interest-free loans to employees in addition to qualified disaster assistance payments.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Category: Labor & Employment

Haitian TPS Program Will End in July 2019

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Yoga and Massage Therapist Fired for Being “Too Cute” Sees Gender Discrimination Revived on Grounds of Unjustified Spousal Jealousy

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Survey Says: Employees Still Value Validation Over Compensation

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Maryland’s Montgomery County Joins Jurisdictions Increasing Minimum Wage to $15.00

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Time to Think About Holiday Bonuses

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