Labor & Employment Archives - Page 69 of 154

Time to Think About Holiday Bonuses

Halloween has passed and we are now squarely approaching the holiday season. While this time of year brings many good things, it can also bring unwanted headaches for employers wanting to spread some “holiday cheer,” especially those who forget how bonuses may affect payment of overtime. So, while we recently discussed bonuses in general, now is a good time for a refresher on bonuses and overtime pay in the context of holiday payments.

First, don’t forget the general rule for non-exempt employees is that all compensation is to be included in the calculation of the “regular rate.” Bonuses must be included within the regular rate unless specifically excluded by law or regulation. Bonuses which do not qualify for exclusion from the regular rate must be totaled in with other earnings to determine the regular rate on which overtime is based. However, certain things are excluded from compensation used to calculate the regular rate.

The first of these is the traditional “Christmas bonus,” or more precisely, “sums paid as gifts; payment in the nature of gifts made at Christmas time or other special occasions, as a reward for service, the amounts of which are not measured by or dependent on hours worked, production or efficiency.” To not be included as compensation used for calculating the regular rate, the “bonus must actually be a gift or be in the nature of a gift.” The bonus cannot be measured by the hours worked, production or efficiency. Nor can it be so substantial that it can be assumed that employees consider it as part of wages for which they work. The bonus may, however, vary between employees based on length of service. Finally, it cannot be paid pursuant to some contract. Bottom line – true Christmas gifts or holiday bonuses do not have to be included in the regular rate for purposes of computing the regular rate.

The second, and more challenging, scenario is a bonus that while paid at year-end is not necessarily a true holiday gift. As we recently addressed, the question is whether such bonuses truly are discretionary. Again, the exclusion is narrow. To be excluded from computation of the regular rate, the “sum paid in recognition of services performed in a given period” (i.e. bonus) must fall in one of two categories. One, the fact that the payment is to be made and the amount to be paid must be in the sole discretion of the employer. Further, the decision must be made at or near the end of the period in which payment is to be made and not be based on any promise, contract or agreement which causes the employee to regularly expect such payments. Or two, the compensation may be excluded from the regular rate if the payments are made pursuant to a bona fide profit-sharing plan or trust or bona fide thrift or savings plan.

Employers looking to spread holiday cheer in the form of end-of-the-year bonuses must therefore address the primary question of whether the bonus truly is discretionary. In making this determination, consider the following facts that may destroy the discretionary aspect of a bonus:

(1) If the employer promises in advance to pay a bonus

(2) If the amount of the bonus is conditioned on allocating a percentage of sales to the “bonus pool”

(3) If the bonus is promised at the time of hire

(4) If the bonus is to induce employees to work more efficiently or to remain with the employer

As examples, attendance bonuses, individual or group production bonuses, bonuses for quantity or quality of work, or retention bonuses are not discretionary and must be included in the regular rate.

So, celebrate the holidays and reward your employees, but be careful to consider whether bonuses must be included in computing the regular rate for non-exempt employees.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

The Law of Unintended Consequences: BIPA and the Effects of the Illinois Class Action Epidemic on Employers

Has your company recently beefed up its employee identification and access security and added biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retina scans? Have you implemented new timekeeping technology utilizing biometric identifiers like fingerprints or palm prints in lieu of punch clocks? All of these developments provide an extra measure of security control beyond key cards which can be lost or stolen, and can help to control a time-keeping fraud practice known as “buddy punching.” If you have operations and employees in Illinois (or if you utilize biometrics such as voice scans to authenticate customers located in Illinois), your risk and liability could have increased with the adoption of such biometric technology, so read on ….

What’s the Issue in Illinois?

The collection of biometric identifiers is not generally regulated either by the federal government or the states. There are some exceptions, however. Back in 2008, Illinois passed the first biometric privacy law in the United States. The Biometric Information Privacy Act, known as “BIPA,” makes it unlawful for private entities to collect, store, or use biometric information, such as retina/iris scans, voice scans, face scans, or fingerprints, without first obtaining individual consent for such activities. BIPA also requires that covered entities take specific precautions to secure the information. BIPA also carries statutory penalties for every individual violation that can multiply quickly … and the lawsuits against employers have been coming by the dozens over the past few months.

The Requirements of BIPA

Among other requirements, under BIPA, any “private entity” — including employers — collecting, storing, or using the biometric information of any individual in Illinois – no matter how it is collected, stored or used, or for what reason – must:

Provide each individual with written notice that his/her biometric information will be collected and stored, including an explanation of the purpose for collecting the information as well as the length of time it will be stored and/or used.
Obtain the subject’s express written authorization to collect and store his/her biometric information, prior to that information being collected.
Develop and make available to the public a written policy establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for destroying the biometric information, which shall include destruction of the information when the reason for collection has been satisfied or three years after the company’s last interaction with the individual, whichever occurs first.

Also, any such information collected may not be disclosed to or shared with third parties without the prior consent of the individual.The Money Issue

Under the law, plaintiffs may recover statutory damages of $1,000 for eachnegligent violation and $5,000 per intentional or reckless violation, plus attorneys’ fees and other relief deemed appropriate by the court. Moreover, if actual damages exceed liquidated damages, then a plaintiff is entitled under the Act to pursue actual damages in lieu of liquidated damages.

These damage calculations are made and awarded under BIPA on an individual basis. Do the math: If an employer has 100 employees in Illinois and has allegedly been negligent in obtaining required BIPA consent from employees, this can be a potential exposure of an employer to $500,000 in penalties, before you add in the ability to recover attorneys’ fees.

Who is Getting Sued?

The list of companies sued under BIPA spans industries. The initial groups of defendants included companies such as Facebook, Shutterfly, Google, Six Flags, and Snapchat. Also, a chain of tanning salons and a chain of fitness centers were each sued for using biometric technology to identify members. Between July and October, nearly 26 class-action lawsuits were filed in Illinois state court by current and former employees alleging their employers had violated the BIPA. Companies range from supermarket chains, a gas station and convenience store chain, a chain of senior living facilities, several restaurant groups, and a chain of daycare facilities.

Facts vary from case to case, but nearly all of the recent employee BIPA cases implicate fingerprint or palm-print time-keeping technologies that collect biometric data to to clock employees’ work hours. The plaintiffs allege their employers failed to inform employees about the companies’ policies for use, storage and ultimate destruction of the fingerprint data or obtain the employees’ written consent before collecting, using or storing the individual biometric information.

In at least one case, the employee has also alleged fingerprint data was improperly shared with the supplier of the time-tracking machines, and has named that supplier as a defendant as well (Howe v. Speedway LLC, No. 2017-CH-11992 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 1, 2017)).

What Do I Do Now?

In order to avoid becoming the next target, employers with operations and employees in Illinois should ask some basic questions and review processes and procedures:

First question to ask: are we collecting, storing or using individual biometric data for any purpose?
If the answer is yes, has your company issued the required notice and received signed releases/consents from all affected individuals? This release/consent should be obtained at the commencement of employment before any collection of individual biometric data begins. Do you have a publicaly available written policy to cover the collection, storage, use and destruction of the data? The employee handbook is the most logical place for this policy.
Review your processes: (a) make sure that any collected data is not being sold or disclosed to third parties, outside of the limited exceptions permitted by the Act, and this includes vendors and third party suppliers of biometric technology who process and store the information in a cloud-based service, and (b) make sure that you evaluate your internal data privacy protocols and processes for protecting this new data set, and be prepared to prove that you have “reasonably sufficient” security measures in place for the individual biometric data.
Review your vendor processes: If a vendor has access to the individual biometric data (such as a software-as-a-service provider), make sure the vendor has sufficient data privacy protocols and processes in place and that you have representations regarding this protection from the vendor.
Review insurance coverage for this type of exposure with your broker.
Remember the data breach issues: Make sure your data breach policies recognize that individual biometric data is considered personal information under Illinois laws addressing data breach notification requirements.

This post was authored by Cynthia J. Larose of © Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Right-to-Work Battle in Illinois Enters Cease Fire – For Now

Illinois is completely surrounded by right-to-work states that have laws making it unlawful for companies to require union dues as a condition of employment. Notwithstanding the recent trend of states enacting such laws, the Illinois legislature tried its best this year to block right-to-work legislation within its borders.

Earlier this year, the Illinois legislature passed a law that would prohibit local governments from enacting their own right-to-work laws after one Illinois municipality attempted to enact a right-to-work ordinance in 2015. Illinois Gov. Bruce Rauner vetoed the legislation – based on his belief that right-to-work laws promote business growth – and this week the legislature fell one vote short of overriding his veto. There are signals legislators may attempt to revive the legislation next year. Thus, this remains an issue for Illinois employers to watch.

This issue is not unique to Illinois; local governments in Kentucky enjoyed some success with their own right-to-work ordinances several years ago before the state enacted its own right-to-work law.

Right-to-work laws are permitted under Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act and make it unlawful for companies to require union dues as a condition of employment. In states where right-to-work laws are not enacted, most unionized employers have clauses in their labor agreements that require dues payments as a condition of employment – the clauses generally are known as “union seniority clauses.” At present, 28 states have right-to-work laws on the books. The National Right to Work Foundation maintains a current list.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

The Politics of Tragedy – New Employment Rights Proposed for Bereaved Parents

You know it’s time to re-issue your employment legislation when the nearest available section number for the insertion of an amendment into the Employment Rights Act is Section 171ZZ. Though it might sound like a bottom-rank Star Wars droid, that little fellow is actually the proposed product of a new Bill on time off work for parents who lose children, the Parental Bereavement (Leave and Pay) Bill.

No one can question the lasting devastation of the death of a child, but what evidence is there that we really need still more employment legislation to ensure that the parent has some time to mourn? So far as is apparent from recent speeches on the matter (go to www.theyworkforyou.com to see who has said what in Parliament on the point), the sponsoring MP has no direct evidence of time off not being granted by an employer in those circumstances. Instead he relies on an unattributed story from another MP about someone in Scotland who was told on the death of his new baby that as he would therefore no longer need the balance of his paternity leave, he was expected to return to work. If true, this is obviously grim beyond words, but no Employment Tribunal on earth would support a dismissal on those grounds and so it seems scant grounds indeed for this new legislation. Any employer which would say such a thing at that time is hardly likely to pay attention to some obscure Westminster regulation anyway.

All that said, what about the proposal itself? Running to 18 pages, a full third of them consequential amendments to other statutory provisions, the Bill sets out a scheme with distressing parallels in terms of complexity and rank over-engineering with the Shared Parental Leave rules, including the frankly appalling proposition, that the employer should be entitled to ask for proof of the child’s death as a condition of granting the leave.

Key points so far, bearing in mind that the Bill is merely an enabling framework, not the detailed regulations due to be made under it:

“Child” is anyone under 18 and likely to include stillbirths after 24 weeks of pregnancy. “Parent” may include step-parents and others with established caring relationships above and beyond the biological parents.
The minimum period of leave will be two weeks, to be taken in whole weeks (but not necessarily consecutively) within eight weeks from the passing of the child.
Like maternity absence, you keep all your terms and conditions (and obligations) of employment over the absence period except in relation to remuneration.
There is a hint that the employer’s ability to dismiss the employee during the absence period may be limited and/or there may be an obligation on the employer to offer alternative employment. I imagine that this may end up looking like the Regulation 10 rules in the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations around redundancy and priority for redeployment during maternity leave. A dismissal in breach of those rules in likely to be automatically unfair.
The right to time off has no prior service condition but Statutory Parental Bereavement Pay will by a new Section 171ZZ6(2)(b) – I am not making this up, I promise – only be available to those with six months’ prior continuous service.
Eligibility for SPBP may also be conditional on appropriate prior written notices being given to the employer of the week or weeks for which it is to be paid. I would take the view that giving an express form of notice to my employer would be the last thing on my mind if my world had just fallen apart through the loss of a child, so you would at least hope that any such notice could be retrospective.
SPBP will be deemed included in any continuation of the employee’s salary over the absence period and by Section 171ZZ10 you will not be able to contract out of paying it or make the employee contribute to it.

Losing a child is a horrible thing but this fairly overt attempt to turn grief into political capital is neither necessary nor fit for purpose. We must hope, for the benefit of both employers and the very people it is designed to protect, that if the Bill makes law at all, the implementing measures greatly declutter the provisions which it currently proposes.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Citing Failure to Cooperate, Court Orders Use of Specific Keyword Search Terms

United States v. New Mexico State Univ., No. 1:16-cv-00911-JAP-LF, 2017 WL 4386358 (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2017)

In this pay discrimination case, the Court addressed Defendants’ motion for a protective order precluding further searching for responsive documents. Citing defense counsel’s failure to “adequately confer” before performing the initial searches, “which resulted in searches that were inadequate to reveal all responsive documents,” the Court concluded that “which searches will be conducted is left to the Court” and went on to order Defendants to conduct additional searches with specific terms, many of which were proposed by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants payed a female employee less than they were paying her male counterparts, despite similar responsibilities in the track and field program, and sought, broadly speaking, production of documents reflecting communications regarding her compensation; production of documents regarding her complaints concerning pay; and production of documents regarding any other complaints of pay discrimination made by other coaches, trainers, etc. Without adequately cooperating with the plaintiff, Defendants performed “more than 20” keyword searches and produced “more than 14,000 pages of documents.” When Plaintiff indicated concern regarding the adequacy of Defendants’ searching, the parties were unable to resolve their dispute and Defendants ultimately moved for a protective order. Defendants argued that the discovery sought was not proportional to the needs of the case, noting the efforts already undertaken. Plaintiff disagreed.

Indicating that this case presented “the question of how parties should search and produce [ESI] in response to discovery requests,” the Court reminded the parties that “[t]he best solution in the entire area of electronic discovery is cooperation among counsel” and that “[c]ooperation prevents lawyers designing keyword searches ‘in the dark, by the seat of the pants,’ without adequate discussion with each other to determine which words would yield the most responsive results.” In the present case, the Court concluded that the failure to confer resulted in inadequate searches and, acknowledging Plaintiff’s argument that “[Defendant] alone is responsible for its illogical choices in constructing searches” indicated that, “which searches will be conducted is left to the Court.”

As promised, the Court went on to discuss the three disputed discovery requests and identified specific search terms and custodians to be searched, many of which were proposed by the plaintiff. The Court also instructed the parties to work together to the extent necessary, if the non-responsive documents returned were too voluminous, for example.

The Court ended the opinion by returning to the topic of cooperation:

Electronic discovery requires cooperation between opposing counsel and transparency in all aspects of preservation and production of ESI. Moreover, where counsel are using keyword searches for retrieval of ESI, they at a minimum must carefully craft the appropriate keywords, with input from the ESI’s custodians as to the words and abbreviations they use, and the proposed methodology must be quality control tested to assure accuracy in retrieval and elimination of “false positives.” It is time that the Bar—even those lawyers who did not come of age in the computer era—understand this.

[Citation omitted.]

A copy of the Court’s order is available here.

For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Employers Helping Employees—Are Disaster Relief Payments and Loans Exempt From Puerto Rico Income Tax?

With the havoc wrought by Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, employers are exploring options to provide emergency relief to those employees who have encountered financial hardship to meet their necessities and repair their homes in the wake of the disaster. Occasionally, aid from employers to employees comes in the form of disaster-relief monetary payments and interest-free loans. In light of the state of emergency in Puerto Rico declared by local authorities, on October 4, 2017, the Puerto Rico Department of Treasury released Administrative Determination No. 17-21 (AD 17-21), which provides necessary and well-timed guidance on the taxation of this type of assistance.

Qualified Disaster Assistance Payments

Disaster assistance payments, which meet the requirements of AD 17-21, are not includable in an employee’s taxable income and, thus, are exempt from Puerto Rico income tax. Under AD 17-21, any payment made by an employer to an employee, or directly to a provider of goods and/or services, will be considered “qualified” and not treated as taxable compensation provided that:

payments are made in lieu of wages lost by the employee while he or she is not able to work due to the disaster;
payments are made to (a) cover necessary and reasonable expenditures of the employee or the employee’s relatives for food, medications, gas, lodging, medical expenses, the care of children or dependents, power generators, funeral services, and/or the repair of destruction to the employee’s principal residence incurred as a result of Hurricane Maria, as long as the payment is made directly to the provider of goods and/or services; (b) to the employee himself or herself and to mitigate damages or losses resulting from Hurricane Maria, subject to a monthly cap of 1,000; and/or (c) for other purposes, as recognized by AD 17-21;
payments are received by the employee (or the provider of goods and/or services, as appropriate) at any time between September 21, 2017, and December 31, 2017; and
payments are in no way attributable or related to the level of the employee’s position or salary.

Employers that make qualified disaster assistance payments must report such payments no later than January 31, 2018, by submitting a sworn statement to the Puerto Rico treasury stating the names and social security numbers of the employees who received qualified payments and the total amount of the payments. Qualified disaster assistance payments made in compliance with AD 17-21 are tax-deductible for the employer.

Interest-Free Loans

Interest-free loans of up to $20,000 (either individually or in the aggregate) granted by an employer to an employee, from September 21, 2017, through June 30, 2018, to cover necessary and reasonable expenses of the employee or the employee’s family and expenditures for the construction or repair of the employee’s principal residence due to damage from Hurricane Maria are exempt from Puerto Rico income tax.

Employers may grant interest-free loans to employees in addition to qualified disaster assistance payments.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

New California Laws Provide Protections to Immigrant Employees

On October 5, 2017, California Governor Jerry Brown signed 11 bills essentially making California a sanctuary state. The California Values Act (SB 54) aims to protect undocumented immigrants living in California. Brown stated that “this bill strikes a balance that will protect public safety while bringing a measure of comfort to those families who are now living in fear every day.” The law, which will become effective on January 1, 2018, stops state and local enforcement agencies from using state resources to enforce federal immigration laws.

While the California Values Act has received a good deal of press, it is the Immigrant Worker Protection Act (AB 450), that is most relevant to employers.

With the signing of the IWPA, California became the first state to explicitly affirm the rights of immigrant workers at the worksite. The bill imposes an affirmative obligation on California employers to provide employees notification that ICE has determined they are lacking work authorization, thereby giving them advance warning that ICE may be considering their apprehension and removal from the U.S. through a workplace raid. Beyond union support, the IWPA is designed to protect an immigrant workforce essential to California’s economy – especially its agriculture. “According to [California] state Controller Betty Yee, undocumented immigrants’ labor is worth more than $180 billion a year.”

To protect immigrant employees, the IWPA:

Requires employers to ask for a warrant before allowing federal immigration officials into a workplace to interview employees
Bars employers from sharing employees’ confidential information (i.e. Social Security numbers) without a subpoena except for I-9s or other documents when a Notice of Inspection has been provided
Establishes penalties ranging from $2,000 to $10,000 for employers that:
- Fail to give employees public notice within 72 hours of an upcoming federal immigration inspection of employee records including written notice to any Collective Bargaining Representative
- Fail to provide affected employees with a copy of any Notice of Inspection and a copy of any inspection results within 72 hours

In late September, just prior to the signing of these bills, ICE implemented “Operation Safe City.” During the four-day operation about 500 people were arrested in California, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, in cities and counties specifically targeted for their sanctuary policies. Thomas Homan, ICE’s Acting Director stated: “Sanctuary jurisdictions that do not honor detainers or allow us access to jails and prisons are shielding criminal aliens from immigration enforcement and creating a magnet for illegal immigration . . . As a result, ICE is forced to dedicate more resources to conduct at-large arrests in these communities.” Now, in response to the California Values Act and the IWPA, ICE announced it would have to target California neighborhoods and worksites.

For more Immigration legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Employees Sue for Fingerprint Use

Employees of Peacock Foods, an Illinois-based food product manufacturer, recently filed a lawsuit against their employer for alleged violations of Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act. Under BIPA, companies that collect biometric information must inter alia have a written retention policy (that they follow). As part of the policy, the law states that they must delete biometric information after they no long need it, or three years after the last transaction with the individual. Companies also need consent to collect the information under the Illinois law, cannot sell information, and if shared must get consent for such sharing.

According to the plaintiff-employees, Peacock Foods used their fingerprints for a time tracking system without explaining in writing how the saved fingerprints would be used, or if they would be shared with third parties. According to the employees, this violated BIPA’s requirement for explaining -in the consent request- how information would be used and how long it would be kept. The employees also alleged that Peacock Foods did not have a retention schedule and program in place for deleting biometric data. The employees are currently seeking class certification.

Putting it Into Practice: This case is a reminder that plaintiffs’ class action lawyers are looking at BIPA and possible complaints that can be brought under the law. To address the Illinois law – and similar ones in Texas and Washington – companies should look at the notice and consent process they have in place.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

US Attorney General Jefferson Sessions Issues New Guidance On Transgender Employees

Yesterday, U.S. Attorney General Jefferson Sessions issued new guidance reversing the federal government’s former position that gender identity is protected under Title VII.

In a memo sent to the heads of all federal agencies and the U.S. attorneys, the attorney general stated that as a matter of law, “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on gender identity per se.” The memorandum further stated the DOJ will take the position in all pending and future matters that Title VII does not protect against discrimination on the basis of gender identity or transgender status.

Sessions’ memo explains Title VII expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex but makes no reference to gender, and that courts have interpreted “sex” to mean biologically male or female. Sessions concluded employers may differentiate on the basis of sex in employment practices, so long as the practices do not expose members of one sex to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which the other sex is not exposed. The memo highlighted sex-specific bathrooms as such an example. Sessions explained while Title VII prohibits “sex-stereotypes,” insofar as that sort of sex-based consideration causes disparate treatment between men and women, Title VII is not properly construed to proscribe employment practices that take into account the sex of employees, but do not impose different burdens on similarly situated members of each sex.

This guidance reverses and withdraws previous guidance by Attorney General Eric Holder in a December 15, 2014 memorandum in which Holder stated Title VII prohibits employers from using “sex-based considerations,” such as gender identity, in employment decisions. Sessions’ memo also runs contrary to the current position of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which treats discrimination against an employee on the basis of gender identity, including transgender status and sexual orientation, as violations of Title VII.

Currently, there is a split of authority in the courts on whether sex discrimination under Title VII includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sex stereotyping, and thus prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals. The U.S. Supreme Court will likely have to resolve the issue in the future, but may issue some relevant guidance this term in the Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. case (involving issues of a school district’s obligations to a transgender student).

While it is now the position of the Department of Justice that Title VII protections do not extend to transgender individuals, employers should still be careful to avoid discrimination on the basis of gender identity, as the law is still unsettled. As Attorney General Sessions’ memorandum notes, there are still federal statutes that prohibit discrimination against transgender persons, and states and localities may have additional protections. Moreover, the EEOC could still bring suit against employers who engage in transgender discrimination.

For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Chicago City Council Committee Approves Hands Off-Pants On Ordinance to Protect Hotel Employees

On October 2, 2017, the Chicago City Council Committee on Workplace Development and Audit approved an amendment to the Municipal Code (the “Ordinance”) that, if approved by the full City Council, will require hotel employers to equip hotel employees assigned to work in guestrooms or restrooms with portable emergency contact devices and develop and implement new anti-sexual harassment policies and procedures. The Ordinance is in response to multiple reports of sexual assault and harassment targeted at hotel employees by hotel guests.

The Ordinance in its current form will require hotel employers to (1) equip employees who are assigned to work in a guest room or restroom, under circumstances where no other employee is present in the room, with a panic button (at no cost to the employee) which the employee may use to summon help from other hotel staff if s/he reasonably believes that an ongoing crime, sexual harassment, sexual assault or other emergency is occurring in the employee’s presence; (2) develop, maintain and comply with a written anti-sexual harassment policy to protect employees against sexual assault and sexual harassment by guests; and (3) provide all employees with a current copy of the hotel’s anti-sexual harassment policy, and post the policy in conspicuous places in areas of the hotel where employees can reasonably be expected to see it.

With respect to the anti-sexual harassment policy mandates, employers must develop a policy that:

Encourages employees to immediately report to the employer instances of alleged sexual assault and sexual harassment by guests;
Describes the procedures that the complaining employee and employer shall follow in such cases;
Affords the complaining employee the right to cease work and leave the immediate area where danger is perceived until such time that hotel security or the police arrive to provide assistance;
Affords the complaining employee the right, during the duration of the offending guest’s stay at the hotel, to be assigned to work on a different floor or at a different station or work area away from the offending guest;
Provides the complaining employee with sufficient paid time to (a) file a complaint with the police against the offending guest, and (b) testify as a witness at any legal proceeding that may ensue as a result of such complaint;
Informs the employee that the Illinois Human Rights Act and Chicago Human Rights Ordinance provide additional protections against sexual harassment in the workplace; and
Informs the employee that it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against any employee who reasonably uses a panic button or exercises any right under the Ordinance.

Employers in violation of the Ordinance would be subject to a fine between $250-$500 for each offense, and each day that a violation continues constitutes a separate and distinct offense.

Consequently, it is critical that Chicago hotel employers monitor the status of this Ordinance, which is now pending before the full City Council. If passed and signed into law, the Ordinance will take effect within 90 days of signature. Employers should consider preparations for providing panic buttons to those employees protected by the Ordinance and training hotel employees on their use, and revisiting anti-sexual harassment policies, whether stand-alone or included in employee handbooks, to ensure compliance with the Ordinance’s mandates. Additionally, employers should consider providing updated anti-sexual harassment and anti-retaliation training to all employees, including those who are assigned to work in guest rooms or restrooms, to ensure that all employees fully understand their employer’s policies and procedures.

For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Category: Labor & Employment

Time to Think About Holiday Bonuses

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