Category: Labor & Employment

EEOC Orientation-Bias Guidance Stirs Controversy among Commentators

EEOC Supreme CourtThe public comment period for the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) proposed workplace harassment guidance closed last week. The EEOC’s broad definition of sexual orientation bias drew attention from practitioners and advocacy groups alike. Amidst the uncertain legal landscape surrounding harassment based on sex, the EEOC’s proposed guidance takes a progressive stance on the scope of what constitutes sex-based harassment. Under the proposed guidance, the EEOC’s definition of harassment based on sex, protected by Title VII, includes an “individual’s transgender status or the individual’s intent to transition,” “gender identity,” and “sexual orientation.” The guidance went further, stating that “using a name or pronoun inconsistent with the individual’s gender identity in a persistent or offensive manner” is sex-based harassment.

The proposed guidance follows a June 2016 report issued by the EEOC’s Task Force on Workplace Harassment, describing strategies to prevent harassment at work. According to the report, almost one-third of claims filed with the EEOC are harassment-based, with sexual harassment constituting over 40% of the claims in the private sector. Issued this past January, the EEOC’s proposed guidance’s purpose is to guide practitioners, employers, and employees alike on the agency’s position toward different types of harassment protected by Title VII. The new guidance updates nearly three-decades-old EEOC direction on workplace harassment and expands the scope of harassment in several areas, including sexual orientation and gender identity. The public comment period, which ended this past week, drew 154 comments. The wide array of those comments highlights the controversial nature of what is and is not be protected under Title VII when it comes to sex-based harassment.

Most critics of the proposed guidance called the EEOC’s definition of sex-based harassment premature and unsupported by case law. Three federal appellate courts are currently deciding cases based on whether sexual orientation is protected under Title VII, but no appellate court to date has found that it is indeed protected. Opponents of the guidance argued that, without certainty at the Congressional or Supreme Court level, the EEOC is improperly “legislating from below” and is in danger of diminishing its credibility.

On the other hand, supporters of the guidance commended the EEOC for its broad definition of sex-based harassment, and some even urged the EEOC to further broaden the definition to include those who do not identify with the gender binary or who are unable or choose not to transition fully. There was also some concern among proponents that the current phrase “intent to transition” would encourage the court to draft intent-based tests that would exclude certain individuals from protection under Title VII.

Commentators took particular notice of the improper pronoun usage example, which states that using a pronoun inconsistent with an individual’s gender can constitute Title VII-prohibited harassment. Some criticized this as an improper classification of hate speech that went beyond the scope of Title VII protection. Others lobbied for an adjustment period for employees and employers to adopt the new standard or, alternatively, add an intent element to the act. Proponents applauded the example’s inclusion as a type of harassment often experienced by employees.

As the government agencies and courts grapple with what is protected under Title VII, it would be prudent for all employers (including those who are not in states or localities that have explicitly broadened these protections) to include both sexual orientation and gender identity in their policies and trainings. The EEOC’s guidance may signal what is to come in the ever-changing area of sex-based harassment as courts and agencies trend toward a more inclusive definition of sex-based harassment. In addition to the possible legal ramifications, getting ahead of the curve and creating a harassment-free workplace promotes a healthier and happier work environment for all and, in the end, makes good business sense.

ARTICLE BY Taylor E. Whitten of Foley & Lardner LLP
© 2017 Foley & Lardner LLP

NLRB Will Not Hack Into Prior Decision Regarding Employee Email Use During Non-Work Time

NLRB employee email national labor relations boardNetwork security and protection of confidential information are among the reasons many companies place limits on how and when employees may use company-provided email.  However, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has largely ignored if not outright rejected these legitimate concerns, finding that under certain circumstances, they are outweighed by employees’ right to use email as a means to engage in concerted activity protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which includes union organizing.  The NLRB’s March 24, 2017 decision in Purple Communications, Inc.reconfirmed the Board’s position, first announced in an earlier 2014 decision, that an employer that provides its employees with access to company email systems must presumptively allow employees to use those systems during non-work time to engage in NLRA-protected activity.  Accordingly, under this standard, an employer who maintains a policy prohibiting employees from all use of company email during non-work time presumptively violates the NLRA.

It was precisely this type of non-work time email restriction that landed Purple Communications, Inc. in hot water with the NLRB.  At the initial hearing in this case, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Purple’s total ban on non-work time use of company email did not violate the NLRA, relying on the NLRB’s decision from 2007 in Register Guard, which held that employees have no statutory right to use employer-provided email systems for Section 7 purposes, and thus allowed employers to prohibit non-work time use of company email systems, so long as the policy or practice did not discriminate against NLRA-protected activity.  The parties on both sides in the Purple matter appealed the ALJ’s decision on this and other grounds, and the matter was taken up for consideration by the Board. After review of the record, a Board majority (in a three-to-two member decision) promulgated a new standard under the NLRA for employer regulation of its own email systems during non-work time (Purple I).  The Board majority expressly overruled Register Guard, and held that under its new standard, employees are presumptively entitled to use their employers’ email systems during non-work time in order to engage in statutorily-protected communications.  The Board announced that this presumption can only be overcome in rare cases where “special circumstances” exist to allow employers to maintain “production or discipline.”  Notably, special circumstances cannot be established through the ordinary (yet entirely legitimate) concerns that affect all employers, such as those mentioned above concerning security or confidentiality of information.  In its order setting forth this standard, the Board also remanded the matter back to the ALJ to enter an order consistent with the new standard.  On remand, the ALJ predictably found Purple’s policy violated the NLRA under the Purple I standard.  Purple once again appealed, asking the Board to reconsider the standard it announced in the Purple I decision.

On March 24, 2017, a majority of the three-member Board panel assigned to review the matter confirmed the standard announced in Purple I, without significant comment except to refer back to the original 2014 majority decision.  Acting Board Chairman Philip Miscimarra dissented from the majority’s Purple II decision, as he did in Purple I, calling the standard it set forth “incorrect and unworkable,” and pointing out many of its practical flaws.  Among them, Acting Chairman Miscimarra explained that the Purple standard fails to properly balance an employer’s right to control its technology resources, which are a significant expense to employers to maintain and secure, with employees’ NLRA rights.  The dissent also pointed out that the decision limits employers’ ability to control work-time behavior, because an email sent by one employee during his or her non-work time often will be received and read by another employee during his or her own work time.  In addition, the dissent noted the tension created by the majority’s decision between an employer’s legitimate right to monitor use of its technology, including email (allowing it to appropriately intercept improper communications, such as harassing or discriminatory communications for which it could be liable under other laws), with the NLRA’s prohibition of employer surveillance of NLRA protected activity. These and other concerns are likely now once again going through many employers’ minds when considering the Purple standard.

There is a silver lining for employers, at least for now.  First, the Purple standard does not apply to employer regulation of email during working time, only non-work time.  Second, the Purple standard only applies to employers who already grant employees access to company email systems in the course of their work; employers are not required to provide employees with email access they do not otherwise have.  Third, the Purple decision only applies to company email, and not other forms of company technology.  However, the latter restriction may only be temporary.  Although the composition of the NLRB is expected to become more employer-friendly with the change in presidential administration, it is possible that the NLRB could use the same or similar reasoning from Purple to broaden the non-work time use requirement to other forms of company technology (cell phones and social network platforms, to name a couple).

Because of this, employers would be well-served to review their technology policies.  Absent truly unique circumstances, employers generally should avoid policies that state a total ban on non-work time use of company-provided email.  Bolstering other company policies, such as those that relate to confidentiality and time keeping, may help alleviate some of the problems meant to be addressed by a broad non-work time email ban. And, to avoid becoming the next name on a new NLRB standard, consider whether any non-work time use restrictions on other forms of technology might be overbroad under the reasoning in Purple.

ARTICLE BY Daniel B. Pasternak of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

© Copyright 2017 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Religious Dress at UK Workplaces Revisited – is the fuss justified?

Religious Dress UK Workplace“Bosses can ban burkas, scarves, crosses” shouts the front page of last Tuesday’s Metro, followed by a commentary far too short to explain that this is almost always untrue.

This is the resurrection of an old debate concerning the extent of your right to manifest your religion at work through how you dress. When last seen, the European Court of Justice had decided in a Eweida v. British Airways that it would be religious discrimination to ban an employee from wearing a visible crucifix at work unless there was a good reason for it, for example health and safety. The two cases which led to yesterday’s headline (one of which – spoiler alert – said that bosses couldn’t ban religious dress) were considering slightly separate points. Bougnaoui v. ADDH considered whether it would be discriminatory for the employer to react to a customer complaint by banning the wearing of a Muslim head scarf, while Achbita v. G4S asked whether it would still be discriminatory if the employer banned all outward signs of religious or political belief.

In Bougnaoui the ECJ was clear – if you use the potentially discriminatory views of your customers as a ground for imposing dress restrictions on your employees, that will be unlawful.  Ms Bougnaoui wore a headscarf at work but was asked to remove it after a customer complained.  That was just visiting the customer’s views on the employer’s staff and so was unlawful.

However, in Achbita the employer maintained a written, comprehensive and consistent ban on the wearing of all religious and political symbols, regardless of the faith or political affiliation in question.  It did this because it wished to present a picture of overt neutrality among its workforce.  This was in turn a result of the nature of its business, supplying security and reception staff to a variety of Government and private sector clients, some in highly confidential and security-critical environments.  It did not want those customers to have any reason, real or (particularly) perceived, to doubt the commitment, loyalty or intentions of the people G4S supplied to them.

The ECJ had to find that there was no direct discrimination on religious grounds since all religions and beliefs were treated exactly the same. Ms Achbita’s headscarf was no more or less welcome than would have been Ms Eweida’s little crucifix.  It then asked whether G4S’s stance could constitute unlawful indirect discrimination, i.e. whether it was the imposition of a provision, criteria or practice (the ban on religious indicators in what you wear at work) which prejudiced more people with a particular characteristic than not (religion), affected the individual employee (Achbita’s headscarf) and wasn’t justifiable.

The question here therefore revolved around whether G4S’s ban was justifiable, i.e. a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The objective of overt neutrality was accepted as a legitimate aim given the very particular circumstances of the services G4S provided and to whom.  This will obviously be very much the exception as corporate objectives go, hence the misleading nature of the Metro’s headline.  But even given the legitimacy of the objective, was a blanket ban on religious or political wear a proportionate means of achieving it?

Reluctantly the ECJ decided that it was, largely since there was no other means of achieving that objective. Nonetheless, to satisfy that test G4S had to show that the policy was enforced regardless of religion and no matter how mainstream (and so probably uncontroversial) the political belief.  That meant not just the items in the title but also what the employee manifested through badges worn and bags carried, etc.   It meant showing there was rigorous enforcement of the rule – obviously you could not claim it as necessary if breaches were ignored.  It meant also that G4S had to show that it had considered means by which the adverse impact of the rule had been minimised as far as practicable, for example by applying the rule only to those in sensitive public/client-facing roles and looking at the possibility of transferring affected staff out of those jobs where possible.

The ECJ’s decision has been greeted with predictable dismay by religious leaders. “It will lead to an increase in hate crime”, says one, and “shows that faith communities are no longer welcome”, says another, both equally without supporting evidence.  The issue here however is not supressing religious belief at all, but in allowing businesses where it really matters (a tiny minority only) to provide a service where its customers do not have grounds to push back against individuals on perceived political or religious grounds.  At one level, professional opportunity could thereby be said to be increased, not limited.

But I repeat – the businesses in which overt neutrality will be a legitimate aim will be very few in number indeed. These cases do not alter for a moment the basic rule that limiting religious manifestation in the workplace will be unlawful discrimination unless you have an exceptionally good reason to do so.  But then you are left with the headline: “Bosses Can’t Generally Ban Burkas”, etc. and that somehow lacks the same punch.

ARTICLE BY David Whincup of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

© Copyright 2017 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Does Same Sex Harassment Support Gender Discrimination Claims? Texas Supreme Court to Decide

Same Sex harassmentThe Texas Supreme Court agreed to determine whether a school teacher’s allegations of a hostile work environment by her same-sex superiors can support a claim of gender discrimination in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). The court will also decide whether the circumstantial evidence presented to prove the teacher’s retaliation claim is sufficient to support a violation of the TCHRA.

The teacher alleged that a fellow coach began to sexually harass by allegedly making comments about the teacher’s body and physical appearance. When the teacher reported the harassment to her direct supervisor, the supervisor did nothing to put a stop to it and, shockingly, joined in the harassment. The teacher subsequently reported the harassment to the school principal and submitted a written complaint. The principal failed to file a formal complaint and, rather, conducted her own investigation. The principal’s underwhelming reaction pushed the school teacher to file charges of discrimination and harassment with the EEOC, at which point the principal informed her that there would be “consequences” for her complaints.

The teacher quickly found that there would, in fact, be consequences to her complaints. Within a few days of learning of the EEOC charges, the principal placed the teacher on a remedial plan and claimed it was necessary to assist in the teacher’s ineffective communication with co-workers and failure to report the alleged harassment within 10 days of its occurrence. The principal placed the teacher on administrative leave soon thereafter and eventually terminated her employment.

The school’s petition to the Texas Supreme Court asked it to determine whether the teacher’s allegations of same-sex hostile work environment—woman to woman harassment, in this case—can constitute gender-based discrimination under the TCHRA. The school argued in its petition that the appeals court failed to consider a U.S. Supreme Court standard that requires harassment to be “discriminatory at its core” in order to be actionable. The school also asked the court to determine whether the teacher’s circumstantial evidence used to support her retaliation claim was sufficient to support a TCHRA violation, giving special consideration to the teacher’s failure to submit any evidence regarding the but-for causation analysis required in such cases. The case will likely be placed on the court’s calendar in late 2017. Click here to view full briefing on the issue.

ARTICLE BY Laura Luisi of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

© 2017 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Yes, Your March Madness Office Bracket is Technically Illegal

march madness office bracket
marc

March Madness has arrived!  The 2017 NCAA Basketball Tournaments tip-off tonight (March 15) and continue through the Women’s and Men’s National Championship Games on April 2 and 3 respectively.  With this, comes the American tradition of companies and their employees betting on tournament outcomes through office bracket pools.

As lawyers, we have to point out that your company’s March Madness pool is very likely illegal under at least three federal gambling laws (the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, the Interstate Wire Act of 1961, and the Uniform Internet Gambling Enforcement Act) and many state laws.  And we would be remiss to not mention that there is a parade of horribles that could happen from permitting such workplace wagering.

With that said, the more practical reality is that office pools have become a widely-practiced and culturally accepted form of gambling, law enforcement authorities seem to have little interest in enforcing laws that technically prohibit them, and many employers view these office pools as a workplace morale booster.

For those employers – seemingly, most all of them – who will not shut down this popular practice, here are some best practices to help mitigate legal issues when sponsoring or allowing office pools:

  • Make sure that all entry fees are distributed solely to the winner or winners of the pool.  An employer, or employees organizing a pool, should never take a “cut” of entry fees.  Under various anti-gambling laws, profiting from the pool in this way raises a host of issues.

  • Limit pools to offices within a particular state.  Doing so may prevent the pool from violating federal laws, as they generally require the transmission of money or communications across state lines to be applicable.

  • Make participation completely voluntary and limit entry fees to nominal amounts.  Expensive or compelled buy-ins may encourage the predilections of employees who are problem gamblers, and expensive buy-ins may tempt those employees responsible for collecting and distributing entry fees to surreptitiously take a “cut.”  Compelled buy-ins could implicate wage and hour and religious anti-discrimination laws.  Following these guidelines helps ensure that an office pool is low-stakes and simply intended to promote friendly rivalry.

  • Do not retaliate against or single-out employees who may complain to the pools.  There are plaintiff’s lawyers out there who will try to tether an internal complaint of unlawful activity to later adverse action against the complainer.

  • Prohibit employees from gambling in other pools on company time or through company equipment.  Apart from a workplace pool, employees may choose to participate in other pools with non-employees, and there are many options to do so online (including through company-issued or owned computers).  These other pools can raise additional concerns about potential violations of the law, to the extent they involve large wagers, are structured to profit the organizer, or involve interstate communications.  Consequently, for reasons of both legality and ensuring employee productivity, employers are best served by a policy that prohibits employee gambling in other pools on company time or company equipment.

  • Consider sponsoring a free pool that provides a non-monetary award.  Although employees may not find it as interesting, an employer concerned about the legality of its office pool may consider sponsoring a pool that is free to enter, with a non-monetary award (a gift card or some other prize) for the winners.  The lack of an exchange of money in such a pool may avoid the reach of potentially applicable anti-gambling laws.

Putting legality aside, it is well-established that employee productivity takes a hit during March Madness, particularly since it is now possible to watch games online through work computers or personal mobile devices, and permitting an office pool could encourage distraction.

To accommodate employee interest in the tournaments while reducing productivity loss employers should consider airing the games in a breakroom or lunchroom. At the same time, add sports broadcasts and websites to blocked sites on company systems that monitor and limit Internet use on company-owned computers, systems and devices (certainly, gambling and unlawful activity websites should be blocked year-round).  And if productivity becomes a problem, communicate policies addressing these concerns to employees, including policies restricting viewing to non-break times or reminding employees (including those tempted to duck out early to catch a game) of applicable attendance and punctuality policies.

As March Madness begins, we wish you the home court advantage.

ARTICLE BY Mark E. Terman & Dennis M. Mulgrew, Jr. of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

©2017 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

How Does Supreme Court’s Remand of Transgender Discrimination Case Impact Wage-and-Hour Class Actions?

supreme court transgender discriminationOn March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court, in a one-sentence summary disposition, remanded the case of Gloucester County Sch. Bd. v. G.G. to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “for further consideration in light of the guidance document issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017.”  For those unfamiliar with Gloucester County, the case involves a public school’s obligations to a transgender student under Title IX and, in particular, whether Title IX’s prohibition against sex discrimination requires a school to treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity when providing sex-separated facilities, such as toilets, locker rooms, and showers.

So what does this have to do with wage-and-hour class actions?  As it turns out, in Gloucester County, the Supreme Court was poised to consider the scope, and perhaps the continuing viability, of the Auer doctrine, which frequently comes into play in wage-and-hour litigation.  Under the Auer doctrine, courts generally will enforce an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless that interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”  In wage-and-hour class actions, this often results in cases being decided based on guidance issued by the Department of Labor through opinion letters, its Field Operations Handbook, and other sources.

This deference to the Department of Labor can be frustrating for employers and attorneys practicing wage-and-hour law because the guidance issued by the Department of Labor often changes with each new Presidential administration.  For example, an entire industry can decide to classify a group of employees as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements based on an opinion letter from the Department of Labor only to learn years later that the Department has withdrawn the opinion letter after the start of a new administration.  If courts are obligated under Auer to defer to these shifting interpretations issued by the Department of Labor, it can create a great deal of uncertainty for employers seeking to comply with the FLSA and for parties litigating wage-and-hour class actions.

In the long term, eliminating or narrowing the Auer doctrine could provide more consistency for employers and litigants.  With the remand of Gloucester County, that is unlikely to happen in the near future.  In the short term, however, the continuing viability of the Auer doctrine may benefit employers who are hopeful that the Department of Labor, under the Trump administration, will take a more employer-friendly view of certain regulations.  For now, the Department of Labor remains free to shape FLSA through opinion letters and other guidance documents and without having to resort to the time-consuming process of issuing revised regulations.

ARTICLE BY Jeffrey L. Rudd  of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2017

Puerto Rico Enacts Equal Pay Law, Prohibits Employers from Inquiring about Past Salary History

Puerto Rico Equal PayAlmost two months after signing sweeping employment law reform, Governor Ricardo Rosselló has signed Puerto Rico Act No. 16 of March 8, 2017, known as the “Puerto Rico Equal Pay Act.” Act 16 is effective immediately.

Although modeled after the federal Equal Pay Act, Act 16 goes further, limiting instances in which employers can inquire into an applicant’s salary history, among other key provisions.

Pay Discrimination Prohibition. Like the federal Equal Pay Act, Act 16 establishes a general prohibition of pay discrimination based on sex among employees in jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and that are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.

Past Salary History Inquiries Prohibited. Act 16 prohibits employers from inquiring into an applicant’s past salary history, unless the applicant volunteered such information or a salary was already negotiated with the applicant and set forth in an offer letter, in which case an employer can inquire or confirm salary history.

Pay Transparency. Act 16 forbids employers from prohibiting discussions about salaries among employees or applicants, with certain exceptions for managers or human resources personnel. It also contains an anti-retaliation provision protecting employees who disclose their own salary or discuss salaries with other employees, object to any conduct prohibited by the law, present a claim or complaint, or participate in an investigation under Act 16.

Remedies and “Self-Evaluation Mitigation.” Available remedies for victims of pay discrimination include back pay and an equal amount as a penalty. Double compensatory damages also are available as remedies. The additional back pay penalty can be waived if the employer demonstrates that, in the year prior to the presentation of a salary claim, the employer voluntarily undertook a “self-evaluation” of its compensation practices and made reasonable efforts to eliminate pay disparities based on sex. The self-evaluation or mitigating measures cannot be used as evidence of violation of the law for events that take place within six months after the self-evaluation’s completion or within one year of the self-evaluation if the employer has commenced reasonable and good faith mitigating measures. The Puerto Rico Secretary of Labor is tasked with preparing and distributing uniform guidelines for employer self-evaluations.

The Department of Labor is authorized to prepare interpretive regulations and must commence a statistical study into pay inequality among men and women. The federal EPA and its regulations will be used as reference in interpreting Act 16.

The penalty provisions of Act 16 will not be effective until March 8, 2018, to permit employers to take any mitigating measures.

ARTICLE BY Maralyssa Álvarez-Sánchez & Juan Felipe Santos of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2017

Congress Boots “Blacklisting” Regulation and Sends it to President’s Desk

Congress Capitol blacklistingOn March 6, 2017, on a narrow straight party line vote of 49–48, the U.S. Senate passed a Congressional Review Act (CRA) Joint Resolution of Disapproval, which moots Executive Order (EO) 13673, “Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces“—also referred to as government contractor “blacklisting”— and which revoked its implementing regulations and Labor Department guidance. The U.S. House of Representatives passed the joint resolution, H.J. Res. 37 on February 2, 2017. The next step is to send the Joint Resolution of Disapproval to the president for signature.

If signed by the president, the CRA Joint Resolution of Disapproval prohibits the future re-issuance of a federal regulation in the same or substantially similar form without authorization of Congress.

President Obama signed EO 13673 on July 31, 2014, and implementing regulations were issued in final on August 24, 2016. The EO and its implementing regulations would require federal contractors and subcontractors to notify federal contracting officers of violations and “administrative merits determinations” of 14 federal labor and employment laws, and their state equivalents, including wage and hour, discrimination, union organizing, and collective bargaining, and workplace safety and health laws.

Key Takeaways

The resolution of disapproval does not repeal the executive order; it only disapproves of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (published at 81 Fed. Reg. 58562) to implement the EO, which the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), General Services Administration (GSA), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) finalized on August 25, 2016. Nevertheless, the joint resolution has the effect of essentially repealing the EO or rendering it moot. President Trump is expected to revoke the EO in a separate action

In addition, the resolution will prohibit the paycheck transparency provision of the EO from being implemented. (A district court temporarily enjoined the other provision of the EO; the joint resolution also renders this injunction moot.)

This resolution of disapproval should relieve government contractors of having to implement the provisions requiring them to disclose labor law violations and revamp their payroll systems to meet the requirements of the EO’s paycheck transparency provisions. Not only would we expect the president to sign the resolution, but we also anticipate, at some point, that Executive Order 13673 will be rescinded and that the Labor Department will withdraw its guidance.

ARTICLE BY Harold P. Coxson & Alfred B. Robinson, Jr. of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

© 2017, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Immigration Fact and Fiction for the U.S. Employer: Know Your Rights – 5 Things to Tell Your Foreign National Employee in the Current Climate

foreign national employeeOn February 21, 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released two memoranda signed by DHS Secretary Kelly addressing immigration enforcement.  While a sitting President cannot independently modify laws or regulations without going through the normal rule making process, he/she can significantly alter policy and enforcement priorities.  These two memoranda are a clear example of a shift in focus.  While the memos largely address individuals who are undocumented, your foreign national employees may be collaterally impacted as a result of being inadvertently involved in an enforcement action, when encountering an emboldened DHS officer or even in dealing with local police officials, given their new immigration related authority.

We provide a brief overview of several issues one may encounter.  We will provide additional information in subsequent postings as these directives, and others, continue to evolve.

1. Fact or Fiction, Can Your Foreign National Employee be Detained by DHS?

The new Kelly memos make it clear that the previous administration’s “catch and release” program is over.  The administration vows to deter illegal immigration by aggressively detaining noncitizens and expanding the categories of individuals who are considered priorities for removal.   The broad language of the memos suggest that  a foreign national employee could be detained and deported if he/she is convicted of a criminal offense, charged with a criminal offense, or even has committed acts that could rise to a chargeable criminal offense.  Assuming your employee has proper visa classification and he/she has been maintaining status, all should be OK.

As the law requires, we recommend all foreign nationals carry with them, at all times, proof of immigration status.  This means if your employee is a nonimmigrant worker (H-1B, L-1B, E-3, etc.) he/she should carry his/her Employment Authorization Document, I-94 card, passport with entry stamp, or other proof of lawful presence (or at least a photocopy of the relevant documents and be able to access the original quickly if needed).  If your employee is a Lawful Permanent Resident, he/she should carry his/her greencard (or at least a photocopy and be able to access the original quickly if needed).  Employees should have handy the name and contact information of their supervisor or HR representative who can also verify their employment details.

2. Fact or Fiction, Can the Company Continue to Employ a Foreign National Worker Authorized to Work Pursuant to DACA (Deferred Action Childhood Arrivals)?

As per the Questions and Answers guidance provided by DHS subsequent to the release of the memos, DACA continues as a program.  That means that if your employee is a DACA beneficiary and is employed pursuant to a valid Employment Authorization Document (EAD), you can continue to employ him/her and they can continue to renew their work permit.   This may change in the near future but for now it stands.

Some leaked Executive Orders (EO) have included provisions to end “amnesty programs.”   If this should happen, a DACA beneficiary will lose his/her permission to work in the United States.  Short of marrying a U.S. citizen, most DACA participants have no other immigration relief or form of work eligibility.  We have some hope that when implementing any new executive orders, the government will allow the “Dreamers” to continue working at least through the expiration of their current EADs so that both employers and employees alike are not impacted suddenly.

3. Fact or Fiction, Can the Company’s Foreign National Employees Continue to Travel Abroad?

Yes, but customs officers at airports and other ports of entry may question the employee about their immigration status and underlying eligibility for that status.   If the employee is selected for a longer interview during the admission process, he/she will be sent to a “secondary inspection” area.  While United States citizens have the right to have an attorney present during questioning, non-citizens generally do not have such a right while the officer determines whether or not to admit the foreign national employee.

Please advise your employees that if a DHS officer’s questions have to do with anything other than the foreign national’s immigration status, he/she does have the right to an attorney but it is unlikely that such requests will be granted until after the questioning is completed.

Also, employers should be warned that we expect a new Executive Order (EO) re-implementing the “travel ban” will be issued next week.   While foreign nationals of the 7 countries noted in the previous EO, namely Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, will be surely impacted, it is possible the new EO will extend a “travel ban” to other countries.  As such, we recommend foreign nationals from these 7 countries not travel abroad at this time, and we will keep you updated as the new EO is released to warn potentially additional foreign national employees against travel.

4. Fact of Fiction, Can a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officer Review My and/or a Foreign Employee’s Personal Electronic Devices and /or Social Media Accounts?

Since 2008, it has been the position of CBP that it may, upon a “reasonable suspicion”, inspect electronic devices, such as phones and laptops.  Moreover, this can result in CBP confiscating the devices for several weeks or months.  As such, employees should take proactive steps to ensure the confidentiality of client, customer and proprietary information.   This means that phones and computers should contain only information that is needed for the business trip. Some employers may want to provide laptops and phones that are used solely for business trips and do not contain any sensitive information.   Basically, if the employee does not need the device or information for the trip – it should be left at home.

With respect to social media, CBP Officers have recently been requesting passwords to review an applicant for admission’s social networking activity.  In addition, social media questions – while not yet mandatory – have been added to the ESTA online application.  ESTA provides visa free travel to nationals of certain designated countries.  As such, it appears that the trend will continue so employees should continue to utilize social media judiciously and remember that no post in cyber space is confidential.

5. Fact of Fiction, Do These Changes Impact a Foreign Worker’s Privacy Rights?

The memorandum addressing this issue states that DHS will no longer afford Privacy Act rights and protections to individuals who are neither U.S. citizens nor lawful permanent residents.  Since 2009, DHS has treated personally identifiable information (PII) as subject to the Privacy Act. PII includes information that is collected, used, maintained, or disseminated and includes U.S. citizens and LPRs, as well as visitors and undocumented persons.

Non-U.S. persons have had the right of access to their PII and the right to amend their records, absent an exemption under the Privacy Act.   It is unclear whether the 2009 guidance will remain in place until the DHS Privacy Office develops new guidance and it is unclear what DHS intends as to the scope, purpose, and intent of the new guidance.   For example, if your foreign national employee commits a crime or is even suspected of committing a crime as determined by an immigration officer, the employee’s name may be placed on a list which DHS will be begin publishing and making public soon.

Conclusion

Most employers are committed to having a diversity of talent and to the fair and equal treatment of all employees, whatever their background, so perhaps this is a good time to share such a message with your employees.  It is probably beneficial to include that as an employer, the company will aim to support and protect colleagues, regardless of their race, country of origin, and religion or belief system, and that the previous (and perhaps future) executive orders, as well as memoranda are only likely to affect a small minority of employees but are still taken very seriously.  Confirming that impacted employees can reach out to local HR partners or managers if they have questions or concerns is highly reassuring to most employees.

ARTICLE BY David Grunblatt & Erica Loomba of Proskauer Rose LLP
© 2017 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Are You Still Minding the Gap? A Check-Up for Navigating Line Between Political and Hate Speech and Workplace Acceptability

megaphone political speech hate speechIn December 2015, we broadly reviewed concerns and compliance issues for employers when managing employees engaged in workplace political speech or those accused of engaging in “hate” speech in the workplace. A brief scan of headlines so far into 2017 reveals more than 900 instances of alleged violence, hate speech, and harassment in and out of workplaces reported since late January. Human Resource professionals and in-house counsel may wonder, again—what are the company’s obligations and duties to our employees?

A quick review: “Political activity” and “political affiliation” are only protected statuses for certain employees and in certain locales. Courts have held the First Amendment protects public employees from their employers using political affiliation as a basis for employment decisions. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 expressly prohibits political affiliation discrimination toward federal employees. Several states have passed their own statutes concerning private-sector employees:

  • Michigan prohibits direct or indirect threats against employees for the purpose of influencing their vote;

  • Oregon prohibits threatening loss of employment in order to influence the way an employee votes on any candidate or issue;

  • Florida considers it a felony criminal offense to discharge or threaten to discharge an employee for voting, or not voting, in any election (municipal, county or state) for any candidate or measure submitted for a public vote;

  • Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia prohibit employers from posting or distributing notices threatening to close their businesses or lay off employees if a particular candidate is elected; and

  • California, Colorado, New York, North Dakota, and Louisiana have passed laws deeming it illegal for an employer to retaliate against an employee for off-duty participation in politics or political campaigns.

Several cities, such as Lansing, Michigan; Madison, Wisconsin and Seattle, Washington, protect political affiliation similar to protections afforded race, sex, age and disability, even for private sector employees.

Beyond these mandated protections, private sector employees should be mindful of workplace speech and conduct. For example, managers and supervisors who express any type of political opinion to subordinate employees may expose themselves to subsequent claims they acted out of bias against those employees on the basis of other protected statuses. How could an employee draw such a connection in his or her allegation? As we saw in the most recent election cycle, some political candidates across all levels (local, state and federal) voiced strong opinions about race relations, foreign relations policy, religious freedom, Second Amendment rights, immigration, LGBT rights and other issues directly related to characteristics protected by federal, state or local workplace anti-discrimination laws. Dropping into a workplace political debate with a subordinate employee about a candidate, elected official, political party, cause or other political issue risks allowing that employee to associate expressed opinions with some type of prohibited discriminatory bias.

Best Practices Check-up

  1. Understand there could be laws relating to workplace political speech or activities in your location;

  2. Educate managers and supervisors regarding what laws impact the workplace as well as the employer’s workplace culture; training can form a vital line of defense by limiting potential exposure before it has a chance to evolve;

  3. Remind managers and supervisors how personal opinions can be viewed by subordinate employees as a form of prohibited workplace bias; and

  4. Encourage managers and supervisors to resist being drawn into workplace political discussions, particularly with subordinate employees.

Should an employee file an internal complaint alleging a workplace hate-based incident, conduct a measured, consistent investigation to determine what (happened), who (was targeted) and if hate speech or other actions (based on a protected class or against company culture) is likely to have occurred. Resist assumptions.

If the investigation yields a conclusion that inappropriate behavior occurred, initiate appropriate actions to (1) hold employees appropriately accountable (for example, through formal warning up to discharge) and (2) decrease the likelihood of repeated incidents. Resist any media, or social media, attention that can serve to derail thoughtful consideration of the facts and promote an atmosphere leading to impulsive decisions.

ARTICLE BYJay M. Dade of Polsinelli PC

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California