Category: Internet

Employer Email Policies on Chopping Block as General Counsel Seeks to Overrule Register Guard and Board Calls for Amicus Briefs

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In a development of importance to both union and non-union employers, the NLRB General Counsel has asked the NLRB to overrule its 2007 decision in Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007).  In Register Guard, the Board had held that employers could bar employee use of the employer’s email for non-business purposes, including union or other communications protected under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, so long as the employer did so on a non-discriminatory basis.

The General Counsel now seeks a new rule that employees may use employer email for union or other Section 7 protected purposes so long as doing so does not impede production or workplace discipline. The Board has issued a notice the case, Purple Communications, Inc., Case Nos. 21-CA-095151, 21-RC-091531 and 21-RC-091584, inviting interested parties to file amicus briefs by June 16, 2014.

In its notice, the Board asked the amicus briefs to address the following questions:

  1. Should the Board reconsider its conclusion in Register Guard that employees do not have a statutory right to use their employer’s email system (or other electronic communications systems) for Section 7 purposes
  2. If the Board overrules Register Guard, what standard(s) of employee access to the employer’s electronic communications systems should be established? What restrictions, if any, may an employer place on such access, and what factors are relevant to such restrictions?
  3. In deciding the above questions, to what extent and how should the impact onthe employer of employees’ use of an employer’s electronic communicationstechnology affect the issue?
  4. Do employee personal electronic devices (e.g., phones, tablets), social media accounts, and/or personal email accounts affect the proper balance to be struck between employers’ rights and employees’ Section 7 rights to communicate about work-related matters? If so, how?
  5. Identify any other technological issues concerning email or other electronic communications systems that the Board should consider in answering the foregoing questions, including any relevant changes that may have occurred in electronic communications technology since Register Guard was decided.

How should these affect the Board’s decision?

The Board also invited amici to submit “empirical and other evidence”, which most likely means studies showing how employees use email in the workplace, how much productive time is lost because of over-use of email, and the like.  It is also possible the Board’s eventual decision could have an impact on other types of employee communications through various electronic devices and social media.

It has long been anticipated that the new Board and General Counsel would want to revisit the Register Guard decision.  Now that the time has come, it will be important for employers to engage as amici in an effort to shape the outcome and provide all Board members — including possibly dissenting ones — with both legal analysis and practical and operational considerations that should inform the Board’s policy choices in this important area.

Article By:

Ronald Meisburg
Of:
Proskauer Rose LLP

The Effect of On-line Shopping on Retail Leases and Percentage Rent

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“Percentage Rent” is a familiar concept to retailers and landlords and has long formed a significant aspect of the business arrangement between commercial landlords and their retail tenants.  In a lease arrangement that includes percentage rent, a landlord may negotiate a relatively reduced base rent for the chance to have some “skin in the game” by agreeing to participate in a percentage of tenant’s revenue, through gross sales, when that revenue exceeds a certain threshold amount.  Tenants appreciate this arrangement because they pay percentage rent if they are doing well and their sales exceed that negotiated threshold level. Landlords appreciate this model because it compensates them for the costs they incur in creating and maintaining successful shopping centers with amenities, such as food courts and open spaces.  If a successful shopping center drives foot traffic to individual tenants that increases their sales, tenants are often willing to compensate landlords for their part in driving that foot traffic.  The concept really is a “rising tide lifts all boats” model, in which landlords and tenants work as partners.

The explosion of on-line shopping throws a wrench into this scheme.  With more people purchasing from retailers on-line, and more retailers encouraging customers to place orders on-line, how will retail leases with percentage rent provisions be affected? Many percentage rent leases are carefully crafted to limit the types of sales that count toward the revenue in which landlord shares, often by including as only those sales “made from the store.”  The question to consider: if a large percentage of a store’s sales are made on-line, can or should those sales be treated as made from, or initiated in that store, such that the landlord will be entitled to a percentage of such sales?

It is clear that out of stock items unavailable during a customer’s visit to a store, but ordered at the store and delivered directly to the customer’s home should be counted toward gross sales at that store and counted toward the percentage rent calculation.  Similarly, on-line sales made at a computer terminal in the store, or on-line sales made at the customer’s home and picked up at the store should also be counted.  It becomes much less clear when a customer never sets foot in the store itself in either placing an order or receiving goods.  It may be difficult for a landlord to assert their right to a percentage of an on-line sale made by a customer in their home where the merchandise is then delivered directly to that customer’s home where the transaction occurs without any contact with the store premises.

As traditional retail stores work to accurately account for on-line sales with their landlords, another issue has recently emerged.  Traditional on-line only merchants such as Amazon have seen a potential benefit of having a brick and mortar presence to market their business and may soon open physical locations.  The question of percentage rent may become even more difficult to account for when the store front is really merely a marketing device to drive customers to company websites.

A thoughtful balance should be found to properly compensate Landlords for the sales they are driving to retailers. At the same time, from tenant’s perspective retail leases must be carefully drafted to exclude sales that are not derived from a particular store.  If this balance is struck properly, landlord/tenant partnerships will be well positioned for success in the retail and commercial real estate markets.

Article By:

Geoffrey H. Smith
Of: 
Sherin and Lodgen LLP

FDA (Food and Drug Administration) Proposes Tobacco Products Rule; E-Cigarettes, Cigars To Be Regulated

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The rule would ban the sale of e-cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco, and other products to those under 18; would require warning statements on product packages and in advertisements; and would require manufacturers to register and list products the with Agency and submit new products for premarket review.

On April 25, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA or the Agency) published a proposed rule (the Rule) in the Federal Register, establishing, for the first time, federal regulatory authority over electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes), cigars, pipe tobacco, dissolvable tobacco products, and nicotine gels (deemed tobacco products).[1]

Key Takeaways from the Rule, if Finalized

The following would apply to the newly deemed tobacco products:

  • No sales to those younger than 18 years of age and requirements for verification by means of photographic identification
  • Requirements to include health warnings on product packages and in advertisements
  • Prohibition of vending machine sales unless in an adult-only facility

In addition, per the Rule, manufacturers of newly deemed tobacco products would be subject to the following requirements, among others:

  • Register with, and report product and ingredient listings to, the Agency
  • Market new tobacco products only after FDA review
  • Not make direct and implied claims of reduced risk unless FDA confirms (1) that scientific evidence supports the claim and (2) that marketing the product will benefit public health
  • Not distribute free samples

Background

The Tobacco Control Act provides FDA with the authority to regulate cigarettes, cigarette tobacco, roll-your-own tobacco, and smokeless tobacco. Section 901 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), as amended by the Tobacco Control Act, permits FDA to issue regulations deeming other tobacco products not named in the tobacco control statute (e.g., e-cigarettes) to be subject to the FD&C Act. Section 906(d) provides FDA with the authority to propose restrictions on the sale and distribution of tobacco products, including restrictions on access to, and advertising and promotion of, tobacco products if FDA determines that such regulation would protect public health.

The Rule would extend FDA’s existing authority over cigarettes, cigarette tobacco, roll-your-own tobacco, and smokeless tobacco to include e-cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco (including hookah [water pipe] tobacco), dissolvable tobacco products, and nicotine gels. This latter group of tobacco products, deemed by FDA to be subject to the Tobacco Control Act, was not named in such legislation.

Scope of the Rule

Broadly, the Agency has proposed the following two alternatives for the scope of the deeming provisions and, consequently, the application of the Rule:

  • Option 1 would extend the Agency’s authority to all tobacco products not previously regulated by FDA that meet the statutory definition of “tobacco product,”[2] except accessories of such products
  • Option 2 would extend the Agency’s authority to all tobacco products not previously regulated by FDA that meet the statutory definition of “tobacco product,” except premium cigars[3] and the accessories of products not previously regulated by FDA

FDA is seeking comment on the relative merits of Option 1 versus Option 2, based primarily on the public health consequences of adopting one option or the other.

The principal difference between the two options is the scope of cigar regulation. Under Option 1, all cigars would be covered. Under Option 2, only a subset of cigars (i.e., “everything but “premium” cigars) would be covered by the Rule.

As noted above, accessories of proposed deemed tobacco products are outside the scope of the Rule. FDA considers accessories of proposed deemed products to be those items that are not included as part of a finished tobacco product or items that are intended or expected to be used by consumers in the consumption of a tobacco product. For example, FDA considers accessories to be those items that may be used in the storage or personal possession of a proposed deemed product (e.g., hookah tongs, bags, cases, charcoal burners and holders, cigar foil cutters, humidors, carriers, and lighters). However, e-cigarettes, and the components thereof, and hookah pipes are covered by the Rule.

Requirements; Implications for Retailers and Manufacturers

Generally, deemed tobacco products would be subject to the same FD&C Act provisions that apply to cigarettes. These include, but are not limited to the following:

  • Prohibition on selling (at a retail counter or via a vending machine) these products to persons under 18 years of age and verification by means of photographic identification related to the same
  • Enforcement action against products determined to be adulterated and misbranded
  • Required submission of ingredient listing and reporting of harmful and potentially harmful constituents (HPHCs) for all tobacco products
  • Required registration and product listing for all tobacco products
  • Prohibition against use of modified risk descriptors (e.g., “light,” “low,” and “mild” descriptors) and claims unless FDA issues an order permitting their use
  • Prohibition on the distribution of free samples
  • Premarket review requirements

Display of Health Warnings on Deemed Tobacco Product Packages and Advertisements

The Rule would require the following health warning on packages of cigarette tobacco, roll-your-own tobacco, and deemed tobacco products other than cigars sold, distributed, or imported for sale within the United States: “WARNING: This product contains nicotine derived from tobacco. Nicotine is an addictive chemical.” Regarding cigars, the Rule would require that any cigar sold, distributed, or imported for sale within the United States must bear one of the following warning statements on each product package:

  • “WARNING: Cigar smoking can cause cancers of the mouth and throat, even if you do not inhale.”
  • “WARNING: Cigar smoking can cause lung cancer and heart disease.”
  • “WARNING: Cigars are not a safe alternative to cigarettes.”
  • “WARNING: Tobacco smoke increases the risk of lung cancer and heart disease, even in nonsmokers.”
  • “WARNING: This product contains nicotine derived from tobacco. Nicotine is an addictive chemical.”[4]

These warning statement requirements also apply to advertisements of cigarette tobacco, roll-your own tobacco, and deemed tobacco products, regardless of form, which could encompass retail or point-of-sale displays (including functional items, such as clocks or change mats), magazine and newspaper ads, pamphlets, leaflets, brochures, coupons, catalogues, posters, billboards, direct mailers, and Internet advertising (e.g., websites, banner ads, etc.).

New Requirements for Deemed Tobacco Products; Implications for E-Cigarettes and Hookahs

Significantly, the Rule would require manufacturers of deemed tobacco products to meet new additional requirements. In addition to the deemed tobacco products themselves, the scope of the Rule also includes components and parts sold separately or as parts of kits sold or distributed for consumer use or further manufacturing or included as part of a finished tobacco product. Such examples would include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • Air/smoke filters
  • Tubes
  • Papers
  • Pouches
  • Flavorings used for any of the proposed deemed tobacco products (such as flavored hookah charcoals and hookah flavor enhancers)
  • Cartridges for e-cigarettes (including the liquid contained therein)

The Rule would require manufacturers of deemed tobacco products that were not on the market in the United States by February 15, 2007 to only market such products after FDA premarket clearance. The review process adopts a system similar to the medical device regulatory process. Manufacturers may submit either (1) a premarket tobacco product application (PMTA) to, and receive a marketing authorization order from, FDA or (2) a substantial equivalence (SE) report if the new product is substantially equivalent to a predicate product (i.e., a product commercially marketed in the United States as of February 15, 2007) at least 90 days prior to introducing or delivering for introduction into interstate commerce for commercial distribution of the product.[5]

A PMTA may require one or more types of studies, including chemical analysis, nonclinical studies, and clinical studies. To demonstrate substantial equivalence, an SE notice must compare a new product to a predicate product to demonstrate that the products have the same characteristics or, if there are differences between such products, that the differences do not raise different questions of public health.

The Agency intends to continue to allow the marketing of such products pending FDA’s review of either a PMTA or SE notice, presuming such application or notice is submitted within 24 months after publication of the final Rule. It is unclear whether most e-cigarette products commercially marketed in the United States could be eligible for an SE report or if they would be required to go through the PMTA process.

Although the PMTA and SE requirements do not take effect until 24 months after publication of the final Rule, we would expect manufacturers to begin, in the near term, to gather the necessary information and prepare the necessary applications/notifications to come into compliance. Those manufacturers that submit their PMTAs or SE reports early within the 24-month window presumably will receive clearance before the close of the window. Retailers should be aware of supply chain issues and possible disruptions in the marketplace because of the Rule and should work with suppliers to understand the continued availability of deemed tobacco products.

What Is Not in the Rule; No Impact on Internet Sales or Flavored Products

The Rule’s prohibition on sales from vending machines is not intended to impact the sale of any tobacco product via the Internet, and the Rule does not otherwise address Internet sales. Note, however, that state laws would continue to apply to Internet sales.

Moreover, the Rule does not restrict the sale of deemed tobacco products that are flavored. FDA specifically notes in the Rule that the prohibition against the use of characterizing flavors established in the Tobacco Control Act applies to cigarettes only (i.e., it does not apply to e-cigarettes, pipe tobacco, cigars, dissolvable tobacco products, or nicotine gels). However, FDA requests comments on the characteristics or other factors it should consider in determining whether a particular tobacco product is a “cigarette” as defined in section 900(3) of the FD&C Act and, consequently, subject to the prohibition against characterizing flavors. FDA’s request for comments in this area is in response to the proliferation of products marketed as “little cigars” or “cigarillos” (allegedly to get around the flavored cigarette ban), but which the Agency has indicated are truly cigarettes.

Compliance Dates

The age restrictions in the Rule would take effect 30 days after publication of the final Rule, whereas the proposed health warning requirements would take effect 24 months after publication of the same. The PMTA and SE requirements would also take effect 24 months after publication of the final Rule.

Comments on the Rule

Interested parties are encouraged to submit comments on the Rule, identified by Docket No. FDA-2014-N-0189 and/or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) 0910-AG38 by July 9, 2014.

[1]. Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 79 Fed. Reg. 23,142 (proposed April 25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 1140, 1143), available here.

[2]. Section 201(rr) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 321(rr)), as amended by the Tobacco Control Act, defines the term “tobacco product” to mean “any product made or derived from tobacco that is intended for human consumption, including any component, part, or accessory of a tobacco product (except for raw materials other than tobacco used in manufacturing a component, part, or accessory of a tobacco product).” FDA notes in the Rule that products falling within the FD&C Act’s definition of “tobacco product” may not be considered tobacco products for federal excise tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 5702(c).

[3]. The Rule defines “premium cigars” as cigars that are wrapped in whole tobacco leaf; contain a 100% leaf tobacco binder; contain primarily long filler tobacco; are made by manually combining the wrapper, filler, and binder; have no filter, tip, or non-tobacco mouthpiece and are capped by hand; do not have a characterizing flavor other than tobacco; weigh more than 6 pounds per 1,000 units; and sell for $10 or more per cigar.

[4]. In 2000, in settlements with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the seven largest U.S. cigar manufacturers agreed to include warnings about significant adverse health risks of cigar use in their advertising and packaging. See, e.g., In re Swisher International, Inc., Docket No. C-3964 (FTC Aug. 25, 2000). Under the 2000 FTC consent orders, virtually every cigar package and advertisement is required to clearly and conspicuously display one of several warnings on a rotating basis. FDA is proposing to adopt these four cigar warning statements from the FTC consent orders, which the vast majority of cigars already use.

[5]. FDA states in the Rule that it is aware of new product category entrants into the market after the February 15, 2007 reference date and that the SE pathway may not be available to these newer products.

Article By:

Jonathan A. Havens
Anthony “Tony” Pavel
Kathleen M. Sanzo
Of:
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

Social Media Marketing – New FTC (Federal Trade Commission) Guidance On Generating “Buzz”

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For the first time since it issued its Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising in 2009, the FTC has provided new guidance on the use of social media to generate consumer interest (or “buzz”) in a brand.

Shoe manufacturer Cole Haan had a great social media marketing idea.  They would run a contest through Pinterest.  The winner would get a $1,000 shopping spree courtesy of Cole Haan.  To enter, Pinterest users had to “pin” images of Cole Haan shoes on Pinterest.  They even came up with a great slogan for the campaign: “Wandering Sole.”  Finally, so that people could find the images easily, contestants were required to include the hash tag “#wanderingsole” in their pin descriptions.

This was a great marketing idea.  Lots of Pinterest users would post pictures of Cole Haan’s product on Pinterest and generate buzz about Cole Haan shoes. Here is what one Pinterest page currently looks like:

Cole Haan Pinterest

There was only one problem; the Federal Trade Commission.

The FTC considered the posting of images of Cole Haan shoes by Pinterest users to be endorsements of the product.  To be clear, the issue was not whether the Pinterest users actually intended to endorse the brand.  Rather, the concern was whether viewers of the image might perceive the posting of the images to be endorsements.  As such, the FTC investigated the marketing practice and issued a closing letter to Cole Haan regarding their investigation.

As stated in the closing letter, the FTC thought that the since the Pinterest “pins” constituted an endorsement, there should have been a “clear and conspicuous” disclosure concerning the fact that the “endorsers” (i.e., the Pinterest users entering the contest) were being compensated for their endorsement, namely, the chance to win the $1,000 shopping spree.  The FTC did not believe that the “#Wanderingsole” hash tag was sufficient to provide this required disclosure.  Fortunately, the FTC did not take enforcement action against Cole Haan, recognizing that the FTC had not squarely addressed this issue before.

So finally, we get to the point of this post.  While I understand the FTC’s point (I really do), I think social media marketers will need more specific bright line guidance as to what type of disclosure is required.  The reason is that in the social media context, the amount of text that may be capable of devoting to such disclosure can be very limited.  It is noteworthy that the 2009 guidance issued by the FTC provided numerous examples to help us identify when endorsement disclosure s would be required.  Not one of those examples, however, indicated what would constitute a sufficient disclosure.

In fact, one of the comments submitted (by Heath-McLeod) in connection with the 2009 guidelines requested that the FTC provide “minimum standards for the size and clarity of disclosures.”  The FTC expressly rejected this request saying that:

“advertisers flexibility to meet the specific needs of their particular message is often preferable to attempting to mandate specific language, font, and other requirements applicable across-the-board to all ads.  Advertisers thus have always been free under the Guides to make their disclaimers as large and clear as they deemed appropriate to convey the necessary information to consumers”

That’s good, I suppose.  Advertisers need some freedom to do what they think is appropriate in the context of their marketing.  But how, as a practical matter, are advertisers supposed to get comfortable that the disclosure they give is sufficient?  For example, would it have been sufficient for the Pinterest users to have included the word “sponsored” in their pin description?  How about just the word “ad?”  Would that have been sufficient?  It’s not clear.

Consider, for example, the fact that a similar disclosure having to be made through Twitter or using SMS (i.e., texting) might be very difficult given the 140 character limit.  Now, consider further that the FTC guidelines for endorsements also require an additional disclosure when the person depicted in the endorsement is not a real consumer of the product.  Perhaps Cole Haan’s hash tag should have read:

“#These pins are part of a contest. Contestants may win prize for posting pins of Cole Haan products. Persons in such pins may not be actual consumers of the pinned product”

Darn, that’s 141 characters.  Maybe if I get rid of the “#” ….

Article By:

Kurt E. Anderson
Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C.

Gaga for Gigabit: The FCC (Federal Communications Commission) Liberates 100 MHz of Spectrum for Unlicensed Wi-Fi

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On April 1, the FCC took steps to remedy a small but growing annoyance of modern life:  poor Wi-Fi connectivity.  Removing restrictions that had been in place to protect the mobile satellite service uplinks of Globalstar, and by unanimous vote, the FCC’s First Report and Order on U-NII will free devices for both (i) outdoor operations; and (ii) operation at higher power levels in the 5.15 – 5.25 GHz band (also called the U-NII-1 band).1 The Report and Order also requires manufacturers to take steps to prevent unauthorized software changes to equipment in the U-NII bands, as well as to impose measures protecting weather and other radar systems in the band.

The practical impact of these rule changes is difficult to overstate.  By removing the operating restrictions in the U-NII-1 band, the FCC essentially doubled the amount of unlicensed spectrum in the 5 GHz band available to consumers.  In the near future, use of this spectrum will help to alleviate congestion on existing Wi-Fi networks, especially outdoor “hotspots” typically used at large public places like airports, stadiums, hotels and convention centers.  Two less-obvious, longer-term benefits also are worth watching.

First, the new IEEE 802.11ac standard for Wi-Fi was finalized in January 2014.  This next generation Wi-Fi standard is capable of delivering vast increases in raw throughput capacity to end-users, often approaching the holy grail of transfer speeds: 1 gigabit.  To achieve those speeds, wide channels of operation are required – channels that simply were not available to Wi-Fi devices.  Now that the U-NII-1 band has been unleashed for Wi-Fi usage, there should be little impediment to the near-term rollout of 802.11ac compatible devices.

This new standard will offer marked improvements in download speeds and streaming quality, and be a boon to consumers who increasingly rely on mobile devices for bandwidth intensive applications such as HD video.  Unsurprisingly, cable operators in particular are excited by the possibilities of this technology; on the day the Report and Order was released, Comcast Chief Technology Officer Tony Werner authored a lengthy blog post touting the possibilities of Comcast offering Gigabit Wi-Fi to its customers utilizing the U-NII-1 band.[2]

Second, in addition to the untempered enthusiasm of the MSOs, wireless carriers also have a stake in this unlicensed spectrum.  Specifically, as use of licensed mobile spectrum continues to expand exponentially, the wireless carriers will increasingly encourage wireless offloading as a means of addressing congestion and capacity issues on macro cellular networks.  For example, Cisco Systems estimates that 45% of global mobile data traffic was offloaded onto the fixed network through Wi-Fi or small cells in 2013.[3]

This transformation of 100 MHz of spectrum in the U-NII-1 band marks one part of a renewed focus on consumer broadband at the FCC.  In addition to unlicensed Wi-Fi, the FCC is also in the middle of a proceeding – covered in an earlier FCC Law Blog post[4] – to streamline rules for wireless infrastructure.  Taken together with the FCC’s release earlier this week of auction rules for 65 MHz of AWS-3 spectrum later this year, it becomes clear that although it is early yet, the Wheeler Commission is gaga for broadband.

[1] U-NII is the acronym for “Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure devices”, unintentional radiators which facilitate broadband access and wireless local area networking, including Wi-Fi.  A copy of the First Report and Order is available here.

[2] See Tony Werner’s blog post here.

[3] See Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2013-2018.

[4] See Sleeper “Small” Cells: The Battle Over The FCC’s Wireless Infrastructure Proceeding.

Article By:

Douglas A. Svor
Dave Thomas
Of:
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

 

 

Facebook Post Breaches Confidentiality Provision of Settlement Agreement

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A Florida appellate court has ruled that a teenaged daughter’s post on Facebookmentioning her father’s confidential settlement of an age discrimination claim breached a confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement, barring the father from collecting an $80,000 settlement. Gulliver Schools, Inc. v. Snay, No. 3D13-1952 (Fla 3d DCA Feb. 26, 2014).

The plaintiff, Patrick Snay, was a headmaster of Gulliver, a private school in the Miami area. After his contract was not renewed, he sued for age discrimination. The parties reached a settlement pursuant to a written agreement, which included a detailed confidentiality provision. The provision stated in part:

13. Confidentiality . . . [T]he plaintiff shall not either directly or indirectly, disclose, discuss or communicate to any entity or person, except his attorneys or other professional advisors or spouse any information whatsoever regarding the existence or terms of this Agreement. . . A breach . . . will result in disgorgement of the Plaintiff’s portion of the Settlement Payments.

A couple of days after the agreement was signed, Snay’s daughter, who had recently been a student at Gulliver, posted the following on her Facebook page:

Mama and Papa Snay won the case against Gulliver. Gulliver is now officially paying for my vacation to Europe this summer. SUCK IT.

Snay’s daughter had about 1,200 Facebook friends, many of whom were current or former Gulliver students. Gulliver notified Snay of the breach and refused to tender the $80,000 to Snay under the terms of the settlement. (Snay’s attorneys received their portion). Snay moved to enforce the agreement. Limited discovery revealed that Snay and his wife notified their daughter “that the case was settled and they were happy with the result.” Snay denied ever discussing a trip to Europe. The district court held that Snay’s actions did not violate the terms of the agreement, but the appellate court reversed, noting that Snay was prohibited from “directly or indirectly” disclosing even the “existence” of the settlement.

The decision offers lessons for counsel, litigants, and parents. Counsel and litigants need to remember that these types of confidentiality provisions with disgorgement penalties are taken seriously by the courts and can be enforced. Parents need to remind their children to be mindful of what they post on social media, because it might have adult consequences.

Article by:

V. John Ella

Of:

Jackson Lewis P.C.

California District Court Holds that Providing Cellphone Number for an Online Purchase Constitutes “Prior Express Consent” Under TCPA – Telephone Consumer Protection Act

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A federal district court in California recently ruled that a consumer who voluntarily provided a cellphone number in order to complete an online purchase gave “prior express consent” to receive a text message from the business’s vendors under the TCPA. See Baird v. Sabre, Inc., No. CV 13-999 SVW, 2014 WL 320205 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014).

In Baird, the plaintiff booked flights through the Hawaiian Airlines website. In order to complete her purchase, the plaintiff provided her cellphone number. Several weeks later she received a text message from the airline’s vendor, Sabre, Inc., inviting the plaintiff to receive flight notification services by replying “yes.” The plaintiff did not respond and no further messages were sent. The plaintiff sued the vendor claiming that it violated the TCPA by sending the single text message.

The central issue in Baird was whether, by providing her cellphone number to the airline, the plaintiff gave “prior express consent” to receive autodialed calls from the vendor under the TCPA. In 1992, the FCC promulgated TCPA implementing rules, including a ruling that “persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.” In re Rules & Reg’s Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8769 ¶ 31 (1992) (“1992 FCC Order”). In support of this ruling, the FCC cited to a House Report stating that when a person provides their phone number to a business, “the called party has in essence requested the contact by providing the caller with their telephone number for use in normal business communications.” Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102–317, at 13 (1991)).

The court found that, while the 1992 FCC Order “is not a model of clarity,” it shows that the “FCC intended to provide a definition of the term ‘prior express consent.’” Id. at *5. Under that definition, the court held that the plaintiff consented to being contacted on her cellphone by an automated dialing machine when she provided the number to Hawaiian Airlines during the online reservation process. Id. at *6. Under the existing TCPA jurisprudence, a text message is a “call.” Id. at *1. Furthermore, although the plaintiff only provided her cellphone number to the airline (and not to Sabre, Inc., the vendor), the court concluded that “[n]o reasonable consumer could believe that consenting to be contacted by an airline company about a scheduled flight requires that all communications be made by direct employees of the airline, but never by any contractors performing services for the airline.” Id. at *6. The Judge was likewise unmoved by the fact that the plaintiff was required to provide a phone number (though not necessarily a cellphone number) to complete the online ticket purchase. Indeed, the court observed that the affirmative act of providing her cellphone number was an inherently “voluntary” act and that, had the plaintiff objected, she could simply have chosen not to fly Hawaiian Airlines. Id.

Baird does not address the October 2013 TCPA regulatory amendments that require “prior express written consent” for certain types of calls made to cellular phones and residential lines (a topic that previously has been covered on this blog). See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(2), (3) (emphasis added). “Prior express written consent” is defined as “an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorized such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.” 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8). Whether the Baird rationale would help in a “prior express written consent” case likely would depend on the underlying facts such as whether the consumer/plaintiff agreed when making a purchase to be contacted by the merchant at the phone number provided, and whether the consumer/plaintiff provided an electronic signature. See 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8)(ii).

Nonetheless, Baird is a significant win for the TCPA defense bar and significantly reduces TCPA risk for the defendants making non-telemarketing calls (or texts) to cellphones using an automated dialer (for which “prior express consent” is the principal affirmative defense). If that cellphone number is given by the consumer voluntarily (and, given the expansive logic of Baird, we wonder when it could be considered “coerced”), the defendant has obtained express consent. Baird leaves open a number of questions worth watching, including how far removed the third-party contractor can be from the company to whom a cellphone number was voluntarily provided. Judge Wilson seemed to think it was obvious to the consumer that a third-party might be utilized by an airline to provide flight status information, but how far does that go? We’ll be watching.

Article By:

Of:

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Bad Precedent: Lawyer Censured for Buying Google Keywords for Other Lawyers and Law Firms

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I thoroughly disagree with this anti-competitive, anti-consumer censure. It’s bad precedent.

Google Keywords

I was the defense’s law firm marketing/social media expert witness in Habush vs. Cannon & Dunphy on this very issue (although the lawsuit was filed under a Wisconsin state “invasion of privacy” statute).

This is common practice online.  When you Google “Avis,” a sponsored link for Hertz shows up in the margin.  The user isn’t deceived and everyone gets more information and more choices, which is good for consumers.  It’s a strategy that helps smaller firms with smaller marketing budgets compete against big-name, big-budget firms.

This keyword-bidding strategy is certainly aggressive, but it shouldn’t be considered unethical or unprofessional; it’s simply an issue of taste, which is subjective.  We shouldn’t legislate taste.

 

Article by:

Ross Fishman

Of:

Fishman Marketing, Inc.

New Social Network for Attorneys Now Online

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A new social network for attorneys – Foxwordy – has now launched and is offering any lawyer who is “an innovator and influencer in the legal industry” a free three-month membership to what its founder is calling an “invitation-only private social-networking platform brings together relevant top-tier legal colleagues to efficiently collaborate in real-time.”

Lawyer Attorney Social Media

It appears that this new site is aimed at creating a new attorney-to-attorney referral platform.  Foxwordy founder Monica Zent said that the site provides a way for attorneys to gain a peer validated reputation and encourages collaborations that would normally happen via the phone, in person or by email.

Some of the site’s features include:

  • Real-time collaboration with other lawyers working on common issues
  • Ability for attorneys to share best practices and language for legal documents
  • Listing of job opportunities similar to LinkedIn

Zent says there are currently 1,000 members on the website that is now out of beta.  The network will not be available to the public; it is designed solely as a website for attorneys to share information and collaborate, and membership is by invitation only.  You provide your name and email address on the home page to request an invitation.

It was unclear on the site how you are vetted for membership; since the site’s revenue model is based on subscriptions alone ($10 per month), I was guessing that the bar isn’t set too high.  And I was proven right after I had one of my non-attorney staff members enter her name and Gmail address, and she received a congratulatory email minutes later on her acceptance.

I’d be interested to hear from attorneys who sign up and participate on this new social network for lawyers – what are you finding of most value for your practice from this new social media tool?

Article by:

Stephen Fairley

Of:

The Rainmaker Institute

Digital Currency Identified as an “Emerging Risk” in the Canadian Federal Government’s 2014 Budget

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On February 11, 2014, the Canadian Federal Government released its 2014 Budget. In the 2014 Budget, the Federal Government pledged to introduce legislative amendments to strengthen Canada’s anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regime in the area of virtual (digital) currency.

2013: Year of Bitcoin?

At the beginning of 2013, one bitcoin could be purchased for $12. For a brief period in November 2013, one bitcoin was worth more than one ounce of gold ($1242 to $1240, respectively). Forbes and MarketWatch wrote articles proclaiming 2013 as the year of bitcoin, and “bitcoin” was chosen as the word of the year by the Australian National Dictionary Centre (beating out worthy candidates, including “selfie” and “twerk”).

This increased popularity of digital currency has brought increased scrutiny from regulators and law enforcement. Last year in the United States, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network issued guidance with respect to whether activities by individuals and companies related to virtual currencies are subject to registration, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, and the FBI arrested the “mastermind” of Silk Road (a marketplace selling illegal items and accepting payment in virtual currency). In early 2014, a prominent member of the bitcoin community was indicted on money laundering charges.

Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) Release Its Position on Bitcoin

Prior to the release of the 2014 Budget, the main Canadian government references to digital currency were from the CRA. The first notable CRA acknowledgment of bitcoin was in April 2013 in the form of a CRA communication to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (“CBC”). The communication stated that transactions involving bitcoin are barter transactions and that gains resulting from bitcoin transactions could be income or capital depending on the specific facts.

On November 5, 2013, the CRA issued its first release on the taxation of digital currency. This release reinforced the CRA’s earlier position on bitcoin that was set out in its April 2013 e-mail to the CBC. On December 23, 2013, in CRA Document No. 2013-0514701|7, subject “Bitcoins,” the CRA further clarified its position with respect to bitcoin “in response to a summary of comments that were provided in response to a recent media enquiry describing the income tax consequences of various transactions involving digital currency.”

Accordingly, the CRA considers bitcoin to be a commodity, not a currency. Therefore, using bitcoins to purchase goods or services is considered a barter transaction. The sale of bitcoins at a profit is treated as either income or capital depending on a particular taxpayer’s circumstances.

Virtual Currency in the 2014 Budget

Virtual currency is identified in the 2014 Budget as an “emerging risk” that threatens Canada’s international leadership in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Bitcoin is cited in the 2014 Budget as an example of such virtual currency.

In the 2014 Budget, the Federal Government proposed to introduce anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing regulations for virtual currencies, such as bitcoin.

The Federal Government noted in the 2014 Budget that this proposal was based on a report by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce entitled Follow the Money: Is Canada Making Progress in Combatting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing? Not Really (the “Report”). The Report is a five-year review of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (the “Act”) and was issued in March 2013. However, the only reference in the Report to digital currency is a brief note that the development of electronic methods to launder money must be addressed through timely amendments to the Act and its regulations.

2014: Year of Bitcoin Regulation

The Federal Government has identified digital currency as an “emerging risk” in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Accordingly, the regulation of digital currency in Canada is imminent, and individuals and businesses dealing in bitcoin will soon be subject to certain registration, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements.

Article by:

Dickinson Wright PLLC