From Trips to ACTA: Establishing the Intent to Uphold Access to Medicine in the Face of Ambiguity

The National Law Review would like to congratulate Guadalupe A. Lopez  of the American University Washington College of Law  one of our Spring 2011 Student Legal Writing Contest Winners. Guadalupe writes about generic drugs and patents and the distribution of  pharmaceuticals  in developing countries:  

Introduction

The numbers speak for themselves. Each year, over 9.5 million people die due to infectious diseases for which there exists medication – most live in developing countries.i Currently, there are over 33 million people around the world living with HIV/AIDS,ii 70 percent of whom are in dire need of anti-retroviral medication but not receiving it.iii This has been attributed, in part, to the lack of affordable healthcare in developing countries, along with the high drug prices associated with monopolies provided by pharmaceutical patents.iv

Studies demonstrate that there is a significant change in the price of a drug once its patent expires, allowing its generic version to be legally manufactured and introduced into a given market.v The introduction of a generic drug often results in the reduction of prices anywhere between 22% and 88%, depending on the type of drug and the number of generic manufacturers producing it.vi In some instances, even the threat of introducing a generic drug into a market will be enough to significantly lower the price of its patented version.vii For this reason, it is in the best financial interest of pharmaceutical companies to acquire and maintain the highest levels of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) protection on their patents. In furtherance of that objective, pharmaceutical companies have actively engaged in campaigns, both domestically and around the world, aimed at preventing generic manufacturers from accessing global drug markets.viii Unfortunately, this comes at a high cost to patients who are in need of treatment and cannot afford the patented versions of these medicines. This paper will address this concern by explaining how the pursuit of high levels of IPR protection has exacerbated the inaccessibility of medication by keeping more affordable, generic drugs off the market.ix This has been largely possible due to a narrow application of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (“TRIPS Agreement”), as well as efforts to establish the highest possible levels of IPR protection, led mainly by industrialized nations.

The first section of this paper will provide an introduction to the TRIPS framework as well as a timeline of international events leading to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Doha Declaration”). This was a declaration by all members of the TRIPS Agreement reaffirming their obligation to protect public health through the use of provisions referred to as “TRIPS flexibilities.” The second section explains that despite the Doha Declaration, certain TRIPS flexibilities have been undermined through the implementation of bilateral trade agreements with developing countries, and regulations within regional trading blocs providing vigorous protection of IPRs.x These trade agreements and regulations contain “TRIPS-Plus” provisions demanding higher levels of IPR protection than those required by the TRIPS Agreement itself.xi In essence, they have been seen as attempts to circumvent the obligations agreed to during the Doha Declaration, acknowledging that public health issues take precedent over IPRs. The third section of this paper introduces the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) recently negotiated by the world’s most industrialized nations, and presents the arguments raised in opposition to the accord. Many have argued that due to the special interests behind ACTA’s negotiating countries, this agreement will have a detrimental impact on developing countries, as they will be forced to adopt a framework of heightened IP standards to which they did not explicitly assent.xii The last section argues that despite the clear threats posed by ACTA, negotiating countries have expressed a clear intent to uphold access to medicine principles as asserted in the Doha Declaration. However, because many of the ACTA negotiations have been held behind closed doors, there is no record that reflects this intent outside of the public statements made by country representatives. The section proposes creating an unofficial drafting history for ACTA based on amendments made to various drafts of the text as well as public statements released by the parties. This drafting history will provide assistance when interpreting any ambiguity within ACTA that may be used to impede access to medicine or undermine any of the obligations made under the Doha Declaration.

I.  The implementation of TRIPS and the resulting need for the Doha Declaration on public health

A. The Development of the TRIPS Agreement

During the 1980s, a number of corporate actors mobilized together after realizing that they shared the common goal of increasing the protection of their intellectual property rights.xiii This alliance was comprised of trans-national corporations from a variety of sectors, among them agricultural chemical producers, software producers, entertainment providers, and brand-name pharmaceutical providers.xiv After successfully lobbying their interests at a domestic level, these actors began seeking a way to further expand the protection of their interests by pursuing higher levels of IPR protection outside the United States.xv They did so by creating a strategy to link IP with trade, two areas of law which until then, were vastly unrelated. In addition, this interest group also formed strong political ties within the U.S. and gained considerable support with the U.S. government, particularly the Office of the US Trade Representative.xvi Through transnational mobilization and aggressive lobbying of various governments, international organizations and private sectors, this coalition managed to include its newly formulated trade-based IP regime in the agenda for the GATT’s Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (“Uruguay Round”) held in 1995.xvii

During the Uruguay Round, the United States persistently promoted the adoption of a new global intellectual property regime.xviii Some scholars have noted that many countries assented to the TRIPS Agreement in hopes that a multi-lateral rule based system would eliminate the US’ coercive economic policy.xix As a result, many developing countries were at a disadvantage during TRIPS Agreement negotiations due to the asymmetry in bargaining power vis-à-vis more industrialized countries. Furthermore, developing countries were at an additional disadvantage because their negotiators lacked the necessary training in the area of intellectual property essential to negotiating a new set of IP standards.xx Daniel Gervais explains that as a result, industrialized countries made very few concessions during the negotiations while developing countries were “forced to accept a package that they perhaps did not fully understand and yet, contained a set of foreign IP norms which they now had to implement.”xxi This Uruguay Round of negotiations resulted in what is known today as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement- adopted and put into force in 1994.xxii

The TRIPS Agreement was an effort to implement a global intellectual property rights regime and establish what industrialized countries believed should be the minimum levels of IPR protection required of all countries before acceding as members of the WTO.xxiii As a result, the TRIPS Agreement obligated developing nations to enforce levels of IPR protection similar to those adopted by highly industrialized nations, despite the lack of development in their own domestic IP laws.xxiv Included as part of the TRIPS Agreement were provisions requiring a 20-year term of protection for patented medication, which pharmaceutical companies argued were necessary to sustain innovation and fund research and development for future pharmaceutical products.xxv Along with these higher levels of protection, however, came huge impediments to the accessibility of essential medication in developing nations.

B.  Access to Medicine Consequences

The implementation of the TRIPS Agreement provided pharmaceutical companies with a legal and effective monopoly over their products due to the period of protection granted to their products before the introduction of any generic competitors.xxvi This meant that name-brand pharmaceutical companies were able to maintain high drug prices so long as they were still under the 20-year patent protecting their products. Within developing countries, however, this additional term of patent protection ultimately resulted in the overall reduction of affordable medicine.

This monopoly over medicines and prices proved to be devastating during the late 1990s when the HIV/AIDS epidemic was reaching its peak.xxvii It was at this point that developing countries realized the extent of the serious access to medicine implications that accompanied the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. Developing countries, particularly South Africa, took initiatives to address the crisis by providing low-cost medication to its citizens and by issuing compulsory licenses for anti-retroviral HIV/AIDS medication.xxviii These efforts were met with fierce resistance from pharmaceutical companies and retaliation in the form of a lawsuit by the U.S. government.xxix The outcome was a wave of public outrage and widespread protests against the U.S. and pharmaceutical companies, largely led by developing countries, civil activists, and international organizations.xxx Due to mounting international pressure, the U.S. government eventually caved, withdrawing the lawsuit against South Africa as well as the trade sanctions previously implemented against it.xxxi At this point, it became clear that there was a much-needed reassessment of the objectives and interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.

C. A Call for the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health

In an effort to address the public health concerns resulting from the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO introduced a “development round” in 2001 known as the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Doha Declaration”).xxxii During this round, members of the WTO unanimously recognized the need of developing countries to address serious public health issues such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.xxxiii The Doha Declaration thus stands for the assertion that the TRIPS Agreement should not prevent any WTO member from taking measures to protect the health of its citizens. In doing so, the Declaration reaffirmed each member’s right to use the safeguards within the TRIPS Agreement without risking retaliation from other WTO members.xxxiv Specifically, the Doha Declaration reaffirmed a member’s right to parallel import medication under Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, and issue compulsory licenses under Article 31.xxxv

Parallel Imports

Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement provides WTO members with the right to import patented drugs after they have been sold in other markets.xxxvi This provision essentially allows WTO members to import brand-name drugs from other countries where it is being sold at a lower retail price.xxxvii This means that once a brand-name drug is legally sold in one country, the patent holder “exhausts” his rights over the product, at which point the drug may be re-sold and exported to other countries.xxxviii This TRIPS flexibility thus provides developing countries the option to purchase medicine from foreign markets where it is being sold at a lower price than within its own domestic market. By taking advantage of this flexibility, developing countries with limited healthcare resources are able to import cheaper medicine, thereby increasing its affordability and overall access to its citizens.

Compulsory Licensing

Another safeguard reaffirmed during the Doha Declaration is a country’s right to issue compulsory licenses in cases of national emergencies, granted through Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.xxxix Article 31 allows a country to license the manufacturing of a generic drug while its brand-name version is still under patent without the express consent of the patent holder.xl Compulsory licenses have proven to be one of the most effective tools for providing life-saving drugs, such as anti-retroviral medication, to patients in developing countries, particularly within Africa.xli They have led to greater competition in the drug market by allowing generic drugs to compete with patented pharmaceutical products, driving down its overall cost.xlii This leads to more affordable prices for both citizens and governments providing healthcare services in the country where it is issued. The issuance of compulsory licenses have proved so effective in reducing drugs costs that even the mere threat of issuing one will often compel pharmaceutical companies to drastically reduce their prices in an effort to keep generic manufacturers off the market.xliii

The use of TRIPS flexibilities such as the two discussed above have been praised and strongly encouraged by non-profit organizations and civil society groups working to promote access to medicine in developing countries.xliv Despite the progress made, however, there is growing concern that these efforts have been undermined through pressure from bilateral and regional trade agreements, domestic legislation, and new forms of multilateral agreements such as ACTA.

II.  Circumventing the Doha Declaration Through TRIPS-Plus Agendas

The TRIPS Agreement succeeded in implementing a new global regime of heightened standards of intellectual property right protection. However, it also left room for countries to implement measures to protect the public health of its citizens through provisions known as “TRIPS flexibilities.”xlv Through TRIPS flexibilities, governments are free to address issues arising from the lack of innovation for diseases affecting their populations, coupled with high pharmaceutical prices and restrictions on availability.xlvi Despite these flexibilities though, recent free trade agreements (FTA) between developed and developing countries, particularly those with the US, have been criticized for restricting the adoption of these TRIPS flexibilities.xlvii By including “TRIPS-Plus” provisions into their FTAs, developed nations have narrowed the application of TRIPS flexibilities, thereby posing dangers to the production and availability of medicines in developing countries. More recently, regional trading blocs, such as the EU, have similarly begun to draw criticism due to the inclusion and strict enforcement of TRIPS-Plus measures within its borders.

A.  TRIPS-Plus Obligations in Free Trade Agreements

Since the Doha Declaration and the reinforcement of TRIPS flexibilities, several industrialized countries have continued to vigorously represent the commercial interest of pharmaceutical companies in trade negotiations with developing countries.xlviii By using access to their markets as a form of inducement, developed countries have been able to secure higher levels of IPR protection, known also as “TRIPS-Plus” measures, through trade agreements.xlix As reported by Oxfam International, some FTAs have contained TRIPS-Plus provisions providing for the following increased protection:

  • Expanded scope over pharmaceutical patents (covering new therapeutic uses of existing medicines and formulations);
  • Limitations on the grounds for issuing compulsory licenses to highly restrictive emergencies, government non-commercial use, and competition cases;
  • Barring parallel imports of patented medicines sold more cheaply elsewhere;
  • Extending patent monopolies for administrative delays by patent offices and drug regulatory authorities.l

In a report prepared for House Representative Henry Waxman in 2005, the Committee on Government Reform declared that “[C]ontrary to the Doha Declaration, U.S. trade negotiators have repeatedly used trade agreements to restrict the ability of developing nations to acquire medicines at affordable prices.”li Although Congress requires that the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) comply with the Doha Declaration on Public Health, nearly every free trade agreement negotiated in the past decade by USTR has included TRIPS-Plus provisions significantly restricting the manufacturing of generic drugs.lii In addition, the USTR has previously announced its TRIPS-Plus agenda as well as a commitment to pursue levels of IPR protection in accordance with those of the pharmaceutical industry.liii Oxfam International asserts that this commitment to higher standards of IPR protection can be explained by the close relationship between the USTR and the pharmaceutical industry within the U.S.liv

Special 301 Watch List

One effective tool that the U.S. has used to enforce the TRIP-Plus provisions within its FTAs is the Special 301 Watch List (“Special 301”).lv The Special 301 is a report mandated by the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 through which the USTR assesses whether countries are complying with IPR standards contained in bilateral or multi-lateral agreements with the U.S.lvi If the USTR finds that a country is not in compliance with such standards, it sends a “warning” through the Special 301 Report threatening to impose trade sanctions pursuant to the U.S. Trade Act.lvii Oxfam International argues that the U.S. has used the Special 301 process to pressure countries into unilaterally implementing TRIPS-Plus provisions.lviii In addition, the Government Accountability Office has noted that while the overall number of countries listed on the Special 301 has decreased, the number of countries cited for pharmaceutical-related issues has increased.lix One example of this, sparking controversy among various members of Congress, was the placement of Thailand on the Special 301 Watch List for having issued a compulsory license for HIV/AIDS medication in 2006.lx

After this incident sparked international attention, however, Congress took it upon itself to adjust the USTR’s attitude on how it proceeded to negotiate bilateral trade agreements.lxi Since then, the USTR has made significant concessions by providing greater flexibility to provisions that at one point may have impeded access to medicine in developing countries.lxii These efforts have been reflected in amendments made to the US-Colombia and US-South Korea FTAs, making them more amenable to the adoption of TRIPS flexibilities.lxiii

B.  TRIPS-Plus Obligations in Regional Agreements:  The Case of EU Council Regulation 1383/2003

In addition to TRIPS-Plus obligations contained in FTAs, some industrialized nations have enacted far-reaching TRIPS-Plus measures as part of their domestic legislation. As noted by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), the European Union (EU) has been particularly active in vigorously enforcing “maximalistic” standards of IPRs within its own region.lxiv To illustrate, the EU implemented Council Regulation 1383/2003, which involves the searches, seizures, and destruction of goods suspected of infringing intellectual property rights by customs officials throughout its borders.lxv This regulation explicitly grants IP right holders the ability to prohibit the import or export of goods suspected of infringing patents, copyrights, and trademarks to and from the EU.lxvi Because this regulation is directed at all imports and exports, it has been greatly criticized by advocacy groups concerned with access to medicine due to its obstruction to the transit of pharmaceutical goods passing through EU territory.lxvii In doing so, EC 1383/2003 comes into conflict with Article V of the GATT, which establishes the principle of freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting party.lxviii The regulation also conflicts with the obligations to public health undertaken by all WTO members under the Doha Declaration.

In particular, the implementation of EC 1383/2003 has resulted in several detentions of shipments of generic medication that did not meet the heightened IP standards within the EU, but were otherwise legal in their importing and exporting countries.lxix This incident sparked widespread controversy as most of the shipments were traveling from India and destined to developing countries – such as Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador – and only briefly traveling through the EU.lxx While most of the shipments were only temporarily seized, some of them were in fact destroyed for not complying with IPR standards within the EU, pursuant to EC 1383/2003.lxxi The EU defended its actions as an unfortunate result of the MEDI-FAKE initiative, which targets illegal counterfeit medicines entering the EU.lxxii Still, critics argue that these detentions, all involving generic medication, were neither incidental nor accidental, but were rather opportunistic acts of IPR holders in an effort to obstruct generic competition through false counterfeiting allegations.lxxiii Whichever may be the case, these incidents demonstrate EU officials generalized the use of the term “counterfeit,” thereby implicating other forms of IP infringements having nothing to do with counterfeiting (such as patent violations). The EU seizures have resulted in a great deal of debate over the consequences that EC 1383/2003 (and similar policy) has on freedom of transit principles and on the overall impeding effect it can have on access to medicine. This brings us to ACTA.

III.  The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) is a multilateral agreement currently being negotiated between the world’s most industrialized nations,lxxiv and aimed at combating counterfeit goods.lxxv It represents one of the most important attempts to negotiate a “North to North” agreement on issues of intellectual property rights protection after the TRIPS Agreement. For this reason, ACTA is seen by critics as an attempt to create a new template of TRIPS-plus protection outside any interference from developing countries, multilateral organizations, or civil society in general. Parties to these negotiations assert, however, that the objectives behind the implementation of ACTA are to “establish an international framework for participating governments to more effectively combat the proliferation of counterfeiting and piracy” and to “define effective procedures for enforcing existing intellectual property rights.”lxxvi

To many of its critics though, ACTA reflects a fairly clear intent to expand TRIPS standards and even remove some of its flexibilities.lxxvii In particular, ACTA has been criticized by civil society groups and developing countries for threatening the freedom of transit of generic medicines. India and China are some of ACTA’s most vocal opponents; they argue that such measures do not take into consideration the interests of developing countries or their commitments to the Doha Declaration on Public Health.lxxviii These countries also warn that ACTA would create trade restrictions for WTO members who are not negotiating parties of ACTA, yet who are still subjected to obligations beyond those required by the TRIPS Agreement.lxxix

The criticism over ACTA has not stopped there. Other institutions that have taken issue with ACTA have included the World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization. These organizations argue that ACTA goes far beyond what was needed to combat counterfeiting and piracy, and in the process, is creating a new regime of IPR protection that will undermine multilateral institutions such as themselves by weakening their authority.lxxx

A.  Access to Medicine Threats Posed by ACTA

The most serious concern raised by access to medicine advocates is that like EC 1382/2003, ACTA will jeopardize shipments of affordable medicines in transit between developing countries, having a chilling effect on the trade of generic pharmaceuticals and on the TRIPS Agreement flexibilities.lxxxi This problem has been mostly raised with regard to proposed border measures granting customs officials the ability to restrict shipments being imported or exported from ACTA member countries. This measure has been highly criticized for essentially requiring customs officials to make highly specialized and technical determinations as to what amounts to patent infringements.lxxxii These complex adjudications, critics say, should follow after the presentation of highly specific facts related to patents, which may only be resolved by an appropriate panel or tribunal post hoc, not while the goods are in transit.lxxxiii

Under existing TRIPS provisions, border measures are to be taken only against suspected counterfeit, trademark, and copyright violations.lxxxiv Customs officials are allowed to take ex officio action against alleged infringers only after they have acquired prima facie evidence showing that an IP right has been infringed.lxxxv In addition, TRIPS requires those who requested the ex officio action to pay for any injury caused to suspected infringers as a result of a wrongful detention of goods.lxxxvi ACTA, on the other hand, permits such actions to be taken on the mere suspicion that the goods are infringing not only copyright and trademark, but also patent rights. Furthermore, ACTA indemnifies authorities from any injury caused by the wrongful detention of goods, which may last for up to a year under this new agreement.lxxxvii This creates incentives for right holders to abuse ACTA procedures and to initiate border investigations and seizures without having to prove, within any reasonable period of time, that the goods are in fact infringing. This leaves serious implications relating to the transit of shipments carrying generic medication.

In addition, provisions addressing penalties for ACTA violations vis-à-vis the penalties enforced under the TRIPS Agreement have similarly raised serious concerns.lxxxviii Under the TRIPS Agreement, any willful, commercial-scale counterfeiting is a criminal act sanctioned by national law enforcement.lxxxix In contrast, civil IP infringements under TRIPS, including violations of patent rights, consist of commercial disputes between legitimate entities and are compensable only through legal remedies.xc The reason for this distinction is that unlike counterfeiting, civil infringements of IPRs are not seen as attempts to defraud the public and are therefore not subject to the same criminal sanctions.xci While TRIPS has made it clear what types of infringements will result in criminal and civil liability, ACTA does not distinguish between the two.xcii This leaves the inference that because ACTA explicitly targets counterfeits, all infringements will be punishable as criminal violations.

Furthermore, various ACTA drafts have included provisions extending injunctions against third parties who have provided “intermediary services” that have facilitated the infringement involved.xciii While ACTA fails to define what an “intermediary party” is, those who would likely be affected under this provision include generic drug manufacturers, international shippers, and other key players involved in the international trade of medicines.xciv In turn, such injunctions could potentially “inhibit the supply and distribution systems and thereby deter generic entry, robust generic competition, and legitimate international trade of generic medicines of assured quality.”xcv Due to its failure to define “intermediary,” this provision may similarly jeopardize non-government organizations such as Medicins Sans Frontieres and UNITAID, who assist in funding the purchase of generic drugs destined for developing countries.xcvi

The unfortunate result of these ACTA provisions is that they have a potentially chilling effect on the production, trade, and ultimate distribution of generic drugs. Due to the risk of incurring not only civil, but criminal liability, many generic drug manufacturers and third-party carriers will potentially be deterred from producing and transporting medication because of the blurred distinctions between counterfeit and simple patent infringements.

B.  New IP Law-Making in the Process?

A number of scholars have argued that ACTA is an effort to seek an alternative forum that is more responsive to higher levels of IP protection.xcvii As part of this forum-shifting argument, Susan Sell notes that protectionists have previously shifted their agenda from the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) to the World Trade Organization (through the TRIPS Agreement), to bilateral and regional trade agreements (such as those discussed above), and now to ACTA.xcviii Each time the chosen forum becomes more receptive to exceptions, likely due to pressure from civil society groups, the forum once again changes. Thus, ACTA is seen as the creation of an entirely new international institution for IP enforcement, establishing its own set of rules, standards, and methods of enforcement, notwithstanding those outlined in prior multilateral negotiations such as the TRIPS Agreement.

However, other scholars argue that ACTA is more than a mere effort aimed at shifting the forum of protection. Instead, they assert that such attempts reflect a broader notion of international IP law-making in the process.xcix This argument is based on the impact which bilateral trade agreements tend to have on a country’s position on IP standards during subsequent multilateral negotiations. These scholars argue that this is all part of a strategy to create an endless upward spiral of international IP obligations.c This movement, often referred to as the “global IP ratchet,” is only the first stage of a conscious effort on the part of IP interest groups to use bilateral agreements as vehicles to incorporate heightened IP standards into subsequent multilateral treaties, such as ACTA.ci Targeting countries on a one-on-one basis through bilateral agreements ensures that they are on-board with future stated agendas. Scholars argue that in the end, if enough of these bilateral agreements are negotiated, these higher IP standards will become the minimum standards from which future trade negotiations will proceed.cii As cited by Kimberlee Weatherall:

“Once a substantial portion of trading partners have agreed to observe the same standards as those enshrined in present U.S./EU legislation, there is no way back to a meaningful lessening of what appear as widely accepted rules, creating a spiral endlessly moving upwards.” ciii

That is to say, that all of this is not merely about shifting the forum away from the WTO, but rather, a part of an overall scheme to slowly, but certainly, increase global levels of protection for IP right holders. Weatherall suggests that bilateral agreements have ultimately served as the “stepping stones” for ACTA by setting minimum standards of IP protection among the parties involved, while creating leverage for certain countries at the negotiating table.civ As reflected by the leaked ACTA drafts, these higher levels of IP protection were, without a doubt, introduced during the various rounds of negotiation.cv

Along these lines, ACTA is seen as part of a larger “enforcement agenda” being pushed by special interest groups within highly industrialized nations. This enforcement agenda has been described as, “[A] continuous, wide-ranging effort by special-interest groups and lobbyists to secure favorable legislation and institutionalize practices that support their current business models, all under the claim of enforcing intellectual property rights.”cvi Ultimately, what emerges is “[A] web of numerous forums, regional, and bilateral agreements and unilateral institutions, all being captured to pursue a global TRIPS-plus agenda.”cvii The unfortunate consequence of this agenda is that because it caters to special interest groups, it fails to consider the disproportionate impact that these higher standards carry for developing countries lacking the resources and infrastructure to implement them. Nonetheless, many fear that such standards will soon become the norm as more and more countries continue to adopt them through efforts such as ACTA.cviii

IV.  ACTA’s Unofficial Drafting History: Establishing An Intent to Promote Access to Medicine

Despite the concerns stated above, recent leaked drafts of the text have indicated that ACTA has amended some of the measures that have been stirring controversy with access to medicine advocates.cix The two most significant of these are provisions on border measures and intermediary liability.cx According to the new draft, ACTA no longer requires countries to provide preemptive border measures for patents, meaning that if adopted, generic medicines will no longer be subject to border detentions for alleged patent violations.cxi In addition to this, ACTA parties have dropped the provision requiring intermediary liability for carriers of shipments of generic medication. The new draft reflects that the parties have made significant concessions in response to public health concerns, resulting in what some have referred to as “ACTA-Lite,” a watered down version of what ACTA was intended to be.cxii

Aside from demonstrating the tremendous impact that civil society groups can bring to the negotiating table, this move indicates that there is at least some commitment to preserve the safeguards and flexibilities established by the TRIPS Agreement. To demonstrate this commitment, many governments have released public statements ensuring that the passage of ACTA will not affect a country’s right to provide for the public health of its citizens.cxiii In a joint statement issued by the participating governments with respect to the potential obstruction to access to medication, the parties stated that, “ACTA will not hinder the cross-border transit of legitimate generic medicines,” while reaffirming that “patents will not be covered in the section on Border Measures.”cxiv

USTR officials released similar statements after certain members of Congress voiced concern over the ways in which ACTA would affect the availability of generic medicine. In a letter from Senator Ron Wyden to the USTR regarding ACTA’s impact, one of his main questions involved the ways in which ACTA would preserve the public health flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration.cxv In its response, the USTR stated that “ACTA is not intended to interfere with a signatory’s ability to respect its citizens’ fundamental rights and civil liberties, and will be consistent with the WTO TRIPS Agreement and will respect the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. (emphasis added).”cxvi From these comments, it would therefore appear that the overall purpose of ACTA is not to limit the transit, sale, or distribution of generic medicine. Nonetheless, while this intent has been reflected through a number of press releases, likely aimed at bolstering public support, there is no record of negotiation binding the parties to this intent.

The importance of legislative history within the context of multilateral negotiations is that it establishes the parties’ intent at the time of negotiation, giving the text meaning in light of potential ambiguity. However, in the case of ACTA, there is no such record of negotiations as these have been highly secretive and mostly held behind closed doors.cxvii As a result, the only evidence of the parties’ actual negotiating intent comes from inferences that have been drawn from the modifications made to several leaked versions of the agreement.cxviii This paper suggests that based on these modifications, there be an unofficial “drafting history” established, reflecting a principle of intent aimed at upholding access to medicine. This legislative history would be a compilation of the parties’ stated objectives to the press, civil society, members of Congress and Parliament, and other government officials regarding the purpose of ACTA. These statements should be analyzed with respect to the various proposals for modification made by each respective party, as reflected by the leaked versions of the agreement. Furthermore, such a drafting history will require close scrutiny of prior versions of the text in comparison with its final version (to be released in the following weeks) in order to determine whether the parties did in fact bind themselves to their publicly stated objectives. Such an analysis will also allow scholars to draw inferences from the various amendments proposed and those that were actually adopted, such as the changes to border measures discussed above. Functionally, this drafting history will serve to provide guidance to officials whenever there may be ambiguity in the text, by establishing a principle that such ambiguity shall be read in light of the parties’ intent to provide for the unrestricted transit of generic medication.

V. CONCLUSION

Due to legitimate concerns that ACTA may be creating a new institutional framework of IP standards, it is vital that parties clearly define the limits of this new agreement. As we have seen with the cases of EU detentions, there is a genuine fear that heightened IP standards may have serious restrictions on the transit and ultimate distribution of generic medication within developing countries. For this reason, there is a need to clearly and effectively communicate that parties do not intend for this to be the case with the implementation of ACTA. Through publicly released statements, leaked drafts, and new amendments made to the agreement, it appears that the parties to ACTA have made active efforts to communicate that they do not intend to impede the flow of generic medication. However, there is still a need to bind parties to this principle through a more formal manifestation of this commitment.

i Global Health Council, Impact of Infectious Diseases. Available from: http://www.globalhealth.org/infectious_diseases (citing World Health Organization, WHO Global Burden of Disease: 2004 Update).

ii World Health Organization, Global Summary of Aids Epidemic: 2009. Available from: http://www.who.int/hiv/data/2009_global_summary.png. 

iii Medicines Sans Frontiers, Running In Place: Too Many Patients Still in Urgent Need of HIV/AIDS Treatment, Briefing Document on HIV/AIDS. Available from: http://www.msfaccess.org/main/hiv-aids/introduction-to-hivaids/msf-and-hivaids.

iv See Generally, Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World, Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 211 (Summer 2004).

v Id.

vi Id.

vii Id.

viii Id.

ix Oxfam Briefing Paper, Patents versus Patients: Five Years after the Doha Declaration, Oxfam International (November 2006).

Id.

xi Id.

xii See Generally, Andrew Rens, Collateral Damage: The Impact of ACTA and the Enforcement Agenda on the World’s Poorest People. PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-08, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property (2010).

xiii Susan Sell, Trips and the Access to Medicine Campaign, Wisconsin International Law Journal 481, 484 (2001-2002).

xiv Id.

xv Id.

xvi Id. at 485.

xvii Id. at 487, 488.

xviii Id. at 489.

xix Id. (noting that the US often used access to its large domestic market as a means to force other countries to adopt and enforce stricter intellectual property policies).

xx Daniel Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of Play, Fordham Law Review 505, 507 (2005).

xxi Id. at 509.

xxii Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm.

xxiii Bryan C. Mercurio, supra note 4, at 218.

xxiv Oxfam Briefing Paper, supra at note 9, at 5.

xxv Id.

xxvi Id.

xxvii Id.

xxviii Id. A compulsory license is a type of flexibility provided by the TRIPS Agreement, stating that countries may grant drug manufacturers the authorization to produce the generic version of a patented drug without the consent of the right holder in order to meet a public health emergency.

xxix Id.

xxx Bryan C. Mercurio, supra note 4, at 224.

xxxi Id.

xxxii Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.

xxxiii Id.

xxxiv Rahul Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run Around the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology 433, 441 (2005) (citing Doha Declaration).

xxxv Id.

xxxvi Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1995).

xxxvii Rahul Rajkumar, supra note 35, at 444.

xxxviii Id.

xxxix Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1995).

xl Oxfam Briefing Paper, supra note 9, at 9.

xli Id.

xlii Id. at 10.

xliii Id. (explaining the case in Brazil in 2005 after it threatened to issue a compulsory license, causing a 46% discount in the price of Kaletra, an anti-retroviral AIDS drug).

xliv See e.g., Medicine Sans Frontieres, available at http://www.msf.org.

xlv See Generally Bryan C. Mercurio, supra note 4.

xlvi Sisule F. Musung et al., The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries : Can They Promote Access to Medicine?, Study 4C, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (August 2005).

xlvii Id.

xlviii Oxfam Briefing Paper, supra note 9, at 13.

xlix Id. (citing as an example, the US-Jordan free trade agreement).

l Id. at 15.

li Report of Committee on Government Reform, Trade Agreements and Access toMedicine Under the Bush Administration (June 2005).

lii Jorn Sonderholm, Intellectual Property Rights and the TRIPS Agreement: An Overview of Ethical Problems and Some Proposed Solutions, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5228, World Bank Development Research Group (March 2010).

liii Oxfam Briefing Paper, supra note 9, at 13. (USTR declaring an internal reorganization plan to “better support vital US innovation, including those of the pharmaceutical industry”).

liv Id. (noting that there are currently 20 pharmaceutical-industry representatives on USTR advisory committees).

lv 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1974).

lvi Id.

lvii Oxfam Briefing Paper, supra note 9, 1t 14. (noting that this applies despite the fact that countries may be in compliance with minimum IPR standards required by the TRIPS Agreement).

lviii Id. at 17.

lix Government Accountability Office Report, supra note 60.

lx Id.

lxi Id.

lxii Id. at 41. (noting that several pending free trade agreements have been amended and made more responsive to provisions outlining TRIPS flexibilities).

lxiii Id.

lxiv Xavier Seuba, Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 27, 9 (2010).

lxv Council of Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003.

lxvi Id.

lxvii Xavier Seuba, supra note 65.

lxviii General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947).

lxix Xavier Seuba, supra note 65, at 2.

lxx Id. at 5.

lxxi Id.

lxxii Id.

lxxiii Id.

lxxiv Negotiating countries include the US, the EU, Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, Australia, NZ, South Korea, Morocco, Singapore, and Canada

lxxv United States Trade Representative, ACTA Fact Sheet (March 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/acta-fact-sheet-march-2010.

lxxvi Id.

lxxvii ICTSD, Animated TRIPS Council Meeting Tackles Public Health, ACTA, Biodiversity, Intellectual Property Programme, Vol. 14:22 (June 16, 2010).

lxxviii Id.

lxxix ICTSD, ACTA Faces Criticism at WTO and in the United States, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, at 8, Vol. 14:38 (Nov. 3, 2010).

lxxx Id.

lxxxi Peter Mayberduk, ACTA and Public Health, PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-09, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property (2010).

lxxxii Id. at 2.

lxxxiii Id.

lxxxiv Id. (citing Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (1994)).

lxxxv Id. (citing TRIPS Article 48).

lxxxvi Id.

lxxxvii Peter Mayberduk, supra note 82, at 3.

lxxxviii Id. at 5.

lxxxix Id.

xc Id. (These remedies include monetary damages, injunctions, and declaratory relief).

xci Id.

xcii Id.

xciii Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (August 2010).

xciv Brook K. Baker, ACTA: Risks of Intermediary Liability for Access to Medicine, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-01.

xcv Id.

xcvi Id.

xcvii See Generally, Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA (June 14, 2010). SMU Law Review, Vol. 64, 2011.

xcviii Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratched, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play, IQsensato Occasional Papers No. 1 (June 2008) (stating that, “As soon as one venue becomes less responsive to a high protectionist agenda, IP protectionists shift to another In search of a more hospitable venue.”). 

xcix Kimberlee Weatherall, ACTA as a New Knd of International IP Law-Making, PIJIP Paper No. 2010-12, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property (2010).

c Id.

ci Id. at 6. (noting that several of the countries participating in ACTA negotiations are parties to a U.S. free trade agreement (either active or pending Congressional approval) and that the negotiating position of these countries has been influenced by their respective FTA with the US).

cii Id.

ciii Id. at 9.

civ Id. at 6.

cv Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (August 2010).

cvi Peter Mayberduk, supra note 82 (arguing that the key players behind this agenda are multinational tobacco, pharmaceutical, film and record companies, noting that these are the primary lobbying bodies behind the advancement of ACTA).

cvii Andrew Rens, supra note 12.

cviii Id.

cix ICTSD, Watered-down ACTA Approaching Conclusion, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 14:30 (September 8, 2010)

cx Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (October 2010).

cxi Id.

cxii ICTSD, Watered-down ACTA Approaching Conclusion, supra note 110.

cxiii ICTSD, Officials Seek to Ease Fears of Privacy Violations under ACTA, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 14: 25 (July 7th 2010).

cxiv Id.

cxv Letter from Ron Wyden to USTR, January 6, 2010, available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1701.

cxvi Response from USTR to letter from Senator Ron Wyden, January 28, 2010, available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1700.

cxvii See generally, Over 75 Law Profs Call for Halt of ACTA, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/academic-sign-on-letter-to-obama-on-acta (accessed November 22, 2010).

cxviii See generally, ACTA- Text and Leaked Documents, PIJIP Database, available at https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (accessed November 22, 2010).

Guadalupe Lopez Copyright © 2011

Life Sciences Strategies for Anti-Corruption & FCPA Compliance 23-24 June Washington, DC

The National Law Review is  a proud media sponsor of the upcoming Life Sciences Strategies for Anti-Corruption & FCPA Compliance – which addresses  the Unique Challenges and Risk Areas Tied to FCPA and Corruption Faced by the Pharmaceuticals, Medical Device and Biotechnology Companies  

Pharmaceutical and medical device companies operating overseas are particularly vulnerable to FCPA violations because of the nature of public health systems in many foreign countries where health care systems are owned and operated by the government. Given the fact that employees are in constant contact with the health care providers at different touch points within the organization, there is a need to ensure all interactions are monitored and effective policies are in place to curb any potential violations.

Gain insights on how to deal with issues stemming from gifts and entertainment of government officials to develop effective training programs and best practices in operating in emerging countries as well as dealing with 3rd parties.

With a one-track focus, the Life Sciences Strategies for Anti-Corruption & FCPA Compliance Conference is a highly intensive, content-driven event that includes case studies, presentations and panel discussions over two full days. This conference targets industry leaders from the pharmaceutical, medical device and biotechnology and clinical research organizations in order to provide an intimate atmosphere for both the delegates and speakers.

key conference topics include:

  • Analyze the key provisions of the UK Bribery Bill and the impact on life sciences industries by Abbott Laboratories
  • Identify practical strategies to develop effective global anti-corruption compliance program from CareFusion
  • Assess the challenges of conducting and implementing effective global traning programs by Medtronic, Inc.
  • Develop robust internal controls for 3rd party due-diligence by Talecris Biotherapeutics, Inc.
  • Address FCPA and corruption risk stemming from sales and marketing activities and interaction from Covidien
  •  

    key conference features include:

  • Expert Case Studies and Presentations by Industry Leading FCPA & Anti-Corruption Professionals
  •  

  • Illuminating Roundtable Discussions Led by St. Jude Medical (June 23rd) and Johnson & Johnson (June 24th)
  • Earn up to 16 hours of CLE Credits
  •  

    for more details and to register:


    Highlights of the UK Bribery Act Guidance: What It May Mean For Your Company

    Recently posted by Bracewell & Giuliani LLP – a great overview of the recently passed UK Bribery Act:  

    On March 30, 2011, the UK Ministry of Justice issued its highly anticipated guidance (Guidance) for the UK Bribery Act (the Act), a criminal anti-corruption statute that will become effective July 1, 2011.1 The Act covers both commercial and official bribery, within and sometimes outside the UK, and a company may be criminally liable for failing to prevent bribes from being offered or paid by its employees, agents or subsidiaries.

    Following a brief overview of the new Guidance, in this Update we review:

    • The jurisdictional reach of the Act
    • The impact of extended liability for business organizations
    • Six fundamental principles that can form a full defense for companies
    • Facilitation payments, which are considered illegal bribes under the Act
    • The treatment of hospitality and promotional expenses

    Overview

    The newly-released Guidance offers some assistance to commercial companies doing business in the UK seeking to implement “adequate procedures” – both to prevent violations and serve as an affirmative defense against liability under the Act. For United States companies doing business in the UK, both the Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) form essential components of a comprehensive global anti-corruption compliance program.

    The Guidance sets out six fundamental principles (see below), but one overarching theme is clear:  Companies would be wise to fully evaluate and understand their entire business operations – how and where they do business — assess the differing risks they face and tailor common sense programs to address those specific risks. In pursuing a risk-based approach, companies may be afforded reasonable flexibility (depending on the size, structure, and complexity and the sophistication of their operations) to implement appropriate, and varying, programs.

    Jurisdictional Reach Over US and Other Companies

    The Act’s jurisdictional reach extends to business organizations that are incorporated or formed in the UK, and also to those that conduct business in the UK (wherever they are incorporated or formed). Whether a business is deemed to “carry on” business, or even part of its business, for the purposes of the Act – and be rendered a “relevant commercial organisation” — will be a fact-sensitive determination, which the Guidance submits will be based on a common-sense approach. Ultimately, the courts will make the final determination based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The Guidance provides two examples which in and of themselves will not confer jurisdiction on the company: (1) where the company’s securities are listed and may be traded on the London Stock Exchange; and (2) where it merely has a UK subsidiary (which “may act independently of its parent or other group companies”).

    Extended Liability for Business Organizations

    A “relevant commercial organization” risks prosecution if the government determines there is sufficient evidence to establish that an “associated person” bribed someone else with the intent to obtain or retain business or an advantage for that business entity. The associated person — someone who merely needs to “perform[] services” for or on behalf of the company — is not required to be prosecuted as a predicate for the company’s prosecution. Nor is the associated person required to have a close connection with the UK. Moreover, the determination of who performs such services is to be based on a broad interpretation. Employees are presumed to perform services, agents and subsidiaries qualify, and contractors and suppliers may also qualify depending on the circumstances. Titles and position are not determinative; far more important are the underlying conduct and the practical realities.

    In addition to liability for failing to prevent bribery from occurring, the business organization may also be prosecuted if the government can prove that the bribe giving or receiving (or offering, encouraging or assisting) took place by someone “representing the corporate ‘directing mind.'” JPG.

    An Adequate Compliance Program Is A Full Defense: Six Fundamental Principles

    The Act creates a full defense for companies that can demonstrate they have implemented “adequate procedures” to prevent associated persons from engaging in bribery (even if a case of bribery has been proved). The affirmative defense is required to be proved by “the balance of probabilities.” In deciding whether to proceed with its case, the government will also consider the adequacy of compliance procedures, which can turn on the case-by-case facts and circumstances, including the level of control exercised over the conduct of the relevant associated persons and the degree of risk for which mitigation is required.

    Six core principles have been set out in the Guidance and accompanying commentary to help advise companies in devising and implementing adequate procedures to prevent bribery:

    1. Proportionality of response to the bribery risks that the organization faces and to the nature, scale and complexity of the organization’s activities
    2. Commitment of top-level management to prevent bribery by associated persons (e.g., effectively communicating no tolerance policy from top to bottom)
    3. Risk Assessment (to promote periodic, informed and documented assessment proportionate to the company’s size and structure and to the nature, scale and location of its operations)
    4. Due Diligence: Demanding that companies investigate and are aware of who is acting on their behalf in order to mitigate bribery risks
    5. Communication (and training): Ensure that policies and programs are “embedded and understood” throughout the company through internal and external communication.
    6. Monitoring and Review: Undertake systematic review to assess changed circumstances and new risks and implement improved procedures where deemed appropriate

    Facilitation Payments Constitute Illegal Bribes Under the Act

    Unlike the FCPA, the Act prohibits facilitation payments – small grease payments to low-level government officials to perform or expedite routine, non-discretionary services (e.g., processing immigrations or customs forms, turning on the electricity, etc.)… Nonetheless, the Guidance makes clear that the UK government appreciates that given the realities in certain global regions and in certain sectors, overnight elimination is not feasible. Moreover, “eradication” of facilitation payments is recognized as a “long-term objective.” However, the JPG identifies factors tending in favor of and against prosecution:

    Factors in favor of prosecution: (i) large or repeated payments; (ii) planned or accepted payments that may reflect standard operating procedure; (iii) payments reflective of an official’s corruption; and (iv) the failure to follow the organization’s facilitation payment policies and procedures

    Factors against prosecution: (i) a single small payment; (ii) payment identified as part of genuinely proactive approach involving self-reporting and remedial action; (iii) adherence to the organization’s clear and appropriate procedures for facilitation payment requests; and (iv) the particular circumstances placed the payer in a vulnerable position

    Hospitality and Promotional Expenses Are Not Prohibited by the Act

    Like the promotional expense exception under the FCPA, the Act does not criminalize bona fide hospitality and promotional expenses, as long as there is no improper intent. Specifically, the guidance makes clear that providing tickets to sporting events or taking clients to dinner to promote and continue good relations, or paying for reasonable travel expenses in order to demonstrate your company’s goods or services, if reasonable and proportionate, will not run afoul of the Act. However, where hospitality expenses are made to mask an intent to bribe or improperly induce advantageous business conduct, the authorities can be expected to view the expense payment as an illegal bribe under the Act. The extent of the hospitality and promotional expenses offered, the way in which they were provided and the level of influence the client exercised or could exercise in the business decision will all be examined.

    Current Considerations

    The next three months, until July 1, when the Act goes into effect, will provide a special opportunity for U.S. and other companies doing business in the UK to re-evaluate their operations and take a fresh look at the effectiveness, or “adequacy,” of their anti-corruption policies and procedures. Conducting a measured, proportionate and risk-based assessment makes eminent good sense in light of the UK Bribery Act, the FCPA and an evolving global propensity for strict anti-corruption enforcement.

    The Ministry of Justice Guidance can be found here.

    _______________________

    1Also issued that same day is the Joint Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions (JPG), which provides some insight into the Directors’ views as to “prosecutorial decision-making” regarding violations of the Act.

    © 2011 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

    China Adopts Amendment to the Criminal Law to Outlaw Bribery of Foreign Officials

    Recent guest bloggers at the National Law Review from Squire Sanders & Dempsey (US) LLP.Nicholas ChanZijie (Lesley) Li, Amy L. Sommers, and  Laura Wang outline some of the recent changes in Chinese law related to bribery of foreign officials

    On February 25, 2011 the PRC adopted Amendment No. 8 of the PRC Criminal Law, criminalizing bribery of foreign government officials and “international public organizations” to secure illegitimate business benefits. This amendment goes into effect on May 1, 2011.

    The PRC did not have any law addressing cross-border bribery before and this law will be the first law to condemn bribery of foreign officials. This amendment is the PRC’s effort to comply with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption to which the PRC is a signatory.

    The amendment was made to Article 164 of the PRC Criminal Law prohibiting entities or individuals from offering bribes to employees of companies and enterprises who are not government officials. With the amendment, it is a criminal act to bribe foreign government officials or international public organizations.

    According to this Article 164, if the payor is an individual, depending on the value of the bribes, he or she is subject to imprisonment up to 10 years; if the payor is an entity, criminal penalties will be imposed against the violating entity and the supervisor chiefly responsible and other directly responsible personnel may also face imprisonment of up to 10 years. Penalties may be reduced or waived if the violating individual or entity discloses the crime before being charged. According to the PRC Supreme Procuratorate issued in 2001, individuals offering bribes of more than RMB10,000 and entities offering bribes of more than RMB 200,000 may be prosecuted under Article 164.

    Unlike other bribery-related crimes in the PRC, which focus on the receipt by the briber of ”illegitimate benefits,” bribery of foreign officials or international organizations prohibits securing illegitimate business benefits. In advance of the release of judicial interpretation of what may be “illegitimate business benefits,” the current legal understanding of what is “to secure illegitimate benefits” means in other bribery-related crimes may provide a reasonable basis for understanding this amendment.

    The law refers to “officials of foreign countries and international public organizations,” but does not define these terms. For example, it is not clear whether international public organization includes foreign non-governmental organizations.

    As of this Alert, no judicial interpretation or administrative regulations regarding the implementation of this provision has been promulgated. It is not clear whether foreign companies may also be subject to jurisdiction under the PRC Criminal Law with respect to this new amendment. We will continue to closely monitor future development related to this amendment.

    ©Squire, Sanders & Dempsey All Rights Reserved 2011

    Europe Just Cost Women a Bunch of Money on Their Car Insurance By Switching to Gender Equality

    In honor of International Women’s Day – we at the National Law Review want to point out that every rainbow also has it’s rain as pointed out today by the Risk Management Monitor

    Males have by and large run this planet since Neanderthals were drawing on walls in caves. So when we talk about improving gender equality, we are generally talking about things that are immediately beneficial to women. A recent ruling by the European Court of Justice, however, is likely going to cost female drivers some money.

    The court has found that tying insurance rates to gender goes against Europe’s Fundamental Charter of Rights. So come December 2012, insurers will no longer be able to do it. The actuarial science regarding male and female drivers, particularly those under 25 years old, couldn’t be clearer. Young men get into more and more expensive accidents than your women. Still, while the numbers don’t lie, I have always wondered why that fact makes it OK to discriminate.

    Apparently the court agreed.

    Claire Wilkinson of III’s Terms + Conditions blog explains the likely fallout.

    In the past, insurers relied on a 2004 directive that recognized the strength of the evidence for gender-based rates. The average claim for an 18-year-old male in the U.K. totals £4,400 ($7,160), vs. £2,700 ($4,390) for an 18-year-old female.

    The net effect: Women will be subsidizing men for auto insurance. One British insurer estimated that women under 25 years could pay 25% more per year – perhaps £400 ($650).

    The ruling affects other types of insurance, too. Women live longer, so they traditionally paid lower rates for life insurance. (The insurer could earn more investment income off the premium while waiting for the woman’s demise.) So women will see life insurance rates rise, perhaps by 20%.

    This issue is obviously a thorny one.

    On the one hand, equality is good. On the other, the insurance industry just lost a major, effective way to underwrite risks and properly price rates. Claire brings up the notion of credit ratings being used as a rate-setting metric as well, another thing that always struck me as irrelevant to car-driving ability. Again, the numbers there show some pretty definitive trends but, logically, the connection seems like one inappropriate to the policies that drivers are purchasing.

    But what do I know?

    I take the subway to work and have never even owned a car.

    UPDATE: Canadian Underwriter ran a good piece on this development that includes the following insights about the marketplace uncertainty the decision has created.

    The court’s decision will create some uncertainty in the market during the transitional period, says Noleen John, a legal consultant for international legal practice Norton Rose LLP.

    “Insurers will from December 2012 need to apply unisex rates,” said John. “This transitional period is less than that recommended by the Advocate General and means that insurers will need to review their policies and practices as soon as possible.

    “It also seems likely, in view of the length of the transitional period, that insurers may need to use uncertainty premiums until they have sufficient data in relation to the carrying on of business on this new basis. This could result in higher premiums or lower benefits for certain policyholders (female motorists and male annuitants).”

    The decision also may create some uncertainty about the future of other established actuarial factors used to establish insurance premiums.

    “There is going to be uncertainty in the insurance market for some time as a result of this decision,” says Ashley Prebble, insurance partner atNorton Rose LLP. “It is likely that the decision will require the European Commission to clarify the position with regards to other potential areas of discrimination, particularly age and disability.”

    We shall see.

    Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor. Copyright 2011 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

    ANALYSIS — U.S. Interests at Risk in Six Mideast Nations

    Very comprehensive article about the U.S.’ Middle East interests posted yesterday at the National Law Review by Barbara Slavin writing for the Center for Public Integrity:

    Political unrest and violence in the Mideast are unsettling to American interests in the region in the short term. Credit: Kevin Frayer/The Associated Press

    For decades, politics in most of the Middle East has been frozen like a fossil in amber. Monarchies and pseudo-republics denied their people meaningful participation and representation. Aging presidents-for-life clung to power, grooming sons to replace them. Well-connected elites amassed wealth while burgeoning young populations struggled to find jobs.

    The amber has shattered. Mideast dictators have fallen to people power, not U.S.-led regime change. Now the critical question is who will replace these leaders?

    The end of this era could be a net-positive for the United States if more democratic governments take hold. In the short term, though, these developments bring with them potential threats to U.S. interests: safeguarding oil supplies, protecting Israel, fighting terrorism and containing the current Iranian regime. The biggest impact may be regional dynamics that curb Israel from attacking foes in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

    With the proviso that this fateful year in the Middle East is just beginning, what follows are snapshots of six pivotal nations whose post-revolution politics and policies will impact U.S. national security:

    Egypt

    The most populous Arab nation, Egypt has vied with Saudi Arabia as the premier Arab ally of the United States. Once the trend-setter in Arab politics, culture and diplomacy, Egypt stagnated during Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year reign. With Mubarak’s resignation Feb. 11, a “supreme defense council” led by Defense Minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi is leading the transition. The military has promised to submit a new constitution to a referendum and then hold elections for a new parliament and president.

    Mubarak’s successor is likely to maintain the 1979 peace treaty with Israel—even if the Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest Islamic political group in the modern Middle East, gains a major share in the next government. As a nation that relies on tourism, Egypt cannot afford to renounce peace with Israel or to impose Islamic law. The Egyptian military will not want to jeopardize its supply of U.S. military hardware. However, a more democratic Egypt will not be silent if Israel attacks Gaza again as it did in 2008-2009, or Lebanon in 2006. Egypt is likely to lift a blockade on Gaza imposed after Hamas seized the enclave in 2007, making it easier for Hamas to smuggle weapons via the Sinai desert. Egypt may also restore diplomatic relations with Iran, which the U.S. will see as a blow to its containment strategy. Already, the interim government permitted an aging Iranian warship and supply vessel to transit the Suez Canal and enter the Mediterranean—the first such crossing since the Iranian revolution.

    On counterterrorism, the Egyptian government is less likely to make mass arrests or to accept, via rendition, terror suspects caught elsewhere by the United States.  Bruce Riedel, a former senior National Security Council official and CIA officer dealing with the Middle East, said that a less repressive Egyptian government will benefit U.S. interests in the long term by diminishing the pool of recruits for al-Qaida. Still, the transition may be dicey. “While we may lose on the tactical level, we may gain on the strategic level,” he said.

    Saudi Arabia

    Saudi Arabia is the region’s great economic prize, sitting on top of one fifth of the world’s known oil reserves. King Abdullah, who has ruled officially since 2005 and de facto since 1995, is progressive in Saudi terms and has introduced a few modest reforms. Still, the upheaval nearby was sufficient for the king to rush home from Morocco, where he had been recuperating after back surgery. Reaching into his government’s deep pockets, he promised $37 billion in new government handouts to civil servants and students.

    Gregory Gause, a Saudi expert at the University of Vermont, noted that major flooding in Jeddah in January which killed 10 people and caused severe property damage did not provoke mass protests. “If there was ever a time when people would take to the streets, this would have been it,” Gause said. The monarchy benefits, he said, from the fact that its opposition is divided between liberals and religious conservatives and so far remains a largely online phenomena However, last month a group of more than 100 Saudi intellectuals signed a petition for additional reforms, including an elected advisory council. Thousands of Saudis have signed onto Facebook and Twitter accounts calling for mass protests on March 11, the ninth anniversary of a fire in Mecca that killed 15 girls who were prevented from leaving a burning school without their Islamic cloaks.

    Saudi security forces appear to have suppressed the main recent threat to the regime from al-Qaida, whose founder was Saudi-born. U.S. concerns focus on Saudi succession and preventing disruptions to Saudi oil production. Abdullah is 87 and in poor health; his half brother and crown prince, Sultan, is also an octogenarian and ailing. Third in line is the slightly younger Prince Nayef, the interior minister, who is not popular. The kingdom’s youth resent the stipends doled out to 7,000 Saudi princes and the foreign workers who take both high-paying and menial jobs. Saudi Arabia’s minority Shiite population, which predominates in the Eastern Province where most Saudi oil is produced, faces discrimination and has protested in the past. The Saudi leadership fears contagion from Bahrain, the scene of unprecedented political tumult in recent weeks. The two countries are connected by a 16-mile causeway.

    Bahrain

    Bahrain is a major concern for U.S. policymakers because of its sectarian divide and location. Not only is it linked to Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, but it is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which guards the Persian Gulf and its precious oil traffic. The fleet also is a buffer between Iran and the region’s fragile sheikhdoms and emirates. From that base, some 3,000 U.S. military officers oversee 30 ships and 30,000 sailors.

    Bahrain’s ruling al-Khalifa family badly mishandled protests that broke out Feb. 14, allowing masses of demonstrators to assemble in a roundabout called Pearl Square and then sending in troops to fire on sleeping protesters. The show of force drew worldwide condemnation and the regime has since made a series of concessions, freeing political prisoners, calling for dialogue, dismissing a few cabinet ministers, allowing a once-banned opposition leader to return from exile and permitting demonstrators to refill Pearl Square.

    These gestures have not appeased the protesters. Shiite Muslims make up about 70 percent of the island state’s half million citizens and are demanding parliamentary reforms and an end to discrimination in employment, education and housing. Calls to overturn the Sunni Khalifas—or at least restore a more democratic, single-chamber parliament, which briefly existed in the 1970s—are growing. Saudi analyst Gregory Gause said King Hamad is “caught between his population and his family” which holds virtually all key government offices, including that of prime minister; Hamad’s uncle has been in that position since Bahrain’s independence from Britain 40 years ago. Given Bahrain’s sectarian divide and Iran’s proximity, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. worry about Iranian encroachment although so far Bahraini protesters have emphasized their nationalism by wrapping themselves literally in Bahraini flags.

    Iran

    Iranian officials from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and government-appointed leaders of Friday prayers have been crowing that Arab demonstrators are following a script written 32 years ago in Iran. Certainly, Tehran has enjoyed seeing the toppling of secular, U.S.-backed dictators but there is no indication that the protesters were motivated by a desire for Iranian-style theocracy. In fact, the uprisings have been marked by the absence of slogans such as “Islam is the Solution” and that old Iranian favorite, “Death to America.”  On Feb. 14 and Feb. 20, protests boomeranged back to Iran as the Green Movement that erupted following disputed June 2009 presidential elections returned to the streets of major Iranian cities. Tehran in recent days has resembled an armed camp as more demonstrations erupt.

    Mehdi Khalaji, an Iran analyst at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that if the Arab revolts had taken place before Iran’s post-election crisis, “Iran could have used it in the framework of its propaganda.” Now, Khalaji said, such claims look hypocritical, even laughable. In the short term, Iran may benefit from the distraction of Western policymakers. Since Jan.1, the regime has executed 120 prisoners, according to the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, giving Iran the dubious distinction of executing more people per capita than any other nation. While global media attention was focused on Libya, Iranian authorities on Feb. 24 arrested two opposition leaders and their wives.

    Disruption of oil production in Libya and general uncertainty in the region have boosted oil prices and Iran’s revenues. Prospects for an attack on Iran’s nuclear program by either Israel or the United States have decreased as those countries focus on the instability among once-trusted Arab allies.

    However, in the longer term, the Iranian regime faces major challenges. New heroes are emerging in the Arab world, supplanting Ahmadinejad, Khamenei and Lebanese protégé Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah. A more democratic Egypt may earn it a bigger diplomatic role, diminishing Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf. In the interim, Turkey—a prosperous democratic state with diplomatic ties to all its neighbors—is a far more attractive regional model than Iran. The Iranian government must also content with a young, Internet-savvy generation, international economic sanctions, and cyber-warfare attacks on its nuclear program.

    Israel

    Israel can take comfort in the fact that for once, protests in the Arab world have had nothing to do with Israel, the Palestinians or Lebanon. Nevertheless, Israelis worry that successor governments in Egypt and elsewhere may be less accommodating to their actions against Arabs. A future Egyptian president will not “sit on the sidelines” if Israel decides to attack Gaza or Lebanon again, Riedel said. “The Egyptians are not going to be as passive.  This is going to be the major source of friction between Cairo and Washington.”

    There is also the question of what impact the unrest will have on Palestinian governments in both the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has promised new elections and efforts to reunify with Hamas, which seized control of Gaza in 2007. Successors to Abbas and to Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad may be less willing and capable of reaching a bargain with Israel.

    The Obama administration said it remains determined to push for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Dennis Ross, the top White House official in charge of Middle East policy, recently said that the lesson Israel should draw from the fall of Mubarak is “the danger of getting stuck in an unsustainable status quo.” The Palestinians’ higher birth rate, the need to give new Arab leaders a stake in peace, and the increasingly sophisticated arsenals of Hamas and Hezbollah all argue for reaching a settlement with the Palestinians sooner rather than later, Ross said. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, already risk averse when it comes to making concessions for peace, is likely to become even more so as he waits to see what kind of government emerges in Egypt and whether any other pro-Western Arab dominos—such as Jordan—will fall. U.S. domestic politics may make it less likely that President Obama will pressure Netanyahu to give up more land for peace. One possibility is that Netanyahu might instead explore a settlement with Syria that could undercut Iranian influence and the possibility of a new Israeli confrontation with Hezbollah.

    Libya

    Libya is important to the United States because it is a major oil supplier to Europe, and like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, has both spawned and confronted numerous members of al-Qaida. A major U.S. concern is that Islamic fundamentalists will fill the vacuum left by Moammar Gadhafi’s brutal regime.

    During his 41-year rule, Gadhafi prevented the creation of political parties. He staged phony “people’s congresses” while dictating policy behind the scenes and parceling out plum positions and business opportunities to members of his family and tribe. Whenever he sensed a threat, he reshuffled officials, leading one Libyan a decade ago to compare his countrymen to “mice in a bag” that Gadhafi would shake periodically to pre-empt opposition from organizing. Despite their lack of experience in politics or civil society institutions, Libyans in the eastern part of the country first liberated from Gadhafi’s rule are already putting together provisional governments. A pool of talented Libyans including returning exiles should be able to form a credible new administration. However, the transition is Libya has already been bloodier than in neighboring countries and there is a prospect of civil warfare between tribes and regions. Al-Qaida would likely take advantage of such chaos. Still, it is hard to imagine that Gadhafi’s successors will be worse stewards of Libyan interests or more menacing to the world at large than he has been.

    Barbara Slavin has reported on the Middle East for more than three decades, and is the author of the 2007 book Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the US and the Twisted Path to Confrontation.

     Reprinted by Permission © 2011, The Center for Public Integrity®. All Rights Reserved.

    IRS Announces Second Special Voluntary Disclosure Initiative for Taxpayers With Undisclosed Offshore Accounts

    Posted this week at the National Law Review by Keith R. Gercken of Sheppard Mullin – updated information on 2011’s tax amnesty program for off shore accounts:  

    The Internal Revenue Service announced on February 8, 2011 the creation of a second special voluntary disclosure initiative for U.S. taxpayers with undisclosed foreign bank and other financial accounts. This new program is a follow-on to the IRS’ original voluntary disclosure initiative that closed on October 15, 2009. The 2009 program reportedly attracted some 15,000 voluntary disclosures by taxpayers with previously undisclosed offshore accounts, and has been viewed within the government as a success in getting taxpayers “back into the U.S. tax system” by offering them the ability to avoid or significantly mitigate various the criminal and civil penalties that would otherwise have potentially applied had their failure to disclose been discovered by the IRS on audit.

    As background, U.S. persons are generally required to file an annual information statement with the IRS disclosing any beneficial interest in, or signatory authority over, bank or other financial accounts located outside the U.S. This information statement is filed on Form TD F 90-22.1, and is generally referred to as an “FBAR” (Foreign Bank Account Report). From an accountholder perspective the failure to file FBARs as required can potentially lead to a large array of both civil and criminal penalties – including monetary penalties of up to 50% of the unreported account balance (per year) and criminal penalties if the failure to file was willful.

    The new 2011 program represents a second chance for taxpayers who did not take advantage of the original 2009 voluntary disclosure program. While the penalty structure offered by the IRS this time around is slightly less favorable than under the original 2009 program, it still offers taxpayers an opportunity to significantly reduce their penalty exposure. Highlights of the new 2011 program include the following:

    • The program covers the years 2003 through 2010.
    • There is an August 31, 2011 deadline to submit all required information to the IRS, including delinquent or corrected FBARs and amended income tax returns reporting any previously unreported income.
    • In lieu of the normal 50% per year penalty, a participating taxpayer must pay a 25% penalty on the highest aggregate account balance in the undisclosed offshore account during the period covered by the voluntary disclosure. In limited cases, this 25% penalty may be reduced to 12.5% or 5%.
    • Participating taxpayers must pay all delinquent taxes relating to any unreported offshore income, together with applicable interest and a 20% accuracy-related penalty.
    • Participating taxpayers must pay any other applicable civil penalties associated with a failure to file returns or failure to pay taxes during the period covered by the voluntary disclosure.
    • The program includes a generally favorable alternative resolution procedure to enable participating taxpayers to calculate their tax liability associated with investments that may have been made in “passive foreign investment companies” (e.g., foreign mutual funds) through their undisclosed offshore accounts.
    • Participating taxpayers must fully cooperate with the IRS in providing information on offshore financial accounts, institutions and facilitators.
    • The IRS will not initiate criminal prosecution of taxpayers who fully comply with the terms of the program.

    The IRS remains focused on the potential evasion of U.S. income tax that is facilitated by hiding funds in offshore accounts, and has been increasingly aggressive in pursuing U.S. taxpayers who have failed to properly file FBARs and pay taxes on offshore income. As offshore financial secrecy continues to erode, the IRS has become increasingly able to obtain information relating to U.S. taxpayers directly from foreign banks. As a result, taxpayers with undisclosed offshore accounts that did not previously take advantage of the 2009 voluntary disclosure program may wish to consider the potential advantages of participating in this new 2011 program.

    Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

     

    Mexico’s Unified Secured Transactions Registry Offers New Opportunities for Secured Lending

    A big thank you to recent featured bloggers at the National Law Review from Strasburger & Price LLPJohn E. Rogers wrote a helpful post about commercial lending changes in Mexico. 

    Mexican companies have historically encountered difficulties in attracting secured lending from U.S. and other foreign banks, mainly because of concerns as to the reliability of Mexican laws governing secured transactions and of its systems for filing and perfecting security interests (garantías reales) in personal (movable) property or goods (bienes muebles).  Mexican banks have shared these concerns and have tended to rely on real property collateral in most of their secured lending.  As a result, many Mexican companies whose primary assets are inventory, receivables and equipment have lacked access to adequate financing on competitive terms.

    In order to encourage lenders to finance the operations of Mexican borrowers, Mexico has enacted significant reforms of its secured transactions laws. Most recently, dramatic steps have been taken to improve its public registry system to make it easier to search for existing liens on a debtor’s property and to perfect new security interests.

    Mexican Bankruptcy Considerations

    The importance to creditors of taking collateral security from Mexican debtors has arguably been increased by certain difficulties in the application of the Mexican Bankruptcy Law (the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles or LCM) enacted in 2000 and subsequently amended.1 As a practical matter, the LCM does not ensure the “cram down” of secured creditors to the extent possible under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor, under a reorganization plan, to pay a secured creditor less than its full claim if it is under-collateralized.   The secured claim can be “crammed down” to the value of the collateral by paying under the plan, over time, the value of the collateral, with the remainder of the claim being treated as unsecured.2

    The LCM provides that a secured creditor may proceed with the enforcement of its collateral security if the reorganization plan does not provide for full payment of the secured debt, or the payment of the value of the collateral.3 On the surface, the latter option suggests the possibility of a cram down, but the absence of clear valuation procedures and criteria in the LCM, combined with the fact that bankruptcy judges often have limited experience with the LCM and few precedents to rely upon, means that it is more difficult than it would be under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to prevent the secured creditor from proceeding (or threatening to proceed) with an action to enforce its collateral.  Depending on the importance of the collateral to the future operation of the debtor, any such enforcement action could in effect jeopardize the success of the reorganization plan.

    This gives the secured creditor significant negotiating leverage in a restructuring under the LCM, and has implications not only for secured bank lending but also for Mexican corporate bond financings, as to which bond investors may have a strong argument based on the LCM to insist on collateral security when the bonds are issued.  If an issuer must provide such collateral, for example to support a high-yield bond offering, it may be less costly for the issuer to provide collateral consisting of personal property than to mortgage its real property, partly because of high mortgage recording costs and the related notarial fees.  In order to obtain the advantages of treatment as a secured creditor under the LCM, having personal property collateral is as effective as having real property collateral of comparable value.

    Like the U.S. Before the UCC

    Mexico has a bewildering variety of personal property security interests, including among others the pledge (prenda), the industrial mortgage (hipoteca industrial) and the specialized security interests tied to the crédito refaccionario and the crédito de habilitación y avío, that brings to mind the personal property collateral devices (chattel mortgages, trust receipts etc.) that were commonly used in the U.S. prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Although Mexico has had the advantage of a single Commercial Code (and other federal secured transactions laws) that apply to the entire country, rather than a system of separate State laws as in the U.S., each of the 32 States and the Federal District has its own Civil Code establishing a Public Registry system for real property deeds and mortgages (each such registry is a Registro Público de la Propiedad) and, although personal property security filings are governed by the federal Commercial Code, they have previously been required to be made in the commercial registry (Registro Público de Comercio or “RPC”), which is normally managed by a unit of the related State or municipal government, in the place of the debtor’s domicile.  Some of these locally managed commercial registries are less reliable than others, and significant delays are common in searching for existing liens and filing new security interests on collateral of companies domiciled in remote locations.

    The Nonpossessory Pledge and the Guaranty Trust

    On the substantive side, Mexico has made significant progress since 2000 by amending the Mexican Commercial Code and the General Law of Credit Instruments and Transactions (the Ley General de Títulos y Operaciones de Crédito or LGTOC) to permit personal property security interests to be created more easily on a “floating lien” basis.  A new type of nonpossessory pledge called theprenda sin transmisión de posesión allows a debtor to pledge all of its inventory and receivables, for example, generically described (rather than described by reference to specific items), to a secured party without requiring that possession of the collateral be transferred to the secured party.  This pledge can permit the debtor to sell the pledged collateral in the ordinary course of business without obtaining a case-by-case release from the secured party, and can automatically subject newly acquired property to the pledge without any further filing, which effectively results in a floating lien.  A similar effect can be achieved through a guaranty trust (fideicomiso de garantía) with respect to the same or similar types of property, whereby title to the collateral is transferred to a Mexican trustee (typically a Mexican bank).4 Although these new devices resemble a security interest created in the U.S. under Article 9 of the UCC, lenders have remained reluctant to significantly expand their secured lending activities in Mexico because of ongoing concerns about their ability to perfect these security interests against third parties through the public registry system.

    UNCITRAL and the OAS Encourage Registry Reforms

    Recently, in an attempt to provide guidance for emerging market countries like Mexico that wish to improve access by borrowers to secured lending, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has promoted reforms of the bankruptcy laws and secured transactions laws in such countries. Its 2008 Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions indicated the importance of a country having a “registry in which information about the potential existence of security rights in movable assets may be made public.”5 In 2010, UNCITRAL decided to expand its work in this field by preparing a “model registry regulation,” which is still in the process of preparation.

    The previous efforts of the Organization of American States (OAS) to adopt a Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions (the “Model Law”)6 appear to have influenced Mexico in its adoption of the nonpossessory pledge concept. The OAS has also been tackling the registry issue; in October 2009, it held its Seventh Inter-American Conference on Private International Law, which approved Model Registry Regulations to “provide the legal foundation for implementing and operating the registry regime contemplated by the Model Law.”7 Among other things, the Model Registry Regulations contemplate the adoption of electronic filing systems and acknowledge that most of their features were recommended in UNCITRAL’s 2008 Guide and included in the registry systems recently developed in some Latin American countries, including Mexico, as well as in the U.S. (the UCC), Canada (the Personal Property Security Act) and some European countries.

    Mexico’s 2009 Commercial Code Amendments and Creation of the RUG

    Mexico has been receptive to the objectives reflected by the UNCITRAL and OAS efforts.  Not only did Mexico enact secured transactions law reforms in 2000 and subsequent years to reflect many of the changes contemplated by the OAS’ Model Law, but Mexico’s initiatives with respect to public registry reforms have actually preceded the formal adoption of model rules by UNCITRAL and the OAS.  In August 2009, a few months prior to the adoption of the OAS Model Registry Regulations, the Mexican Congress approved amendments to the federal Commercial Code that provide for the establishment of a Unified (or Sole) Registry of Movable Property Collateral (the Registro Único de Garantías Mobiliarias or “RUG”).8 The new Article 32 bis of the Code provides for the RUG (pronounced “roog”) to be a centralized registry for all types of security interests granted in favor of any creditor that carries out commercial activities (a comerciante) in personal property.  The RUG will be a section of the PRC under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy (Secretaría de Economía), in which all filings are to be carried out electronically, through the RUG website, www.rug.gob.mx.

    The stated Congressional purpose of the RUG is to strengthen the system for personal property secured transactions “as an effective tool for access to credit.”  Its main functions are to create a mechanism that allows public disclosure of security interests created on personal property and to establish priority rules for secured creditors.  Filings through the RUG have immediate effect, without requiring any approval by any authority.  Such filings can be made by financial institutions, public officials, public notaries (notarios públicos) or brokers (corredores públicos) and others authorized by the Ministry of Economy.  Under Article 32 bis 4 of the amended Commercial Code, a debtor is generally deemed to have authorized any secured party creditor that is acomerciante to file evidence of the applicable security interest in the RUG.  Article 32 bis 7 allows “any interested party” to request the issuance of a certification as to the filings that have been made in the RUG with respect to any debtor.

    New Registry Regulations

    On September 23, 2010, an executive decree was issued by Mexican President Felipe Calderón implementing the 2009 Commercial Code amendments by amending the Regulations governing the PRC to provide specifically for the inclusion of the RUG as a section of the overall PRC.9 The amendments clarify how the RUG will operate through the electronic system called the Integrated System of Registry Procedures (Sistema Integral de Gestión Registral or SIGER) and the procedures to be followed for the use of the RUG by those who wish to (i) search it for the existence of existing security interests and (ii) perfect their own security interests as against third parties by filing notices.  Anyone who registers with the RUG can initiate a search, but filings of security interests directly by an institutional creditor can only be done if the creditor entity has arranged to utilize an electronic signature for this purpose which satisfies the technical requirements contemplated by the Commercial Code10. Otherwise the security interest must by filed on the creditor’s behalf by someone else authorized under the RUG to do so.

    The provisions of the amended Regulations (the “Amended Registry Regulations”) impose certain formalities which do not seem to be contemplated by the new Article 32 bis of the Commercial Code and may contravene the policy guidelines recommended by the OAS and UNCITRAL.  For example, Article 10 of the Amended Registry Regulations provides for the RUG registrar or officer to verify that a filing has been properly made “in accordance with applicable legal and regulatory provisions,” which would seem to prevent the filing from becoming immediate and automatic, as provided in Article 32 bis 4 of the amended Commercial Code.  Also, Article 10 bis of the Amended Registry Regulations specify that filings can only occur through a public authenticating officer (fedatario), i.e. a public notary (notario público) or broker (corredor público), although Article 30 bis seems to permit others, including financial entities, to make filings without using a fedatario.   As a practical matter, until changes are made in Article 10 bis to allow filings to be made otherwise, it seems advisable to use a fedatario to carry out the filing.  A number of law firms in Mexico employ fedatarios, so this should not be a significant impediment to the filing process or impose a significant additional cost.   The use of a fedatario has the advantage of avoiding the requirement under Article 10 that the RUG registrar or officer verify the propriety of the filing; under Article 10 bis a filing by a fedatario has immediate effect.

    Preventive Filings

    Prior to the closing of a secured lending transaction, the proposed lender may wish to have the comfort that there will be no last-minute filings by other lenders of security interests that would have priority (based on time of filing) over any security interest to be filed to secure the transaction in favor of the proposed lender.   To obtain such comfort, Articles 32 bis 5 of the Commercial Code amendments and 33 bis of the Amended Registry Regulations permit the proposed lender to make a filing prior to the scheduled closing, which will have the effect of preventing any other lender from making a filing that would have priority over the later definitive filing by the proposed lender of its own security interest.  If the closing does not take place, the debtor need not seek removal of the preventive filing from the records of the RUG, because such filing would automatically cease to be effective after the passage of a specified period, normally two weeks.

    Information to be Provided in Filings through the RUG

    Article 33 Bis 2 of the Amended Registry Regulations provides that the information that must be provided in the filing of the security interest will be (i) the name of the debtor or debtors granting the security interest, (ii) the name of the creditor or secured party, (iii) the type of security device utilized to create the security interest, (iv) the personal property securing the relevant obligations, (v) the secured obligations, (vi) the term or time frame during which the filing will be effective, and (vii) anything else contemplated by Article 33 of such regulations, i.e. anything else that may be required by the forms to be used in order to effect such filings, which are to be specified in a publication in the official Gazette (Diario Oficial) of the Republic.

    Using the RUG

    As contemplated by the Amended Registry Regulations, to provide further guidance on using the RUG, the Ministry of Economy published a User’s Guide (Guía de Usuario) in Spanish providing additional guidance as to how the search and filing processes will operate.11 The User’s Guide shows how (i) a user can become registered with the RUG, (ii) searches can be performed, (iii) search certificates can be obtained, (iv) secured party creditors (whether organized or resident within or outside of Mexico) can be registered and (v) the creditor’s representatives can be registered in order to be entitled to submit filings on behalf of the creditor.

    Mexican creditors can be registered online by including their Mexican tax ID numbers in the creditor information they provide.  In the case of foreign creditors not having such numbers, the registration may be carried out at one of the designated offices of the Ministry or through a fedatario. Foreign creditors that wish to avoid delays at the closing of a secured loan may wish to become pre-registered before the closing.  For cases involving multiple creditors, such as a syndicated loan, there is a separate procedure for entering the names of the additional creditors.  As for the debtor, the filing form contemplated by the User’s Guide mandates that it be filed electronically in such a way that the debtor’s name is accompanied by an indication of whether the debtor is an individual or an entity and his or its nationality, registration file (folio) number and taxpayer ID or CURP number.  A debtor that is an individual may be registered by a fedatario at the time of the filing of the security interest, but a debtor that is a company or other entity will have to have been registered in the PRC prior to the time of filing.

    According to the User’s Guide, the filing of a security interest is to be effected by making entries in the electronic equivalent of a document akin to a UCC financing statement, which should specify

    • (i) the name and address of the person requesting the registration of the security interest,
    • (ii) a description of the type of property subject to the security interest, such as “machinery and equipment” (the applicable type is to be selected from alternatives that appear on the screen),
    • (iii) the type of security document under which the security interest was created, i.e. whether it was a nonpossessory pledge, guaranty trust etc. (again, the selection is from the types indicated on the screen),
    • (iv) the date of the relevant security agreement,
    • (v) the maximum amount secured, specifying the applicable currency,
    • (vi) a more detailed description of the property subject to the security interest,
    • (vii) a description of the public deed issued before the fedatario which formalized the security agreement,
    • (viii) a description of the agreement under which the secured obligation arose,
    • (ix) optionally, any terms and conditions established by the documents, and
    • (x) the period of time for which the filing is to remain effective.

    The User’s Guide provides examples of entries that are to be made in the online “financing statement,” and indicates how the electronic signature is to be applied to the document in order to affect its filing.

    The User’s Guide includes similar instructions for related procedures, such as amendments, assignments, renewals or reductions of the effective term of the filing, corrections of errors, cancellations and “annotations” (anotaciones).   The annotations might include information on any enforcement action with respect to the security interest, and would be made pursuant to instructions from a court or other authority.  An annotation might result from a debtor challenging the propriety of the filing.

    Effect of the Reforms: Better than the UCC?

    The RUG is now the exclusive method in Mexico for perfecting security interests in inventory, receivables, equipment and many other types of personal property, whether created through a possessory or nonpossessory pledge, guaranty trust or other device, superseding all of the local public registries.  However, security interests previously filed in the local registries will continue to be effective, so lenders must undertake searches as to any debtor in the locally-managed public registry responsible for such debtor’s domicile until such time as the previously filed security interests are no longer effective (for example, because they have been released or the related debt has been repaid), or otherwise satisfy themselves that no such filings have occurred (for example, by obtaining representations and warranties from the debtor to this effect).   Similar transition issues were encountered in the U.S. during the implementation of the UCC and its associated filing systems.

    Two features are present in the Mexican situation which did not exist in the case of the adoption of the UCC.  First, the RUG will be the sole registry in Mexico for filing security interests in personal property, unlike the separate filing systems in the 50 States of the U.S. and in the District of Columbia, and many local filing places such as the offices of County Clerks.  Thus, the sometimes thorny question in the U.S. of where to file will not apply in Mexico.  Secondly, the RUG is exclusively electronic, as opposed to the recordation systems in the U.S., which initially relied entirely on paper filings and have only recently began to transition to electronic systems, gradually, on a State by State basis.

    It will still be necessary to comply with the relevant requirements for creating security interests, which in Mexico often requires that the security agreement or pledge agreement be formalized by the preparation by afedatario of a formal deed (escritura).  Instead of being recorded in the locally managed public registry, such deed should now be recorded in the RUG.   Filings as to some types of collateral, such as vessels and aircraft, will continue to be made in specialized registries. Also, some of the enforcement remedies available under the UCC are not available under Mexican law, and the enforcement process in Mexico is likely to be more time-consuming than it is in the U.S.

    But with those exceptions, and despite some uncertainty created by the amended Regulations, the establishment of the RUG represents a huge step forward by Mexico in making secured lending an attractive option for borrowers and lenders alike. Even a lender that remains skeptical about the enforcement of security interests in Mexico may be persuaded that it is worth perfecting security interests pursuant to a filing in the RUG in order to obtain the important practical advantages under the Mexican bankruptcy law of being a secured lender.


    *The authors gratefully acknowledge the collaboration of Fernando Barrita of Strasburger & Forastieri and the helpful comments of Steve Roberts and John Dorsey in Austin and of Professor Alejandro Garro of Columbia Law School in New York.  The authors are, however, solely responsible for the contents of this article.

    1 Published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación (the “D.O.F.”) on May 12, 2000. Amendments to the LCM were published in the D.O.F. on December 27, 2007.

    2 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A).

    3 See LCM Articles 158, 160.

    4 Published in the D.O.F. on May 23, 2000, with amendments published in the D.O.F. on June 13, 2003.

    5 Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,  GA Res. 63/121, UN GAOR, 63rd Sess., 17 December 2008.

    6 Adopted on February 8, 2002, by the Sixth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law (known as “CIDIP-VI”, for its Spanish acronym) [CIDIP-VI, Final Act 3(f), OEA/Ser.K/XXI.6/ CIDIP-VI/doc.24/02 rev.3 (March 5, 2002)].

    7 Approved by the Seventh Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law (CIDIP-VII)
    at its second plenary session of October 9, 2009); quoted language appears in the Introduction.

    8 Published in the D.O.F. on August 27, 2009.

    9 Published in the D.O.F. on September 23, 2010.

    10 Art. 11 of the Amended Registry Regulations.

    11 See http://www.rug.gob.mx/Rug/resources/pdf/
    guia%20de%20usuario/Manual%20de%20Usuario%20RUG.pdf
    .

    © Copyright 2011 Strasburger & Price, LLP.

     

    Crisis in Egypt: The Economical Repercussions

    Two articles posted yesterday at the National Law Review address two key issues related Egypt to which impact the U.S. – Trade and the amount of foreign aid the U.S. sends to Egypt.  The Risk Management Monitor highlights some of the business issues impacted by the turmoil:  

    The crisis in Egypt can soon turn from a political uprising to an economic catastrophe and humanitarian emergency if things don’t return to normal operation soon.

    Shipping

    In the port of Alexandria, among others, army tanks stand guard to ensure no one enters the area. Good plan, except that hardly anything is going out, including exports that are crucial to the country’s economy. Though reports claim that some ports are closed, the Suez Canal is apparently open to shipping traffic. Shipping companies, however, are hesitant to enter the area. If the Suez Canal should close, it would not only spell disaster for a country already in serious turmoil, but it would also mean a worldwide shipping disruption.

    Production Plants

    • Nissan: the automaker suspended operations Sunday until February 3rd.
    • Unilever: the multinational corporation’s offices in Cairo have been closed since January 28th.
    • General Motors: the car maker’s plant near Cairo has not produced vehicles since January 28th with production estimated to resume Friday, February 4th.
    • Lafarge SA: the a French building materials company has temporarily stopped operations due to the situation. The company has six production sites in Egypt, six quarries and 62 ready-mix plants and employs 8,172 Egyptian workers.
    • Heineken NV: the Dutch brewer has halted operations and told its 2,040 employees in Egypt to stay home.

    Tourism

    The nation’s tourism sector has taken a huge hit that is expected to last for some time.

    Foreigners are struggling to flee the country, tour and cruise companies are seeing cancellations and a growing list of Western and Arab nations are sending in flights to evacuate their nationals. The tourism sector is vital for Egypt — and is among one of the four top sources of foreign revenue for the country.

    Tourism accounts for 5 to 6% of the country’s GDP, while Cairo International Airport is the second largest airport in Africa, after Johannesburg, handling 15 million tourists per year.

    Call Centers and Online Retail

    Egypt is home to numerous call centers and IT outsourcing companies. But little can be done when the government cuts internet access throughout the entire nation. Microsoft is just one of the 120 companies in Cairo’s Smart Village, an area built for major multinational and local, high-tech companies.

    Asked about the situation in Egypt, Microsoft said in a written response to a query that it “is constantly assessing the impact of the unrest and Internet connection issues on our properties and services. What limited service the company as a whole provides to and through the region, mainly call-center service, has been largely distributed to other locations.”

    Hewlett-Packard is another company with operations in the Smart Village. They have asked their employees there to stay home. Though President Obama has urged the Egyptian government to restore internet access, little has changed for fear that protesters will use social networks to organize further riots. For a country that has taken pride in its growing outsourcing and call center business, the suspension of internet access is taking a huge toll.

    All of the above have affected financial markets worldwide. And with a “million man march” planned for tomorrow in the Arab world’s most populous nation, little is expected to change in the near future.

    Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor. Copyright 2011 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

     

    Employment-Based Preference EB-5 Program Assistance

    For the National Law Review’s featured guest bloggers from Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLPHugh E. Wall III discusses an immigrant visa program which gives preference to qualified foreign investors. 

    The fifth employment-based preference (“EB-5”) immigrant visa program encourages qualified foreign investors to invest within the United States in exchange for permanent residency. The program is currently underutilized; of the 10,000 EB-5 visas available last year, the United States Customs and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) only issued 4,218 visas. The following list is a summary of the program features.

    • Pursuant to the basic program, an alien investor must make a capital investment of either $500,000 or $1,000,000, depending on whether the investor invests in a “Targeted Employment Area” (“TEA”), in a new commercial enterprise located within the United States. The enterprise must directly create or preserve at least ten full-time jobs for qualified U.S. workers.
    • Under the Regional Center Pilot Program, foreign investors must complete the basic program requirements by investing either $500,000 or $1,000,000 in a new commercial enterprise. However, unlike the basic program, under the Regional Center Pilot Program, the new commercial venture need not directly create the ten jobs required by the basic program. Instead, the commercial venture need only show that the investment indirectly created or preserved ten jobs.
    • To create a Regional Center, an individual or entity must file a Regional Center Proposal with USCIS to request approval of the investment proposal and the designation of the applying entity as a Regional Center. The entity applying for Regional Center status must maintain at least $100,000 in capital before the USCIS will award Regional Center status. There are currently 90 Regional Centers operating in 34 states. USCIS awards the vast majority of utilized EB-5 visas to alien investors who have invested in a Regional Center.
    • A TEA is an area with an unemployment rate that is at least 150% of the national average. If the foreign investor invests in a non-TEA, the investor must contribute the standard threshold minimum of $1,000,000. If the investor invests in a TEA, the investor need only invest $500,000 to be eligible for the EB-5 visa.

    Copyright © 2010 Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP. All rights reserved.