Category: Intellectual Property

NIST Releases New Framework for Managing AI and Promoting Trustworthy and Responsible Use and Development

On January 26, 2023, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) released the Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (“AI RMF 1.0”), which provides a set of guidelines for organizations that design, develop, deploy or use AI to manage its many risks and promote trustworthy and responsible use and development of AI systems.

The AI RMF 1.0 provides guidance as to how organizations may evaluate AI risks (e.g., intellectual property, bias, privacy and cybersecurity) and trustworthiness. The AI RMF 1.0 outlines the characteristics of trustworthy AI systems, which are valid, reliable, safe, secure, resilient, accountable, transparent, explainable, interpretable, privacy enhanced and fair with their harmful biases managed. It also describes four high-level functions, with associated actions and outcomes to help organizations better understand and manage AI:

  • The Govern function addresses evaluation of AI technologies’ policies, processes and procedures, including their compliance with legal and regulatory requirements and transparent and trustworthy implementation.
  • The Map function provides context for organizations to frame risks relating to AI systems, including AI system impacts and interdependencies.
  • The Measure function uses quantitative, qualitative or mixed-method tools, techniques and methodologies to analyze, benchmark and monitor AI risk and related impacts, including tracking metrics to determine trustworthy characteristics, social impact and human-AI configurations.
  • The Manage function entails allocating risk resources to mapped and measured risks consistent with the Govern function. The Manage function includes determining how to treat risks and develop plans to respond to, recover from and communicate about incidents and events.

NIST released a draft AI Risk Management Framework Playbook to accompany the AI RMF 1.0. NIST plans to release an updated version of the Playbook in the Spring of 2023 and launch a new Trustworthy and Responsible AI Resource Center to help organizations put AI RMF 1.0 into practice. NIST has also provided a Roadmap of its priorities to advance the AI RMF.

Copyright © 2023, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.
For more Technology Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Bad Faith Games – Hasbro Rolls and Loses

For EU and UK trademarks, there is a five-year grace period following the issuance of a registration, during which the trademark owner must use the mark in connection with the goods and/or services covered by the registration before it can be challenged (and potentially ultimately revoked) for non-use with such goods and/or services. Some trademark owners have tried to take advantage of this by re-filing their previously registered trademarks for exactly the same goods and/or services just before the five-year grace period ends as a means of extending this grace period. This is commonly referred to as “evergreening.”

In Hasbro v EUIPO1, the General Court has upheld the EUIPO Board of Appeal’s decision that repeat filing of trademarks can result in bad faith applications. While it is true that evergreening doesn’t always mean bad faith, where it can be demonstrated that an applicant’s intention for filing a trademark application is to dodge showing genuine use of a mark more than five years old, then bad faith may be established.

Bad faith?

In legal terms, “bad faith” goes back in time and considers a trademark owner’s intention at the time it applied for the trademark. If the intention was to weaken the interests of third parties or obtain a trademark registration for reasons that are unrelated to the trademark itself, then this might result in bad faith. In Hasbro, the question of whether the board game conglomerate acted in bad faith hinged on whether Hasbro’s repeat filings of the MONOPOLY trademark, to avoid showing genuine use of the mark, amounted to bad faith.

Hasbro v EUIPO

When Hasbro filed its MONOPOLY trademark yet again, specifying goods and services near-identical to its earlier filing, the General Court said the application was made in bad faith, as Hasbro’s intention was to prolong the five-year grace period allowed for establishing use.

Although the case was initially rejected by the Cancellation Division of the EUIPO, the EUIPO Board of Appeal partially invalidated Hasbro’s EU Registration for the MONOPOLY mark. A key factor of the General Court’s decision supporting the EUIPO Board of Appeal’s verdict was Hasbro’s admission that its motivation for re-filing was to avoid potential costs that would be incurred to show genuine use of the MONOPOLY trademark.

Impact

The Hasbro case is setting precedent in both the European and UK courts. Although the Hasbro case came along post-Brexit, it is still considered “good law” in the English courts.

In a recent dispute between the two supermarket chains Tesco and Lidl2, Tesco argued that Lidl’s wordless version of its logo should be invalidated, as the mark had never been used and Lidl was periodically re-filing it to avoid having to prove genuine use. Tesco’s counterclaim was struck out in the High Court as Tesco had not made a clear-cut case for bad faith. However, the Court of Appeal allowed Tesco’s appeal and maintained that it was possible bad faith had occurred. This forced Lidl to explain its intentions when filing the mark, which is consistent with the Hasbro case. Tesco’s bad faith allegation will now be assessed at the substantive trial later this year. This will be watched closely by brand-owners and practitioners hoping for further guidance on evergreening and specifically where re-filings amount to bad faith.

In Sky v SkyKick3, the Court of Appeal said that a trademark applicant can have both good and bad reasons for applying to register trademarks. However, trademark filings that are submitted underhandedly, particularly where dishonesty is the main objective of filing the application in the first place, should be invalidated.

Bad faith beware!

The Hasbro v EUIPO decision has resulted in brand owners and trademark lawyers taking greater care when re-filing trademarks. It is important to highlight though, that re-filing a trademark is allowed. It is only when it can be established that an applicant’s intention at the point of re-filing the mark was to skirt use requirements, that bad faith can be found.

Brands looking to file new, or re-file existing, trademarks, should ensure they have a clear trademark strategy. Also consider retaining and recording: (1) evidence of genuine use of your marks; and (2) your reasons for re-filing any existing trademarks.

1 21/04/2021, Case T‑663/19, ECLI:EU:T:2021:211 (Hasbro, Inc. v European Union Intellectual Property Office)

2 Lidl Great Britain Limited v Tesco Stores Limited [2022] EWHC 1434 (Ch)

3 Sky Limited (formerly Sky Plc), Sky International AG, Sky UK Limited v SkyKick, UK Ltd, SkyKick, Inc [2021] EWCA Civ 1121, 2021 WL 03131604

Article By Sarah Simpson and Tegan Miller-McCormack of Katten. To read Kattison Avenue/Katten Kattwalk | Issue 2, please click here.

For more entertainment, art, and sports legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2023 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

IP Rights in Virtual Fashion: Lessons Learned in 2022 and Unanswered Questions

There was a lot of talk and much hype about the “metaverse” in 2022. While some were skeptical and stayed on the sidelines to watch, many companies began offering virtual counterparts to their real-world products for use by avatars in the metaverse, including virtual clothing and accessories. For example, Tommy Hilfiger live-streamed a virtual fashion show on Roblox as part of the New York Fashion Week, and Decentraland hosted a Metaverse Fashion Week. Many companies also introduced NFTs into fashion product lines, such as Alo’s NFT offering.

The emergence of virtual goods has generated novel questions about how to protect and enforce IP rights in virtual fashion, and how those strategies might differ from IRL (meaning “in real life”) fashion. Although many questions remain unanswered, this article sets out important considerations for how companies might use various IP laws to protect virtual fashion goods in the United States.

I. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN VIRTUAL FASHION AND IRL FASHION

Before diving into the IP discussion, it’s worth highlighting some distinctions between virtual fashion and IRL fashion outside the legal context, beyond the obvious fact that virtual fashion is worn by avatars. IRL clothing and accessories are worn primarily for protection against the elements, to conform to societal standards, to conform with a specific event’s dress requirements, to communicate via express messages on clothing or accessories, or to express oneself through the style or design of the clothing.

Virtual fashion can also serve each of those purposes for an avatar, and in some cases the person behind the avatar. But, because it is comprised of software code, the possibilities for virtual fashion utility are endless. For example, a particular piece of virtual clothing can also grant access to certain virtual spaces or events or give the avatar special powers within virtual worlds. If tied to an NFT (non-fungible token), virtual clothing can also provide benefits on and off virtual platforms, including exclusive access to sales promotions and IRL events.

Unlike IRL clothing, however, virtual fashion items currently face compatibility limitations, as the ability to use any virtual fashion item across all virtual platforms is unlikely.

To muddy the waters, as virtual and augmented reality technologies are becoming more popular, they can blur the lines between IRL and virtual fashion. For example, an IRL sweatshirt, when viewed through an appropriate lens, could feature virtual components.

II. IP PROTECTION FOR VIRTUAL FASHION

Because there are no IP laws specific to virtual fashion items, we must seek protection from laws that have traditionally applied to real-life clothing, namely, trademark, trade dress, copyright, and design patent. But the application of these laws can sometimes differ in the virtual context. Each is addressed below.

A. TRADEMARK

Trademark law protects source identifiers such as words, names, logos, and slogans. Obtaining trademark rights specifically in virtual goods, whether acquired through use in commerce or federal registration, is generally straightforward and similar to marks covering IRL fashion. This is evidenced by many marks that were registered in 2022 and specifically cover virtual goods.

That said, even if a company does not have trademark coverage specifically for its virtual goods, the owner of a trademark covering IRL fashion items should have strong arguments that such trademark rights extend to their virtual counterparts. To that point, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) has refused registration of marks covering virtual goods and services based on prior registrations for the identical marks covering the corresponding IRL goods and services. See, e.g., the refusals of Application No. 97112038 for the mark GUCCI and Application No. 97112054 for the mark PRADA, each of which were filed by parties unrelated to the famous brands.

However, for purposes of enforcement outside of the USPTO context, if a defendant’s goods are virtual, it would have a stronger argument that such goods are not commercial products, but rather expressive works protected by the First Amendment. If a court accepts such an argument, it must then weigh the plaintiff’s trademark rights against the defendant’s First Amendment right of free expression, meaning it would be more challenging for a brand owner to enforce its trademark rights.

In this regard, please see our earlier alert regarding the Hermès v. Rothschild case, in which the court deemed NFTs tied to images of bags called “MetaBirkins” subject to First Amendment protection. [1] In denying Rothschild’s motion to dismiss, the court acknowledged in a footnote that virtually wearable bags (i.e., as opposed to virtual fashion that is displayable but not wearable) might not be afforded First Amendment protection. But we suspect defendants will argue even virtually wearable items should be afforded First Amendment protection, especially given that video games have received such protection. [2]

On balance, companies should consider seeking federal trademark registration specifically for virtual goods and services, for a few reasons:

More direct coverage could help a company in an enforcement action against infringing virtual goods, even if the defendant successfully argues it should be entitled to First Amendment protection. For instance, if the plaintiff has direct coverage for virtual goods, it may be easier to prove the defendant’s use of the mark was “explicitly misleading” under the Rogers test. [3]

Certain platforms featuring virtual fashion items may only honor a takedown request if the complainant company has a federal registration covering goods that are the same or nearly identical to the allegedly infringing virtual goods.

The registration will provide a presumption of valid trademark rights nationwide, and it may serve as a deterrent to third parties wishing to use confusingly similar marks in virtual worlds.

B. TRADE DRESS

U.S. trademark law also protects certain source-identifying elements of a product’s aesthetic design, configuration/shape, and packaging, often referred to as “trade dress.” To obtain trade dress protection, such elements must be (1) non-functional and (2) distinctive (either inherently or acquired through use). There are a couple of interesting nuances with respect to acquiring trade dress protection in the virtual context.

First, although we have not yet seen any case law specifically addressing this, companies will likely have stronger arguments that virtual shape or design elements (as opposed to IRL elements) are non-functional. Specifically, the non-functionality requirement means the relevant elements must not be essential to the use or purpose or affect the cost or quality of the article. For real-life fashion items, this can be difficult to meet due to the inherently functional nature of many aspects of clothing or accessories. However, because virtual fashion items are essentially software code with endless possibilities, in many instances the fashion item will not require any particular design or shape to function.

Second, some virtual fashion items could receive more favorable treatment from a distinctiveness perspective. The distinctiveness requirement has historically been a difficult barrier for protecting IRL fashion. Specifically, case law prior to 2022 established that, while packaging can sometimes be inherently distinctive, product design and configuration/shape can never be, meaning companies must prove such elements have acquired distinctiveness. Proving acquired distinctiveness is burdensome because the company must have used the elements extensively, substantially exclusively, and continuously for a period of time. Often, by the time a company can acquire distinctiveness in the design, the design is no longer in style. Or, if a design is popular and copied by third parties, it can be difficult for the company to claim it used the design substantially exclusively.

If, however, a virtual fashion item provides the user with benefits that go beyond merely outfitting the avatar, such as by providing access to other products or services, one might argue that those items should be construed as packaging, or some new category of trade dress, for such other products or services, in which case the elements could possibly be deemed inherently distinctive with respect to those other products or services.

That said, if a company already has trade dress protection for IRL fashion goods, it should have good arguments that the protection extends to any virtual counterpart. On the flipside, given the difficulties companies typically face in seeking trade dress protection in IRL fashion, to the extent they can obtain trade dress protection in a virtual counterpart more easily, perhaps it can argue the rights in any virtual goods should also extend to the physical counterpart. Or, if a company introduces a physical design and virtual design simultaneously, it could possibly acquire distinctiveness in both sooner, as the simultaneous use would presumably create greater exposure to more customers and reinforce the source-identifying significance of the alleged elements.

With respect to enforcement, like traditional marks, defendants are more likely to raise a successful First Amendment defense for any virtual products allegedly infringing trade dress. The Hermès case is again an example of this, as Hermès alleged infringement of both its BIRKIN word mark and the trade dress rights in the design of its handbags, and the court held that the defendant’s MetaBirkin NFTs were entitled to the First Amendment protection.

Finally, although obtaining trade dress protection is typically more difficult than obtaining trademark protection for traditional marks such as words and logos, companies should also consider seeking registration for trade dress in virtual goods, particularly for important designs that are likely to carry over from season to season, for the same reasons discussed in the trademark section above.

C. COPYRIGHT

Copyright protects original works of authorship that contain at least a modicum of creativity, which is a relatively low bar. However, copyright does not protect useful articles. In effect, for IRL fashion items, copyright generally extends only to those designs that would be entitled to copyright protection if they were extracted or removed from the clothing or viewed on a different medium, and not to the shape of the fashion item itself.

Like trade dress protection, copyright protection should provide companies with greater protection for virtual fashion items than would be available for IRL items, particularly because the software behind the virtual fashion can theoretically create an infinite number of clothing shapes that are creative and not necessarily “useful.” Nonetheless, if a virtual clothing item is merely shaped like its IRL counterpart that lacks originality (e.g., a virtual t-shirt shaped like a basic real-life t-shirt), it may also fail to qualify for copyright protection based on a lack of creativity.

Unlike trade dress protection, however, copyright protection arises immediately upon creation of the work and its fixation in a tangible medium of expression, so it can be a useful tool for protecting virtual fashion without having to spend the time and resources required to seek registration as trade dress and establish acquired distinctiveness.

In addition, unlike IRL fashion, a separate copyright protects the underlying source code for virtual clothing items, which could provide owners with an additional, though likely limited, claim against unauthorized source code copycats.

A copyright registration will provide owners with the ability to sue for copyright infringement, but companies should balance:

  • the benefits of seeking potentially broader copyright protection in virtual fashion items (apart from the code) than it would for IRL items with the risks of conceding that virtual fashion items are works of art entitled to First Amendment protection, which would make trademark and trade dress enforcement more difficult; and
  • the benefits of obtaining any copyright registration for source code with the benefits of keeping the source code secret (although the Copyright Office permits some redactions, significant portions are required to be deposited into the public record).

We are unaware of any 2022 case law specifically addressing copyright in virtual fashion. However, the following cases are worth watching:

  • Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith[4]: In October 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments regarding whether Andy Warhol’s “Prince Series” silk screen prints and pencil drawings based on a photograph infringed the photographer’s copyright, or whether they were sufficiently “transformative” to constitute fair use. The outcome of this case could affect a copyright owner’s ability to enforce copyrights against unauthorized digital reproductions of its work, especially if the original work is fixed in a physical medium (e.g., enforcing copyright in a physical clothing item against a third party’s digital reproduction).
  • Thaler v. Perlmutter[5]: Filed in June 2022, the plaintiff is suing the U.S. Copyright Office for refusing registration of an AI-created image because there was no human author. The outcome of this case will necessarily implicate virtual fashion incorporating any AI-generated work.

D. DESIGN PATENT

Design patents protect the ornamental appearance or look of a unique product. Specifically, they protect any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture. Traditionally, this law was interpreted to require that the article of manufacture is a physical or tangible product. Thus, in the fashion industry for example, one can file a design patent application directed to a unique shoe, handbag, or jewelry design. Historically, an image or picture would not qualify for design patent protection.

However, the USPTO is currently assessing design patents with respect to new technologies such as projections, holograms, and virtual and augmented reality. In December 2020, the USPTO issued a request for public comment regarding a potential rule change to the “article of manufacture” requirement and whether U.S. law should be revised to protect digital designs. Public opinion was mixed, and in April 2022, the USPTO issued a summary of this requested information.

Although the USPTO has not yet formally revised the rules, it has issued guidelines over the years that provide examples of non-physical products that could be protected by a design patent, suggesting changes may ultimately be coming to U.S. design patent law. For example, in 1995, the USPTO released guidelines for design patent applications claiming computer-generated icons. In general, to be eligible for protection, the computer-generated icon must be embodied in a computer screen monitor, or other display monitor. The USPTO has also issued guidance allowing type font to be protectable by design patents. However, it is still unclear whether the USPTO will set forth design patent guidance specific to digital designs or virtual fashion.

Notwithstanding the possibility of obtaining a design patent specifically on such virtual goods, courts have been reluctant to find that a virtual product infringes the design patent for an IRL product. For example, in 2014, in P.S. Products, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.,[6] P.S. Products accused Activision of infringing its design patent directed to a stun gun by depicting a virtual weapon in its video game that P.S. Products claimed resembled its patent-protected IRL product.

The court found there was no infringement because “no ordinary observer would be deceived into purchasing a video game believing it to be plaintiffs’ patented stun gun.” This case may have come out differently if the virtual gun was sold separately from the video game and could be used across various platforms rather than being one component of a particular video game. Although there are still software compatibility restrictions for virtual goods, portability of virtual goods is likely to grow as technology evolves and companies respond to consumer demands.

While we wait for further USPTO guidance that ultimately may have application to virtual fashion, parties seeking design patent protection may consider simultaneously filing one application to protect the work as a digital design on a display screen, like a patentable computer-generated icon, and a second, traditional design patent application to protect the design as a tangible product. That said, companies should consider other options for protecting any designs created by AI, as the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held in 2022 that AI cannot qualify as an inventor for purposes of obtaining a patent.[7]

III. Virtual Fashion in Practice

Contracts relating to virtual fashion are analogous to contracts for IRL fashion and should be structured accordingly. For instance, companies should ensure that contracts with IP contributors include an assignment of all IP rights, or at least a sufficiently broad license. In the virtual context, this includes rights to the software code itself. Likewise, downstream licensing should generally address ownership, licensee rights, and if applicable, confidentiality for any trade secrets in the source code. In addition, for both IP contributors and licensees, if AI software is used in any part of the creative process, companies should give thought to allocation of ownership.

In addition, some designers or marketing teams may prefer to encourage a brand’s customer base to copy its designs or create derivative works. Although this seems counterintuitive (especially to an IP lawyer), many players in the Web3 space encourage others to build off their own designs. For example, the Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC), known for issuing NFTs tied to images of apes, grants owners of its NFTs the rights to use the images of apes, including for commercial purposes.[8] For example, one purchaser of a Bored Apt NFT created a Bored Ape-themed restaurant.

In the virtual fashion context, if a marketing team wants customers to build off the brand’s virtual designs but wants to retain ownership of its own designs (and perhaps derivatives), it should implement standard licensing terms relating to ownership, customer licensee rights, and other provisions. However, it’s important to consider how the terms are presented and how customers indicate assent to maximize the prospects of enforceability.

From a business perspective, companies can also now use NFTs and smart contracts to receive automatic royalties in any downstream sales or licenses. And because NFTs use blockchain technology, which provides an immutable chain of title, third parties will be able to trace such designs to the original source. This means companies can encourage the sharing of designs and receive royalties in connection with the downstream licensing of designs tied to NFTs, and third parties can confirm that the designs are legitimate by reviewing the relevant blockchain ledger. Accordingly, although encouraging customers to use the brand’s designs may not be a model for every brand, there are some steps brands can take to protect the IP rights associated with them and reap financial benefits.

As virtual fashion items become more popular, companies are faced with uncertainties and novel questions regarding how to protect and enforce their IP rights. In 2022, some questions were answered, but many more remain open. Therefore, it is important to discuss strategies for protecting innovative virtual fashion with IP counsel.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Notably, on December 30, 2022, the Hermès court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, with an opinion to follow by January 20. A jury trial is scheduled to begin on January 30, 2023. Hermès International, et al. v. Mason Rothschild, 1:22-cv-00384-JSR (S.D.N.Y.).

[2] See, e.g., AM Gen. LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

[3] If a defendant’s unauthorized use of a mark is protected by the First Amendment, many courts use the Rogers test to balance the plaintiff’s trademark rights with the defendant’s First Amendment right of expression. This test looks at whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark was artistically relevant and, if so, whether it was explicitly misleading. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).

[4] 11 F.4th 26 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1412 (2022).

[5] Case No. 1:22-cv-01564 (D.D.C.).

[6] 140 F. Supp. 3d 795, 802 (E.D. Ark. 2014).

[7] Thaler v. Vidal, 43 F.4th 1207, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

[8] We will save for another day a discussion of the recent lawsuit against BAYC and many celebrities for failing to disclose financial incentives when promoting the BAYC NFT collection, and instead focus here on IP protection. Adonis Real, et al., v. Yuga Labs, Inc., et al., 2:22-cv-08909 (C.D. Cal.). But companies should also ensure that influencers properly disclose any incentives and other material connections.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2023 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.

Artists Are Selling AI-Generated Images of Mickey Mouse to Provoke a Test Case

Several artists, frustrated with Artificially Intelligent (AI) image generators skirting copyright laws, are using similar image generators to produce images of Mickey Mouse and other copyrighted characters to challenge the current legal status of AI art. While an artist’s copyright in a work typically vests at the moment of fixation, including the right to prosecute copyright violation, AI-generated work complicates the issue by removing humans from the creative process. Courts have ruled that AI cannot hold copyright, which by corollary also means that AI-generated art sits in the public domain. This legal loophole has angered many professional artists whose art is used to train the AI. Many AI generators, such as Dall-E 2 and Midjourney, can render pieces in the style of a human artist, effectively automating the artist’s job.

Given Disney’s reputation for vigorously defending its intellectual property, these artists hope that monetizing these public-domain AI Mickeys on mugs and T-shirts will prompt a lawsuit. Ironically, provoking and losing a case in this vein may set a favorable precedent for the independent artist community. As AI becomes more advanced, society will likely need to address how increasingly intelligent and powerful AI can complicate and undermine existing law.

Blair Robinson also contributed to this article.

For more Intellectual Property Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

NetEase Wins 50 Million RMB & Injunction on Appeal in Minecraft Infringement Litigation at the Guangdong Higher People’s Court

On November 30, 2022, the Guangdong Higher People’s Court announced that NetEase was awarded 50 million RMB (over $7 million USD) and an injunction in an unfair competition case against Shenzhen Mini Play Company (深圳迷你玩公司) involving Minecraft and Mini Play’s similar sandbox game Mini World (迷你世界).  NetEase has the exclusive right to operate Minecraft in China since 2016.  This is believed to be the highest damages award in China for game infringement.

 

 

 

 

Minecraft on left versus Mini World on right.

Minecraft (我的世界) is a sandbox game developed by the Swedish company Mojang Studios in 2009. In May 2016, NetEase announced that it had obtained the exclusive right to operate the game in China, and had the right to enforce any intellectual property infringement and unfair competition claims. In the same month, Shenzhen Mini Play Company launched “Mini World” on Android , and then launched the iOS version and the computer version successively. In 2019, NetEase filed a lawsuit with the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court, accusing multiple core elements of the game Mini World of plagiarizing Minecraft. Specifically, NetEase alleged that the overall screens of the two games are highly similar, which constitutes copyright infringement and unfair competition. The court ordered Mini Play to stop the unfair competition, eliminate the impact, and pay 50 million RMB in compensation. The Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court also determined that “Mini World” was infringing the copyright in Minecraft, and ordered Mini Play to delete the infringing game elements and compensate NetEase more than 21.13 million RMB. Subsequently, both parties appealed to the Guangdong High Court.

The Guangdong Higher Court found that the two games involved in the case are sandbox games, which only set basic game goals and rules, and provided players with basic game resources or elements such as wood, food, creatures, etc. Players freely explore and interact in the virtual world. Players can use the basic game resources preset in the game to create virtual objects, buildings, landscapes, and even game worlds by destroying, synthesizing and building using the basic game resources. Minecraft mainly makes profits through user charges with the cumulative number of downloads from various channels exceeding 3.36 billion with more than 400 million registered users since its launch.

The Guangdong High Court held that the overall screens of the two games constitute electronic works, that is, “audio-visual works” under the newly amended copyright law, but the similarity between the two lies in the design of the game elements rather than the screens of the games. Therefore, it rejected NetEase’s claim of copyright infringement. At the same time, the court held that Mini World and Minecraft are highly similar in terms of gameplay rules, and there are many overlaps in the details of game elements that have exceeded the limit of reasonable reference. By plagiarizing the design of game elements, Mini Play directly seized the key and core personalized commercial value of other people’s intellectual achievements, and seized business opportunities by improperly obtaining other people’s business benefits, which constituted unfair competition.

In determining the amount of compensation, the court held that Mini Play, as the infringing party, should have on hand relevant data of its business income, but refused to provide it to the court without justified reasons, and should bear the legal consequences of adverse presumption.  According to evidence from a third-party platform, the profits of infringement by Mini Play far exceeded the amount of compensation requested by NetEase and therefore the upheld the award of 50 million RMB in compensation for unfair competition.  The Court further ordered Mini Play to delete 230 game elements from Mini World that infringed.

The original announcement from the Guangdong Higher People’s Court can be found here (Chinese only).

Article By Aaron Wininger of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Supreme Court to Consider First Amendment Protection for Parody Dog Toy

The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to consider the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment to commercial parody products that feature the unauthorized use of another party’s trademark(s). Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, Case No. 22-148 (Supr. Ct. Nov. 21, 2022) (certiorari granted). The questions presented are as follows:

  1. Whether humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead receives heightened First Amendment protection from trademark-infringement claims.
  2. Whether humorous use of another’s mark as one’s own on a commercial product is “noncommercial” under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C), thus barring as a matter of law a claim of dilution by tarnishment under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.

This is the second time Jack Daniel’s has filed a petition for certiorari in connection with this case. The Supreme Court first considered the matter in January 2021, following the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate and remand the district court’s finding of trademark infringement, reverse the judgment on dilution and uphold the validity of Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress rights.

The case then returned to the district court, which granted summary judgment to VIP Products. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and then Jack Daniel’s filed its second petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court will seek to settle the long-standing split amongst the US Courts of Appeal regarding the proper analysis for parody in trademark infringement and dilution claims and the scope of protection afforded to it via the First Amendment.

For more Supreme Court and Litigation News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

Legal Standing in Trademark Non-Use Cancellation Actions

In recent years the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office (IMPI) allowed the possibility that complainants credit their legal standing on trademark non-use cancellation proceedings through the existence of a trademark application without the need of initially demonstrating that such application was blocked to registration in view of the prior existence of third parties’ confusingly similar registered marks, as long as the official action citing the conflicting registration as pertinent barrier was submitted as subsequent evidence in the proceeding.

Accordingly, it started to be a common practice to file non-use cancellation actions submitting as evidence a certified copy of the trademark application serving as a basis to attack the registration not being used accompanied with the results of an availability search showing the existence of the registration subject to the proceeding.

Nonetheless, such criteria adopted by IMPI was revoked by the Federal Court of Administrative Affairs and by Federal Circuit Courts sustaining that legal standing must be credited initially along with the complaint without being possible to do it at a later stage by submitting the evidence attesting that IMPI objected the registration of complainant’s trademark application on grounds of likelihood of confusion because of the existence of defendant’s registration.

The Court’s reasonings behind the revocation of such criteria were mainly based on legal certainty arguments stating that legal standing can only born when a formal objection is raised by IMPI communicating to the applicant the existence of a citation based on likelihood of confusion.

Therefore, IMPI is now starting to analyze and solve non-use cancellation actions following the Court’s legal reasonings stating that legal standing must be credited initially along with the complaint, without enabling complainants to credit such standing subsequently.

Consequently, it is advisable that titleholders file non-use cancellation actions only after being served with the official actions communicating the existence of pertinent barriers blocking the registration.

Article By Jaime Rodríguez of OLIVARES

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

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Names and Brand Names

A key aspect of trademarks has been at the forefront of both fiction and real-life sports news over the past few weeks: what makes a name a name and who can use a name as a trademark? While trademarks are commercial rights, trademark law also protects a person’s right to control their own identity, including well-known pseudonyms and nicknames.

Marvel’s She-Hulk: Attorney-at-Law is, like most TV shows about lawyers, often cavalier with how it represents the law, but when the question of the protagonist’s rights in her nom de guerre came up, it was more accurate than most courtroom dramas. Jen Walters (the civilian identity of the titular She-Hulk) discovers a “super-influencer” has launched a line of cosmetics under the SHE-HULK brand and based on that use, is claiming trademark rights in SHE-HULK, going so far as to sue Jen Walters for her use of the name She-Hulk. While much of the terminology is mangled, the show’s hearing on the issue reaches points that are relevant in the real world. First, does “She-Hulk” identify a living person? And second, would another’s use of SHE-HULK be “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association” (as set forth in 15 U.S. Code § 1125) of that user and the person known to the public as SHE-HULK? It being a superhero show, Jen Walters ultimately vindicates her rights to the She-Hulk name and SHE-HULK Mark.

Circumstances in the real world are rarely as cut-and-dried. In a proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, NBA player Luka Doncic is attempting to reclaim the trademark rights in his own name from his ex-manager, his mother. Doncic, born in 1999, was a basketball star from his early teens. During his meteoric rise in European basketball, his mother, with his consent at the time, registered a design trademark (consisting mainly of his name) for goods and services including soaps, recorded basketball games, apparel, sports equipment, and promotional and educational services, starting with an application in the European Union in 2015 (when Doncic was 16) and filing in the U.S. in 2018 (when he was 19).

Doncic, as stated in his petition to cancel that U.S. Registration, has since withdrawn his consent to his mother’s use and registration of his name as a trademark. Instead, he has, through his own company, Luka99, Inc., applied to register a few marks including his own name, which have been refused registration because of the existing registration owned by his mother. To clear the way for his own registrations, he is seeking to cancel hers on the basis that (as in the fictional example above) her use or registration is likely to make consumers believe the goods and services offered with her authorization are associated with or endorsed by him, and because he has withdrawn his consent, her registrations are no longer permitted to remain on the register.

As Doncic was a minor when he gave consent, he has a good chance of regaining control of his name. Not everyone is so lucky, so you should be especially careful when entering any agreement that allows someone to use your name as a trademark.

Article By David H. Siegel of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

Supreme People’s Court Upholds China’s First Patent Linkage Ruling – Decision Released

On August 28, 2022, 知识产权那点事 published the first patent linkage decision from the Supreme People’s Court (SPC). The SPC upheld the Beijing IP Court ruling that Wenzhou Haihe Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.’s application for marketing authorization for a generic form of “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule” did not fall within scope of protection of the relevant patent. China’s patent linkage system prevents marketing authorization for a generic prior to the expiration of the patent term on the branded equivalent unless the Beijing IP Court or the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) rules that the generic does not fall within the scope of the relevant patent rights or is invalid.

On November 10, 2021, the Beijing IP Court announced that the plaintiff of the case, Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Roche, claimed that it was the patentee as well as the holder of the marketing license for the patented drug “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule”, and the patent involved in the drug was CN 2005800098777.6 entitled “ED-71 preparation.” The plaintiff discovered that the defendant Wenzhou Haihe Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. had applied to the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA) for a generic drug marketing license application named “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule”. The public information on the Chinese listed drug patent information registration platform showed that the defendant had made a 4.2 category statement regarding the generic drug (the generic drugs do not fall into the scope of protection of the related patents). Therefore, the plaintiff filed a drug patent linkage lawsuit with the Beijing Intellectual Property Court in accordance with the provisions of Article 76 of the Amended Patent Law, requesting the court to confirm that the generic drug “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule” that the defendant applied for registration fell into the scope the rights of Patent No. 2005800098777.6 enjoyed by the plaintiff.

 

The Beijing IP Court held:

The technical solution used by the generic drug involved is neither the same nor equivalent to the technical solution of claim 1 of the involved patent, so the technical solution does not fall within the protection scope of claim 1 of the involved patent. Since claims 2-6 are dependent claims of claim 1, if the technical solution of the generic drug involved does not fall within the protection scope of claim 1, it also does not fall within the protection scope of claims 2-6. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim that the involved generic drug falls within the protection scope of claims 1-6 of the involved patent cannot be established, and the court will not support it.

In the decision, the Supreme People’s Court stated there were two key points:

1. In the process of drug marketing review and approval, disputes arising from the patent rights related to the drug to be registered between the drug marketing license applicant and the relevant patentee or interested parties are only one type of the related patent rights between the two parties – often referred to as drug patent link disputes. For chemical generic drugs, the drug regulatory department of the State Council conducts drug marketing review and approval based on the application materials of the generic drug applicant, and decides whether to suspend the approval of the relevant drugs according to the effective judgment made by the people’s court [or the China National Intellectual Property Administration] on such disputes within the prescribed time limit. Therefore, when judging whether the technical solution of a generic drug falls within the scope of patent protection, in principle, it should be compared and judged on the basis of the application materials of the generic drug applicant. If the technical solution actually implemented by the generic drug applicant is inconsistent with the declared technical solution, it shall bear legal responsibility in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations on drug supervision and administration; if the patentee or interested party believes that the technical solution actually implemented by the generic drug applicant constitutes infringement, a separate lawsuit for patent infringement may also be filed. Therefore, whether the technical solution actually implemented by a generic drug applicant is the same as the application materials is generally not within the scope of examination to confirm that the dispute falls within the scope of patent protection.

2. The court of second instance held that both the donation [to the public] rule and the estoppel rule can constitute a restriction on the application of the principle of equivalence, both of which aim to achieve a reasonable balance between equitably protecting the interests of the patentee and safeguarding the interests of the public. If the conditions for limiting the application of the principle of equivalence are met, there is usually no need to judge whether the two features constitute similar means, functions, and effects, and whether those skilled in the art can conceptualize them without creative work. In this case, since Haihe Company claimed the application of the estoppel rule by virtue of the amendment of the claims by Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., and claimed the application of the donation rule by the patent text as the result of the amendment, the court of second instance first rendered a judgment on whether the rules on estoppel should be applied on the basis of the amendment of the claims by the patentee.

The case numbers are:

北京知识产权法院（2021）京73民初1438号民事判决书

最高人民法院（2022）最高法知民终905号民事判决书

The full text of the decision courtesy of 知识产权那点事 is available here (Chinese only).

Article By Aaron Wininger of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Unfashionably Late: Seventh Circuit Rejects Misappropriation Claim Premised On Prototype Created Eleven Years Prior

The Seventh Circuit recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of a former employee and his new employer on claims for misappropriation of trade secrets relating to a prototype of an actuator created eleven years prior, holding that the inference that the defendant used his knowledge of the prototype more than a decade later was “barely conceivable” and “exceptionally unreasonable.” REXA, Inc. v. Chester, — F.4th —, 2022 WL 2981167, at *6 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In 2002, Mark Chester, an engineer at Koso America, Inc. (“Koso”), participated in a project to create a new valve for a hydraulic actuator. An actuator is a component of a machine that produces motion. While the project was unsuccessful, it did produce an experimental prototype of another actuator. Koso shelved the experimental prototype due to the improbability of commercial success. The following year, Chester left Koso.

After more than a decade had passed since Chester worked on the 2002 project for Koso, Chester and his new employer, MEA Inc. (“MEA”), built a new actuator prototype, later known as the Hawk. Chester and MEA filed a related patent application, which was approved in part. REXA, Inc. (“REXA”), a company affiliated with Koso, brought suit against Chester and MEA for misappropriation of trade secrets under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”), among other claims. REXA argued that Chester and MEA’s actuator incorporated and disclosed confidential designs contained within the prototype Koso developed in 2002. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chester and MEA. REXA appealed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants on the misappropriation claims. First, the Seventh Circuit agreed that REXA failed to identify a concrete trade secret, as the Court was unable to determine which aspects of the 2002 designs are known to the trade, and which are not. The Court explained that several aspects of the 2002 actuator prototype are widely known in the industry, which by definition, is not sufficiently secret to qualify for protection under the ITSA.

Second, the Seventh Circuit held that even if REXA had identified a trade secret, REXA had not established that defendants misappropriated trade secrets when MEA filed its patent application or developed the Hawk actuator. With respect to MEA’s patent application, the Court explained that REXA’s allegations “rest on a series of untenable inferences.” Id. Indeed, eleven years had passed since Chester worked on the actuator prototype, and it was undisputed that he never saw or took any documents with him when he left Koso. Additionally, REXA did not cite any case where a court “inferred” a misappropriation of trade secrets despite a lack of evidence that the defendant seized or possessed documents, nor could the Seventh Circuit find any such case. As such, the Court found the lack of evidence, coupled with the eleven-year gap, “renders the inferences that REXA asks us to draw exceptionally unreasonable.” Id.

Regarding the design of MEA’s Hawk actuator, the Seventh Circuit held that the 2002 prototype did not include features of the patent application that made the Hawk both a non-obvious improvement over prior art and commercially valuable. Thus, Chester and MEA could not have misappropriated trade secrets contained within the 2002 prototype.

REXA serves as an important reminder that trade secret claimants must identify with specificity the elements that distinguish the alleged trade secret from general knowledge in the field or public domain. Additionally, REXA confirms that, at least in the Seventh Circuit, courts are hesitant to draw inferences supporting misappropriation claims without any evidence the defendant seized or possessed documents from the plaintiff, particularly if a significant period of time passes before the alleged misappropriation occurs.

Article By Mikela T. Sutrina and Jenna G. Crawford of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.