Washington Shake-Up: Vice President Harris to Lead Democratic Nomination for 2024 Presidency

Following President Biden’s withdrawal from the 2024 presidential race on Sunday, the nation’s capital has experienced another political shock, leading to swift mobilization within the Democratic Party. President Biden quickly endorsed Vice President (VP) Kamala Harris as the Democratic nominee, triggering a rapid wave of support from Congressional leaders, governors, stakeholders, and party donors including former Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY), all 24 Democratic governors, EMILYs List, and the United Auto Workers.

VP Harris has secured enough backing from Democratic delegates to clinch her party’s nomination to challenge former president Donald Trump in November. With the election a little over 100 days away, we have highlighted VP Harris’ stance on key issues during her tenure in Congress and her 2020 Presidential bid.

Technology

VP Harris is very familiar with the tech industry due to her roots in Silicon Valley as San Francisco’s district attorney, and her subsequent roles as Attorney General and US Senator from California. Although she hasn’t called for the breakup of big tech like some of her former colleagues in the Senate, she has criticized tech CEOs for the data privacy practices and targeted advertising tactics that their companies deploy, and voiced support for general regulation of big tech firms. In the White House, she serves as President Biden’s lead on AI initiatives and has actively promoted policies aimed at mitigating AI risks such as algorithmic bias, disinformation, and privacy concerns, while maximizing its benefits for Americans.

Climate Change

VP Harris has a long history of challenging the oil industry for its role in pollution and is likely to take it a step further than President Biden in tackling climate change. In the 2020 Presidential race, Harris proposed a $10 trillion climate plan aimed at achieving a carbon-neutral US economy by 2045, featuring initiatives such as a climate pollution fee and the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies.

In the Senate, Harris authored legislation that would have authorized grants to fund projects that address the specific climate-related challenges faced by vulnerable communities and invest in critical upgrades to the nation’s water infrastructure.

As California’s attorney general, VP Harris brought lawsuits against major oil companies, including British Petroleum (BP) for failing to stop underground storage tanks from leaking gasoline at 800 sites across the state, and also filed an investigation into ExxonMobil over its climate change disclosures.

Health Care

Maternal health was at the forefront of Harris’ health care priorities during her tenure in the Senate and has continued in her current role as Vice President. She sponsored landmark legislation such as the Black Maternal Health Momnibus Act, aimed at tackling the crisis facing Black maternal health care. This legislation enhances data collection, expands access to prenatal, postpartum, and doula care in underserved communities, promotes implicit bias training for health care professionals, and funds research and innovation to improve health outcomes and reduce disparities for Black women. Although the bill was not enacted, it remained a priority in both chambers of Congress after Harris’ departure from the Senate. It is also the centerpiece bill of the Congressional Black Maternal Health Caucus. Harris also championed legislation aimed at addressing the impact of uterine fibroids on women’s health through initiatives such as research funding, patient support tactics, and health care provider training. Additionally, she supported legislation to establish a loan repayment program for mental health professionals working in areas with critical workforce shortages.

In her 2020 presidential campaign, Harris introduced a health care plan that proposed a gradual transition toward Medicare-for-All over a decade. Her plan allowed individuals and employers to initially buy into Medicare while maintaining strict regulations for private insurance options. She also consistently opposed efforts to restrict access to reproductive health care services.

Tax

With numerous tax provisions under former President Trump’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act set to expire in 2025, all eyes are on VP Harris’ anticipated tax policy proposals. During her tenure in Congress, she championed a significant tax reform bill that would have introduced the LIFT credit—a refundable tax credit of $3,000 for single filers and $6,000 for married couples—benefiting a large portion of middle- and working-class Americans. Unlike the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), this credit’s amount would not depend on the number of children reported on a taxpayer’s return but would phase out as income increased. Harris emphasized that this credit aimed to boost families’ after-tax income to help them cope with rising living costs.

Additionally, she sponsored legislation in Congress aimed at protecting workers from harassment and discrimination, funding earthquake mitigation efforts, and providing housing assistance to low-income families. During her 2020 presidential campaign, Harris advocated strongly for repealing Trump’s tax law. She proposed implementing a financial transaction tax to expand Medicare coverage and advocated for taxing capital gains as part of her broader economic platform.

A Look Ahead

With midterm elections looming in the House and 33 Senate seats up for election, the impact of VP Harris’ nomination on Congressional races will be watched closely. As the first woman of color and the highest-ranking woman in US history to hold the office of Vice President, Harris’ nomination marks a pivotal moment in American politics. It may influence voter behavior, candidate strategies across the aisle, and the broader political landscape leading up to the November elections.

The Democratic National Convention (DNC) is scheduled to be held in Chicago, Illinois, from August 19 to August 22. However, due to upcoming state ballot deadlines which precede the convention date, a virtual roll call where delegates formally select Kamala Harris as the nominee will conclude by August 7. Harris is expected to choose her running mate in the coming days, as her campaign team has sent vetting materials to Arizona Sen. Mark Kelly, Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz, North Carolina Gov. Roy Cooper, and Pennsylvania Gov. Josh Shapiro.

What Does the End of Chevron Deference Mean for Federal Health Care Programs?

On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of Chevron deference in the closely watched case of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.[1] In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that Chevron’s rule that courts must defer to federal agencies’ interpretation of ambiguous statutes gave the executive branch interpretive authority that properly belonged with the courts. Moreover, the Court concluded that Chevron deference was inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), holding that the APA requires courts to exercise independent judgment when deciding legal issues in the review of agency action.

Loper will have significant and immediate implications for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the federal agency charged with the administration of the federal health care programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. As detailed below, the Court’s decision sets a more exacting standard for courts to apply when reviewing HHS’s regulations and legal positions.

What Was Chevron Deference?

The doctrine of Chevron deference was established in 1984 by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.[2] In that case, the Court held when a “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” raised regarding a statute that the agency administers, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”[3]

Although scholars have debated Chevron’s rationale at length, it generally was read to require deference based upon agencies’ presumed subject matter expertise and an assumption that Congress delegated authority to agencies—rather than courts—to fill in gaps in statutory schemes. Notably, the Supreme Court had not itself invoked Chevron deference since 2016, although lower courts have continued to rely on it regularly.[4]

What Did Loper Decide?

Loper involved two New England fishing companies appealing the D.C. Circuit’s ruling that applied Chevron deference to uphold the National Marine Fisheries Service’s interpretation of the Federal Magnuson-Stevens Act (the “Act”) as requiring fishermen to pay for the use of compliance monitors on certain fishing boats, even though the federal law is silent on who must pay. Petitioners used the case as a vehicle to present a broader challenge to Chevron,arguing that the doctrine has led to excessive deference to federal agencies, resulting in overregulation, the abdication of judicial responsibility to interpret statutes, and the unwarranted imposition of regulatory enforcement costs.

The Loper majority firmly rejected Chevron and held that the APA requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding legal questions that arise in reviewing agency action. As the majority held, “courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”[5]

Importantly, however, Loper noted that deference may still be afforded agencies in certain instances. First, the Court observed that the APA expressly mandates a deferential standard of review for agency policy-making and fact-finding.[6] Second, Loper explained that some statutes are best read to “delegate[] discretionary authority to an agency,” in which case a court’s role is to merely ensure the agency “engaged in ‘reasoned decisionmaking’” within that authority.[7] Lastly, Loper reaffirmed that an agency’s “expertise” remains “one of the factors” that may make an agency’s interpretation persuasive.[8]

How Will Loper Impact Federal Health Care Programs?

Loper’s directive that courts should construe statutes independently and not defer to agencies’ positions has enormous implications for providers and suppliers that participate in federal health care programs. Much of today’s health care landscape is governed by HHS’ regulations, impacting many Americans and much of the federal budget. For example, Medicare currently covers more than 67 million beneficiaries, and Medicare spending comprised 12% of the federal budget in 2022 and 21% of national health care spending in 2021.[9]

Federal health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid are established by statutes that set forth myriad requirements regarding the coverage of items and services, and how, when, and by whom those items and services may be furnished.[10] HHS’s various components—most notably the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—have issued numerous, detailed regulations to implement these statutes. HHS’s components also include FDA, CDC, HRSA, AHRQ, OCR, NIH, and many others that intersect with health care providers and suppliers regularly.

Going forward under Loper, future challenges to agency regulations will take place upon a much different playing field. This has several important implications:

  • More Legal Challenges: We expect to see more legal challenges brought against HHS’s regulations as they are issued. Loper expressly stated that it “does not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework,” so prior decisions affirming regulations should be stable.[11] But going forward, Loper means that courts have no “thumb on the scale” in favor of HHS’s legal positions, and so litigants may view Loper as increasing their odds of success. At the same time, this may create more uncertainty for providers and suppliers who must determine how to comply with new regulations under challenge.
  • Less Ability for HHS to Create New Programs or Impose New Requirements: Especially where HHS imposes new substantive requirements that are not clearly authorized by statute, HHS’s regulations may be vulnerable. For example, the challengers to CMS’s minimum-staffing requirements for nursing homes are sure to cite Loper.[12] Likewise, when HHS creates new programs or initiatives by regulation based on broad statutory language (e.g., HHS’s recent creation of rural emergency hospital regulations[13]), the regulations may be more vulnerable to challenges. As another example, legal challenges to FDA’s new rule on Laboratory Developed Tests are pending and will likely invoke Loper.[14]
  • More Incentive to Challenge Reimbursement Rules: Legal challenges are frequently brought to CMS’s rules governing reimbursement, which often have complicated statutory formulas subject to differing interpretations. Whereas in the past, courts often deferred to CMS’s interpretations,[15] Loper now creates more potential for providers and suppliers to seek more favorable legal interpretations to enhance reimbursement.
  • Slower and More Cautious Rulemaking: As HHS promulgates new regulations, it will now have to consider the enhanced litigation risk that Loper creates. This may lead to agencies slowing and proceeding more cautiously in rulemaking as agencies seek to craft defensible regulations.
  • Inconsistent Decisions by Courts: Because Loper directs courts to exercise independent judgment rather than defer to HHS’s interpretations, we expect that courts in different areas of the country may reach differing conclusions regarding HHS regulations. This may make certain geographic locations more advantageous for provider and supplier operations or expansions.

Conclusion

Going forward, courts will be more amenable than ever to siding with challenges to HHS regulations. This creates both challenges and opportunities for providers and suppliers who should carefully assess the legal basis for all new regulations.

The authors acknowledge the contributions of Callie Ericksen, a student at the University of California Davis Law School and 2024 summer associate at Foley & Lardner LLP.


[1] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (June 28, 2024), together with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, No. 22-1219, available here.

[2] 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

[3] Id. at 843 (emphasis added).

[4] See Am. Hosp. Ass’n (“AHA”) v. Becerra, 142 S. Ct. 1896, 1904 (2022) (determining that HHS’s preclusion of judicial review “lacks any textual basis,” remaining silent with respect to Chevron); Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 142 S. Ct. 2354, 2362 (2022) (illustrating that HHS’s reading aligns with the statute’s “text, context, and structure” in calculating the Medicare fraction for purposes of Medicare Part A benefits, without any mention of Chevron); Vanda Pharms., Inc. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,98 F.4th 483 (2024) (holding that CMS’s definitions of “line-extension” and “new formulation” did not conflict with the Medicaid statute).

[5] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, slip op. 35 (June 28, 2024).

[6] Id. at slip. op. 14 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (E)).

[7] Id. at slip op. 18.

[8] Id. at slip op. 25 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

[9] See KFF, Medicare 101 (published May 28, 2024), available here.

[10] See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395lll.

[11] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, slip op. 34 (June 28, 2024).

[12] See Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 24-cv-114 (N.D. Tex) (challenging the rule issued at 89 Fed. Reg. 40876 (May 10, 2024).

[13] Conditions of Participation, 42 C.F.R. §§ 485.500-485.546 (Subpart E), and Payments, §§ 419.90-419.95 (Subpart J), 87 Fed. Reg. 71748, 72292-93 (Nov. 23, 2022),

[14] 21 C.F.R. § 809, 89 Fed. Reg. 37286 (May 6, 2024).

[15] See, e.g.Baptist Mem’l Hosp. – Golden Triangle, Inc. v. Azar, 956 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2020) (deferring to CMS’s rule addressing “costs incurred” for calculating Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital payments).

EEOC Unveils Final Rule Implementing Pregnant Workers Fairness Act PWFA

Go-To Guide:
  • Effective June 18, employers covered by the Pregnancy Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) are required to offer reasonable workplace accommodations to workers who are pregnant or have a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth.
  • PWFA applies to covered entities, which include public and private employers with 15 or more employees, unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.
  • A preliminary injunction was entered on June 17, which “postpones the effective date of the Final Rule’s requirement that covered entities provide accommodation for purely elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy” for the states of Louisiana and Mississippi.
  • Covered employers should review the requirements of the PWFA to ensure that their workplace policies and procedures allow for the requisite accommodations under the Act and follow current challenges to accommodations regarding elective abortions under the law.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) final rule implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) went into effect June 18, 2024, but not without legal challenge.

The final rule, covered in a previous GT Alert, requires employers to offer reasonable workplace accommodations to workers who are pregnant or have a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth. The rule includes an exception for employers if the requested accommodation would cause the business an undue hardship.

However, the requirement of a workplace accommodation for “purely elective abortions” has been enjoined from implementation and enforcement in the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and against four Catholic organizations. On June 17, 2024, Judge David C. Joseph in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana ruled that the EEOC overstepped its authority by requiring workplace accommodations for “purely elective abortions.”

The motions for preliminary injunction, filed by the states of Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as four entities affiliated with the Catholic Church, sought injunctive relief to the extent that the PWFA requires employers to accommodate purely elective abortions of employees. The court rejected the EEOC argument “that Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted [it] the authority to interpret the scope of the PWFA in a way that imposes a nationwide mandate on both public and private employers – irrespective of applicable abortion-related state laws enacted in the wake of Dobbs – to provide workplace accommodation for the elective abortions of employees.”

Based on its analysis, the court entered a preliminary injunction which “postpones the effective date of the Final Rule’s requirement that covered entities provide accommodation for the elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy” for the states of Louisiana and Mississippi and any agency thereof, any covered entity under the final rule with respect to all employees whose primary duty station is located in Louisiana or Mississippi, and the entities affiliated with the Catholic Church that sought the court’s involvement.1

What should employers know to ensure compliance with the PWFA, given the limited injunctive relief issued? Below is a summary of the law and considerations for implementing the rule, which is now effective.

Application

  • The PWFA applies to employees, which include applicants and former employees where relevant based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.
  • The PWFA applies to covered entities, which include public and private employers with 15 or more employees, unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.
  • The states of Louisiana and Mississippi; employers located in Louisiana and Mississippi and with employees whose primary duty station is located within the states; and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lake Charles, the Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lafayette, and the Catholic University of America are not required to provide accommodations for the elective abortions of employees that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to the pregnancy.

What Is Considered a ‘Known Limitation’?

  • A limitation is “known” to a covered entity if the employee, or the employee’s representative, has communicated the limitation to the covered entity.
  • The physical or mental condition may be a modest or minor and/or episodic impediment or problem.
  • An employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions that had a need or a problem related to maintaining their health or the health of the pregnancy. “Pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” includes uncomplicated pregnancies, vaginal deliveries or cesarian sections, miscarriage, postpartum depression, edema, placenta previa, and lactation.
  • An employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions who sought health care related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition itself.
  • There is possible overlap between the PWFA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because in these situations, the qualified employee may be entitled to an accommodation under either statute, as the protections of both may apply.

What Is an ‘Undue Hardship’?

  • An employer or covered entity does not need to provide a reasonable accommodation if it causes an undue hardship, meaning significant difficulty or expense, to the employer.

The PWFA Prohibits the Following Conduct by Covered Employers

  • Failure to make a reasonable accommodation for the known limitations of an employee or applicant, unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship;
  • Requiring an employee to accept an accommodation other than a reasonable accommodation arrived at through the interactive process;
  • Denying a job or other employment opportunities to a qualified employee or applicant based on the person’s need for a reasonable accommodation;
  • Requiring an employee to take leave if another reasonable accommodation can be provided that would let the employee keep working;
  • Punishing or retaliating against an employee or applicant for requesting or using a reasonable accommodation for a known limitation under the PWFA, reporting or opposing unlawful discrimination under the PWFA, or participating in a PWFA proceeding (such as an investigation); and/or
  • Coercing individuals who are exercising their rights or helping others exercise their rights under the PWFA.

Non-Exhaustive List Of Examples of ‘Reasonable Accommodations’

  • Additional, longer, or more flexible breaks to drink water, eat, rest, or use the restroom;
  • Changing food or drink policies to allow for a water bottle or food;
  • Changing equipment, devices, or workstations, such as providing a stool to sit on, or a way to do work while standing;
  • Changing a uniform or dress code or providing safety equipment that fits;
  • Changing a work schedule, such as having shorter hours, part-time work, or a later start time;
  • Telework;
  • Temporary reassignment;
  • Temporary suspension of one or more essential functions of a job;
  • Leave for health care appointments;
  • Light duty or help with lifting or other manual labor; or
  • Leave to recover from childbirth or other medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.

Employer Training

  • Employers should consider training supervisors on how to respond to requests for accommodation.
  • Unlike requests for accommodation under the ADA, an accommodation pursuant to the PWFA may include a temporary suspension of essential job functions for qualified individuals (barring undue hardship to the employer).
  • Employees do not need to use specific words to request an accommodation to begin the interactive process.
  • Employers may not require that the employee seeking an accommodation be examined by a health care provider selected by the employer.

Further efforts to enjoin the implementation of the Rule were thwarted when the U.S. District Court for the District of Arkansas denied a motion for injunctive relief filed by a group of Republican state attorneys general on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the rule.

Acting U.S. Attorney Levy Forecasts False Claims Act COVID Cases Targeting Private Lenders Of CARES Act Loans That Failed In Their Obligation To Safeguard Government Funds

Acting U.S. Attorney Joshua Levy discussed the enforcement priorities for the Massachusetts U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) during a Q&A session on May 29, 2024, and made clear that the historical focus of the office remains the top priority: detecting and combating health care fraud, waste, and abuse. In particular, both Levy and Chief of the USAO’s Civil Division, Abraham George, have recently indicated that the government will pursue large dollar COVID fraud cases both criminally and civilly. As we have discussed previously, we expect False Claims Act (FCA) COVID cases to materialize in the coming years as the government zeroes in on wrongdoers via enhanced data analytics and AI tools as well as via traditional investigative methods and the forthcoming Whistleblower Rewards Program.

Recent COVID FinTech Lender, Kabbage, $120 MM False Claims Act Settlement

The recent Kabbage settlement is illustrative of the types of COVID cases the office is looking to bring pursuant to the FCA. Acting U.S. Attorney Levy discussed the settlement, publicized in May, with now-bankrupt online lender, Kabbage Inc. Kabbage allegedly knowingly processed and submitted thousands of false claims for Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan forgiveness, loan guarantees, and processing fees. The PPP – a loan program for small businesses created via the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act – was administered the federal Small Business Administration (SBA). The CARES Act authorized private lenders to approve PPP loans for eligible borrowers who could later seek forgiveness for the loans if borrowers used the loans for eligible expenses, including employee payroll.

Among other things, participating PPP lenders were obligated to 1) confirm borrowers’ average monthly payroll costs by PPP loan documentation; and 2) follow applicable Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (BSA/AML) requirements. SBA guaranteed any unforgiven or defaulted PPP loans as long as the private lender adhered to PPP requirements.

Private lenders received a fixed fee calculated as a percentage of the loan amount. Here, U.S. Attorney Levy’s office alleged that Kabbage awarded inflated and fraudulent loans to maximize its profits, then sold its assets and left the remaining company financially depleted, leading to bankruptcy. Kabbage was allegedly aware of the following errors as of April 2020, failed to correct them, and continued to make improper loan disbursements after learning of the issues:

  1. double-counting state and local taxes paid by employees when calculating gross wages;
  2. failing to exclude annual compensation above $100,000 per employee; and
  3. improperly calculating employee leave and severance payments.

Kabbage also allegedly failed to implement appropriate fraud controls to comply with the PPP, BSA, and AML by knowingly:

  1. removing underwriting steps to facilitate processing a high volume of loan applications and maximizing loan processing fees;
  2. setting substandard fraud check thresholds;
  3. relying on automated tools that were inadequate in identifying fraud;
  4. devoting insufficient personnel to conduct fraud reviews;
  5. discouraging its fraud reviewers from requesting information from borrowers to substantiate their loan requests; and
  6. submitting to the SBA thousands of dubious PPP loan applications that were fraudulent or highly suspicious.

The settlement, which will result in the U.S. securing up to $120 million pursuant to bankruptcy proceedings, resolves qui tam complaints brought by two separate whistleblowers: an accountant who submitted PPP loan applications to multiple lenders and a former analyst in Kabbage’s collection department.

Predictions for Future COVID Fraud Enforcement

Acting U.S. Attorney Levy’s comments make clear that we can expect to see FCA COVID cases targeting private lenders of CARES Act loans that failed in their obligation to safeguard government funds. To date, COVID fraud prosecution has largely targeted “low-hanging fruit” criminal cases, such as those involving submission of false information to obtain COVID relief funding that the recipient spends on luxury items. We discussed in April that the COVID Fraud Enforcement Task Force (CFETF) and a bipartisan group of Senators had, via a report and draft legislation, pleaded with Congress to increase funding to prosecute COVID fraud. Investigations such as those involving Kabbage require a large investment of resources and, as U.S. Attorney Levy commented, his office must prioritize large-dollar COVID fraud cases most likely to result in specific and general fraud deterrence.

As we have written previously, the government is playing a long game tracking COVID fraud. The Justice Department’s CFETF reported in April that to date, the DOJ had seized or forfeited $1.4 billion in stolen relief funds as well as bringing criminal charges against 3,500 defendants and 400 civil settlements. With a ten-year statute of limitations and increasingly more accurate data analytics tools, we expect the DOJ will continue to identify and recover misappropriated funds from large and lower dollar fraudsters. So long as COVID fraud enforcement remains a well-funded priority of the government, we anticipate a steady stream of FCA COVID settlements involving lenders and borrowers. The government is casting a wide net to recoup the nearly $300 billion in COVID fraud estimates. We will continue to monitor and report on developments.

HHS Publishes Final Rule to Support Reproductive Health Care Privacy

The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization to eliminate the federal constitutional right to abortion continues to alter the legal landscape across the country. On April 26, 2024, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) published the “HIPAA Privacy Rule to Support Reproductive Health Care Privacy” (the “Final Rule”).

The Final Rule—amending the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“Privacy Rule”) under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), as well as the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act)—strengthens privacy protections related to the use and disclosure of reproductive health care information. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule limits the disclosure of protected health information (PHI) and is part of HHS’s efforts to ensure that patients will not be afraid to seek health care from, or share important information with, health care providers.

The Final Rule:

  • Prohibits the use or disclosure of PHI when it is sought to investigate or impose liability on individuals, health care providers, or others who seek, obtain, provide, or facilitate reproductive health care that is lawful under the circumstances in which such health care is provided, or to identify persons for such activities.
  • Requires covered entities and business associates to obtain a signed attestation that certain requests for PHI potentially related to reproductive health care are not for these prohibited purposes.
  • Requires covered entities to modify their NPPs to support reproductive health care privacy.

“Since the fall of Roe v. Wade, providers have shared concerns that when patients travel to their clinics for lawful care, their patients’ records will be sought, including when the patient goes home,” OCR Director Melanie Fontes Rainer said in a news release. OCR administers the Privacy Rule, which requires most health care providers, health plans, health care clearinghouses (“covered entities”) and business associates to safeguard the privacy of PHI.

Commenters to an earlier notice of proposed rulemaking (“2023 NPRM”) raised concerns that PHI related to reproductive health care would be used and disclosed to expose both patients and providers to investigation and liability under state abortion laws, particularly new and revived laws. This Final Rule is intended to prohibit the disclosure of PHI related to lawful reproductive health care—a change from the current Privacy Rule where an entity is generally permitted, but not required, to disclose relevant and material information in a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.

Key Takeaways

New Category of Protected Health Information. The Final Rule changes the HIPAA Privacy Rule by defining a new category of protected health information and adds a new “prohibited use and disclosure” under the HIPAA Privacy Rule at 45 CFR 164.502—mandating that a covered entity or business associate may not use or disclose PHI:

  • To conduct a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation into any person for the mere act of seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating “reproductive health care”;
  • To impose criminal, civil, or administrative liability on any “person” for the mere act of seeking, obtaining, providing or facilitating “reproductive health care”; and
  • To identify any “person” for any of those above described purposes.

Prohibition. Under the Final Rule, HIPAA-covered entities and business associates who receive requests for protected health information must make a reasonable determination that one or more of the following conditions exists:

  • The reproductive health care is lawful in the state in which such health care is provided under the circumstances in which it is provided (e.g., if a resident of one state traveled to another state to receive reproductive health care, such as an abortion, that is lawful in the state where such health care was provided).
  • The reproductive health care is protected, required, or authorized by federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, regardless of the state in which such health care is provided (e.g., reproductive health care such as contraception is protected by the Constitution).

Presumption. Such care is presumed lawful unless the HIPAA-covered entity or business associate has

  • actual knowledge that the reproductive care was not lawful under the circumstances it was provided; or
  • factual information supplied by the requester demonstrating a substantial factual basis that the reproductive health care was not lawful under the specific circumstances in which it was provided.

Attestation Requirement. The Final Rule adds 45 CFR § 164.509(c) to require a covered entity or business associate, when it receives a request for PHI potentially related to reproductive health care, to obtain a signed attestation from the requester. However, obtaining the attestation does not relieve a covered entity or business associate from its responsibility to determine whether the reproductive health care that may be the subject of the requested information was lawful. An attestation must contain the following elements:

  • A description of the information requested that identifies the information in a specific fashion, including one of the following:
    • The name(s) of any individual(s) whose protected health information is sought, if practicable;
    • If that name is not practicable, the name(s) or other specific identification of the person(s) or class of person(s) who are requested to make the use or disclosure;
  • The name or other specific identification of the person(s) or class of persons to whom the covered entity is to make the requested use or disclosure;
  • A clear statement that the use or disclosure is not for a purpose prohibited under 45 CFR § 164.502(a)(5)(iii)(i.e., identifying any person under the newly added prohibition);
  • A statement that a person may be subject to criminal penalties if they use or disclose the reproductive health information improperly;
  • Must be in plain language and contain the elements set forth in 45 CFR § 164.509(c) (inclusion of other elements not set forth in 45 CFR § 164.509(c) is prohibited); and
  • Must be signed by the person requesting the disclosure (which may take an electronic format).

The Final Rule prohibits the attestation from being “combined with” any other document (yet allows additional supporting information or documentation needed for the request to be submitted with the attestation (for example, a clearly labelled subpoena). While covered entities can develop their own attestation form, to reduce the compliance burden, HHS plans to publish a model attestation form prior to the compliance date.

Notices of Policy Practices. With the new processes for using and disclosing reproductive health information, covered entities must update their Notices of Privacy Practices (NPPs) required under 45 CFR § 164.520. For purposes of this Final Rule, updates to the NPPs must describe among other things the types and uses of disclosures of PHI that are prohibited under 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii). The notice should also contain a description of the uses and disclosures for which an attestation is required under the new 45 CFR § 164.509. Further, the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs determined that this Final Rule meets the criteria in 5 USC § 804(2) for being a major rule because it is projected to have an annualized impact of more than $100,000,000 based on the number of covered entities and business associates that will have to implement these changes.

Practical Implications for HIPAA Covered Entities & Business Associates

Considering the significant changes this Final Rule introduces, there is no time like the present for covered entities and business associates to consider the compliance implications that a new category of PHI will have on existing HIPAA policies and procedures. In addition to developing and/or obtaining new attestation forms, making reasonable determinations of the lawfulness of reproductive health care and updating notices of privacy practices, privacy and security officers will likely need to evaluate the impact these changes will have on the policies that govern data dissemination, and the processes and procedures that may change as well. Covered entities and business associates will also likely want to include these changes into training for employees involved in these activities.

The Final Rule goes into effect on June 25, 2024, with a compliance date of December 23, 2024. The NPP requirements, however, take effect on February 16, 2026—consistent with OCR’s 42 CFR Part 2 Rule of February 16, 2024, so that covered entities regulated under both rules can implement changes to their NPPs at the same time.

HIPAA covered entities and business associates should consider the context and framework of the HIPAA Privacy Rule and these new modifications as they consider third-party requests for any PHI that may include reproductive health information (the current HIPAA Privacy Rule remains in effect until the new rule takes effect). If the new reproductive health prohibition is not applicable, HIPAA covered entities should still consider the fact that HIPAA otherwise permits, but does not require, them to disclose PHI under most of the HIPAA exceptions contained in 45 CFR § 164.512. Therefore, HIPAA affords covered entities the ability to protect the privacy interests of their patients, especially in the current post-Dobbs environment.

Covered entities and business associates now face the challenge of implementing these new requirements and training their workforce members on how to analyze and respond to requests that include reproductive health care information. Questions remain surrounding a covered entity or business associate’s burden of determining that the reproductive health care provided to an individual was in fact lawful. For example, if a complaint follows, does a covered entity have to account for the disclosures that are made? While the Final Rule is gender-neutral, what is the likelihood that it would be applied to men—could it? In any case, we will continue to monitor developments, including questions of how HIPAA and other privacy concerns interact with reproductive health care, in the wake of Dobbs. For more on the subject, please see our past blog on the 2023 proposed rule.

Ann W. Parks contributed to this article.

Poor Oversight: Healthcare Company & Owner to Pay $1 Million for Care Plan Oversight Service Billing Fraud

The United States announced that Chicago-based healthcare company Apollo Health Inc. (Apollo), and its owner, Brian J. Weinstein, will pay $1 million to resolve False Claims Act allegations. The claims state that Apollo, under the direction of Weinstein, submitted bills to Medicare for services that were never performed. The case was brought by two whistleblowers who will be rewarded for their efforts.

From December 2014 through March 2017, Apollo allegedly submitted Medicare claims for care plan oversight services (CPO) that did not occur. CPOs detail a physician’s duties to supervise a patient receiving complex medical care. Weinstein allegedly directed Apollo to submit 12,592 CPO service claims for over two dozen providers employed by Apollo, despite Weinstein’s knowledge that no services had been rendered to Medicare patients, and no CPO services were documented in medical records.
Medicare fraud undermines the trust and integrity of the healthcare system, resulting in significant financial burdens on taxpayers. When individuals or organizations engage in fraudulent activities, such as billing for services not rendered or submitting false claims, they siphon funds from Medicare’s intended beneficiaries. Medicare fraud diminishes the resources available for legitimate healthcare services for truly ill Medicare beneficiaries.
The settlement resolves claims brought by two whistleblowers, also known as relators, under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act. Javar Jones and Louis Curet, the relators in the case, will receive 20% of the settlement amount for bringing the fraudulent activity to the United States’ attention. Whistleblowers who report fraud against the government via a qui tam lawsuit can earn a 15-25% share of the government’s recovery.

A New Day for “Natural” Claims?

On May 2, the Second Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of KIND in a nine year old lawsuit challenging “All Natural” claims. In Re KIND LLC, No. 22-2684-cv (2d Cir. May 2, 2024). Although only time will tell, this Circuit decision, in favor of the defense, may finally change plaintiffs’ appetite for “natural” cases.

Over the many years of litigation, the lawsuit consolidated several class action filings from New York, Florida, and California into a single, multi-district litigation with several, different lead plaintiffs. All plaintiffs alleged that “All Natural” claims for 39 KIND granola bars and other snacks were deceptive. Id. at 3. Plaintiff had alleged that the following ingredients rendered the KIND bars not natural: soy lecithin, soy protein isolate, citrus pectin, glucose syrup/”non-GMO” glucose, vegetable glycerine, palm kernel oil, canola oil, ascorbic acid, vitamin A acetate, d-alpha tocopheryl acetate/vitamin E, and annatto.

The Second Circuit found that, in such cases, the relevant state laws followed a “reasonable consumer standard” of deception. Id. at 10. Further, according to the Second Circuit, the “Ninth Circuit has helpfully explained” that the reasonable consumer standard requires “‘more than a mere possibility that the label might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.’” Id. (quoting McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co., 69 F.4th 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2023)). Rather, there must be “‘a probability that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’” Id. To defeat summary judgement, the plaintiffs would need to present admissible evidence showing how “All Natural” tends to mislead under this standard.

The Second Circuit agreed with the lower court that plaintiffs’ deposition testimony failed to provide such evidence where it failed to “establish an objective definition” representing reasonable consumer understanding of “All Natural.” Id. at 28. While one plaintiff believed the claim meant “not synthetic,” another thought it meant “made from whole grains, nuts, and fruit,” while yet another believed it meant “literally plucked from the ground.” Id. The court observed that plaintiffs “fail[ed] to explain how a trier of fact could apply these shifting definitions.” Id. The court next rejected as useful evidence a dictionary definition of “natural,” which stated, “existing or caused by nature; not made or caused by humankind.” Id. at 29. The court reasoned that the dictionary definition was “not useful when applied to a mass-produced snack bar wrapped in plastic” – something “clearly made by humans.” Id.

The court, finally, upheld the lower court’s decision to exclude two other pieces of evidence the plaintiffs offered. First, the Second Circuit agreed that a consumer survey was subject to exclusion where leading questions biased the results. Id. at 21-22. The Second Circuit also agreed that an expert report by a chemist lacked relevance where it assessed “typical” sourcing of ingredients, not necessarily how KIND’s ingredients were manufactured or sourced. Id. at 22-24.

© 2024 Keller and Heckman LLP
by: Food and Drug Law at Keller and Heckman of Keller and Heckman LLP

For more news on Food Advertising Litigation, visit the NLR Biotech, Food, Drug section.

The 80/20 Rule is Here: CMS Finalizes HCBS Care Worker Payment Requirements

In May 2023, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a series of rule changes intended to help promote the availability of home and community-based services (“HCBS”) for Medicaid beneficiaries. Chief among these proposals was a new rule that would require HCBS agencies to spend at least 80% of their Medicaid payments for homemaker, home health aide, and personal care services on direct care worker compensation (the “80/20 Rule”). Intended to help stabilize the HCBS workforce, the proposal faced immediate backlash from HCBS providers and Medicaid agencies, who expressed concern that the 80/20 rule would harm HCBS providers by mandating specific allocations to worker compensation and bogging down providers and Medicaid agencies with burdensome reporting requirements.

After reviewing thousands of comments, CMS released an advance copy of the final rule this week. Defying stakeholder anticipation that the 80/20 Rule would be relaxed, or updated to provide more flexibility for providers, CMS finalized the 80/20 Rule largely as originally proposed, including the following key requirements:

  • HCBS providers must spend at least 80% of Medicaid payments on direct care worker compensation;
  • HCBS providers will have six years (increased from four) from the effective date of the final rule to demonstrate compliance with the 80/20 Rule;
  • States must begin collecting and tracking data on direct care worker compensation within four years of the effective date of the final rule; and
  • States are permitted to establish different standards for smaller HCBS providers and to establish hardship exemptions – in both cases based on objective and transparent criteria.

Under the broad mandate of the 80/20 Rule, there are a number of key definitions that HCBS providers must consider as they evaluate these new requirements:

Direct Care Workers

Because the 80/20 Rule was adopted largely to stabilize the HCBS workforce, a key component is whose compensation qualifies for inclusion. CMS’s proposed definition encompassed almost any person with a role in providing direct care to patients (e.g., RNs, LPNs, individuals practicing under their supervision, home health aides, etc.). Under the final 80/20 Rule, CMS clarified that “direct care workers” also include those whose role is specifically tied to clinical supervision (e.g., nurse supervisors).

Compensation

Compensation of direct care workers means:“[s]alary, wages, and other remunerations as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act and implementing regulations; [b]enefits (such as health and dental benefits, life and disability insurance, paid leave, retirement, and tuition reimbursement); and [t]he employer share of payroll taxes for direct care workers delivering services authorized under section 1915(c) of the Act.” CMS clarified that “compensation” also includes:

  1. Overtime pay;
  2. All forms of paid leave (e.g., sick leave, holidays, and vacations);
  3. Different types of retirement plans and employer contributions; and
  4. All types of benefits: CMS intentionally used the phrase “such as” to indicate the list of benefits was non-exhaustive, and indicated technical guidance to states on this subject is forthcoming.

Excluded Costs

CMS expressed concern that HCBS providers would include training costs for direct care workers as “compensation,” and that calculating compensation in this way could result in negative outcomes, such as diminished training opportunities. To address these concerns, CMS created the concept of “excluded costs,” which are excluded from the percentage calculations under the 80/20 Rule. See § 441.302(k)(1)(iii) (“costs that are not included in the calculation of the percentage of Medicaid payments to providers that are spent on compensation for direct care workers.”). Excluded costs are limited to:

  1. Costs of required direct care worker training;
  2. Direct care worker travel costs (mileage, public transportation subsidy, etc.); and
  3. Personal protective equipment costs.

Medicaid Payments

CMS largely adopted its expansive view of what qualifies as a “Medicaid Payment” for purposes of 80/20 Rule calculations. CMS clarified that the 80/20 Rule encompasses both standard and supplemental payments and applies regardless of whether HBCS services are delivered through fee-for-service or managed care delivery systems. CMS also declined to create a formal carve-out for value-based care or pay-for-performance arrangements, despite recognizing their value.

What Comes Next?

HCBS providers and state Medicaid agencies have six years to sort out their compliance with the 80/20 Rule (though data tracking and reporting begins after year three). On the provider side, this means carefully evaluating the business and economic impacts of compliance with the 80/20 Rule and monitoring CMS and state-level guidance on implementation as it develops over time. For multi-state providers, this process becomes even more complicated, as there is a high likelihood that states will choose to implement the 80/20 Rule in different, and potentially contradictory, ways.

Providers also need to work with the state agencies to address the adequacy of HCBS rates generally. CMS recognized the important role that the underlying rates play in HCBS sustainability but declined to mandate specific payment rates or methodologies. As a result, positive momentum on the rates themselves must come from state initiatives.

The Hidden Dangers: Long-Term Effects of Mild Traumatic Brain Injury

Traumatic brain injuries can have life-changing impacts on a person’s life, and understandably so because they result from injuries to the brain either through a massive blow to the head or injury by a penetrative object into the brain matter.

However, not all types of traumatic brain injuries have quite dramatic symptoms, and a mild TBI (traumatic brain injury) is one such injury. They result from a relatively minor blow to the head or a jerking of the head, causing injuries to the brain tissue.

While most mild TBIs resolve in a few weeks, some can affect the victim’s life in the long term.

Symptoms of a Mild TBI

If you have suffered a blow to the head in an accident, you need to pay attention to your symptoms, as it can help you identify signs of a mild TBI, also known as a concussion. Symptoms like passing out briefly, headache, memory loss, confusion, loss of balance, sensitivity to light and noise, problems keeping balance, tingling in your fingers, etc., are indicative of a concussion.

However, other injuries can present similar symptoms, so it is best to have a doctor make that determination. Also, it is important to note that concussions can go undetected for days because they tend to have delayed symptoms.

Unfortunately, taking too much time before seeking medical attention for a mild TBI can introduce treatment gaps, which can result in complications when seeking compensation for the long-term effects of a concussion. A timely hospital visit helps create a link between an accident and symptoms that could show days after the accident. Which is why personal injury lawyers always insist on seeking medical attention even when you feel okay.

Long-Term Effects of a Mild TBI

While most effects of a concussion will be gone after 90 days of suffering an accident, and this is for cases of severe injuries, there are situations where the effects of an injury can last years or a lifetime. Common long-term effects of a mild TBI on a person’s life include:

LONG-TERM MEMORY LOSS

Memory loss is pretty common after a concussion. However, it involves losing a recollection of the few minutes before and after an injury.

In some cases, the affected person can start remembering things once forgotten. However, in severe cases, memory loss can impact a person’s life in the long term.

DEPRESSION

Many people will develop symptoms of depression after a concussion, usually as a result of chemical changes resulting from the brain injury. While most symptoms will disappear as the brain recovers, some people may have to live with the symptoms for an extended period.

In some cases, symptoms of depression won’t show until some time after other symptoms are gone.

COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT

In most cases, the effect of a mild TBI on a person’s thinking and cognitive abilities resolves in a few months at most.

But there is no guarantee that your cognitive abilities will return to your pre-injury levels, especially with relatively severe concussions or injuries that went undetected for a long time.

Treatment and Support for Mild TBI

You may not need hospitalization after a TBI. Often, doctors focus on treating the symptoms and may prescribe cognitive and behavioral therapy to address the psychological and injury effects on a person’s mental well-being.

If the injuries resulted from an accident and another person’s negligence was to blame, you could consider talking to a personal injury lawyer to help recover damages.

Incorporating AI to Address Mental Health Challenges in K-12 Students

The National Institute of Mental Health reported that 16.32% of youth (aged 12-17) in the District of Columbia (DC) experience at least one major depressive episode (MDE).
Although the prevalence of youth with MDE in DC is lower compared to some states, such as Oregon (where it reached 21.13%), it is important to address mental health challenges in youth early, as untreated mental health challenges can persist into adulthood. Further, the number of youths with MDE climbs nationally each year, including last year when it rose by almost 2% to approximately 300,000 youth.

It is important to note that there are programs specifically designed to help and treat youth that have experienced trauma and are living with mental health challenges. In DC, several mental health services and professional counseling services are available to residents. Most importantly, there is a broad reaching school-based mental health program that aims to provide a behavioral health expert in every school building. Additionally, on the DC government’s website, there is a list of mental health services programs available, which can be found here.

In conjunction with the mental health programs, early identification of students at risk for suicide, self-harm, and behavioral issues can help states, including DC, ensure access to mental health care and support for these young individuals. In response to the widespread youth mental health crisis, K-12 schools are employing the use of artificial intelligence (AI)-based tools to identify students at risk for suicide and self-harm. Through AI-based suicide risk monitoring, natural language processing, sentiment analysis, predictive models, early intervention, and surveillance and evaluation, AI is playing a crucial role in addressing the mental challenges faced by youth.

AI systems, developed by companies like Bark, Gaggle, and GoGuardian, aim to monitor students’ digital footprint through various data inputs, such as online interactions and behavioral patterns, for signs of distress or risk. These programs identify students who may be at risk for self-harm or suicide and alert the school and parents accordingly.

Proposals for using AI models to enhance mental health surveillance in school settings by implementing chat boxes to interact with students are being introduced. The chat box conversation logs serve as the source of raw data for the machine learning. According to Using AI for Mental Health Analysis and Prediction in School Surveys, existing survey results evaluated by health experts can be used to create a test dataset to validate the machine learning models. Supervised learning can then be deployed to classify specific behaviors and mental health patterns. However, there are concerns about how these programs work and what safeguards the companies have in place to protect youths’ data from being sold to other platforms. Additionally, there are concerns about whether these companies are complying with relevant laws (e.g., the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act [FERPA]).

The University of Michigan identified AI technologies, such as natural language processing (NLP) and sentiment analysis, that can analyze user interactions, such as posts and comments, to identify signs of distress, anxiety, or depression. For example, Breathhh is an AI-powered Chrome extension designed to automatically deliver mental health exercises based on an individual’s web activity and online behaviors. By monitoring and analyzing the user’s interactions, the application can determine appropriate moments to present stress-relieving practices and strategies. Applications, like Breathhh, are just one example of personalized interventions designed by monitoring user interaction.

When using AI to address mental health concerns among K-12 students, policy implications must be carefully considered.

First, developers must obtain informed consent from students, parents, guardians, and all stakeholders before deploying such AI models. The use of AI models is always a topic of concern for policymakers because of the privacy concerns that come with it. To safely deploy AI models, there needs to be privacy protection policies in place to safeguard sensitive information from being improperly used. There is no comprehensive legislation that addresses those concerns either nationally or locally.
Second, developers also need to consider and factor in any bias engrained in their algorithm through data testing and regular monitoring of data output before it reaches the user. AI has the ability to detect early signs of mental health challenges. However, without such proper safeguards in place, we risk failing to protect students from being disproportionately impacted. When collected data reflects biases, it can lead to unfair treatment of certain groups. For youth, this can result in feelings of marginalization and adversely affect their mental health.
Effective policy considerations should encourage the use of AI models that will provide interpretable results, and policymakers need to understand how these decisions are made. Policies should outline how schools will respond to alerts generated by the system. A standard of care needs to be universally recognized, whether it be through policy or the companies’ internal safeguards. This standard of care should outline guidelines that address situations in which AI data output conflicts with human judgment.

Responsible AI implementation can enhance student well-being, but it requires careful evaluation to ensure students’ data is protected from potential harm. Moving forward, school leaders, policymakers, and technology developers need to consider the benefits and risks of AI-based mental health monitoring programs. Balancing the intended benefits while mitigating potential harms is crucial for student well-being.

© 2024 ArentFox Schiff LLP
by: David P. GrossoStarshine S. Chun of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more news on Artificial Intelligence and Mental Health, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.