Shijiazhuang Market Supervision Bureau Fines Trademark Agency 50,000 RMB for Attempting to Trademark Olympic Gold Medalist’s Social Media Account

On May 18, 2022, the Shijiazhuang Yuhua District Market Supervision Administration issued an Administrative Penalty Decision against a Shijiazhuang trademark agency for attempting to trademark the name of Eileen Gu’s Douyin account (TikTok’s sister app in China). Eileen Gu won three gold medals in the Beijing Winter Olympics earlier this year and has become extremely popular in China.

On February 11, 2022, Wang XX, the legal representative of the trademark applicant Hebei Yi Biotechnology Co., Ltd., contacted Wang YY, a staff member of a trademark agency in Shijiazhuang, China, to apply for trademarks for Frog Princess Eileen in English and Chinese.  Frog Princess Eileen is the name of the 2022 Winter Olympics champion and model Eileen Gu’s (Gu Ailing) Douyin registered account. This account has released videos since August 29, 2018.  Ms. Gu won gold medals in big air and halfpipe and a silver medal in slopestyle at the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. She then received a lot of media coverage and became famous, with a great reputation and influence. Therefore, Ms. Gu has the prior rights to the names of her Douyin registered account “Frog Princess Eileen” and due to their high popularity and influence, the scope of protection for “Frog Princess Eileen” is more powerful than the general right of trade names.

 

A promotional image from Gu’s recent campaign with Louis Vuitton. Credit: Louis Vuitton

 

At the same time, Ms. Gu made outstanding contributions to my China’s gold medal list in this Winter Olympics. Applicants other than Ms. Gu herself that register and apply for the trademarks “Frog Princess Eileen”  not only damages the prior rights of the Winter Olympic champion Gu but also damages the public interests of the society, which is easy to cause social damage and adverse effects. In this case, the trademark agency in Shijiazhuang, as a trademark agency agency for many years, nonetheless applied for a trademark even though it should have known or knew that the trademark would damage the existing prior rights of others.

Accordingly, the trademark agency was fined 50,000 RMB and Wang YY and Li (business personnel) were each fined 5,000 RMB.

The full text of the punishment is available here (Chinese only) courtesy of 知识产权界: 行政处罚决定书.

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Thailand’s Personal Data Protection Act Enters into Force

On June 1, 2022, Thailand’s Personal Data Protection Act (“PDPA”) entered into force after three years of delays. The PDPA, originally enacted in May 2019, provides for a one-year grace period, with the main operative provisions of the law originally set to come into force in 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the Thai government issued royal decrees to extend the compliance deadline to June 1, 2022. 

The PDPA mirrors the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) in many respects. Specifically, it requires data controllers and processors to have a valid legal basis for processing personal data (i.e., data that can identify living natural persons directly or indirectly). If such personal data is sensitive personal data (such as health data, biometric data, race, religion, sexual preference and criminal record), data controllers and processors must ensure that data subjects give explicit consent for any collection, use or disclosure of such data. Exemptions are granted for public interest, contractual obligations, vital interest or compliance with the law.

The PDPA applies both to entities in Thailand and abroad that process personal data for the provision of products or services in Thailand. Like the GDPR, data subjects are guaranteed rights, including the right to be informed, access, rectify and update data; restrict and object to processing; and the right to data erasure and portability. Breaches may result in fines between THB500,000 (U.S.$14,432) and THB5 million, plus punitive compensation. Certain breaches involving sensitive personal data and unlawful disclosure also carry criminal penalties including imprisonment of up to one year.

Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Is Coming… Are You Ready? CBP Issues Hints at the Wave of Enforcement To Come

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued some guidance relating to its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) prior to June 21, 2022, the effective date of the rebuttable presumption.

What to Know

  • US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued some guidance relating to its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) prior to June 21, 2022, the effective date of the rebuttable presumption.
  • The new guidance imposes tighter timelines and a higher burden of evidence on importers to rebut the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor. If CBP does not make a decision within specific timeframes, goods will automatically be deemed excluded.
  • CBP is expected to issue additional technical guidance at the end of May or early June. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is also expected to issue guidance closer to June 21, 2022.
  • CBP is scheduled to host informational webinars detailing their UFLPA guidance in the coming weeks.

What’s New: Tighter Timelines  

While US importers were eagerly anticipating the issuance of technical guidance regarding implementation of the UFLPA from CBP last week, which is now expected this week, CBP did post a new guidance document summarizing the UFLPA and forced labor Withhold Release Orders (WRO) enforcement mechanisms. Specifically, CBP’s authority to detain merchandise under the UFLPA will be pursuant to 19 CFR § 151.16, which provides for a much different timeline for the detention of merchandise than the WRO process. Under this process, if Customs does not make a timely decision regarding admissibility, goods are automatically excluded.

UFLPA Timeline Enforcement under 19 CFR § 151.16

Number of Days

Actions

5 Days from Presentation for Examination

CBP must decide whether to release or detail merchandise

  • If the merchandise is not released, it is detained
5 Days after Decision to Release or Detain

CBP will issue a notice to importer advising them of:

  • The initiation of detention
  • Date merchandise examined
  • Reason for detention
  • Anticipated length of detention
  • Nature of tests and inquiries to be conducted
  • Information to accelerate disposition
  Upon written request, CBP must provide importer with testing procedures, methodologies used, and testing results
Within 30 Days of Examination

CBP will make a final determination as to the admissibility of merchandise

  • If CBP does not make a determination within the 30-day period, the merchandise will be deemed excluded
  • This means any submission to rebut the presumption should be made before this 30 day period
Within 180 Days of CBP Determination/Exclusion Importers may protest CBP’s final determination
Within 30 Days After Protest Submitted The protest is deemed denied if CBP does not grant or deny the protest within 30 days
Within 180 Days after the Date the Protest is Denied

The importer may commence a court action contesting the denied protest (28 U.S.C. § 1581(a))

  • In a court action, CBP must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an admissibility decision has been reached for good cause
  • Customs can decide to grant the protest after the deemed denial but before a court case is filed

This is a much shorter timeline than the WRO process. Importantly, a company contesting CBP’s detention of merchandise pursuant to the UFLPA would be required to submit documentation to rebut the presumption within the 30-day period that CBP is assessing admissibility, whereas the WRO process permits 90 days. Like the WRO process, the importer may also file a protest 180 days after CBP makes its final determination regarding the exclusion.

CBP Listening Session: A Higher Burden of Evidence 

On Tuesday, May 24, 2022, CBP provided information regarding the publication of guidance and enforcement of the UFLPA:

  • CBP Publication of Guidance. CBP’s guidance regarding its enforcement of the rebuttable presumption and the UFLPA is scheduled to be published the week of May 30.
  • DHS Publication of Guidance. DHS guidance will be published on or about June 21, 2022, which will include information relating to supply chain due diligence, importer guidance, and the entity lists.
  • Clear and Convincing Evidence Required to Rebut the Presumption that Merchandise was Produced with Forced Labor. It was confirmed that the UFLPA will have a much higher burden of evidence required to rebut the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor than that of a WRO. Any exception to the rebuttable presumption must be reported to Congress, and thus the level of evidence that will be required to overcome the rebuttable presumption is very high. As a practical matter, it appears that very few detained entries will be released. Importers are advised to start conducting due diligence on supply chains in order to ensure that they will be able to obtain documentation should merchandise be detained once the rebuttable presumption goes into effect. Importantly, products that are subject to an existing WRO from Xinjiang will now be enforced under the UFLPA process instead of the WRO process.
  • Evidence Required if Merchandise is Detained. The forthcoming guidance will set forth information regarding how an importer may meet the exception to the rebuttable presumption and to demonstrate that merchandise was not produced with forced labor, by meeting the following three criteria:
    • Demonstrate compliance with the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force/DHS strategy;
    • Demonstrate compliance with CBP’s guidance and any inquiries that CBP raises; and
    • Provide clear and convincing evidence that the supply chain in question is free of forced labor.
  • Binding Rulings. Importers may apply for a binding ruling to confirm or request an exception to the rebuttable presumption under the UFLPA. Although CBP is still finalizing the process for importers to apply for a binding ruling, importers would be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that merchandise is not produced with forced labor. If the ruling is granted, it applies to future shipments for the specific supply chain in question.
  • Known Importer Letters and Detention Notices. Going forward, CBP will not issue Known Importer letters, and CBP will notify importers that merchandise is subject to the UFLPA through the issuance of detention notices.
  • Detention of Merchandise. If goods are detained by CBP because they are suspected of having a nexus to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), importers may either provide clear and convincing evidence that merchandise was not produced with forced labor or export the products. If detained products that fall under the UFLPA are comingled with other products that are not subject to the UFLPA, importers may request the segregation of the merchandise that is not subject to the UFLPA.
  • Chain of CBP Review for Importer Submissions Relating to Detained Merchandise. Chain of CBP review for the request of an exception to the rebuttable presumption has not been finalized yet. However, importers will be required to submit evidence that rebuts the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor to the applicable CBP Port Director. For the moment, the CBP Commissioner is the final individual who can ultimately make an exception to the rebuttable presumption, but CBP is deciding if it will delegate this responsibility to any additional persons.

Upcoming CBP Informational Webinars

CBP will be holding three webinar sessions, all covering the same material, to discuss and review its guidance relating to the UFLPA. The dates of the webinars and the registration links are listed below.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

USCIS to Implement Premium Processing for Certain Previously Filed Form I-140 Petitions

On May 24, 2022, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced that it would begin implementing premium processing for certain petitioners who have a pending Form I-140 under the EB-1 and EB-2 classifications.

As explained in our previous alert, USCIS had announced that it will expand its premium processing service to include additional immigration benefit case types, pursuant to a final rule issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The rule is intended to implement the Emergency Stopgap USCIS Stabilization Act passed by Congress and is part of USCIS’s efforts to reduce existing backlogs and provide needed relief to Employment Authorization Document (EAD) cardholders.

While the rule will become effective on May 31, 2022, it will be implemented in a phased approach over a three-year period. USCIS has now begun implementing these changes to premium processing, starting with certain Form I-140 classifications: EB-1C (classification as a multinational executive or manager) and EB-2 (classification as a member of professions with advanced degrees or exceptional ability seeking a national interest waiver (NIW)).

This expansion will occur in the following phases:

  • Beginning June 1, 2022, USCIS will accept premium processing requests for EB-1C multinational executive and manager petitions received on or before January 1, 2021.
  • Beginning July 1, 2022, USCIS will accept premium processing requests for EB-2 NIW petitions received on or before June 1, 2021, and EB-1C multinational executive and manager petitions received on or before March 1, 2021.

USCIS will only accept premium processing requests for currently pending cases based on their date of filing, as noted above. USCIS is not accepting new Form I-140 petitions in these categories with a premium processing request at this time. We anticipate that USCIS will expand premium processing requests for more recently filed EB-1 and EB-2 petitions in the future.

Article By Shannon N. Parker of Mintz

For more immigration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Beware OFAC in a Time of Sanctions

On Monday, April 25, 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) announced a settlement with Toll Holdings Limited (“Toll”), an Australian freight forwarding and logistics company, with respect to Toll’s originations and/or receipt “of payments through the U.S. financial system involving sanctioned jurisdictions and persons.” Toll, which is not an American entity, and is neither owned by Americans nor located in the U.S. or any of its territories, was involved in almost 3000 transactions where payments were made in connection with sea, air, and rail shipments to, from, or through North Korea, Iran, or Syria, AND/OR involving the property of a person on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. OFAC did not have direct jurisdiction over Toll, BUT because the payments for Toll’s freight forwarding and logistics services flowed through U.S. financial institutions, Toll “caused the U.S. financial institutions to be engaged in prohibited activities with … sanctioned persons or jurisdictions.”

Each OFAC violation can be the basis of civil sanctions. Here the 2853 violation would have supported the imposition of civil sanctions totaling over $826 million. Toll was “happy” to settle OFAC’s enforcement action for $6 million. OFAC found that the Toll violations were “non-egregious,” in part due to the rapid growth of Toll after 2007 through acquisitions of smaller freight forwarding companies. OFAC noted that by 2017 Toll had almost 600 invoicing, data, payment, and other systems spread across its various units. OFAC also noted that Toll did not have adequate compliance procedures and procedures in place and did not attend to those issues until an unnamed bank threatened to cease doing business with Toll because Toll was using its U.S. dollar account to transact business with sanctioned jurisdictions and/or persons. OFAC took note of Toll’s voluntary self-disclosure, well-organized internal investigation, and extensive remedial measures.

OFAC traces its origins to the War of 1812, when the then Secretary of the Treasury imposed sanctions on the United Kingdom in retaliation for the impressment of American sailors. The Treasury Department has had a special office dealing with foreign assets since 1940 (and the outbreak of World War II), with statutory authority found in the Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917 (as World War I raged), and a series of federal laws involving embargoes and economic sanctions. OFAC received its current name as part of a Treasury Department order on October 15, 1962 (contemporaneous with the Cuban missile crisis).

The Toll settlement reflects the growing use by OFAC of public enforcement against foreign businesses for “causing” violations by involving U.S. payment systems. The use of U.S. dollars in any part of a transaction will typically involve the U.S. financial system, directly or indirectly – that subjects the entirety of the transaction to U.S regulatory jurisdiction, including that of OFAC. The Toll settlement evidences OFAC’s increasing willingness to exercise its expansive jurisdiction over foreign businesses, even those involving primarily extraterritorial transactions — for example, the increase in OFAC sanctions of foreign businesses seen as facilitating the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Foreign businesses must give serious and continuing attention to having substantial policies and procedures in place to insure compliance with U.S. sanctions and, thereby, to avoid OFAC enforcement actions. Companies can start by reviewing OFAC’s Framework for Compliance Commitments and implementing the recommendations there. In addition, all parties to a transaction should be screened against sanction lists (OFAC’s, and also those of the U.K. and E.U.). Companies should consider adopting preventive measures, not only to deter violations, but also to demonstrate a vigorous compliance program.  Similarly, these issues MUST be considered as part of any merger or acquisition (as the Toll experience suggests).Finally, all counterparties, including financial intermediaries, should be evaluated for potential sanction list issues. Otherwise, a foreign business may have to “pay the Toll” for its shortcomings.

Experienced American business lawyers may prove helpful in designing and/or evaluating the compliance programs of non-U.S. companies.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

Afghanistan Temporary Protected Status Application Instructions To Be Issued

The Temporary Protected Status (TPS) grant for Afghanistan will go into effect on May 20, 2022, with publication of the notice in the Federal Register with instructions on how to apply for TPS and for Employment Authorization.

In March 2022, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas announced that Afghanistan was added to the list of countries eligible for TPS. This would benefit approximately 75,000 individuals and provide temporary employment authorization. The 18-month initial grant and registration period became effective on March 20, 2022, and runs through November 20, 2023.

To be eligible, individuals must demonstrate their continuous residence in the United States since March 15, 2022, and their continuous physical presence in the United States since March 20, 2022. Any nationals or residents of Afghanistan who are not currently residing in the United States or who arrived after March 15, 2022, will not be eligible for this TPS designation.

Eligible individuals must submit Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status, during the 18-month initial registration period. They may also submit a request for an Employment Authorization Document using Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization. The applications may be submitted together and may be submitted online.

Afghan nationals who arrived in the United States through the evacuation effort, Operation Allies Welcome, received humanitarian parole and work authorization for a period of two years. Those individuals may also be eligible for TPS.

DHS has also announced that F-1 students from Afghanistan experiencing severe economic hardship due to the situation in Afghanistan will be eligible for work authorization, increased permittable work hours, and a reduction in their course load as an accommodation.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

Trade Mark Infringement – Muslim Dating App Meets its Match [.com]

A recent Intellectual Property Enterprise Court Decision (IPEC) on 20 April 2022 has decided that ‘Muzmatch’, an online matchmaking service to the Muslim Community has infringed Match.com’s registered trade marks.

The decision by Nicholas Caddick Q.C was that Muzmatch’s use of signs and its name amounted to trade mark infringement and/or passing off of Match.com’s trade marks. This case follows successful oppositions by Match.com to Muzmatch’s registration of its marks in 2018, and unsuccessful attempts by Match.com to purchase Muzmatch between 2017 and 2019.

Match.com is one of the largest and most recognisable dating platforms in the UK. It first registered a word mark ‘MATCH.COM’ in 1996 and also owns other dating-related brands including Tinder and Hinge with other marks including the word mark ‘TINDER’. Match.com used a 2012 TNS report to illustrate its goodwill and reputation and 70% of people surveyed would be able to recall Match.com if prompted, 44% unprompted and 31% of people would name Match.com as the first dating brand off the ‘top of their head.’

Muzmatch is a comparatively niche but growing dating platform, which aims to provide a halal (i.e. in compliance with Islamic law) way for single Muslim men and women to meet a partner. Muzmatch is comparatively much smaller and was founded in 2011 by Mr Shahzad Younas and now has had around 666,069 sign-ups in the UK alone.

The Court considered that the marks ‘Muzmatch’ and ‘MATCH.COM’ and each company’s graphical marks, had a high degree of similarity in the services provided. The marks were also similar in nature orally and conceptually and the addition of the prefix ‘Muz’ did not distinguish the two marks, nor could the lack of the suffix ‘.com’ or stylistic fonts/devices.

The key issue of the case relates to the idea of the term ‘Match’ which is used by both marks to describe the nature of the business: match[ing]. Muzmatch argued that as both marks share this descriptive common element, so it is difficult to conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion between the two marks as the term just describes what each business does.

 The Court found that finding that there is a likelihood of confusion for a common descriptive element is not impossible, as the descriptive element can be used distinctively. The average consumer would conclude that the portion ‘Match’ is the badge of origin for Match.com due to its reputation as a brand and the very substantial degree of distinctiveness in the dating industry. An average consumer would have seen the word ‘Match’ as the dominant element in the Match.com trade marks and Match.com is often referred to as just ‘Match’ in advertisements.

Aside from its marks, Muzmatch utilised a Search Engine Optimisation strategy from January 2012 whereby it utilised a list of around 5000 keywords which would take a user to a landing page on the its website. In the list of the keywords used, Muzmatch used the words ‘muslim-tinder’, ‘tinder’ and ‘halal-tinder’ which were accepted by Muzmatch during the litigation to have infringed Match’s trade marks of the Tinder brand including the word mark ‘TINDER’. Muzmatch’s SEO use was also found to cause confusion based on some of its keywords including ‘UK Muslim Match’, which again uses the term Match distinctively, therefore a consumer may confuse a link to ‘UK Muslim Match’ with ‘Match.com’.

Therefore, the Court found that there was likely to be confusion between Muzmatch and Match.com because of the distinctive nature of the term ‘Match’ in the world of dating platforms.  An average consumer would conclude that Muzmatch was connected in a material way with the Match.com marks, as if it was targeted at Muslim users as a sub-brand, so this confusion would be trade mark infringement under S10(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994.

The Court also considered that Muzmatch had taken unfair advantage of Match.com’s trade marks and had therefore infringed those marks under S10(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994. This was due to the reputation of Match.com’s trade marks and because a consumer would believe that Muzmatch was a sub-brand of Match.com.

The Court rejected Muzmatch’s defence of honest concurrent use and found that Match.com would also have an alternative claim in the tort of passing off.

Key Points:

  • The Court found that a common descriptive element can acquire distinctiveness in an area, solely because of a company’s reputation and influence in that market.
  • The use of Search Engine Optimisation strategies can also constitute a trade mark infringement.
  • The lack of the suffix ‘.com’ in a mark is not sufficient to distinguish use from a household brand such as Match.com, so care should be taken with brands such as ‘Match.com’, ‘Booking.com’[1]

Source:

[1] Match Group, LLC, Meetic SAS, Match.Com International Limited v Muzmatch Limited, Shahzad Younas [2022] EWHC 941 (IPEC)


[1] Note- Blog Post of July 6 2020 Relating to Booking.com- https://www.iptechblog.com/2020/07/us-supreme-court-opens-doors-to-generic-com-trademarks/

Comparing and Contrasting the State Laws: Does Pseudonymized Data Exempt Organizations from Complying with Privacy Rights?

Some organizations are confused as to the impact that pseudonymization has (or does not have) on a privacy compliance program. That confusion largely stems from ambiguity concerning how the term fits into the larger scheme of modern data privacy statutes. For example, aside from the definition, the CCPA only refers to “pseudonymized” on one occasion – within the definition of “research” the CCPA implies that personal information collected by a business should be “pseudonymized and deidentified” or “deidentified and in the aggregate.”[1] The conjunctive reference to research being both pseudonymized “and” deidentified raises the question whether the CCPA lends any independent meaning to the term “pseudonymized.” Specifically, the CCPA assigns a higher threshold of anonymization to the term “deidentified.” As a result, if data is already deidentified it is not clear what additional processing or set of operations is expected to pseudonymize the data. The net result is that while the CCPA introduced the term “pseudonymization” into the American legal lexicon, it did not give it any significant legal effect or status.

Unlike the CCPA, the pseudonymization of data does impact compliance obligations under the data privacy statutes of Virginia, Colorado, and Utah. As the chart below indicates, those statutes do not require that organizations apply access or deletion rights to pseudonymized data, but do imply that other rights (e.g., opt out of sale) do apply to such data. Ambiguity remains as to what impact pseudonymized data has on rights that are not exempted, such as the right to opt out of the sale of personal information. For example, while Virginia does not require an organization to re-identify pseudonymized data, it is unclear how an organization could opt a consumer out of having their pseudonymized data sold without reidentification.


ENDNOTES

[1] Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(ab)(2) (West 2021). It should be noted that the reference to pseudonymizing and deidentifying personal information is found within the definition of the word “Research,” as such it is unclear whether the CCPA was attempting to indicate that personal information will not be considered research unless it has been pseudonymized and deidentified, or whether the CCPA is mandating that companies that conduct research must pseudonymize and deidentify. Given that the reference is found within the definition section of the CCPA, the former interpretation seems the most likely intent of the legislature.

[2] The GDPR does not expressly define the term “sale,” nor does it ascribe particular obligations to companies that sell personal information. Selling, however, is implicitly governed by the GDPR as any transfer of personal information from one controller to a second controller would be considered a processing activity for which a lawful purpose would be required pursuant to GDPR Article 6.

[3] Va. Code 59.1-577(B) (2022).

[4] Utah Code Ann. 13-61-303(1)(a) (2022).

[5] Va. Code 59.1-577(D) (2022) (exempting compliance with Va. Code 59.1-573(A)(1) through (4)

[6] C.R.S. 6-1-1307(3) (2022) (exempting compliance with C.R.S. Section 6-1-1306(1)(b) to (1)(e)).

[7] Utah Code Ann. 13-61-303(1)(c) (exempting compliance with Utah Code Ann. 13-61-202(1) through (3)).

[8] Va. Code 59.1-577(D) (2022) (exempting compliance with Va. Code 59.1-573(A)(1) through (4)

[9] C.R.S. 6-1-1307(3) (2022) (exempting compliance with C.R.S. Section 6-1-1306(1)(b) to (1)(e)).

[10] Va. Code 59.1-577(D) (2022) (exempting compliance with Va. Code 59.1-573(A)(1) through (4)

[11] C.R.S. 6-1-1307(3) (2022) (exempting compliance with C.R.S. Section 6-1-1306(1)(b) to (1)(e)).

[12] Utah Code Ann. 13-61-303(1)(c) (exempting compliance with Utah Code Ann. 13-61-202(1) through (3)).

[13] Va. Code 59.1-577(D) (2022) (exempting compliance with Va. Code 59.1-574).

[14] Va. Code 59.1-577(D) (2022) (exempting compliance with Va. Code 59.1-574).

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Are You Ready for the UK Plastic Packaging Tax?

The plastic packaging tax (the ‘Tax’) came into force on 1 April 2022, with UK businesses that produce or import plastic packaging components in quantities of 10 or more tonnes per year affected. However, despite already being in force, research conducted by YouGov, on behalf of Veolia, has found that a high proportion of retail and manufacturing businesses (77% of those surveyed) are still not aware of the Tax.

As businesses gain increased awareness, the Tax is likely to receive a mixed reception. Whilst most would support the Government’s aim of increasing the use of recycled content in plastic packaging components, the Tax comes at a time when 92% of manufacturers and 90% of importers are reporting increased costs. With the introduction of the Tax, those businesses that have not already passed these increased costs on to customers will likely do so, meaning that the Tax may unintentionally add to the cost of living in the UK. This is compounded when one considers that the Tax came into force just five days before the controversial increase in national insurance contributions.

To manage increased costs and to ensure compliance with the law, businesses should pay close attention to the rules of the Tax.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more articles on international laws, visit the NLR Global section.

Your Employee As Your Arbitrator? Maybe!

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Court”) has, by its order dated August 24, 2009, in the matter of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. (“Appellants”) Vs. M/s. Raja Transport (P) Ltd. (“Respondent”)1, once again upheld that the Court must give full effect and meaning to the appointment procedure set by the parties in the arbitration agreement before appointing arbitrator of their choice.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Appellant and Respondent entered into an agreement dated February 28, 2005 (“Agreement”), where under, the Respondent was appointed as the dealer of the Appellant for the retail sale of petroleum products. Clause 692 of the Agreement provided for settlement of disputes by arbitration where the Director, Marketing of the Appellant, or a person appointed by him, was to act as the sole arbitrator.

On August 06, 2005, the Appellant terminated the dealership. The Respondent filed suit in the Civil Court, Dehradun, seeking (1) a declaration that the order of termination of dealership was illegal and void and (2) for a permanent injunction restraining the Appellant from stopping the supply of petroleum products to the retail outlet of the Appellant. In this same suit, the Appellant filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”), praying that the suit be rejected and the matter be referred to arbitration in terms of Section 69 of the Agreement. The Ld. Judge allowed the Appellant’s application and directed the parties to refer the matter to arbitration within two months and also directed the Appellant not to stop supplies to the Respondent for a period of two months.

Both parties challenged the said order before the District Court, Dehradun. The Respondent also filed an application under Section 9 of the Act seeking an interim injunction against the Appellant. Both appeals and the Section 9 application were disposed off by a common order dated January 20, 2006, whereby, both appeals were dismissed and the Section 9 application was allowed, retraining the Appellant from interrupting the supply of petroleum products to the Respondent for two months as well as directing the parties to refer the matter to arbitration as per the agreement, within the said period of two months.

While the appeals were pending, the Respondent issued letter dated January 04, 2006, through their counsel, wherein, the Respondent, referring to the Appellant’s insistence that only its Director, Marketing could be appointed as the Arbitrator, inter alia alleged that it (the Respondent) did not expect fair treatment or justice if the Director, Marketing or any other employee of the Appellant was appointed as the Arbitrator and called upon the Respondent to have a joint meeting so as to enable the parties to mutually agree on an independent arbitrator. This request was not accepted by the Appellant.

Thereafter, the Respondent filed an application before the Chief Justice of the Uttaranchal High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act for appointment of an independent arbitrator to decide the dispute. This application7 was allowed and a retired High Court Judge was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to decide the dispute. The Ld. Chief Justice inter alia assigned the following two reasons to appoint a retired Judge as an Arbitrator instead of the persons as named in the arbitration agreement.

  1. The Director (Marketing) of the Appellant, being its employee, should be presumed not to act independently or impartially.
    1. The Respondent had taken steps in accordance with the agreed appointment procedure contained in the arbitration agreement and directions of the civil court by issuing notice dated January 04, 2006, calling upon the Appellant to appoint an arbitrator. After receipt of the said notice, the Appellant had to refer the matter to its Director, Marketing, which it did not do, nor did it take any steps for the appointment of an Arbitrator. The Appellant had, thus, failed to act as required under the agreed procedure.

    Aggrieved by the said order, the Appellant preferred an appeal before the Court.

    JUDGMENT:

    The facts and circumstances of this case raised three issues for the Court to consider:

    1. Whether the Ld. Chief Justice of the Uttaranchal High Court was justified in assuming that when an employee of one of the parties to the dispute is appointed as an arbitrator, he will not act independently or impartially.

    On this issue, the Court inter alia noted as under:

    • Arbitration is a binding and voluntary dispute resolution process by a private forum so chosen by the parties.
    • Where a party, with open eyes and full knowledge and comprehension of the said provision enters into a contract with a government/statutory corporation/public sector enterprise, where such arbitration agreements providing for settlement of disputes where the arbitrator will be one of its senior officers, were common, such party cannot subsequently turn around and contend otherwise unless performance of that part of the arbitration agreement is impossible, or is void being contrary to the provisions of the Act.
    • It was settled law that arbitration agreements in government contracts providing that an employee of the department (usually a high official unconnected with the work or the contract) will be the arbitrator are neither void, nor unenforceable.
    • Whilst the provisions relating to independence, impartiality and freedom from bias are implicit under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the same are made explicit in the Act.
    • This position may differ where the person named as the arbitrator is an employee of a company/body/individual other than the state and its instrumentalities e.g. a Director of a private company who is party to the arbitration agreement. In such cases, there may be a valid and reasonable apprehension of bias in view of his position and interest. In such cases, the court has the discretion not to appoint such a person.
    1. In what circumstances the Chief Justice or his designate can ignore the appointment procedure or the named arbitrator in the arbitration agreement to appoint an arbitrator of his choice.

    On this issue, the Court inter alia noted as under:

    • The court must first ensure that the terms of the agreement are adhered to or given effect to, as far as possible and those remedies, as provided for, are exhausted.
    • It is not mandatory to appoint the named arbitrator but at the same time, due regard has to be given to the qualifications required by the agreement and other considerations. Referring the disputes to the named arbitrator shall be the rule. Ignoring the named arbitrator and nominating an independent arbitrator shall be the exception to the rule, which is to be resorted to for valid reasons.

    Interestingly, the Court also proceeded to expound on the scope of Section 11 of the Act, which contains the scheme of appointment of arbitrators.

    1. Whether the Respondent had taken the necessary steps for the appointment of an arbitrator in terms of the agreement, and the Appellant had failed to act in terms of the agreed procedure, by not referring the dispute to its Director, Marketing for arbitration.

    On this issue, the Court inter alia noted as under:

    • In view of the order dated January 20, 2006, the Respondent ought to have referred the dispute to the Director (Marketing) of the Appellant within two months from January 2006. The Respondent had not done so and in light thereof, it was the Respondent that had failed to act in terms of the agreed procedure and not the Appellant.
    • As the Arbitrator was already identified, there was no need for the Respondent to ask the Appellant to act in accordance with the agreed procedure.

    The Court proceeded to hold that the Chief Justice had erred in having proceeded on the basis that the Respondent had performed its duty under the agreement and that there was justification for appointment of an independent arbitrator.

    The Court then proceeded to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and appointed the Director (Marketing) of the Appellant as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes between the parties.

    ANALYSIS:

    By this decision, the Court has once again upheld that when a person enter into a contract with a government/statutory corporation/public sector enterprise having an arbitration agreement providing for settlement of disputes where the arbitrator will be one of its senior officers, such person cannot subsequently turn around and contend otherwise unless performance of that part of the arbitration agreement is impossible, or is void being contrary to the provisions of the Act. However, this position may differ where the person named as the arbitrator is an employee of a company/body/individual other than the state and its instrumentalities e.g. a Director of a private company who is party to the arbitration agreement.

    Referring to its decision taken earlier in the matter of Northern Railway Administration, Ministry of Railway, New Delhi Vs. Patel Engineering Company Ltd. (please refer to our earlier hotline dated August 26, 2008) Court reiterated that it is important to first ensure that the terms of the arbitration agreement are adhered to or given effect to, as far as possible and those remedies, as provided for, are exhausted, before they intervene in any manner.

    However, If circumstances exist, giving rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the person nominated, or if other circumstances warrant appointment of an independent arbitrator by ignoring the procedure prescribed, the Chief Justice or his designate may, for reasons to be recorded ignore the designated arbitrator and appoint someone else.

    FOOTNOTES

    1 Civil Appeal No. 5760 of 2009 arising out of SLP (C) No. 26906 of 2008.

    2 “69. Any dispute or a difference of any nature whatsoever or regarding any right, liability, act, omission or account of any of the parties hereto arising out of or in relation to this Agreement shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director, Marketing of the Corporation or of some officer of the Corporation who may be nominated by the Director Marketing. The dealer will not be entitled to raise any objection to any such arbitrator on the ground that the arbitrator is an officer of the contract related or that in the course of his duties or differences. ………………..It shall also be a term of this contract that no other person other than the Director, Marketing or a person nominated by such Director, marketing of the Corporation as aforesaid shall act as arbitrator hereunder…………………….”

    Nishith Desai Associates 2022. All rights reserved.

Article By Sahil Kanuga and Vyapak Desai with Nishith Desai Associates.

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