Category: Global

Brexit: Limiting the Damage

It is one of the ironies of history that the EU as it is today, starting with the single market, was largely made in Britain, the achievement, above all, of former prime minister Margaret Thatcher and her right-hand man in Brussels, the then Commissioner (Lord) Arthur Cockfield. The single market has long been viewed by observers in countries with less of a free market tradition as a typically British liberal invention. And yet it is this market, as well as the EU itself, that another Conservative government is now seeking to leave.

Britain has also left its stamp on key EU initiatives from regional policy to development assistance and fisheries. The EU’s interest in a common foreign and security policy originally stemmed from Britain. The EU’s comparatively transparent and accountable administrative rules date from the reforms introduced by former British Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock when he was Vice-President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004. Thus, representatives of Britain’s two major parties have helped to make the EU what it is today.

If British prime ministers had explained to public opinion earlier the extent of their country’s influence on the EU, something that other Europeans never doubted, the referendum of 23 June 2016 might never have occurred.

A “Smooth and Sensible” Brexit

Be that as it may, Europeans on both sides of the English Channel are now grappling with the consequences of that vote. If reason and economic interest prevail, a “smooth and sensible” Brexit, as evoked by the British prime minister in Florence in September, might yet emerge.

This would involve a broad agreement, in 2017, on the principal aspects of the divorce settlement. This concerns mainly Britain’s financial commitments to the EU, the residence, professional and health rights of citizens living on both sides of the Channel after Brexit, and the need to maintain the Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland and to avoid a hard border across the island of Ireland after Brexit. While Brussels, London and Dublin have affirmed their intention of achieving these goals, there are many practical and political issues to resolve.

If sufficient confidence and trust between EU and UK negotiators is established, it should also be possible to agree to the general terms of a future political and economic agreement between London and Brussels by the end of the year and to broach the question of transitional arrangements to smooth the way for government and business. The British government wishes to ensure that business need adjust to Brexit only once, hence the need for a smooth transition to a well-defined future relationship.

If good progress is made next year, the separation agreement and transitional arrangements could be drawn up by October 2018, allowing enough time for approval by EU and British institutions ahead of Britain’s exit from the EU at midnight between 29 and 30 October 2019. Little, except Britain’s lost vote in EU institutions, would then change for the next two to three years, as the UK continued to make payments to the EU budget, respect judgements of the European Court of Justice and accept the free movement of labour.

The breathing space would be used to negotiate, sign and ratify a two-part long-term agreement. The first part would cover trade and economic issues; it could take effect provisionally relatively quickly after agreement had been reached. The second part, though, would be a wide-ranging political agreement, involving security and even aspects of defence. Both sides have an interest in cooperation on armaments production and unconventional forms of conflict, as well as police and judicial affairs. This would involve the member states’ legal responsibilities and require ratification by all twenty-eight countries concerned. It might not come into effect before the mid-late 2020s.

This relatively benign sequence of events assumes that the British government is unified behind its negotiator, David Davies, and that the political situation in Britain and the EU remains generally stable. It also assumes that the EU can move beyond its rigid two-stage sequencing of the negotiations.

However, there may well be political upsets, involving a leadership competition in the Conservative Party and, perhaps, an early general election. The opposition Labour Party may come to power bringing a change in priorities but also differences of opinion in its own ranks. The British economy will be damaged by Brexit, according to leading economists, and public opinion is likely to react when this is widely felt.[1]Until now, the main impact has been a decline in sterling and rising inflation, raising the prospect of higher interest rates.

The “Cliff Edge” Scenario

Such uncertainties, as well as the divergent political agendas of London and Brussels, may make the smooth and sensible Brexit impossible to achieve during the limited time available. This opens the way to a second scenario, widely described in Britain as the cliff edge. Under this hypothesis, the December 2017 goal for achieving a breakthrough in the separation talks is missed. This further postpones discussion of transitional arrangements and a future long-term agreement.

Negotiations continue fitfully during 2018 but the two sides are too far apart to reach agreement by October 2018, which the EU chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, has designated as the effective deadline. If October passes without an overall agreement, it will probably be too late to secure the agreement of the European Parliament before 29 March 2019, when the two-year negotiating period initiated by the British government’s notification of withdrawal expires. Nonetheless, negotiations might well go down to the wire.

Unless all twenty-eight countries “stop the clock” at midnight, an old Brussels ruse, the UK would then leave the EU without an agreement. Business leaders have warned of the chaos this will bring. There will be an unmanageable fivefold increase in work at British, Irish and mainland European ports checking consignments, the suspension of air travel between the UK and the EU, pending the conclusion of a new air transport agreement, and other major disruptions.

Health, safety, veterinary and phytosanitary inspections, as well as the assessment of customs duties, would lead to long queues of lorries at ports on both sides of the channel. Neither side can build the necessary infrastructure and linked IT systems or recruit sufficient qualified staff in time to cope with dramatically increased requirements after a hard Brexit. Supply chains would be disrupted and many foreign-owned companies, which had not already relocated to remaining EU countries, would seek to do so rapidly.

The political and economic damage of going over the cliff edge would last for years and embitter the UK’s relations with the EU and third countries. Many would question the value of Britain’s WTO commitments in the absence of appropriate trading arrangements between Britain and the EU.

This then is a sketch of the cliff edge. Those who admire Britain for its pragmatism, fairness and common sense find it hard to believe that such a scenario might become reality. Surely, they say, Britain and the EU are involved in preliminary skirmishing of the type that precedes any negotiation. They are sure to come to their senses as the decisive deadlines approach. Nothing is less than certain.

A Tale of “Downside” Risks

The outcome may well diverge from either the optimistic or the pessimistic scenarios delineated above. However, the risks are mainly “downside” as the economists put it. British negotiators have not yet grasped the fundamentally asymmetric nature of negotiations between twenty-seven countries backed by European institutions on the one side and a single country seeking to leave the club on the other. It would be better for government, business and the public, if this reality were more widely recognized, leading to realistic negotiating targets. Indeed, Brexit is not really a negotiation at all in the usual sense. It is rather an effort by the leaving country to secure some exceptions from the club’s rules at the time of its departure. This is much akin to the efforts of a candidate (joining) country to achieve some, temporary, transitional exceptions to the EU’s rules.

The Brexit talks are essentially an exercise in damage limitation, mainly through transitional arrangements. When the divorce and transitional arrangements have been agreed, Britain and the EU can concentrate on negotiating a long-term partnership which will be in their mutual interest.

This post was written by Michael Leigh of Covington & Burling LLP., © 2017
For more Global legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

US Attorney General Jefferson Sessions Issues New Guidance On Transgender Employees

Yesterday, U.S. Attorney General Jefferson Sessions issued new guidance reversing the federal government’s former position that gender identity is protected under Title VII.

In a memo sent to the heads of all federal agencies and the U.S. attorneys, the attorney general stated that as a matter of law, “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on gender identity per se.” The memorandum further stated the DOJ will take the position in all pending and future matters that Title VII does not protect against discrimination on the basis of gender identity or transgender status.

Sessions’ memo explains Title VII expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex but makes no reference to gender, and that courts have interpreted “sex” to mean biologically male or female. Sessions concluded employers may differentiate on the basis of sex in employment practices, so long as the practices do not expose members of one sex to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which the other sex is not exposed. The memo highlighted sex-specific bathrooms as such an example. Sessions explained while Title VII prohibits “sex-stereotypes,” insofar as that sort of sex-based consideration causes disparate treatment between men and women, Title VII is not properly construed to proscribe employment practices that take into account the sex of employees, but do not impose different burdens on similarly situated members of each sex.

This guidance reverses and withdraws previous guidance by Attorney General Eric Holder in a December 15, 2014 memorandum in which Holder stated Title VII prohibits employers from using “sex-based considerations,” such as gender identity, in employment decisions. Sessions’ memo also runs contrary to the current position of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which treats discrimination against an employee on the basis of gender identity, including transgender status and sexual orientation, as violations of Title VII.

Currently, there is a split of authority in the courts on whether sex discrimination under Title VII includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sex stereotyping, and thus prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals. The U.S. Supreme Court will likely have to resolve the issue in the future, but may issue some relevant guidance this term in the Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. case (involving issues of a school district’s obligations to a transgender student).

While it is now the position of the Department of Justice that Title VII protections do not extend to transgender individuals, employers should still be careful to avoid discrimination on the basis of gender identity, as the law is still unsettled. As Attorney General Sessions’ memorandum notes, there are still federal statutes that prohibit discrimination against transgender persons, and states and localities may have additional protections. Moreover, the EEOC could still bring suit against employers who engage in transgender discrimination.

This post was written by Allison L. Goico & Hayley Geiler of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved., © 2017
For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

President Trump Shifts the U.S. Policy Towards Cuba

As we have previously reported on the growing fear that the Trump Administration would roll back President Barack Obama’s plan to normalize relations with Cuba. Then-candidate Donald Trump was calling President Obama’s deals with Cuba “one-sided” and beneficial “only [to] the Castro regime.” Last week Friday, at an event at the Manuel Artime Theater in Miami, President Trump officially announced his Administration’s new public policy towards Cuba and fulfilled a campaign promise.

Cuban FlagPresident Trump’s speech culminated in the issuance of a National Security Presidential Memorandum and an accompanying White House Fact Sheet on the U.S. Policy toward Cuba.  In sum, President Trump’s directive:

(a)  Ends economic practices that “benefit the Cuban government” by prohibiting most economic activities with the Cuban military conglomerate, Grupo de Administración Empresarial (“GAESA”). This change is most likely to affect the hotel and tourism industry sectors, since these are the industries said to be largely controlled by GAESA. A list of companies that will be on the “blacklist” will be issued by the State Department at a later date.

(b)   Adheres “to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba,” by amending regulations related to educational travel (i.e., by ending individual people-to-people travel) and enforcing the strict record keeping requirements related to travel to Cuba.

(c)   Opposes any efforts in the United Nations or other international forums to lift the embargo on Cuba.

(d)   Supports the expansion of internet services and free press in Cuba by convening a task force that will work with non-governmental organizations and private sector entities to examine the challenges and opportunities in those areas.

(e)  Keeps in place the Obama Administration’s elimination of the “Wet Foot, Dry Foot” policy.

(f)  Ensures that engagement with Cuba in general is advancing the interests of the United States.

As explained in the new FAQs issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the policy changes will not go into effect until the Treasury Department and the U.S. Department of Commerce have finalized their new regulations. Importantly, the new Cuba policy changes will not have retro-active effect. Those travel arrangements and commercial engagements that were in place prior to the issuance of the upcoming regulations will not be affected.

Al Cardenas, who heads the Latin America practice group at Squire Patton Boggs and previously served as the former Chairman of American Conservative Union and former Chairman of the Florida GOP, explains:  “Despite the emotional setting and rightful remembrance of the struggles of the Cuban people found in President Trump’s speech, which was focused on a Cuban exile audience, President Trump’s executive action preserves many of the changes made during President Obama’s Administration (some of which were outlined in President Obama’s 2014 Speech). For example, the respective embassies in Washington and Havana will remain open, the U.S. licenses issued to airlines and cruise line companies have been kept, efforts to expand direct telecommunications and internet access will continue, and the additional categories for travel to Cuba for the most part remain in place. While one-step back is the prohibition on U.S. travelers from staying at government-owed facilities, this should be a boon to the family-owned B&B’s and other rentals on the island. It remains to be seen whether there will be a significant drop off in tourist travel to the island.”

Viewed as a whole, President Trump is tightening some areas where improved economic relations with the United States could have benefitted some auspices of the Cuban Government.

This post was written by Beatriz E. Jaramillo and  Stacy A. Swanson of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.

President Trump Announces Withdrawal from Paris Agreement on Climate Change

President Trump announced on Thursday his intention to initiate a formal withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement, a global agreement designed to address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. The President indicated that the United States would move forward with the pull-out and possibly attempt to re-negotiate the agreement in order to get “terms that are fair to the United States.”  President Trump frequently discussed pulling out of the Paris Agreement while on the campaign trail, citing concerns regarding its potential impact on the American economy, particularly the energy sector.

While the President’s intentions are clear, the path forward is less obvious. The U.S. cannot immediately exit the Paris Agreement and several nations, including Germany, France, and Italy, announced in a joint statement that “that the Paris Agreement cannot be renegotiated.”  In addition to announcing withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, President Trump also indicated that the U.S. would immediately halt the remaining $2 billion of the $3 billion in aid to developing countries pledged by President Obama as a part of the Green Climate Fund, which also is a component of the UNFCCC.

The Paris Agreement’s formal processes does not allow for a notice of withdrawal to be submitted until November 4, 2019, after which it will take one year for such notice to become effective. Assuming adherence to this process, the earliest the U.S. can formally withdraw from the Paris Agreement is November 5, 2020, one day after the next presidential election.  Because the Agreement’s only binding obligations are certain reporting requirements, the withdrawal is viewed by some as a symbolic gesture, since any federal GHG reduction measures resulting from the Paris Agreement would still need to be pursued through domestic legislation or regulatory action.  As a practical matter, irrespective of the Paris Agreement the administration can—and likely will—take steps to alter federal climate change policy.

Paris Agreement Background

The Paris Agreement builds on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty signed by President George H. W. Bush and ratified by the United States Senate in 1992. The Paris Agreement was adopted in December 2015 as part of the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC.  Following its initial adoption, President Obama ratified the Paris Agreement as an “executive agreement” on September 3, 2016.  The Paris Agreement was ultimately signed by 195 parties, ratified by 146 nations and the European Union, and entered into force on November 4, 2016.

The Paris Agreement directs signatory nations to develop voluntary GHG reduction measures, known as “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions,” which convert to “Nationally Determined Contributions” (NDCs) after a nation ratifies the Paris Agreement.  The Paris Agreement further provides for periodic updates to NDCs in order to continually “enhance” emission reductions targets.  The Paris Agreement’s only binding provisions are reporting obligations largely governed by the UNFCCC and “global stocktakes” that occur every five years.  These reporting measures were designed to help track total carbon emissions and progress towards meeting each NDC.  However, actual attainment of an NDC is voluntary and the Paris Agreement has no legally binding enforcement mechanism. The Paris Agreement also directs wealthier nations to help developing nations reduce GHG emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change, but again these actions would be taken on a voluntary basis.

What happens next?

The UNFCCC made a formal statement in response to President Trump’s announcement that it “regrets” the decision of the United States to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, and that it remains open to discussion of the rules and modalities currently being negotiated for implementation of the Paris Agreement.  At the same time, the UNFCCC stated that the Paris Agreement has been “signed by 195 Parties and ratified by 146 countries plus the European Union [and] cannot be renegotiated based on the request of a single Party.”  Based on this statement and similar statements from France, Germany, Italy, and other nations, it appears that any near-term renegotiation of the Paris Agreement is unlikely.

Regardless of whether the United States is a party to the Paris Agreement, multinational corporations will still be subject to GHG reduction programs in other nations as those nations attempt to fulfill their NDCs. In addition, France and other nations have indicated the possibility of imposing a carbon tax on American imports from certain industries if the United States does formally withdraw from the Paris Agreement.

Under the Paris Agreement, the United States established its NDC as a goal of reducing GHG emissions 26-28 percent below 2005 levels, by 2025, and to make “best efforts” to reduce emissions by 28 percent. It is important to note that the U.S. is in the first sustained period where greenhouse gas emissions have decreased while economic growth has increased, largely the result of increased reliance on natural gas, improved vehicle fuel economy, state and regional GHG programs, and growth in renewable energy.  These factors are likely to persist even if the U.S. leaves the Paris Agreement.  And even in the absence of U.S. commitments under the Paris Agreement or additional federal action, U.S. GHG emissions are expected to decline by about 15-18 percent below 2005 levels by 2025.

The federal Clean Power Plan was one measure that was expected to further reduce U.S. GHG emissions. However, that program is subject to ongoing legal challenges and has been stayed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  There also are various lawsuits underway seeking to compel the federal government to take action on climate change. See e.g., Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Nov. 10, 2016).   Apart from litigation, the Trump Administration has indicated a willingness to modify the Clean Power Plan (should it be upheld) and reconsider other federal regulations and programs directed at GHG emissions and climate change, such as motor vehicle emissions standards.  These processes will take time to play out and, in combination with ongoing state-level programs, will ultimately determine the course of climate change policy in the United States for the remainder of the Trump Administration.

This post was written by Brook J. Detterman, Leah A. Dundon and Kristin H. Gladd of Beveridge & Diamond PC.

State Department Makes Predictions about EB Cut-Off Date Movement

Notably, the State Department stated with certainty that the EB-2 Rest of the World category likely will retrogress in the coming months.

At a recent American Immigration Lawyers Association meeting, the US Department of State made comments about Employment-Based (EB) cut-off date movement in the final third of the fiscal year. This Immigration Alert summarizes the comments made by the State Department and what they could mean for EB cut-off date movement in the upcoming months.

EB-1: China and India

US Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that the “final action date” of January 1, 2012 will control for the China and India EB-1 categories. These have apparently exhausted close to 50% of the entire EB-1 limit for the 2017 fiscal year. This cut-off date is expected to be maintained until the end of September, when the fiscal year ends. The final action cut-off date for the China and India EB-1 categories may once again become current at the start of the new fiscal year on October 1, 2017, but there is no guarantee that this will happen.

EB-1: Rest of the World

The EB-1 Rest of the World category (i.e., countries other than China, India, Mexico, the Philippines, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) should remain current for the foreseeable future.

EB-2: India

A slight advancement in the EB-2 India category will occur in June, but it is unlikely that this category will once again reach the most advanced final action cut-off date that was reached last year. The State Department stated that it may maintain the existing final action date through the end of September, but there is no guarantee that this will occur.

EB-2: China

EB-2 China will advance by less than one month to March 1, 2013 in June. The State Department noted that the EB-2 China category should continue to advance slowly and will probably exhaust its per-country limit before the end of the year.

EB-3: China

EB-3 China’s final action date of October 1, 2014 will continue to apply in June. As a result of a significant EB-3 downgrade volume, retrogression in this category is possible in the final months of the fiscal year.

EB-2: Worldwide

The State Department noted that the EB-2 category has experienced significant usage, and stated with certainty that a final action cut-off date will be imposed for the EB-2 Rest of the World category in August—or even as early as July. This cut-off date, once imposed, should remain unchanged through the end of September, with a small advancement possible in September and a return to currency in October.

EB-3: Rest of the World

The EB-3 Rest of the World category will move forward by one month in June to April 15, 2017. The State Department expects further forward movement in this category for the rest of the fiscal year.

EB-3: India

The State Department noted that the EB-3 India category will advance in June from March 25, 2005 to May 15, 2005. Continued forward movement is expected in July and August. The State Department predicts that the July cut-off date for the EB-3 India category will advance to October 15, 2005.

How This Affects You

It is highly likely that the cut-off date movement predicted by the State Department will occur. Persons seeking permanent residence through the EB process should take note of this predicted movement and plan accordingly. In particular, persons in the EB-2 Rest of the World category may wish to consider filing adjustment of status applications before the anticipated retrogression in this category occurs in July or August. Once this retrogression occurs, only persons with priority dates before the new cut-off date will be able to file such applications.

This post was written by A. James Vázquez-Azpiri of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.

Trump Administration Notifies Congress of Intent to Renegotiate NAFTA

The White House formally notified Congress on Thursday of the Trump administration’s intent to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The notification letter from U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer marked the start of a 90-day window to consult with members of Congress on developing negotiation priorities before beginning formal negotiations with Canada and Mexico as early as August 16, 2017.NAFTA, USA, Mexico, Canada

Currently, there is no indication that renegotiations will impact NAFTA-related immigration programs. However, under the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, the administration’s negotiation objectives are required to be made public 30 days before formal negotiations begin. While the letter to Congressional leadership did not discuss any specific changes to NAFTA, the administration indicated that it would aim to modernize outdated chapters of the agreement and address challenges faced by U.S. consumers, businesses, and workers.

NAFTA Immigration Programs

Among other economic and trade relationships established under NAFTA, the agreement created the TN nonimmigrant classification, which allows certain citizens of Canada and Mexico to work temporarily in the United States in a professional capacity. The agreement also provides an expanded range of permissible business activities for Canadian and Mexican citizens in B-1 visitor status and permits Canadian citizens to submit L-1 intracompany transferee petitions directly at U.S. ports of entry and pre-flight inspection stations for adjudication by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Whether the Trump administration intends to alter existing immigration programs under NAFTA is not yet known.

This post was written by Kara Kelly of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

“WannaCry” Ransomware Attack Causes Disruption Globally – With Worst Yet to Come

A ransomware known as “WannaCry” affected 200,000 people in 150 countries over the weekend, locking computer files and demanding payment to release them. As of this morning, Australia and New Zealand users seem to have avoided the brunt of the attack, with the Federal Government only confirming three reports of Australian companies being affected.  Not that ransomware attacks tend to be the subject of reporting – there is quite a high rate of payment of affected users as the pricing is deliberately cheaper than most alternatives unless your back-up process is very good.

The ransomware utilises vulnerabilities in out-of-date, unpatched versions of Microsoft Windows to infect devices. It spreads from computer for computer as it finds exposed targets, without the user having to open an e-mail attachment or click a link as is commonplace in most attacks. Ransom demands start at US$300 and doubles after three days.

The U.K. National Health Service (NHS) was among the worst hit organisations, forcing hospitals to cancel appointments and delay operations as they could not access their patients’ medical records. The Telegraph suggested that 90 percent of NHS trusts were using a 16 year old version of Windows XP which was particularly vulnerable to the attack. More attacks are anticipated throughout the working week as companies and organisations turn on their devices.

The U.K. National Cyber Security Center has released guidance to help both home users and organisations limit the impact of the attacks. It can be read here.

Edwin Tan is co-author of this article. 

European Union Adopts Brexit Negotiation Guidelines

Brexit Bull HornOn April 29, a Special European Council, meeting as 27 member states (as opposed to the full 28 member states, as would usually be present), adopted the Article 50 guidelines (Guidelines) to formally define the EU’s position in Brexit negotiations with the United Kingdom. This follows the resolution of the European Parliament on key principles and conditions for the negotiations, adopted on April 5 (for further information, see the April 7 issue of Corporate & Financial Weekly Digest).

The Guidelines are set out under six headings covering:

  • core principles;
  • a phased approach to the negotiations;
  • agreement on arrangements for an orderly withdrawal;
  • preliminary and preparatory discussions on a framework for the EU-UK future relationship;
  • the principle of sincere cooperation; and
  • the procedural arrangements for negotiations under Article 50.

On May 22, the EU General Affairs Council is expected to authorize the opening of the negotiations, nominate the European Commission as the EU negotiator and adopt negotiating directives.

The Guidelines are available here.

President Trump Will Welcome Palestinian President to White House, Meet with Australian Prime Minister in New York City

White HouseCongress Will Hold Hearings on Human Trafficking, Remittances and International Development, While Also Focusing on a Longer-Term Funding Measure for the Remainder of Fiscal Year 2017

President Donald Trump welcomed Argentine President Mauricio Macri to the White House last Thursday. In a joint statement, the two leaders committed to expanding bilateral trade and investments; strengthening cooperation to counter narco-trafficking, terrorist financing, money laundering, corruption and other illicit finance activities; and increasing cooperation on cyber policy. President Trump will welcome Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to the White House on Wednesday. The President will travel to New York City on Thursday for an event and will also meet with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.

President Trump signed multiple executive documents last week, including a Memorandum on aluminum and national security interests, as well as Executive Orders (E.O.) on veterans affairs, energy, agriculture, land management, and education. President Trump marked his 100th day in office with a Make America Great Again rally in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, after signing two more E.O.s related to trade on Saturday.

On Friday, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis honored two U.S. Army Rangers who died Thursday in Afghanistan. He said: “They carried out their operation against [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan] in Afghanistan before making the ultimate sacrifice to defend our nation and our freedoms.”

Congress passed a short-term measure on Friday to fund the Federal Government for another week, allowing both chambers additional time to negotiate a longer-term measure that will fund the Government through the end of Fiscal Year 2017.  The Senate also approved the nomination of Sonny Perdue to serve as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture last Monday. Congress is in session this week.

North Korea – U.S. Continues Pressure on the International Community

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chaired the U.N. Security Council on Friday, where he focused on North Korea’s illegal nuclear program and its continued provocative activities. He sought to get the Council to act and leverage additional pressure on North Korea, saying:

“For too long, the international community has been reactive in addressing North Korea. Those days must come to an end.”

He outlined steps that the international community could undertake to leverage North Korea into abandoning its nuclear program. The White House released a brief statement on Friday afternoon acknowledging President Trump was briefed on North Korea’s failed missile test that day.

On Wednesday, after a briefing to the Senators at the White House, Secretary Tillerson, Defense Secretary Mattis, and Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats issued a joint statement on North Korea’s unlawful weapons programs and nuclear and ballistic missile tests, saying each provocation jeopardizes stability in Northeast Asia and poses a growing threat to U.S. allies and the U.S. homeland. The officials noted: “We are engaging responsible members of the international community to increase pressure on the D.P.R.K. in order to convince the regime to de-escalate and return to the path of dialogue. We will maintain our close coordination and cooperation with our Allies, especially the Republic of Korea and Japan, as we work together to preserve stability and prosperity in the region. The United States seeks stability and the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. We remain open to negotiations towards that goal. However, we remain prepared to defend ourselves and our Allies.”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford also participated in the Senate briefing.  In a summary, the Defense Department recapped North Korea as an urgent national security threat and a top foreign policy priority for the U.S. Government.

On 27 April, the head of U.S. Pacific Command recommended that the U.S. military develop capabilities that can directly defend against North Korean artillery. Testifying at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last week, Adm. Harry Harris shared that the U.S. currently cannot counter an artillery barrage from North Korea. He explained the missile defense system that the United States is deploying to South Korea, is only designed to intercept ballistic missiles. North Korea currently possesses roughly 4,000 artillery pieces positioned near the demilitarized zone. Committee Chairman John McCain (R-Arizona) noted that these pieces had the potential to target the South Korean capital, Seoul, and its metropolitan area of 26 million people.

South Korea – McMaster Affirms Missile Defense

On 30 April, National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster confirmed that the United States would adhere to its agreement with South Korea for a new missile defense system, but indicated that payment for the system might be renegotiated. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, also known as THAAD, is being rolled out in response to military provocations from North Korea.

In an interview with “Fox News Sunday,” McMaster shared that he told his South Korean counterpart that “until any renegotiation, that the deal’s in place,” but explained that, “what the president’s asked us to do is to look across all of our alliances and to have appropriate burden-sharing, responsibility-sharing.” President Donald Trump said in a recent interview that he “informed South Korea it would be appropriate if they paid” for the missile defense system.

Syria, Iraq – Combating ISIS

The Pentagon gave an update last Friday on the U.S. and Coalition military forces’ efforts to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Coalition forces conducted 24 strikes consisting of 30 engagements against ISIS targets in Syria. In Iraq, Coalition forces conducted eight strikes consisting of 24 engagements against ISIS targets, coordinated with and in support of the Iraqi government. The destruction of ISIS targets in both countries also further limits the group’s ability to project terror and conduct external operations throughout the region and the rest of the world, according to task force officials.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said on Thursday at a U.N. Security Council session she chaired on the humanitarian crisis in Syria:

“All eyes and all pressure now need to go to Russia because they are the ones that could stop this if they wanted to…the images don’t lie. The humanitarian workers don’t lie. The fact that they can’t get the assistance they need – that’s not lying. What is, is to continue to give Russia a pass for allowing this terrible situation to occur. I will continue to press the Security Council to act, to do something, regardless of if the Russians continue to veto it, because it is our voice that needs to be heard.”

The Department of State designated Mubarak Mohammed A Alotaibi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order E.O. 13224 on 27 April.  Alotaibi is the Syria-based deputy leader of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) affiliate in Saudi Arabia, which was designated by the U.S. Department of State as a SDGT under E.O. 13224 on 19 May 2016.

On 24 April, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced new sanctions targeting 271 Syrian individuals in response to the 4 April sarin gas attack in Syria. According to an accompanying press release, the action – one of the largest OFAC has ever taken – targets employees of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). They have been added to OFAC’s list of Specially Designated Nationals (also known as the SDN List) pursuant to Executive Order 13582, “Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Syria.” The full list of newly-designated individuals can be found here.

Afghanistan – Review of U.S. Policy

Defense Secretary Mattis added another stop to his Middle East trip last week that focused on a theme of combatting ISIS. The Secretary was in Kabul, Afghanistan, last Monday. At a press conference Secretary Mattis said of the 21 April Taliban attack on an Afghan military base and mosque that killed more than 100 people: “As if we needed a reminder of the type of enemy we’re up against, the killing of Afghan citizens and soldiers — protectors of the people — just as they were coming out of a mosque, a house of worship, it certainly characterizes this fight for exactly what it is. These people have no religious foundation. They are not devout anything, and it shows why we stand with the people of this country against such heinous acts perpetrated by this barbaric enemy and what they do.”

Regarding President Trump’s directive to review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, Secretary Mattis said: “This dictates an ongoing dialogue with Afghanistan’s leadership, and that’s why I came here: to get with President Ghani and his ministers and hear directly and at length from … General Nicholson to provide my best assessment and advice as we go forward.”

NAFTA – U.S. Withdrawal Averted

President Trump considered signing an order last week that would have withdrawn the United States from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). After news of the possible action emerged, the leaders of Mexico and Canada, interested stakeholders, and Members of Congress rallied to call the White House and urge against such action. President Trump said in an interview on Thursday: “I was all set to terminate [NAFTA]. I looked forward to terminating. I was going to do it.” Later in the interview, the President added he reserves the right to change his mind – “I can always terminate.”

Nominations – Update

The Senate has yet to schedule a final vote on Amb. Robert Lighthizer’s nomination to serve as U.S. Trade Representative.  A vote is expected to happen in the next couple of weeks.

Last week, President Trump announced his intent to nominate the following individuals: (1) Kari A. Bingen to serve as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.  Ms. Bingen currently serves as the policy director for the House Armed Services Committee. (2) Robert Story Karem to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.  Mr. Karem most recently served on the Presidential Transition Team as an advisor to Central Intelligence Agency Director, Mike Pompeo, during his confirmation process.  He previously served in the White House as a Middle East policy advisor to former Vice President Richard B. Cheney.

Congressional Hearings This Week

  • On Tuesday, 2 May, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Global Human Rights is scheduled to hold a hearing titled “Wining the Fight Against Human Trafficking: The Frederick Douglass Reauthorization Act.”

  • On Tuesday, 2 May, the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled “Examining the U.S. – E.U. Covered Agreements.”

  • On Tuesday, 2 May, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled a hearing to consider the nomination of the Honorable Terry Brandstad, to serve as U.S. Ambassador to China.

  • On Wednesday, 3 May, the House Foreign Affairs Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing to consider the following bills:

    • R. 1625 – To amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to include severe forms of trafficking in persons within the definition of transnational organized crime for purposes of the rewards program of the Department of State, and for other purposes.

    • R. 1677 – To halt the wholesale slaughter of the Syrian people, encourage a negotiated political settlement, and hold Syrian human rights abusers accountable for their crimes.

    • R. 2200 – To reauthorize the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, and for other purposes.

  • On Wednesday, 3 May, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Economic, Energy, and Environmental Policy is scheduled to hold a hearing titled “Global Philanthropy and Remittances and International Development.”

  • On Thursday, 4 May, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is scheduled to hold a hearing titled “International Development: Value Added Through Private Sector Engagement.”

Looking Ahead

Washington is expected to focus on the following upcoming events:

  • 3 May: President Trump will welcome Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas

  • 4 May: President Trump travels to New York City, where he will hold a bilateral meeting with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull

  • May: Formal notification to Congress of intent to renegotiate NAFTA expected

  • 25 May: President Trump to attend the NATO Leaders Meeting in Belgium

  • 26-28 May: President Trump to attend the G-7 Leaders’ Summit in Taormina, Sicily

  • 18-20 June: SelectUSA Investment Summit in National Harbor, Maryland

ARTICLE BY Stacy A. Swanson and Pooja Virkar of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

© Copyright 2017 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Right to Disconnect: New Right for French Employees?

right to disconnect FranceA new law, called El Khomri law, passed on August 8th, 2016 in France providing a right to disconnect for employees.

Such right is entered into force on January 1st, 2017

According to the law, it belongs to the employers and the unions to negotiate this new right to determine its modalities of application and of control. Such negotiation should take place in companies having at least 50 employees and should provide for the implementation of mechanisms of regulation regarding the use of the new technologies in order to ensure the compliance with rest times and holidays and the familial and personal life of the employees.

Should no agreement be reached with the unions defining the methods of implementation of the right to disconnect, the employer shall unilaterally elaborate, after having consulted the work’s council committee, a policy which shall need to provide for the training actions and sensitization to the use of digital tools.

However, the idea to enable an employee to disconnect completely outside of his working hours is not new in France.  In 2004, the French Supreme Court had already judged that an employee could not be dismissed for serious misconduct due to the fact that he had not responded to professional solicitations during his lunch break (Cass. Soc. February 17, 2004 n°01-45889).

Furthermore, several collective bargaining agreements applicable in different sectors of industry had already provided for a right to disconnect (e.g. Syntec).

If the title of this right seems simple, its exact nature questions.

Indeed, no legal definition of what is exactly the right to disconnect is given.

The right is generally described as a right for the employee to not be connected to a digital professional tool (email, smartphone…) during off-duty and vacation time.  However, it is not easy to impose the right to disconnect in a professional environment in which the “BYOD” concept has experienced a takeoff without precedent and which therefore has the consequence of dimming a little more the barrier between professional and private life.

However, by sending back to the collective negotiation, the El Khomri law leaves it to unions and employers to guarantee the efficiency of such a right in a manner that matches with the way the company operates.  This relative flexibility obliges them however to be imaginative and to find devices adapted to the nature of the functions occupied by the employees to the variety of the means of communication used, considering evidently the needs of each company.

As such, the right to disconnect is not uniform and can materialize itself in several ways:

  • by a reinforced information of the employees on the use of digital tools (e.g. avoiding to reply to all recipients or to send emails during the week-end or holidays),

  • by the implementation of training actions or sensitization to new technologies (e.g. reminding the employees that they should not send emails after 9.00 pm or the absence of obligation of the recipient to answer emails outside of regular hours),

  • more radically, by automatically redirecting the emails of the employees who are out of the office to an appropriate available employee or the interruption of the professional mailbox during evenings and weekends, or even during holidays.

The new law does not provide for any sanction in case of noncompliance, however, companies should take into consideration that employers failing to implement it will likely be sanctioned by judges on the basis of the necessity to preserve the health and safety of the employees at the workplace as well as the necessity to comply with working time regulations.

ARTICLE BY Cécile Martin of Proskauer Rose LLP

© 2017 Proskauer Rose LLP.