Financial Services Law Archives - Page 40 of 41

Residential Foreclosures: Lenders Become Landlords

Featured Guest blogger at the National Law Review, W. Alexander Burnett of Williams Mullen provides great insight on the evolving role of certain lenders becoming landlords after foreclosures:

Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Public Law 111-22

Introduction

On May 20, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (the “PTFA” or the “Act”). The PTFA was part of the larger “Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009.” The Act provides new protections to bona fide tenants in any federally-related mortgage loans or any residential real property. Before enactment of PTFA, a new owner of a foreclosed property could take immediate action to evict an existing tenant. The PTFA requires the foreclosing party to allow the tenant to remain in the premises through the end of the lease term, and it requires the foreclosing party to provide a bona fide tenant with at least 90 days notice to vacate. As a result, lenders and other parties who foreclose on residential rental property occupied by a tenant have no choice but to play the role of landlord until the expiration of the tenant’s lease. This article explains who is affected by the Act, the requirements under the Act, and the respective rights, remedies and obligations for both foreclosing parties and tenants who occupy the foreclosed properties.

The Basics

Who Is Affected by the PTFA?

The PTFA applies to any residential real property or any “federally-related mortgage loan” acquired through foreclosure. The only properties not covered by the Act are non-residential properties that were not foreclosed in connection with a federally-related mortgage loan. Note that one court in New York has held that the PTFA can only be enforced where “federally-related mortgage loans” are involved and that the enforcement of the PTFA in all residential loan situations “would extend federal control to arguably every area of human endeavor and vitiate the constitutional framers’ requirement that ‘federalism’ involves a limited universe of power and that the states retained all but expressly ceded powers.” Collado v. Boklari, 892 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2009). It is important to note, however, that this case has been distinguished by at least one other court, and that other courts have held that the PTFA applies in connection with non-federally-related mortgage loans.

The PTFA protects the rights of a “bona fide tenant,” which is defined by the Act as a person in possession of the property with or without a lease, provided that:

i. the tenant is not the mortgagor or the child, spouse, or parent of the mortgagor;

ii. the lease or tenancy was the result of an arms-length transaction; and

iii. the lease or tenancy requires the receipt of rent that is not substantially less than fair market rent for the property, or the rent is reduced or subsidized due to a federal, state, or local subsidy.

All three elements must be satisfied for a tenant to be a bona fide tenant.

The new restrictions in the PTFA are binding on any “immediate successor in interest” in the property. While the Act does not define “immediate successor in interest,” the term generally means the first party to take title to the property following the foreclosure. Note that the PTFA does not specifically address the situation involving a deed in lieu of foreclosure.

What Are the Effective Dates of the Act?

The PTFA became effective immediately upon enactment on May 20, 2009 and applies to all foreclosures that occur after enactment; pending foreclosures included. The provisions of the Act expire on December 31, 2012.

What Requirements Are Imposed on an Immediate Successor in Interest?

First, a successor must allow any existing tenants to remain in the premises until the end of the lease term. If, however, the property is sold to a purchaser who will occupy the property as a primary residence, then the new owner can give 90 days notice of the early termination of the lease. Second, if the lease has expired, is month-to-month or is terminable at will, the successor must give the tenant at least 90 days notice before requiring the tenant to vacate the property. The PTFA, therefore, places drastic new burdens on lenders and other foreclosing parties, especially when there is a significant amount of time remaining under a residential lease, because the lender must serve as a landlord throughout the duration of that lease.

The notice to vacate must be given to the tenant by the successor. Therefore, the successor can’t give notice prior to acquiring title to the property at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, the notice of foreclosure sale cannot also serve as the 90-day notice to vacate. It is good practice to send the notice to vacate and any other notices to the tenant by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, and to keep the receipts in case they are needed to prove to a court that proper notice was given.

Unfortunately, the PTFA does not give any details or set forth the rights or remedies of the successor during the time that the tenant is allowed to remain in the property. The Act merely states that successor assumes an interest in the property “subject to the rights of any bona fide tenant.” That likely means that the successor steps into the shoes of the former landlord and assumes both the rights and responsibilities of the landlord under the lease. This, of course, raises many questions which the Act does not answer.

Reading Between the Lines: The Details Behind the PTFA

What Responsibilities Do Tenants Owe to their New Landlords?

Presumably, a tenant must abide by all of the provisions in the lease. If the tenant defaults under the lease, the Act does not preempt a landlord from evicting the tenant without giving the 90 day notice under the Act. If a tenant has stopped paying rent, for example, the new landlord should follow applicable provisions under the lease and in the Landlord Tenant Act (Va. Code § 55-217, et seq.) or the Virginia Residential Landlord Tenant Act (Va. Code § 55-248.2, et seq.) to give proper notice of the default to the tenant and then to file an Unlawful Detainer suit to evict the tenant.

The Successor Has the Burden of Proving that an Occupant Is Not a Bona Fide Tenant.

In Bank of America v. Owens, the successor issued a 90 day notice to vacate immediately after foreclosure. 2010 NY Slip Op 20164, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 954 (N.Y. City Ct. May 5, 2010). Along with the notice to vacate, the successor also issued a questionnaire to determine if the occupant was a bona fide tenant. The questionnaire stated that, if it was not returned to the successor within five days, the successor would commence eviction proceedings. When the questionnaire was not returned, the successor filed an eviction suit immediately and well before the expiration of the 90 day period. The court held that the new burden imposed by the questionnaire was impermissible and was not authorized by the PTFA. The court also held that the burden is on the successor to show that an occupant is not a bona fide tenant.

Can Tenants File Suit Against Successors For Violating the PTFA?

No. The PTFA does not create a private right of action. In Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., the Bank foreclosed on property and evicted the tenants one month later without giving 90 days notice. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51697 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2010). The tenants’ personal property was placed on the street where it was damaged or stolen. The tenants filed suit against the Bank seeking money damages for, among other causes of action, violations of the PTFA. The court held that the PTFA does not create a private cause of action and dismissed the PTFA count. See also, Fannie Mae v. Lemere, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67005 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2010) (“[F]ederal courts have held that the [PTFA] does not create a federal private right of action, but indeed provides directives to state courts.”) It is important to note, however, that these tenants may have had other valid causes of action against the bank, such as conversion or unlawful ouster. In addition, it is clear from the Bank of America v. Owens case that a tenant may use a violation of the PTFA as a defense in an eviction proceeding, even though it cannot be used as the basis for an affirmative claim for damages against a successor.

Is the New Landlord Responsible for the old Security Deposit?

This question is simply not answered by the Act, and there are no cases from the Virginia state or federal courts that interpret the Act. Generally speaking, however, under Virginia law a foreclosure wipes out the lease, which suggests that the new landlord is not responsible for the security deposit. In addition, the old landlord holds the security deposit in trust for the tenant. If the old landlord fails to transfer the security deposit to the new landlord, pursuant to Va. Code § 55-507, then the tenant would have a direct claim against the old landlord. The new landlord may not have any recourse against the old landlord. Furthermore, under the PTFA the new landlord steps into the shoes of the old landlord only with respect to the real property itself and not with respect to incidentals such as the security deposit. Nevertheless, it is possible that a court making a generous interpretation of the PTFA could find that the new landlord stepped into the same shoes of the old landlord and, therefore, is responsible for the old security deposit.

Can a Successor Terminate a Lease Early Using “Cash for Keys”?

Yes. “Cash for keys” is a program offered by many mortgage lenders where the tenant agrees to turn over the property in good condition and/or before the expiration of the tenant’s lease in exchange for a cash payment from the lender. It is no different than an agreement between a landlord and tenant to modify or terminate a lease early. There is no magic to it, and there is nothing in the PTFA that prevents a successor and a tenant from reaching such an agreement. It is important, however, to ensure that the transaction is arms-length, that it is agreed to voluntarily by both the successor and the tenant, and that the parties put the agreement in writing and sign it.

7th Securities Litigation and Enforcement Summit April 26-27 New York, NY

The National Law Review is proud to be a media partner for the upcoming IQPC’s 7th Securities Litigation and Enforcement Summit – April 26-27 in New York, NY. This two day event will feature panel discussions, case studies, contemporary insights and practical advice vital to the successful management of securities litigation.

The second half of 2010 the securities industry witnessed a rise in class action suits mainly due to an increase of undisclosed product and operational defects, breaches of fiduciary duties and accounting improprieties. Securities litigation and associated risk is thus once again front and center in the legal landscape.

ATTEND AND LEARN ABOUT:

SEC, DOJ and State Attorneys General enforcement initiatives and actions
New enforcement initiatives under the Frank Dodd Act – what will be the impact for securities litigation cases?
Developing effective strategies to respond to and resolve government enforcement actions
Aligning litigation strategy with macro economic considerations
International trends impacting US based securities litigation
Recent trends in Insider Trading and Fraud investigations

Register By Friday March 25th and Save:

Please click here for more information and to register:

Foreclosure or Deed in Lieu: What’s Right for You?

This week’s featured bloggers at the National Law Review are from Williams Mullen. Jamie Watkins Bruno details two options available in Virgina for defaulted loans secured by deeds:

In Virginia, a lender holding a defaulted loan secured by a deed of trust has two primary means to enforce its remedies under that deed of trust: foreclosure by a trustee’s sale and conveyance by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. We’ve put together a brief primer summarizing the key strengths, weaknesses and procedural guidelines for each alternative to help you determine which option works best for your needs, timeline and budgetary constraints.

I. Trustee’s Sale.

The most common procedure for foreclosure is the sale of the property by a trustee, a non-judicial action. A trustee can act only in a manner authorized by the express or implied terms of the trust instrument or as authorized by statute. If the deed of trust does not provide otherwise, the provisions of the Virginia Code control as to the authority of the trustee. Foreclosure by a trustee’s sale can usually be completed within thirty (30) to forty-five (45) days after the expiration of any cure period provided by the loan documents for the default giving rise to the foreclosure, if the lender acts promptly.

A. The Trustee.

1. Duties and Obligations. A trustee is a fiduciary for both the debtor and the creditor. The trustee must not place himself in a position where the trustee’s personal interests conflict with the interests of the parties to whom he owes a fiduciary duty. A trustee who is counsel to or an employee of the noteholder must be sensitive to the obligation to discharge his fiduciary duties in an impartial manner. The mere fact that a trustee in a deed of trust securing a debt due to a corporation is a stockholder, member, employee, officer or director of, or counsel to, the corporation, however, does not disqualify him from exercising the powers conferred by the trust instrument. Trustees cannot act as purchasers, directly or indirectly, at their own sales; when a trustee buys directly or indirectly at his own sale, that constitutes constructive fraud, and the transaction is voidable. This rule also applies to a trustee who is named in a deed of trust but does not act.

2. Substitution of Trustee. If the person who is to conduct the foreclosure is not named in the deed of trust as trustee, a substitution of trustee is needed. When an instrument appointing a substitute trustee has been executed by the holders of more than fifty percent (50%) of the secured obligations, the substitute trustee can immediately execute all powers granted to the prior trustee.

B. Initial Procedures.

1. Documentation. A trustee should secure the proper documentation from the noteholder, which includes the deed of trust, the original note, title evidence (including title policies and surveys), copies of any correspondence between the noteholder and the debtor, copies of mortgage insurance or guaranty agreements, appraisal, written direction to proceed with the foreclosure and engagement letter. The trustee should verify that the noteholder has complied with all notice requirements set forth in the deed of trust.

2. Diligence. A trustee should contact the local commissioner of accounts regarding fees charged for approving and examining accounts as well as any local requirements, including proper advertisement procedures. Though the trustee is only charged with selling the property encumbered by the deed of trust, the noteholder should consider any relevant diligence issues affecting the property prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings, including environmental matters, permits, insurance, utilities, leases, appraisal, physical condition and rights in fixtures. In addition, though there is no statutory right of redemption in Virginia, the debtor does have the right to pay off the secured indebtedness before the sale; some deeds of trust provide for reinstatement of the debt if the debtor cures all defaults and pays all expenses in the manner and time provided in such deeds of trust.

3. Title. While the doctrine of caveat emptor applies in a foreclosure sale, a trustee must be aware of all liens and encumbrances affecting the property. A trustee cannot sell a greater interest in the property than the deed of trust gives him authority to sell, and any sale by the trustee will be subject to encumbrances having precedence over the deed of trust. A trustee must be aware of all encumbrances on the property, including federal tax liens, in order to properly notify all interested parties, to exercise proper discretion as to whether a fair sale can be had, and to make a lawful distribution of the proceeds of the sale. A trustee should order a title rundown of the property from the date of the original title policy, which can be obtained for approximately $100-$250.

C. Notice.

The trustee has no authority to exercise the power of sale or to obtain possession of the property until such time as the debtor defaults under the terms of the note and the trust instrument. The trustee must satisfy himself that the note and the deed of trust are actually in default before initiating foreclosure proceedings, including providing any pre-acceleration notice required by either document.

1. Requirements; Timing. The present owner of the property must be given written notice of sale at his last known address as such address and owner’s name appear in the records of the secured party, which must be personally delivered or sent by registered or certified mail at least fourteen (14) days before the date of the foreclosure sale. It is a good idea to send a separate notice to each owner by regular mail. Each such must provide the date, time, and place of sale and is sufficient if it contains the same information set forth in the public advertisement of the sale. ‘Inadvertent’ failure to give notice imposes no liability on either the trustee or the secured party, and failure to comply with the notice requirements will not affect the validity of the sale. A purchaser for value will have no duty to ascertain whether proper notice was given. Actual receipt by the owner of the foreclosure notice is not required, and a defective statutory notice does not affect the validity of a foreclosure sale.

2. Other Parties. Notice should also be given to any guarantors of the indebtedness, subordinate lienholders, private mortgage insurers, the United States (if a federal tax lien affects the property) and any government agencies that are involved with the secured loan. If a federal tax lien affects the property and has been filed for at least thirty (30) days before the date of the proposed sale, notice should be given to the United States at least twenty-five (25) days prior to such sale.

D. Advertisement.

A trustee must conform the advertising to the terms of the deed of trust, and any material departure will invalidate the sale. Substantial compliance, however, is sufficient as long as the rights of the parties are not materially affected. Section 55-62 of the Virginia Code provides a permissible form of notice that must include the time, place, and terms of sale, including the amount of any deposit required. The advertising provisions are mandatory and override the discretion of the trustee, regardless of the contractual agreement of the parties.

1. Requirements; Timing. The advertisement must briefly describe the property to be sold by street address, if any, and, if there is no street address, the general location of the property with reference to routes, streets, and known landmarks. The tax map identification number of the property may be used but is not required. The advertisement must also include the name, address, and telephone number of the trustee and the secured party, or the secured party’s agent or attorney, to respond to inquiries from the public about the sale. Advertisement of the foreclosure must be made in a newspaper having a general circulation in the city or county where the property being sold or any portion thereof lies. The sale can be held no earlier than eight (8) days after the first advertisement and no later than thirty (30) days after the last advertisement.

2. Number of Publications. If the deed of trust provides for the number of publications by using language such as “advertisement required,” then the direction of the deed of trust must be followed. In any event, if the newspaper advertisement is published on a weekly basis, it must be published not less than once a week for two weeks before the sale; and if published on a daily basis, it must be published not less than once a day for three days, which may be consecutive days. If the deed of trust does not provide for the number of publications, the Virginia Code requires that “the trustee shall advertise once a week for four successive weeks; provided, however, that if the property or some portion thereof is located in a city or in a county immediately contiguous to a city, publication of the advertisement five different days, which may be consecutive days, shall be deemed adequate.”

E. The Sale.

There are virtually no rules regarding bidding at a foreclosure sale, other than that the purchase price of the property must not be so low as to ‘shock the conscience’. The sale may take place “at the premises or at such other place in the city or county in which the property or the greater portion thereof lies, or in the corporate limits of any city surrounded by or contiguous to such county.” Most sales take place on the front steps of the city or county circuit court building. In the absence of specific direction in the trust instrument, the trustee is authorized to sell “upon such terms and conditions as the trustee may deem best.” This language has been interpreted to include the power to sell either for cash or on credit. The trustee must be present and either conduct or supervise the sale. In the absence of specific authority in the deed of trust, a trustee cannot, even with the consent of the lender, delegate the power to sell and be absent from the sale; the trustee may employ an auctioneer to cry out the sale. Prior to bidding, the trustee should announce the terms of sale and answer any general questions from the public. The trustee should disclose fully any known liens or encumbrances. A contract of sale between a trustee and a purchaser is complete when the trustee knocks down the property to the highest bidder and makes and signs a memorandum of the sale and its terms. The trustee may require a deposit, and a closing will be scheduled for approximately ten (10) to thirty (30) days after the sale, all as set forth in the advertisement. In the event that there was a federal tax lien on the property, the government has a right of redemption for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days, meaning that the government may take the property and reimburse the purchaser for the amount paid within this time frame. The trustee may request the waiver of such right upon the delivery of the notice of sale.

F. Settlement and Accounting.

A purchaser can only require a deed with special warranty of title from the trustee. The trustee is not responsible for conveying good title, because a trustee can sell only the interest conveyed to him under the deed of trust. Recordation tax to be paid upon recordation of the deed is the greater of the amount bid at the sale or the assessed value of the property. The trustee must receipt for the proceeds. Any proceeds from the sale must be applied in the following order: to discharge the expenses of executing the trust, including the trustee’s commission; to discharge all taxes, levies, and assessments, with costs and interest, including the due pro rata thereof for the current year; and to discharge in the order of their priority, if any, the remaining debts and obligations secured by the trust instrument, and any liens of record inferior to the trust instrument under which sale is made, with lawful interest. Any residual proceeds shall be paid to the debtor or his assigns. Within six months of the sale, the trustee must file an accounting of sale, including the original note, and all vouchers for his expenses with the local commissioner of accounts. The secured party may sue the debtor or any guarantor for any deficiency between the amount of the proceeds of the sale applied to the note and the amount of indebtedness outstanding thereunder.

G. Advantages and Disadvantages.

In Virginia, a trustee’s sale is a relatively quick and efficient means of foreclosing on real property. Once the sale has been completed, the purchaser will own the property free and clear of other junior encumbrances (provided that the junior lienholders were properly notified). However, the lender must be cognizant of the procedural and timing requirements in order to properly coordinate the trustee’s sale, and the foreclosure process can be more expensive than acquir4ing the property by a deed in lieu.

II. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure.

With a deed in lieu of foreclosure, the grantor transfers the fee simple title to the property encumbered by the deed of trust to the lender under the deed of trust. The lender contemporaneously releases the lien of the deed of trust and forgives or stipulates the liability of the obligors under the obligations secured by the deed of trust.

A. Advantages. Acquisition by a deed in lieu can be advantageous to a debtor, as the process minimizes damage to the debtor’s reputation and credit rating by avoiding a formal foreclosure and creates substantial savings in costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees and trustee’s fees. The lender may find significant benefits as well, such as efficiency and the ability to obtain quick control of the property to effect its completion, rental or sale to a third party.

B. Disadvantages. A lender should be aware of the potential disadvantages to obtaining property by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. The lender will own the property subject to junior encumbrances (which are normally extinguished by a foreclosure sale) and all obligations of the former owner (including building code violations and environmental responsibilities). The debtor’s creditors may attack the sale as a fraudulent or voluntary conveyance if the value of the property greatly exceeds the value of the loan forgiven; and any guarantor that did not consent to the transaction may assert that the guarantors and debtor are released from any deficiency claim.

Mexico’s Unified Secured Transactions Registry Offers New Opportunities for Secured Lending

A big thank you to recent featured bloggers at the National Law Review from Strasburger & Price LLP. John E. Rogers wrote a helpful post about commercial lending changes in Mexico.

Mexican companies have historically encountered difficulties in attracting secured lending from U.S. and other foreign banks, mainly because of concerns as to the reliability of Mexican laws governing secured transactions and of its systems for filing and perfecting security interests (garantías reales) in personal (movable) property or goods (bienes muebles). Mexican banks have shared these concerns and have tended to rely on real property collateral in most of their secured lending. As a result, many Mexican companies whose primary assets are inventory, receivables and equipment have lacked access to adequate financing on competitive terms.

In order to encourage lenders to finance the operations of Mexican borrowers, Mexico has enacted significant reforms of its secured transactions laws. Most recently, dramatic steps have been taken to improve its public registry system to make it easier to search for existing liens on a debtor’s property and to perfect new security interests.

Mexican Bankruptcy Considerations

The importance to creditors of taking collateral security from Mexican debtors has arguably been increased by certain difficulties in the application of the Mexican Bankruptcy Law (the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles or LCM) enacted in 2000 and subsequently amended.¹ As a practical matter, the LCM does not ensure the “cram down” of secured creditors to the extent possible under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor, under a reorganization plan, to pay a secured creditor less than its full claim if it is under-collateralized. The secured claim can be “crammed down” to the value of the collateral by paying under the plan, over time, the value of the collateral, with the remainder of the claim being treated as unsecured.²

The LCM provides that a secured creditor may proceed with the enforcement of its collateral security if the reorganization plan does not provide for full payment of the secured debt, or the payment of the value of the collateral.³ On the surface, the latter option suggests the possibility of a cram down, but the absence of clear valuation procedures and criteria in the LCM, combined with the fact that bankruptcy judges often have limited experience with the LCM and few precedents to rely upon, means that it is more difficult than it would be under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to prevent the secured creditor from proceeding (or threatening to proceed) with an action to enforce its collateral. Depending on the importance of the collateral to the future operation of the debtor, any such enforcement action could in effect jeopardize the success of the reorganization plan.

This gives the secured creditor significant negotiating leverage in a restructuring under the LCM, and has implications not only for secured bank lending but also for Mexican corporate bond financings, as to which bond investors may have a strong argument based on the LCM to insist on collateral security when the bonds are issued. If an issuer must provide such collateral, for example to support a high-yield bond offering, it may be less costly for the issuer to provide collateral consisting of personal property than to mortgage its real property, partly because of high mortgage recording costs and the related notarial fees. In order to obtain the advantages of treatment as a secured creditor under the LCM, having personal property collateral is as effective as having real property collateral of comparable value.

Like the U.S. Before the UCC

Mexico has a bewildering variety of personal property security interests, including among others the pledge (prenda), the industrial mortgage (hipoteca industrial) and the specialized security interests tied to the crédito refaccionario and the crédito de habilitación y avío, that brings to mind the personal property collateral devices (chattel mortgages, trust receipts etc.) that were commonly used in the U.S. prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Although Mexico has had the advantage of a single Commercial Code (and other federal secured transactions laws) that apply to the entire country, rather than a system of separate State laws as in the U.S., each of the 32 States and the Federal District has its own Civil Code establishing a Public Registry system for real property deeds and mortgages (each such registry is a Registro Público de la Propiedad) and, although personal property security filings are governed by the federal Commercial Code, they have previously been required to be made in the commercial registry (Registro Público de Comercio or “RPC”), which is normally managed by a unit of the related State or municipal government, in the place of the debtor’s domicile. Some of these locally managed commercial registries are less reliable than others, and significant delays are common in searching for existing liens and filing new security interests on collateral of companies domiciled in remote locations.

The Nonpossessory Pledge and the Guaranty Trust

On the substantive side, Mexico has made significant progress since 2000 by amending the Mexican Commercial Code and the General Law of Credit Instruments and Transactions (the Ley General de Títulos y Operaciones de Crédito or LGTOC) to permit personal property security interests to be created more easily on a “floating lien” basis. A new type of nonpossessory pledge called theprenda sin transmisión de posesión allows a debtor to pledge all of its inventory and receivables, for example, generically described (rather than described by reference to specific items), to a secured party without requiring that possession of the collateral be transferred to the secured party. This pledge can permit the debtor to sell the pledged collateral in the ordinary course of business without obtaining a case-by-case release from the secured party, and can automatically subject newly acquired property to the pledge without any further filing, which effectively results in a floating lien. A similar effect can be achieved through a guaranty trust (fideicomiso de garantía) with respect to the same or similar types of property, whereby title to the collateral is transferred to a Mexican trustee (typically a Mexican bank).⁴ Although these new devices resemble a security interest created in the U.S. under Article 9 of the UCC, lenders have remained reluctant to significantly expand their secured lending activities in Mexico because of ongoing concerns about their ability to perfect these security interests against third parties through the public registry system.

UNCITRAL and the OAS Encourage Registry Reforms

Recently, in an attempt to provide guidance for emerging market countries like Mexico that wish to improve access by borrowers to secured lending, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has promoted reforms of the bankruptcy laws and secured transactions laws in such countries. Its 2008 Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions indicated the importance of a country having a “registry in which information about the potential existence of security rights in movable assets may be made public.”⁵ In 2010, UNCITRAL decided to expand its work in this field by preparing a “model registry regulation,” which is still in the process of preparation.

The previous efforts of the Organization of American States (OAS) to adopt a Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions (the “Model Law”)⁶ appear to have influenced Mexico in its adoption of the nonpossessory pledge concept. The OAS has also been tackling the registry issue; in October 2009, it held its Seventh Inter-American Conference on Private International Law, which approved Model Registry Regulations to “provide the legal foundation for implementing and operating the registry regime contemplated by the Model Law.”⁷ Among other things, the Model Registry Regulations contemplate the adoption of electronic filing systems and acknowledge that most of their features were recommended in UNCITRAL’s 2008 Guide and included in the registry systems recently developed in some Latin American countries, including Mexico, as well as in the U.S. (the UCC), Canada (the Personal Property Security Act) and some European countries.

Mexico’s 2009 Commercial Code Amendments and Creation of the RUG

Mexico has been receptive to the objectives reflected by the UNCITRAL and OAS efforts. Not only did Mexico enact secured transactions law reforms in 2000 and subsequent years to reflect many of the changes contemplated by the OAS’ Model Law, but Mexico’s initiatives with respect to public registry reforms have actually preceded the formal adoption of model rules by UNCITRAL and the OAS. In August 2009, a few months prior to the adoption of the OAS Model Registry Regulations, the Mexican Congress approved amendments to the federal Commercial Code that provide for the establishment of a Unified (or Sole) Registry of Movable Property Collateral (the Registro Único de Garantías Mobiliarias or “RUG”).⁸ The new Article 32 bis of the Code provides for the RUG (pronounced “roog”) to be a centralized registry for all types of security interests granted in favor of any creditor that carries out commercial activities (a comerciante) in personal property. The RUG will be a section of the PRC under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy (Secretaría de Economía), in which all filings are to be carried out electronically, through the RUG website, www.rug.gob.mx.

The stated Congressional purpose of the RUG is to strengthen the system for personal property secured transactions “as an effective tool for access to credit.” Its main functions are to create a mechanism that allows public disclosure of security interests created on personal property and to establish priority rules for secured creditors. Filings through the RUG have immediate effect, without requiring any approval by any authority. Such filings can be made by financial institutions, public officials, public notaries (notarios públicos) or brokers (corredores públicos) and others authorized by the Ministry of Economy. Under Article 32 bis 4 of the amended Commercial Code, a debtor is generally deemed to have authorized any secured party creditor that is acomerciante to file evidence of the applicable security interest in the RUG. Article 32 bis 7 allows “any interested party” to request the issuance of a certification as to the filings that have been made in the RUG with respect to any debtor.

New Registry Regulations

On September 23, 2010, an executive decree was issued by Mexican President Felipe Calderón implementing the 2009 Commercial Code amendments by amending the Regulations governing the PRC to provide specifically for the inclusion of the RUG as a section of the overall PRC.⁹ The amendments clarify how the RUG will operate through the electronic system called the Integrated System of Registry Procedures (Sistema Integral de Gestión Registral or SIGER) and the procedures to be followed for the use of the RUG by those who wish to (i) search it for the existence of existing security interests and (ii) perfect their own security interests as against third parties by filing notices. Anyone who registers with the RUG can initiate a search, but filings of security interests directly by an institutional creditor can only be done if the creditor entity has arranged to utilize an electronic signature for this purpose which satisfies the technical requirements contemplated by the Commercial Code¹⁰. Otherwise the security interest must by filed on the creditor’s behalf by someone else authorized under the RUG to do so.

The provisions of the amended Regulations (the “Amended Registry Regulations”) impose certain formalities which do not seem to be contemplated by the new Article 32 bis of the Commercial Code and may contravene the policy guidelines recommended by the OAS and UNCITRAL. For example, Article 10 of the Amended Registry Regulations provides for the RUG registrar or officer to verify that a filing has been properly made “in accordance with applicable legal and regulatory provisions,” which would seem to prevent the filing from becoming immediate and automatic, as provided in Article 32 bis 4 of the amended Commercial Code. Also, Article 10 bis of the Amended Registry Regulations specify that filings can only occur through a public authenticating officer (fedatario), i.e. a public notary (notario público) or broker (corredor público), although Article 30 bis seems to permit others, including financial entities, to make filings without using a fedatario. As a practical matter, until changes are made in Article 10 bis to allow filings to be made otherwise, it seems advisable to use a fedatario to carry out the filing. A number of law firms in Mexico employ fedatarios, so this should not be a significant impediment to the filing process or impose a significant additional cost. The use of a fedatario has the advantage of avoiding the requirement under Article 10 that the RUG registrar or officer verify the propriety of the filing; under Article 10 bis a filing by a fedatario has immediate effect.

Preventive Filings

Prior to the closing of a secured lending transaction, the proposed lender may wish to have the comfort that there will be no last-minute filings by other lenders of security interests that would have priority (based on time of filing) over any security interest to be filed to secure the transaction in favor of the proposed lender. To obtain such comfort, Articles 32 bis 5 of the Commercial Code amendments and 33 bis of the Amended Registry Regulations permit the proposed lender to make a filing prior to the scheduled closing, which will have the effect of preventing any other lender from making a filing that would have priority over the later definitive filing by the proposed lender of its own security interest. If the closing does not take place, the debtor need not seek removal of the preventive filing from the records of the RUG, because such filing would automatically cease to be effective after the passage of a specified period, normally two weeks.

Information to be Provided in Filings through the RUG

Article 33 Bis 2 of the Amended Registry Regulations provides that the information that must be provided in the filing of the security interest will be (i) the name of the debtor or debtors granting the security interest, (ii) the name of the creditor or secured party, (iii) the type of security device utilized to create the security interest, (iv) the personal property securing the relevant obligations, (v) the secured obligations, (vi) the term or time frame during which the filing will be effective, and (vii) anything else contemplated by Article 33 of such regulations, i.e. anything else that may be required by the forms to be used in order to effect such filings, which are to be specified in a publication in the official Gazette (Diario Oficial) of the Republic.

Using the RUG

As contemplated by the Amended Registry Regulations, to provide further guidance on using the RUG, the Ministry of Economy published a User’s Guide (Guía de Usuario) in Spanish providing additional guidance as to how the search and filing processes will operate.¹¹ The User’s Guide shows how (i) a user can become registered with the RUG, (ii) searches can be performed, (iii) search certificates can be obtained, (iv) secured party creditors (whether organized or resident within or outside of Mexico) can be registered and (v) the creditor’s representatives can be registered in order to be entitled to submit filings on behalf of the creditor.

Mexican creditors can be registered online by including their Mexican tax ID numbers in the creditor information they provide. In the case of foreign creditors not having such numbers, the registration may be carried out at one of the designated offices of the Ministry or through a fedatario. Foreign creditors that wish to avoid delays at the closing of a secured loan may wish to become pre-registered before the closing. For cases involving multiple creditors, such as a syndicated loan, there is a separate procedure for entering the names of the additional creditors. As for the debtor, the filing form contemplated by the User’s Guide mandates that it be filed electronically in such a way that the debtor’s name is accompanied by an indication of whether the debtor is an individual or an entity and his or its nationality, registration file (folio) number and taxpayer ID or CURP number. A debtor that is an individual may be registered by a fedatario at the time of the filing of the security interest, but a debtor that is a company or other entity will have to have been registered in the PRC prior to the time of filing.

According to the User’s Guide, the filing of a security interest is to be effected by making entries in the electronic equivalent of a document akin to a UCC financing statement, which should specify

(i) the name and address of the person requesting the registration of the security interest,
(ii) a description of the type of property subject to the security interest, such as “machinery and equipment” (the applicable type is to be selected from alternatives that appear on the screen),
(iii) the type of security document under which the security interest was created, i.e. whether it was a nonpossessory pledge, guaranty trust etc. (again, the selection is from the types indicated on the screen),
(iv) the date of the relevant security agreement,
(v) the maximum amount secured, specifying the applicable currency,
(vi) a more detailed description of the property subject to the security interest,
(vii) a description of the public deed issued before the fedatario which formalized the security agreement,
(viii) a description of the agreement under which the secured obligation arose,
(ix) optionally, any terms and conditions established by the documents, and
(x) the period of time for which the filing is to remain effective.

The User’s Guide provides examples of entries that are to be made in the online “financing statement,” and indicates how the electronic signature is to be applied to the document in order to affect its filing.

The User’s Guide includes similar instructions for related procedures, such as amendments, assignments, renewals or reductions of the effective term of the filing, corrections of errors, cancellations and “annotations” (anotaciones). The annotations might include information on any enforcement action with respect to the security interest, and would be made pursuant to instructions from a court or other authority. An annotation might result from a debtor challenging the propriety of the filing.

Effect of the Reforms: Better than the UCC?

The RUG is now the exclusive method in Mexico for perfecting security interests in inventory, receivables, equipment and many other types of personal property, whether created through a possessory or nonpossessory pledge, guaranty trust or other device, superseding all of the local public registries. However, security interests previously filed in the local registries will continue to be effective, so lenders must undertake searches as to any debtor in the locally-managed public registry responsible for such debtor’s domicile until such time as the previously filed security interests are no longer effective (for example, because they have been released or the related debt has been repaid), or otherwise satisfy themselves that no such filings have occurred (for example, by obtaining representations and warranties from the debtor to this effect). Similar transition issues were encountered in the U.S. during the implementation of the UCC and its associated filing systems.

Two features are present in the Mexican situation which did not exist in the case of the adoption of the UCC. First, the RUG will be the sole registry in Mexico for filing security interests in personal property, unlike the separate filing systems in the 50 States of the U.S. and in the District of Columbia, and many local filing places such as the offices of County Clerks. Thus, the sometimes thorny question in the U.S. of where to file will not apply in Mexico. Secondly, the RUG is exclusively electronic, as opposed to the recordation systems in the U.S., which initially relied entirely on paper filings and have only recently began to transition to electronic systems, gradually, on a State by State basis.

It will still be necessary to comply with the relevant requirements for creating security interests, which in Mexico often requires that the security agreement or pledge agreement be formalized by the preparation by afedatario of a formal deed (escritura). Instead of being recorded in the locally managed public registry, such deed should now be recorded in the RUG. Filings as to some types of collateral, such as vessels and aircraft, will continue to be made in specialized registries. Also, some of the enforcement remedies available under the UCC are not available under Mexican law, and the enforcement process in Mexico is likely to be more time-consuming than it is in the U.S.

But with those exceptions, and despite some uncertainty created by the amended Regulations, the establishment of the RUG represents a huge step forward by Mexico in making secured lending an attractive option for borrowers and lenders alike. Even a lender that remains skeptical about the enforcement of security interests in Mexico may be persuaded that it is worth perfecting security interests pursuant to a filing in the RUG in order to obtain the important practical advantages under the Mexican bankruptcy law of being a secured lender.

^*The authors gratefully acknowledge the collaboration of Fernando Barrita of Strasburger & Forastieri and the helpful comments of Steve Roberts and John Dorsey in Austin and of Professor Alejandro Garro of Columbia Law School in New York. The authors are, however, solely responsible for the contents of this article.

¹ Published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación (the “D.O.F.”) on May 12, 2000. Amendments to the LCM were published in the D.O.F. on December 27, 2007.

² 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A).

³ See LCM Articles 158, 160.

⁴ Published in the D.O.F. on May 23, 2000, with amendments published in the D.O.F. on June 13, 2003.

⁵ Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, GA Res. 63/121, UN GAOR, 63rd Sess., 17 December 2008.

⁶ Adopted on February 8, 2002, by the Sixth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law (known as “CIDIP-VI”, for its Spanish acronym) [CIDIP-VI, Final Act 3(f), OEA/Ser.K/XXI.6/ CIDIP-VI/doc.24/02 rev.3 (March 5, 2002)].

⁷ Approved by the Seventh Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law (CIDIP-VII)
at its second plenary session of October 9, 2009); quoted language appears in the Introduction.

⁸ Published in the D.O.F. on August 27, 2009.

⁹ Published in the D.O.F. on September 23, 2010.

¹⁰ Art. 11 of the Amended Registry Regulations.

¹¹ See http://www.rug.gob.mx/Rug/resources/pdf/
guia%20de%20usuario/Manual%20de%20Usuario%20RUG.pdf.

Can a 401(k) Plan Member Recover Damages to His Individual Account Caused By a Plan Administrator’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty?

Recently posted at the National Law Review by guest blogger David B. Cosgrove – a question many unhappy 401(k) plans members may have pondered:

An ERISA Plaintiff cannot seek individual monetary damages for a Plan Administrator’s breach of fiduciary duty to the plan. Importantly, however, seeking damages on behalf of the 401(k) Plan as a result of a Plaintiff’s losses in his individual account is explicitly permitted under LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008), which held that ERISA Section 502(a)(2) authorizes recovery by a plan participant for fiduciary breaches “that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual account.” 522 U.S. at 256. The Supreme Court in LaRue made clear its reasoning for this holding:

Whether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all participants and beneficiaries, or only to persons tied to particular individual accounts, it creates the kind of harms that concerned the draftsmen of § 409. Id. at 256.

For instance, a Plaintiff may rely upon ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) for a Defendant’s failure to provide the Plaintiff with the full 401(k) benefits owed to him under the 401(k) Plan at issue. And the Plaintiff may also rely upon ERISA Section 502(a)(2) for a Defendant’s breaches of fiduciary duties. A plain reading of Sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(2) establishes that the two sections provide for different relief. Indeed, as the 9th Circuit explicitly noted in Harris v. Amgen, Inc.:

Section 502(a)(1)(B) allows a plan participant “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.” By contrast, Section 502(a)(2) encompasses claims based on breach of fiduciary duty and allows for the more expansive recovery of “appropriate relief,” including disgorgement of profits and equitable remedies. 573 F.3d 728, 734, n. 4 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

Regardless, some defendants incorrectly assert that “the Eighth Circuit and other courts alike have repeatedly held that participants cannot state claims for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA Section 502(a) when they are also seeking to recover the same benefits under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B).” The falsity of this assertion is clear upon a review of the federal caselaw. Indeed, the cases usually cited are inapplicable in that each is either irrelevant or is limited in scope to claims brought under ERISA Sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3), not Sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(2). See Geissal ex rel. Estate of Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp., 338 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2003) (narrowly holding that a beneficiary cannot bring a claim for benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B) and Section 502(a)(3)(B));Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 176 F.3d 1044, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Wald v. Southwestern Bell Corporation Customcare Medical Plan, 83 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1996) in holding that “where a plaintiff is ‘provided adequate relief by [the] right to bring a claim for benefits under [Section 502(a)(1)(B)],’ the plaintiff does not have a cause of action to seek the same remedy under [Section 502(a)(3)(B)]”). Some defendants also cite Coyne & Delaney Co. v. BCBS of Va., Inc., 102 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 1996). However, Coyne is not relevant in that it analyses whether aplan fiduciary can bring a claim for benefits under ERISA Section 502(a)(3). 102 F.3d at 713.

Some plan defendants also rely upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008) for the proposition that duplicative claims under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(2) are inappropriate. Specifically, defendants may rely upon commentary by Chief Justice Roberts in that case, without revealing that Justice Roberts wrote the concurring opinion rather than the opinion of the Court. Accordingly, his analysis is not binding. Id. at 249. In fact, at the conclusion of his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts acknowledged that his analysis is not binding on the issue: “In any event, other courts in other cases remain free to consider what we have not—what effect the availability of relief under § 502(a)(1)(B) may have on a plan participant’s ability to proceed under § 502(a)(2).” Id. at 260.

Indeed, in Crider v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2008 WL 2782871 (W.D. Ky. 2008), the Western District of Kentucky acknowledged that Justice Roberts’ analysis inLaRue is not binding, and therefore noted that in deciding whether to allow a claim under both ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) and Section 502(a)(2), the question for the court is whether the facts the plaintiff alleges “state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Section 502(a)(2) which is separate from her claim for benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B).” Id. at *2. The court further noted that in deciding this question, the Sixth Circuit has on at least three occasions “allowed plaintiffs to pursue both a claim for benefits under Section 502(a)(1) and also to attempt to hold a plan responsible for breaches of fiduciary duty under a separate Section 502(a) action.” Id. Finally, In Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., the Sixth Circuit observed that plan-wide claims are distinct from claims seeking to correct the denial of individual benefits. 409 F.3d 710, 718 (6th Cir. 2005).

Finally, it is well-established that “[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must view the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”Guarantee Co. of North America, USA v. Middleton Bros., Inc., 2010 WL 2553693, at *2 (E.D. Mo. June 23, 2010). To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim need only be facially plausible, “meaning that the factual content…allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”Id. (quoting Cole v. Homier Dist. Co., Inc., 599 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2010)).

Beware of Fiduciary Duties to Creditors Different for Corporations and LLCs

Posted yesterday at the National Law Review by Jennifer Feldsher, Robb Tretter and Jonathan P. Gill of Bracewell and Giuliani details about a recent ruling in Delaware concerning creditors of LLC’s which contradicts widespread assumptions and runs contrary to common commercial practice:

In a recent decision, CML V, LLC v. Bax, et al., C.A. No 5373-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2010), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that, unlike Delaware corporations, creditors of an insolvent Delaware limited liability company cannot bring derivative actions against the members or managers of the company unless they specifically contract for such rights. The decision effectively precludes creditors of insolvent limited liability companies from suing members and managers for breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the company, unless they amend the company’s limited liability operating agreement to provide directly that such duties are owed to creditors.

The Chancery Court noted that the ruling contradicts widespread assumptions held by both academics and the Delaware courts themselves. In fact, this ruling runs contrary to common commercial practice, in which the form of an entity, whether a corporation, limited liability company or limited partnership, is most often selected for tax or corporate control reasons, with the expectation that the general tenets of the Delaware corporate law apply.

Background

According to the decision, JetDirect Aviation Holdings, LLC was highly leveraged and had volatile cash flows and internal control deficiencies. In April 2007, CML V, LLC loaned JetDirect approximately $34 million. Subsequently, in late 2007, JetDirect’s board of managers undertook four major acquisitions allegedly without the benefit of current information on the company’s financial condition. JetDirect defaulted on its loan obligations to CML in June 2007 and was insolvent by January 2008, at which time JetDirect’s managers began liquidating some of JetDirect’s assets, including selling certain assets to manager controlled entities. CML alleges that such sales were approved by JetDirect’s board without an adequate review of the fairness of such transactions and, thus, breached fiduciary duties owed indirectly to CML. Such duties are indirect because at the juncture of insolvency creditors, rather than the company’s equity holders, become the residual stakeholders.

Each of JetDirect’s operating subsidiaries eventually commenced bankruptcy cases and CML brought claims both directly against JetDirect on account of JetDirect’s defaults under the loan and derivatively against JetDirect’s mangers for breach of fiduciary duties owed to CML. The derivative claims were based on allegations that JetDirect was either in the zone of insolvency or insolvent by April 2007, thus, the managers owed fiduciary duties to its creditors, including CML, and the managers breached those duties. The alleged fiduciary duties breached by the managers were (i) their duty of care, by approving the 2007 acquisitions while “lacking critical information relating to JetDirect’s financial condition,” (ii) their duty of loyalty, by acting in bad faith when “failing to implement and monitor an adequate system of internal controls” and (iii) their duty of loyalty by “benefiting from self interested asset sales.” JetDirect’s mangers moved to dismiss CML’s derivative claims against them, arguing that CML lacks standing to bring derivative suits under the LLC Act.

The Chancery Court’s Decision

In ruling that the creditors of a limited liability company lack standing to bring an action in right of the limited liability company against its members and managers for breaches of fiduciary duties or otherwise, the Chancery Court held that the plain language of Section 18-1002 of the LLC Act, entitled “Proper Plaintiff,” only allows a member or an assignee of an interest in such limited liability company to bring a derivative claim.

The Chancery Court went on to distinguish the rights of creditors of insolvent Delaware corporations from the rights of creditors of insolvent limited liability companies. The Court acknowledged that a combination of Section 327 of the DGCL and case law have provided creditors of insolvent Delaware corporations with standing to bring derivative claims against directors on behalf of the corporations for breaches of fiduciary duties.¹ However, in CML, the Court determined that no such right exists for a creditor of a limited liability company given that the language of Section 18-1002 of the LLC Act is exclusive to “a member or assignee of a limited liability company interest,” while the language of Section 327 of the DGCL is not exclusive to shareholders of the corporation, but simply dictates the qualifications required to be met by shareholders instituting derivative suits.

In support of its decision, the Chancery Court recognized that the LLC Act provides flexibility so that creditors may negotiate certain rights and protections for themselves. Consistent with other recent cases, the Court notes that “LLCs are creatures of contract, designed to afford the maximum amount of freedom of contract, private ordering and flexibility to the parties involved.”² Creditors can protect themselves through the covenants, asset liens, and other negotiated contractual protections customarily contained in a loan agreement and can also bargain for express contractual rights in the borrower’s LLC agreement. Such rights may include, among other things, (i) penalties and other consequences for members triggered by the occurrence of specific events, (ii) personal liability of members for the debts of the limited liability company, and (iii) creation or expansion of fiduciary duties of members and managers to preserve assets for creditors, which would be triggered by insolvency.

Take-Aways for Creditors of LLCs

Unlike rights afforded to creditors of Delaware corporations, creditors of Delaware limited liability companies are barred from bringing claims based upon breaches of fiduciary duties by the members or mangers of such companies unless, among other things, they amend the LLC agreement to directly provide for them. Thus, in order to fully protect themselves, creditors of limited liability companies will need to bargain for specific rights in the loan agreement or demand amendments to the borrower’s LLC agreement as a pre-condition to extending credit or making a loan.

_____________________
¹See CML V, 6 A.3d at 240, citing N. AM. Catholic Educ. Programming Found, Inc. V. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007); see also § 320 DGCL

²CML V, 6 A.3d at 249 (quoting Travel Centers of Am., LLC v. Brog, 2008 WL 176987, at *1 (Del.Ch. Apr. 3, 2008) (quoting In re Grupo Dos Chiles, LLC, 2006 WL 668443, at *2 (Del.Ch. Mar. 10, 2006)); see also Kelly v. Blum, 2010 WL 629850 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010).

Milestone or Millstone? Financing, that is.

The National Law Review included a great post this week about the challenges for Milestone Financing from Paul A. Jones of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP:

As a lawyer, I’ve counseled many an entrepreneur, and even an occasional angel or venture investor, who thought so-called milestone-based financing rounds might bridge an especially irksome entrepreneur-investor gulf on valuation. And, indeed, if you’ve been around the high-impact startup game awhile, you are bound to have seen some of these deals done. You might even have seen some of them work out. But as attractive as the idea of punting on valuation and/or funding timing pending the future achievement (or not) of some pre-defined milestone can be, more than a few words of caution are in order.

The kind of milestone financing I am talking about typically looks something like the following. An investor agrees to put in some money up front, with the valuation thereof, and/or the provision of an additional sum of money, determined at some later time, when the company has (or has not) accomplished some defined milestone(s). In theory, this structure can be a good mechanism for bridging otherwise intractable differences about valuation and funding requirements between entrepreneurs and investors. In practice, though, this approach can be quite problematic.

The problems with milestone funding are basically as follows. First, the parties too often leave the definition of what constitutes achieving the milestone subject to interpretation. Some milestones are in fact hard to define with precision. Beyond that, precision itself in terms of defining a milestone can be problematic if, as is often the case, success or failure in achieving a milestone can take forms not contemplated at the beginning of the enterprise. Second, and particularly where the milestone is more distant in time, market conditions can change so that one party or the other inevitably ends up feeling like they are being held to a deal that no longer makes sense. Finally – and this, for me, is the biggest issue with milestone funding – is that what seem like the best/most pressing milestones today might be overtaken by events before they are achieved. Most technology-based startups evolve rapidly: what looks like the best use of limited resources at, say, the first closing of a milestone financing, might look like a less than optimal use of resources a day, week, month or quarter later. But with a milestone financing clock ticking, the various parties – founders, managers and investors – can find themselves with confused and conflicting priorities. At best, in this situation, you will have a serious management distraction on your hands.

Milestone financing structures can be good tools in the right situations. Considering the real world risks, however, they should be considered as if not last at least late-in-the-day resorts. And, when used, both sides should be careful to pick milestones that can be achieved sooner, rather than later, and defined, appropriately, with precision. And then everyone should still cross their respective fingers that the business – technology, markets, competition, etc. – stays reasonably stable at least until the milestone is achieved.

Lender Liability and the Exception to CERCLA

Recently posted at the National Law Review by Joanne M. Schreiner and Matthew A. Whitlow of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP – explain possible liability under CERCLA for lenders in certain situations:

Lenders are making loans again. Lenders are much more cautious about the loans they are making and much more thorough with their due diligence on every piece of property. Perhaps the biggest concern for a lender (aside from whether its borrower will default) is the environmental condition of the property. Now more than ever, lenders are fearful (and rightfully so) of exposure to liability for violations of environmental laws following foreclosure and transfer of possession of a commercial property. Generally, Lenders are insulated from such liability; however, they must be careful not to overstep the boundaries of the protections afforded them.

What is CERCLA?

It is mentioned in many commercial real estate loan documents, typically in connection with a representation by a borrower that they are in material compliance with it. “CERCLA” is an acronym for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. This is the primary piece of federal legislation governing events related to the exposure of real estate to hazardous materials in the United States. Most state environmental laws are based on this law. When it comes to commercial real estate (or any real estate for that matter), the last place anyone wants to be is on the wrong side of CERCLA because CERCLA imposes strict liability upon “owners and operators” of real property for penalties and costs related to hazardous waste contamination and clean up. A lender can become an “owner and operator” of real property under CERCLA in several ways, with potential exposure to CERCLA strict liability. There are three exceptions to CERCLA strict liability: (i) an Act of God; (ii) an Act of War; or (iii) Secured Creditor Safe Harbor.

Initially, the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor allowed that a lender who owned or possessed real property for the sole purpose of protecting its security interest in the real property, and who did not “participate in the management of the real property,” was excluded from strict liability under CERCLA. Unfortunately, courts disagreed on how to interpret the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor (specifically, when did a lender “own or possess” the real property and what constituted “participating in the management” of the real property?). The Secured Creditor Safe Harbor was later narrowed and more clearly defined.

The U.S. EPA adopted guidelines (which were later codified in CERCLA) to test whether a lender and a lender’s actions were protected by the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor. These guidelines attempted to clarify what “participating in the management” of a property means. A two-part test was established to determine whether lenders met this factor:

Did the lender exercise control over the management of the borrower’s environmental compliance program? In other words, did the lender tell the borrower what to do to comply with applicable environmental laws?
Did the lender participate in the Borrower’s day-to-day decision-making process with respect to environmental compliance and other business operations? Simply collecting rent from tenants or advising the borrower on financial matters related to the property is not considered “participation in management.” Other lender activities that do not satisfy this second part include: (i) pre-loan investigations; (ii) loan servicing; (iii) loan workouts; and (iv) foreclosures.

If a lender can prove that: (i) it holds a security interest in real property to secure repayment of money or some other obligation; and (ii) it did not actually participate in management of the property, then the lender is protected by the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor.

What happens after a lender forecloses and becomes the actual owner of the property?

Under CERCLA, a lender must establish it has made commercially reasonable efforts to divest itself of the real property in a commercially reasonable time and on commercially reasonable terms, taking into account market conditions and legal and regulatory requirements. CERCLA does not define “commercially reasonable;” however, lenders can look to the EPA for guidance. The EPA provides that a lender makes “commercially reasonable” efforts to divest the property when the lender lists the property with a broker or advertises the property for sale in an “appropriate publication” (publication of general circulation) within 12 months of foreclosure. It is important to note that lenders who were not protected by the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor pre-foreclosure cannot be protected by the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor after foreclosure. A lender’s own acts or omissions during ownership or control of the real property are not protected by the Secured Creditor Safe Harbor provision.

A lender considering making a commercial real estate loan should consider the following “best practices” to avoid CERCLA liability:

document everything;
avoid active participation in the operational affairs of the Borrower and the property;
if practical, have a receiver appointed to manage the property during default and foreclosure;
conduct pre-foreclosure environmental due diligence;
ensure good environmental management post-repossession or post-foreclosure; and
carefully document efforts to market the property for sale

Rise in Foreclosures + An Increase in Mortgage Fraud = More Homeowner Fires

A recent posting at the National Law Review by Rick Hammond of Johnson & Bell Ltd. highlights some of many problems related to mortgage fraud.

According to recent reports, many insurers have experienced an increase in the number of fire claims since the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis. Allegedly, many of these fires were intentionally set by homeowners facing foreclosure. Not surprisingly, when homeowners’ monthly mortgage payments increase after their low introductory rates expire or when falling home values and stricter lending practices reduce the possibility of restructuring or refinancing loans, the natural result is an increase in the number of foreclosures and an increase in homeowner fires.

That’s not the only problem facing the insurance industry. Insurers are also experiencing an increase in fires associated with the rise in mortgage fraud, which is also running rampant across the United States. Mortgage fraud is generally defined as the intentional misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission by an applicant or other interested party relied on by a lender or underwriter to provide funding for a mortgage loan.

Victims of mortgage fraud include borrowers, mortgage industry entities, and those living in the neighborhoods affected by mortgage fraud. As properties affected by mortgage fraud are sold at artificially inflated prices, properties in surrounding neighborhoods also become artificially inflated. When property values are inflated, property taxes increase as well. Legitimate homeowners also find it difficult to sell their homes. When properties foreclose as a result of mortgage fraud, neighborhoods deteriorate and surrounding properties depreciate.

Legal Issues and Developing Law

Insurable Interest by the Insured

The threshold question in many cases involving mortgage fraud and its effect on insurance coverage is whether the insured has an insurable interest in the property at the time of a loss. An insurable interest at the time of loss is essential to the validity of an insurance policy. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Reeg, 128 Ill. App. 3d 352, 470 N.E.2d 1103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Generally speaking, a person has an insurable interest in property whenever he or she would profit or gain some advantage by a property’s continued existence, and suffer loss or disadvantage by its destruction. Lieberman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 6 Ill.App.3d 948, 287 N.E.2d 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).

To determine whether an individual has an insurable interest in property, a court will usually examine whether an economic benefit or detriment inures to the named insured under any set of circumstances. In cases involving a straw person, a close examination of the facts might reveal that in every conceivable manner an insured did not contribute a single cent towards the purchase of the insured property or its maintenance. That is, an investigation might reveal that every payment towards the purchase or maintenance of the insured premises was made by a straw person, that is, the property’s unidentified buyer-in-fact.

Therefore, a proper investigation would seek to determine whether a buyer-in-fact paid for the insurance, paid the initial down payment, the mortgage payments, and for all upkeep and necessary expenses, and whether he or she paid for every attendant cost for the property. In these cases, the actual insured will likely not incur economic loss due to the damage suffered by the insured premises, nor gain economically from any recoverable insurance proceeds. Simply put, the primary question is whether there was an actual relationship between the insured and the insured premises, or whether the insured’s relationship to the insured premises is illusory.

Mortgagee’s Duty to Notify Insurer of Foreclosure Proceedings

An insurer is often unaware of a pending foreclosure on property that it insures until after a fire has occurred. Must a mortgagee, as a condition to receiving coverage, give notice to the insurer when that mortgagee initiates foreclosure? A recent case in Tennessee is instructive in analyzing this question (See: U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WL 4463959).

In this case, a homeowner and insured fell behind on her monthly mortgage payments and the mortgagee, U. S. Bank, N.A., initiated foreclosure. The bank sent a letter to the homeowner stating that it started foreclosure, but the bank neglected to give notice of the foreclosure to the property insurer, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company. Before the foreclosure process was completed, the homeowner and her husband filed for bankruptcy, which stayed the foreclosure proceedings. Shortly thereafter, the house was destroyed by fire.

U.S. Bank filed a claim with the insurers, Tennessee Farmers, for the fire loss, but the insurer denied the claim because the bank had failed to notify Tennessee Farmers that a foreclosure had been initiated. Tennessee Farmers stated that the foreclosure filing constituted an increase in hazard and, as such, the bank was required to notify the insurance company, and the bank’s failure to provide this notice was a breach of the policy’s mortgage clause, which stated:

We will:

(a) protect the mortgagee’s interest in the insured building. This protection will not be invalidated by any act or neglect of any insured person, breach of warranty, increase in hazard, change of ownership, or foreclosure if the mortgagee has no knowledge of these conditions

The trial court denied Tennessee Farmers’ motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the bank. The insurance company then filed an appeal. On appeal, Tennessee Farmers argued that the foreclosure proceedings was an “increase in hazard” under the terms of the policy of insurance, and contended that the bank’s bad faith claim was unfounded. On the other hand, U.S. Bank argued that commencing foreclosure proceedings did not constitute an increase in hazard, and asked the court to adopt the Kentucky’s court’s opinion in Anderson v. Kentucky Growers Ins. Co., Inc., 105 S.W.3d 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

In Anderson, the policy’s mortgage clause stated that the insurance company’s denial of the insured’s claim would not apply to a mortgagee’s claim if the mortgagee had notified the insurer of a “substantial change in risk of which the mortgagee becomes aware.” In that case, the house was destroyed by fire, and the insurance company argued that the filing of foreclosure proceedings constituted a “substantial change in risk of which the mortgagee became aware.”

The court in Anderson ruled against the insurer, noting that insurance contracts are liberally construed in favor of the insured: “While we agree that the filing of foreclosure proceedings constitutes a ‘change of risk,’ we do not agree that such a change is necessarily ‘substantial.” The court then concluded that the policy did not “clearly and unambiguously” require the mortgagee to give the insurer notice when foreclosure was initiated. The court in Anderson further held that commencing foreclosure proceedings, while certainly a “change of risk,” did not constitute a “substantial change of risk” within the meaning of the mortgage clause.

The Tennessee Farmers’ court rejected the Anderson court’s analysis, noting that the mortgage clause in the Tennessee Farmer’s policy required notification of “any” increases in hazard, not just a “substantial” increase in hazard. However, this issue remains a moving target. Thus, after the Tennessee Court of Appeals agreed with the insurance company and reversed the trial court’s decision, U.S. Bank then appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court. The state’s high court held that the bank’s commencement of foreclosure proceedings was not an increase of hazard requiring notification to insurance company under the standard mortgage clause in a fire insurance policy, and the bank’s commencement of foreclosure proceedings was not an increase of hazard requiring statutory notification to insurance company.

Mortgage Fraud and the Insurer’s Right of Rescission

By its very nature, mortgage fraud involves the intentional misstatement and misrepresentation of material information to a mortgagee. Often, the same misrepresentations made to the mortgagee are also made to an insurer on an insurance application and give rise to a rescission action. For an insurer to rescind a policy due to misrepresentation, the insured’s statement must be false, and the false statement must have been made with the intent to deceive ormaterially affect the acceptance of the risk or hazard by the insurer. Illinois State Bar Assn. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 335 Ill. App. 156, 821 N.E.2d 706 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). In such circumstances, an insurance policy becomes voidable, not void ab initio, and an insurer can waive its right to void if it does not invoke it promptly.

However, in some states an insurer has no general duty to investigate the truthfulness of answers to questions asked on an insurance application. Those states have recognized that “an insurance company has the right to rely on the truthfulness of the answers given by an insurance applicant, and the insured has the corresponding duty to supply complete and accurate information to the insurer.” Commercial Life Insurance v. Lone Star Life Insurance, 727 F. Supp. 467, 471 (N.D. Ill. 1989).

However, an insurer is generally estopped from voiding a policy for untrue representations in the application if the insured discloses facts to the agent and the agent, in filling out the application, does not state the facts as disclosed to him, but instead inserts conclusions of his own or answers inconsistent with the facts. See Boyles v. Freeman, 21 Ill. App. 3d 535, 539, 315 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). Typically, an insurer cannot rely on incorrectly recorded answers, even when the insured knows that the agent has entered answers different from the ones he or she provided, if the incorrect answers are entered under the agent’s advice, suggestion, or interpretation. Loganv. Allstate Life Insurance Co., 19 Ill. App. 3d 656, 660, 312 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).

Thus, the agent’s knowledge of the truthfulness of the statements is imputed to the insurer. Generally, only when an applicant has acted in bad faith, either on his or her own or in collusion with the insurer’s agent, will a court refuse to impute the agent’s knowledge to the insurance company.

Most laws that are enacted to regulate rescission actions are designed to prevent insurance companies from rescinding policies based on cursory or unintended misstatements by an insured. However, in cases involving straw persons, an argument can be made that the buyers-in-fact act as puppet masters and typically arrange to have the insureds’ names placed on the mortgage and the insurance policies to shield him or herself from exposure, while still enjoying potential profits from sales or insurance proceeds. In these cases, a court will likely recognize this deceptive arrangement, and that the buyer-in-fact elicited an insurance policy using the purported insured as a front. Arguably, a court should order rescission of the insurance policy in these types of cases.

Rescission of the Mortgagee’s Right of Recovery

Most policies’ mortgage clause does not address rescission of the contract, nor does it describe the mortgagee’s rights in the context of rescission, because these rights are, in fact, extinguished by rescission. Therefore, a novel approach in cases involving fraud in the application for insurance is to file a declaratory judgment action seeking rescission and voiding of the policy, which will possibly render the mortgage clause inapplicable, and asking a court to bar the mortgagee from receiving any benefits of that clause. Thus, rescission could potentially wipe the entire policy away, and the insurer would owe no contractual duties to either the insured or the mortgagee. Assuming rescission is granted, in effect, the policy will have never legally existed, and all parties that had any putative rights under that policy would have none.

Importantly, some courts have held that an insurer’s right to rescind or deny coverage on the basis of fraud only applies to the claims of the insured, not to claims of innocent third-parties that are injured by the insured’s tortuous acts. However, this argument is inapplicable here, since a mortgagee is not a third party but is tantamount to a first-party insured. Moreover, contract law governs the alleged wrongful acts of the insured rather than tort law.

Increasing the Effectiveness of an Insurance Claims Investigation

To conduct a more effective investigation when faced with mortgage fraud and foreclosure issues, the author encourages insurers, as part of their investigations, to check the sales history of the insured premises because several sales within a short period of time could indicate false, inflated values. Also, it is advisable to conduct a title search, checking with the local tax assessment office or recorder of deeds, to analyze the property’s ownership history and to ensure that the insured owns the property. Interviewing and completing background checks on the appraisers and real-estate brokers that were involved in a transaction are also advisable.

Finally, review information regarding recent comparable sales in the area, and other documents, such as tax assessments, to verify the property’s value. Reviewing a title history can help determine if a property has been sold multiple times within a short period, which could indicate that the property has been “flipped” and that the value is falsely inflated.

Time to Retire the ESOP from the 401k: Assessing the Liabilities of KSOP Structures in Light of ERISA Fiduciary Duties and Modern Alternatives

The National Law Review would like to congratulate Adam Dominic Kielich of Texas Wesleyan University School of Law as one of our 2010 Fall Student Legal Writing Contest Winners !!!

I. Introduction

401k plans represent the most common employer-sponsored retirement plans for employees of private employers. They have replaced defined benefit pension plans, as well as less flexible vehicles (such as ESOPs) as the primary retirement plan.¹ However; some of these plan models have continued their legacy through 401ks through structures that tie the two together or place one inside the other. A very common and notable example is the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). ESOPs are frequently offered by companies as an investment vehicle within 401ks that allow participants to invest in the employer’s stock as an alternative to the standard fund offerings that are pooled investments (e.g. mutual funds or institutional funds). Participants may be unaware that the company stock option in their 401k is a plan within a plan. These combination plans are sometimes referred to as KSOPs.²

Although this investment vehicle seems innocuous, KSOPs generate considerable risk to both participants and sponsors that warrants serious consideration in favor of abandoning the ESOP option. Participants face additional exposure in their retirement savings when they invest in a single company, rather than diversified investment vehicles that spread risk across many underlying investments. They may lack the necessary resources to determine the quality of this investment and invest beyond an appropriate risk level. Moreover, sponsors face substantial financial (and legal) risk by converting their plan participants into stockholders within the strict protections of ERISA.³ The risk is magnified by participant litigation driven by the two market downturns of the last decade. Given the growing risk, sponsors may best find themselves avoiding the risks of KSOPs by adopting a brokerage window feature (sometimes labeled self-directed brokerage accounts) following the decision in Hecker.⁴

II. Overview and History of ESOPs

A. ESOP Overview

ESOPs are employer-sponsored retirement plans that allow the employee to invest in company stock, often unitized, on a tax-deferred basis. They are qualified defined contribution plans under ERISA. As a standalone plan, ESOPs take tax deferred payroll contributions from employees to purchase shares in the ESOP, which in turn owns shares of the employer’s stock. That indirect ownership through the ESOP coverts participants into shareholders, which gives them shareholder rights and creates liabilities to the participants both as shareholders and as participants in an ERISA-protected plan. They may receive dividends, may have the option to reinvest dividends into the plan, and may be able to receive distributions of vested assets in cash or in-kind, dependent upon plan rules.⁵

ESOPs offer employers financial benefits: they create a way to add to employee benefit packages in a manner that is tax-advantaged while providing a vehicle to keep company stock in friendly hands – employees – and away from the hands of parties that may seek to take over the company or influence it through voting. Additionally, ESOPs create a consistent flow of stock periodically drawn out of the market, reducing supply and cushioning prices. Moreover, with those shares in the hands of employees, who tend to support their employer, there are fewer shares likely to vote against the company’s decision-makers or engage in shareholder activism.⁶

B. Brief Relevant History of ESOPs

ESOPs are generally less flexible and less advantageous to employees than 401ks. ESOPs lack loan options, offer a single investment option, typically lack a hardship or in-service distribution scheme and most importantly, lack diversification opportunities. Individual plans may adopt more restrictive rules to maintain funds within the plan as long as possible, as long as it is ERISA-compliant. Perhaps the most important consequence of that lack of diversity is that it necessarily ties retirement savings to the value of the company. If the company becomes insolvent or the share price declines without recovery, employees lose their retirement savings in the plan, and likely at least some of the pension benefits funded by the employer. The uneven distribution of benefits to employees helped pave the way for ERISA in 1974.⁷

C. Current State of Law on ESOPs

1. ESOPs Within 401k Plans

After the ERISA regulatory regime paved the way for 401k plans, employers began folding their ESOPs and other company stock offerings into the 401ks. For decades employers could mandate at least some plan assets had to be held in company stock. When corporate scandals and the dot com bubble burst in 2001, it evaporated significant retirement savings of participants heavily invested in their employer’s stock, often without their choice. Congress responded by including in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) by eliminating or severely restricting several permissible plan rules that require 401k assets in any company stock investment within 401k plans.⁸

2. ERISA Litigation of the 2000s

Participants who saw their 401k assets in company stock vehicles disappear with the stock price had difficulty recovering under ERISA until recent litigation changed how ERISA is construed for 401k plans. ERISA was largely written with defined benefit plans in mind. Defined benefit plans hold assets collectively in trust for the entire plan. Participants may have hypothetical individual accounts in some plan models, but they do not have actual individual accounts. ERISA required that suits brought by participants against the plan (or the sponsor, trust, or other agent of the plan) for negligence or malfeasance would represent claims for losses to the plan collectively for all participants, so any monetary damages would be awarded to the plan to benefit the participants collectively, similar to the shareholder derivative suit model. Damages were not paid to participants or used to increase the benefits payable under the plan.

Defined contribution plans with individual participant accounts, such as 401k plans and ESOPs, were grafted onto those rules. Therefore, any suit arising from an issue with the company stock in one of these plans meant participants could not be credited in their individual accounts relative to injuries sustained. It rendered participant suits meaningless in most cases because the likelihood of recovery was suspect at best.⁹

The Supreme Court affirmed this view in 1985 in Russell, and courts have consistently held that individual participants could not individually benefit from participant suits. Participants owning company stock through the plan could take part separately in suits as shareholders against the company, but these are distinguished from suits under ERISA. In 2008, the Supreme Court revisedRussell in LaRue and held that Russell only applied to defined benefit plans. Defined contribution plan participants could now bring claims individually or as a class and receive individual awards as participants. This shift represented new risks to sponsors that immediately arose with the market crash in 2007.¹⁰

III. Risks to Employees

The primary risk to employees is financial; a significant component of employee financial risk is the investment risk. 401k sponsors are required to select investments that are prudent for participant retirement accounts. This is why 401k plans typically include pooled investments; diversified investment options spread risk. ESOPs are accepted investments within 401k plans, although they are not diversified.¹¹ This increases the risk, and profit potential, participants can expose themselves to within their accounts. While added risk can be exponentially profitable to participants when the employer has rising stock prices or a bull market is present, the downside can also be significantly disastrous when the company fails to meet analyst expectations or the bears take over the markets.

Moreover, employees may be more inclined to invest in the employer’s stock than an independent investor would. Employees tend to be bullish about their employer for two reasons.¹² First, employees are inundated with positive comments from management while typically negative information is not disclosed or is given a positive spin. This commentary arises in an area not covered by ERISA, SEC, or FINRA regulations. This commentary is not treated as statements to shareholders; they arise strictly from the employment relationship. This removes much of the accountability and standards that otherwise are related to comments from the company to participants and shareholders. Management can, and should, seek to motivate its employees to perform as well as possible. While the merit of misleading employees about the quality of operations may be debatable, the ability to be positive to such an end is not.

Second, employees tend to believe in the quality of their employer, even if they espouse otherwise. They tend to believe the company is run by experienced professionals who are leading the company to long term success. Going to work each day, seeing the company operating and producing for its customers encourages belief that the company must be doing well. It can even develop into a belief that the employee has the inside edge on knowing how great the company is, although this belief is likely formed with little or no knowledge of the financial health of the company. The product of the internal and external pressures is a strong likelihood employees will invest in an ESOP over other investment options for ephemeral, rather than financial, reasons.¹³

Additionally, participants may have greater exposure to the volatility of company stock over other shareholders due to 401k plan restrictions. While some plans are liberally constructed to give participants more freedom and choice, some plans conversely allow participants few options. This is particularly relevant to the investment activity within participant accounts. Participants may be limited to a certain number of investment transfers per period (e.g. quarterly or annually), may be subject to excessive trade restrictions, or may even find themselves exposed to company stock through repayment of a loan that originated in whole or in part from assets in the ESOP. Additionally, the ESOP may have periodic windows that restrict when purchases or redemptions can occur. While a regular shareholder can trade in and out of a stock in seconds in an after-tax brokerage account, ESOP shareholders may find themselves hung out to dry by either the ESOP or 401k plan rules. These restrictions are not penal; they represent administrative decisions on behalf of the sponsor to avoid the added expense generally associated with more liberal rules.

Although employees take notable risk to their retirement savings portfolio by investing in ESOPs within their 401k plans, it can add up to a tremendous financial risk when viewed in the bigger picture of an employee’s overall financial picture. Employees absorb the biggest source of financial risk by nature of employment through the company because it is the major, if not sole, income stream during an employee’s working years. This risk increases if the employer is also the primary source of retirement assets or provides health insurance. The employee’s present and future financial well being is inherently tied directly to the employer’s financial well being. This risk is compounded if the employee also has stock grants, stock options, or other stock plans that keep assets solely tied to the value of the company stock. If the employee is fortunate enough to have a defined benefit plan (not withstanding PBGC coverage) or retirement health benefits through the company, then that will further tie the long term success of the company to the financial well being of the employee. Adding diversification in the retirement portfolio may be a worthwhile venture when those other factors are considered in a holistic fashion.

IV. Risks to the Sponsor

ERISA litigation is a serious risk and concern to sponsors. Although there is exposure in other areas related to participants as stockholders, ERISA establishes higher standards towards participants than companies otherwise have towards shareholders. Sponsors once were able to protect themselves under ERISA but since LaRue participants have an open door to reach the sponsor to recover losses related to the administration of the plan.¹⁴ ERISA requires sponsors to make available investment options that are prudent for 401k plans. The dormant side of that rule requires sponsors to remove investment options that have fallen below the prudent standard. Company stock is not excluded from this requirement.¹⁵

Any time the market value of the stock declines, the sponsor is at risk for participant losses for failure to remove the ESOP (or other company stock investment option) as an imprudent investment within the plan. Participants are enticed to indemnify losses through the sponsor. Such a suit is unlikely to succeed when the loss is short term and negligible, or the value declined in a market-wide downturn. However, as prior market downturns indicate, investors look to all possible avenues to indemnify their losses by bringing suits against brokers, advisors, fund companies, and issuers of their devalued assets. There is no reason to believe that participants would not be enticed to try this route; LaRuewas born out of the downturn in the early 2000s.¹⁶

The exposure for sponsors runs from additional costs to mount a defense to massive monetary awards to indemnify participants for losses. In cases where participants are unlikely to recover, sponsors still must finance the defense against what often turns into expensive, class action litigation or a long serious of suits. However, there is a serious risk of sponsors having to pay damages, or settle, cases where events have led to a unique loss in share value. Participants have filed suit under the theory that the sponsor failed to remove imprudent investment options in a timely fashion. BP 401k participants filed suit following the gulf oil leak under a similar theory that the sponsor failed to remove the company stock investment option from the plan, knowing that it would have to pay clean up costs and settlements. While it remains to be seen if these participants will be successful, they surely will not the last to try.¹⁷

Sponsors should take a good, long look at the ESOP to determine whether the sponsor receives more reward than risk – particularly future risk – from its inclusion. The risk to a company does not have as severe as the situation BP faced this year. Even bankruptcy or mismanagement that results in serious stock decline can merit suit when the sponsor fails to immediately withdraw the ESOP, since it has prior knowledge of the bankruptcy or mismanagement prior to any public release.

To hedge these risks, sponsors can adopt several options. First, sponsors may limit the percentage of any account that may be held in company stock. This is easily justified as the sponsor taking a position in favor of diversification and responsible execution of fiduciary duties. While this may not completely absolve the sponsor of the duty to remove imprudent investment options, it does act as a limit on liability. Although it does provide some protection against risk, it is an imperfect solution.

Second, ESOP plans can adopt pricing structures to discourage holding large positions of company stock for the purpose of day trading. Some 401k plans allow participants to trade between company stock and cash equivalents without restraint. When the ESOP determines share pricing based on the closing price of the underlying stock, it creates a window where participants can play the company stock very differently than the constraints of most 401k investment options.

It is a very alluring reason to take advantage of the plan structure by taking an oversized position in company stock. Add the possibility to indemnify losses in court and it becomes even more desirable. The process is simple: participants can check the trading price minutes before the market closes. If the stock price is higher than the basis, they sell and net profit. If it is below, they hold the stock and try against each day until the sale is profitable. They will then buy back into the ESOP on a dip and repeat the process. This is distinguishable from the standard diversified fund options in 401k plans, where ignorance of the underlying investments preempts the ability to game closing prices. Funds generally discourage day trading – and may even carry redemption fees to penalize it – and encourage long term investing strategies more consistent with the objective of retirement accounts.

Available solutions are directly tied to the cause of the problem; changing the ESOP pricing scheme can eliminate gaming closing prices. ESOPs can adopt other pricing schemes such as average weighted pricing and next day order fulfillment. Average weighted pricing gives participants the average weighted prices of all transactions in the stock, executed that day, by a given entity. For example, if the ESOP is held with Broker X as the trustee, it may rely upon Broker X to provide the prices and volumes of all of its executed orders that day in the stock, which is used to determine the average weighted price participants will receive that day. Alternately, participants could be required to place orders on one day and have the order fulfilled on the following day’s closing with that day’s closing price. Both of these pricing schemes introduce some mystery into the price that diminishes gaming the closing price. This is also an imperfect solution, even if combined with the first option, because it maintains the risks of the ESOP.

Sponsors may also take advantage of brokerage windows to expand employee investment options, including company stock, without the risks afforded to ESOPs. Brokerage windows create brokerage accounts within 401k plans. The brokerage window is not an investment in itself; it is a shell that allows employees to reach through the window to access other investments. Sponsors found good reason to be suspicious of brokerage windows, seeing it as liability for all the available investments that could be deemed imprudent for retirement accounts. A minute minority of participants saw it as a way to have their cake and eat it too during the last rise and fall of the markets; they could invest more aggressively within their 401ks and then demand sponsors indemnify their losses when the markets gave up years of gains on the basis of sponsor failure to review the available contents of the window under the prudence standard.

However, in Deere the court handed down a critcal decision: sponsors could not be responsible for the choices made by participants within brokerage windows. InDeere, several Deere & Co. (John Deere) employees sued the company for making available investments that were imprudent for 401k accounts that caused substantial losses in the 2007 market downturn. John Deere had not reviewed the thousands of available options under the ERISA prudence standard. Although the plaintiffs’ theory was a compelling interpretation of ERISA duties, the court rejected the theory on two grounds. First, it would be impossible for any sponsor to review every investment available through the window. Second, participants had taken ownership of the responsibility to review their investment decisions by choosing to invest through the window.¹⁸

Following the court’s decision in Deere, brokerage windows gained new life as a means for sponsors to expand investment availability at less risk. Rather than having to review a menu of funds and company stock for prudence under ERISA, sponsors can justifiably limit the fund selection directly offered through the plan and leave the rest of the options to the brokerage window. Importantly, this includes offering company stock in the window. By utilizing the brokerage window, sponsors allow access to the company stock without the liabilities of offering an ESOP through the plan. The sponsor will likely lose out on any benefits received from the ESOP, although for most established employers ESOPs are likely more of a convenience factor and a legacy offering rooted in the history of employer-sponsored plans.

Although Deere foreclosed participant abuse of brokerage windows, this option is not without its own negative aspects. Future litigation may reestablish some liability upon the sponsor for the brokerage link. Sponsors may face alternate liability under ERISA for selecting a brokerage window with excessive commissions or fees, similar to requirements for funds under ERISA.¹⁹ Given the flurry of awareness brought to 401k management fees and revenue sharing agreements between sponsors and fund providers following the market crash in 2007, it is likely that brokerage windows will be the hot ticket for participants in the next market crash. Therefore, sponsors should preemptively guard against future litigation by reviewing available brokerage window options to make sure any fees or commissions are reasonable and the categories of investment options are reasonable (even if specific investments in those categories are not).

Perhaps a lesser concern, sponsors need to consider overall plan operation and any negative impacts that may arise from shifting to a brokerage window-based investment offering. These concerns may be less of a legal risk issue than a risk of participant discontent and dealing with those effects. There are primarily two areas that brokerage windows can create discontent. First, when participants want to move from a fund to the brokerage window, they must wait for the sale to settle from the fund and transfer to the window, which generally makes the money available in the window the day after the fund processes the order. Conversely, selling investments in the window may delay transferring money into plan funds because of settlement periods and the added delay of settlement with the fund once the funds are available to move out of the window. Additionally, the settlement periods within the window may frustrate participants, although the plan has no control over those timeframes. Those natural delays in processing the movement of money may create discontent, especially for those participants trying to invest based upon short term market conditions.

Second, those same processes and delays can negatively affect plan distributions. Many plans offer loans and withdrawal schemes, and while sponsors may have their own reasons for making those options available, participants often use those offerings to finance emergency financial needs. Brokerage windows can complicate and delay releasing money to participants. Settlement periods will create delays; if money has to be transferred out of the window to another investment to make those funds available for a distribution that will add at least one more day before money can be released. If participants find themselves in illiquid investments, the money may not be able to move for a distribution at all. Although these issues may not be of legal significance but they will be significant to the people responsible for absorbing participant complaints and there may be additional expenses created in handling those issues.

An additional concern is that the Department of Labor (DOL) is still fleshing out several requirements surrounding brokerage windows and how they relate to ERISA requirements. For example, the DOL October 2010 modification of 401k disclosure rules affects plans as a whole, but it leaves open several areas of ambiguity around the specific effects on brokerage windows. Sponsors may face continuing financial costs complying and determining how to comply with DOL requirements. Future changes in the regulations may negatively affect plans that rely heavily on brokerage windows to provide access to a greater range of investment options.²⁰

These considerations are not exhaustive to the benefits or risks of either ESOPs or brokerage windows, they merely highlight some of the more salient points as they relate generally to the legal and significant financial benefits and risks to sponsors. There may be additional concerns equally salient to sponsors given their particular situation, such as participant suspicion of the removal of the ESOP or unwillingness at the executive level to retire the ESOP.

V. Conclusion

Although brokerage windows may open the door to some new liabilities, it closes the door to the risks of ESOPs, for both participants and sponsors. Sponsor diligence in administering retirement plans will always be the most successful method of checking liability; however, as discussed ESOPs risk putting sponsors in an unwinnable position. Removing the company stock option may not be the most beneficial option in all cases but it may be time for sponsors to consider retiring the ESOP from the 401k in light of the current regulatory regime. A brokerage window option is well suited to take advantage of participant ownership of the employer’s stock, as well as other investment opportunities, while limiting the risk that normally accompanies that ownership. Ultimately, sponsors must consider what is best for the plan and its participants over both the short term and the long term.

Endnotes.

1. Chris Farrell, The 401(k) Turns Thirty Years Old, Bloomberg Businessweek Special Report, Mar. 15, 2010,http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/mar2010/pi20100312_874138.htm.

2. National Center for Employee Ownership401(k) Plans as Employee Ownership Vehicles, Alone and in Combination with ESOPs, (no date provided),http://www.nceo.org/main/article.php/id/15/.

3. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2010); the term “sponsor” can be used interchangeably with “employer” for purposes of this discussion, however there are some situations where the employer is not the sponsor, such as union plans, or the employer is not the sole sponsor in the case of multi-employer plans. This discussion relates to KSOPs where the sponsor is the employer. Different rules and different liability may apply to other plan structures.

4. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 590 (7^th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).

5. Todd S. Snyder, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs): Legislative History, Congressional Research Service, May 20, 2003.

6. William N. Pugh et al. The Effect of ESOP Adoptions on Corporate Performance: Are There Really Performance Changes?, 21Managerial & Decision Econ., 167, 167-180 (2000).

7. Supra note 5.

8. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 901, 29 U.S.C. 401 (2010).

9. LaRue v. DeWitt, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 254-55 (2008).

10. Id. at 255-56.

11. Shlomo Benartzi et al., The Law and Economic of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 50 J.L. & Econ. 45, 45-79 (2007).

12. Id.

13. Id.

14. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 254-55.

15. § 1104.

16. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250-51.

17. E.g., In Re: BP P.L.C. Securities Litigation, MDL No. 2185, 2010 WL 3238321 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010).

18. Hecker, 556 F.3dat 590.

19. §1104.

20. 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (2010).

Introduction

The Basics

Who Is Affected by the PTFA?

What Are the Effective Dates of the Act?

What Requirements Are Imposed on an Immediate Successor in Interest?

Reading Between the Lines: The Details Behind the PTFA

What Responsibilities Do Tenants Owe to their New Landlords?

The Successor Has the Burden of Proving that an Occupant Is Not a Bona Fide Tenant.

Can Tenants File Suit Against Successors For Violating the PTFA?

Is the New Landlord Responsible for the old Security Deposit?

Can a Successor Terminate a Lease Early Using “Cash for Keys”?

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ATTEND AND LEARN ABOUT:

Register By Friday March 25th and Save:

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I. Trustee’s Sale.

A. The Trustee.

B. Initial Procedures.

C. Notice.

D. Advertisement.

E. The Sale.

F. Settlement and Accounting.

G. Advantages and Disadvantages.

II. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure.

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Mexican Bankruptcy Considerations

Like the U.S. Before the UCC

The Nonpossessory Pledge and the Guaranty Trust

UNCITRAL and the OAS Encourage Registry Reforms

Mexico’s 2009 Commercial Code Amendments and Creation of the RUG

New Registry Regulations

Preventive Filings

Information to be Provided in Filings through the RUG

Using the RUG

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Background

The Chancery Court’s Decision

Take-Aways for Creditors of LLCs

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What is CERCLA?

What happens after a lender forecloses and becomes the actual owner of the property?

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Legal Issues and Developing Law

Insurable Interest by the Insured

Mortgagee’s Duty to Notify Insurer of Foreclosure Proceedings

Mortgage Fraud and the Insurer’s Right of Rescission

Rescission of the Mortgagee’s Right of Recovery

Increasing the Effectiveness of an Insurance Claims Investigation

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I. Introduction

II. Overview and History of ESOPs

A. ESOP Overview

B. Brief Relevant History of ESOPs

C. Current State of Law on ESOPs

1. ESOPs Within 401k Plans

2. ERISA Litigation of the 2000s

III. Risks to Employees

IV. Risks to the Sponsor

V. Conclusion

Endnotes.

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