Oil Pollution Act: Tips for Spill Response, Compliance, and Enforcement

Oil spills commonly occur when least expected and, even in smaller quantities can significantly disrupt business operations and create risks for enforcement and/or litigation. It’s important that companies are prepared and know the environmental requirements for when the least expected happens, including understanding what actually is “oil” (hint: it’s broader than you might think!), who to notify, legal authorities at play, and best practices to ensure compliance and minimize exposure to regulators and/or private parties.

What is “Oil” Anyway?

Section 311 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) make up the federal statutory framework for oil spills. However, many companies may not realize that both petroleum-based and non-petroleum-based substances are regulated as “oil” under the CWA and OPA. As a result, many companies may not realize that they are subject to these laws and, therefore, fail to adequately prepare for compliance and/or response both pre- and post-spill.

Specifically, Section 311(a)(1) of the CWA defines oil as “oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil.” 40 CFR § 112.2 further defines oil as “oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to: fats, oils, or greases of animal, fish, or marine mammal origin; vegetable oils, including oils from seeds, nuts, fruits, or kernels; and, other oils and greases, including petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, synthetic oils, mineral oils, oil refuse, or oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil.” This definition is notably broader than what many may consider “oil” (i.e., crude oil and refined petroleum products) and encompasses animal fats, vegetable oils, and non-petroleum oils.

When to Notify?

The CWA and OPA require companies to notify the National Response Center (NRC) of oil spills as soon as they are discovered (i.e., within 15 minutes). This applies to all discharges that reach navigable waters of the U.S. (WOTUS) or adjoining shorelines and (1) cause a sheen; (2) violate applicable water quality standards; or (3) cause a sludge or emulsion beneath the surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines. In practice, this typically results from a sheen, which 40 C.F.R. § 110.1 defines as an “iridescent appearance on the surface of water.” The Oil Pollution Prevention regulations (discussed further below) also identify discharges from regulated facilities that require reporting, though there are exceptions—for example, when the discharge is in compliance with a permit under Section 402 of the CWA.

Under state and local laws, notification may be much more stringent. For example, California requires immediate reporting of “any significant release or threatened release” of a hazardous material, which includes oil. This can be subjective and requires a fact- and legal-specific evaluation of whether the release qualifies as “threatened” and/or “significant.” In Georgia, immediate notification is required either when the oil creates a “significant sheen on top of state waters” or when the amount discharged is unknown—further creating different criteria for when reporting is required. Regardless of what triggers notification, it is important that companies understand that different agencies—federal, state, and local—may each have different reporting requirements, and accurate and timely reporting is absolutely crucial. Often, failure to timely report is the first violation sought by agencies and can result in increased penalties and additional scrutiny.

What Authorities Are at Play?

At the federal level, two agencies primarily exercise authority over oil spills—the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Coast Guard (CG). Depending on the location of the spill, the EPA or CG may lead federal oversight with the EPA overseeing inland spills and CG overseeing offshore spills. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and Federal Railroad Administration may also exercise authority for pipeline or railroad releases, respectively.

As mentioned above, Section 311 of the CWA and OPA—enacted in 1990 in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill—make up the federal statutory framework for oil spills. In practice, these authorities are best categorized into two areas: (1) oil spill response; and (2) oil spill prevention and preparedness. It is important for companies to understand the expectations for both (discussed in more detail below), and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (often referred to as the National Contingency Plan or NCP), which outlines the federal government’s cleanup strategy for responding to oil spills, including other cleanups under CERCLA. The goal of the NCP is to ensure that resources are available and responses are consistent. Thus, when the federal government oversees a cleanup, the federal On-Scene Coordinator will expect that all response efforts, including those conducted by the responsible party, are consistent with the NCP.

At the state level, most utilize their respective water laws to address oil spills, though some states, like Louisiana, have laws comparable to OPA. At the local level, municipalities have notification and emergency response authorities that will be applicable. In the end, it’s very important that companies understand that several layers of government may have some form of oversight depending on the size, impact, and location of an oil spill.

OPA v. CWA

While the CWA and OPA are complimentary, including OPA amending the CWA, companies should understand the goals and implications of both. Generally, the CWA focuses on oil spill enforcement for cleanups and penalties, and the OPA broadens national and regional capability for preventing, responding to, and paying for oil spills.

For the CWA, Section 311(b)(3) expressly prohibits the discharge of oil (or hazardous substances) into or upon WOTUS and adjoining shorelines in quantities that may be harmful.1 For oil, this generally means discharges to WOTUS that cause sheening or violate applicable water quality standards. Sections 311(c) and (e) of the CWA provide extensive authority to the federal government to respond to these discharges, including threatened discharges, by issuing orders—either unilaterally or by consent—to owners, operators, or persons in charge of the facility from which the discharge occurs.

Sections 311(b)(6) and (7) of the CWA further empower the federal government to pursue significant penalties—both administrative and civil—for spills that reach WOTUS and/or when responsible parties fail to comply with an order. If gross negligence or willful misconduct is involved, you can expect even greater penalties—commonly more than three-fold—not to mention possible criminal liability. Internally, the EPA utilizes the Civil Penalty Policy for Sections 311(b)(3) and (j) of the CWA and factors outlined in Section 311(b)(8) of the CWA, including the seriousness of the violation, economic benefit to the responsible party, history of prior violations, and efforts to minimize or mitigate the discharge, to evaluate enforcement and penalty calculations.

Akin to the CWA, Section 2702(a) of OPA also makes responsible parties liable for removal costs and natural resource damages resulting from any discharge of oil, including a substantial threat of discharge, to WOTUS and adjoining shorelines. Notably, this includes not only costs incurred by the federal government, but also costs or damages to private parties, including damages for the loss of personal property, loss of revenues/profits due to injury, and cost of additional services during or after a spill. OPA further aims to strengthen national and regional response strategies, amend the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, require facilities to develop prevention and response plans, and establish a fund for damages and cleanup costs—each discussed below.

While it is typically always the priority of the federal government to have responsible parties pay for and conduct their own spill cleanups, when a responsible party is unknown, unable, or refuses to pay, funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) can be utilized to pay for the response. The OSLTF is managed by the CG’s National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) and the NPFC thereby manages any oversight or cleanup costs incurred by the federal government. Thus, if an oil spill occurs at your facility and the federal government incurs costs responding or overseeing, the NPFC will be the entity that seeks recovery of those costs—even if the EPA later pursues penalties for the same discharge pursuant to Sections 311(b)(6) and (7) of the CWA. In addition, when a non-liable party performs a cleanup or incurs damages as a result of an oil spill, that party may file a claim for reimbursement directly against the responsible party and/or seek reimbursement from the NPFC.

Lastly, regarding liability, both the CWA and OPA are strict liability and provide limited liability defenses for acts of God, acts of war, or acts/omissions of third parties—comparable to CERCLA. Even so, it’s important to note that Section 309(g)(6) of the CWA states that the federal government may not seek enforcement, including penalties, if the state “has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action” under a comparable state law. This includes issuing a final order or directing a responsible party to pay a penalty. As mentioned above, states typically pursue oil spill violations via their respective water laws, which may be considered comparable. State penalties may often be substantially less than those sought by the federal government—thus, early engagement with the state can be advantageous depending on the circumstances.

Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations

Section 311(j) of the CWA and OPA, as outlined in 40 C.F.R. Part 112, require facilities that store oil in significant quantities to prepare Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plans to prevent accidental releases from reaching WOTUS or adjoining shorelines. Facilities with a greater risk of release and impact to WOTUS may also be required to develop a Facility Response Plan (FRP) to prepare for “worst-case spills.” At the outset, companies should confirm whether these regulations are applicable to their operations and facilities.

SPCC plans are required for facilities that are: (1) non-transportation-related (i.e., they store, process, or consume oil rather than simply move it from one facility to another); and (2) collectively store more than 1,320 gallons of oil above ground or 42,000 gallons below ground that could reasonably be expected to discharge oil to a WOTUS or adjoining shorelines. This can include oil drilling and production facilities, oil refineries, industrial, commercial, and agricultural facilities storing/using oil, facilities that transfer oil via pipelines or tank trucks (including airports), and facilities that sell or distribute oil, like marinas. Practically, these regulations require facilities to have a written plan certified by a professional engineer (apart from qualified facilities), maintain adequate secondary containment for oil storage, maintain updated lists of the federal, state, and local agencies that must be contacted in case of a spill, and follow regular inspection requirements, among other requirements.

In addition to SPCC, FRP plans are required for facilities that could reasonably expect to cause “substantial harm” to the environment by discharging oil into or upon WOTUS. They either have: (1) total oil storage capacity greater than or equal to 42,000 gallons and transfer oil over water to/from vessels; or (2) total oil storage capacity greater than or equal to 1 million gallons and either do not have sufficient secondary containment, are located at a distance such that a discharge could cause “injury” to habitat or shut down a drinking water intake, or within the past five years, have had a reportable discharge greater than or equal to 10,000 gallons. If so, given that FRP is self-identifiable, the facility must prepare and submit its FRP plan to its applicable EPA regional office. Among other things, these plans include evaluating , medium, and worst-case discharge scenarios, descriptions and records of self-inspections, drills, and response training, and diagrams of the facility site plan, drainage, and evacuation plan.

EPA commonly conducts inspections at subject facilities to ensure that SPCC and FRP plans are effectively implemented. Should your facility have an oil spill, plan on an inspection very soon to evaluate compliance and mitigation efforts with your respective requirements.

Suggested Actions

Beyond being aware of the above implications and requirements, below are several actions to consider to ensure compliance and minimize possible enforcement and/or litigation when the least expected occurs.

  • Act Fast: Should an oil spill occur, regardless of size, act fast to respond, mitigate, and determine if notification is required. This includes immediate internal coordination with those responsible for responding, as well as outreach to your environment counsel and/or consultant. If the determination for reporting is close, it is recommended that you report (with a qualified caveat) rather than withhold.
  • Education and Training: Ensure your staff is trained to effectively respond to, report, and prevent oil spills. Oil spills happen despite best attempts otherwise. When the inevitable happens, make sure facility staff are prepared to respond and mitigate the potential impacts of the spill, including having spill reporting hotlines and other contact numbers easily accessible and staff trained on where all information is located. Also, learn from past spills and/or near spills by conducting evaluations and identifying lessons learned to be utilized to prevent future spills.
  • Prepare for Outside Communication: If the spill is significant or causes public impacts, be prepared for outreach by the public, including local news and community groups. Notifications to the NRC are available online and impacts to public or private property often lead to alerts to local news and organizations. Ensure your public affairs contact(s) are aware and develop necessary communication, including desk statements, should the spill create public attention.
  • Review Compliance: Evaluate your current compliance with federal, state, or local requirements, including the development, assessment, and update (if needed) of SPCC and/or FRP response plans. This includes determining if either or both are required at your facility. Should a spill occur, it is important to make sure your response plans are up-to-date and ready for implementation.
  • Regular Audits and Updates: Periodically audit your spill response and prevention measures (SPCC and FRP plans), including any changes to facility operations, secondary containment features, or volumes of oil stored, to identify and correct inaccuracies and ensure that your plans are up-to-date. For FRP, this includes submitting updates to the appropriate EPA regional office within 60 days of each change that may materially affect the response to a worst-case discharge.
  • Insurance: Though not always necessary, consider appropriate insurance coverage to mitigate potential financial liabilities.
  • Consultation: If you have any doubts about your obligations during an oil spill or need assistance with compliance, please do not hesitate to contact your environment counsel or consultants for guidance and support.

1 While this discussion focuses on the impacts of oil spills, it’s important to remember that Section 311 of the CWA (though not OPA) also applies to hazardous substances—discharges to a WOTUS that exceed a reportable quantity pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 117.3—though the federal government may typically utilize the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), or combination thereof, to pursue such releases.

Top Risks for Businesses in 2024

Just weeks into 2024, it is already clear that uncertainty will be the watchword. Will the economic soft landing of 2023 persist into 2024? Will labor unrest, strong in 2023, settle down as inflation cools? Will inflation remain tamed? Will the U.S. elections bring continuity or a new administration with very different views on the role of the U.S. in the world and in regulating business?

Uncertainty is also fueling a complex risk environment that will require monitoring global developments more so than in the past. As outlined below, geopolitical risks are present, multiple, interconnected and high impact. International relations have traditionally fallen outside the mandate of most C-Suites, but how the U.S. government responds to geopolitical challenges will impact business operations. Beyond additional disruptions to global trade, businesses in 2024 will face risks associated with expanding protectionist economic policies, climate change impacts, and AI-driven disruptors.

Geopolitical Tensions Disrupting Global Trade

The guardrails are coming off the international system that enshrines the ideals of preserving peace and security through diplomatic engagement, respecting international borders (not changing them through military might) and ensuring the free flow of global trade. In 2022, the world was shocked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it has taken time for the full impact to reverberate through the international system. While political analysts write on a “spillover of conflict,” the more insidious impact is that more leaders of countries and non-state groups are acting outside the guardrails because they are no longer deterred from using military force to achieve political goals, making 2024 ripe for new military conflicts disrupting global trade beyond the ongoing war in Europe.

In October 2023, Hamas launched a war from Gaza against Israel. Thus far, fighting has spread to the West Bank, between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in the north, and to the Red Sea, with Iranian-backed Houthis attacking shipping through the strategic Bab al Mandab strait. Container ships and oil tankers, to avoid the risks, are re-routing to the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks of extra sailing time, with the associated costs. Insurance premiums for cargo ships sailing in the eastern Mediterranean have skyrocketed, with some no longer servicing Israeli ports. Companies and retailers with tight delivery schedules are switching to airfreight, which is expected to drive up airfreight rates.

Iran, emboldened by its blossoming relationship with Russia as one of Moscow’s new arms suppliers, is activating its proxy armies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to attack Western targets. In a two-day period in January 2024, the Iran Revolutionary Guards directly launched strikes in Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Nuclear-armed Pakistan retaliated with a cross border strike in Iran. While there are many nuances to these incidents, it is evident that deterrence against cross-border military conflict is eroding in a region with deep, festering grievances among neighbors. Iran is in an escalatory mode and could resume harassing shipping in the Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where about a fifth of the volume of the world’s total oil consumption passes through on a daily basis.

In East Asia, North Korea is also emboldened by the changing geopolitical environment. Pyongyang, too, has become a major supplier of weaponry to Moscow for use in Ukraine. While Russia (and China) in the past have constructively contained North Korean predilection for aggression against its neighbors, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un may believe the time is ripe to change the status quo. Ominously, in a Jan. 15 speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly (North Korea’s parliament), Kim rejected the policy of reunification with South Korea and proposed incorporating the country into North Korea “in the event of war.” While North Korean leaders frequently revert to brinksmanship and aggressive language, Kim’s speech reflects confidence of a nuclear power, aligned with Russia against a shared adversary – South Korea, which is firmly aligned with the G7 consensus on Russia. A war in the Korean peninsula would be felt around the world because East Asia is central to global shipping and manufacturing, disrupting supply chains, as well as the regional economy.

China is also waiting for the right moment to “unite” Taiwan with the mainland. Beijing has seen the impact of Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine and has been deterred from aiding the Russian war effort. In many ways, China has benefited from these sanctions and the reorientation of global trade. Also, Russia, with its far weaker economy, has proven surprisingly resilient to sanctions, another lesson for China. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese people voted in January and returned for a third time the ruling party that strongly rejects Chinese territorial claims. Tensions are high, with the Chinese military once again harassing Taiwanese defenses. For Beijing, the “right moment” could fall this year should conflict break out on the Korean peninsula, which would tie the U.S. down because of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The uncertainty here is not that there are global tensions, but how the U.S. will respond as they develop and how U.S. businesses can navigate external shocks. Will the U.S. be drawn into a new war in the Middle East? Can the U.S. manage multiple conflicts, already deeply involved in supporting Ukraine? Is the U.S. economy resilient enough to withstand trade disruptions? How can businesses strengthen their own resiliency?

Economic Protectionism Increasing Costs and Risks

Geopolitical tensions, the global pandemic and the unequal benefits of globalization are impacting economic policies of the U.S. and the political discourse around the merits of unrestrained free trade. Protectionist economic policies are creeping in, under the nomenclature of “secure supply chains,” “friend-shoring” and “home-shoring.” The U.S. has imposed tariffs on countries (even allies) accused of unfair trade practices and has foreclosed access to certain technologies by unfriendly countries, namely China.

While the response to some of these trade restrictions are new trade agreements with “friends” to regulate access under preferred terms, in essence creating multiple “friends” trade blocs for specific sectors, other responses are retaliatory, including counter tariffs and export restrictions or outright bans. In 2024, the U.S. economy will see the impact of these trade fragmentation policies in acute ways, with upside risks of new business opportunities and downside risks of supply chain disruptions, critical resource competition, increased input costs, compliance risks and increased reputational risks.

Trade with China, which remains significant and important to the stability of the U.S. economy, will pose new risks in 2024. While Washington and Beijing have agreed to some political and security guardrails to manage the relationship, economic competition is unrestrained and stability in the bilateral relations is not guaranteed. The December 2023 bipartisan report by the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, with its 150 recommendations on fundamentally resetting economic and technological competition with China, if even partially adopted, risks reigniting the trade war.

2024 is a presidential election year for the U.S. A change of control of the executive branch could result in many economic and regulatory policy reversals. The definition of “friend” could shift or narrow. Restrictions on trade with China could accelerate.

Impacts of Climate Change and Sustainability Policies

2023 was the hottest year on record, and El Niño conditions are expected to further boost the warming trend. Many regions experienced record-breaking wildfire activity in 2023, including Canada where 18 million hectares of land burned. Extreme storms caused life-threatening flooding in Europe, Asia and the Americas. 2024 is expected to bring even more climate hazards. The impacts will be physical and financial, including growing insurance losses and adverse impacts on operations and value chain. Analysts expect that in 2024, the economic and financial costs of adverse health impacts from climate change will increase, with risks related to the spread of infectious disease, insufficient access to clean water, and physical harm to the elderly and vulnerable. The direct economic effect will be on health systems, but also loss of productivity due to extreme weather incidents and effects of epidemics.

Energy transition to low-carbon emissions is underway in the U.S., but it is uneven and still uncertain. The financial market is investing in an impressive number of startups and large-scale projects revolving around cleantech. Still, there is hesitancy on the opportunity and risks of sustainability. Thus far, progress towards sustainability goals has been private sector-led and government-enabled. There is a risk that government incentive programs encouraging the transition to low-carbon energy could be reversed or curtailed under a new administration.

In 2024, some companies will face more climate disclosure compliance requirements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is expected to release its final rule on climate change disclosures. The final action has been delayed several times because of pushback by public companies on some of the requirements, including Scope 3 greenhouse gas emission disclosures (those linked to supply chains and end users). California has not waited for the SEC’s final rule: In October 2023, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law legislation that will require large companies to disclose greenhouse gas emissions. The California climate laws go into effect in 2026, but companies will need to start much earlier to build the capabilities to plan, track and report their carbon footprint. For U.S. companies doing business in the European Union, they will need to comply with the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, with the rules coming into force mid-2024.

Disruptive Technology

In 2023, generative AI was the talk of the town; in 2024, it will be the walk. Companies are popping up with new tools for every imaginable sector, to increase efficiency, task automation, customization, personalization and cost reduction. Business leaders are scrambling to integrate AI to gain a competitive edge, while navigating the everyday risks related to privacy, liability and security. While there are concerns that AI will displace humans, there is a growing consensus that while some jobs will disappear, people will focus on higher value work. That said, new rounds of labor disruptions linked to workforce transition are likely in 2024.

2024 will also bring AI-generated misinformation and disinformation. Bad actors will spread “synthetic” content, such as sophisticated voice cloning, doctored images and counterfeit websites, seeking to manipulate people, damage companies and economies, and foment dissent.

In 2024, around 2 billion people in more than 50 countries will vote in elections at risk of manipulation by misinformation and disinformation, which could destabilize the real and perceived legitimacy of newly elected governments, risking political unrest, violence, terrorism and erosion of democratic processes. Large democracies will hold elections in 2024, including the U.S., the EU, Mexico, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Africa. Synthetic content can be very difficult to detect, while easy to produce with AI tools.

This is not a theoretical threat; synthetic content is already being disseminated in the U.S., targeting New Hampshire voters with robocalls that share fake recorded messages from President Biden encouraging people not to vote in the primary election. The U.S. is already polarized with citizens distrustful of the government and media, a ready vulnerability. Businesses are not immune. Notably, CEOs have stood apart, with higher ratings for trustworthiness and risk being called upon to vouch for “truth” (and becoming collateral damage in the fray).

AI-powered malware will make 2023 cyber risks look like child’s play. Attackers can use AI algorithms to find and exploit software vulnerabilities, making attacks precise and effective. AI can help hackers quickly identify security measures and evade them. AI-created phishing attacks will be more sophisticated and difficult to detect because the algorithms can assess larger amounts of piecemeal information and craft messages that mimic communication styles.

The role of states backing cyber armies to spread disinformation or steal information is growing and is part and parcel of the erosion of the existing international order. States face little deterrence from digital cross-border attacks because there are yet to be established mechanisms to impose real costs.

As Foretold, California’s New Forced Speech Laws Are Being Challenged

Last year, I commented on the likely unconstitutionality of two California laws compelling forced speech:

The California legislature has of late adopted the tactic of driving behavior by compelling speech. SB 253 (Wiener), for example, compels disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions and SB 261 (Stern) requires disclosure of climate-related financial risks. Both of these requirements clearly compel speech arguably in contravention of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006) (“Some of this Court’s leading First Amendment precedents have established the principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.”).

I had previously noted that SB 253 was very similar to an earlier bill that did not make it into law.

Yesterday, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and several others filed suit in the Central District Court challenging these laws. In its complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the “State’s plan for compelling speech to combat climate change is unconstitutional – twice over.” The plaintiffs urge the court to apply “strict scrutiny” to both laws because they compel speech about a controversial subject – climate change. If the court applies strict scrutiny, the bills would be presumptively unconstitutional and may be upheld only by proof that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. That is an exceedingly high hill to climb.

Because both bills quite obviously violate basic free speech rights, the question arises whether the authors knew or were grossly negligent in not knowing of the constitutional infirmities of the legislation. In 2020, I wrote Senator Wiener, the author of SB 253, that SB 260, “abridges free speech rights guaranteed by the U.S. and California Constitutions”. At the time, I was distressed that the legislative analyses for SB 260 failed to mention the constitutional infirmities of the bill. See Legislators Again Kept In Dark About Constitutional Infirmities Of Climate Corporate Accountability Act and Legislators Again Kept In Dark About Constitutional Infirmities of Climate Corporate Accountability Act.

For more news on California Free Speech Laws regarding Climate Change, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

CalRecycle Seeks Stakeholder Feedback on Single-Use Packaging EPR Program

Tomorrow, February 1, the California Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery (CalRecycle) will host a hybrid question and answer session to discuss the draft rulemaking on their extended producer responsibility (EPR) program, as discussed below. A 45-day public comment period will follow. Members of the regulated community who wish to attend can find in-person and virtual information on the session here.

Members of B&D’s Plastics and Packaging team will attend the public meeting and will be prepared to answer any questions clients and contacts may have. A more substantive update on what to expect from CalRecycle and the rulemaking process is forthcoming.

Background

In June 2022, the California legislature passed a transformational law creating an EPR program with ambitious goals to ensure 100% of single-use packaging and plastic food ware is recyclable or compostable by 2032. The law creates responsibility for producers, typically manufacturers that are brand owners (although it applies to others as well), to join a producer responsibility organization (PRO) that will develop a plan to implement the law, including raising $5 billion from industry members over 10 years. CalRecycle has selected the Circular Action Alliance (CAA) as the PRO and is developing regulations to implement the law.

Companies potentially impacted by the SB 54 regulations should monitor the rulemaking process and prepare to submit comments within the upcoming 45-day public comment period. To receive periodic updates on CalRecycle’s implementation of SB 54, subscribe to the Agency’s SB 54 listserv here.

PFAS MDL Settlements: Red Herrings For Downstream Companies

Leading up to the aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) MDL litigation bellwether trial in June 2023, questions circulated regularly about the end game for the water utilities that had filed lawsuits alleging PFAS contamination to drinking water. With several hundred utilities with pending lawsuits seeking the costs for technology needed to filter PFAS from drinking water, monitoring wells, testing equipment, disposal costs, etc., and potentially thousands of other water utilities with similar potential lawsuits, the damages seemed astronomical. So, too, did the amount of time it would take to litigate each case to get the water utilities monetary relief. These two competing forces, plus the pressure of an actual trial date looming, led Dupont and 3M to announce PFAS MDL settlements in June 2023. At $1.185 billion by Dupont and between $10.3 billion and $12.5 billion by 3M, with the intention of both settlement funds to resolve all pending and potential water utility claims in the United States, it seemed to many that a resolution had been achieved that would address PFAS in drinking water systems without burdening utility customers or the utilities themselves.

The issue, though, is that over 9,000 water utilities were estimated to be in need of treatment technology to meet the EPA’s newly proposed drinking water standards. The American Water Works Association (AMWA) reminded everyone that their own estimates of the costs of compliance to the EPA’s level would cost utilities over $3.2 billion annually. Even buying into the old joke that lawyers are horrible at math, it does not take long for one to realize the significant gap in the proposed settlement amounts and AMWA’s estimates. Water utilities accepting money under the Dupont and 3M settlement funds are not all going to receive 100% of the necessary funding for remediation. How then will this deficit be resolved?

Water utilities will be reluctant to pass on all of the costs to customers, although pricing increases could provide a stopgap measure for water utilities on top of the MDL settlement funds. State or even federal funding may be available under grant, loan or other programs that can also assist. However, when the dust settles, it is likely that water utilities are going to look to a particular group of parties to pursue damages from – companies that discharged PFAS into waterways that fed into the water utility facilities. Lawsuits already abound nationally filed by private citizens against such companies for property damage, bodily injury and medical monitoring. Why then would water utilities finding themselves in need of significant money to properly treat drinking water not take similar legal action? Couple this with pressure water utilities are starting to receive in the form of finding themselves sued in class action lawsuits by private citizens, and the legal notion of contribution begins to ring very true for water utilities looking to minimize their own damages in such lawsuits and find sources of funding for remediation technology.

Companies that have historically discharged effluent into waterways that feed drinking water supplies must therefore keep all of the above in mind and not be lulled into a false sense of complacency that the Dupont and 3M settlements in the MDL are going to mean the end of PFAS drinking water litigation. I predict quite the opposite.

It is of the utmost importance that businesses along the whole commerce chain that have or believe that they might have used PFAS in certain processes take steps now to understand their PFAS risk. Public health and environmental groups urge legislators to regulate PFAS at an ever-increasing pace. Similarly, state level EPA enforcement action is increasing at a several-fold rate every year. Companies that did not manufacture PFAS, but merely utilized PFAS in their manufacturing processes, are becoming targets of costly enforcement actions at rates that continue to multiply year over year. Lawsuits are also filed monthly by citizens or municipalities against companies that are increasingly not PFAS chemical manufacturers. The only way to manage future risk is to fully understand what that risk picture looks like, and companies would be well-advised to invest in proper diligence for the PFAS risk question.

Multistate Coalition Supports EPA’s Proposed Revisions to the Safer Choice Standard

As reported in our December 5, 2023, memorandum, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed updates to the Safer Choice Standard on November 14, 2023, that include a name change to the Safer Choice and Design for the Environment (DfE) Standard (Standard), an update to the packaging criteria, the addition of a Safer Choice certification for cleaning service providers, a provision allowing for preterm partnership termination under exceptional circumstances, and the addition of several product and functional use class requirements. 88 Fed. Reg. 78017. On January 16, 2024, California Attorney General Rob Bonta announced that, alongside a coalition of 12 attorneys general, he submitted a comment letter that:

  • Supports EPA’s proposed revisions to its Safer Choice Standard;
  • Recommends that EPA not allow products with plastic primary packaging to use the Safer Choice label or DfE logo;
  • Recommends that if EPA does allow products with plastic primary packaging to use the label and logo, EPA should prohibit the use of chemical recycling in meeting the proposed standard’s plastic packaging recycled content requirements; and
  • Calls on EPA to exclude any products or packaging that contain any per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), “whether intentionally introduced or not.”

USDA Requesting Comments on New AFIDA Regulations that Could Impact Renewable Energy Developers

On December 18, 2023, the Farm Service Agency of the United States Department of Agriculture published Notice in the Federal Register that it is considering changes to its FSA-153 Form required to report foreign interests in agricultural land pursuant to the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (“AFIDA”), 7 U.S.C.A.§ 3501 et seq.

Interested stakeholders are invited to provide comments regarding the proposed changes no later than February 16, 2024. The Federal Register Notice is available in its entirety via the following link: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/18/2023-27683/request-for-information-on-agricultural-foreign-investment-disclosure-act-afida-fsa-153-form.

Many renewable developers are subject to AFIDA and regularly report long-term wind and solar leasehold interests to the USDA. The changes proposed by the USDA may directly impact the data required to be reported by renewable developers. In additional to comments requested on other AFIDA reporting matters, the USDA requests public input on the following:

(1) Are long-term leasehold filings—particularly those in the wind turbine and solar panel industries—“different enough” from land ownership purchase or sale filings that a separate version of the FSA–153 form should be created? Should a different “logic path” of questions be developed for long-term leasehold filings?

(2) Many foreign wind energy companies have long-term leaseholds on U.S. agricultural land farmed by U.S. producers that trigger the AFIDA reporting requirement. Currently, the entire acreage of the parcel is captured; this is because the number of wind turbines that will be established on the land (if any) is often an unknown at the time of AFIDA reporting. In addition, the existence of the leasehold generally precludes other energy company involvement on the acreage. Does this approach overstate foreign energy company activity on U.S. agricultural land? If so, how should the acreage associated with these leaseholds be captured?

(3) How should solar panels or photovoltaics—which are situated above the agricultural land—be treated for AFIDA reporting given that AFIDA uses an acreage basis for reporting?

(4) Some foreign owners are providing a very low estimate of the value of the lease (as the flat payment is low) on the FSA–153 form while others are providing the estimated value of the entire parcel. How should “interest in the value of the agricultural land” be defined for leases?

(5) In addition to the legal description of each leasehold parcel already required to be reported on Form FSA-153, is it an undue burden on foreign owners or their representatives to require one or more of the following: (a) the longitude and latitude for each parcel; (b) the property tax ID number assigned by the county; and (c) the FSA tract number and the FSA farm number?

As many renewable developers are aware, AFIDA imposes reporting requirements with respect to the acquisition or disposition of interests in agricultural property by a foreign-owned entity or an entity in which a “significant interest or substantial control” is held by a non-U.S. parent.

Sales and acquisitions in particular may be highly scrutinized by the USDA to ensure that a disposition is filed by the selling entity and an acquisition form is filed by the acquiring entity. If, for example, an entity sells a portfolio of wind or solar leases, that entity should file FSA-153 dispositions, and the purchaser should file FSA-153 acquisitions for the same property. In addition to acquisitions and dispositions, reporting of an amended FSA–153 is triggered when the land use changes, the tiers of ownership change, or the name of the foreign person changes.

Although AFIDA’s requirements have been in existence for many years, the USDA’s recent imposition of significant fines and penalties (up to 25% of the FMV of the property) to developers who fail to file (or are late to file) FSA-153 reports has engendered a new interest in AFIDA and made it more crucial to consider these reporting requirements in any diligence analysis.

Significant interest or substantial control is defined by Federal regulations as an ownership interest of ten percent or more. “Foreign owners” also includes long-term leaseholders in the wind and solar industries.

AFIDA generally defines “agricultural land” as ten acres or more of land that has been used for agricultural purposes (e.g. farming, cropland, ranching, grazing, timber production) within the last five years. These definitions apply even if the land has been planned and plotted or re-zoned for nonagricultural purposes.

Agricultural land is categorized as cropland, forestland, pastureland, other agriculture, and non-agricultural land (homesteads, farm roads).

7 C.F.R. §781.2(c) defines “any interest in real property” as all interest acquired, transferred or held in agricultural lands, except:
(1) Security interests;
(2) Leasehold interests of less than ten (10) years;
(3) Contingent future interests;
(4) Noncontingent future interests which do not become possessory upon the termination of the present possessory estate;
(5) Surface or subsurface easements and rights of way used for a purpose unrelated to agricultural production, and;
(6) An interest solely in mineral rights.

Key Developments in Environmental Law and Policy in 2023, and What’s Ahead in 2024 [PODCAST]

On this episode of the Bracewell Environmental Law Monitor, we look back at the significant developments in environmental and natural resources law and policy in 2023, as well as look ahead to what’s to come in 2024. Co-hosts Daniel Pope and Taylor Stuart talk with Ann Navaro and Tim Wilkins, partners in Bracewell’s environment, lands and resources practice, about a range of topics, such as climate and environmental justice, renewable energy advancements, regulatory developments and much more.

 

EPISODE HIGHLIGHTS

[01:44] Big Developments in 2023: The Biden administration’s top priorities have been climate and environmental justice. The big development of 2023 on the climate front has been on the methane side rather than the carbon dioxide side. Regarding environmental justice, the Biden administration and NGOs have been really pushing to apply justice factors in enforcement, in cleanups, new rulemaking, permitting, issuance of grants and loans, and the like.

[06:59] A Significant Year for Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act: Almost a year ago, the Biden administration issued its definition of “Waters of the United States.” Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued another decision interpreting Waters of the United States in the Sackett case and essentially eviscerated one of the bases for the Biden administration’s Waters of the US rulemaking. Litigation is ongoing.

[09:33] Congress Amended the National Environmental Policy Act and the Fiscal Responsibility Act: This was enormous, as core provisions had never seen substantive amendments. There are mixed reviews of what that amendment to NEPA accomplished.

[13:41] Renewable Energy: There’s been advancement in renewable energy projects and trying to permit those projects and an emphasis on promoting renewable energy. For example, for offshore wind, in this year and in prior years of the Biden administration, there’s been a lot of advancement on leasing.

[21:57] On the Horizon in Environmental Law in 2024: Ann shares that the US Army Corps of Engineers could revise Nationwide Permit 12. Tim shares that the White House is reviewing EPA’s CERCLA hazardous substance listing for two of the leading PFAS chemicals, and the listing will go final sometime early in 2024. In addition, the SEC’s semi-annual rulemaking agenda for April 2024 promises to include proposed climate disclosure rules for publicly traded companies.

An Early Christmas Present from Three Fifth Circuit Judges Who Concluded a Louisiana Property Is Not Subject to Federal Clean Water Act Jurisdiction

Garry Lewis owns 2000 acres in Livingston Parish, Louisiana and he has been fighting with the Army Corps of Engineers over whether any of those 2000 acres are wetlands subject to Federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction for over a decade. On two separate occasions the Army Corps of Engineers has said the answer to that question is “yes”. The first time the Corps made this determination, a District Court Judge disagreed. The second time was before the Supreme Court’s definition of “Waters of the United States”, including jurisdictional wetlands, in Sackett v. EPA and it is that second determination that is the subject of a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision earlier this week.

The Sacketts had been fighting with EPA and the Corps about whether their much smaller property was subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction for twice as long as Mr. Lewis until the Supreme Court found in the Sacketts’ favor earlier this year. The day the Supreme Court decided Sackett I wrote that “[f]or my entire adult life, the Courts have deferred to EPA’s interpretation of statutes it has been charged by Congress to implement. That era is most certainly over . . .”

This week three Judges of the Fifth Circuit proved my point. Over the Corps’ objection, the Judges took it upon themselves to apply the Supreme Court’s Sackett holding to determine that “based on photographs of [Mr. Lewis’s] property” there is “no ‘continuous surface connection’ between any plausible wetlands on the Lewis tracts and a ‘relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters.’”

The Corps had argued unsuccessfully that it should be given the opportunity to apply Sackett for itself before Judges weighed in.

The Fifth Circuit Judges were probably right to conclude that, given the chance, the Corps “could create an ‘endless loop’ of financially onerous regulatory activity” for Mr. Lewis. But the Judges fail to mention that conclusion could be based on the fact that EPA’s and the Corps’ tenth, post Sackett, attempt to determine the reach of the Clean Water Act continues to extend Clean Water Act jurisdiction to “tributaries,” “impoundments,” and “wetlands” that have a “continuous surface connection” to waters that are not “traditional navigable waters, the territorial seas, [or] interstate waters.” That’s a different standard than the Justice Alito-supplied standard the three Fifth Circuit Judges applied in holding that the Lewis property was not subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction even though a culvert on the Lewis property connects to a “relatively permanent water” which connects to another “relatively permanent water” which connects to a “traditional navigable water.”

Now EPA’s and the Corps’ most recent Waters of the United States regulation is currently being challenged in two Federal District Courts, including on the basis that the regulation is broader than allowed by the Supreme Court in Sackett. But that regulation hasn’t been struck down yet. That apparently didn’t matter at all to these three Judges of the Fifth Circuit. And it may be worth mentioning that one of those challenges to EPA’s and the Corps’ regulation is in Federal District Court in Texas which is in, you guessed it, the Fifth Circuit.

What does this all mean? Well, I think it means we’re going to continue to see some Judges applying the Supreme Court’s Sackett holding to determine the extent of Clean Water Act jurisdiction, ignoring EPA’s and the Corps’ subsequent regulation, unless and until Congress decides to get involved in the longest running controversy in environmental law.

CFTCs Increased Reach over Environmental Commodities

During 2023 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) engaged in several regulatory actions aimed at further clarifying its jurisdictional reach over environmental commodity markets generally and the voluntary carbon credit (VCC) markets in particular. First, on June 20, 2023, the CFTC issued an alert seeking whistleblower tips relating to carbon market misconduct. CFTC noted that many VCCs serve as the underlying commodity for futures contracts that are listed on CFTC designated contract markets (DCMs) over which the CFTC has full enforcement authority as well as the regulatory oversight. Importantly, the CFTC also noted that it has anti-fraud and anti-manipulation enforcement authority over the related spot markets for VCCs as well as carbon allowances and other environmental commodities products that are linked to futures contracts.1

Second, on July 19, 2023 the CFTC held its second convening where several market participants expressed the view that reliability, integrity and resilience of VCCs will be significantly improved with greater regulatory involvement.2

Third, in response to a growing demand to become more actively involved in environmental commodity markets on December 4, 2023, the CFTC issued proposed Guidance Regarding the Listing of Voluntary Carbon Credits Derivatives and Request for Comment (VCC Guidance).3 The VCC Guidance “outlines factors for a DCM to consider in connection with product design and listing [of futures contracts on VCCs] to advance the standardization of such products in a manner that promotes transparency and liquidity.”

The VCC Guidance is remarkable because: (i) it is non-binding (i.e., it is only guidance, not a regulation – stating that DCMs “should consider”); (ii) it notes several times that “for the avoidance of doubt, this proposal is not intended to modify or supersede the Appendix C Guidance” [to Part 38 of CFTC regulations];4 (iii) it addresses the already existing regulatory requirements for DCOs (i.e., Core Principle 3 – the requirement that all listed futures are not readily susceptible to manipulation);5 (iv) it attempts to reach over spot physically-settled VCC markets over which the CFTC does not have the regulatory jurisdiction and can only exercise its limited enforcement anti-fraud and anti-manipulation jurisdiction; (v) it requires DCMs to “consider” a number of VCC characteristics that are clearly outside of DCM’s control and probably competency, which include transparency, additionality, permanency and risk of reversal, robust quantification, governance and tracking mechanisms, and measures to prevent double-counting of VCCs; (vi) it requires DCMs to submit to the CFTC “explanation and analysis of the contract” it intends to list; (vii) it requires DCMs to actively monitor VCC contracts to ensure that they continue to meet these standards; and (viii) notes that the same standards should apply to swap execution facilities (SEFs) that may list swaps on VCCs. Finally, this VCC Guidance is followed by a number of questions and an open comment period ending on February 16, 2024.

The VCC Guidance is an important step forward to promoting transparency and integrity of VCC markets within the jurisdictional constraints of the CFTC. Even though the VCC Guidance does not (and cannot) impose any additional compliance requirements on DCMs and SEFs short of promulgating a rulemaking in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, it is clear that DCM’s compliance burden with respect to listed VCC contracts before the VCC Guidance was issued are clearly different than after the VCC Guidance would become effective. Further, unlike other physically-deliverable commodities that serve as underliers to futures contracts on DCMs, VCCs traded in spot and forward markets are treated differently and will probably be in the same category as virtual currencies.

https://icvcm.org/

https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8723-23

https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventvoluntarycarbonmarkets071923

https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8829-23

https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-17/chapter-I/part-38/appendix-Appendix%20C%20to%20Part%2038

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7