The SEC Speaks–And Fails to Defend Mandatory Climate Disclosures

During the opening remarks of the two-day SEC Speaks Conference, Chairman Gensler failed to express any statement of support in connection with the SEC’s recently promulgated rule on mandatory climate disclosures. (Instead, his speech focused on a number of other topics, including clearinghouse rules and proposed regulations.) In contrast, Republican SEC Commissioner Uyeda devoted the entirety of his speech to offering critiques of the SEC’s newly enacted mandatory climate disclosure rule.

While most of Commissioner Uyeda’s criticisms had been previously voiced on other occasions, certain legal arguments achieved greater prominence in these remarks. In particular, Commissioner Uyeda emphasized the concept of materiality, noting that “[t]he significant changes in the final rule reflect a recognition that no disclosure rule that veers from materiality is likely to survive a court challenge,” and opining that “changes to selected portions of the rule text intended to mitigate legal risk do not necessarily convert a climate change activism rule to a material risk disclosure rule.” There was also a focus on procedural concerns, including a potential violation of the Administrative Procedure Act due to “the failure to repropose the rule” since “the changes were so significant,” and that “the fail[ure] to consider [the] rule’s economic consequences [renders] the adoption of the rule arbitrary and capricious.” Finally, Commissioner Uyeda compared the climate disclosure rule to the previously enacted conflict minerals rule (which was mandated by Congress), stating that “public companies and investors are stuck with a mandatory disclosure rule that deviates from financial materiality but fails to resolve the social purpose for which it was adopted.” Each of these arguments should be expected to feature in the upcoming litigation in the Eighth Circuit concerning the legality of the SEC’s climate disclosure rule.

Still, the failure by Chairman Gensler and his fellow Democratic Commissioners to offer a robust public defense of the climate disclosure rule may simply reflect a shifting of priorities now that the rule has been enacted. Notably, just a few days ago–on March 22, 2024–Chairman Gensler forcefully defended the SEC’s climate disclosure rule at a conference hosted by Columbia Law School, where his entire speech advocated the concept of mandatory disclosures and stated that the SEC’s climate disclosure rule “enhance[d] the consistency, comparability, and reliability of [climate-related] disclosures.” Moreover, it is altogether possible that a speech on the second day of the conference might offer a rejoinder to the varied critiques of the climate disclosure rule.

Unlike the conflict minerals rule, which was mandated by Congress, the Commission has acted on its own volition to adopt a climate disclosure rule that seeks to exert societal pressure on companies to change their behavior. It is the Commission that determined to delve into matters beyond its jurisdiction and expertise. In my view, this action deviates from the Commission’s mission and contravenes established law.

https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks-sec-speaks-040224

Weather & Climate Risk Management Part IV: Taxation of Weather Risk Management Products

Are there differences in the way in which weather derivatives and weather insurance are taxed?

Yes. Weather insurance products, including parametric insurance, are taxed as insurance; and derivatives are taxed in accordance with the tax rules applicable to the particular type of derivative product held by the taxpayer. A business needs to carefully consider these tax differences to determine the best product or products to meet its weather risk management needs.

How is insurance taxed to a policyholder?

When a business buys weather insurance, it pays a premium to the insurance company so that the company assumes the business risks set out in the policy. Assuring the policy is purchased to manage a business’s legitimate weather-related risk, the premium is deductible under Internal Revenue Code (Code) § 162 as an ordinary and necessary business expense.

If insurance coverage is triggered and a policyholder receives a payout under the policy, the payout is not taxable up to the policyholder’s tax basis if the payment reimburses the policyholder for property damage or loss. In other words, payments under insurance policies are not taxable up to the policyholder’s tax basis because the payments simply restore (in whole or in part) the policyholder to the financial position it was in before it incurred the loss. If the reimbursement amount under the policy exceeds the policyholder’s tax basis, the amount it receives over its tax basis is treated as taxable income.[1]

Business interruption insurance covers losses (such as lost profits and ongoing expenses) from events that close or disrupt the normal functioning of the policyholder’s business. The payout amount is often based on past business results. Business interruption insurance proceeds are likely to be taxable to the policyholder because they compensate the policyholder for lost revenue.

To ensure that a policyholder receives the most favorable tax treatment, it must carefully document its business purpose for entering into the insurance, the amount of its tax basis, and receipt of the insurance proceeds.

How are derivatives taxed?

It depends on whether the taxpayer has entered into a futures contract, forward contract, option, swap, cap, or floor. The taxpayer must then consider its status in entering into each derivative: is it acting as a hedger, dealer, trader, or investor? The taxpayer must also determine whether it has made all the required tax identifications and elections. In dealing with derivatives, the taxpayer must go through this three-step process for each product it is considering. Hedgers and dealers receive ordinary income and loss on their derivative transactions, while traders and investors receive capital gain and loss.

Why might a taxpayer want to be treated as a hedger with respect to its weather derivatives?

A taxpayer seeking to use weather derivatives to manage its weather-related business risks typically wants to be treated as a tax hedger so that the gain or loss on its derivative transactions qualify as tax hedges. This would allow the taxpayer to match its derivative gains or losses with its weather-related income or losses. Because ordinary property generates ordinary income or loss, a business hedger typically wants to receive ordinary income or loss on its weather derivatives. In other words, a hedger wants to match the tax treatment it receives on its hedges with that of the items it is hedging. Many risk management transactions with respect to weather-related risks do not meet the hedge definition (see the discussed below). For a detailed discussion of the tax hedging rules, see the forthcoming Q&A with Andie, “Business Taxation of Hedging Transactions.”

What is required for a weather derivative to be treated as a tax hedge?

To qualify as a tax hedge, the transaction must manage interest rate fluctuations, currency fluctuations, or price risk with respect to ordinary property, borrowings, or ordinary obligations.[2] In addition to meeting the definition of a tax hedge, the taxpayer must comply with the identification requirements set out at Code §§ 1221(a)(7) and 1221(b)(2) and the tax accounting requirements set out at Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4.[3]

What is the tax analysis that a taxpayer should conduct to determine if its weather derivatives qualify as tax hedges?

When entering into a weather derivative, a taxpayer should conduct the following tax analysis: (1) is the transaction entered into in the ordinary course of its trade or business (2) primarily (3) to manage price risk (4) on ordinary property or obligations (5) held or to be held by the taxpayer. If the answer to all of these questions is “yes,” then the taxpayer has a qualified tax hedge if—but only if—it complies with all of the required identification rules set out in Code §§ 1221(a)(7) and 1221(b)(2) and as explained in Treasury Regulation § 1.1221-2. If the taxpayer cannot answer all of these questions with a “yes,” then the weather derivative transaction is not a tax hedge, and it is subject to the tax rules that apply to capital assets.[4] The requirement that a taxpayer must be hedging ordinary property, borrowings, or obligations means that favorable tax hedging treatment is not available for many legitimate weather risk management activities.

What types of assets, obligations, and borrowings qualify as ordinary property and ordinary obligations for purposes of the tax hedging rules?

Weather derivatives qualify as tax hedges if they can be tied to price risk with respect to ordinary assets or ordinary obligations. In many situations, however, weather derivatives are entered into to manage a taxpayer’s anticipated profitability, sales volume, plant capacity, or similar issues. These risks are not the transactions that receive tax hedge treatment.

Ordinary property includes property that if sold or exchanged by the taxpayer would not produce capital gain or loss without regard to the taxpayer’s holding period. Items included in a taxpayer’s inventory—such as natural gas or heating oil held by a dealer in those products—are treated as ordinary property that can be hedged. Qualifying hedges can also include hedges of purchases and sales of commodities for which the taxpayer is a dealer, such as electricity, natural gas, or heating oil. If a utility agrees to purchase electricity at a fixed price in the future, for example, the utility is exposed to price risk if it cannot resell the fixed-price electricity for at least the amount it paid to purchase that electricity. Accordingly, the utility could agree to sell electricity under a futures contract (short position) that would qualify as a tax hedge.

On the liability side of a business, the hedge could relate to a taxpayer’s price risk with respect to an ordinary obligation. An ordinary obligation is an obligation the performance of which (or its termination) would not produce a capital gain or loss. For example, a forward contract to sell electricity or natural gas at a fixed price entered into by a dealer is treated as an ordinary obligation. In addition, a utility that enters into a fixed price forward sales contract agreeing to sell electricity at a fixed price has an ordinary obligation to deliver electricity at that fixed price.

What sorts of weather derivative transactions are not tax hedges?

Many legitimate risk management activities do not qualify as tax hedges. Weather derivative transactions that protect overall business profitability (such as volume or revenue risk) are not directly related to ordinary property or ordinary obligations. As a result, weather derivatives entered into to protect a business’s revenue stream or its net income against volume or revenue risk are not tax hedges.

Many taxpayers in the normal course of their businesses enter into weather derivatives to manage volume or revenue risks of reduced demand for their products or services. These transactions are not tax hedges. The taxpayer is not managing a price risk (either current or anticipated) attributable to ordinary assets, borrowings, or ordinary obligations.

Take, for example, a ski resort or amusement park operator that enters into a weather derivative to protect itself against adverse weather conditions that are likely to result in a reduction in the number of skiers or amusement park visitors. The taxpayer’s risk management efforts in these cases either relate to its investment in its facility (which for the most part consists of real estate and business assets that are not taxed as ordinary assets) or to its expected revenue. Similarly, a power generator that hedges its plant capacity or its revenue stream with a weather derivative tied to the number of Cooling Degree Days would not meet the definition of a tax hedge.

Why don’t more weather derivatives qualify as tax hedges?

As part of Congress’ efforts to modernize the tax rules with respect to hedging, it specifically authorized the Treasury to issue regulations to extend the hedging definition to include other risks that the Treasury sets out in regulations.[5] The Treasury, unfortunately, has not proposed or issued any regulations extending the benefits of tax hedging. This means that weather derivative transactions entered into to manage weather-related volume or revenue risks do not qualify as tax hedges. In this situation, the taxpayer receives capital gain or loss on the derivative product.

What are some examples of weather derivatives that can qualify as tax hedges?

A weather derivative qualifies as a tax hedge if it manages the taxpayer’s price risks with respect to ordinary assets or obligations. Thus, a taxpayer entering into weather derivatives primarily to manage its price risk with respect to increased supply costs will meet the definition of a hedging transaction. Such a transaction manages the taxpayer’s price risks with respect to ordinary property.

If, for example, a commodity dealer buys a put option (or sells a call option) on a designated weather event to protect it against price risks with respect to its existing inventories or future fixed-price commitments, the dealer has entered into a qualified tax hedge, provided it meets the identification requirements.

A heating oil distributor with heating oil inventory (or forward contracts to purchase heating oil at a fixed price) might enter into a weather swap to protect itself from the risk of an unseasonably warm heating season. This swap should qualify as a tax hedge because the swap manages the distributor’s risk of a decline in the market price for its heating oil inventories (or a decline in its fixed-price forward contract purchase commitments) due to unseasonably warm weather.

If an electric utility enters into forward commitments to sell electricity at fixed prices for delivery in the summer cooling months, it may buy a call option on a designated weather event that would qualify as a tax hedge to the extent the option protects the utility against the risk of being unable to acquire or generate the electricity at a low enough price if the demand for electricity in the cooling season is higher than expected because of unseasonably warm weather resulting in higher electricity prices.

Conclusion

All organizations face weather and climate risks. As part of their enterprise-wide risk management, they have available to them a number of weather risk transfer tools. This series on weather and climate risk provides a detailed review of weather risk management. Organizations can look to standardized futures and option contracts traded on regulated commodity exchanges; they can enter into customized OTC weather derivatives designed with their specific weather risks in mind; they can put in place indemnity insurance; they can purchase parametric insurance; or they can mix and match multiple derivative products and insurance coverages to meet their specific organization’s needs. In Part I of this Q&A series on Weather & Climate Risk Management, we considered the landscape and context within which weather and climate decision making takes place, along with the overarching risk management approaches and principles that apply. In Part II, we looked at the details on the various weather risk management products. In Part III, we addressed the regulation of these products; and in Part IV, we reviewed the taxation of these various classes of products.


[1] Taxability is subject to a nonrecognition provision at Code § 1033(a) if the taxpayer complies with the requirements to purchase “qualified replacement property.” https://irc.bloombergtax.com/public/uscode/doc/irc/section_1033

[2] Treas. Reg. § 1221-2 and Code §§ 1221(a)(7) and 1221(b)(2).

[3] For a detailed discussion of the tax hedging rules see my forthcoming Q&A with Andie, “Business Taxation of Hedging Transactions” due out in Spring 2024.

[4] If the taxpayer is a dealer or a commodity derivatives dealer, the weather derivative would be an ordinary asset in the taxpayer’s hands.

[5] Code § 1221(b)(2)(A)(iii).

Recent Updates to State and Federal Climate Disclosure Laws

Last year, California became the first state to pass laws requiring companies to make disclosures about their greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions as well as the risks that climate change poses for their businesses and their plans for addressing those risks. These new laws now face funding and legal hurdles that are delaying their implementation.

While California’s new laws navigate these challenges, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted its own final climate disclosure rule on March 6. Formally entitled The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors (“SEC Rule”), it requires public companies to make disclosures about the climate-related risks that have materially impacted, or are reasonably likely to have a material impact on, a registrant’s business strategy, operations, or financial condition, and also to disclose their Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions. The SEC Rule is significantly scaled-back from what the SEC originally proposed in March 2022; most notably, it does not require disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions. It too faces legal challenges.

California’s New Laws[1]

On October 7, 2023, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law two sweeping climate disclosure bills, Senate Bill 253 (“SB 253”), the Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act, and Senate Bill 261 (“SB 261”), the Climate-Related Risk Act.

Under SB 253, companies that do business in California and have more than $1 billion in annual revenue will be required to disclose emissions data to the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) each year, starting in 2026. The new law will affect more than 5,400 companies. Under the new law, CARB can levy fines of up to $500,000 per year for violations thereunder. The new reporting requirements apply to both public and private companies, unlike the SEC Rule, which applies only to certain public companies.

Under SB 261, companies with more than $500 million in annual revenue will be required to disclose on a biennial basis how climate change impacts their business, including reporting certain climate-related financial risks and their plans for addressing those risks. These disclosures also begin in 2026 and will affect roughly 10,000 companies.

Funding Hurdles

Funding is necessary for CARB to develop and implement regulations for both climate disclosure laws, as well as to review, administer, and enforce the new laws. To implement SB 253, CARB estimated that it required $9 million in the 2024-25 fiscal year and $2 million in the 2025-26 fiscal year. For SB 261, CARB estimated that it needed an aggregate of $13.7 million over the 2024-25 and 2025-26 fiscal years to identify covered entities, establish regulations, and develop a verification program.

Governor Newsom’s $291.5 billion budget proposal for the 2024-25 fiscal year did not allocate any funding for the implementation of the new laws. The sponsors of the two laws, SB 253’s Senator Scott Wiener and SB 261’s Senator Henry Stern, immediately released a statement sharply critical of this aspect of the Governor’s budget proposal.[2] With limited exceptions, the budget proposal defers all new discretionary spending decisions to the spring, pending input from the legislature, with a final spending plan expected in July of 2024.

The budget process in California can be a lengthy negotiation. The Governor proposes a budget, but then must work with the Legislature to develop the final budget. In this regard, it is important to note that Senator Wiener was appointed to chair the Senate Budget Committee earlier this year. Thus, it’s possible that funding will be provided to implement the laws, though CARB already faced an aggressive set of deadlines for developing the regulations.

Legal Challenges

Some companies, including tech giants like Apple and Salesforce, want the new rules implemented quickly. Large businesses may have an interest in implementing the legislation expeditiously for the benefit of operational certainty and because they have the resources to absorb costs that their smaller competitors cannot. Other companies view the new rules as needlessly burdensome and are committed to halting the legislation in its tracks.

In January, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce joined the American Farm Bureau Federation, California Chamber of Commerce, Central Valley Business Federation, Los Angeles County Business Federation and Western Growers Association in filing a lawsuit[3]in federal district court challenging the climate disclosure laws under the theory that they violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and are preempted by federal law.

According to the complaint, the climate disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by “forc[ing] thousands of companies to engage in controversial speech that they do not wish to make, untethered to any commercial purpose or transaction…for the explicit purpose of placing political and economic pressure on companies to “encourage” them to conform their behavior to the political wishes of the State.” The plaintiffs argue that, in the event that the State seeks to compel a business to speak noncommercially on controversial political matters, such action shall be presumed by a reviewing court to be unconstitutional unless the government proves that it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The plaintiffs also allege that the new climate disclosure laws are not narrowly tailored to further any legitimate interest of the state, let alone a compelling one.

The lawsuit also contends that the federal Clean Air Act preempts California’s ability to regulate GHG emissions beyond its jurisdictional borders. According to the plaintiffs, the new laws seek to regulate out-of-state emissions “through a novel program of speech regulation.” The complaint further argues that, because the new disclosure requirements operate as de facto regulations of GHG emissions nationwide, they “run headlong” into the Dormant Commerce Clause and broader principles of federalism. The plaintiffs ask the court to enjoin California from implementing or enforcing the new rules, thereby making them null and void.

A more serious preemption challenge may be that the California climate disclosure laws are preempted by the SEC Rule. The issue was addressed during the March 6 SEC hearing (discussed below), and it’s been reported that SEC General Counsel Megan Barbero answered that “nothing” in the Rule “expressly preempts any state law.” However, she added that the issue could arise as a question of “implied preemption,” which “would be determined by a court in a future judicial proceeding.” The question would be whether the SEC has “occupied the field” to such an extent that it preempts state rules in the space. Those would be questions of fact largely turning on how the climate laws are being applied and enforced, and thus any such challenge is likely to await CARB’s implementation of the laws.

The SEC Rule

On March 6, 2024, the SEC adopted the final SEC Rule which will require public companies to include certain climate-related disclosures in registration statements and annual reports. The final SEC Rule requires registrants to disclose material climate-related risks, activities undertaken to mitigate or adapt to such risks, information regarding the board of directors’ oversight of climate-related risks and management of material climate-related risks, and information about climate-related targets or goals that are material to the company’s business, operations, or financial condition.

To add transparency to investors’ assessments of certain climate-related risks, the SEC Rule also requires disclosure of material Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions, the filing of an attestation report in connection thereof, and disclosure of impacts that severe weather events and other climate-related conditions have on financial statements, including costs and losses. The final SEC Rule includes a phased-in compliance period for all registrants, with compliance dates ranging from fiscal year 2025-26 to 2031-32, depending on the registrant’s filer status and the content of the disclosure. In general, the SEC Rule requires less than the California climate disclosure laws, as Senator Wiener observed[4].

Key Takeaways

  • Implementation and/or enforcement of SB 253 and SB 261 is delayed for the time being due to a lack of funding, and thus the roll-out of the regulatory regime for the two laws appears likely to slip, such that the laws’ 2026 compliance deadlines may also slip.
  • The lawsuit challenging SB 253 and SB 261 adds some uncertainty to the process of ensuring compliance with climate disclosure requirements, and may cause further delay.
  • The delayed implementation of the new laws affords companies additional time to develop a compliance strategy. Due to the lessened scope of the SEC Rule, companies that are prepared to comply with the California laws are likely to be prepared to comply with the SEC Rule. And implementation of the SEC Rule may be delayed by legal challenges as well, thereby creating more time for companies to develop a compliance strategy.

FOOTNOTES

[1] A prior article describing these laws in more detail is here.

[2] See Senators Wiener & Stern Respond to Governor Pausing Funding To Implement Landmark Climate Laws | Senator Scott Wiener (ca.gov)

[3] Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. v. Cal. Air Resources Boardet al. (Cal. Central Dist., Western Div.) (Case No. 2:24-cv-00801).

[4] See Senator Wiener Responds to Watered Down SEC Climate Rule: “California’s Climate Leadership is More Critical than Ever” | Senator Scott Wiener).

California PFAS Ban in Products: 6th Largest Global Economy Enters the Fray

We reported extensively on the landmark legislation passed in Maine in 2021 and Minnesota in 2023, which were at the time the most far-reaching PFAS ban in the United States. Other states, including Massachusetts and Rhode Island, have subsequently introduced legislation similar to Maine and Minnesota’s regulations. While we have long predicted that the so-called “all PFAS / all products” legislative bans will become the trend at the state levels, it is significant to note that California, the world’s sixth largest economy, recently introduced a similar proposed PFAS ban for consumer products.

The California proposed legislation, coupled with the existing legislation passed or on the table, will have enormous impacts on companies doing business in or with the state of California, as well as on likely future consumer goods personal injury lawsuits. The California PFAS ban must therefore not be overlooked in companies’ compliance and product development departments.

California PFAS Ban

California’s SB 903 in its current form would prohibit for sale (or offering for sale) any products that contain intentionally added PFAS. A “product” is defined as “an item manufactured, assembled, packaged, or otherwise prepared for sale in California, including, but not limited to, its components, sold or distributed for personal, residential, commercial, or industrial use, including for use in making other products.” It further defines “component” as “an identifiable ingredient, part, or piece of a product, regardless of whether the manufacturer of the product is the manufacturer of the component.”

While the effective date of SB 903’s prohibition would be January 1, 2030, the bill gives the California Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) the authority to prohibit intentionally added PFAS in a product before the 2030 effective date. It also allows DTSC to categorize PFAS in a product as an “unavoidable use”, thereby effectively creating an exemption to the bill’s ban, although California exemption would be limited to five years in duration. Similar carve outs were also included in the Maine and Minnesota bans. In each instance, certain information must be provided to the state to obtain an “unavoidable use” exemption. In California, an “unavoidable use” exemption would only be granted if:

  1. There are no safer alternatives to PFAS that are reasonably available.
  2. The function provided by PFAS in the product is necessary for the product to work.
  3. The use of PFAS in the product is critical for health, safety, or the functioning of society.

If a company sells a products containing PFAS in the state of California in violation of the proposed law, companies would be assessed a $1,000 per day penalty for each violation, a maximum of $2,500 per day for repeat offenders, and face possible Court-ordered prohibition of sales for violating products.

Implications To Businesses From The Minnesota PFAS Legislation

First and foremost of concern to companies is the compliance aspect of the California law. The state continues to modify and refine key definitions of the regulation, resulting in companies needing to consider the wording implications on their reporting requirements. In addition, some companies find themselves encountering supply chain disclosure issues that will impact reporting to the state of California, which raises the concern of accuracy of reporting by companies. Companies and industries are also very concerned that the information that is being gathered will provide a legacy repository of valuable information for plaintiffs’ attorneys who file future products liability lawsuits for personal injury, not only in the state of California, but in any state in which the same products were sold.

It is of the utmost importance for businesses along the whole supply chain to evaluate their PFAS risk. Public health and environmental groups urge legislators to regulate these compounds. One major point of contention among members of various industries is whether to regulate PFAS as a class or as individual compounds. While each PFAS compound has a unique chemical makeup and impacts the environment and the human body in different ways, some groups argue PFAS should be regulated together as a class because they interact with each other in the body, thereby resulting in a collective impact. Other groups argue that the individual compounds are too diverse and that regulating them as a class would be over restrictive for some chemicals and not restrictive enough for others.

Companies should remain informed so they do not get caught off guard. Regulators at both the state and federal level are setting drinking water standards and notice requirements of varying stringency, and states are increasingly passing PFAS product bills that differ in scope. For any manufacturers, especially those who sell goods interstate, it is important to understand how those various standards will impact them, whether PFAS is regulated as individual compounds or as a class. Conducting regular self-audits for possible exposure to PFAS risk and potential regulatory violations can result in long term savings for companies and should be commonplace in their own risk assessment.

SEC’s Slimmed Down Climate-Related Disclosures Finally Adopted

On March 6, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted regulations[1] that will require public companies to file mandatory climate-related disclosures with the SEC beginning in 2026. First proposed in March 2022, the climate-related disclosure rules were finalized after consideration of over 24,000 comment letters and active lobbying of the SEC by business and public interest groups alike. These new rules are aimed at eliciting more consistent, comparable, and reliable information for investors to make informed decisions related to climate-related risks on current and potential investments.

The new rules require a registrant to disclose material climate-related risks and activities to mitigate or adapt to those risks; information about the registrant’s oversight of climate-related risks and management of those risks; and information on any climate-related targets or goals that are material to the registrant’s business, results of operations, or financial condition. In addition, these new rules require disclosure of Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions with attestation by certain registrants when emissions are material; and disclosure of the financial effects of extreme weather events.

Unlike the initial proposal, the EU Climate Sustainability Reporting Directive (“CSRD”) and the California Climate Data Accountability Act, the new rules do not require disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions. The new rules require reporting based upon financial materiality, not the double-materiality (impact and financial) standard utilized by the EU under the CSRD. Whether registrants will ultimately be required to comply with the new rules depend upon the outcome of anticipated challenges, such as the challenge to the SEC’s authority to promulgate the rule filed in the Eleventh Circuit on March 6th by a coalition of ten states.

Highlights of the New Rule

In the adopting release, the SEC notes that companies are increasingly disclosing climate-related risks, whether in their SEC filings or via company websites, sustainability reports, or elsewhere; however, the content and location of such disclosures have been varied and inconsistent.[2] The new rules not only specify the content of required climate-related disclosures but also the presentation of such disclosures.

The new rules amend the SEC rules under the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), creating a new subpart 1500 of Regulation S-K and Article 14 of Regulation S-X. As a result, registrants, companies that are registered under the Exchange Act, will need to:

  • File climate-related disclosures with the SEC in their registration statements and Exchange Act annual reports;
  • Provide the required climate-related disclosures in either a separately captioned section of the registration statement or annual report, within another appropriate section of the filing, or the disclosures may be included by reference from another SEC filing so long as the disclosure meets the electronic tagging requirements; and
  • Electronically tag climate-related disclosures in Inline XBRL.

The rules require a registrant to disclose:

  • Climate-related risks that have had or are reasonably likely to have a material impact on the registrant’s business strategy, results of operations, or financial condition;
  • The actual and potential material impacts of any identified climate-related risks on the registrant’s strategy, business model, and outlook;
  • Specified disclosures regarding a registrant’s activities, if any, to mitigate or adapt to a material climate-related risk including the use, if any, of transition plans, scenario analysis, or internal carbon prices;
  • Any oversight by the board of directors of climate-related risks and any role by management in assessing and managing the registrant’s material climate-related risks;
  • Any processes the registrant has for identifying, assessing, and managing material climate-related risks and, if the registrant is managing those risks, whether and how any such processes are integrated into the registrant’s overall risk management system or processes;
  • Information about a registrant’s climate-related targets or goals, if any, that have materially affected or are reasonably likely to materially affect the registrant’s business, results of operations, or financial condition. Disclosures would include material expenditures and material impacts on financial estimates and assumptions as a direct result of the target or goal or actions taken to make progress toward meeting such target or goal;
  • For large accelerated filers (“LAFs”) and accelerated filers (“AFs”) that are not otherwise exempted, information about material Scope 1 emissions and/or Scope 2 emissions;
  • For those required to disclose Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 emissions, an assurance report at the limited assurance level, which, for an LAF, following an additional transition period, will be at the reasonable assurance level;
  • The capitalized costs, expenditures expensed, charges, and losses incurred as a result of severe weather events and other natural conditions, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, drought, wildfires, extreme temperatures, and sea level rise, subject to applicable one percent and de minimis disclosure thresholds, disclosed in a note to the financial statements;
  • The capitalized costs, expenditures expensed, and losses related to carbon offsets and renewable energy credits or certificates (“RECs”) if used as a material component of a registrant’s plans to achieve its disclosed climate-related targets or goals, disclosed in a note to the financial statements; and
  • If the estimates and assumptions a registrant uses to produce the financial statements were materially impacted by risks and uncertainties associated with severe weather events and other natural conditions or any disclosed climate-related targets or transition plans, a qualitative description of how the development of such estimates and assumptions was impacted, disclosed in a note to the financial statements.

Highlights of what did not get adopted

In its adopting release, the SEC described various modifications it made to its March 2022 proposed rules. The SEC explained that it made many of these changes in response to various comment letters it received. Some of the proposed rules that did not get adopted are:[3]

  • The SEC eliminated the proposed requirement to provide Scope 3 emissions disclosure.
  • The adopted rules in many instances now qualify the requirements to provide certain climate-related disclosures based on materiality.
  • The SEC eliminated the proposed requirement for all registrants to disclose Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions in favor of requiring such disclosure only by large accelerated filers and accelerated filers on a phased in basis and only when those emissions are material and with the option to provide the disclosure on a delayed basis.
  • The SEC also exempted emerging growth companies and smaller reporting companies from the Scope 1 and Scope 2 disclosure requirement.
  • The SEC modified the proposed assurance requirement covering Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions for accelerated filers and large accelerated filers by extending the reasonable assurance phase in period for LAFs and requiring only limited assurance for AFs.
  • The SEC eliminated the proposed requirements for registrants to disclose their GHG emissions in terms of intensity.[4]
  • The SEC removed the requirement to disclose the impact of severe weather events and other natural conditions and transition activities on each line item of a registrant’s financial statements. The SEC now requires disclosure of financial statement effects on capitalized costs, expenditures, charges, and losses incurred as a result of severe weather events and other natural conditions in the notes to the financial statements.
  • The adopted rules are less prescriptive than certain of those that were proposed. For example, the former now exclude in Item 1502(a) of Regulation S-K negative climate-related impacts on a registrant’s value chain from the definition of climate-related risks required to be disclosed. Similarly, this definition no longer includes acute or chronic risks to the operations of companies with which a registrant does business. Also, Item 1501(a) as adopted omits the originally proposed requirement for registrants to disclose (a) the identity of board members responsible for climate-risk oversight, (b) any board expertise in climate-related risks, (c) the frequency of board briefings on such risks, and (d) the details on the board’s establishment of climate-related targets or goals. Along the same lines, Item 1503 as adopted requires disclosure of only those processes for the identification, assessment, and management of material climate-related risks as opposed to a broader universe of climate-related risks. The rule as adopted does not require disclosure of how the registrant (a) determines the significance of climate-related risks compared to other risks, (b) considers regulatory policies, such as GHG limits, when identifying climate-related risks, (c) considers changes to customers’ or counterparties’ preferences, technology, or market prices in assessing transition risk, and (d) determines the materiality of climate-related risks. In the same vein, the adopted rules, unlike the proposed rules, do not require disclosure of how the registrant determines how to mitigate any high priority risks. Nor do the new rules retain the proposed requirement for a registrant to disclose how any board or management committee responsible for assessing and managing climate-related risks interacts with the registrant’s board or management committee governing risks more generally.
  • The SEC eliminated the proposal to require a private company that is a party to a business combination transaction, as defined by Securities Act Rule 165(f), registered on Form S-4 or Form F-4, to provide the subpart 1500 and Article 14 disclosures.

Timing of Implementation

The new rules will become effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. Compliance with the rules will not be required until much later, however.

Consistent with its earlier proposal, and in response to comments that the SEC received concerning the timing of implementing the proposed rule, the new rules contain delayed and staggered compliance dates that vary according to the registrant’s filing status and the type of disclosure.

The below table from the SEC’s new release summarizes the phased-in implementation dates.[5]

FILING STATUS

Large Accelerated Filers (“LAFs”)—a group whom the SEC believed most likely to be already collecting and disclosing climate-related information—will be the first registrants required to comply with the rule. The earliest that an LAF would be required to comply with the climate-disclosure rules would be upon filing its Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025, which would be due no later than March 2026.[6]

Accelerated Filers (“AFs”) are not required to comply with the new rules for yet another year after LAFs. Climate-related disclosures for AFs must be included upon filing a Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2026, due no later than March 2027. Smaller Reporting Companies (“SRCs”), Emerging Growth Companies (“EGCs”), and Non-Accelerated Filers (“NAFs”) have yet another year to meet the first compliance deadline for climate-related disclosures. These types of filers need not include their climate-related disclosures until filing their Form 10-Ks for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2027, which, again, would be due no later than March 2028.

TYPES OF DISCLOSURES

The new rules also phase in the requirements to include certain disclosures over time. The requirements to provide quantitative and qualitative disclosures concerning material expenditures and material impacts to financial estimates or assumptions under Items 1502(d)(2), 1502(e)(2), and 1504(c)(2) are not applicable until the fiscal year immediately following the fiscal year in which the registrant’s initial compliance is required. LAFs, for example, are not required to report these qualitative and quantitative disclosures until filing a Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2026, due in March 2027. That should be one year after an LAF files its first Form 10-K with climate-related disclosures. The SEC adopted this phased-in approach to respond to commentators’ concerns regarding the availability (or current lack thereof) of policies, processes, controls, and system solutions necessary to support these types of disclosures.

Likewise, the new rules provide for a further phased-in compliance date for those registrants required to report their Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions and an even later date for those filers to obtain limited or reasonable assurance for those emissions disclosures. An LAF, for example, is not required to disclose its Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions until filing its Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2026, due in March 2027. And those disclosures would not be required to be subject to the limited-assurance or reasonable-assurance requirements until filing the Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2029 or December 31, 2033, respectively.

In accordance with the table above, AFs, SRCs, EGCs, and NAFs have even more time to meet these additional disclosure requirements, if they are required to meet them at all.

It should be noted that the SEC recognized that registrants may have difficulty in obtaining GHG emission metrics by the date their 10-K report would be due. As a result, the rule contains an accommodation for registrants required to disclose Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, allowing domestic registrants, for example, to file those disclosures in the Form 10-Q for the second fiscal quarter in the fiscal year immediately following the year to which the GHG emissions disclosure relates. This disclosure deadline is permanent and not for a transition period.

Liability for Non-Compliance

In the introduction to the adopting release, the SEC explains that requiring registrants to provide certain climate-related disclosures in their filings will, among other things, “subject them to enhanced liability that provides important investor protections by promoting the reliability of the disclosures.”[7] This enhanced liability stems from the treatment of the disclosures as “filed” rather than “furnished” for purposes of Exchange Action Section 18 and, if included or otherwise incorporated by reference into a Securities Act registration statement, Securities Act Section 11.[8] According to the SEC, “climate-related disclosures should be subject to the same liability as other important business or financial information” that registrants include in registration statements and periodic reports and, therefore, should be treated as filed disclosures.[9]

In an attempt to balance concerns about the complexities and evolving nature of climate data methodologies and increased litigation risk, the SEC, in the adopting release, emphasizes certain modifications made in the new rules including:

  • limiting the scope of the GHG emissions disclosure requirement;
  • revising several provisions regarding the impacts of climate-related risks on strategy, targets and goals, and financial statement effects so that registrants will be required to provide the disclosures only in certain circumstances, such as when material to the registrant; and
  • adopting a provision stating that disclosures (other than historic facts) provided pursuant to certain of the new subpart 1500 provisions of Regulation S-K constitute “forward-looking statements” for the purposes of the PSLRA safe harbors.[10]

Registrants are subject to liability under Securities Act Section 17(a), Exchange Act Section 10(b), and/or Rule 10b-5 for false or misleading material statements in the information disclosed pursuant to the new rules.[11]

Observations

Consistent with its recent trajectory, the SEC continues to be a kinder, gentler regulator on climate disclosure requirements. Although the new rules will apply broadly to publicly traded companies, their scope is less demanding than the requirements under recent similar laws enacted in California or the EU. Under the California Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act (the “CCDA”), companies with annual revenues in excess of $1 billion and “doing business in California”[12] will be required to publicly disclose Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions beginning in 2026, and Scope 3 emissions beginning in 2027. And because the California law applies to all companies, not just those that are publicly traded, it is also more broadly applicable and will trigger assessments and compliance for companies that are not subject to the SEC’s rule. The CCDA is currently the subject of legal challenge that includes questions of whether the required disclosures violate the First Amendment right to free speech, as well as possible federal preemption. As a result, there is a chance that the CCDA may yet be diluted or found unconstitutional. But in light of the imminent timeline for compliance, many companies subject to the CCDA are already developing programs to facilitate and ensure timely compliance with the requirements.

Similarly, the EU has broader reporting obligations under the CSRD than the SEC’s new rules. Compliance with the CSRD is required for both public and private EU companies as well as for non-EU companies with certain net annual turnovers, certain values of assets, and a certain number of employees. Under the CSRD, companies must publish information across a wide spectrum of subjects, including emissions, energy use, diversity, labor rights, and governance. Initial reporting under the CSRD begins to phase-in in 2025.

A key takeaway here is that although the SEC rules may have taken a lighter approach to climate disclosures, many large companies are likely to be subject to more stringent requirements under either the CCDA or the EU CSRD. And as some companies begin to comply to provide this information and data, the market may drive demand and an expectation that other companies, not otherwise subject to these various reporting regimes, follow suit. While the SEC rules may be a slimmed down version of what could have been, it is likely that the trend toward transparency and disclosure will continue to be driven by other regulatory bodies and market forces alike.


[1] Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, 17 CFR 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, and 249, adopting release available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/33-11275.pdf.

[2] Id. at 48.

[3] Id. at 31-33.

[4] Id. at 225.

[5] Id. at 589.

[6] The new rules’ compliance dates apply to annual reports and registration statements. But, in the case of registration statements, compliance is required beginning with any registration statement that is required to include financial information for the full fiscal year indicated in the table above.

[7] Id. at 13.

[8] Id. at 584. At a high level, Section 18 imposes liability for false and misleading statements with respect to any material fact in documents filed with the SEC under the Exchange Act and Section 11 imposes liability for material misstatements or omissions made in connection with registered offerings conducted under the Securities Act.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 803.

[11] Id.

[12] A term which is not defined in the law, but is likely intentionally very broad, and is expected to be interpreted in that way.

SEC Issues Long-Awaited Climate Risk Disclosure Rule

INTRODUCTION

On Wednesday, 6 March 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved its highly anticipated final rules on “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors” by a vote of 3-2, with Republican Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda dissenting. Accompanying the final rules was a press release and fact sheet detailing the provisions of the rulemaking. The final rules will go into effect 60 days after publication in the Federal Register and will include a phased-in compliance period for all registrants.

This is likely to be one of the most consequential rulemakings of Chairman Gary Gensler’s tenure given the prioritization of addressing climate change as a key pillar for the Biden administration. However, given the significant controversy associated with this rulemaking effort, the final rules are likely to face legal challenges and congressional oversight in the coming months. As such, it remains unclear at this point whether the final rules will survive the forthcoming scrutiny.

WHAT IS IN THE RULE?

According to the SEC’s fact sheet:

  • “The final rules would require a registrant to disclose, among other things: material climate-related risks; activities to mitigate or adapt to such risks; information about the registrant’s board of directors’ oversight of climate-related risks and management’s role in managing material climate-related risks; and information on any climate-related targets or goals that are material to the registrant’s business, results of operations, or financial condition.
  • Further, to facilitate investors’ assessment of certain climate-related risks, the final rules would require disclosure of Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on a phased-in basis by certain larger registrants when those emissions are material; the filing of an attestation report covering the required disclosure of such registrants’ Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 emissions, also on a phased-in basis; and disclosure of the financial statement effects of severe weather events and other natural conditions including, for example, costs and losses.
  • The final rules would include a phased-in compliance period for all registrants, with the compliance date dependent on the registrant’s filer status and the content of the disclosure.”

NEXT STEPS

The final rules are likely to face significant opposition, including legal challenges and congressional oversight. It is expected that there will be various lawsuits brought against the final rules, which are likely to receive support from several industry groups, or potentially GOP-led state attorneys general who have been active in litigating against environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies and regulations. It is also possible that the final rules could face criticism from some climate advocates that the SEC did not go far enough in its disclosure requirements.

Further, it is expected that the House Financial Services Committee (HFSC) will conduct oversight hearings, as well as introduce a resolution under the Congressional Review Act (CRA), to attempt to block the regulations from taking effect. HFSC Chairman Patrick McHenry (R-NC) indicated that the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee will hold a field hearing on March 18 and the full Committee will convene a hearing on April 10 to discuss the potential implications of the rules. If a CRA resolution were to pass the House and garner sufficient support from moderate Democrats in the Senate to pass, it would likely be vetoed by President Biden.

Ultimately, the SEC climate risk disclosure rules are unlikely to significantly change the trajectory of corporate disclosures made by multinational companies based in the U.S., most of whom have already been making sustainability disclosures in accordance with the Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. The ongoing problem for investors is that such disclosures are not standardized and therefore are not comparable. Consequently, many of these large issuers may continue to enhance their sustainability disclosures in accordance with standards issued by the International Sustainability Standards Board and the Global Reporting Initiative as an investor relations imperative notwithstanding the SEC’s timetable for implementation of these final rules.

A more detailed analysis of the SEC rules is forthcoming from our Corporate and Asset Management and Investment Funds practices in the coming days.

President Biden Nominates Three FERC Commissioners

On February 29, 2024, President Biden nominated three new commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). The nominations will be reviewed and voted on by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and are subject to confirmation by the full Senate. If approved, the nominees will provide FERC with a full slate of five commissioners, including three Democrats and two Republicans.

Judy Chang is the Managing Principal of the Analysis Group in Boston and former Undersecretary of Energy and Climate Solutions of the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources. She is a Democrat and will succeed Commissioner Allison Clements with a term ending June 30, 2029. Commissioner Clements has announced that she would not serve a second term, but she may remain on FERC after June 30, 2024, until replaced or through December 31, 2024. Ms. Chang was the keynote speaker at Pierce Atwood’s 2022 Energy Infrastructure Symposium.

Lindsay See is the Solicitor General of the State of West Virginia. Ms. See is a Republican, recommended to the President by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, and will succeed former Commissioner James Danly with a term ending June 30, 2028. Ms. See has represented West Virginia in many multi-state legal coalitions on a variety of national issues, including energy and environmental rules and policies.

David Rosner is a member of the FERC staff, an energy industry analyst who has been on loan to the majority staff of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which is chaired by Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia. Mr. Rosner will succeed former Chairman Richard Glick with a term ending June 30, 2027.

All three nominations have been received by the Senate and referred to the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which will hold a hearing on each nominee. The Committee has not yet scheduled any hearings.

FERC Chairman Willie L. Phillips was designated as chairman on February 9, 2024. He was previously acting chairman. His term ends June 30, 2026. Commissioner Mark C. Christie’s term ends on June 30, 2025.

EPA Emphasizes its Criminal Enforcement Program

This Alert Update supplements a recent VNF alert analyzing the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) enforcement priorities for fiscal years (FY) 2024-2027. EPA recently announced that its criminal program helped to develop the Agency’s national enforcement compliance initiatives and strongly suggested that it would look to pursue criminal cases under each initiative.

Previously announced National Enforcement and Compliance Initiatives (NECIs) for FY 2024-2027 include climate change, coal ash landfills and impoundments, a new focus on contaminants such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), and environmental justice initiatives. Current NECIs address aftermarket defeat devices for mobile sources, hazardous air pollutant (HAP) emissions, and compliance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program.

EPA’s head of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), David Uhlmann, stated the agency is “promoting far greater strategic coordination between our criminal and civil enforcement programs” when speaking to the American Legal Institute-Continuing Legal Education’s (ALI-CLE) Environmental Law 2024 meeting on February 22, 2024.

Uhlmann highlighted that some prior cases handled civilly should have been potentially handled criminally, and that this may change moving forward. The practical implications for companies of the shift to a more active EPA criminal program may include significantly higher penalties and potential jail time for violations. Uhlmann also noted that “EPA will continue to reserve criminal enforcement for the most egregious violations.” His comments suggest that “egregiousness” will be evaluated based on the adverse effects of the violation, particularly on disproportionately overburdened communities, and the degree of intent. Uhlmann also added that companies could avoid criminal prosecution if they are “honest with the government” and have “strong ethics, integrity, and sustainability programs.”

The U.S. Justice Department’s Environment and National Resources Division (ENRD) litigates both civil and criminal cases for EPA and closely coordinates on enforcement initiatives. The Assistant Attorney General of ENRD, Todd Kim, also spoke during the February 22 ALI-CLE panel, and focused some of his remarks on the enforcement of environmental laws in the online marketplace. He cautioned that “online companies, just like brick-and-mortar companies, would do well to take pains to ensure that they are complying with environmental laws in selling and distributing products,” because EPA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) will enforce such laws in all market settings.

Both Uhlmann and Kim highlighted “21st century” challenges and opportunities, with NECIs addressing challenges and new opportunities such as data availability and analysis allowing EPA and DOJ to better enforce environmental laws and regulations in a targeted and effective manner. Some of the newest data and data analytics are being used to advance EPA’s environmental justice priorities. “So again, companies would do well to think about the ways we use data and to be talking with their neighbors to ensure that they’re doing what they can to ensure that disproportionately overburdened communities are getting the help they need,” Kim stated.

These EPA and DOJ statements clearly signal a potential increase in criminal environmental enforcement actions, creating additional risks for companies that run afoul of regulatory requirements. These corporate risks, which also may also be borne by executives and other employees, may be mitigated through the prompt detection and reporting of non-compliant conduct and through the development and maintenance of robust compliance programs. The ability to conduct prompt and thorough internal investigations and compliance audits should be a central part of an effective corporate compliance program.

OECD Tour de Table Includes Information on U.S. Developments on the Safety of Manufactured Nanomaterials

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has published the latest edition of the Developments in Delegations on the Safety of Manufactured Nanomaterials and Advanced Materials — Tour de Table. The Tour de Table compiles information provided by delegations on the occasion of the 23rd meeting of the OECD Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials (WPMN) in June 2023. The Tour de Table lists U.S. developments on the human health and environmental safety of nanomaterials. Risk assessment decisions, including the type of nanomaterials assessed, testing recommended, and outcomes of the assessment include:

  • The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) completed review of four low volume exemptions (LVE) that included a graphene material, a titanium dioxide material, and two graphene oxide materials, one of which was a modification to an existing exemption. EPA denied two of the LVEs and granted two under conditions that limited human and environmental exposures to prevent unreasonable risks.
  • According to the Tour de Table, EPA has under review 17 premanufacture notices (PMN), 16 of which are for multi-walled carbon nanotube chemical substances and one of which is for a graphene material. The Tour de Table states that EPA is still reviewing these 17 chemical substances for potential risks to human health and the environment. EPA completed its review of one significant new use notice (SNUN) for a single-walled carbon nanotube, regulating it with a consent order due to limited available data on nanomaterials. The consent order limits uses and human and environmental exposures to prevent unreasonable risks.

The Tour de Table includes the following information regarding risk management approaches in the United States:

  • Between June 2022 and June 2023, EPA received notification of two nanoscale substances based on metal oxides that met reporting criteria pursuant to its authority under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Section 8(a), bringing the total number of notifications to 87. Reporting criteria exempted nanoscale chemical substances already reported as new chemicals under TSCA and those nanoscale chemical substances that did not have unique or novel properties. According to the Tour de Table, most reporting was for metals or metal oxides.
  • Since January 2005, EPA has received and reviewed more than 275 new chemical notices for nanoscale materials under TSCA, including fullerenes and carbon nano-onions, quantum dots, semiconducting nanoparticles, and carbon nanotubes. EPA has issued consent orders and significant new use rules (SNUR) permitting manufacture under limited conditions. A manufacturer or processor wishing to engage in a designated significant new use identified in a SNUR must submit a SNUN to EPA at least 90 days before engaging in the new use. The Tour de Table notes that because of confidential business information (CBI) claims by submitters, EPA may not be allowed to reveal to the public the chemical substance as a nanoscale material in every new chemical SNUR it issues for nanoscale materials. EPA will continue to issue SNURs and consent orders for new chemical nanoscale materials in the coming year.
  • Because of limited data to assess nanomaterials, the consent orders and SNURS contain requirements to limit exposure to workers through the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), limit environmental exposure by not allowing releases to surface waters or direct releases to air, and limit the specific applications/uses to those described in the new chemical notification.

Regarding updates, including proposals, or modifications to previous regulatory decisions, the Tour de Table states that “[t]he approaches used, given the level of available information, are consistent with previous regulatory decisions. EPA’s assessments now assume that the environmental hazard of a nanomaterial is unknown unless acceptable hazard data is submitted with nanomaterial submission.”

The Tour de Table lists the following new regulatory challenge(s) with respect to any action for nanomaterials:

  • Standards/methods for differentiating between different forms of the same chemical substance that is a nanomaterial;
  • Standardized testing for the physical properties that could be used to characterize/identify nanomaterials; and
  • Differentiation between genuinely new nanoscale materials introduced in commerce and existing products that have been in commerce for decades or centuries.

Striking a Balance: The Supreme Court and the Future of Chevron Deference

In its frequent attempts to enforce the separation of powers that the Constitution’s framers devised as a system of checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government, it is often the so-called “Fourth Branch”—that includes the varied administrative agencies—that is at the heart of things.[1]

These agencies possess a level of technical and scientific expertise that the federal courts generally lack. And, without reference to expertise, Congress often leaves it to agencies and the courts to interpret and apply statutes left intentionally vague or ambiguous as the product of the legislative compromise required to gain passage. This phenomenon begs the question of the extent to which the federal courts may defer to administrative agencies in interpreting such statutes, or whether such deference abnegates the judicial prerogative of saying what the law is. Having passed on several opportunities to revisit this question, the Supreme Court of the United States has finally done so.

In what potentially will lead to a decision that might substantially change the face of federal administrative law generally while voiding an untold number of agency regulations, the Supreme Court, on January 17, 2024, heard oral argument in a pair of appeals, Loper Bright Enterprises, et al., v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, and Relentless, Inc., et al. v. Department of Commerce, No. 22-1219, focusing on whether the Court should overrule or limit its seminal decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense CouncilInc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Almost 40 years ago, the Chevron decision articulated the doctrine commonly known as “Chevron deference,” which involves a two-part test for determining when a judicial determination must be deferential to the interpretation of a statute. The first element requires determining what Congress has spoken directly to the specific issue in question, and the second is “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

Among the most cited Supreme Court cases, Chevron has become increasingly controversial, especially within the conservative wing of the Court, with several Justices having suggested that the doctrine has led to the usurpation of the essential function of the judiciary.

Chevron deference affects a wide range of federal regulations, and the Court’s ruling, whether or not Chevron is retained in some form, is likely to result in significant changes to how agencies may implement statutes and how parties affected by regulations may seek relief from the impact of those regulations. Interestingly, commentators on the recent oral argument in the case are widely divided in their predictions as to the outcome—some suggesting that the conservative majority of the Court will overrule Chevron outright, others suggesting that the Court has no intention at all to do so.

Based on remarks made during the oral arguments by Justice Gorsuch, and by Justices Amy Coney Barrett and Elena Kagan, as well as Justice Kagan’s fashioning of a majority that clarified a related interpretive rule in an earlier case focusing on agencies’ authority to interpret their own regulations, we suggest that there is a substantial possibility that the Court will take a moderate path by strengthening judicial scrutiny at the “Step One” level while recognizing that there are technical and scientific matters as to which courts have no expertise. At the same time, the Court may make it clear that, essentially, legal issues are within its prerogatives and are not subject to agency interpretation.

We examine how the Court might find a path to a better balancing of agency and judicial functions that is consistent with and builds upon other recent rulings involving the review of actions taken by administrative agencies. Whatever the outcome, the Court’s ruling in these cases will have a profound impact on individuals and entities that are regulated by federal agencies or that depend on participation in government programs, such as Medicare and Social Security.

Chevron Refresher

Most law students and lawyers have some familiarity with the touchstone for judicial review of agency rules that was articulated in Chevron, a case that dealt with regulations published by the Environmental Protection Agency to implement a part of the Clean Air Act.[2] The Supreme Court explained that judicial review of an agency’s final rule should be based on the two-part inquiry that we mentioned earlier. First, the reviewing court should determine whether Congress made its intent unambiguously clear in the text of the statute; if so, the inquiry ends, and both the agency and the reviewing court must give effect to Congress’s intent. This has become known by the shorthand phrase “Step One.”

If Congress’s intent is not clear, either because it did not address a specific point or used ambiguous language, then the court should defer to the agency’s construction if it is based on a permissible reading of the underlying statute. This has become known as “Step Two.”

In applying Step Two, a reviewing court should determine if the gap left by Congress was explicit or implicit. If the ambiguity is explicit, then the agency’s regulations should be upheld unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute.[3] If the ambiguity is implicit, then the “court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”[4]

Chevron deference is not a blank slate for courts to find ambiguity. It recognized that the judiciary “is the final authority on issues of statutory construction” and instructed that in applying Step One, judges are expected to apply the “traditional tools of statutory construction.”[5] It also recognized that any deference analysis should fit within the balance among the branches of government. The Supreme Court explained that while Congress sets an overall policy, it may not reach specific details in explaining how that policy is to be executed in particular contexts. In these situations, the executive branch may have the necessary technical expertise to fill in the details, as it is charged with administering the policy enacted into law. The Court noted that the judiciary was not the ideal entity to fill in any gaps left in legislation because “[j]udges are not experts in the field” and that courts are not political entities. As a result, agencies with expertise are better suited to carry out those policies. Moreover, even if agencies are not accountable to the public, they are part of the executive branch headed by the President, who (unlike judges with life tenure) is directly accountable to the electorate.[6]

Nevertheless, during the recent oral arguments, the Chief Justice stated that the Court had not in recent years employed Chevron itself in its analysis of agency action. The reason why the issue of whether Chevron unduly intrudes upon the judicial function, and whether it should be overruled or modified, relates to the fact that it is widely used in lower court review of administrative actions. Its reconsideration also relates to increasing jurisprudential conservatism on the Supreme Court and the application of originalism and, more widely, textualism.

The Chevron concept of deference to agency regulations exists alongside a line of cases in which courts have deferred to an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations. In both Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.[7] and Auer v. Robbins,[8] the Supreme Court developed the principle that courts are not supposed to substitute their preference for how a regulation should be interpreted; instead, a court should give “controlling weight” to that interpretation unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”[9] Nevertheless, the Court has refused to extend that form of deference to subregulatory guidelines and manuals where there is little or no evidence of a formal process intended to implement Congress’s expressed intent.[10]

The Chevron framework has generated criticism, including statements by several current Justices. Their position relies on an argument that Chevron distorts the balance of authority in favor of the executive and strips courts of their proper role. In a recent dissent from a denial of certiorari, Justice Gorsuch complained that Chevron creates a bias in favor of the federal government and that instead of having a neutral judge determine rights and responsibilities, “we outsource our interpretive responsibilities. Rather than say what the law is, we tell those who come before us to go ask a bureaucrat.”[11] Justice Thomas has written that the Administrative Procedure Act does not require deference to agency determinations and raises constitutional concerns because it undercuts the “obligation to provide a judicial check on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”[12]

Chevron and the Herring Fishermen

The dispute that has brought Chevron deference to the Supreme Court in 2024 starts with the business of commercial fishing for herring. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) published a regulation in 2020 that requires operators of certain fishing vessels to pay the cost of observers who work on board those vessels to ensure compliance with that agency’s rules under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (“Act”). Several commercial fishing operators challenged the regulations, which led to two decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the First Circuit. Both courts upheld the regulations, but on slightly different grounds. In the first decision, Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo,[13] the District of Columbia Circuit followed the traditional Chevron analysis and concluded that the Act did not expressly address who would bear the cost of the monitors. The NMFS’s interpretation of the statute in the regulation was found to be reasonable under Step Two of Chevron based on the finding that the agency was acting within the scope of a broad delegation of authority to the agency to further the Act’s conservation and management goals, and on the established precedent concluding that the cost of compliance with a regulation is typically borne by the regulated party.

The second decision by the First Circuit, Relentless, Inc. v. United States Department of Commerce,[14] took a slightly different approach. That court focused on the text of the Act and concluded that the agency’s interpretation was permissible. It did not anchor its decision in a Chevron analysis and stated that “[w]e need not decide whether we classify this conclusion as a product of Chevron step one or step two.”[15] The First Circuit also emphasized that the operators’ arguments did not overcome the presumption that regulated entities must bear the cost of compliance with a relevant statute or regulation.

The parties have staked out starkly different views of Chevron’s legitimacy and whether it is compatible with the separation of powers in the U.S. Constitution. The fishermen petitioners argue that Chevron is not entitled to respect as precedent because the two-part test was only an interpretive methodology and not the holding construing the Clean Air Act. Their core argument is that Chevron improperly and unconstitutionally shifts power to the executive branch by giving more weight to the agencies in rulemaking and in resolving disputes where the agency is a party and shifts power away from the judiciary’s role under Article III to interpret laws and Congress’s legislative authority power under Article I. Taking this one step further, the petitioners argue that this shift violates the due process rights of regulated parties. They also argue that Chevron is unworkable in practice, citing instances where the Supreme Court itself has declined to apply the two-part test and the lack of a consensus as to when a statute is clear or ambiguous, making the application of Chevron inconsistent. Put another way, according to the petitioners, the problem with Chevron is that there is no clear rule spelling out how much ambiguity is needed to trigger deference to an agency’s rule. Next, they argue that Chevron cannot be applied when an underlying statute is silent because this allows agencies to legislate when there is a doubt as to whether Congress delegated that power to the agency at all and that it would run counter to accepted principles of construction that silence can be construed to be a grant of power to an agency. Finally, they contend that Chevron deference to agencies conflicts with Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, where Congress authorized courts to “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”[16]

The Secretary of Commerce argues that there are multiple reasons to preserve Chevron deference. First, the Secretary argues that Chevron fits within the balance of power between the branches of the federal government. In the Secretary’s view, Chevron deference is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, as it respects (1) Congress’s authority to legislate and to delegate authority to an administrative agency, (2) the agency’s application of its expertise in areas that may be complex, and (3) the judiciary’s authority to resolve disputed questions of law. Therefore, the Chevron framework avoids situations where courts may function like super-legislatures in deciding how a statute should be implemented or administered and second-guess policy decisions.

According to the Secretary, courts know how to apply the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, and if an ambiguity exists after that exercise is complete, it is appropriate to defer to an administrative agency that has technical or scientific experience with the subject matter being regulated. In addition, the Secretary contends that Chevron promotes consistency in the administration of statutes and avoids a patchwork of court rulings that may make it difficult or impossible to administer a nationwide program, such as Social Security or Medicare. Third, the Secretary notes that Chevron is a doctrine that has been workable for 40 years and that over those decades, Congress has not altered or overridden its holding, even as it has enacted thousands of statutes since 1984 that either require rulemaking or have gaps that have been filled by rulemaking. As a result, the Secretary argues that there are settled interpretations that agencies and regulated parties rely on, and overruling Chevron would lead to instability and relitigating settled cases. Finally, the Secretary argues that Chevron deference cannot be limited to interpretations of ambiguous language alone, as there are no accepted criteria for distinguishing ambiguous statutory language from statutory silence.

The Oral Argument

The Supreme Court heard arguments in both cases on January 17, 2024. Over more than three hours of argument, the Justices focused on several questions. Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson expressed concerns that abandoning the Chevron framework would put courts in the position of making policy rather than just ruling on questions of law. In their view, courts lack the skills and expertise to craft policy and should not act as super-legislators. They also stressed that there are situations in which the tools of statutory construction do not yield a single answer or that Congress has not addressed the question either because it left some matters unresolved in the statute or through other subsequent changes not contemplated by Congress, such as the adoption of new technologies. In these cases, the Justices wanted to know why deference to an agency was not appropriate and did not see any clear indication that Congress intended that courts, not agencies, should make determinations when the statutory language is ambiguous or silent. They also questioned why the Supreme Court should overrule Chevron when Congress has been fully aware of the decision for 40 years and has not enacted legislation to eliminate the ability of a court to defer to an agency’s determinations.

The members of the more conservative wing of the Supreme Court questioned counsel about weaknesses in the Chevron framework. Justice Gorsuch returned to his earlier criticism of Chevron and asked the parties to define what constitutes enough ambiguity to allow a court to move from Step One to Step Two. He further questioned whether there was sufficient evidence that Congress ever intended to give the government the benefit of the doubt when an individual or regulated entity challenges agency action. Justice Gorsuch, along with Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, asked whether Chevron actually resulted in greater instability and whether it was appropriate to abandon Chevron in favor of the lesser form of deference articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., where deference is not a default outcome and a court is supposed to exercise its independent judgment to give weight to agency determinations based on factors including the thoroughness of the agency’s analysis, the consistency and validity of the agency’s position, and the agency’s “consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”[17] The follow-up questions asked whether it was correct to accord deference to agency regulations when the agency’s policy can shift from administration to administration.

Where Is the Conservative Court Likely to Go?

The length of the argument and the alacrity of questioning do not mean that the Supreme Court is going to overrule the 40-year-old, highly influential Chevron doctrine. It is, however, quite likely that the doctrine will be narrowed and clarified. To say nothing of the recent oral argument, several recent decisions evidence a reluctance to abandon deference altogether. In a pair of decisions issued in 2022 involving Medicare reimbursement to hospitals, the Court resolved deference questions by relying on the statutory text alone.

Those decisions involved challenges to a Medicare regulation governing hospital reimbursement, and a published interpretation of a section of the Medicare statute governing reimbursement for outpatient drugs. Although the Court ruled in the government’s favor in the former case and against the government in the latter case, neither decision relies on Chevron—even though in one case, the petitioner’s counsel expressly asked the Court to overrule Chevron during the oral argument.[18] Yet, by relying on the text of each statute to resolve a regulatory dispute, the Court’s reasoning in both decisions is consistent with Step One of the Chevron test and demonstrates that it is workable in practice and need not result in a dilution of judicial review. In addition, the Court has developed another limit to agency action in its decisions, finding that when a regulatory issue presents a “major question,” deference is irrelevant unless the agency can show that Congress expressed a clear intent that the agency exercise its regulatory authority. This concept remains a work in progress because the Court has not defined criteria that make an issue a major question.[19]

These cases provide a useful background to an increasingly jurisprudentially conservative, textually oriented Court. Two cases that were specifically discussed during oral argument are particularly significant in plotting the Court’s landing place with regard to Chevron. Justice Gorsuch made multiple references to Skidmore, which sets forth the principle that a federal agency’s determination is entitled to judicial respect if the determination is authorized by statute and made based on the agency’s experience and informed judgment. Unlike the Chevron standard, the Skidmore standard considers an agency’s consistency in interpreting a law it administers.

The second, and more recent, precedent that is even more likely to guide the narrowing of Chevron is Kisor v. Wilkie.[20] There, a 5-4 divided Court adopted a multi-stage regime for reviewing an agency’s reliance upon arguably ambiguous regulations that is roughly analogous to Chevron’s two-stage analytical modality. In doing so, it modified, but did not overrule, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and its doctrinal predecessor, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), which permit a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, so long as that interpretation is reasonable, even if the court believes another reasonable reading of the regulation is the better reading.

Kisor saw a mixed bag of Justices joining, or dissenting from, various parts of the Kagan opinion. What made the majority as to its operative section was the Chief Justice’s joining Justice Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. With Justice Ginsburg having been succeeded by Justice Barrett, and Justice Breyer having been succeeded by Justice Jackson, one might hypothesize that there now would be a conservative 5-4 majority that would have overruled Auer. However, it was Justice Barrett who raised the possibility of “Kisorizing” Chevron, a suggestion quickly adopted by Justice Kagan. Justice Gorsuch, a longtime opponent of Chevron, is likely amenable to a Skidmore-oriented result.

The Kagan opinion cabins and arguably lowers the level of deference an agency’s interpretation of a rule should receive. Thus, with a strong nod to the Court’s jurisprudential drift to the right, Justice Kagan begins with the truism that whatever discretion an agency might claim, the Court’s analysis must proceed under the proposition that an unambiguous rule must be applied precisely as its text is written. It is not unlikely that, if the Court narrows Chevron (as we predict it shall), it also will begin with a more robust requirement to apply the statutory text in Step One and re-emphasize the need to exhaust all of the tools of statutory construction; in other words, there is no need for deference unless there is genuine ambiguity. If an agency’s determination is to become relevant, it only becomes so after ambiguity is established.[21]

In short, if the law gives a definitive answer on its face, there is nothing to which a court should defer, even if the agency argues that there is an interpretation that produces a better, more reasonable result. This is a textual determination that addresses the criticism of the so-called Administrative State’s acting as a quasi-legislature to which the Court yields its own power to say what the law is.

However, even a reasonable agency interpretation, the Kagan opinion notes, might not be dispositive. The opinion must be the agency’s official position, not one ginned up for litigation purposes, and it must reflect the agency’s particular expertise.

­Conclusion

In its 40-year life, Chevron deference has been at the heart of the application of federal administrative law. No case among all of the many governmental functions that the Supreme Court considers has been more widely cited, and no administrative law case has been more controversial, especially among jurisprudential conservatives. While asked by various parties to do so, the Court has declined, and the Chevron structure has been applied, often inconsistently, by federal courts. Perhaps reflecting the increasingly conservative direction of the Court, we have reached a point where the Court will consider retiring this long-standing precedent or, alternatively, refreshing it based on the experience of courts and agencies since 1984.

Justice Kagan’s analytic method in Kisor v. Wilkie could also apply to tightening Chevron. In her decisions, she has exhibited great fidelity to reading text literally, avoiding the perils of legislation from the bench. As she wrote in Kisor:

[B]efore concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court must exhaust all the traditional tools of construction. . . . For again, only when that legal toolkit is empty and the interpretive question still has no single right answer can a judge conclude that it is more one of policy than of law. That means a court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it found the regulation impenetrable on first read. Agency regulations can sometimes make the eyes glaze over. But hard interpretive conundrums, even relating to complex rules, can often be solved. A regulation is not ambiguous merely because discerning the only possible interpretation requires a taxing inquiry. To make that effort, a court must carefully consider the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no agency to fall back on. . . . Doing so will resolve many seeming ambiguities out of the box, without resort to . . . deference” (citations and internal punctuation omitted).[22]

Text alone might not provide the answer in every case, as Justice Kagan recognizes as she outlines four additional steps that might lead to judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations. However, to the extent that a majority of the Court elects to retain Chevron, though narrowing it, her approach in the analogous setting reflected in Kisor would be effective in resolving the two cases now at bar—recognizing agency expertise in technical and scientific matters beyond the competency of the judiciary while preserving the function of the courts to determine what the legislature actually wrote, not to write it themselves.

* * * *

ENDNOTES

[1] Besides the administrative bureaucracy, various jurists and commentators have, under this rubric, included the press, the people acting through grand juries, and interest or pressure groups. Those institutions represent the arguable influence of extra-governmental sources. We are focused here on the level of judicial deference afforded to federal administrative agencies.

[2] 467 U.S. at 842-43.

[3] 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

[4] Id. at 844.

[5] Id. at 843, fn.9.

[6] Id. at 865-66.

[7] 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).

[8] 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).

[9] Id.

[10] United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).

[11] Buffington v. McDonough, No. 21-972 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting at 9) (2022).

[12] Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199,1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

[13] 45 F.4th 359 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

[14] 62 F.4th 621 (1st Cir. 2023).

[15] Id. at 634.

[16] 5 U.S.C. § 706.

[17] 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

[18] Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, 142 S.Ct. 2354 (2022), and American Hospital Ass’n v. Becerra, 142 S.Ct. 1896 (2022). The request to overrule Chevron appears in the transcript of the American Hospital Ass’n oral argument, at 30.

[19] West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S.Ct. 2587 (2022); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).

[20] 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).

[21] Kisor predicated deference, if at all, upon five preliminary stages. First, as noted, the reviewing court should determine that a genuine ambiguity exists after applying all of the tools of statutory construction. This is consistent with Step One of Chevron, but Justice Kagan makes it clear that this is a heightened textual barrier. Second, the agency’s construction of the regulation must be “reasonable”; this is a restatement of Step Two of Chevron. The Court cautioned that an agency can fail at this step. Third, the agency’s construction must be “the agency’s ‘authoritative’ or ‘official position,’” which was explained as an interpretation that is authorized by the agency’s head or those in a position to formulate authoritative policy. Fourth, the regulatory interpretation must implicate the agency’s “substantive expertise.” Finally, the regulatory interpretation must reflect the agency’s “fair and considered judgment” and that a court should decline to defer to a merely “convenient litigating position” or “post hoc rationalizatio[n] advanced” to “defend past agency action against attack.”

[22] 139 S.Ct. at 2415.