What 2014’s Continued IPO Surge Means for Clean Tech and Renewable Energy Companies

Mintz Levin Law Firm

The year 2014 is on track to be the most active IPO marketin the United States since 2000, with the mid-year total number of IPOs topping last year’s mid-year total by more than 60%.[1] There were 222 US IPOs in 2013, with a total of $55 billion raised, and 2014 has already seen 151 US IPOs, for a total of $32 billion, completed by the mid-year mark. The year 2000 (over 400 IPOs) was the last year of a 10-year boom in US IPOs that reached its peak in 1996 (over 700 IPOs).

What does this mean for emerging energy technology andrenewables companies that might be looking to the capital markets? As of mid-year 2014, there have been six cleantech/renewables IPOs, while there were a total of seven in all of 2013. In both years, these deals have represented a relatively small percentage of total IPOs and still do not match the level of activity in the more traditional energy and oil & gas sector.  In 2014, IPOs were completed by a range of innovative companies, including Aspen Aerogels, TCP International and Opower.

Two unambiguously positive developments for clean energy in 2013 and the first half of 2014 have been the strong market for follow-on offerings and YieldCo IPOs. As was the case in 2013, several larger energy tech companies that are already public completed follow-on offerings to bolster cash for growth in 2014. Following in the footsteps of Tesla, SunEdison, First Solar, and other companies who completed secondary offerings in 2013, Jinko Solar (January 2014), Pattern NRG (May 2014), Plug Power (January and April 2014), Trina Solar (June 2014), and several other public companies capitalized on the continued receptiveness of clean-tech capital markets.

Following on successful YieldCo IPOs in 2013 (NRG Yield, Pattern Energy), there have already been three YieldCo IPOs in 2014: Abengoa Yield, NextEra Energy Partners, and, most recently, Terraform Power. The continued growth of YieldCo deals as well as the growing dollar amount of such offerings is an extremely encouraging sign for the energy and clean-tech sector as a whole, signaling a longer-term market acceptance of the ongoing changes in domestic and global energy consumption. The successful public market financings of these companies – whose strategy typically involves the purchase and operation of existing clean, energy-generating assets – should result in increased access to capital for renewable energy generation assets, as well as related technologies and services across the sector.

If the first half of this year is any indication, 2014 should prove to be a strong year for clean-tech and renewable energy companies opting to pursue the IPO path. The IPOs, follow-on offerings, and YieldCo successes that we’ve seen so far should improve the prospects for forthcoming clean-energy IPOs in the second half of 2014 and beyond.  I expect to see more renewable/clean energy companies follow the IPO route and make the most of the market’s continued receptiveness.


[1]  Please note that there will be some variance in the statistics for IPOs generally. This is because most data sets exclude extremely small initial public offerings and uniquely structured offerings that don’t match up with the more commonly understood public offering for operating companies. The data above is based on information from http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2012Statistics.pdf and Renaissance Capital www.renaissancecapital.com.

ARTICLE BY:

OF:

Texas Supreme Court Clarifies Royalty Calculations For Enhanced Oil Recovery

steptoe-johnsonlogo

In French v. Occidental Permian, Ltd., the Texas Supreme Court clarified royalty calculations for enhanced oil recovery.  The Court:

  1. Rejected a royalty owners’ claim that royalties on casinghead gas should be determined as if the injected carbon dioxide (CO2) was not present
  2. Held that, under the applicable leases and Unitization Agreement, the costs of removing CO2 from the gas were post-production expenses that royalty owners must share with the working interest owner

In the opinion, the Court emphasized the importance of efficient production of oil and gas and the prevention of waste.

Background

The Plaintiffs-Appellants, Marcia Fuller French and others (“French”), were lessors on two different oil and gas leases.  Both lease royalty provisions provided that the casinghead gas royalty was net of post-production expenses, but not production expenses.  The Defendant-Appellee, Occidental Permian Ltd. (“Oxy”) owned a working interest.  The parties had entered into a Unitization Agreement to allow secondary recovery operations.

Oxy began injecting wells on these leases with CO2 in 2001 in order boost oil production when waterflooding became less effective.  As a result, the wells produced natural gas that was about 85% CO2.  Although Oxy could reinject the entire casinghead gas stream, Oxy had the gas treated off site to remove the CO2.   It sold the resulting gas and had the extracted CO2 sent back to the well to be reinjected.  Oxy paid royalties on the gas after it was treated and deducted the treatment costs from French’s royalties.

French sued arguing that, except for the removal of contaminants and the extraction of NGL, the costs of processing the casinghead gas (including transportation costs) were production costs that should be borne solely by Oxy.  Conversely, Oxy argued the CO2 removal was necessary to render the gas stream marketable.  At trial, the Court agreed with French and awarded her $10,074,262.33 in underpaid royalties and entered a declaratory judgment defining Oxy’s ongoing royalty obligations.  The court of appeals reversed with a focus on the damages calculations, but did not reach a decision on whether the cost of separating the CO2 from the casinghead gas was a production expense.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Court examined the parties’ agreements noting that French consented to the injection of extraneous substances into the oil reservoir and gave Oxy the right and discretion to decide whether to reinject or process the casinghead gas.  The Court further pointed out the Agreement provided that the royalty owners agreed to forego royalties on any unitized substances used in the recovery process.  The Court found that French benefited from that decision and therefore must share in the cost of the CO2 removal.  The question then became whether the CO2 processing was a production or post-production cost.

French argued that the CO2 separation was akin to the removal of water from oil, which Oxy treated as a production cost.  The Court, however, found that oil and water are “immiscible” and separation of the two is a relatively simple process, unlike CO2 and gas separation, which requires special technology.  Water separation is necessary for reinjection into the reservoir and to make the oil marketable.  Conversely, CO2 separation is not necessary for continued production of oil.  The Court then noted that Oxy was not required to reinject the casinghead gas.  Therefore, based on the parties’ agreements, “French, having given Oxy the right and discretion to decide whether to reinject or process the casinghead gas, and having benefited from that decision, must share in the cost of the CO2removal.”  Id. at 7.

Conclusion

The Court indirectly emphasized efficient production of oil and gas and prevention of waste.  The gas processing was economically beneficial to both French and Oxy.  The CO2 separation increased the value of the stream to both Oxy and French by allowing sale of the extracted NGLs and allowing reinjection of more than 10% of the gas produced directly back into the field.  Because French received the benefit of Oxy’s decision, it had to share in the cost.

This opinion is an important reminder to carefully negotiate and agree to terms in all agreements.  It is a further reminder to proceed in an efficient and economic manner.

Commerce Department Rulings Spur Oil Export Battle

Covington BUrling Law Firm

As reported in our blog post of last week, the Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) recently determined in two private classifications that lease condensate — a type of stabilized and distilled light crude oil — is not subject to the United States’ broad ban on crude oil exports.  BIS has for years defined “crude oil” in its regulations as “a mixture of hydrocarbons that existed in liquid phase in underground reservoirs and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface separating facilities and which has not been processed through a crude oil distillation tower.”   Although the regulations state that this definition includes lease condensate, BIS appears to have determined that lease condensate that has been distilled is a refined petroleum product that is not subject to the broad ban on crude oil exports from the United States.

While BIS claims that there has been “no change in policy on crude oil exports,” the recent determinations have spurred the debate over whether the U.S. should change its position on crude oil exports.  In particular, Senators Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Edward Markey (D-Mass.) — who have been vocal opponents of lifting the ban on crude oil exports — wrote a letter to Commerce Secretary Priztker alleging that BIS may have impermissibly approved the exports of lease condensate and demanding copies of the two determinations and information on the legal rationale for approving such exports by July 14, 2014.  Senators Markey and Menendez argue that allowing exports of crude oil would increase reliance on foreign oil and cause domestic gas prices to rise.  However, with U.S. crude oil production surging as a result of the advancements in hydrofracking technology, Senators Lisa Murkowski and Mary Landrieu have championed the effort to reconsider the ban on crude oil exports, which has been in place since the Arab oil embargo and global energy supply shortages of the 1970s.  In particular, Senator Murkowski has issued a report calling for a “renovation” of U.S. energy export policy, which includes an April 2014 white paper in advocating for condensate exports.

While some view BIS’ approval of condensate exports as a step towards a greater liberalization in crude oil export policy, financial analysts such as Morgan Stanley are not bullish on any significant changes occurring before this years’ mid-term elections.  Moreover, recent reports indicate that the White House may not have been aware that BIS was planning to issue such determinations, and therefore this may not represent a conscious effort on the part of the Obama Administration to change crude oil export policy.  Indeed, Secretary Pritzker has confirmed publicly that the rulings were not a change in policy.  However, the Secretary also said that “it’s a mistake to think there isn’t serious conversation going on within the administration about what we should do,” and that the issue of energy exports overall should be “examined holistically from an economic, strategic, and diplomatic standpoint.”  These statements suggest that the Administration is not backing down from the condensate rulings, and is considering the broader policy issues involved in allowing exports of other oil products.

Article By:

 

SEC Settles Civil Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Action Against Two Former Oil Services Executives

Katten Muchin

On the eve of a trial which was scheduled to begin this week, the Securities and Exchange Commission settled a civil Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) case it brought against two former oil services executives. The case was an outgrowth of anindustry-wide investigation the SEC had initially commenced beginning in 2010.

In February 2012, the SEC filed a complaint against Mark A. Jackson, who was the former CEO and CFO of Noble Corporation, and James J. Ruehlen, former Director and Division Manager of Noble’s Nigerian subsidiary, alleging that they authorized the payment of bribes to customs officials to process false paperwork that purported to show the export and re-import of oil rigs, which was necessary under the requirements of Nigerian law. In fact, the rigs had never been moved. The SEC alleged that the scheme was part of a design to save Noble from losing business and incurring costs associated with exporting rigs from Nigeria and re-importing them under new permits. The complaint asserted violations of the anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA. The complaint also detailed the fact that Jackson had refused to cooperate during Noble’s internal investigation of the matter and had asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify during the SEC investigation.

The settlement with Jackson and Ruehlen was the last in a lengthy saga of FCPA actions against Noble and its former employees. Noble was initially charged with FCPA violations in a civil action in 2010. The company settled, agreeing to pay more than $8 million in fees. The SEC filed charges against Jackson and Ruehlen in 2012 following the corporate settlement and also filed charges against Thomas F. O’Rourke, the former controller and head of internal audit at Noble. O’Rourke quickly settled and agreed to pay a penalty.

Despite pursuing the action for more than two years and alleging serious wrongdoing by the defendants, including responsibility for an extensive bribery scheme, the SEC agreed to settle with Jackson and Ruehlen just two days before their trial was to commence with an injunction against violating the books and records provision of the FCPA. Although Noble had settled its own case for a hefty penalty, neither Jackson nor Ruehlen were required to pay a fine, concede a violation of the bribery provisions of the FCPA nor agree to restrictions on employment.

SEC v. Jackson et al., No. 4:12-c-00563 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2014).  

Article By:

Of:

The Supreme Court’s Greenhouse Gas Permitting Decision – What Does It Mean?

McDermottLogo_2c_rgb

The U.S. Supreme Court today partly upheld and partly rejected the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s federal Clean Air Act permitting regulations governing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from stationary sources.  The decision is mostly a victory for EPA, and its narrow scope means that it will almost certainly not disrupt, let alone invalidate, EPA’s ongoing Section 111(d) rulemaking to set GHG emission limits for existing power plants.  At the same time, the decision does not necessarily mean that EPA’s 111(d) proposal is free from legal challenge.  That is because the decision does not address 111(d).

Today’s decision concerns the Clean Air Act’s two stationary source permitting programs – the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) program and the Title V program.  In 2010, EPA announced that it was including GHG emissions within the scope of both programs.  Various states and industry groups challenged that announcement, and today, the Supreme Court partly agreed and partly disagreed with the challengers.

First, five justices (Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Alito and Thomas) held that a source’s GHG emissions, standing alone, cannot trigger the obligation to undergo PSD and Title V permitting.  That part of the decision is a loss for EPA.  But the second part of the decision is a victory for the agency.  Seven justices (Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Beyer, Sotomayor and Kagan) held that EPA canrequire sources that are subject to PSD “anyway,” because they emit other types of pollutants in significantly large quantities, to control their GHG emissions.  In sum, GHG emissions cannot trigger the obligation to undergo PSD permitting, but EPA can use the PSD permitting process to impose source-specific GHG emission limits on facilities that trigger the process for other reasons.

The decision does not address EPA’s authority to impose substantive limits on GHG emissions using other statutory provisions such as Clean Air Act Section 111(d).

Article By:

Of:

EU Sanctions And The International Oil And Gas Industry

Andrews Kurth

The international oil and gas industry is continuously tasked with adapting to an ever evolving sanction-regulated environment. The level of sanction activity and implementation in recent years has been unprecedented, partly as a result of the political events which gave rise to the Arab Spring and the opposition to Iran’s nuclear programme. The recent crisis in the Ukraine, and associated sanctions against Russia, have sparked further debate around the need for effective, targeted punitive measures and the consequences they may have for Europe.

This article considers the EU’s sanction regime, explores the effect it has on international oil and gas companies and addresses the short-comings of the EU’s decentralised system.

What are sanctions?

Sanctions are political policy instruments used to encourage jurisdictions acting in contravention of international law to adopt standards supported by the wider global community. They impose measures designed to cause damage to the targeted government, non-state entity or individual (“Target”) in order to force it to undertake, or prevent it from undertaking, certain behaviour. They may inhibit the Target from accessing foreign markets for trade or deny it from pursuing financial and other forms of commerce. The professed ultimate objective of a sanction is to preserve or restore global peace and security.

What is the source of EU sanctions?

The UN Security Council imposes sanctions through Security Council resolutions which are binding on the EU. The EU implements all sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council through legislation enacted by the European Council. The process typically results in a European Council regulation which has direct effect in EU member states’ separate legal systems, creating rights and obligations for those subject to them, and overrides national law. Additionally, the EU may decide to impose self-directed sanctions or restrictive measures which go further than a UN Security Council resolution in circumstances in which the EU deems such action to be necessary.

Why do EU sanctions affect international oil and gas companies?

Over the past two decades, the EU has engaged in an active use of restrictive measures in the form of economic and financial sanctions, embargoes and restrictions on admission to a country. Economic and financial sanctions typically take the form of asset-freeze measures which involve the use of funds and economic resources by Targets or persons acting for and on behalf of Targets, and the provision of funds and economic resources to designated Targets. Embargoes may prohibit trade in certain goods, and activities relating to such trade, with Targets (including the flow of arms and military equipment). Visa or travel bans can be imposed preventing certain persons from entering the EU or transit through the territory of EU member states. These sanction measures are part of the EU’s strategy to support the specific objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

At the time of writing, the EU has announced asset freezes and travel bans against around twenty individuals in Russia and the Ukraine. Companies conducting their business in the oil and gas sector should be particularly vigilant to ensure they act in compliance with EU sanctions, as Ukrainian and Russian entities and individuals who operate in this industry may increasingly become sanction targets.

US sanctions are questionable under international law because they apply extra-territorially to third state parties involved in business activities with the Target. Unlike the US, the EU has refrained from adopting legislation with extra-territorial effect. However, the EU’s recent sanctions against Iran displayed a greater resemblance to those levied by the US than had previously been the case. For example, sanctions were imposed prohibiting the provision of key resources to various parts of the Iranian oil and gas industry, as well as the provision of financial services to that sector. As a result of EU financial sanctions most, if not all, banks and other financial institutions have declined from conducting any business relations with the Iranian regime.

It is clear that EU sanctions are wide reaching and their scope has a significant impact on business activities. They will apply to international oil and gas companies in the following situations:

  • within EU territory, including its airspace;
  • on board of aircrafts or vessels under the jurisdiction of an EU member state;
  • to EU nationals, whether or not they are in the EU;
  • to companies and organisations incorporated under the law of a member state, whether or not they are in the EU (this captures branches of EU companies in non-EU countries); and
  • to any business done in whole or in part within the EU.

The corporate behaviour, performance and conduct of international companies are powerful channels through which the objectives of sanctions against Targets are achieved. Since an international oil and gas company has little option but to observe EU sanctions to the extent such company falls within the EU’s jurisdiction, these restrictive measures are likely to play a big part in a company’s commercial decision making processes.

Why are EU sanctions difficult to manage?

A principal reason why EU sanctions are difficult for international oil and gas companies based in various EU member states to manage largely stems from the fact that the European Union lacks a centralised licensing body. Instead, the responsibility for implementing and enforcing EU sanctions is delegated to the relevant competent authorities of the EU member states. The potential for variance and discrepancy is rife in a system where there are twenty-eight EU member states, each with their individual national resource constraints and self-centred policy objectives.

Typically, the competent authorities of EU member states are responsible for:

  • granting exemptions and licences;
  • establishing penalties for sanction violations;
  • coordinating with financial institutions; and
  • reporting upon the implementation of sanctions to the European Commission.

There have been calls for a central EU licensing body which would produce a single licensing and exemption policy for EU member states. Although EU guidelines on sanctions and best practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures go some way to plug the gap, arguably a more comprehensive regime for implementing sanctions is required to provide a better level of certainty to international businesses operating in the realms of the EU.

Managing the risks

International oil and gas companies have always had to function in politically active climates. As sanctions initiated by multilateral organisations such as the UN and EU become more fashionable, so too does the exposure to political risk that these companies will face. Given the considerable levels of investment that can only be recouped over extended periods of time, and in accordance with pre-determined contractual apportionments, international oil and gas companies need to be able to recognise, assess and manage these political risks effectively.

Oil and gas companies can relieve the risks imposed on them by sanctions through political lobbying, taking pre-emptive measures and by reacting quickly to sanctions once they are implemented. Commercial negotiations will need to focus on the allocation of risk as a result of one party’s failure to perform or withdrawal from the contract on the grounds of applicable sanctions.

International oil and gas companies need to be proactive and consider both the legal solutions and pre-cure safeguards. Time and effort should be spent focusing on drafting and negotiating the relevant contractual documentation, following a careful risk assessment, instead of deferring to dispute resolution provisions. For instance, careful construction of force majeure provisions can allocate each party’s obligations in the circumstance where an event outside of a party’s control causes contractual performance to become impossible. Thus, whilst conventional force majeure clauses relating to physical events afford relief to an affected party from its liabilities under the contract, oil and gas companies should consider expanding such contractual provisions to cover sanctions and other restrictive measures imposed on them by the UN and EU.

To avoid falling foul of existing EU sanctions, oil and gas companies should also consider putting in place comprehensive compliance procedures and systems to implement applicable sanction regimes. Penalties for breach of sanctions can be severe; a person guilty of a sanction-related offence may be liable on conviction to imprisonment and/or a fine. Falling foul of sanctions also means that a transaction can immediately become unlawful.

Conclusion

In view of the economic significance of the EU, the application of economic financial sanctions can be a powerful tool. But like a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, the effectiveness and success of the EU’s sanction regime depends on all EU member states applying, implementing and enforcing EU sanctions in a consistent manner.

The current EU sanction regime warrants a fully integrated approach which would undoubtedly benefit its policy objectives and move some way to reducing the unduly high economic cost that international oil and gas companies face when operating their businesses in the EU.

In voicing the sentiments of Henry Kissinger: “No foreign policy – no matter how ingenious – has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none”, perhaps now, in the dawn of the recent events which have taken place in the EU’s backyard in the Ukraine and Russia, the EU should further global security measures by tightening its ranks and implementing a more centralised, and better monitored, sanction regime.

Article By:

Of:

Colorado’s Cutting Edge Legislation Fosters Clean Fuel Truck Adoption

Lewis Roca Rothgerber

 

The State of Colorado recently passed HB 14-1326, the “Clean Trucks Bill,” catapulting itself into the group of cutting edge states that are on the forefront of the clean fuel issue. Recognizing that trucks represent a huge opportunity for emissions reductions by replacing diesel engine trucks with trucks reliant on clean fuels, the Clean Trucks Bill paves the way for improved air quality, reduction in greenhouse gases, promotion ofdomestic energy sources and ultimately, cost savings for industry and for consumers. The bill, which passed the Colorado Senate unamended from the version previously passed by the House, was sent to Governor Hickenlooper on May 12, 2014. The Governor is expected to sign the bill and pass it into law soon.

The Clean Trucks Bill employs several components to promote clean fuels. The bill recognizes that the expense of clean fuel trucks over their traditional fuel counterparts leaves clean fuel trucks at a competitive disadvantage, with clean fuel trucks costing between 25 and 75 percent more. As such, the bill expands the alternative fuel tax credit targeting trucks. While existing tax credits provided incentives for compressed natural gas and propane trucks, the bill broadens the category of eligible fuels by incorporating hydrogen and liquefied natural gas into the credit-eligible fuels. Electric or hybrid-electric vehicles greater than 8,500 pounds in gross vehicle weight ratio (GVWR) also become eligible for the tax credit. Additionally, the bill introduces tax credits for heavy duty trucks (greater than 26,000 GVWR) and expands tax credit eligibility to light and medium-duty trucks.

By promoting broader adoption of clean fuel trucks, eventually market development and economies of scale will cause clean fuel trucks to become more cost competitive. The bill provides an 8-year period to achieve those economies of scale, paring down the percentage of a clean fuel truck purchase or conversion that is eligible for the tax credit over that time period. However, the maximum amount of the credit remains constant over the life of the legislation; heavy-duty trucks are eligible for up to $20,000 in tax credits per income tax year, medium-duty trucks up to $15,000 per income tax year, and light-duty trucks up to $7,500 per income tax year.

But the Clean Trucks Bill didn’t stop at a package of clean fuel truck purchase or conversion tax credits. Aerodynamic technologies proven to improve fuel efficiency and clean fuel refrigerated trailers also gained eligibility for tax credits. (Previously, tax credits were only available for idling reduction technologies.) The importance of the inclusion of clean fuel trailers cannot be understated, as fleets prefer to use the same fuel for the truck as the trailer, and the tax credit provides an incentive for the purchase or conversion of the clean fuel trailer in companion with the clean fuel truck.

The Clean Trucks Bill also updates the sales tax exemption for low-emitting vehicles over 10,000 GVWR. Today, virtually every vehicle over 10,000 GVWR meets the eligibility requirements for the sales tax exemption. The Clean Trucks Bill limits that sales tax exemption to trucks meeting more stringent standards.

The final element of the Clean Trucks Bill eliminates the specific ownership tax penalty for purchasing a clean fuel truck. Because the specific ownership tax is based on the purchase price of a vehicle, clean fuel trucks with their higher purchase price stand at a disadvantage to traditional fuel trucks with a lower purchase price. The Clean Trucks Bill abrogates that penalty by reducing the price at which clean trucks are valued for purposes of the specific ownership tax to an amount comparable to traditional fuel vehicles. By equalizing the tax value of a clean fuel truck with a traditional fuel truck, local government recipients of specific ownership tax revenues are unaffected from a revenue standpoint.

The benefits of the Clean Trucks Bill are many. First, the bill stimulates Colorado’s economy by promoting trucks using clean fuels, of which Colorado is a major producer. The bill also supports reduced emissions and improved air quality by providing an incentive for cleaner fuel trucks. Finally, the bill encourages energy independence through the promotion of domestically-produced clean fuels like natural gas and propane, as well as hydrogen and liquefied natural gas. It’s not often legislation of this magnitude can be widely perceived as a win-win, but Colorado is on the eve of becoming one of few states to accomplish such a feat.

Article By:

Of:

The North Carolina Senate Passes Energy Modernization Act

Womble Carlyle

When I was a child, and daring, “frack” was my risky substitute cuss word; but not substitute enough…. Well it’s back at the General Assembly this summer as lawmakers set the stage for hydraulic fracturing “fracking” in North Carolina. Opponents claim there is not enough clarity regarding the rights of property owners under which the fracking might occur and not enough public disclosure regarding what chemicals are used in the fracking process. Proponents insist that the revenue and job creating opportunity is too good to delay further and that the state’s Mining Commission can adequately oversee the process.

SB 786 – Energy Modernization Act. Also known as An Act to

(1) Extend the Deadline for Development of a Modern Regulatory Program for the Management of Oil and Gas Exploration, Development, and Production in the State and the Use of Horizontal Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing Treatments for that Purpose;

(2) Enact of Modify Certain Exemptions from Requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act Applicable to Rules for the Management of Oil and Gas Exploration, Development, and Production in the State and the Use of Horizontal Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing Treatment for that Purpose;

(3) Create the North Carolina Oil and Gas Commission and Reconstitute the North Carolina Mining Commission;

(4) Amend Miscellaneous Statutes Governing Oil and Gas Exploration, Development, and Production Activities;

(5) Establish a Severance Tax Applicable to Oil and Gas Exploration, Development, and Production Activities;

(6) Amend Miscellaneous Statutes Unrelated to Oil and Gas Exploration, Development, and Production Activities; and

(7) Direct Studies on Various Issues, as Recommended by the Joint Legislative Commission on Energy Policy.

Attempts to amend the bill with stricter water quality and property protections failed. The latest version of the bill is here: http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Senate/PDF/S786v2.pdf

 

Wind Farms and Eagle “Take” Permits – Litigation is Coming Over the New “30-Year” Permit Rule

McDermottLogo_2c_rgb

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) recently changed its eagle “take” permitting rules to allow wind developers to apply for 30-year take permits; previously, such permits, which allow the incidental killing of eagles, were available for a maximum of just five years.  Wind developers had lobbied for the rule change based on concerns that shorter permitting periods inhibit their ability to obtain financing.  But now, a bird conservation group, the American Bird Conservancy (ABC), is threatening litigation to overturn the “30-Year” rule.

 

How strong are ABC’s claims?

Not especially strong, because the FWS has powerful responses to each of ABC’s contentions.  The FWS will also be protected by the deferential standard of review that typically applies in this type of lawsuit.  And even if ABC were to prevail on its claims, the end result is less likely to be wholesale revocation of the rule than some delays in implementing it.  That is because ABC’s claims are largely procedural in nature, not substantive.

ABC’s claims are summarized in an April 30 letter to the U.S. Department of the Interior and the FWSannouncing the group’s intention to file suit over the 30-Year rule.  The letter contends that the FWS committed three legal errors when it extended the maximum take permitting period from five years to 30 years.  According to ABC, the FWS violated:  (1) the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment for the 30-Year rule; (2) the Endangered Species Act (ESA), by allegedly failing to ensure that the rule is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species; and (3) the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA), which is the statute that authorizes take permits, by prioritizing the concerns of wind developers over those of the eagles the statute is designed to protect.

The problem for ABC – and the good news for wind developers – is that FWS has strong defenses to ABC’s assertions.  First, the NEPA claim will almost certainly turn on whether the FWS correctly concluded that the 30-Year rule falls within a “categorical exclusion” from NEPA’s requirements.  In its letter, ABC quibbles with the FWS’s conclusion, but courts generally review such conclusions under a highly deferential standard of review.  Indeed, agencies often prevail on such claims simply by offering a facially plausible explanation of why NEPA does not apply.  Here, the FWS has done that.  The agency’s NEPA implementation regulations permit the FWS to forego NEPA analysis for rules that have broad or speculative impacts, provided that those impacts will be analyzed on a case-by-case basis in the future.  The FWS contends that is the situation here – it will conduct a NEPA analysis on a permit-by-permit basis in the future.  Courts have rejected NEPA claims under similar circumstances in the past.

The FWS has a similar defense to ABC’s ESA claim.  That claim turns on whether the FWS had a duty to engage in internal consultation about the potential impact of the 30-Year rule on endangered species or critical habitat.  ABC’s letter insists that the FWS was subject to that duty and failed to comply with it.  But the FWS previously concluded, in 2009, that the eagle take permitting rule as a whole would not have any impact on endangered species.  That leaves the FWS in a strong position now, because the 30-Year rule does little more than change the maximum available permitting period under the existing permitting rule.  The FWS will also likely argue that, contrary to ABC’s assertions, the 30-Year rule does not affect endangered species because all it does is authorize the issuance of permits, it does not itself grant any developer permission to undertake any activity.  In sum, the FWS will likely argue that the proper time for ESA consultation is in the context of specific permit applications in the future, not in the context of this more general rulemaking that is not project-specific.

Finally, although ABC insists that the FWS should not have privileged the interests of wind developers over the protection of eagles, that is probably not enough to establish that the 30-Year rule violates the BGEPA.  The BGEPA expressly allows the FWS to permit eagle takes “for the protection of . . . other interests in any particular locality.”

ABC will likely wait 60 days before actually commencing litigation, so as to comply with the ESA’s citizen suit provision.  In the interim, the FWS will surely be evaluating the merits of ABC’s contentions and considering what options it has for addressing them.  Wind developers may want to make their voices heard during that 60 day period, and may want to consider intervening to defend the 30-Year rule in the event this matter does in fact proceed to litigation.

Article By:

Of:

The President’s Methane Reduction Strategy – Here’s What Energy Companies Need to Know

McDermottLogo_2c_rgb

President Obama recently released a Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions (Strategy) that sets forth a multi-pronged plan for reducing methane emissions both domestically and globally.  Domestically, the plan is to focus on four sources of methane—the oil and gas sector, coal mines, agriculture and landfills—and to pursue a mix of regulatory actions with respect to those sources.  Energy companies now have the opportunity to help influence exactly what those actions will be.

For the oil and gas sector, the Strategy indicates that the federal government will focus primarily on encouraging voluntary efforts to reduce methane emissions—such as bolstering the existing Natural Gas STAR Program and promoting new technologies.  But the Strategy also identifies two areas of potential mandatory requirements.  First, later this year, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) will issue a draft rule on minimizing venting and flaring on public lands.  Regulated parties will have the opportunity to submit comments after the proposed rule is released.  Second, the Strategy confirms that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will decide this fall whether to propose any mandatory methane control requirements on oil and gas production companies.  Consistent with that announcement, on April 15, 2014, EPA released five technical whitepapers discussing methane emissions from the oil and gas production process.  The agency is soliciting comments on those whitepapers—they are due by June 16, 2014.

For coal mines, the Strategy indicates that BLM will soon be seeking public input on developing a program to capture and sell methane from coal mines on public lands.  The Strategy further indicates that EPA will continue promoting voluntary methane capture efforts.

For landfills, the Strategy calls for public input on whether EPA should update its regulations for existing solid waste landfills, indicates that EPA will be proposing new regulations for future landfills, and indicates that EPA will continue to support the development of voluntary landfill gas-to-energy projects.

For agriculture, the Strategy does not suggest any new regulatory requirements.  Instead, it indicates that EPA and the Department of Energy will work to promote voluntary methane control efforts and that those agencies will place special emphasis on promoting biogas—starting with the release of a “Biogas Roadmap” in June 2014.

In addition to these sector-specific approaches, the Strategy emphasizes the need for improved methane measurement and modeling techniques, both domestically and globally.  All of the topics covered by the Strategy are ones about which regulated parties may want to submit comments—to EPA, BLM and/or the Office of Management and Budget.

Article by:
Of: