Supreme People’s Court Upholds China’s First Patent Linkage Ruling – Decision Released

On August 28, 2022, 知识产权那点事 published the first patent linkage decision from the Supreme People’s Court (SPC). The SPC upheld the Beijing IP Court ruling that Wenzhou Haihe Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.’s application for marketing authorization for a generic form of “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule” did not fall within scope of protection of the relevant patent. China’s patent linkage system prevents marketing authorization for a generic prior to the expiration of the patent term on the branded equivalent unless the Beijing IP Court or the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) rules that the generic does not fall within the scope of the relevant patent rights or is invalid.

On November 10, 2021, the Beijing IP Court announced that the plaintiff of the case, Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Roche, claimed that it was the patentee as well as the holder of the marketing license for the patented drug “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule”, and the patent involved in the drug was CN 2005800098777.6 entitled “ED-71 preparation.” The plaintiff discovered that the defendant Wenzhou Haihe Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. had applied to the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA) for a generic drug marketing license application named “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule”. The public information on the Chinese listed drug patent information registration platform showed that the defendant had made a 4.2 category statement regarding the generic drug (the generic drugs do not fall into the scope of protection of the related patents). Therefore, the plaintiff filed a drug patent linkage lawsuit with the Beijing Intellectual Property Court in accordance with the provisions of Article 76 of the Amended Patent Law, requesting the court to confirm that the generic drug “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule” that the defendant applied for registration fell into the scope the rights of Patent No. 2005800098777.6 enjoyed by the plaintiff.

 

The Beijing IP Court held:

The technical solution used by the generic drug involved is neither the same nor equivalent to the technical solution of claim 1 of the involved patent, so the technical solution does not fall within the protection scope of claim 1 of the involved patent. Since claims 2-6 are dependent claims of claim 1, if the technical solution of the generic drug involved does not fall within the protection scope of claim 1, it also does not fall within the protection scope of claims 2-6. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim that the involved generic drug falls within the protection scope of claims 1-6 of the involved patent cannot be established, and the court will not support it.

In the decision, the Supreme People’s Court stated there were two key points:

1. In the process of drug marketing review and approval, disputes arising from the patent rights related to the drug to be registered between the drug marketing license applicant and the relevant patentee or interested parties are only one type of the related patent rights between the two parties – often referred to as drug patent link disputes. For chemical generic drugs, the drug regulatory department of the State Council conducts drug marketing review and approval based on the application materials of the generic drug applicant, and decides whether to suspend the approval of the relevant drugs according to the effective judgment made by the people’s court [or the China National Intellectual Property Administration] on such disputes within the prescribed time limit. Therefore, when judging whether the technical solution of a generic drug falls within the scope of patent protection, in principle, it should be compared and judged on the basis of the application materials of the generic drug applicant. If the technical solution actually implemented by the generic drug applicant is inconsistent with the declared technical solution, it shall bear legal responsibility in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations on drug supervision and administration; if the patentee or interested party believes that the technical solution actually implemented by the generic drug applicant constitutes infringement, a separate lawsuit for patent infringement may also be filed. Therefore, whether the technical solution actually implemented by a generic drug applicant is the same as the application materials is generally not within the scope of examination to confirm that the dispute falls within the scope of patent protection.

2. The court of second instance held that both the donation [to the public] rule and the estoppel rule can constitute a restriction on the application of the principle of equivalence, both of which aim to achieve a reasonable balance between equitably protecting the interests of the patentee and safeguarding the interests of the public. If the conditions for limiting the application of the principle of equivalence are met, there is usually no need to judge whether the two features constitute similar means, functions, and effects, and whether those skilled in the art can conceptualize them without creative work. In this case, since Haihe Company claimed the application of the estoppel rule by virtue of the amendment of the claims by Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., and claimed the application of the donation rule by the patent text as the result of the amendment, the court of second instance first rendered a judgment on whether the rules on estoppel should be applied on the basis of the amendment of the claims by the patentee.

The case numbers are:

北京知识产权法院(2021)京73民初1438号民事判决书

最高人民法院(2022)最高法知民终905号民事判决书

The full text of the decision courtesy of 知识产权那点事 is available here (Chinese only).

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

In the Weeds? Humira “Patent Thicket” Isn’t an Antitrust Violation

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that welfare benefit plans that bought the drug Humira did not have valid antitrust claims against the patent owner. The Court found that amassing patents by itself is not enough to give rise to an antitrust claim, and that the welfare benefit plans would need to prove that the patents were invalid. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al. v. AbbVie Inc., et al., Case No. 20-2402 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2022) (Easterbrook, Wood, Kirsch, JJ.)

AbbVie owns a patent covering Humira, which is a drug used to treat arthritic and inflammatory diseases. Humira is not covered by the Hatch-Waxman Act because it is a biologic drug, rather than a synthetic drug. Biologics are covered by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), under which a competitor must ask the US Food and Drug Administration for permission to sell a “biosimilar” drug based on certain guidelines. From the first sale of the original drug, the competitor must wait 12 years to enter the market. If the original drug seller believes that a patent blocks competition and initiates litigation, the competitor is still free to sell its biosimilar drug. The competitor sells at risk of an adverse outcome in the litigation.

The original Humira patent expired in 2016, but AbbVie obtained 132 additional patents related to the drug. After the 12-year BPCIA requirement passed, none of AbbVie’s competitors chose to launch a biosimilar. Instead, competitors settled with AbbVie on terms to enter the US market in 2023. In exchange, AbbVie agreed that enforcement of all 132 of its patents would end in 2023 even if they were not set to expire.

Welfare benefit plans that pay for Humira on behalf of covered beneficiaries accused AbbVie of violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The payors argued that AbbVie’s settlements with potential competitors established a conspiracy that restrained competition in violation of Section 1, and that AbbVie’s “patent thicket” allowed AbbVie to reap unlawful monopoly profits from Humira after expiration of the original patent in violation of Section 2. The district court dismissed the complaint. The payors appealed.

The issue on appeal with respect to Section 2 was whether the payors had to prove that all of AbbVie’s Humira-related patents were invalid. Under the Walker Process antitrust doctrine, a party may be liable for an antitrust violation if it knowingly asserts a fraudulently procured patent in an attempt to monopolize a market. The payors did not argue that all 132 of AbbVie’s patents were fraudulent. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the patent laws do not set a cap on the number of patents a person (or company) can hold, the payors would need to prove that each of AbbVie’s 132 Humira-related patents were invalid to succeed in showing a violation under Section 2. Not only did the payors fail to prove that all 132 patents were invalid, but they did not even offer to do so. The Court thus agreed with the district court that AbbVie did not amass a patent thicket to maintain monopoly profits from Humira.

The issue on appeal with respect to Section 1 was whether AbbVie’s settlements with potential biosimilar competitors were anticompetitive. The Seventh Circuit found that the payors could have a Section 1 claim if they were injured by the terms of AbbVie’s settlements with its competitors (for example, by showing that AbbVie overpaid a competitor to defer entry). The terms of AbbVie’s settlements allowed the competitors immediate entry to the European market, and AbbVie agreed to US market entry before its last Humira-related patents expired. The Court found that those terms, as well as the payors’ failure to show that AbbVie overpaid the competitors to delay their entry, rendered the settlements lawful.

The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

Medical Marijuana, Workers’ Compensation, and the CSA: Hazy Outlook for Employers As States Wrestle With Cannabis Reimbursement as a Reasonable Medical Expense

While each state has its own unique workers’ compensation program, workers’ compensation generally requires employers to reimburse the reasonable medical expenses of employees who are injured at work. Depending on the injury, these expenses can include hospital visits, follow-up appointments, physical therapy, surgeries, and medication, among other medical care. In recent years, medical cannabis has become increasingly common to treat a myriad of ailments—as of February 2022, 37 states, the District of Columbia, and three territories now allow the use of medical cannabis.

While that is good news for patients seeking treatment for issues like chronic pain, medical cannabis laws can cause a major headache for employers. The federal law known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) classifies cannabis as a Schedule I substance, meaning that under federal law, it is not currently authorized for medical treatment anywhere in the United States and is not considered safe for use even under medical supervision. So, what happens when an employee is injured at work, is eligible for workers’ compensation, and is prescribed medical cannabis to treat their work-related injury in a state that authorizes medical cannabis?

Employers are faced with a tricky dilemma: They can reimburse the employee’s medical cannabis as a reasonable medical expense and risk violating the federal prohibition against aiding and abetting the possession of cannabis. Or, they can refuse to reimburse the otherwise reasonable medical expense and risk violating the state’s workers’ compensation law.

Usually, where it is impossible for an employer to comply with both state and federal law, federal law wins—a legal concept called conflict preemption. Unfortunately for employers, however, clarity on this issue will have to wait—the U.S. Supreme Court recently declined two requests to review state supreme court cases on this issue and definitively decide whether the CSA preempts state workers’ compensation laws that require reimbursement of medical cannabis. In the absence of federal guidance, national employers with workers in different states must follow the decisions of the handful of state courts that have taken up the question. The state courts who have decided the issue have come to inconsistent conclusions—thus, whether an employer should reimburse medical cannabis will vary depending on the state where the employee is injured.

For example, in Maine and Minnesota, both states’ highest courts have concluded that employers are not required to pay for their injured employees’ medical cannabis. These courts reasoned that employers would face liability under the CSA for aiding and abetting the purchase of a controlled substance. The employer, if reimbursing employees for using medical cannabis, would knowingly subsidize the employee’s purchase of marijuana in direct violation of federal law. However, in such a case, the employer would also violate state law for refusing to reimburse the employee’s reasonable medical expenses. Deeming it impossible for the employer to comply with both laws, these states’ courts concluded that the federal prohibition on cannabis preempts the state workers’ compensation laws.

States such as New Jersey have gone the other way, requiring employers to reimburse employee’s medical cannabis. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that there was no conflict between the prohibitions of the CSA and the demands of the New Jersey workers’ compensation law. Thus, the federal law did not preempt New Jersey’s state law, and employers were required to comply by reimbursing medical cannabis as a reasonable reimbursement.

Meanwhile, Massachusetts followed Maine and Minnesota’s approach, but did so based on its own medical marijuana statute, not the CSA. The Massachusetts law explicitly exempts health insurance providers or any government agency or authority from the reimbursement requirement because doing so violates federal law.

Given this patchwork of state decisions, employers should be cautious in determining whether to approve or deny medical cannabis as a reasonable medical expense under state workers’ compensation laws. While the answer is relatively clear (for now) in the states discussed above, there are still over 30 states with medical cannabis programs that have not addressed this issue. It is important to note that many state medical cannabis laws include provisions like Massachusetts that exempt employers from reimbursing employees for cannabis—a clear indicator that these laws were designed with federal prohibitions in mind. But these provisions are not necessarily determinative—New Jersey’s medical cannabis law has a similar provision, yet New Jersey employers are still required to reimburse for medical cannabis.

The bottom line is that federal CSA violations can be hefty, including a mandatory $1,000 fine, possible incarceration of up to one year, and possibly more if “aggravating factors” are found, such as prior convictions. Employers should therefore pay careful attention to their respective state medical cannabis laws, workers’ compensation laws, as well as the CSA and consult with counsel to determine the best approach in their particular jurisdiction. It is likely that more of these cases will be brought in the future, so be sure to check back for further developments in this evolving area of law.

Article By Amanda C. Hibbler of Foley & Lardner LLP. This article was prepared with the assistance of 2022 summer associate Zack Sikora.

For more cannabis legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

Minnesota Inadvertently Allows Unregulated Intoxicating Cannabis Edible Products

As of July 1, 2022, unregulated intoxicating THC products derived from hemp have been legalized in Minnesota, apparently as the result of confusion by state legislators about the new law’s actual effect. Although the express intent of the statute is to allow the sale of products that contain so-called “non-intoxicating cannabinoids” to consumers in Minnesota, the new law contains a massive loophole that effectively legalizes all forms of THC sold in edible products at levels that intoxicate with only a bare minimum of regulatory oversight.

This surely cannot have been the goal of many Minnesota legislators who voted for the bill. In fact, the Minneapolis Star Tribune has reported that at least one senator in the state’s Republican-controlled Senate confirmed that he did not realize that the new law would legalize edible products with all forms of THC. 

The Loophole

The new law changes section 151.72 of the Minnesota Statutes by defining “non-intoxicating cannabinoid” as “substances extracted from certified hemp plants that do not produce intoxicating effects when consumed by any route of administration.” The bill then incongruously allows for cannabinoid edible products to be sold to consumers in the state so long as the product contains no more than 0.3 percent of any THC and no more than 5 mg of any THC in a single serving, or more than a total of 50 mg of any THC per package.

Most states are now being forced to grapple with how to respond effectively to the problem of unregulated intoxicating hemp cannabinoids being sold openly and online. Edible products with intoxicating levels of hemp-derived delta-8 THC, delta-9 THC, delta-10 THC and THC-O Acetate are sold widely as legal and less-expensive alternatives to regulated marijuana products. States have employed various strategies to, by varying degrees, limit, regulate or prohibit intoxicating hemp cannabinoids, and lawsuits on the subject have been initiated in several states.

No state has created a loophole quite like what exists in Minnesota’s new law. Although Minnesota seeks, at least nominally, to only allow the sale of products that contain “non-intoxicating cannabinoids,” food and beverages that contain less than 0.3 percent THC concentration may nevertheless be intoxicating due to the large amounts that may be consumed easily.

To illustrate the problem of hemp products that contain less than 0.3 percent delta-9 THC concentration but are nevertheless intoxicating, consider this:

  • A typical energy bar of 60 grams would be allowed to have up to 180 mg THC if limited to 0.3 percent THC concentration by weight.
  • Regulated cannabis edible products, by comparison, typically may be sold only in a serving size of no more than 10 mg, with a limit of up to 100 mg per package.
  • A four-gram hemp gummy product, however, could have 10 mg of THC and still fall below the allowable concentration threshold.
  • Minnesota’s new law allows up to 5 mg THC per serving and 50 mg THC per package.

The intoxicating potential here is evident. One need only consume two servings to ingest the same amount of THC allowed in a standard regulated marijuana product serving. Ingesting 50 mg of THC will heavily intoxicate all but the most jaded stoner. Nowhere in the new law, however, is there any requirement to warn that the cannabis edible product may cause intoxication when consumed as suggested.

The Goal Informs the Solution

States should focus on the goal of prohibiting or properly regulating intoxicating hemp products that are currently sold as an unregulated and less-expensive alternative to regulated cannabis. We have previously warned that any state that decides to allow hemp-derived THC in edible products must necessarily grapple with tricky questions over how to regulate maximum serving size, active cannabinoid concentration per serving size, the number of servings per container, consumer warnings and similar questions to mitigate the risk to public health and safety. Cannabis and hemp industry leaders have likewise warned against “percentage” thresholds of cannabinoids as an appropriate measure for foods and beverages for the reasons described above.

In comparison to Minnesota, other states are proceeding in a more cautious manner. California’s recent Assembly Bill 45, for example, draws attention to the above-mentioned issues but acknowledges that more study is needed by the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) before implementing regulations are issued. The bill provides that CDPH “may regulate and restrict the cap on extract and may cap the amount of total THC concentration at the product level based on the product form, volume, number of servings, ratio of cannabinoids to THC in the product, or other factors, as needed.”

Analysis

Exacerbating the problem is the fact that product contamination, label inaccuracies and outright fraud are pervasive within the hemp cannabinoid market. Products often are marketed with misleading or false claims, and many fail to incorporate any explicit warning of intoxicating effects. Because the Minnesota statute incorrectly assumes that consumers will not become intoxicated from compliant cannabis edible products, no such warnings are mandated. This is a mistake.

It appears that better education around hemp-derived edible products could have led to more thoughtful legislation in Minnesota. This example may nevertheless provide a learning opportunity for other states that are studying how to regulate intoxicating hemp products.

© 2022 Wilson Elser

Looking into Our (Slightly Hazy) Crystal Ball: What Will the Mississippi Cannabis Market Look Like?

When you do what we do, you get a lot of calls and a lot of questions. Many of the calls and questions are not fruitful. Quite honestly, some of the calls are from folks whose interest in and experience with cannabis is, we suspect, on a purely personal and leisurely level. In the words of Hyman Roth, this is the business we’ve chosen.

But one legitimate question we’re often asked is what we think the cannabis market will look like in Mississippi. And, more specifically, whether Mississippi’s new medical cannabis regime will be similar to the one in Oklahoma.

It’s a loaded question, and one we suspect many questioners don’t fully appreciate. On the one hand, Oklahoma’s medical cannabis program has been compared to the Wild West. At last count, there were more medical cannabis dispensaries than liquor stores or supermarkets in the state. Many have concluded that this is a bad thing and/or that the program is a failure. Others have deemed the program a triumph of capitalism, a survival-of-the-fittest trial where only the “best” will survive.

As is often the case, we think the answer is probably somewhere in the middle.

On the one hand, the obvious and primary similarity between the programs is the absence of an expressed cap on the number of licenses available. While most states limit the number of licenses available, neither Oklahoma nor Mississippi does so. Many believe this feature will lead to Mississippi following the lead of Oklahoma in terms of the proliferation of dispensaries throughout the Magnolia State.

On the other hand, there are a number of differences between the two states and their statutes that indicate to us that Mississippi’s regime will differ in several important ways – ways we are seeing play out now. First, while the license fee for a dispensary in Oklahoma is $2,500, the fee in Mississippi is $25,000, 10 times the amount. And that amount is owed annually and is in addition to the initial $15,000 application fee. As a practical matter, and for better or worse, this feature alone should significantly cull the number of dispensaries because it provides a substantial barrier to entry into the industry.

Second, there may be significantly fewer locations available to open a dispensary in Mississippi than one would expect due to several geographic-limiting features of the law. Initially, localities have until May 3 to opt out of the medical cannabis regime, and several cities have already done so. Also, dispensaries cannot be located within 1,000 feet of any church, school, or daycare facility. For those unfamiliar with Mississippi, it may be tough to find anywhere in the state that isn’t within 1,000 feet of a church. Even more, the law forbids one dispensary from being within 1,500 feet from another dispensary, and dispensaries are only permissible in commercially zoned areas.

Third, the cannabis industry examining the Mississippi market will have the benefit of having lived through the Oklahoma experience. This is likely to minimize the “goldrush” mentality seen in Oklahoma’s early days. Instead, look for larger players to let the dust settle and come in looking to acquire operators who proved successful breaking out of the initial melee.

Conclusion

It seems possible that, at least in the early years, the Mississippi medical cannabis regime may more closely resemble Oklahoma than a state like Florida with strict limitations on the number of licenses. But our prediction is that certain aspects of Mississippi law and culture will lead to less of a free-for-all at the outset, hopefully leading to a more efficient and more orderly transition to a rational cannabis market in Mississippi.

© 2022 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

Update: In Opioid Liability Ruling for Doctors, SCOTUS Deals Blow to DOJ

On June 27, 2022, the United States Supreme Court ruled that doctors who act in subjective good faith in prescribing controlled substances to their patients cannot be convicted under the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”).  The Court’s decision will have broad implications for physicians and patients alike.  Practitioners who sincerely and honestly believe – even if mistakenly – that their prescriptions are within the usual course of professional practice will be shielded from criminal liability.

The ruling stemmed from the convictions of Dr. Xiulu Ruan and Dr. Shakeel Kahn for unlawfully prescribing opioid painkillers.  At their trials, the district courts rejected any consideration of good faith and instructed the members of the jury that the doctors could be convicted if they prescribed opioids outside the recognized standards of medical practice. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits affirmed the instructions.  Drs. Ruan and Kahn were sentenced to 21 and 25 years in prison, respectively.

The Court vacated the decisions of the courts of appeals and sent the cases back for further review.

The question before the court concerned the state of mind that the Government must prove to convict a doctor of violating the CSA.  Justice Breyer framed the issue: “To prove that a doctor’s dispensation of drugs via prescription falls within the statute’s prohibition and outside the authorization exception, is it sufficient for the Government to prove that a prescription was in fact not authorized, or must the Government prove that the doctor knew or intended that the prescription was unauthorized?”

The doctors urged the Court to adopt a subjective good-faith standard that would protect practitioners from criminal prosecution if they sincerely and honestly believed their prescriptions were within the usual course of professional practice.  The Government argued for an objective, good-faith standard based on the hypothetical “reasonable” doctor.  The Court took it one step further.

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.  He said that for purposes of a criminal conviction under the CSA, “the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.”  To hold otherwise “would turn a defendant’s criminal liability on the mental state of a hypothetical ‘reasonable’ doctor” and “reduce culpability on the all-important element of the crime to negligence,” he explained.  The Court has “long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes,” wrote Justice Breyer.

Justice Samuel Alito wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice Clarence Thomas joined and Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined in part.  Although Justice Alito would vacate the judgments below and remand for further proceedings, he would hold that the “except as authorized” clause of the CSA creates an affirmative defense that defendant doctors must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Court’s decision will protect patient access to prescriptions written in good faith.  However, for the government, the Court’s decision means prosecutors face an uphill battle in charging, much less convicting, physicians under the CSA.  Indeed, the Court’s decision may have a chilling effect on the recent surge in DOJ prosecutions of medical practitioners and pain clinics.

© 2022 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

New California Bill Would Prohibit Employers From Acting Against Workers for Off-Work Cannabis Use

A bill introduced in the California Assembly in February 2022 would prohibit employers from discriminating against workers and job applicants for off-duty marijuana use.

Assembly Bill (AB) 2188 would amend the Fair Employment and Housing Act to make it unlawful for employers to discriminate against job applicants or employees for the “use of cannabis off the job and away from the workplace.” It also would prevent discrimination against applicants or employees that fail drug tests detecting “nonpsychoactive cannabis metabolites in their urine, hair, or bodily fluids.” But, it would not permit employees “to be impaired by, or to use cannabis on the job.” AB 2188 also includes carveouts for building and construction trades employees, federal contractors, federal funding recipients, or federal licensees required to maintain drug-free workplaces.

AB 2188 would add to the current body of laws legalizing and regulating marijuana use in the Golden State. Indeed, Proposition 215 legalized the medical use of cannabis in 1996, while in 2016, Proposition 64 did so for recreational marijuana.

While the enactment of Prop. 64 represents a victory for recreational marijuana advocates, the legislation does not include language prohibiting employers from discriminating against employees for off-work recreational marijuana use. To the contrary, it expressly provides that employers will not be required to accommodate an employee’s use of marijuana. The legislative initiative stated that its purpose and intent were, among other things, to “[a]llow public and private employers to enact and enforce workplace policies pertaining to marijuana.”

Current cannabis regulations are consistent with the California Supreme Court’s holding in Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, Inc. In that case the court examined the conflict between California’s Compassionate Use Act (which gives a person who uses marijuana for medical purposes on a physician’s recommendation a defense to certain state criminal charges and permission to possess the drug) and federal law (which prohibits the drug’s possession, even by medical users). The court held that the Compassionate Use Act did not intend to address the rights and obligation of employers and employees, and further noted that the possession and use of marijuana could not be a protected activity because it is still illegal under federal law.

AB 2188 is and reflects a further effort by some to legalize and regulate the non-medical use of marijuana. As of 2021, 18 states and a number of territories had enacted laws to regulate cannabis for adult non-medical use. While in the employment context, certain states have moved to grant employees some level of protection for medical use, others extended protection for non-medical use. Employers are prohibited from taking adverse action against workers or applicants’ recreational use in Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and soon, Connecticut.

AB 2188 passed the Assembly May 26 and was read in the Senate for the first time May 27. If it makes it to the governor’s desk, he will have until Sept. 30, 2022, to sign or veto it.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Senate Bill to Revise and Reassess GRAS Program

  • On May 27, Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), alongside Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass)., introduced the Ensuring Safe and Toxic-Free Foods Act, which is described as “comprehensive legislation that ensures the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) fulfills its responsibility to promote the health and well-being of American families by directing the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to strengthen the Substances Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS) Rule, which exempts companies from seeking pre-market approval for food chemicals.” A summary of the legislation is available here.
  • The legislation would prohibit manufacturers from independently designating substances as GRAS (or manufacturing or selling food containing those substances) without supplying notice and supporting information to the Secretary of HHS. Substances that are carcinogenic or that have evidence of reproductive or developmental toxicity would be prohibited from receiving a GRAS designation. Further, the legislation would require that a GRAS Notice and all supporting information be publicly available online and subject to a 90-day review period.
  • The legislation would also direct the Secretary to create an Office of Food Chemical Safety Reassessment within FDA’s CFSAN. The new office would be responsible for reassessing the safety of existing food additives, food contact substances, color additives, and substances that had already received GRAS status. The office would be required to reassess at least 10 substances (or class of substances) once every three years. As included in the bill, the first 10 substances to be reviewed would be:
    • Perfluoroalkyl substances and polyfluoroalkyl substances
    • Ortho-phthalates
    • The class of bisphenols
    • Titanium dioxide
    • Potassium bromate
    • Perchlorate
    • Butylated hydroxyanisole (BHA)
    • Butylated hydroxytoluene (BHT)
    • Brominated vegetable oil (BVO)
    • Propyl paraben
  • With regard to the legislation, Senator Markey has said “The FDA too often falls short on their responsibility to promote food safety, highlighted recently by the baby formula crisis where FDA’s deputy commissioner for food policy did not learn about the whistleblower complaint for four months. It is long past time we revise existing food safety measures and close the loophole allowing manufacturers to self-regulate what new substances can enter our food supply.”
© 2022 Keller and Heckman LLP

Medicare Advantage: OIG Report Finds Improper Denials

On April 27,2022, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (OIG), Office of Evaluations and Inspections, issued a report on the performance of Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs) in approving care and payment consistently with Medicare coverage rules. In its review, OIG found that 13% of MAO denials of prior authorization requests should have been approved and that 18% of payment requests from providers were improperly denied. OIG also made a number of recommendations to the Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) with respect to its oversight of MAOs.

Purpose and Method of the Study

OIG undertook the study to assess whether MAOs are appropriately providing access to medically necessary services and making payment to providers consistently with Medicare coverage rules. Since CMS pays MAOs principally by capitation, MAOs have a potential incentive to increase their profits by denying access to care of beneficiaries or by denying payments to providers. CMS’s annual audits of MAOs have indicated some persistent problems related to inappropriate denials of service and payment. As enrollment in Medicare Advantage continues to grow, OIG viewed it as important to ensure that medically necessary care is provided and that providers are paid appropriately.

OIG conducted the review by randomly selecting 250 denials of prior authorization requests and 250 payment request denials by 15 of the largest MAOs during a week in June of 2019. OIG had coding experts review the cases and had physician reviewers examine the medical records. Based on these reviews, OIG estimated the rates at which MAOs issued denials of services or payment that met Medicare coverage rules and MAO billing rules. OIG also examined the reasons for the inappropriate denials and the types of services involved.

Standards

MAOs must cover items and services included in fee-for-service Medicare, and may also elect to include additional items and services. MAOs are required to follow Medicare coverage rules that define what items and services are covered and under what circumstances. As the OIG states in the Report, MAOs “may not impose limitations – such as waiting periods or exclusions from coverage due to pre-existing conditions — that are not present in original Medicare.” In following Medicare coverage rules, MAOs are permitted to use additional denial criteria that were not developed by Medicare when they are deciding to authorize or pay for a service, provided the clinical criteria are “no more restrictive than original Medicare national and local coverage policies.” MAOs may also have their own billing and payment procedures, provided all providers are paid accurately, timely, and with an audit trial.

MAOs utilize prior authorization requests before care is furnished to manage care and payment requests from providers to approve payment for services provided. Beneficiaries and providers may appeal such decisions, and beneficiaries and providers are successful in many of the appeals (for a one-time period, as many as 75% of the appeals were granted).

Findings

Prior Authorization Denials

In the study, OIG found that 13% of prior authorization denials were for services that met Medicare coverage rules, thus delaying or denying care that likely should have been approved. MAOs made many of the denials by applying MAO clinical criteria that are not part of Medicare coverage rules. As an example, a follow-up MRI was denied for a beneficiary who had an adrenal lesion that was 1.5 cm in size, because the MAO required the beneficiary to wait one year for such lesions that are under 2 cm in size. OIG’s experts found such a requirement was not contained in Medicare coverage rules and was therefore inappropriate. Rather, the MRI was medically necessary to determine if the lesion was malignant.

OIG also found instances where MAOs requested further documentation that led to a denial of care when it was not furnished, as such additional documentation was not required to determine medical necessity. OIG’s reviewers found that either sufficient clinical information was in the medical record to authorize the care or the documentation requested was already contained in the medical record.

Payment Denials

OIG found in the study that 18% of payment denials fully met Medicare coverage rules and MAO payment policies. As a result of these denials, payment was delayed or precluded for services that should have been paid.

OIG found that common reasons for these inappropriate payment denials were human error in conducting manual reviews (for example, the reviewer not recognizing that a skilled nursing facility (SNF) was an in-network provider), and inaccurate programming.

OIG also found that advanced imaging services (including MRIs and CT scans), stays in post-acute facilities (including SNFs and inpatient rehabilitation facilities), and injections were the services that were most prominent in the inappropriate denials that should have been authorized for care and payment in accordance with Medicare coverage rules.

OIG Recommendations

Based on the study, OIG recommended that:

  • CMS should issue new guidance on both the appropriate and inappropriate use of MAO clinical criteria that are not contained in Medicare coverage rules. In particular, OIG recommended that CMS should more clearly define what it means when it states that MAO clinical criteria may not be “more restrictive” than Medicare coverage rules.

  • CMS should update its audit protocols to address issues identified in the report such as MAO use of clinical criteria and/or examine particular service types that led to more denials. OIG suggests CMS should consider enforcement actions for MAOs that demonstrate a pattern of inappropriate payment denials.

  • CMS should direct MAOs to identify and address the reasons that led to human errors.

CMS reviewed the OIG report and concurred with each of OIG’s recommendations. Those recommendations can affect future coverage decisions as well as utilization of prior authorization tools. AHIP, a national association of health care insurers, challenged the OIG’s sample size as inappropriate to support the agency’s conclusions, and defended prior authorization tools.

Takeaways

Given CMS’s concurrence with the report’s findings, we recommend that MAOs track these issues over the next several months in advance of CMS’s Final Rate Announcement for CY 2024.

MAOs should also be aware of potential False Claims Act (FCA) exposure in this area. FCA exposure can arise when a company seeks and receives payments despite being out of compliance with the basic terms for its participation. If an MAO knew it was denying claims that should be paid because they would be covered under traditional Medicare, but the MAO was still collecting full capitation, it is possible that a whistleblower or the government may pursue FCA liability. This risk warrants attention because whistleblowers can bring qui tam suits under the FCA, with resulting high costs for defense and potentially high penalties if a violation is proven (or settled to avoid further litigation). That said, an FCA suit based on this theory would raise serious questions, including whether any non-payment actually met the FCA’s “knowingly” standard (which includes reckless disregard), or whether any non-payment met the materiality threshold necessary to demonstrate a violation of the FCA.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

FDA and FTC Issue Warning Letters to CBD Companies

  • On March 28, 2022, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jointly issued seven warning letters to companies marketing cannabidiol (CBD) products with COVID-19 related claims.
  • Specifically, the agencies warned the following companies regarding the promotion of their respective products with claims that they cure, mitigate, treat or prevent COVID-19: CureganicsHeaven’s Organics LLCFunctional Remedies, LLC D/B/A Synchronicity Hemp OilGreenway Herbal Products LLCCBD SocialUPSY LLC, and Nature’s Highway. Examples of claims include: “Our research suggest that CBD . . . can block SARS-Cov-2 infection at early and even later stages of infection. . .”, “Studies Show CBD Compounds Prevent COVID Cells From Replicating”, and “Can CBD Help with the Fight Against COVID? Some of the worst effects of COVID are caused by inflammation, and CBD is a potent anti-inflammatory.”
  • By way of background, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), products intended to cure, treat, mitigate, or prevent disease are considered drugs and are subject to the requirements that apply to drugs. Therefore, the agencies classified the products as unapproved and misbranded drugs that may not be legally introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce without prior approval from FDA.
  • The letters included a cease-and-desist demand from FTC, prohibiting the companies from making such COVID-19 related claims. The companies were provided with 48 hours to respond with specific steps that were taken to correct the violations.

© 2022 Keller and Heckman LLP